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Infantry tactics are the combination of military concepts and methods used by infantry to
achieve tactical objectives during combat. The role of the infantry on the battlefield is,
typically, to close with and engage the enemy, and hold territorial objectives; infantry tactics
are the means by which this is achieved. Traditionally infantry have made up the largest
proportion of an army's fighting strength, and consequently often suffer the heaviest
casualties. Throughout history, infantrymen have sought to minimise their losses in both
attack and defence through effective tactics.

Infantry tactics are the oldest method of warfare, and span all eras. In different periods, the
prevailing technology of the day has had an important impact on infantry tactics. In the
opposite direction, tactical methods can encourage the development of particular
technologies. Similarly, as weapons and tactics evolve, so do the tactical formations
employed, such as the Greek phalanx, the Spanish tercio, the Napoleonic column, or the
British 'thin red line'. In different periods the numbers of troops deployed as a single unit can
also vary widely, from thousands to a few dozen.

Modern infantry tactics vary with the type of infantry deployed. Armoured and mechanised
infantry are moved and supported in action by vehicles, while others may operate
amphibiously from ships, or as airborne troops inserted by helicopter, parachute or glider,
whereas light infantry may operate mainly on foot. In recent years, peacekeeping operations
in support of humanitarian relief efforts have become particularly important. Tactics also
vary with terrain. Tactics in urban areas, jungles, mountains, deserts or arctic areas are all
markedly different.

Ancient history

The infantry phalanx was a Sumerian tactical formation as far back as the third millennium
BC.[1] It was a tightly knit group of hoplites, generally upper and middle class men, typically
eight to twelve ranks deep, armored in helmet, breastplate, and greaves, armed with two- to
three-meter (6–9 foot) pikes and overlapping round shields.[2] It was most effective in
narrow areas, such as Thermopylae, or in large numbers. Although the early Greeks focused
on the chariot, because of local geography, the phalanx was well developed in Greece and
had superseded most cavalry tactics by the Greco-Persian Wars. In the fourth century BC
Philip II of Macedon reorganized his army, with emphasis on phalanges,[3] and the first

scientific military research.[4] Theban and Macedonian tactics were variations focused on a
concentrated point to break through the enemy phalanx, following the shock of cavalry.[5]
Carefully organized—into tetrarchia of 64 men, taxiarchiae of two tetrarchiae, syntagmatae
of two taxiarchiae, chilliarchiae of four syntagmatae, and phalanges of four chilliarchiae,
with two chilliarchiae of peltasts and one chilliarchia each of psiloi and epihipparchy
(cavalry) attached[6]—and thoroughly trained,[7] these proved exceedingly effective in the
hands of Alexander III of Macedon.

However, as effective as the Greek phalanx was, it was inflexible. Rome made their army into
a complex professional organization, with a developed leadership structure and a rank
system. The Romans made it possible for small-unit commanders to receive rewards and
medals for valor and advancement in battle. Another major advantage was a new tactical
formation, the manipular legion (adopted around 300BC[8]), which could operate
independently to take advantage of gaps in an enemy line, as at the Battle of Pydna.
Perhaps the most important innovation was improving the quality of training to a level not
seen before. Although individual methods were used by earlier generations, the Romans
were able to combine them into an overwhelmingly successful army, able to defeat any
enemy for more than two centuries.[8]

The Roman tactical system

On the infantry level, the Roman Army adapted new weapons: the pilum (a piercing javelin),
the gladius (a short thrusting sword), and the scutum (a large convex shield) providing
protection against most attacks without the inflexibility of the phalanx.[9] Generally, battle
would open with a volley of light pila from up to 18 m (20 yd) (and frequently far less),[10]
followed by a volley of heavy pila just before the clashing with scuta and gladii. Roman
soldiers were trained to stab with these swords instead of slash, always keeping their
shields in front of them, maintaining a tight shield-wall formation with their fellow soldiers.
To motivate the Roman soldier to come within two meters (6 ft) of his enemy (as he was
required to do with the gladius) he would be made a citizen after doing so, upon completion
of his term of service.[10] Roman infantry discipline was strict, and training constant and
repetitive.

The manipular legion was a improvement over the phalanx on which it was based, providing
a flexibility and responsiveness unequalled before that time. By increasing dispersal, triple
that of a typical phalanx, the manipular legion had the unanticipated benefit of reducing the
lethality of opposing weapons.[11] Coupled with superb training and effective leaders, the

Roman army was the finest in the world for centuries. The army's power on the field was
such that its leaders avoided most fortifications, preferring to meet the enemy on open
ground. To take an enemy-held fortification, the Roman army would cut off any supply lines,
build watchtowers around the perimeter, set up catapults, and force the enemy to attempt
to stop them from reducing the fortification's walls to rubble. The Roman army's
achievements were carefully carved in stone on Trajan's Column, and are well documented
by artifacts strewn about battlefields all over Europe.

