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Published in:

Philosophy Today Volume 63, Issue 4 (Fall 2019), p. 903–913.

DOI: 10.5840/philtoday202016300

Mark Losoncz: Connection

Connection1

Mark Losoncz

It is not uncontroversial to claim that there are material connections or true predications about

them. In particular, it was suggested that there is no need to be committed to the existence of

an "ontological glue" or a "cement of the universe" beyond well-identified monadic or

monistic properties. The refusal of material connections might resonate with the view that

"mereology is innocent: ontological commitment to the fusion of some things is no further

commitment than commitment to each of them" (Varzi 2014: 48), but also with the

conclusion that, ultimately, reality is an all-embracing whole and there are neither materially

separate things, nor connected ones – there are no gaps and no overlaps. The two extremes of

the mereology of composition, namely, mereological nihilism and monism, are both hostile to

material connections. According to some other theories, only the cognitive powers join

together the material entities. That is to say, connections are merely mental, otherwise

unperceivable projections. Taken altogether, these trends have a rich history in Western

philosophy that goes from the Stoics through Peter Auriol and Ockham to Hume and Leibniz.

The anti-connectionist views are no less important in contemporary pointillist theories

according to which matter should be thematized as a mosaic without dynamic relata resulting

in emergent entities. Understood in this way, eliminativism or reductionism about

connections is a widespread opinion.

However, even the aforementioned historical figures can be interpreted in multiple

ways. Even though it seems that certain Stoics rejected the reality of relations that would be

distinct from their foundation, we can also point out the fact that there is a holistic theory of

connections (sunartesis), sympathy (sympatheia), mixture (krasis), and fusion (sunchusis) in

Stoicism (Nef 2017: 127-32). Furthermore, even the otherwise hard-line projectivist Peter

Auriol claimed that "a real relation exists in potency in extra-mental reality" (Henninger

1989: 170), while emphasizing that, in the virtually ordered universe, "a real relation

connects things, is a medium or condition between things" (Henninger 1989: 182). In spite of

being inclined to deny the existence of all composition, Ockham seems to acknowledge the

reality of certain relations of union (of Christ's nature and the divine Logos, and of matter to

substantial form, and vice versa) (Henninger 1989: 144-45). Hume can also be interpreted as

a philosopher of real connection – "connection" appears two hundred and thirty-three times in

his Treatise of Human Nature and his references to the "secret powers" of connection are of

great importance (Nef 2017: 76-84; Hakkaraine n.d.). Finally, Leibniz is often interpreted as

the main enemy of the concept of links as such, that is to say, as a philosopher who reduces

relations to intrinsic monadic properties (see e.g. Henninger 1989: 5,

184-85; Ladyman 2016: 177; Brower 2016: 41-46) and equates connections to the relations

of implication (Arthur n.d.; Mugnai 1992: 123-24). However, it can be demonstrated not only

that Leibniz does not deny the existence of relational facts and properties, but also that he

repeatedly stresses "the universal connection of all things" (quoted by Mugnai 1992: 52; cf.

Mugnai 2012: 205-08), makes a distinction between relations by comparison and relations by

connection (Mugnai 1990: 65-66), and introduces the term vinculum substantiale in order to

conceptualize connections as entities that unify corporeal substances (Look 1999;

Piwowarczyk 2017). All in all, the forgotten connectionist concepts of the past might be

rediscovered by a renewed philosophy of connections as productive material togetherness.

Almost needless to say, what motivates the view that there are material connections is

the commonsensical conviction that without an extrinsically advenient cement the universe

would be disjointed. In order to do justice to the interdependent character of the world, we

must suppose that it involves some peculiar factors over and above the componible

particulars, a certain in-betweenness beyond arbitrary sums or mere aggregates of simples.

