During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG

15. DOJ stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-claimants

were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay
16. DENR vs Yap (G.R. No. 167707, October 08, 2008) Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut
DECISION trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees
REYES, R.T., J.: had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4)
present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over respondents-claimants declared the land they were
12
their occupied lands. occupying for tax purposes.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. The parties also agreed that the principal issue for
167707, a petition for review on certiorari of the resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No.
1 2
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with
the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents- the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon
13
claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of submission of their respective memoranda.
14
Boracay for titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, The RTC took judicial notice that certain parcels of land in
a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-
Proclamation No. 10645">[3] issued by President Gloria 5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol.
and agricultural land. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262
15
The Antecedents filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. The titles were
G.R. No. 167707 issued on
16
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its August 7, 1933.
powdery white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, RTC and CA Dispositions
is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
4
island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants who live in the respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:
5
bone-shaped island’s three barangays. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose
Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly
Reservation Survey of Boracay situated to acquire title to their lands in Boracay, in
6
Island, which identified several lots as being occupied or accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner
7
claimed by named persons. prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of
8
issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a
among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the title to the land.
17
Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under SO ORDERED.
the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their
(PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither
9
Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82
Proclamation No. 1801. mentioned that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could
18
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No not be the subject of disposition. The Circular itself
19
3-82 precluded them from filing an application for judicial recognized private ownership of lands. The trial court
20 21
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling cited Sections 87 and 53 of the Public Land Act as basis
purposes, respondents-claimants for acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and that only those forested areas in public lands were
22
and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with declared as part of the forest reserve.
the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan. The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was
23
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA.
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in
doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:
lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this
24
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.
Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they occupied
10
and paid realty taxes on them. since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly
25
and its implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a G.R. No. 173775
tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707,
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation
26
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred
to have the lots registered in their names through judicial (400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection
confirmation of imperfect titles. purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and
(OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a
countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of
the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall
classified as "public forest," which was not available for form part of the area reserved for forest land protection
disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree purposes.
11
(PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando
27 28 29
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance Sacay, Wilfredo Gelito, and other landowners in
on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for
Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation
30
CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not No. 1064. They allege that the Proclamation infringed on
been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever their "prior vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership. have been in continued possession of their respective lots
in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested
billions of pesos in developing their lands and building Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts
31
internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots. in their bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title,
36
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 in relation to Act No.
proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. 926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874
37 38
Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the and CA No. 141; (b) Proclamation No. 1801 issued by
island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No.
39
of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land 1064 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We
32
Act. Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial
the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and
of imperfect title. executive acts.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners- But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of
claimants do not have a vested right over their occupied the executive to reclassify lands of the public domain.
portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain
40
forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being into agricultural, forest or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973
public forest, the claimed portions of the island are Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural,
inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement,
confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other
41
department, not the courts, which has authority to classes as may be provided by law, giving the government
42
reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and great leeway for classification. Then the 1987
disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
43
act in order to release the lots for disposition. classification with one addition: national parks. Of
44
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the these, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to
consolidation of the two petitions as they principally Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island
involve the same issues on the land classification of had never been expressly and administratively classified
33
Boracay Island. under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
Issues unclassified land of the public domain.
G.R. No. 167707 The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with
45
respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire the conservation of such patrimony. The doctrine has
34
title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island. been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
46
G.R. No. 173775 Constitutions.
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely: All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
I. private ownership are presumed to belong to the
47
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from
PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to
RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL the State as part of the inalienable public
48
OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF domain. Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if
THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private
1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is
AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC determine who shall be the favored recipients of public
FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705? lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted
II. such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary
49
RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR OCCUPIED acts of ownership.
PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian
THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE? ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the
50
III. Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. The Regalian
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the
INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the
OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM? Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the
51
IV. public domain."
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria
2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law
PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds
52
IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF as well as possessory claims.
53
THE CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law partly
CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657. amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the
V. Indies. It established possessory information as the method
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain
54
ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY conditions which were set forth in said decree. Under
PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or
55
OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN possessory information title, when duly inscribed in the
35
BORACAY? (Underscoring supplied) Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted
(respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners- possession which must be actual, public, and
56 57
claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles adverse, from the date of its inscription. However,
over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions possessory information title had to be perfected one year
pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17,
58
imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.
involve their right to secure title under other pertinent In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish
laws. regime could only be founded on royal concessions which
Our Ruling took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant;
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con
to reclassify lands of the public domain el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by
 80
purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land
59 81
information title. > into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable
the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the lands only to those lands which have been "officially
60 82
Philippine Bill of 1902. By this law, lands of the public delimited and classified."
domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of
(3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the
61
or forest lands. The act provided for, among others, the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant who must prove that the land subject of the application is
62 83
(freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system). It also alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
provided the definition by exclusion of "agricultural public incontrovertible evidence must be established that the
63
lands." Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
84
under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared disposable. There must still be a positive act declaring
64
in Mapa v. Insular Government: land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as prove that the land subject of an application for
used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x existence of a positive act of the government such as a
65
x (Emphasis Ours) presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
85
No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The
act established a system of registration by which recorded applicant may also secure a certification from the
title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. government that the land claimed to have been possessed
66
This is known as the Torrens system. for the required number of years is alienable and
86
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine disposable.
Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and administrative action, report, statute, or certification was
made provisions for judicial and administrative presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence
confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay
public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the occupied by private claimants were subject of a
nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease government proclamation that the land is alienable and
67
or purchase lands of the public domain. Under the Act, disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that
occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years lands occupied by private claimants were already open to
preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or
68 87
confirmation of imperfect title. reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of
Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Boracay Island, or portions of it, agricultural lands.Private
Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural
exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans land pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the
88
and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the Philippine Islands (1919) and De Aldecoa v. The Insular
89
same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, Government (1909). These cases were decided under the
possession and occupation en concepto dueño since time provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926.
69
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the absence
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
90
141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."
day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa
general law governing the classification and disposition of is misplaced. These cases did not have the effect of
lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into
70
lands, and privately owned lands which reverted to the agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine
71
State. Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement through which land registration courts would classify lands
under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be classified
of the public domain since time immemorial or since July as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof
26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by presented in each case.
72
Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, which provided for a simple Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the
thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of President of the Philippines had no power to classify lands
imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No. of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural.
73
1073, which now provides for possession and occupation At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding
74
of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier. classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with
75
The issuance of PD No. 892 on February 16, 1976 implicit power to do so, depending upon the
91
discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land preponderance of the evidence. This was the Court’s
76
registration proceedings. Under the decree, all holders of ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and
92
Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic, in which it
lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land
77
the recording of all unregistered lands shall be governed need not be formally released by an act of the Executive
by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing
amended by Act No. 3344. the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated Government of the Philippine Islands.
by PD No. 1529, known as the Property Registration xxxx
Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and
78
registration of property. It governs registration of lands Ankron v. Government is misplaced. These cases were
under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first
79
including chattel mortgages. Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no
required. In keeping with the presumption of State legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public
there must be a positive act of the government, such as an domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the
courts then were free to make corresponding land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with classes of land. The Government, in the first instance,
implicit power to do so, depending upon the under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation,
93
preponderance of the evidence. decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under considered forestry land, unless private interests have
Act No. 926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter
on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral,
in Ankron that "the courts have a right to presume, in the is a question of proof. Until private interests have
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said
94
lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown." Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry
in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.
95
the public domain had been automatically reclassified as 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra) (Emphasis ours)
disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the
imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the classification of lands from the facts of each case, except
96
public domain into agricultural lands. those that have already became private lands. Act
If We accept the position of private claimants, the No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through
automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or
those already classified as timber or mineral land, alienable reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral
96-a
and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of or forest. Since then, courts no longer had the authority,
State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent whether express or implied, to determine the classification
97
with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian of lands of the public domain.
doctrine. Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol
98
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only who were issued their title in 1933, did not present a
to land registration cases brought under the provisions of justiciable case for determination by the land registration
Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with court of the property’s land classification. Simply put, there
judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the
The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were
administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act
No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial
private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their
failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer
to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue of authorized to determine the property’s land classification.
the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
99
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was We note that the RTC decision in G.R. No. 167707
not absolute. Land classification was, in the end, mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of
100
dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was Manila, which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141,
better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could vesting the Executive with the sole power to classify lands
adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited
101
presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated: the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government, De Aldecoa v.
102
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the The Insular Government, and Ankron v. Government of
103
Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the the Philippine Islands.
particular land in question belongs to one class or another Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it
is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has involved a totally different issue. The pertinent issue
trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in
sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, the general classification of agricultural lands; and if so,
mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court
present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935
104
While, as we have just said, many definitions have been Constitution from acquiring agricultural land, which
given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether
that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically
to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof deemed agricultural.
must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands"
mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior
purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De
105
that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears Aldecoa. As We have already stated, those cases cannot
some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral apply here, since they were decided when the Executive
today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural,
mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And timber, or mineral.
vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926
discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as does not create a presumption that the land is
agricultural today may be differently classified alienable. Private claimants also contend that their
tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in continued possession of portions of Boracay Island for the
106
that particular case, having regard for its present or future requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926 ipso
value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence,
considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge they may apply for a title in their name.
that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court
107
agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in Collado v. Court of Appeals. Collado, citing the
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural
107-a
shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land Resources, ruled:
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, "Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in
therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by The law governed the disposition of lands of the public
the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public
to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a classification of
"issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes.
lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots One is descriptive of what appears on the land while the
therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the other is a legal status, a classification for legal
116
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and purposes. At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine
grants in the Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated the legalstatus of Boracay Island, and not look into its
on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been
Islands remained in the government; and that the replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other
government’s title to public land sprung from the Treaty of commercial establishments, it has not been automatically
Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801
of the public domain whose title still remained in the as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
government and are thrown open to private appropriation proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural
and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation
the government and the friar lands." No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a
mere possession by private individuals of lands creates tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot,
the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and the island is susceptible of private ownership.
