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Because such auctions could be used by bidders to gain excessive market power, we impose constraints limiting market power. We focus on auctions that allocate airport arrival and departure slots. We propose a continuous model and an integer programming model for the associated winner determination problem. Using these models, we perform computational experiments that lend insights into the properties of the quantity-contingent auction. <\/jats:p>","DOI":"10.1287\/trsc.2020.0995","type":"journal-article","created":{"date-parts":[[2020,6,15]],"date-time":"2020-06-15T15:40:12Z","timestamp":1592235612000},"page":"858-881","source":"Crossref","is-referenced-by-count":26,"title":["Quantity-Contingent Auctions and Allocation of Airport Slots"],"prefix":"10.1287","volume":"54","author":[{"ORCID":"https:\/\/summer-heart-0930.chufeiyun1688.workers.dev:443\/https\/orcid.org\/0000-0003-2757-8569","authenticated-orcid":false,"given":"Michael O.","family":"Ball","sequence":"first","affiliation":[{"name":"Robert H. 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