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STARTING OUT WITH JAVA™
From Control Structures through Data Structures
FOURTH EDITION
Tony Gaddis
Godfrey Muganda
Oracle and Java are registered trademarks of Oracle and/or its affiliates.
Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners.
Title: Starting out with Java. From control structures through data structures /
Tony Gaddis, Haywood Community College, Godfrey Muganda, North
Central College.
1 18
ISBN-13: 978-0-13-478796-1
ISBN-10: 0-13-478796-X
Contents in Brief
1. Chapter 1 Introduction to Computers and Java 1
21. Chapter 21 Binary Trees, AVL Trees, and Priority Queues 1287
1. Index 1353
1. 1.1 Introduction 1
1. Hardware 2
2. Software 5
1. What Is a Program? 6
2. A History of Java 8
1. Language Elements 8
3. Variables 11
2. Programming Challenge 25
2. 2.2 The print and println Methods, and the Java API 33
4. Identifiers 42
5. Class Names 44
1. Integer Division 57
2. Operator Precedence 57
1. Reading a Character 89
2. Mixing Calls to nextLine with Calls to Other Scanner
Methods 89
3. An Example Program 94
6. Flags 118
2. Precision 164
4. Flags 167
11. 4.11 Generating Random Numbers with the Random Class 249
1. Shadowing 379
11. 7.11 The Selection Sort and the Binary Search Algorithms 463
7. Capacity 479
eBook (eBook PDF) Starting Out with Java: From Control Structures
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(eBook PDF) Starting Out with Java: From Control Structures through
Data Structures 4th Edition Description
This comprehensive textbook provides a step-by-step introduction to Java programming,
guiding readers from fundamental control structures to advanced data structures. The 4th
edition emphasizes object-oriented programming principles, problem-solving, and algorithm
development with clear explanations, practical examples, and numerous programming
exercises. Ideal for introductory programming courses, it covers topics including classes,
inheritance, polymorphism, recursion, collections, generics, and data structures like linked
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Table of Contents
• Introduction to Computers and Java
• Java Fundamentals
• Decision Structures
• Loops and Files
• Methods
• A First Look at Classes
• Arrays and the ArrayList Class
• A Second Look at Classes and Objects
• Text Processing and Wrapper Classes
• Inheritance
• Exceptions and Advanced File I/O
• JavaFX: GUI Programming and Basic Controls
• JavaFX: Advanced Controls
• Recursion
• Sorting, Searching, and Algorithm Analysis
• Generics
• Collections
• Linked Lists
• Stacks and Queues
• Binary Trees, AVL Trees, and Priority Queues
• Appendices
Customer Reviews About Us
141
From Social Efficiency to Social Welfare:
Congress to help craft the Patient Protection and Affordable
vii
Out 208
Highlights 271
ChaPtER 13 Social Security 367
265
Solving the Crowd-Out Problem:
10 State and Local Government Expenditures 275
14
373
70
391
Citizenship
Optimal Provision of Private Goods 193
Incremental Reforms
381
Continued 56
14.3 Moral Hazard Effects of Social Insurance
Has the CAA Been a Success?
aPPlICatIon Valuing Life 229
176
How Can We Measure Preferences for Public
81
BRIEF ContEnts
aPPlICatIon The Externality of SUVs 129
aPPlICatIon Implicit Social Security Taxes and
16 Health Insurance II: Medicare, Medicaid, and Health Care Reform 471
134
Retirement Behavior 387
Leviathan Theory
Deficit 98
1.1 The Four Questions of Public Finance 3
ChaPtER 6 Externalities in Action:
1.2 Why Study Public Finance? Facts on
the top 100 most powerful people in health care in the United
Time Series Analysis 73
9.2 Mechanisms for Aggregating Individual
Restricting Preferences to Solve the Impossibility
3.2 Measuring Causation with Data We’d
Implications
2009–2010, he served as a technical consultant to the Obama
ApplicAtion School Finance Equalization and
Majority Voting: When It Doesn’t Work
EmPIRICal EvIdEnCE Valuing Time Savings 228
Associate, and President Elect of the American
How Does the Government Address Adverse
The Consequences of Moral Hazard
Questions and Problems 361
339
aPPlICatIon Adverse Selection and Health Insurance
aPPlICatIon Valuing Life 229
Identifying the Budget Constraint 40
The Externalities of Smoking 173
6.2 Global Warming 161
Addressed?