Middle Ages
After the fall of the Roman Empire, many of the ingenious tactics they used disappeared.
Tribes such as the Visigoths and Vandals preferred to simply rush their enemies in a
massive horde. These tribes would often win battles against more advanced enemies by
achieving surprise and outnumbering their foes. Born out of the partition of the Roman
Empire, the Byzantine Empire created an effective military. Its conscripts were well-paid and
led by commanders educated in military tactics and history. However, the army mostly relied
on cavalry, making the infantry a smaller portion of its overall force.

The Vikings were able to be effective against stronger enemies through surprise and
mobility. Like guerrillas in other wars, the Vikings could decide when and where to attack. In
part because of their flat bottomed ships, which enabled them to sneak deep into Europe by
river before carrying out an attack, the Vikings could frequently catch their enemies by
surprise. Monasteries were common targets because they were seldom heavily defended
and often contained substantial amounts of valuables. The Vikings were fearsome in battle,
but they became even more so when they included Berserkers.

Battles of the Middle Ages were often smaller than those involving the Roman and Grecian
armies of Antiquity. Armies (much like the states of the period) were more decentralized.
There was little systematic organisation of supplies and equipment. Leaders were often
incompetent; their positions of authority often based on birth, not ability. Most soldiers were
much more loyal to their feudal lord than their state, and insubordination within armies was
common. However, the biggest difference between previous wars and those of the Middle
Ages was the use of heavy cavalry, particularly knights. Knights could often easily overrun
infantry armed with swords, axes, and clubs. Infantry typically outnumbered knights
somewhere between five and ten to one. They supported the knights and defended any loot
the formation had. Infantry armed with spears could counter the threat posed by enemy
cavalry. At other times pits, caltraps, wagons or sharpened wooden stakes would be used as
protection from charging cavalry, while archers brought down the enemy horsemen with
arrows; the English used stakes to defend against French knights at the Battle of Agincourt
in 1415.

Pikemen often became a substitute for communities and villages who could not afford large
forces of heavy cavalry. The pike could be up to 18 feet (5.5 m) long, whereas the spear was
only 6 to 8 feet (2.4 m) in length. Archers would be integrated into these forces of
spearmen or pikemen to rain down arrows upon an enemy while the spears or pikes held the
enemy at bay. Polearms were improved again with creation of the halberd. The halberd
could be the length of a spear, but with an axe head which enabled the user to stab or chop
the enemy cavalry with either the front of the axe or a thin point on the opposite side. The
Japanese also created polearms. The naginata consisted of an approximately 6-foot (1.8 m)
long shaft and a 2.5-foot (0.76 m) blade. The naginata was often used by women to guard a
castle in the absence of men.
 Infantry besieging Jerusalem during
the First Crusade

The crossbow, which did not require trained archers, was frequently used in armies where
the extensive training necessary for longbow was not practical. The biggest disadvantage of
crossbows was the slow reloading time. With the advent of steel and mechanical drawing
aids, crossbows became more powerful than ever. Armor proof against longbows and older
crossbows could not stop quarrels from these improved weapons. Pope Innocent II put a
ban on them, but the move toward using this lethal weapon had already started.

The first gunpowder weapons usually consisted of metal tubes tied down to wooden staves.
Usually, these weapons could only be fired once. These gonnes, or hand cannons, were not
very accurate, and would usually be fired from city walls or in ambush. Like the crossbow,
the gonne did not require trained soldiers and could penetrate the armor worn by enemy

soldiers. Missiliers (whatever their weapon) were protected by soldiers with melee weapons.
Knights would be on either sides of this force and close in on the enemy to destroy them
after they had been weakened by volleys. The introduction of firearms presaged a social
revolution; even an illiterate peasant could kill a noble knight.

Modern history

Early modern period

A tercio in "bastioned square," in battle.

As firearms became cheaper and more effective, they grew to widespread use among
infantry beginning in the 16th century. Requiring little training, firearms soon began to make
swords, maces, bows, and other weapons obsolete. Pikes, as a part of pike and shot
formation survived a good deal longer. By the mid-16th century, firearms had become the
main weapons in many armies. The main firearm of that period was the arquebus. Although
less accurate than the bow, an arquebus could penetrate most armours of the period and
required little training. In response, armor thickened, making it very heavy and expensive. As
a result, the cuirass replaced the mail hauberk and full suits of armour, and only the most
valuable cavalry wore more than a padded shirt.

Soldiers armed with arquebuses were usually placed in three lines so one line would be able
to fire, while the other two could reload. This tactic enabled an almost constant flow of
gunfire to be maintained, and made up for the inaccuracy of the weapon. In order to hold
back cavalry, wooden palisades or pikemen would be in front of arquebusiers. An example
of this is the Battle of Nagashino.

Maurice of Nassau, leader of the 1580s Dutch Revolt, made a number of tactical
innovations, one of which was to break his infantry into smaller and more mobile units,
rather than the traditional clumsy and slow moving squares.[12] The introduction of volley
fire helped compensate for the inaccuracy of musket fire by and was first used in European
combat at Nieuwpoort in 1600. These changes required well-drilled troops who could
maintain formation while repeatedly loading and reloading, combined with better control
and thus leadership. The overall effect was to professionalise both officers and men;
Maurice is sometimes claimed as the creator of the modern officer corps.
His innovations were further adapted by Gustavus Adolphus who increased the
effectiveness and speed of volley fire by using the more reliable wheel-lock musket and
paper cartridge, while improving mobility by removing heavy armour.[13] Perhaps the
biggest change was to increase the numbers of musketeers and eliminating the need for
pikemen by using the plug bayonet.[14] Its disadvantage was that the musket could not be
fired once fixed; the socket bayonet overcame this issue but the technical problem of
keeping it attached took time to perfect.

