Liberum arbitrium

Liberum arbitrium^[1] est mentis et voluntatis gubernatio, ab omnibus rebus soluta quae agendi licentiae intervenire possint. Quod homines sive actores rationales sinit facere quidquid quocumque loco iudicent optimum factu esse. Quod soli homines hanc potestatem habere videntur, actus liber dicitur actus humanus in philosophia.^[2]

Negatio liberi arbitrii, determinismus appellata, saepe quaestionem moralitatis parit quia facultatem voluntatis humanae de bonis ac malis negare potest.

Theoria Spinozae de corpore menteque,^[3] Deo ut causa sui, causalitas vel praedestinatio Calvinismi liberum arbitrium de facto negat, sed clinamen Lucretii determinismum causalitatis refutavit.

Notae

↑ Augustinus, De civitate Dei 22.30 et alibi.
↑ Confer Glossarium Thomisticum.
↑ Benedictus de Spinoza, Ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata, Pars III, "Propositio II "Nex corpus mentem ad cogitandum, et mens corpus ad motum neque ad quietem nec ad aliquid (si quid est) aliud determinere potest."

Nexus interni

Bibliographia

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[1] Augustinus, De civitate Dei 22.30 et alibi.

[2] Confer Glossarium Thomisticum.

[3] Benedictus de Spinoza, Ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata, Pars III, "Propositio II "Nex corpus mentem ad cogitandum, et mens corpus ad motum neque ad quietem nec ad aliquid (si quid est) aliud determinere potest."

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