2.3 Equilibrium and Social Welfare 45
Highlights 188
EmpiricAl EvidEncE Government Failures and
Social Security 21
The Role of Equity
Should We Care? 290
201
The Role of Equity
3.1 The Important Distinction Between
Addressed?
12 Social Insurance: The New Function of Government 335
2.3 Equilibrium and Social Welfare 45
States 259
nector Board, the main implementing body for that effort. In
The Tiebout Model 281
Positive Externalities
Moral Hazard Effects of Unemployment
Incremental Reforms
380
Communities 290
279
ChaPtER 9 Political Economy 241
Effects of Education Levels on Productivity 323
Social Insurance Programs 412
348
Advanced Questions 213
328
77
5.4 Distinctions Between Price and Quantity
3 Empirical Tools of Public Finance 65
Preferences and Indifference Curves 29
221
14.3 Moral Hazard Effects of Social Insurance
Social Security 21
373
5.2 Private-Sector Solutions to Negative
Dr. Gruber received his B.S. in Economics
Has the CAA Been a Success?
256
EmPIRICal EvIdEnCE Measuring the Crowd-Out Effect
195
Majority Voting: When It Doesn’t Work
Why We Need to Go Beyond Randomized Trials
Randomized Trials in the TANF Context
Program Details 369
227
Choosing an Equity Criterion
aPPlICatIon The Montreal Protocol 163
Valuing Driving Time Saved 224
Insurance 359
Compensation Injuries 356
117
Introduction and Background
ChaPtER 12 Social Insurance: The New
Government on the Macroeconomy
Governments
235
408
11.6 Conclusion 331
Questions and Problems 121
Drinking 180
10.1 Fiscal Federalism in the United States
355
35
Randomized Trials as a Solution 69
89
Institutional Features of Unemployment
ChaPtER 12 Social Insurance: The New
History of Acid Rain Regulation
Out 208
Intervention in Insurance Markets 349
How Can We Measure Preferences for Public
edited six research volumes, and is the author of Health Care
tect of the ambitious health reform effort in Massachusetts and
8.1 Measuring the Costs of Public
Choice
Model 262
323
Insurance
Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Public Goods
6.4 The Economics of Other Addictive
Assumptions of the Median Voter Model
Unemployment Insurance 414
11.1 Why Should the Government
245
member of the Institute of Medicine, the
17 Income Distribution and Welfare Programs 511
EmpiricAl EvidEncE Evidence for Capitalization from
chAptEr 11 Education 305
Highlights 59
Selection?
1.1 The Four Questions of Public Finance 3
2.1 Constrained Utility Maximization 28
Example: Unemployment Insurance 353
287
14.1 Institutional Features of Unemployment
Behaviors 180
aPPlICatIon Public Policy Toward Obesity 184
Corrective Taxation 136
Externalities 153
Correlation and Causality 66
291
Highlights 188
261
Education 326
Social Insurance Programs 412
1.1 The Four Questions of Public Finance 3
137
4.2 Measuring the Budgetary Position
nomics. He has published more than 150 research articles, has
in This Model
aPPlICatIon The Financial Shenanigans
of Crowd-Out
358
Innovative and Practical Thinkers of Our Time” by the online
250
8.1 Measuring the Costs of Public
from MIT and his Ph.D. in Economics from
ChaPtER 3 Empirical Tools of Public
The Problems with Coasian Solutions
EmPIRICal EvIdEnCE Valuing Time Savings 228
on the areas of public finance and health eco-
Information and Adverse Selection 342
18 Taxation: How It Works and What It Means 549
Questions and Problems 400
391
chAptEr 11 Education 305
Advanced Questions 60
77
1.1 The Four Questions of Public Finance 3
Randomized Trials as a Solution 69
ApplicAtion Farm Policy in the United
The Size and Growth of Government 12
Finance 65
the National Academy of Social Insurance.
7.4 Conclusion 212
Insurance
Approaches to Addressing Externalities 139
89
221
6.3 The Economics of Smoking 171
The Damage of Acid Rain 156
Problem?