Prussian line infantry attack at the 1745 Battle of Hohenfriedberg.

Once this was resolved in the early 18th century, the accepted practice was for both sides
to fire then charging with fixed bayonets; this required careful calculation since the closer
the lines, the more effective the first volleys. One of the most famous example of this was at
Fontenoy in 1745 when the British and French troops allegedly invited each other to fire
first.[15]
The late 17th century emphasised the defence and assault of fortified places and avoiding
battle unless on extremely favourable terms.[16] In the 18th century, changes in infantry
tactics and weapons meant a greater willingness to accept battle and so drill, discipline and
retaining formation became more important. There were many reasons for this, one being
that until the invention of smokeless powder, retaining contact with the men on either side
of you was sometimes the only way of knowing which way to advance. Infantry in line was
extremely vulnerable to cavalry attack, leading to the development of the carré or square;
while not unknown, it was rare for cavalry to break a well-held square.

Late modern period

Napoleonic

Napoleon Bonaparte did many things to change the nature of warfare. Napoleon's single
greatest legacy in warfare was the extensive use and elaboration of the disseminated army;
he separated groups of units in his army to spread them out over a wider area but kept them
under his central command unlike in earlier times when each separate division would have
fought independently. This allowed him to force battle by turning or encircling the enemy
army where in previous eras armies only fought by mutual consent or because a surprise
manoeuvre had them trapped against an obstacle such as a river.
He relied heavily on the column, a formation less than a hundred men wide and containing
an entire brigade in tight formation and mostly advanced to contact with the bayonet. The
constant movement and sheer mass of this formation could break through most enemy
lines, but was susceptible to being broken by well drilled or large volumes of fire as it could
not fire as it advanced. Its main advantage was its ability to march rapidly and then deploy
into line comparatively easily, especially with well drilled and motivated troops such as those
available to Napoleon after the French Revolution. He later utilised the Mixed Order
formation which could be a combination of one or more lines supported by one or more
columns. This offered the extended firepower of the line with the rapid reaction ability of the
column in support.

The column formation allowed the unit rapid movement, a very effective charge (due to
weight of numbers) or it could quickly form square to resist cavalry attacks, but by its nature
only a fraction of its muskets would be able to open fire. The line offered a substantially
larger musket frontage allowing for greater shooting capability but required extensive
training to allow the unit to move over ground as one while retaining the line.

The mixed order remained a part of French tactical doctrine as the French army grew in
discipline, capitalising as it did on the strengths of both the line and column formations,
while avoiding some of their inherent weaknesses. It was used extensively by Napoleon
when commanding the Grande Armée.
This greatly surpassed other armies at the time which had to move slowly to keep their lines
aligned and coherent and as such keep the cavalry from their interior; spaces could be
guarded with musket fire, but the line had to be generally aligned and this could be lost over
even apparently flat undulating ground as individuals slowed or sped up across uneven
ground. The only antidote was slow movement and the column afforded tactical battlefield
manoeuvrability and as such a chance to outflank or outmanoeuvre the enemy, or, more

importantly, concentrate against weaknesses in the enemy lines.

Napoleon was also an avid user of artillery—he began his career as an artillery officer—and
used the artillery to great effect due to his specialist knowledge. The French army after the
French Revolution was greatly motivated and after the reforms of 1791, well trained in the
newest doctrine.

Napoleon was eventually defeated, but his tactics were studied well into the 19th Century,
even as improved weapons made massed infantry attacks increasingly hazardous.

Irregular tactics

Countries which have not been major world powers have used many other infantry tactics.
In South Africa, the Zulu impis (regiments) were infamous for their bull horn tactic. It
involved four groups - two in the front, one on the left, and one on the right. They would
surround the enemy unit, close in, and destroy them with short assegai, or iklwas while fire-
armed Zulus kept up a harassing fire. The Zulu warriors surprised and often overwhelmed
their enemies, even much better armed and equipped enemies such as the British army.

The Sudanese fought their enemies by using a handful of riflemen to lure enemy riflemen
into the range of concealed Sudanese spearmen. In New Zealand the Māori hid in fortified
bunkers or pā that could withstand strikes from even some of the most powerful weapons of
the 19th century before luring opposing forces into an ambush. Sometimes the natives
would arm themselves with weapons similar or superior to those of the imperialistic country
they were fighting. During the Battle of Little Bighorn, Lt. Colonel George Custer and five out
of twelve companies of the 7th Cavalry were destroyed by a force of Sioux and
Cheyenne.[17]

Unconventional infantry tactics often put a conventional enemy at a disadvantage. During

the Second Boer War, the Boers used guerrilla tactics to fight the conventional British Army.
Boer marksmen would often pick off British soldiers from hundreds of yards away. These
constant sniper attacks forced the British infantry to begin wearing khaki uniforms instead
of their traditional red. The Boers were much more mobile than the British infantry and thus
could usually choose where a battle would take place. These unconventional tactics forced
the British to adopt some unorthodox tactics of their own.

