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HAZOP Study: Identifying Process Risks

The document provides an introduction to Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies, which systematically identify potential hazards and operability problems in process plants. It describes how HAZOP studies work by using guide words to examine how deviations from design intent could occur. Key words focus the team's attention on aspects like flow, pressure, and temperature. The methodology involves applying guide word combinations and recording deviations, causes, consequences, safeguards, and recommended actions. An example HAZOP study of a shell and tube heat exchanger is presented to illustrate the process.

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Umar Draz
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© © All Rights Reserved
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Topics covered

  • hazard identification,
  • HAZOP methodology,
  • risk assessment,
  • failure analysis,
  • process design,
  • systematic questioning,
  • temperature,
  • risk mitigation,
  • process deviations,
  • pressure security
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
225 views5 pages

HAZOP Study: Identifying Process Risks

The document provides an introduction to Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies, which systematically identify potential hazards and operability problems in process plants. It describes how HAZOP studies work by using guide words to examine how deviations from design intent could occur. Key words focus the team's attention on aspects like flow, pressure, and temperature. The methodology involves applying guide word combinations and recording deviations, causes, consequences, safeguards, and recommended actions. An example HAZOP study of a shell and tube heat exchanger is presented to illustrate the process.

Uploaded by

Umar Draz
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

Topics covered

  • hazard identification,
  • HAZOP methodology,
  • risk assessment,
  • failure analysis,
  • process design,
  • systematic questioning,
  • temperature,
  • risk mitigation,
  • process deviations,
  • pressure security

HAZOP STUDY

INTRODUCTION:

Thetechniqueofhazardandoperatibilitystudies,orinmore
commontermsHAZOP,hasbeenusedanddevelopapproximatelydecadesforidentifyingpotentialhazardandoperatibilityproblems
causedbydeviationfromthedesignintentofbothandnewandexistingprocessplants.Beforeprocessingfurther,itmightbeaswellto
clarifysomeaspectsofthesestatements.

POTENTIALHAZARDSANDOPERATIBILITYPROBLEMS

YouwillnotetheboldANDintheabovehanding,itsbecausehighprofileofproductionplantaccident,emphasisistoooften
placedupontheidentificationofhazardstotheneglectofpotentialproblems.YetitisthelatterareathatbenefitsofHAZOPstudyare
usuallythegreatest.
INDUSTRIESINWHICHTHETECHNIQUEISAPPLIED
HAZOPwereinitiallyinventedbyICIintheunitedkingdombutthetechniqueonlystartedtobemorewidelyusedwithinthe
chemicalindustriesaftertheFixboroughdisasterinwhichachemicalplantexplosionkill28people,manyifwhichwereordinaryhouse
holderslivingnearby.Throughthegeneralexchangeofideasandpersonnel,thesystemwasadoptedbythepetroleumindustries,which
hasasimilarpotentialformajordisasters.Thiswasthenfollowedbythefoodandwaterindustry,wherethehazardpotentialisasgreat,
butofadifferentnature,theconcernbeingmoretodowithcontaminationratherthanexplosionsorchemicalrelease.
BASICCONCEPT:
EssentiallytheHAZOPprocedureinvolvetakingafulldescriptionofprocessandsystematicallyquestioningeverypartofit
toestablishhowdeviationfromthedesignintentcanarise.Onceidentified,anassessmentismadeastowhethersuchdeviationsand
theirconsequencescanhaveanegativeeffectuponthesafeendandefficientoperationofplant.Ifconsidernecessaryactionisthen
takentoremedythesituation.

ThecriticalanalysisisappliedinastructuredwaybyaHAZOPteamanditreliesuponthemreleasingtheirimaginationinaneffortto
discovercrediblecausesofdeviations.
Inpractice,manycauseswillbefairly,obvioussuchaspumpfailurecausinglossofcirculationinacoolingwaterfacilitymentioned
above.However,unlikelytheymayseematfirstconsideration.Inthiswayhestudymuchmorethanamechanisticchecklisttypeof
review.Theresultisthattheregoodchancethatpotentialfailuresandproblemswillbeidentified,whichhadnotpreviouslybeen
experiencedinthetypeofplantbeingstudied.
KEYWORDS:
AnessentialfeatureinthisquestioningandsystematicanalysisintheuseofKeywordstofocustheattentionofthe
teamupondeviationsandtheirpossiblecauses.Thekeywordsaredividedintotwosubsets.
Primarykeywords:whichfocusuponaparticularaspectofthedesignintentoranassociatedprocessconditionorparameter.
Secondarykeywords:whichwhencombinedwithaprimarykeyword,suggestpossibledeviations.
PRIMARYKEYWORDS:
Thesereflectboththeprocessdesignintentandoperationalaspectsoftheplantbeingstudied.Typicalprocessorientedwords
mightbeasfollows.Thelistbelowispurelyillustrative,asthewordsemployedinareviewwilldependupontheplantbeingstudied.
Flow
Temperature
Separate(settle,filter,centrifuge)
React

