Do Judicial Assignments Matter? Evidence From Random Case Allocation

Ganglmair, Bernhard; Helmers, Christian; Love, Brian J.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.4726217

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Do Judicial Assignments Matter? Evidence From Random Case Allocation

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 24-003

Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 4726217

42 Pages Posted: 15 Feb 2024

See all articles by Bernhard Ganglmair

Bernhard Ganglmair

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research - Junior Research Group Competition and Innovation; Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation (MaCCI); University of Mannheim - Department of Economics

Christian Helmers

Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business; Charles III University of Madrid

Brian J. Love

Santa Clara University - School of Law

There are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2024

Abstract

Because judges exercise discretion in how they handle and decide cases, heterogeneity across judges can affect case outcomes and, thus, preferences among litigants for particular judges. However, selection obscures the causal mechanisms that drive these preferences. We overcome this challenge by studying the introduction of random case assignment in a venue (the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas) that previously experienced a high degree of case concentration before one judge (Alan Albright), whom litigants could select with virtual certainty. To assess Albright’s importance to patent enforcers, we examine how case filing patterns changed following the adoption of random case allocation and show that case filings in the Western District of Texas decreased significantly at both the intensive and extensive margins. Moreover, to shed light on why litigants prefer Judge Albright, we compare motions practice and case management metrics across randomly assigned cases and show that cases assigned to Albright were both scheduled to proceed to trial relatively quickly and less likely to raise the issue of patentable subject matter.

Keywords: Judicial assignments, judge shopping, forum shopping, litigation, patents, U.S.

JEL Classification: K4, O3

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Ganglmair, Bernhard and Helmers, Christian and Helmers, Christian and Love, Brian J., Do Judicial Assignments Matter? Evidence From Random Case Allocation ( 2024). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 24-003, Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 4726217, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4726217 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4726217