108
disposable. (Emphasis Ours) Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural land.
Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made
prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in
117
are considered public forest under PD No. 705. The Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands" and "areas declared
109 118
DENR and the National Mapping and Resource as alienable and disposable" does not by itself classify
110
Information Authority certify that Boracay Island is an the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82
unclassified land of the public domain. makes reference not only to private lands and areas but
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
unclassified lands of the public domain as public forest. No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior
Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a authority from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands
mass of lands of the public domain which has not been the are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
subject of the present system of classification for the Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both
determination of which lands are needed for forest private and public lands merely recognizes that the island
purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to
unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the
are ipso factoconsidered public forests. PD No. 705, Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest
however, respects titles already existing prior to its Development’s authority to declare areas in the island as
effectivity. alienable and disposable when it provides:
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and
forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.
with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the
has been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way positive act needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable
for commercial developments. As a premier tourist and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to
destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or
more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest both, he would have identified the specific limits of each,
land. as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
111
multi-million peso beach resorts on the island; that the The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain
island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island,
the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
the island’s tourism industry, do not negate its character as Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be
public forest. administered by the PTA – to ensure the concentrated
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the efforts of the public and private sectors in the development
112
Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into of the areas’ tourism potential with due regard for
"agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put,
parks," do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands
land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address
113 119
underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. the areas’ alienability.
114
Director of Forestry is particularly instructive: More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only
A forested area classified as forest land of the public Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and
domain does not lose such classification simply because peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro,
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island,
covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan,
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental,
be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of
growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned
forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal would likewise be declared wide open for private
nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly
what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened the
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No.
115 120
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. (Emphasis 141 provide that it is only the President, upon the
supplied) recommendation of the proper department head, who has
the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak of
121
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. within the meaning of Section 4(a).
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL
Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority granted against the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural
to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public
subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to those lands of the
lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the
Department, through the Office of the President. Courts Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously
122
have no authority to do so. Absent such classification, determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in
the land remains unclassified until released and rendered accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry
123 127
open to disposition. Code.
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial
of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither
land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under
buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and the said law. There are two requisites for judicial
trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No.
form part of the area reserved for forest land protection 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
purposes. possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or
Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona
invalid or irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from
classification of Boracay Island made by the President June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as
128
through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
to make such classification, subject to existing vested As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
rights. Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the
further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
provision of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect
(CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of
public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their
longer convert it into an agricultural land without running entitlement to a government grant under our present
afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus: Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and
SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear
129
of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and from the wording of the law itself. Where the land is not
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter
130
lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain Neither may private claimants apply for judicial
suitable for agriculture. confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program: agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the
undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, petition for declaratory relief that private claimants
taking into account ecological, developmental and equity complied with the requisite period of possession.
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are
limits of the public domain. insufficient to prove the first element of possession. We
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of
PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive from later converting private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent
it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince
unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705. this Court that the period of possession and occupation
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and commenced on June 12, 1945.
124
Soterranea Rafols v. Republic, the Court stated that Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in
unclassified lands are public forests. Boracay, having been in possession of the island for a long
While it is true that the land classification map does not time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing
categorically state that the islands are public forests, the the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued
fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same possession and investments give them a vested right which
result. In the absence of the classification as mineral or cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
timber land, the land remains unclassified land until The continued possession and considerable investment of
125
released and rendered open to disposition. (Emphasis private claimants do not automatically give them a vested
supplied) right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court
"reclassification" of land. If the land had never been is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the
previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and
no prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to
126
agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice on apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied
this point: portions in Boracay even with their continued possession
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the and considerable investment in the island.
prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word One Last Note
"reclassification." Where there has been no previous The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been
classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the invested for the development of Boracay Island, making it a
mass of the public domain which has not been the subject by-word in the local and international tourism industry.
