People V.
Duque
G.R. No. 100285. August 13, 1992
Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ,The Solicitor General
Respondent: NAPOLEON DUQUE
Doctrine:
A statute on prescription of crimes is an act of liberality on the part of the State in favor of
the offender. The applicable well-known principles of statutory interpretation are that
statutes must be construed in such a way as to give effect to the intention of the
legislative authority, and so as to give a sensible meaning to the language of the statute
and thus avoid nonsensical or absurd results, departing to the extent unavoidable from
the literal language of the statute.
Facts:
Appellant Napoleon Duque was charged with and convicted of violating Section 38 in
relation to Section 39 of P.D. No. 442, as amended, known as The Labor Code of the
Philippines. The charge of illegal recruitment was set out in the information where the
accused well knowing that he is not licensed nor authorized by the proper government
agency (POEA) to engage in recruitment of workers abroad, exacted and actually
received money from the victims, to their damage and prejudice. Duque contends that
the offense of illegal recruitment had accordingly prescribed by May 1990.
Duque informed Agustin Ulat that he was recruiting workers for Saudi Arabia and that he
was interested in getting him. Accused likewise presented to him that he (accused) was
a licensed recruiter. Accused asked him to prepare the amount of P20,000.00. He did
not have that money, so he mortgaged his lot for P20,000.00 to the cousin of the
accused, Socorro Arlata. He immediately gave this amount to the accused who assured
him that he would be able to leave within two months. The accused did not issue a
receipt for that amount despite his request. He did not persist in asking the accused
because he trusted him, accused coming from an affluent family and a member of a
well-known Catholic organization, the "Cursillo. However, accused failed to employ him
at Saudi Arabia within two months despite repeated promise to do so. Thus, he
demanded the return of his money but accused failed. Finally, he decided, together with
the other complainants, to file a complaint against accused before the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA).
Elmo Alcaraz, Marcelino Desepida and Norma Francisco individually testified. Alcaraz
was able to give the accused on 22 February 1986 the amount of P5,000.00, but the
accused failed to issue him a receipt and he did not persist in asking for it because he
trusted the accused on. Desepida was able to give the accused on 18 Feb. 1986, the
amount of P7,000.00 as placement fee for which the accused did not issue a receipt
although he promised to issue one the next day. However, the following day, when he
reminded the accused of the receipt, he refused saying that he (Desepida) should trust
[the accused]. Francisco was able to give the accused P9,000.00 on 21 February 1986
in the presence of the other applicants (TSN, 26 Nov. 1990, p. 5). But, the accused
again failed to issue a receipt despite demand. She was told by the accused to trust him.
However, the accused failed to return their money notwithstanding. Thus, all of them
decided to file a complaint with the POEA against the accused. There, they executed a
joint affidavit.
Issue:
Whether or not the criminal offense for which he was convicted has prescribed
Provisions:
Article 290 of the Labor Code provides, in relevant part, that:
Art. 290. Offenses penalized under this Code and the rules and regulations issued
pursuant thereto shall prescribe in three (3) years.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, reads as follows:
Section 2: ...
xxx xxx xxx
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
Article 38 of the Labor Code as amended reads as follows:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. — (a) Any recruitment activities, including the
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-
licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under
Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement
officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three
(3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any
unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph
hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group.
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives
shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-license or non-holder
of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to
national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The
Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents,
paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and
the closure of companies, establishments and entities found to be engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or
authorized to do so.
Ruling:
No.
The recruitment of persons for overseas employment without the necessary
recruiting permit or authority form the POEA constitutes a crime penalized, not by the
Revised Penal Code, but rather by a special law, i.e., Article 38 in relation to Article 290
of the Labor Code. The Labor Code, however, does not contain any provisions on the
mode of computation of the three-year prescriptive period it established.
Appellant Duque assails Section 2 of Act No. 3326 as illogical or absurd. A literal reading
of Section 2 appears to suggest that two (2) elements must coincide for the beginning of
the running of the prescriptive period: first, the element of discovery of the commission of
the violation of the special law; and second, the "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment." It is then argued by appellant that because the co-
existence of these two (2) requirements is necessary under Section 2 of Act No. 3326,
the relevant prescriptive period would never begin to run.
Here appellant has a point. However, it should be noted, firstly, that the literal
reading that appellant suggests, does not benefit appellant, for the prescriptive period in
the case at bar had not in any case been exhausted since prosecution of appellant
commenced only a few months after the POEA and the complainants had discovered
that appellant had no governmental authority to recruit for overseas work and was
merely pretending to recruit workers for overseas employment and to receive money
therefor, i.e., that appellant did not even attempt to locate employment abroad for
complainants. Secondly, we do not think there is any real need for such a literal reading
of Section 2. As is well-known, initiation of proceedings for preliminary investigation of
the offense normally marks the interruption of the period of prescription. Under appellant
Duque's literal reading, the prescription period would both begin and be interrupted by
the same occurrence; the net effect would be that the prescription period would not have
effectively begun, having been rendered academic by the simultaneous interruption of
that same period.
A statute on prescription of crimes is an act of liberality on the part of the State in
favor of the offender. The applicable well-known principles of statutory interpretation are
that statutes must be construed in such a way as to give effect to the intention of the
legislative authority, and so as to give a sensible meaning to the language of the statute
and thus avoid nonsensical or absurd results, departing to the extent unavoidable from
the literal language of the statute. Appellant's literal reading would make nonsense of
Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded
by the word "until." Thus, Section 2 may be read as:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law;
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof;
or as:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and until institution
of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
the applicable prescriptive period in the case at bar began to run from the time the
recruitment activities of appellant Duque were ascertained by the complainants and by
the POEA to have been carried out without any license or authority from the government.
The discovery by the complainants and by the POEA was, as a practical matter,
simultaneous in character and occurred sometime in December 1989 when the
complainants went to the POEA with the complaint for recovery of the placement fees
and expenses they had paid to appellant Duque, and the POEA, acting upon that
complaint, discovered and informed the private complainants that Duque had operated
as a recruiter without the essential government license or authority. Accordingly, the
offense of illegal recruitment had not prescribed when the complaint was filed with the
Provincial Prosecutor's Office in April 1990 and when the information was filed in court in
May 1990.
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the sole modification that the penalty properly imposable and hereby
imposed is life imprisonment and not reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.