After 1945
The Korean War was the first major conflict following World War II. New devices, including
smaller radios and the helicopter were also introduced. Parachute drops, which tended to
scatter a large number of men over the battlefield, were replaced by airmobile operations
using helicopters to deliver men in a precise manner. Helicopters also provided fire support
in many cases, and could be rushed to deliver precision strikes on the enemy. Thus, infantry
were free to range far beyond the conventional fixed artillery positions. They could even
operate behind enemy lines, and later be extracted by air. This led to the concept of vertical
envelopment (originally conceived for airborne), in which the enemy is not flanked to the left
or right, but rather from above.

A Romanian squad of a TAB-77 APC.

This is a typical Soviet arrangement,
with a PK general purpose machine
gun and a RPK light machine gun in
the center and two soldiers with AK-
47 assault rifles and one RPG-7
 grenade launcher on the flanks.
Another soldier provides liaison or
extra firepower where needed.

Mobile infantry tactics

Soviet infantry attack during WWII

As part of the development of armored warfare, typified by blitzkrieg, new infantry tactics
were devised. More than ever, battles consisted of infantry working together with tanks,
aircraft, artillery as part of combined arms. One example of this is how infantry would be
sent ahead of tanks to search for anti-tank teams, while tanks would provide cover for the
infantry. Portable radios allowed field commanders to communicate with their HQs, allowing
new orders to be relayed instantly.

Another major development was the means of transportation; no longer did soldiers have to
walk (or ride a horse) from location to location. The prevalence of motor transport, however,
has been overstated; Germany used more horses for transport in World War II than in World
War I, and British troops as late as June 1944 were still not fully motorized. Although there
were trucks in World War I, their mobility could never be fully exploited because of the
trench warfare stalemate, as well as the terribly torn up terrain at the front and the
ineffectiveness of vehicles at the time. During World War II, infantry could be moved from
one location to another using half-tracks, trucks, and even aircraft, which left them better
rested and able to fight once they reached their objective.

A new type of infantry, the paratrooper, was deployed as well. These lightly armed soldiers
would parachute behind enemy lines, hoping to catch the enemy off-guard. First used by
the Germans in 1940, they were to seize key objectives and hold long enough for additional
forces to arrive. They required prompt support from regulars, however; First British Airborne
was decimated at Arnhem after being left essentially cut off.

To counter the tank threat, World War II infantry initially had few options other than the so-
called "Molotov cocktail" (first used by Chinese troops against Japanese tanks around
Shanghai in 1937[18]) and anti-tank rifle. Neither was particularly effective, especially if
armor was accompanied by supporting infantry. These, and later anti-tank mines, some of
which could be magnetically attached to the tank, required the user to get closer than was
prudent. Later developments, such as the Bazooka, PIAT, and Panzerfaust, allowed a more
effective attack against armor from a distance. Thus, especially in the ruined urban zones,
tanks were forced to enter accompanied by squads of infantry.
Marines became prominent during the Pacific War. These soldiers were capable of
amphibious warfare on a scale not previously known. As Naval Infantry, both Japanese and
American Marines enjoyed the support of naval craft such as battleships, cruisers, and the
newly developed aircraft carriers. As with conventional infantry, the Marines used radios to
communicate with their supporting elements. They could call in sea and air bombardment
very quickly.

The widespread availability of helicopters following World War II allowed the emergence of
an air mobility tactics such as aerial envelopment.

Squad tactics

Offensive tactics

Aggressive squad tactics were similar for both sides, though specifics in arms, numbers,
and the subtleties of the doctrine differed. The main goal was to advance by means of fire
and movement with minimal casualties while maintaining unit effectiveness and control.

The German squad would win the Feuerkampf (fire fight), then occupy key positions. The
rifle and machine gun teams were not separate, but part of the Gruppe, though men were
often firing at will. Victory went to the side able to concentrate the most fire on target most
quickly. Generally, soldiers were ordered to hold fire until the enemy was 600 metres (660
yards) or closer, when troops opened fire on mainly large targets; individuals were fired
upon only from 400 metres (440 yards) or below.

The German squad had two main formations while moving on the battlefield. When
advancing in the Reihe, or single file, formation, the commander took the lead, followed by
the machine gunner and his assistants, then riflemen, with the assistant squad commander
moving on the rear. The Reihe moved mostly on tracks and it presented a small target on
the front. In some cases, the machine gun could be deployed while the rest of the squad
held back. In most cases, the soldiers took advantage of the terrain, keeping behind
contours and cover, and running out into the open when there were none to be found.

