Injunctive Relief

in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS, 115-159 (Brad Biddle, Jorge L. Contreras, Brian J. Love, and Norman V. Siebrasse, eds., 2019, Cambridge University Press), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108594981.005

SMU Dedman School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 406

97 Pages Posted: 10 Oct 2018 Last revised: 22 Aug 2023

See all articles by Norman Siebrasse

Norman Siebrasse

University of New Brunswick - Fredericton - Faculty of Law

Rafał Sikorski

Adam Mickiewicz University

Jorge L. Contreras

University of Utah - S.J. Quinney College of Law

Thomas F. Cotter

University of Minnesota Law School

John M. Golden

University of Texas at Austin - School of Law

Sang Jo Jong

Seoul National University - College of Law

Brian J. Love

Santa Clara University - School of Law

David O. Taylor

Southern Methodist University - Dedman School of Law

Date Written: September 12, 2018

Abstract

Patent systems commonly empower courts to order accused or adjudged infringers to refrain from continuing infringing conduct in the future. Some patentees file suit for the primary purpose of obtaining and enforcing an injunction against infringement by a competitor, and even in cases in which the patentee is willing to license an invention to an accused infringer for an agreed price, the indirect monetary value of an injunction against future infringement can dwarf the amount a finder of fact is likely to award as compensation for past infringement. In some of these cases, an injunction, if granted, would impose costs on accused infringers or third parties that go well beyond the more intrinsic value of the patented technology. This chapter explores the theory behind injunctive relief in patent cases, surveys the availability of this remedy in major patent systems, and suggests a general framework for courts to use when deciding whether injunctive relief is appropriate in individual cases.

Keywords: injunctions, proportionality, tailoring, ongoing royalty, eBay, irreparable injury, noncompensable harm, holdup, holdout

Suggested Citation

Siebrasse, Norman and Sikorski, Rafał and Contreras, Jorge L. and Cotter, Thomas F. and Golden, John M. and Jong, Sang Jo and Love, Brian J. and Taylor, David O., Injunctive Relief (September 12, 2018). in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS, 115-159 (Brad Biddle, Jorge L. Contreras, Brian J. Love, and Norman V. Siebrasse, eds., 2019, Cambridge University Press), https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108594981.005, SMU Dedman School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 406, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3249058

Norman Siebrasse

University of New Brunswick - Fredericton - Faculty of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 4400
Fredericton, New Brunswick E3B 5A3
Canada
506-453-4725 (Phone)
506-453-4548 (Fax)

Rafał Sikorski

Adam Mickiewicz University ( email )

Wieniawskiego 1
Poznan, 61-712
Poland

Jorge L. Contreras

University of Utah - S.J. Quinney College of Law ( email )

383 S. University Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84112-0730
United States

Thomas F. Cotter

University of Minnesota Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-624-7527 (Phone)

John M. Golden

University of Texas at Austin - School of Law ( email )

School of Law
727 East Dean Keeton Street
Austin, TX 78705
United States
(512) 232-1469 (Phone)

Sang Jo Jong

Seoul National University - College of Law ( email )

San 56-1 Kwanak-gu, Shilim-dong
Seoul, 151-742
Korea

Brian J. Love

Santa Clara University - School of Law ( email )

500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA 95053
United States

David O. Taylor (Contact Author)

Southern Methodist University - Dedman School of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 750116
Dallas, TX 75275
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.smu.edu/Law/Faculty/Profiles/Taylor-David-O

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