5.3 Public-Sector Remedies for
Supply Curves
12.7 Conclusion 360
Questions and Problems 400
Education 327
Size-Maximizing Bureaucracy 265
of T echnology (MIT), where he has
Budget Policies and Deficits at the
ChaPtER 9 Political Economy 241
Outcome
23 Taxes on Risk Taking and Wealth 713
37
Quasi-Experiments
10.3 Redistribution Across
aPPlICatIon The Free Rider Problem in Practice 199
256
Gruber5e_FM_Printer.indd 10 16/11/15 4:55 PM
Reductions: The TANF Example
215
6 Externalities in Action: Environmental and Health Externalities 153
Externalities 132
About the Author
aPPlICatIon Flood Insurance and the
53
9.3 Representative Democracy 255
25 Fundamental Tax Reform and Consumption Taxation 777
EmPIRICal EvIdEnCE Valuing Time Savings 228
What Does the Future Hold? 167
325
Highlights 361
10.3 Redistribution Across
256
Redistribution
aPPEndIx Mathematical Models of Expected
5.4 Distinctions Between Price and Quantity
408
taught since 1992. He is also the Director of the
31
9.1 Unanimous Consent on Public Goods
d
1.1 The Four Questions of Public Finance 3
410
Harvard University. Dr. Gruber’s research focuses
145
Example with Full Information
6.1 The Role of Economics in Environmental
111
The Problem of Bias
13.1 What Is Social Security, and How Does It
280
of Economic Research, where he is a Research
Insurance 359
member of the Institute of Medicine, the
“Death Spirals” 347
Has the CAA Been a Success?
339
Supply Curves
Questions and Problems 188
ChaPtER 3 Empirical Tools of Public
Approaches to Addressing Externalities 139
health economist in the nation aged 40 and under.
Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
234
Highlights 400
70
Reform 399
20 Tax Inefficiencies and Their Implications for Optimal Taxation 619
The Damage of Acid Rain 156
Voter
10 State and Local Government Expenditures 275
EmpiricAl EvidEncE Evidence for Capitalization from
Should We Care Only About Externalities, or Do
2009–2010, he served as a technical consultant to the Obama
Valuing Driving Time Saved 224
SEVANS
6.2 Global Warming 161
Corruption
358
Social Security 379
13.1 What Is Social Security, and How Does It
119
18 Taxation: How It Works and What It Means 549
aPPlICatIon Implicit Social Security Taxes and
2.2 Putting the Tools to Work: TANF and Labor
ChaPtER 14 Unemployment Insurance,
Discounting Future Benefits
2.1 Constrained Utility Maximization 28
magazine Slate. In both 2006 and 2012, he was rated one of
4
Living Standards of the Elderly
Fiscal Position? 114
357
Multiple Plants with Different Reduction Costs
ChaPtER 12 Social Insurance: The New
BRIEF ContEnts
Maximization 62
Compensation 405
aPPlICatIon Ida May Fuller 375
Reform Round I: The Greenspan Commission 390
Education? 310
Static Versus Dynamic Scoring
7.2 Private Provision of Public Goods 197
408
5.4 Distinctions Between Price and Quantity
280
25 Fundamental Tax Reform and Consumption Taxation 777
Government on the Macroeconomy
Problem
aPPlICatIon The CBO: Government Scorekeepers 10
How Does Social Security Redistribute in Practice?
Example with Asymmetric Information
Direct Experience with Vouchers 320
89
Current Government Role
50
Supply Curves
15 Health Insurance I: Health Economics and Private Health Insurance 433
405
9
6.2 Global Warming 161
Direct Experience with Vouchers 320
137
16 Health Insurance II: Medicare, Medicaid, and Health Care Reform 471
Insurance
Contents vii
Comparison of the Features of UI, DI, and WC
Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers’
Measuring Long-Run Government Budgets
Advanced Questions 362
Why Do Individuals Value Insurance?