Pressure
Level
Composition
Corrode

RememberingthatthetechniqueiscalledHazardandoperatibilitystudies,addedtotheabovemightberelevantoperationalwordssuch
as:
Isolate
Vent
Inspect
Startup

Drain
Purge
Maintain
Shutdown

SECONDARYKEYWORDS:
Asmentionedabove,whenappliedinaconjunctionwithaprimarykeyword,thesesuggestthepotentialdeviationsorproblems.They
tendtobeastandardsetaslistedbelow.
Word
No
Less
More
Reverse
Other

Meaning
Thedesignintentdoesnotoccur(e.g.flow),ortheoperationalaspectisnotachieved(isolate/No)
Aquantitativedecreaseinthedesignintentoccur(e.g.Pressure/Less)
Aquantitativeincreaseinthedesignintentoccur(e.g.Temperature/More)
Theoppositeofthedesignintentoccurs(e.g.Flow/Reverse)
Theactivityoccurs,butnotinthewayintended(e.g.Flow/other)couldindicatealeakorproduct
flowing where it should not, or composition/other might suggest unexpected proportions in a

Aswellas
Partof

feedstock
Aquantitativeincrease
Aquantitativedecrease

HAZOPSTUDYMETHODOLOGY:
InsimpletermstheHAZOPstudyprocessinvolvesapplyinginasystematicwayallrelevantkeywordscombinationtothe
plantinquestioninanefforttouncoverpotentialproblems.Theresultsarerecordedinacolumnarformatundertheheadings,
Deviation

Cause

Consequences

Safeguard

Action

Inconsideringtheinformationtoberecordedineachofthesecolumnsisgivenbelow.
DEVIATION
Thekeywordscombinationbeingapplied(e.g.Flow/No)
CAUSE
Potentialcausewhichwouldresultinthedeviationoccurring(e.g.strainerblockageduetoimpuritiesinDosingtankmightbeacause
ofFlow/No).
CONSEQUENCES
Theconsequenceswhichwouldarise,bothfromtheeffectofthedeviation(e.g.Lossofdosingresultsincompleteseparation)and,if
appropriatefromthecauseitself(e.g.cavitationsinpumps,withpossibledamageifprolonged).
SAFEGUARDS
Anyexistingprotectivedevices,whicheitherpreventthecauseorsafeguardsagainsttheadverseconsequences,wouldberecordedin
thiscolumn.ForexampleyoumayconsiderrecordingLocalpressuregaugeindischargefrompumpmightindicateproblemwas
arising.Notethatsafeguardneednotberestrictedtohardwarewhereappropriate;creditcanbetakenforproceduralaspectssuchas
regularplantsinspections(ifyouaresurethattheywillactuallybecarriedout!).
ACTION
Whereacrediblecauseresultsinanegativeconsequence,itmustbedecidedwhethersomeactionshouldbetaken.Itisatthisstagethat
consequencesandassociatedsafeguardsareconsidered.Ifitisdeemedthattheprotectivemeasuresareadequate,thennoactionneedto
taken,andwordstothateffectsarerecordedintheactioncolumn.
Actionsfallintotwogroups:

Actionthatremovethecause

Actionsthatmitigateoreliminatetheconsequences

Whereasformeristobepreferred,itisnotalwayspossibleespeciallywhendealingwithequipmentsmalfunction.However,always
investigateremovingthecausefirstandonlywherenecessarymitigatetheconsequences.

Finallyalwaystakeintoaccountthelabeloftrainingandexperienceespeciallyofpersonnelwhowilloperatetheplant.Actions,which
callforelaborateandsophisticatedprotectivesystems,arewasted,aswellasbeinginherentlydangerous,ifoperatorsdonotandnever
will,understandhowtheyfunction.Itisnotunknownforsuchdevicestobedisabled,eitherdeliberatelyorinerror,becausenoone
knowshowtomaintainandcalibratethem.
Havinggonethroughtheoperationsinvolveinrecordingasingledeviation,thesecannowbeputintothecontextoftheactualstudy
meetingprocedure.Fromtheflowdiagrambelowitcanbeseenthatitisverymuchaniterativeprocess,applyinginastructuredand
systematicwaytherelevantkeywordcombinationsinordertoidentifypotentialproblems.