of the present system of classification for purposes of The Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands
determining which are needed for forest purposes and of people have called the island their home. While the
which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or Court commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are
some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the
law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat
umiral. 17. de Aldecoa vs Insular Government (G.R. No. 3894.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they March 12, 1909)
may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as TORRES, J.:
amended, this does not denote their automatic ouster On the 8th of March, 1904, in accordance with the new
from the residential, commercial, and other areas they Land Registration Act, Juan Ibañez de Aldecoa applied for
possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this the registration of his title to a parcel of land, 3,375 square
mean the loss of their substantial investments on their meters in extent, situated in the town of Surigao; a plan
occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily and technical description of said parcel was attached to his
mean lack of right to possess. application.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good After the formalities of the law were complied with, and an
faith as builders of improvements. They can take steps to opinion of the examiner of titles opposing the request of
preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may the applicant, had been rendered, the Attorney-General by
look into other modes of applying for original registration a writing dated March 21, 1905, objected to the
131 132
of title, such as by homestead or sales patent, subject registration applied for, alleging that the land in question
to the conditions imposed by law. was the property of the Government of the United States,
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle and is now under the control of the Insular Government;
private claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to that the title of ownership issued by the politico-
exempt them from certain requirements under the present militargovernor of Surigao, Mindanao, issued on the 19th
133
land laws. There is one such bill now pending in the of June, 1889, to Telesforo Ibañez de Aldecoa, antecessor
House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill of the petitioner with respect to the land in question, was
will become a law is for Congress to decide. entirely null and void, for the reason that said grant had
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has not been made in accordance with the laws then in force
taken the step necessary to open up the island to private on the subject, and because the said governor had no
ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease authority to make such a grant; he prayed the court below
some sectors which view the classification of the island to dismiss the application with costs.
partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is As the case stood the applicant, Aldecoa, on the 8th of
no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the April, 1905, amended his former petition, and relying upon
vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a the provisions of paragraph 5 and 6 of section 54 of Act No.
healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological 926, alleged that at the time he requested the registration
conservation is as important as economic progress. of the land in question, comprised in the plan then
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s submitted, the aforesaid Act No. 926 was not yet in force,
survival. Their promotion and protection are not just fancy and as the latter affords better facilities for securing titles
rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that to property unprovided with them, as in the case with the
become more urgent as destruction of our environment land in question, the applicant availing himself of the
gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by benefits granted by the said Act, prayed that the same be
Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v. applied to the inscription of his land, inasmuch as it was
134
Munoz: included within paragraphs 5 and 6 of section 54, Chapter
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in VI, thereof, and prayed the court to take into consideration
adherence to public policy that should be followed with the amendment of his petition.
respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and Evidence was adduced by the petitioner at the trial of the
many more have spoken, and quite often, about the case, and on February 2, 1907, the judge of the Court of
pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, Land Registration entered his decision in the matter and, in
protection, development and reforestation. Not without view of the opposition offered by the Insular Government
justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any denied the petition without costs, and ordered the
country's natural resources. It is of common knowledge by cancellation of the entry made of the said property in the
now that absence of the necessary green cover on our record under No. 408, folio 206 of volume 2 of the
lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious municipality of Surigao.
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers The applicant excepted to this decision and moved for a
and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. new trial; his motion was overruled to which he also
The fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As excepted and presented the corresponding bill of
waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. exceptions which was approved and submitted to this
With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; court.
geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the
floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property – appeal interposed by counsel for Juan Ibañez de Aldecoa, is
crops, livestock, houses, and highways – not to mention whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being
precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations cultivated, and, ceasing to be agricultural land, was
135
should be written down in a lumberman’s decalogue. converted into a building lot, is subject to the legal
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows: provisions in force regarding Government public lands
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 which may be alienated in favor of private individuals or
is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. corporations. While from the remote time of the conquest
CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. of this Archipelago the occupation or material possession
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 together with the improvement and cultivation for a
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. certain number of years, as fixed by the laws of the Indies,
SO ORDERED. of given portions of vacant Government lands, was the
method established by the Government to facilitate the
acquisition thereof by private persons, later, by the royal
decrees of June 25, 1880, and December 26, 1884, the
system of composition with the State and that of sales by
public auction were instituted as the means of acquiring
such lands.
In view of the difficulties which prevented the rapid
dispatch of the proceedings instituted for this purpose, the
royal decree of February 13, 1894, was promulgated,
establishing the possessory information as the method of
legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain
conditions which were set out in said decree.
After the change of sovereignty, the Commission enacted special provision with respect to building lots or urban
Act No. 926, relating to public lands, in accordance with the lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.
provisions of sections 13, 14, and 15 of the Act of the In the decision rendered by this court in the case of Mapa
Congress of the United States of July 1, 1902, section 54, vs. The Insular Government, No. 3793 (10 Phil. Rep., 175),
paragraph 6 of which (Act No. 926) is as follows: the legislation in force was interpreted in a similar sense.
SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their It is not to be believed that it was the sense of the two
legal successors in right, occupying public lands in sovereign powers that have successively promulgated the
the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any said laws, to place those in possession of building lots
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles under title of ownership in an anomalous, uncertain and
to such lands have not been perfected, may apply insecure position, rendering it impossible for them to
to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine obtain legal titles to the lands appropriated by them, and
Islands for confirmation of their claims and the denying them the care and protection of the law to which
issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit: they were certainly entitled on account of the efforts they
xxx xxx xxx have made, both in their behalf, and for the benefit of the
6. All persons who by themselves or their cities and towns in which they reside, contributing to the
predecessors in interest have been in the open, wealth and increase of the country.
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession In the case at bar we have to deal with laws that were
and occupation of agricultural public lands, as enacted after almost all the towns of this Archipelago were
defined by said Act of Congress of July first, established, and it must be assumed that the lawmakers
nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide have started from the supposition that titles to the building
claim of ownership except as against the lots within the confines of such towns had been duly
Government, for a period of ten years next acquired; therefore, in special cases like the present one,
preceding the taking effect of this Act, except wherein is sought the registration of a lot situated within a
when prevented by a war or force majeure, shall town created and acknowledged administratively, it is
be conclusively presumed to have performed all proper to apply thereto the laws in force and classify it as
the conditions essential to a government grant agricultural land, inasmuch as it was agricultural prior to its
and to have received the same, and shall be conversion into a building lot, and is subject at any time to
entitled to a certificate of title to such land under further rotation and cultivation; moreover, it does not
the provisions of this chapter. appear that it was ever mining or forest land.
All applicants for lands under paragraph one, It should be noted that article 1 of the royal decree and
two, three, four, and five of this section must regulation of the 25th of June, 1880, says: "In the
establish by proper official records or documents Philippine Islands, all vacant lands, soils, and grounds
that such proceedings as are therein required without a lawful private owner, or, which have never been
were taken and the necessary conditions under private control, shall be deemed to be alienable
complied with: Provided, however, That such crown lands for the effects of the regulation, and in
requirements shall not apply to the fact of accordance with law 14, title 12, book 4, of the Novísima
adverse possession. Recopilación;" that article 1 of the royal decree of the 14th
Given the above legal provisions and the data contained in of February, 1894, states: "Vacant lands, soils, grounds, and
the record, it is seen that the land, the registration of which mountains in the Philippine Islands shall be deemed to be
is claimed, was of the class of vacant crown or public land alienable Crown lands, provided they are not included
which the State could alienate to private persons, and within the following exceptions: (1) Those of private
being susceptible of cultivation, since at any time the ownership; (2) those belonging to the forest zone; (3) those
person in possession desired to convert it into agricultural comprised in the communal laws, or within zones reserved
land he might do so in the same manner that he had made for the use in common by residents of the community; and
a building lot of it, it undoubtedly falls within the terms of (4) those lands which are susceptible of private
the said Act of Congress, as well as the provisions of the appropriation by means of composition or possessory
abovecited section 54 and paragraph 6 thereof of Act No. information;" and that although section 13 of the Act of
926, for the reason that the said land is neither mining nor Congress of July 1, 1902, directs the Government of the
timber land. Philippine Islands to classify public lands that are neither
We refrain from mentioning herein what originally was the forest nor mining lands according to their agricultural
nature of the land whereon was built the greatest cities of character and productiveness, section 14 authorizes and
the world; and confining ourselves to that on which the empowers the said Government "to enact rules and
cities and towns in these Islands were erected, it can not be regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to
denied that, at the commencement of the occupation of enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in said
this Archipelago by the Spaniards, and at the time of the Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from
distribution of lands, the latter were rural and agricultural Spain to the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the
in their nature. Rural also were the old towns, the cradle conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees
and foundation of the present cities and large towns of the of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal title
Philippines, and as the inhabitants increased, and added to thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title, etc.;" and
the number of their dwellings, the farms gradually became section 15 authorizes and empowers the said Government
converted into town lots. of the Philippine Islands "on such terms as it may
In provincial towns, and in the suburbs of Manila, many prescribed, by general legislation, to provide for the
houses are to be seen that are erected on lots that form granting, or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and
part of land used for agricultural purposes. If for the time settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and
being, and to the advantage of the possessors thereof, they portions of the public domain, other than timber and
have ceased to be such agricultural lands, they may later mineral lands of the United States on said Islands, as it may
on again become transformed into farming land and, by deem wise, etc."
the industry of the owner, again be made to yield fruit. From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised
cultivation, and may be converted into a field, and planted within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the
with all kind of vegetation; for this reason, where land is State or by the sovereign nation are public in character,
not mining or forestall in its nature, it must necessarily be and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to
included within the classification of agricultural land, not the use of the public in general or reserved by the
because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired
but because it was originally agricultural and may again by any private or judicial person; and considering their
become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of origin and primitive state and the general uses to which
Congress contains only three classifications, and makes no they were accorded, they are called agricultural lands,
urban lands or building lots being included in this
classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural and
urban estates from mineral and timber lands; the 18. Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila (18 G.R. No.