A Reihe could easily be formed into Schützenkette, or skirmish line. The machine gun
deployed on the spot, while riflemen came up on the right, left or both sides. The result was
a ragged line with men about five paces apart, taking cover whenever available. In areas
where resistance was serious, the squad executed "fire and movement". This was used
either with the entire squad, or the machine gun team down while riflemen advanced.
Commanders were often cautioned not to fire the machine gun until forced to do so by
enemy fire. The object of the firefight was to not necessarily to destroy the enemy, but
Niederkämpfen - to beat down, silence, or neutralize them.

The final phases of an offensive squad action were the fire fight, advance, assault, and
occupation of position:
The Fire Fight was the fire unit section. The section commander usually only commanded
the light machine gunner (LMG) to open fire upon the enemy. If much cover existed and
good fire effect was possible, riflemen took part early. Most riflemen had to be on the front
later to prepare for the assault. Usually, they fired individually unless their commander
ordered them to focus on one target.

The Advance was the section that worked its way forward in a loose formation. Usually, the
LMG formed the front of the attack. The farther the riflemen followed behind the LMG, the
more easily the rear machine guns could shoot past them.

The Assault was the main offensive in the squad action. The commander made an assault
whenever he was given the opportunity rather than being ordered to do so. The whole
section was rushed into the assault while the commander led the way. Throughout the
assault, the enemy had to be engaged with the maximum rate of fire. The LMG took part in
the assault, firing on the move. Using hand grenades, machine pistols, rifles, pistols, and
entrenching tools, the squad tried to break the enemy resistance. The squad had to
reorganize quickly once the assault was over.

When occupying a position (The Occupation of Position), the riflemen group up into twos or
threes around the LMG so they could hear the section commander.

The American squad's basic formations were very similar to that of the Germans. The U.S.
squad column had the men strung out with the squad leader and BAR man in front with
riflemen in a line behind them roughly 60 paces long. This formation was easily controlled
and maneuvered and it was suitable for crossing areas open to artillery fire, moving through
narrow covered routes, and for fast movement in woods, fog, smoke, and darkness.

The skirmish line was very similar to the Schützenkette formation. In it, the squad was
deployed in a line roughly 60 paces long. It was suitable for short rapid dashes but was not
easy to control. The squad wedge was an alternative to the skirmish line and was suitable
for ready movement in any direction or for emerging from cover. Wedges were often used
away from the riflemen's range of fire as it was much more vulnerable than the skirmish line.

In some instances, especially when a squad was working independently to seize an enemy
position, the commander ordered the squad to attack in sub-teams. "Team Able", made up
of two riflemen scouts, would locate the enemy; "Team Baker", composed of a BAR man and
three riflemen, would open fire. "Team Charlie", made up of the squad leader and the last
five riflemen, would make the assault. The assault is given whenever possible and without
regard to the progress of the other squads. After the assault, the squad advanced, dodging
for cover, and the bayonets were fixed. They would move rapidly toward the enemy, firing
and advancing in areas occupied by hostile soldiers. Such fire would usually be delivered in
a standing position at a rapid rate. After taking the enemy's position, the commander would
either order his squad to defend or continue the advance.
The British method formations depended chiefly on the ground and the type of enemy fire
that was encountered. Five squad formations were primarily used: blobs, single file, loose
file, irregular arrowhead, and the extended line. The blob formation, first used in 1917,
referred to ad hoc gatherings of 2 to 4 men, hidden as well as possible. The regular single
file formation was only used in certain circumstances, such as when the squad was
advancing behind a hedgerow. The loose file formation was a slightly more scattered line
suitable for rapid movement, but vulnerable to enemy fire. Arrowheads could deploy rapidly
from either flank and were hard to stop from the air. The Extended Line was perfect for the
final assault, but it was vulnerable if fired upon from the flank.

The British squad would commonly break up into two groups for the attack. The Bren group
consisted of the two-man Bren gun team and second in command that formed one element,
while the main body of the riflemen with the squad commander formed another. The larger
group that contained the commander was responsible for closing in on the enemy and
advancing promptly when under fire. When under effective fire, riflemen went to fully
fledged "fire and movement". The riflemen were ordered to fall to the ground as if they had
been shot, and then crawl to a good firing position. They took rapid aim and fired
independently until the squad commander called for cease fire. On some occasions the
Bren group advanced by bounds, to a position where it could effectively commence fire,
preferably at 90 degrees to the main assault. In this case both the groups would give each
other cover fire. The final attack was made by the riflemen who were ordered to fire at the
hip as they went in.

Defensive tactics

German defensive squad tactics stressed the importance of integration with larger plans
and principles in posts scattered in depth. A Gruppe was expected to dig in at 30 to 40
metres (33 to 44 yd) (the maximum that a squad leader could effectively oversee). Other
cover such as single trees and crests were said to attract too much enemy fire and were
rarely used. While digging, one member of the squad was to stand sentry. Gaps between
dug-in squads may be left, but covered by fire. The placing of the machine gun was key to
the German squad defence, which was given several alternative positions, usually being
placed 50 metres (55 yards) apart.

Pairs of soldiers were deployed in foxholes, trenches, or ditches. The pair stood close
together in order to communicate with each other. The small sub-sections would be slightly
separated, thus decreasing the effect of enemy fire. If the enemy did not immediately

mobilize, the second stage of defense, entrenching, was employed. These trenches were
constructed behind the main line where soldiers could be kept back under cover until they
were needed.