There are ineliminable, non-redundant truthmakers for many of our everyday statements

about material connections. In sum, connections cannot be reduced to the non-connective and

non-connected accidents of connected things. To paraphrase Briceño and Mumford's formula

(Briceño and Mumford 2016: 198) for an entirely different purpose: it is not enough that God

creates only x and y in order to create all the connections between them. According to this

view, connections are not an "ontological free lunch" or "ontologically weird and worrisome"

entities which would cause harm to the allegedly self-evident Ockhamian ontological

economy or to the anti-superfluity principle. In short, connections have work to do, if

admitted to ontology as sui generis factors. What is more, by allowing that certain entities

compose into new entities owing to material connections, matter might be described in a

"hierarchical" and polyadic fashion, as a horizon of nested connections, that is to say, of

pervasive n-adic connections of n+1 things.

Indeed, the endorsement of the concept of material connections and their various

variations (mereological fusion, the overlapping of regions, new composite entities,

misconnections and disconnections, metaconnections of connections, etc.) has serious

implications in many fields. There is no question that the concept of material connection has

an important role with respect to the problem of causal connectibility (see e.g. Van Fraassen

1970: 170-99; Schaffer 2016). The mereotopological concept of connection is crucial in

Whitehead's philosophy, but also in the (mereo)topological theory of Bowman L. Clarke

(Clarke 1981), Joseph Muscat and David Buhagiar (Buhagiar and Muscat 2006), Anthony G.
 4

Cohn and Achille Varzi (Cohn and Varzi 2003). In addition, the concept of connection can be

applied to the so-called fusion emergentism of quantum entanglement and non-separability

(Esfeld 2016; McGeever–Silberstein 1999). Connection is even terminologically relevant in

the case of phenomena such as spin connection and Levi-Civita connection. The problem of

connection is also vital in the philosophy of chemistry, with special emphasis on the question

of emergence and chemical bonds (DeLanda 2015; Yoo et al. 2009). A typology and

topology of material connections might be useful in making a distinction between simply

connected objects and more complexly connected objects, such as hollow spheres (for this

hint see Lowe 2016: 110). The concept of connection might also significantly transform

scientific areas in which the concept of relation and, accordingly, relationalism have been

dominant. Thus, it can be argued that a rigorously developed concept of connection might fit

better with the theory of holistic emergence in systems theory and complexity science than

the mostly unquestioned and nearly consensual relationalism. Surely, it is worth mentioning

that there were different approaches as well. For instance, in his philosophical

conceptualization of complex systems, Paul Cilliers implemented connectionism in the theory

of non-linear neural networks (Cilliers 1998: 25-48). The "connectionist revolution" (Medler

1998; Hayek 2014) is increasingly important in the fields of cognitive science, artificial

intelligence, etc. Connection and connectivity also play an integral part in the widely

conceived field of network theory.

It is one thing to say that there are material connections and true predications about them, but

it is another to say that they are not mere brute, further unanalyzable facts. There are many

variations on this concept, depending on how exactly one wants to define its scope, on the

one hand, and its difference with regard to formal connections and to relations as such, on the

other. In a first approximation, one can start from the insight that connection is something
 5

more than what scholastic philosophy described as "being toward another" (ad aliud se

habere). The assertion about the intrinsic relation "x is larger than y" or the assertion about

the extrinsic relation "x is ten meters from y" do not have to refer to any change in what

comprises the foundation of these relations. This differs from connection which necessarily

implies a change in at least one entity, and goes beyond mere co-actuality and co-occurrence.

Perhaps connections do not ground individuality, but they might well have individuating

powers. When x is connected to y, at least x is somehow transformed (as in the case of

asymmetric connections), but it is also possible that they form a new entity together. This

insight is largely responsible for the realist (modestly realist or hyper-realist) inclinations of

connectionist philosophies. Connections do not express a mere change in our terminology, a

convenient fiction or some pre-established consistency. Obviously, even connections with

minimal consequences imply novelty, that is to say, something real in addition to the

properties of pre-existing entities – connection changes that to which it comes. Thus, by

pointing out the importance of creativity and productivity, the philosophy of connections

confronts "the programme for universal micro-reduction." Connections cannot be eliminated

or reduced by reference to monadic properties (and, what is more, it might be that nothing

can be connected to itself). On the other hand, the philosophy of connections is also opposed

to the claim that "everything is connected (to everything else)." It is evident that this monistic

thesis cannot account for new connections. Hence, the philosophy of connections refuses

reductionism in a double way, not only with respect to the parts, but also regarding the whole.