Treasury Department. From 2003 to 2006, he was a key archi-
ChaPtER 8 Cost-Benefit Analysis 219
EmpiricAl EvidEncE Estimating the Return to
258
Highlights 188
18 Taxation: How It Works and What It Means 549
9.5 Conclusion 269
187
70
The Solution 132
Introduction and Background
ApplicAtion School Finance Equalization and
3.1 The Important Distinction Between
7.3 Public Provision of Public Goods 204
The Problem of Adverse Selection
9
Benefits Around the World 410
aPPlICatIon Direct Democracy in the United
Reform Round I: The Greenspan Commission 390
31
Price Regulation (Taxes) Versus Quantity Regulation
4.2 Measuring the Budgetary Position
The Implications of Government Failure
350
283
221
Why Current Labels May Be Meaningless
Gruber5e_FM_Printer.indd 6 13/11/15 3:46 PM
346
Economic Conditions
Voter
EmpiricAl EvidEncE Government Failures and
Has the CAA Been a Success?
Direct Experience with Vouchers 320
EmPIRICal EvIdEnCE The Effect of Legal Drinking
How Does Social Security Work over Time?
10 State and Local Government Expenditures 275
chAptEr 11 Education 305
EmPIRICal EvIdEnCE Valuing Time Savings 228
205
ROBERT DODGE/E1/GETTY IMAGES
California’s Proposition 13 288
aPPlICatIon Public Policy Toward Obesity 184
265
Addressed?
6 Externalities in Action: Environmental and Health Externalities 153
States by Modern Healthcare magazine.
The Solution 132
296
389
Advanced Questions 401
345
12.4 Social Insurance Versus Self-Insurance:
9.1 Unanimous Consent on Public Goods
aPPlICatIon Why Choose 35 Years? 371
13 Social Security 367
aPPlICatIon The Free Rider Problem in Practice 199
EmpiricAl EvidEncE Government Failures and
d
Short-Run Versus Long-Run Effects of the
142
48
5.4 Distinctions Between Price and Quantity
21 Taxes on Labor Supply 657
Questions and Problems 213
Approaches to Addressing Externalities 139
The Solution 132
Optimal Fiscal Federalism
14
269
Highlights 271
54
Care Act. In 2011, he was named “One of the T op 25 Most
Social Security 21
The Externalities of Smoking 173
leave as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy at the
When Is Private Provision Likely to Overcome the
14.1 Institutional Features of Unemployment
31
6.3 The Economics of Smoking 171
Problems with the Tiebout Model
What Is the Market Failure, and How Should It Be
11.1 Why Should the Government
137
358
How Much Consumption Smoothing? 352
381
21 Taxes on Labor Supply 657
Advanced Questions 213
Assumptions of the Median Voter Model
ROBERT DODGE/E1/GETTY IMAGES
3.3 Estimating Causation with Data We
251
339
aPPlICatIon Efforts to Control the
12.6 Putting It All Together: Optimal Social
EmpiricAl EvidEncE Disability Insurance Screening
ApplicAtion Government Corruption 266
Dr. Gruber received his B.S. in Economics
in This Model
Equilibrium
11.3 Evidence on Competition in Education
255
348
Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Public Goods
181
Spending, Taxes, Deficits, and Debts
aPPlICatIon The Good and Bad Sides of Contracting
Evidence on the Tiebout Model
128
Highlights 87
2009–2010, he served as a technical consultant to the Obama
Disability Insurance, and
of T echnology (MIT), where he has
Highlights 332
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
Competitive Equilibrium Maximizes Social
111
Summary
Advanced Questions 189
3.3 Estimating Causation with Data We
State Level
373
Experience with Public School
How Does the Government Address Adverse
What Does the Future Hold? 167
Preferences and Indifference Curves 29
Analysis
Associate, and President Elect of the American
7.1 Optimal Provision of Public Goods 192
5 Externalities: Problems and Solutions 123
384
Fiscal Federalism Abroad
Has the CAA Been a Success?
The Solution 132
256
13.2 Consumption-Smoothing Benefits of
in 2006 became an inaugural member of the Health Con-
ApplicAtion Government Corruption 266
When Is Private Provision Likely to Overcome the
410
Advanced Questions 273
227
1 Why Study Public Finance? 1
7.3 Public Provision of Public Goods 204
EmPIRICal EvIdEnCE The Effect of Legal Drinking
Goods?
