Operation Desert Shield (2006)

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by 64.141.27.82 (talk) at 04:19, 8 August 2018 (Removed incorrect material.). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Operation Desert Shield was a 2006 operation by the Iraqi insurgency and al-Qaeda in Iraq, planned in December 2005 as a push against American forces during the Iraq War. The goal was to destabilize the American foothold in the Anbar province over the course of six months.

Operation Desert Shield
Part of Iraq War and the Global War on Terrorism
DateJanuary 2006 – May 2006
Location
Result Major Al-Qaeda victory
Belligerents
 United States of America
 Iraq

Mujahideen Shura Council

Iraq Other Sunni insurgents

The planning of the operation was not discovered by the Americans until documents captured after the death of Faris Abu Azzam were finally translated, and revealed the details of the operation.[1] The army said the documents surprised them, showing that the insurgents had a "pretty robust command and control system".[1]

The operation

Phase I: January 2006 – March 2006

The first phase, scheduled from January through March 2006, focused on isolating American targets by attacking supply convoys, destroying bridges and restricting the ability of helicopters to provide support.[1]

On 7 January, a two-page memo suggested that those insurgents who had infiltrated American bases be asked to reconnaissance the physical area and send back reports to help select potential targets. It also suggested that ammunition caches be placed in advance of the attacks, that only soldiers who had pledged their willingness to die in battle should be sent, and that they first be trained in a series of rehearsed mock battles.[1]

A later memo was drafted, which contained the names of the American bases that could potentially be assaulted – including a list of weapons each target would require, including explosives.

At the suggestion of the unnamed security chairman, it was decided that operational security required the project to move ahead on a need to know basis, letting individual brigade commanders believe their orders were isolated attacks and not know about their overarching strategy.[1]

References