The defensive firefight was conducted by the machine gun at an effective range while
riflemen were concealed in their foxholes until the enemy assault. Enemy grenades falling on
the squad's position were avoided by diving away from the blast or by simply throwing or
kicking the grenade back. This tactic was very dangerous and U.S. sources report American
soldiers losing hands and feet this way.

In the latter part of the war, emphasis was put on defense against armored vehicles.
Defensive positions were built on a "tank-proof obstacle" composed of at least one anti-
tank weapon as well as artillery support directed by an observer. To intercept enemy tanks
probing a defensive position, squads often patrolled with an anti-tank weapon.

Platoon tactics

This is a sub-unit of a company, comprising three sections with a platoon headquarters. The
strength of standard infantry platoon varies between twenty five and thirty six.

Infantry entrenchment

During the Second World War, trenches, ditches, foxholes and Dragon's teeth (fortification)
were used extensively.

Infantry warfare by type

Jungle warfare

Jungle warfare was heavily shaped by the experiences of all the major powers in the
Southeast Asian theater of operations during the Second World War. Jungle terrain tended
to break up and isolate units. It tended to fragment the battle. It called for greater
independence and leadership among junior leaders, and all the major powers increased the
level of training and experience level required for junior officers and NCOs. But fights in
which squad or platoon leaders found themselves fighting on their own also called for more
firepower. All the combatants, therefore, found ways to increase both the firepower of
individual squads and platoons. The intent was to ensure that they could fight on their own
... which often proved to be the case.

Japan, as one example, increased the number of heavy weapons in each squad. The
"strengthened" squad used from 1942 onwards was normally 15 men. The Japanese squad
contained one squad automatic weapon (a machine gun fed from a magazine and light
enough to be carried by one gunner and an assistant ammunition bearer). A designated
sniper was also part of the team, as was a grenadier with a rifle-grenade launcher.

The squad's TO&E also included a grenade launcher team armed with what historians often
mistakenly call a "knee mortar". This was in fact a light mortar of 50 mm that threw high
explosive, illumination and smoke rounds out to as much as 400 meters. Set on the ground
and fired with arm outstretched, the operator varied the range by adjusting the height of the
firing pin within the barrel (allowing the mortar to be fired through small holes in the jungle
canopy). The balance of the squad carried bolt-action rifles.

The result was that each squad was now a self-sufficient combat unit. Each squad had an
automatic weapons capability. In a defensive role, the machine gun could be set to create a
“beaten zone” of bullets through which no enemy could advance and survive. In an attack, it
could throw out a hail of bullets to keep the opponentʼs head down while friendly troops
advanced. The light mortar gave the squad leader an indirect "hip-pocket artillery"
capability. It could fire high-explosive and fragmentation rounds to flush enemy out of
dugouts and hides. It could fire smoke to conceal an advance, or illumination rounds to light
up any enemy target at night. The sniper gave the squad leader a long-range point-target-
killing capability.

Four squads composed a platoon. There was no headquarters section, only the platoon
leader and the platoon sergeant. In effect, the platoon could fight as four independent, self-
contained battle units (a concept very similar to the US Ranger "chalks.")

The British Army did extensive fighting in the jungles and rubber plantations of Malaya
during the Emergency, and in Borneo against Indonesia during the Confrontation. As a result
of these experiences, the British increased the close-range firepower of their individual
riflemen by replacing the pre-World War II bolt-action Lee–Enfield with lighter, automatic
weapons like the American M2 carbine and the Sterling submachine gun.

However, the British Army was already blessed in its possession of a good squad automatic
weapon (the Bren) and these remained apportioned one per squad. They comprised the
bulk of the squadʼs firepower, even after the introduction of the self-loading rifle (a semi-

automatic copy of the Belgian FN-FAL). The British did not deploy a mortar on the squad
level. However, there was one 2-inch mortar on the platoon level.

The US Army took a slightly different approach.

They believed the experience in Vietnam showed the value of smaller squads carrying a
higher proportion of heavier weapons. The traditional 12-man squad armed with semi-
automatic rifles and an automatic rifle was knocked down to 9 men: The squad leader
carried the M16 and AN/PRC-6 radio. He commanded two fire teams of four men apiece
(each containing one team leader with M16, grenadier with M16/203, designated automatic
rifleman with M16 and bipod, and an anti-tank gunner with LAW and M16).

Three squads composed a platoon along with two three-man machine gun teams (team
leader with M16, gunner with M60 machine gun, and assistant gunner with M16). The
addition of two M60 machine gun teams created more firepower on the platoon level. The
platoon leader could arrange these to give covering fire, using his remaining three squads
as his maneuver element. The M16/203 combination was a particular American creation
(along with its M79 parent). It did not have the range of the Japanese 50 mm mortar.
However, it was handier, and could still lay down indirect high-explosive fire, and provide
support with both smoke and illumination rounds. The US Army also had 60 mm mortars.
This was a bigger, more capable weapon than the Japanese 50 mm weapon. But it was too
heavy for use on the squad or even the platoon level. These were only deployed on the
company level.