Questions and Problems 59
nector Board, the main implementing body for that effort. In
266
National Savings 391
7 Public Goods 191
Advanced Questions 401
ChaPtER 7 Public Goods 191
349
Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Public Goods
Valuing Driving Time Saved 224
408
Outcomes
Static Versus Dynamic Scoring
Basic Model 140
Unemployment Insurance 414
24 Taxation of Business Income 739
Government in the United States and Around
13.3 Social Security and Retirement 383
7.3 Public Provision of Public Goods 204
Assumptions of the Median Voter Model
Out
Decentralization
Can Trading Make Environmental Agreements More
Questions and Problems 149
The Problem of Adverse Selection
10.2 Optimal Fiscal Federalism 281
States 259
Highlights 238
Experience with Public School Incentives
1 Why Study Public Finance? 1
416
vi
Equilibrium
ChaPtER 13 Social Security 367
aPPlICatIon Implicit Social Security Taxes and
ROBERT DODGE/E1/GETTY IMAGES
9 Political Economy 241
viii CONTENTS
Quality 328
Regulation
EmpiricAl EvidEncE Estimating the Effects
187
Institutional Features of Unemployment
Samaritan’s Dilemma 350
aPPlICatIon The Good and Bad Sides of Contracting
380
ChaPtER 9 Political Economy 241
Addressed?
130
aPPlICatIon The Social Security Trust Fund and
253
Questions and Problems 213
Gruber5e_FM_Printer.indd 10 16/11/15 4:55 PM
Asymmetric Information 342
21 Taxes on Labor Supply 657
EmpiricAl EvidEncE Testing the Median Voter
Redistribution
Externalities 136
Valuation 226
137
Example: Unemployment Insurance 353
17 Income Distribution and Welfare Programs 511
256
aPPlICatIon The Good and Bad Sides of Contracting
Governments
Private Responses to Public Provision: The Problem
EmpiricAl EvidEncE Evidence for Capitalization from
14.1 Institutional Features of Unemployment
Example with Asymmetric Information
37
Governments
and Abroad 277
Compensation 405
Congress to help craft the Patient Protection and Affordable
Provision
Growth
Short-Run Versus Long-Run Effects of the
Health Care Program at the National Bureau
The Budget Deficit in Recent Years 95
346
aPPlICatIon Flood Insurance and the
Index I-1
Economy?
When Should the Government Intervene in the
9.5 Conclusion 269
13.1 What Is Social Security, and How Does It
Moral Hazard Effects of Unemployment
8
Innovative and Practical Thinkers of Our Time” by the online
Assumptions of the Median Voter Model
Institutional Features of Unemployment
9.3 Representative Democracy 255
EmPIRICal EvIdEnCE Estimating the Adverse Health
Social Security 21
Example with Full Information
Moral Hazard Is Multidimensional
vii
Questions and Problems 149
Lessons for Consumption-Smoothing Role of Social
Gruber5e_FM_Printer.indd 9 13/11/15 3:46 PM
6.3 The Economics of Smoking 171
the National Academy of Social Insurance.
Regulation
2.3 Equilibrium and Social Welfare 45
11.1 Why Should the Government
Economic Conditions
Advanced Questions 273
141
Productivity 308
Insurance
Out 208
5 Externalities: Problems and Solutions 123
EmpiricAl EvidEncE Testing the Median Voter
the World 11
Communities 290
Uncertainty About Costs of Reduction
102
Social Security 379
Private Responses to Public Provision: The Problem
Real Versus Nominal 101
208
Benefits Around the World 410
Growth
10.1 Fiscal Federalism in the United States
71
Model 262
aPPEndIx The Mathematics of Utility
2.3 Equilibrium and Social Welfare 45
Randomized Trials in the TANF Context
Rationales for Social Security 379
of the Government: Alternative
18 Taxation: How It Works and What It Means 549
255
205
Experience with Public School Incentives
Insurance
What Does the Future Hold? 167
5.4 Distinctions Between Price and Quantity
41
3.3 Estimating Causation with Data We
11
When Should the Government Intervene in the
Markets 320
Structural Modeling 85
24 Taxation of Business Income 739
Externalities 153
Externalities 153
251
338
Dr. Gruber received his B.S. in Economics
EmpiricAl EvidEncE Estimating the Effects
The Problem of Adverse Selection
Compensation Injuries 356
357
Maximization 62
12.4 Social Insurance Versus Self-Insurance:
Projects 220
Demand Curves 46
ApplicAtion School Finance Equalization and
9.5 Conclusion 269
Insurance
253
19 The Equity Implications of Taxation: Tax Incidence 585
145
Problems with Lindahl Pricing
EmpiricAl EvidEncE Moral Hazard Effects of
Externalities and Public Goods
Government in the United States and Around
Paternalism
and Solutions 123
12.1 What Is Insurance and Why Do
EmPIRICal EvIdEnCE Estimating the Adverse Health
Growth
the top 100 most powerful people in health care in the United
ChaPtER 4 Budget Analysis and Deficit
and Solutions 123
Institutional Features of Unemployment
Care Act. In 2011, he was named “One of the T op 25 Most
12.7 Conclusion 360
208
How Might the Government Intervene?