transformation they may have undergone is no obstacle to L-630. November 15, 1947)
such classification as the possessors thereof may again MORAN, C.J.:
convert them into rural estates. Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from
If the land sought to be registered is neither mineral nor the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December of 1941, the
timber land, and on the other hand is susceptible of registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May,
cultivation the Act of Congress contains no provision 1945, he sought to accomplish said registration but was
whatever that would exclude it from being classified as denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground
agricultural land, and assuming that it falls within that that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this
classification, the benefits of paragraph 6, section 54, of jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth
Act No. 926, must forthwith be applied for the reason that branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of
it has been fully proven that the applicant was in a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining
possession thereof for more than 13 years prior to the 26th the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko
of July, 1904, when the said Act went into effect. appealed to this Court.
Furthermore, there is no legal reason or cause to exclude There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue
urban lands from the benefits of the aforesaid Act; on the is whether or not an alien under our Constitution may
contrary, the interpretation that urban real estate, that is acquire residential land.
not mineral or forestall in character, be understood to fall It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is
within the classification of agricultural land, is deemed to unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw the appeal
be most rational and beneficial to public interests. which should have been granted outright, and reference is
Therefore, in view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that made to the ruling laid down by this Court in another case
the judgment appealed from should be reversed, and that to the effect that a court should not pass upon a
it should be, as it is, hereby ordered, that, after holding in constitutional question if its judgment may be made to rest
general default all such persons as may have any interest in upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of
the said parcel of land, the registration of the same shall be ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the
granted in accordance with the Land Registration Act. No constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to
special ruling is made as to costs. So ordered. decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to
Willard, J., concurs. be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render
Carson, J., concurs in the result. any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment
simply because we have to avoid a constitutional question.
We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the
appeal only because we wish to evade the constitutional;
issue. Whether the motion should be, or should not be,
granted, is a question involving different considerations
now to be stated.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is
discretionary upon this Court to grant a withdrawal of
appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time
the motion for withdrawal was filed in this case, not only
had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already
been voted and the majority decision was being prepared.
The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever,
and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the
motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of
the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds
to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to
aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one
of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as
against his own stand in this case which had been
maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this
Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal,
the the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander
A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court,
but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice,
issued while this case was pending before this Court.
Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the
withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor General
readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What
is material and indeed very important, is whether or not
we should allow interference with the regular and
complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional
functions, and whether or not after having held long
deliberations and after having reached a clear and positive
conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we
may still allow our conviction to be silenced, and the
constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived,
with all the harmful consequences that might be brought
upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the
new circular be taken full advantage of by many, with the
circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may
never come up again before this court, because both
vendors and vendees will have no interest but to uphold
the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the
register of deeds venture to disobey the orders of their
superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its
conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result
that our indifference of today might signify a permanent of agricultural land, not because it is actually
offense to the Constitution. used for the purposes of agriculture, but because
All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and it was originally agricultural and may again
weighted by this Court for a number of days and the legal become so under other circumstances; besides,
result of the last vote was a denial of the motion the Act of Congress contains only three
withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this classification, and makes no special provision
stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional with respect to building lots or urban lands that
question becomes unavoidable. We shall then proceed to have ceased to be agricultural land.
decide that question. In other words, the Court ruled that in determining
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows: whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is not only
Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility
natural resources. to cultivation for agricultural purposes. But whatever the
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral test might be, the fact remains that at the time the
lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural,
potential energy, and other natural resources of mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural
the Philippines belong to the State, and their lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were
disposition, exploitation, development, or not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the may safely be presumed, therefore, that what the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of Certain expressions which appear in
the inaguration of the Government established Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and
uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with where such words have been in use prior to the
the exception of public agricultural land, shall not adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its
be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease framers and the people who ratified it have used
for the exploitation, development, or utilization such expressions in accordance with their
of any of the natural resources shall be granted technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p.
for a period exceeding twenty-five years, 683.) AlsoCalder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law.
renewable for another twenty-five years, except ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264;
as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, 152 P., 1039.)
