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CAPEC-294: ICMP Address Mask Request

Attack Pattern ID: 294
Abstraction: Detailed
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+ Description
An adversary sends an ICMP Type 17 Address Mask Request to gather information about a target's networking configuration. ICMP Address Mask Requests are defined by RFC-950, "Internet Standard Subnetting Procedure." An Address Mask Request is an ICMP type 17 message that triggers a remote system to respond with a list of its related subnets, as well as its default gateway and broadcast address via an ICMP type 18 Address Mask Reply datagram. Gathering this type of information helps the adversary plan router-based attacks as well as denial-of-service attacks against the broadcast address.
+ Extended Description

Many modern operating systems will not respond to ICMP type 17 messages for security reasons. Determining whether a system or router will respond to an ICMP Address Mask Request helps the adversary determine operating system or firmware version. Additionally, because these types of messages are rare, they are easily spotted by intrusion detection systems. Many ICMP scanning tools support IP spoofing to help conceal the origin of the actual request among a storm of similar ICMP messages. It is a common practice for border firewalls and gateways to be configured to block ingress ICMP type 17 and egress ICMP type 18 messages.

+ Typical Severity

Low

+ Relationships
Section HelpThis table shows the other attack patterns and high level categories that are related to this attack pattern. These relationships are defined as ChildOf and ParentOf, and give insight to similar items that may exist at higher and lower levels of abstraction. In addition, relationships such as CanFollow, PeerOf, and CanAlsoBe are defined to show similar attack patterns that the user may want to explore.
NatureTypeIDName
ChildOfStandard Attack PatternStandard Attack Pattern - A standard level attack pattern in CAPEC is focused on a specific methodology or technique used in an attack. It is often seen as a singular piece of a fully executed attack. A standard attack pattern is meant to provide sufficient details to understand the specific technique and how it attempts to accomplish a desired goal. A standard level attack pattern is a specific type of a more abstract meta level attack pattern.292Host Discovery
Section HelpThis table shows the views that this attack pattern belongs to and top level categories within that view.
+ Prerequisites
The ability to send an ICMP type 17 query (Address Mask Request) to a remote target and receive an ICMP type 18 message (ICMP Address Mask Reply) in response. Generally, modern operating systems will ignore ICMP type 17 messages, however, routers will commonly respond to this request.
+ Resources Required
The ability to send custom ICMP queries. This can be accomplished via the use of various scanners or utilities.
+ Consequences
Section HelpThis table specifies different individual consequences associated with the attack pattern. The Scope identifies the security property that is violated, while the Impact describes the negative technical impact that arises if an adversary succeeds in their attack. The Likelihood provides information about how likely the specific consequence is expected to be seen relative to the other consequences in the list. For example, there may be high likelihood that a pattern will be used to achieve a certain impact, but a low likelihood that it will be exploited to achieve a different impact.
ScopeImpactLikelihood
Confidentiality
Other
Confidentiality
Access Control
Authorization
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+ Taxonomy Mappings
Section HelpCAPEC mappings to ATT&CK techniques leverage an inheritance model to streamline and minimize direct CAPEC/ATT&CK mappings. Inheritance of a mapping is indicated by text stating that the parent CAPEC has relevant ATT&CK mappings. Note that the ATT&CK Enterprise Framework does not use an inheritance model as part of the mapping to CAPEC.
Relevant to the ATT&CK taxonomy mapping (see parent )
+ References
[REF-33] Stuart McClure, Joel Scambray and George Kurtz. "Hacking Exposed: Network Security Secrets & Solutions". Chapter 2: Scanning, pp. 53-54. 6th Edition. McGraw Hill. 2009.
[REF-139] J. Mogul and J. Postel. "RFC950 - Internet Standard Subnetting Procedure". 1985-08. <http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc950.html>.
[REF-123] J. Postel. "RFC792 - Internet Control Messaging Protocol". Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). 1981-09. <http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc792.html>.
[REF-125] Mark Wolfgang. "Host Discovery with Nmap". 2002-11. <http://nmap.org/docs/discovery.pdf>.
[REF-34] Gordon "Fyodor" Lyon. "Nmap Network Scanning: The Official Nmap Project Guide to Network Discovery and Security Scanning". Section 3.7.2 ICMP Probe Selection, pg. 70. 3rd "Zero Day" Edition,. Insecure.com LLC, ISBN: 978-0-9799587-1-7. 2008.
+ Content History
Submissions
Submission DateSubmitterOrganization
2014-06-23
(Version 2.6)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Modifications
Modification DateModifierOrganization
2017-08-04
(Version 2.11)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Resources_Required
2018-07-31
(Version 2.12)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Description Summary, Related_Weaknesses
2019-09-30
(Version 3.2)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Related_Attack_Patterns
2022-02-22
(Version 3.7)
CAPEC Content TeamThe MITRE Corporation
Updated Description, Extended_Description
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Page Last Updated or Reviewed: July 31, 2018