Self Notes.txt

Errata:
3.1.0
	Incorrectly asserts Fuchsbauer et al. extend their protocol to the async case without modification.
	Fix by changing to "The way they extend to async breaks in the presence of malicious players."

Figure 3.3:
	Resulting shares table desynced from other content

Lemma 4:
	Actually shows constant temptation before short case
	Later lemma contradicts this over-assertion!
	Cooperating is an equilibrium except on the short round and except for the short player on the round before the short round when t=2
	
3.2.5:
	The bad case probability can be larger than 1
	It's actually an upper bound, not an exact solution
	
Lemma 36: But since EACH PLAYER has at least t-1 cooperators

The TRSS+ABCP future work idea mentioned in the conclusion of ABCP doesn't guarantee 1 sacrifice