The deficiency of the US formation remained the automatic rifleman, a tradition that had
gone back to the Browning Automatic Rifle (BAR) gunner of World War II. The US Army
discovered that an automatic rifle was a poor substitute for a real machine gun. A rifle fired
in the sustained automatic role easily overheated, and its barrel could not be changed. In
post-Vietnam, the US Army adopted the Belgian Minimi to replace the automatic M16. With
an interchangeable barrel and larger magazine, this weapon, known as the M249 in U.S.
inventory, provided the sustained automatic fire required.

The Republic of Singapore Army, whose experience is 100% in primary and secondary
jungle as well as rubber plantation terrain, took the trend one step further. Their squad
contained only seven men, but fielded two squad automatic gunners (with 5.56mm squad
automatic weapons), two grenadiers with M16/203 underslung grenade launchers, and one
anti-tank gunner with rocket launcher and assault rifle.
So in short, jungle warfare increased the number of short/sharp engagements on the
platoon or even squad level. Platoon and squad leaders had to be more capable of
independent action. To do this, each squad (or at least platoon) needed a balanced
allocation of weapons that would allow it to complete its mission unaided.

Mountain warfare

During the Soviet–Afghan War, the Soviet Army and Air Force fought forces called the
Mujahideen. Although the Soviet Army had greater firepower and modern equipment than
the Mujahideen, they were not able to completely destroy them because of the difficulty of
countering guerrilla tactics in the mountains.

When the Stinger missile was supplied to the Mujahideen, they began to ambush Soviet
helicopters and fixed wing aircraft in proximity of the military airfields. This was because the
Stinger was only effective at a range of 15,000 feet (4,600 m), requiring the Mujahideen to
attack the aircraft as they were landing or taking off. The Stinger, however, was not the
"weapon that won the war". Although it did have a significant effect on the conduct of war, it
was not used to shoot down very many aircraft. It did force the Soviets to modify their
helicopter tactics. Helicopters begun to cooperate more closely with the ground forces,
fixed wing aircraft began flying at higher altitudes, and armor and anti-missile electronic
defense systems were added to aircraft to help protect them from the Stinger.
The Soviets countered the Mujahideen tactics in various ways. The Spetsnaz were used
extensively in special operations by being deployed by helicopter into areas identified as
areas often transited by the Mujahideen, or sites of ambushes. Spetsnaz tactics were
effective against Mujahideen because they employed tactics similar to those used by the
Mujahideen; tanks and aircraft were comparatively less effective due to terrain and enemy
mobility in it. The only technology with a significant impact on Mujahideen were land mines
and helicopters, although over time Mujahideen were able to find ways to avoid and evade
both.

As the Soviet operations stalled, they began retaliating against the civilian population for
supporting the Mujahideen. It was not uncommon for Soviet helicopters to raze an Afghan
village in retaliation for an attack against Soviet soldiers. At other times they dropped mines
from aircraft in the fields and pastures, or shooting the livestock with helicopter weapons.
Without the support of the villagers, the Mujahideen were forced to carry their own food in
addition to weapons and military supplies. Another common tactic was to cordon off and

search villages for Mujahideen. These tactics were not unlike those used by the United
States in Vietnam, or by the Germans against Soviet partisans in World War II.

Conventional infantry tactics are generally modified before implementation in Mountain

Warfare as the defending side generally has a decisive advantage over the attacking side by
holding the heights and forcing the enemy to attack uphill against a fully prepared well
entrenched position. So generally, frontal assault is avoided by implementation of blockade
tactics and cutting off the supply lines, thereby creating a siege. This changed in the Kargil
War of 1999 when Indian forces were faced with the huge task of flushing out intruders and
disguised Pakistani soldiers who had captured high mountain posts. Instead of employing
blockade tactics, Indian Army launched frontal assault against Pakistani Army positions but
the tactics were intensely modified by employment of heavy artillery cover often firing in
direct role and relentless air-strikes before the ground attack. As any daytime attack would
be suicidal, all the attacks were made under the cover of darkness to minimize casualties.
The operation took time but was successful and all the positions were recaptured by the
Indian Army after two months of fighting.

American trained Iraqi troops about

to board a UH-60. Through the use
of helicopters, these troops are able
catch insurgents off guard and raid
 their positions.

Trench warfare

British infantry in a trench during

The Battle of the Somme.

During the First World War, the increasing lethality of more modern weapons, such as
artillery and machine guns, forced a shift in infantry tactics to trench warfare. Massed
infantry charges were now essentially suicidal, and the Western Front ground to a standstill.

A common tactic used during the earlier stages of trench warfare was to shell an enemy
trench line, at which point friendly infantry would leave the safety of their trenches, advance
across no man's land, and seize the enemy trenches. However, this tactic of "preliminary
bombardment" was largely unsuccessful. The nature of no man's land (filled with barbed
wire and other obstructions) was one factor. For a unit to get to an enemy trench line, it had
to cross this area, secure the enemy position, then face counterattack by opposing
reserves. It also depended on the ability of friendly artillery to suppress enemy infantry and
artillery, which was frequently limited by "bombproofs" (bunkers), revetments, poor
ammunition, or simply inaccurate fire.