HAZOPSTUDYOFASHELLANDTUBEEXCHANGER
Inthisstudy,pressure,temperatureandlevelwillbeusedasvariables(secondarywords)differentguidewords(primarywords)willbe
appliedtothesewords.
Pressure
Deviation1:
Shellsideveryhighpressure
Cause:
ExchangeroutletdischargeSDVcloses.
Consequence:
Exchangershellsidewillbeoverpressurized.
ActionRecommended:
HighpressuresecuritymustbeinstalledonshelloutletwhichifactuatedwillcloseallSDVs.
Deviation2
Lowpressureonshellside.

Cause:
Feedpumptrips
Consequence:
Nosignificanceeffectassystemremainswithinthedesignlimits
ActionRecommended:
Notavailable
Deviation3
Tubesidehighpressure.
Cause:
Tuberuptures.
Consequences:
Tubemayoverpressurize,butsinceshellandtubesidearedesignedatsamepressurehencenosignificanteffectisthere.

ActionRecommended:
HighpressuresecuritymustbeinstalledontubeoutletwhichifactuatedwillcloseallSDVs.
Temperature
Deviation4
Tubesidehightemperature.
Cause:
SDVontubesideoutletissuddenlyclosed
Actionrecommended:
HightemperaturesecuritymustbetherethatwillclosetubesideSDVs
Flow
Deviation5
Noflowonshellside
Cause:
ShellsideoutletSDVclosessuddenly
Consequences:
Flowthroughcompressorwillreduceandtubesidetemperaturewillshootup.
ActionRecommended:
Lowflowsecuritytobeinstalledonpumpdischargewhichifactuatedwilltripfeedpumpandcantripthewholeplant.

Common questions

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Examples of keyword combinations include 'Flow/No,' which indicates that the design intent of flow is not occurring, possibly due to a blocked strainer. 'Pressure/Less' suggests a decrease in pressure, potentially caused by a feed pump trip . These combinations help in methodically identifying deviations and analyzing their causes and potential consequences for plant safety and efficiency .

The HAZOP study process involves a detailed and structured application of relevant keyword combinations to identify potential deviations and their causes. For each identified deviation, its potential consequences are evaluated, and existing safeguards are reviewed. Actions are then recommended to either remove the cause or mitigate the consequences, effectively managing risk .

The iterative nature of the HAZOP study involves continuously applying keyword combinations to different parts of the process until all possible deviations are explored. For example, in a shell and tube exchanger study, multiple deviations such as high pressure on the shell side and high temperature on the tube side are examined, leading to recommendations like installing pressure and temperature securities .

For a scenario with high temperature on the tube side, caused by an SDV closing suddenly, the consequence would be a potential risk of damage from overheating. The recommended action is to install high-temperature security that automatically closes tube side SDVs to prevent overheating .

Primary keywords in a HAZOP study focus on specific aspects of the design intent or process conditions, such as flow, pressure, and temperature. Secondary keywords, when combined with primary ones, suggest potential deviations and problems. The combination of these words helps the HAZOP team systematically uncover possible process deviations and their causes .

The HAZOP technique was initially used in chemical industries after the Flixborough disaster highlighted its importance. It has since been adopted by the petroleum industry due to similar disaster potentials. Later, it was extended to the food and water industries, where the focus is more on contamination rather than chemical releases or explosions .

The primary objectives of a HAZOP study are to identify potential hazards and operability problems in process plants. This involves systematically questioning every part of the process to determine deviations from the design intent and assessing whether these deviations could lead to unsafe or inefficient plant operations. If deviations with negative consequences are found, the HAZOP study recommends actions to address them .

The effectiveness of HAZOP study recommendations heavily depends on the training and experience of operating personnel. Recommendations that involve complex protective systems may be ineffective if operators lack the understanding to maintain or operate them properly, potentially leading to the systems being disabled. This consideration ensures that actions are practical and likely to be successfully implemented .

The columnar format used for documenting HAZOP study findings helps organize data systematically under headings like Deviation, Cause, Consequences, Safeguards, and Action. This structured format ensures clarity and consistency, making it easier to assess potential risks, their causes, and the actions needed to address them .

Unlikely causes of process deviations are considered seriously in a HAZOP study because they can uncover unforeseen risks and failures that have not been previously experienced. This thorough examination allows for a comprehensive assessment of all potential vulnerabilities, ensuring robust safety and operability measures .

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