To add another critical note: similarly to ontic structural realism, connectionist philosophy is

committed to a "holistic ontology which is open to the possibility of different types of

inhabitants of the world" (Ladyman 2016: 205), but it is more careful in describing the links

within reality. Neither does connectionist philosophy necessarily imply that all monadic types

of individuation collapse into connections (x might well have certain fundamental properties
 6

before being connected to y, z, etc.), nor does it have to deny or relativise the existence of the

concrete entities that materialize connections. In short, the philosophy of connections is

committed to the reality of emerging connections, but avoids the risky (and overmining,

macro-reductionist) assertion that every kind of concreteness emerges from the world of pure

connections. Another thing also sets connectionist philosophy apart from ontic structural

realism: it embraces only weak holism which suggests that something more than the

connected entities is needed to account for connections. Moreover, even though connectionist

philosophy pays much attention to holistic entities or properties over and above the connected

items, being glued or fused together and resulting in new sets of powers, it does not imply the

thesis that all connections work that way. For instance, when a spy uses a special machine in

order to be connected to an information system, this action might have no effect on the

information system – the spy and the information system do not form a new unifying entity

together. To put it in a formalized way: x might well be connected to y without producing an

additional z entity and without presupposing a whole that would in advance embrace both x

and y. In short, x and y can remain entirely disparate entities.

Clearly, the philosophy of connections does not believe in a cosmic and unified entity

that Helen Beebee called the "something-holding-the-universe-together with a penchant for

conspiracy theories" (Beebee 2006: 525). On the contrary, connectionist philosophy respects

the rich diversity and contextualized character of connections. Its scope extends from merely

juxtaposed nexus (and what Peter van Inwagen calls "fastenation"), through coupling and co-

penetration that leave the connected entities separated, to fusion in which intimate

bondedness might result in new holistic entities that do not fall under the same sortal as the

previously existed entities. The philosophy of connections should not underestimate either the

role of pure contacts (however, it should not imply the reductive thesis that "composition has

to do with the right kind of contact" [Kriegel 2008: 360]), or the possibility of creating
 7

additional assemblages by the way of connection. One might conclude that this way of

thinking avoids the infinite regress of "related relations" and the danger of assuming relations

without their concrete bearers, but it does not necessarily imply that connections cannot

survive without the entities that they initially connected. A cable as a connective entity might

well be disconnected from a network in order to be connected to another one. In this case, we

might well have a true material predication at least about the connective disposition of an

entity. Even though a connectionist philosophy does not have to be committed to the strong

independence of “freely floating” connections, it might be still claimed that connections,

connectivity and nexus are not inescapably swallowed up in the processes of disconnection

and misconnection. There are not only irreducible, strongly external predications about

connections, but there might be also true predications about non-ephemeral, distinct

connections that persist in spite of the cessation of entities that they initially connected. These

insights might be useful in resisting the temptation to deflate the ontological status of

connections. Broadly speaking, connectionism is not "merely attempting to switch the role of

two traditional categories – substance and relation" (Briceño and Mumford 2016: 206); on the

contrary, it introduces a new concept in order to shed new light both on substance and

relation, and also to offer an alternative to the corresponding dilemma of particularist

ontology and relationalism.