The casualties caused by machine gun fire led to the widespread deployment of light
machine guns such as the Lewis Gun within minor infantry units. Trench warfare also led to
the rapid development of new designs of grenades, rifle grenades and light mortars—all of
which represented a rapid increase in the firepower available to low-level commanders.
There was a growing emphasis on field craft, especially in the British and Dominion Armies,
where night-patrolling and raiding tactics soon also demanded an increase in map-reading
and navigation skills. The infantryman of 1914 was content to be trained in rifle and bayonet
and usually attacked in battalion formations. By 1917 he was used to grenades, rifle
grenades, light machine-guns and more specialized weapons and usually worked his way
forward using platoon or section tactics.[19]

An improvement was the creeping barrage in which artillery fire is laid immediately in front
of advancing infantry to clear any enemy in their way. This played an important part in later
battles such as the Battle of Arras (1917), of which Vimy Ridge was a part. The tactic
required close coordination in an era before widespread use of radio, and when laying
telephone wire under fire was extremely hazardous. In response, the Germans devised the
elastic defence and used infiltration tactics in which shock troops quietly infiltrated the
enemy's forward trenches, without the heavy bombardment that gave advance warning of
an imminent attack. The French and British/Dominion Armies were also engaged in evolving
similar infantry tactics.[20] The Allies introduced the tank to overcome the deadlock of static
positions but mechanical unreliability prevented them from doing so.

The Germans used specially-trained Stormtroopers to great effect in 1918, during Operation
Michael, breaching the Allied trench lines and allowing supporting infantry to pour through a
wide breach in the front lines. Even though most of the German forces were on foot, they
were soon threatening Paris. Only timely and stiff resistance, the use of reserves, and
German logistical and manpower problems prevented an Allied disaster. After this spring
offensive, the Allies launched a series of counter-attacks with tanks and small units of
assault infantry protected by air support and short intense artillery barrages while the main
infantry force followed and seized strongpoints. This forced the Germans back and after
less than three months the allies had made the largest territorial gains on the western front
since the war began. The Germans then sued for peace ending the war.

Urban warfare

Urban warfare draws roots from a variety of tactics and strategies. Typically fought in towns
and cities, Urban combatants would encounter problems such as bystanders, buildings, and
restricted mobility. Unlike the battles of Napoleon, a modern military would be restricted by
narrow alleys and roads. This allows an opponent to predict or limit the movement of one's
motorized vehicles by using weapons such as IED's, RPG's, and artillery. This forces the
infantry to push those threats out.

See also

Suppressive fire

Reconnaissance by fire

Spray and pray

All-around defense/Perimeter defense

Notes

s. Dupuy, p.10.

t. Dupuy, p.10-11.

u. Dupuy, p.11.

v. Dupuy, p.12.

w. Dupuy, p.13.

x. Dupuy, p.14. The simple phalanx could be combined into a grand phalanx of four simple
 phalanges, a formation equivalent to a modern army corps.

y. Dupuy, p.13-14.

z. Dupuy, p.16.

{. Dupuy, p.16-17.

s|. Dupuy, p.17.

ss. Dupuy, p.19. Covering a wider area naturally reduces the tendency of any one soldier to
be killed.

st. Messenger, Charles (2001). Reader's Guide to Military History . Routledge. p. 370.
ISBN 1579582419. Retrieved 22 January 2018.

su. Dyer, Gwynne (1985). War (2006 ed.). Basic Books. p. 61. ISBN 0786717718.

sv. Dupuy, Trevor (1980). The Evolution Of Weapons And Warfare (1990 ed.). Da Capo
Press. p. 131. ISBN 0306803844.

sw. Mackinnon, Daniel (1883). Origin and Services of the Coldstream Guards (2017 ed.).
Forgotten Books. p. 368. ISBN 152788578X.

sx. Messenger, Charles (2001). Reader's Guide to Military History . Routledge. p. 370.
ISBN 1579582419. Retrieved 22 January 2018.

sy. Custer suffered from insubordinate junior officers as much as superior enemy
 weapons, as shown in Sklenar, Larry. To Hell With Honor. Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 2000.

sz. Fitzsimons, Bernard, ed. Illustrated Encyclopedia of Twentieth Century Weapons and
Warfare (London: Phoebus, 1978), Volume 18, p.1929-20, "Molotov Cocktail".

s{. Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-1918, Viking Canada
2008

t|. Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack
1916-18, Yale University Press, 1994.

Bibliography

17th Century
Dupuy, Trevor N., Colonel, U.S. Army. Evolution of Weapons and Warfare. Indianapolis:

Bobbs-Merrill, 1980. ISBN 0-672-52050-8

Dyer, Gwynne. War. New York: Crown Publishers, 1985. ISBN 0-517-55615-4

World War II
World War II Infantry Tactics: Squad and Platoon, Dr Steven Bull, 2004 Osprey Ltd.
Dupuy, Trevor N., Colonel, U.S. Army. Evolution of Weapons and Warfare. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill, 1980. ISBN 0-672-52050-8

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