139
11
4
How Does the Government Address Adverse
Identifying the Budget Constraint 40
338
269
Tools of Redistribution: Grants
ROBERT DODGE/E1/GETTY IMAGES
265
Incremental Reforms
Questions and Problems 188
Administrative Costs
315
of Social Security on Savings 382
339
Advanced Questions 273
Comparison of the Features of UI, DI, and WC
EmpiricAl EvidEncE The Flypaper Effect 298
Credit Market Failures
Formalizing This Intuition: Expected Utility Model
5.1 Externality Theory 125
Advanced Questions 60
Reform Round I: The Greenspan Commission 390
aPPlICatIon Valuing Life 229
Credit Market Failures
Can Private Providers Overcome the Free Rider
311
Experience with Public School Incentives
19
Deficit 98
164
Summary
Questions and Problems 301
Growth
Government on the Macroeconomy
50
Environmental and Health
Subsidies
Highlights 332
8.1 Measuring the Costs of Public
13.1 What Is Social Security, and How Does It
The Impact of School Quality
310
109
at Age 21 182
Perspective 106
9.5 Conclusion 269
Problem?
ChaPtER 12 Social Insurance: The New
Preferences 246
Hazard 355
6 Externalities in Action: Environmental and Health Externalities 153
EmPIRICal EvIdEnCE Measuring Crowd-Out 206
Advanced Questions 401
Vouchers
54
Insurance
The Right Mix of Public and Private
245
The Problem of Bias
of Economic Research, where he is a Research
Out
Correlation and Causality 66
ChaPtER 2 Theoretical Tools of Public
2.5 Conclusion 58
3.4 Conclusion 86
How Does Social Security Redistribute in Practice?
Positive Externalities
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
137
Current Government Role
251
Growth
Direct Experience with Vouchers 320
Provision
Evidence
141
aPPlICatIon The Good and Bad Sides of Contracting
9 Political Economy 241
When Is Private Provision Likely to Overcome the
391
aPPlICatIon Valuing Life 229
9
Hazard 355
Lindahl Pricing 243
Hazard 355
Vouchers
Highlights 400
7 Public Goods 191
Programs 413
Innovative and Practical Thinkers of Our Time” by the online
Institutional Features of Disability Insurance 407
Effects of Particulates 158
Lindahl Pricing 243
ApplicAtion Government Corruption 266
Should We Care? 290
310
14 Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers’ Compensation 403
The Example 221
Preface xvii
Moral Hazard Is Multidimensional
313
Subsidies
EmPIRICal EvIdEnCE How Much Does It Cost to
Communities 290
How Might the Government Intervene?
Property Tax Limitations in California 299
115
Education 326
349
345
Unemployment Insurance 414
Dr. Gruber received his B.S. in Economics
12.3 Other Reasons for Government
When Is Private Provision Likely to Overcome the
member of the Institute of Medicine, the
Insurance
4.3 Do Current Debts and Deficits
330
ChaPtER 6 Externalities in Action:
aPPlICatIon The Financial Shenanigans
221
Private-Sector Underprovision 198
349
aPPlICatIon Mixed Proposals for Social Security
3.3 Estimating Causation with Data We
States by Modern Healthcare magazine.
145
6.2 Global Warming 161
381
Problem?
261
The Example 221
105
205
and Abroad 277
Perspective 106
4.5 Conclusion 120
Distribution of Revenue Sources
Highlights 361
358
Preferences and Indifference Curves 29
35
Formalizing This Intuition: Expected Utility Model
PaRt I
the World 11
11 Education 305
From Social Efficiency to Social Welfare:
ApplicAtion School Finance Equalization and
PART II Externalities and Public Goods
What Does the U.S. Government Do?
Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis
Drinking 180
ContEnts
Decentralization
and Solutions 123
Why We Need to Go Beyond Randomized Trials
Supply Curves
Disability Insurance, and
14 Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers’ Compensation 403
Free Public Education and Crowding
aPPlICatIon The Financial Shenanigans
128
2.3 Equilibrium and Social Welfare 45
EmpiricAl EvidEncE Evidence for Capitalization from
Individuals Value It? 337
EmPIRICal EvIdEnCE Estimating the Adverse Health
aPPlICatIon Direct Democracy in the United
355
EmpiricAl EvidEncE The Flypaper Effect 298
ChaPtER 1 Why Study Public Finance? 1
of the Government: Alternative
Median Voter Theory
ChaPtER 8 Cost-Benefit Analysis 219
Structural Modeling 85
8.3 Putting It All Together 235
leave as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy at the
taught since 1992. He is also the Director of the
10.3 Redistribution Across
PART I Introduction and Background
22
245
343
145
12.7 Conclusion 360
Summary
Property Tax Limitations in California 299
Highlights 120
Questions and Problems 301
253
BRIEF ContEnts
Problems with Educational Vouchers
7.3 Public Provision of Public Goods 204
Education
8
5.5 Conclusion 148
311
When Should the Government Intervene in the
Intergenerational Equity
Highlights 24
Continued 56
19
Questions and Problems 59
EmpiricAl EvidEncE Testing the Median Voter
Randomized Trials of ERT
d
Highlights 148
Private-Sector Underprovision 198
Questions and Problems 213
vii
25 Fundamental Tax Reform and Consumption Taxation 777
Approaches to Addressing Externalities 139
14 Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers’ Compensation 403
Benefits Around the World 410
Voter
ChaPtER 9 Political Economy 241
PaRt II
8.3 Putting It All Together 235
70
Problems with Lindahl Pricing
PaRt II
Why Current Labels May Be Meaningless
Introduction and Background
145
Function of Government 335
leave as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy at the
Moral Hazard Effects of Unemployment
Effects of Education Levels on Productivity 323
1.1 The Four Questions of Public Finance 3
Lessons for Consumption-Smoothing Role of Social
aPPlICatIon Efforts to Control the
aPPEndIx Mathematical Models of Expected
311
Property Tax Limitations in California 299
Advanced Questions 88
Problem
The Tiebout Model 281
Associate, and President Elect of the American
PART II Externalities and Public Goods
Externalities 136
Highlights 271
Insurance
117
11.1 Why Should the Government
187
Why Do Governments Do What They Do?
Highlights 361
253
14
and Education 21
Highlights 148
What Is the Market Failure, and How Should It Be
Information and Adverse Selection 342
Regulation
Harvard University. Dr. Gruber’s research focuses
Social Security 379
376
Environmental and Health
311
310
Administration and worked with both the Administration and
Supply Curves
Lobbying
Highlights 400
Theory 383
115
200
Productivity 308
aPPlICatIon The Problems of Contingent
364
349
Credit Market Failures
Actually Get: Observational Data 73
283
Basic Model 140
13
1 Why Study Public Finance? 1
286
Advanced Questions 121
227
Advanced Questions 239
19
Economics at the Massachusetts Institute
89
348
164
Finance 65
The Potential Inefficiency of the Median Voter
18 Taxation: How It Works and What It Means 549
248
Optimal Provision of Private Goods 193
Preface xvii
Short-Run Versus Long-Run Effects of the
373
280
Economic Conditions
Incremental Reforms
The Impact of School Quality
Credit Market Failures
The Implications of Government Failure
6.4 The Economics of Other Addictive
EmpiricAl EvidEncE Moral Hazard Effects of
aPPlICatIon The Problems of Contingent
315
Supply Curves
77
Highlights 148
Introduction and Background
aPPlICatIon Mixed Proposals for Social Security
164
Regulation: The Case of Acid Rain 155
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and
Highlights 361
5.2 Private-Sector Solutions to Negative
14.1 Institutional Features of Unemployment
of Economic Research, where he is a Research
7 Public Goods 191