Up until this point, we focused upon those general characteristics of connections that

are shared by both formal and material connections (and by the possible connections between

formal and material entities, or multicategorial ones, such as exemplification). At this point,

following the lead of certain connectionist philosophers, we will make an attempt to define

the specific nature of material connections. Recently, Frédéric Nef has become an extremely

important torchbearer of the philosophy of connection as a relatively autonomous

syndésiologie (especially in his book under the telling, but somewhat problematic title Anti-
 8

Hume, as it would be better entitled as Anti-Lewis). He conceptualizes connections as

productive entities that are distinct from other types of links (liaisons) such as relations, and

by keeping in mind the difference between connections as processes and nexus as the results

of those processes. From this point of view, what is called "material relation" (such as the

relations of collision or smiling at) is in fact a material connection. For our purposes, it is of

great relevance that Nef points out that the problem of connection is close to that of

emergence (Nef 2017: 33). He also tries to make a rigorous and axiomatic distinction

between material and formal connections. According to his theory, in contrast to formal

connections, material connections are non-reflexive (nothing material can be connected to

itself), weakly asymmetric (if x is connected to y, then it is not necessary that y is also

connected to x), necessarily oriented to something (they cannot be directionally neutral or

topic-neutral) and non-transitive (if x is connected to y and y is connected to z, then it is not

necessary that x is also connected to z). In this view, it is also important that the connection

of material entities can itself be materialized as a further material entity, as is the case with

networking cables (to put it in a formalized way: it is possible that x is connected to y by z).

In addition, Nef raises the question whether formal (for instance, syntactic) connections are

always based on material ones. He also makes a distinction between two kinds of material

connection: one makes a rupture in continuity (as is the case of skin), the other at least

partially assimilates certain entities (as is the case of chemical mixtures). It is suggested that

physical cohesion and coherence are both based on connection. Finally, it is worth noting that

Nef leaves open the question whether the difference between material and formal connections

can be identified with the difference between weak and strong connections. Roughly

speaking, it might be that material entities can be separated without further ado. For instance,

a cable can be disconnected from an information system without implying any essential

change in the nature of the cable or the information system. However, Nef also points out that
 9

there might be strong material connections as well, as is the case with the scientific law of the

connection between sound and mass. Obviously, Nef's syndésiologie is committed not only to

the thesis that connections are not mere brute facts, but also to the claim that the specificity of

material connections can be further analyzed.

Compared to the philosophy of relations, the philosophy of connections is much more

inclined to affirm the possibly material character of the links in the world. While a

philosophy of relations might claim that relations are creations of reason or, together with

Russell, that relations are "neither material nor mental" (cited by Briceño and Mumford 2016:

202), the philosophy of connections can do justice to material togetherness from the very

start. This implies a special attention not only to the diversity of material connections, but

also to the variability in well-established material nexus. Given that connectionism is,

similarly to ontological emergentism, committed to the failure of mereological supervenience

and that it tends to reject priority atomism, it might also offer new insights with regard to

composite entities such as heaps, artifacts, or organisms. Connectionism assumes at least the

truth of mereological aliquidism, that is to say, of the thesis that "some non-empty sets of

[material] things do compose something" (Koons and Pickavance 2017: 505). As for the

question whether something seems to be missing in order to compose a new material entity or

to create unitary powers based on previously existing entities, connectionism's answer is:

connections. We should draw up the inventory of materality by including connections as

well, because being appropriately arranged and aggregativity cannot be the whole truth about

composite material entities. Thus, the conceptualization of material connections might serve

as a corrective to the fact that "the axioms of mereology are silent about the instrinsic

characters of fusions" (MacBride n.d.).

In this article, we will draw up the basic dilemmas and challenges with regard to the

connectionist interpretation of the history of philosophy, without attempting to give anything

like a complete history of the concept of connection. Owing to the "retroactive force" of the

contemporary concept of connection, this historical investigation might discover something

like a historia abscondita of connectivisms or at least certain sketches of the philosophies of

connection. One of the difficulties of this investigation is that the concept of connection was

often hidden among mereological, emergentist, or other general arguments, mostly only in

germ. For instance, it might be argued that Aristotle's philosophy and, following his lead,

many Aristotelian philosophies include implicit or explicit commitments with regard to

material connections, in spite of certain anti-connectionist inclinations: the link between

cause and effect (Marmodoro 2013), the exemplification nexus between universals and

particulars (Loux 1998: 56-57), the tie between matter and form (Loux 1995: 258), the

problem of the mixture of elements (Conleth 2009), the emergence of material complexity

(Lennox 2014), polyadically conceived relations (Hood 2004), or scholastic topics such as

transubstantiation and incarnation (Marmodoro–Hill 2010) might all presuppose or entail a

concept of material connection. Moreover, we are convinced that the pre-modern and early

modern history of philosophy could appear in a new light by taking into consideration the

problem of material connection in the works of Simplicius, Alexander of Aphrodisias,

Abélard, Nicholas of Paris, Cusanus, and others.

What makes this investigation extremely difficult is that the concept of connection

often operates under the veil of the concept of relation. Nevertheless, it is of great importance

that connection and its synonyms explicitly appear in the Western philosophical tradition.

Besides the already mentioned Stoics, Leibniz, Hume, and others, one might also draw

attention to the concept of nexus (nexus elementorum, nexus rerum, etc.) and concrescence in

Baumgarten's, Wolff's, Bergmann's, and Whitehead's philosophy (Nef 2017: 27-28, 98-102,
 11

164-69; Nef 2009). A connectionist perspective might shed new light on more recent

philosophies as well. An obvious example is Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus as

a book that emphasizes the rhizomatic capacity to multiply connections and be connected to

anything other (and as a book in which "connection" appears more than 150 times) (Deleuze

and Guattari 1987). These insights have serious consequences in DeLanda's neo-materialist

assemblage theory (DeLanda 2016) and in Packer and Wiley's materialist approach to media,

mobility and networks (Packer and Wiley 2012). Material ontologies, inspired by Husserlian

ontology, also pay attention to the emergence of new layers and to the mereological links

made "by co-penetration or by connection" (Albertazzi 1996: 204). Of course, anti-

connectionist statements and suggestions, formulated by reductionist monists, priority

atomists, and others, also make part of the conceptual history of connection. The scope of

investigation might be further extended by taking into consideration not only the synchronic-

vertical aspects of connection, but also the diachronic-horizontal ones. For instance,

Bergson's philosophy of time can be well interpreted within a connectionist framework.

Roughly speaking, with regard to a given singularity, event A and event B necessarily form a

heterogeneously connected continuity and result in new holistic properties. Mandelstam was

right when he suggested that Bergson "is interested exclusively in the internal connection

among phenomena" (cited by Fink 1999: 69). This connectivist framework can also be

applied to Bergson's concept of matter as the “movement of movements.” On the other hand,

Humphreys's diachronic, non-supervenience-based account of fusion and emergence

(Humphreys 1997) and Bickhard and Campbell's process model of emergence (Bickhard and

Campbell 2000) can illustrate the contemporary trends in “temporalist” connectionism.

Finally, the non-Western history of the concept of connection lies beyond the scope of this

essay, but it seems evident that even a certain kind of strong connectionism is implied by

many Indian and Chinese-Korean-Japanese traditions. For example, Huayan Buddhism

describes the world as Indra's net, that is to say, as the interconnectedness of all phenomena

(Fox 2013).

All things considered, our essay confirms Dipert's suggestion that many philosophies

"have hinted at claims concerning ... the 'connectedness' of all things," but "few theories have

forthrightly, and with rigor and clarity, addressed ... this supposed connectedness" (Dipert

1997: 329). However, it is also true that the perspective of matter and materiality is especially

of help in discovering what was fruitful in the hidden, forgotten, or underestimated history of

connectionism.

University of Belgrade

Notes
1
. The essay is a part of research project no. 43007, funded by Ministry of Education, Science and

Technological Development – Republic of Serbia.

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