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the It is a fundamental rule that, in construing
development of water "power" in which cases constitutions, terms employed therein shall be
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit given the meaning which had been put upon
of the grant. them, and which they possessed, at the time of
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a
heading and its language, embraces all lands of any kind of word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in
the public domain, its purpose being to establish a legal and constitutional history, it will be
permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation presumed to have been employed in that sense
and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, in a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker,
therefore, this provision, with reference to lands of the 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)
public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber Where words have been long used in a technical
and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public sense and have been judicially construed to have
domain are classified into said three groups, namely, a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the
agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a
finds corroboration in the circumstance that at the time of particular statute in which they are used, the rule
the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic of construction requires that the words used in
classification existing in the public laws and judicial such statute should be construed according to
decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public the sense in which they have been so previously
agricultural lands" under said classification had then used, although the sense may vary from strict
acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the literal meaning of the words. (II Sutherland,
members of the Constitutional Convention who were Statutory Construction, p. 758.)
mostly members of the legal profession. Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular in section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution must be
Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said that the construed as including residential lands, and this is in
phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the
Congress of July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that
in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "where the Legislature has revised a statute after a
"those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be
mineral for timber lands." This definition has been followed regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so
in long line of decisions of this Court. revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon
(See Montano vs.Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibañez after the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly
de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth
Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175; Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit the
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations
Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil., 10.) or corporations controlled by such citizens, which is
And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are
since they are neither mineral nor timber lands, of considered as agricultural lands, for, under the
necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibañez Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No.
Court said: 141, "alienable or disposable public lands" which are the
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are
susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted classified into agricultural, residential, commercial,
into a field, and planted with all kinds of industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that
vegetation; for this reason, where land is not the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a
mining or forestal in its nature, it must particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as
necessarily be included within the classification used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are
neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member
particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the cabinet of the late President Quezon who actively
which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision
alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly under consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine
agricultural or actually devoted to cultivation for Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the Quezon
agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice
commercial; industrial; or lands for other purposes. The under the Osmeña administration, and it was firmly
fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both
under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino administrations.
citizens, is a conclusive indication of their character as It is thus clear that the three great departments of the
public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Government — judicial, legislative and executive — have
Constitution. always maintained that lands of the public domain are
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that
Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land Act No. 2874, agricultural lands include residential lots.
aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural
industrial or residential puposes, but after the Constitution resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the shall not be aliented," and with respect to public
right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino
stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving
constitutional limitation. And, again, prior to the agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may
Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who
land of the public domain suitable for residence or may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is
industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in
after the Constitution and under section 60 of Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be leased, Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be private agricultural land will be transferred or
valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of
pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is the public domain in the Philippines.
another legislative construction that the term "public This constitutional provision closes the only remaining
agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes. avenue through which agricultural resources may leak into
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the
interpretation given by the Executive Department of the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all,
Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming
Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether or not private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens.
the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to
XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1.
include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they
purposes of their disposition," rendered the following have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It
short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion: must be noticed that the persons against whom the
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same
classifies lands of the public domain in the persons who under section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or
Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the
This is the basic classification adopted since the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the
enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, non-transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens. Since
known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots,
adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the same technical meaning should be attached to
the term 'agricultural public lands' and, "agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory
therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute
public laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless
in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular a different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory
Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between
'agricultural public lands' means those public "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is
lands acquired from Spain which are neither public and the latter private. But such difference refers to
timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the
followed by our Supreme Court in many same in both sections, and, for the conservation of the
subsequent case. . . . national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the
part of the public domain must have to be State or by its citizens.
included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September
they are neither timber nor mineral, of necessity, 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then Secretary of
therefore, they must be classified as agricultural. Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that domain may be considered as agricultural lands, whereas
in determining whether lands are agricultural or residential lands of private ownership cannot be so
not, the character of the land is the test considered. No reason whatsoever is given in the opinion
(Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524; for such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced
Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind
other words, it is the susceptibility of the land to that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the
cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary conservation of the national patrimony, and private
farming methods which determines whether it is residential lands are as much an integral part of the
agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129). national patrimony as the residential lands of the public
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no domain. Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the
reason is seen why a piece of land, which may be prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots
sold to a person if he is to devote it to would become superflous if the same prohibition is not
agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed, the
to use it as a site for his home. prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from become more important, for time will come when, in view
a Secratary of Justice who later became the Chief Justice of of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of
private individuals, almost all, if not all, the residential Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the
lands of the public domain shall have become private Constitutional Convention who are now members of this
residential lands. Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones,
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article
words "no land of private ownership" were used and later XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even
changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to
and lastly into "no private agricultural land" and from these understand that neither is he allowed to own a pieace of
changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced land.
in the second and final drafts was intended to limit the This constitutional intent is made more patent and is
meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for strongly implemented by an act of the National Assembly
agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are
wording of the first draft was amended for no other referring again to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the
purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874
The words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to
word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and acquire private only by way of reciprocity. Said section
mineral lands, and since under section 1, this kind of lands reads as follows:
can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the same SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any
would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
to be drafted in harmony with section 1 to which it is permanent improvement on such land, shall be
supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to
section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, persons, corporations, associations, or
and the only lands that may become private are partnerships who may acquire lands of the public
agricultural lands, the words "no land of private domain under this Act; to corporations organized
ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by
than "private agricultural land." And thus the change in the their charters, and, upon express authorization
final draft is merely one of words in order to make its by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of
subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of
possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen from the the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire,
first draft. hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as land, or permanent improvements thereon, or
not including residential lots or lands not strictly any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only
agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely in the manner and to the extent specified in such
acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for laws, and while the same are in force but not
themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and thereafter.
cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any
names lands of any area for building homes, factories, manner under the provisions of the former Public
industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal
vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, order, royal decree, or any other provision of law
airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with
not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y
General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the realengos, or lands of any other denomination
conservative spirit of the Constitution is beyond question. that were actually or presumptively of the public
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision domain or by royal grant or in any other form,
of Article XIII of the Constitution and which was embodied nor any permanent improvement on such land,
in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed,
Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources of the except to persons, corporations, or associations
Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, who may acquire land of the public domain
and other natural resources constitute the exclusive under this Act; to corporate bodies organized in
heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be the Philippine Islands whose charters may
preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that authorize them to do so, and, upon express
nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of the authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to
Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman citizens of the countries the laws of which grant
of the Committee on Agricultural Development of the to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right
Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or
connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, alienate land or pemanent improvements
said: "The exclusion of aliens from the privilege of thereon or any interest therein, as to their own
acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real citizens, and only in the manner and to the extent
estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the specified in such laws, and while the same are in
Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the force, but not thereafter: Provided, however,
Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the That this prohibition shall not be applicable to
same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who the conveyance or acquisition by reason of
said: "With the complete nationalization of our lands and hereditary succession duly acknowledged and
natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given legalized by competent courts, nor to lands and
birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands improvements acquired or held for industrial or
. . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and as residence purposes, while used for such
such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's purposes: Provided, further, That in the event of
body, the lack of possession of which may cause instant the ownership of the lands and improvements
death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely mentioned in this section and in the last
antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I preceding section being transferred by judicial
am afraid that the time will come when we shall be sorry decree to persons,corporations or associations
for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a not legally capacitated to acquire the same under
mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to the provisions of this Act, such persons,
have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those corporations, or associations shall be obliged to
of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that alienate said lands or improvements to others so
since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention capacitated within the precise period of five
one of its fixed and dominating objectives was the years, under the penalty of such property
conservation and nationalization of the natural resources reverting to the Government in the contrary
of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved
these section refers to all private lands, whether strictly Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage of "private
agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a
practically no private land which had not been acquired by qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid
any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, or take part in any sale of such real property as a
the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no
effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens distinction between private lands that are strictly
except "upon express authorization by the Philippine agricultural and private lands that are residental or
Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private
to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear
land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to implementation and a legislative interpretation of the
acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of
came the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 opinion that private residential lands may be sold to aliens
was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows: under the Constitution, no legislative measure would have
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would
manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any have been deemed also permissible under the
permanent improvement on such land, shall be Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress
encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to that such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was
persons, corporations, associations, or such opinion that prompted the legislative measure
partnerships who may acquire lands of the public intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the
domain under this Act or to corporations constitutional prohibition.
organized in the Philippines authorized thereof It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we
by their charters. have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our
manner under the provisions of any previous Act, construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other Philippines from owning sites where they may build their
provision of law formerly in force in the homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the
Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in
baldios y realengos, or lands of any other the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however,
denomination that were actually or that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution
presumptively of the public domain, or by royal from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their
grant or in any other form, nor any permanent residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is
alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to
corporations or associations who may acquire remain here forever and share our fortunes and
land of the public domain under this Act or to misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to
corporate bodies organized in the Philippines acquire.
whose charters authorize them to do For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution
so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands,
not be applicable to the conveyance or including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is
acquisition by reason of hereditary succession affirmed, without costs.
duly acknowledged and legalized by competent Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.
courts: Provided, further, That in the event of the
ownership of the lands and improvements
mentioned in this section and in the last
preceding section being transferred by judicial
decree to persons, corporations or associations
not legally capacitated to acquire the same under
the provisions of this Act, such persons,
corporations, or associations shall be obliged to
alienate said lands or improvements to others so
capacitated within the precise period of five
years; otherwise, such property shall revert to
the Government.
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections
120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only difference being that
in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to
aliens is completely stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to
conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of
Article XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the
alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens, grants
them no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction
carries exceptional weight, for prominent members of the
National Assembly who approved the new Act had been
members of the Constitutional Convention.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the
purview of sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired
by one of the means provided in said provisions. We are
not, however, diciding the instant case under the
provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to
land that had been formerly of the public domain,
otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are
deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of
the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more
absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien
of any private agricultural land including residential land
whatever its origin might have been.
19. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Dumyung (GR After a careful examination and deliberation of the
No. L-31666, April 20, 1929)FERNANDEZ, J.: MOTION TO DISMISS, these civil cases filed by the
This is a petition to review the order of the Court of First defendants as well as the two OPPOSITIONS TO
Instance of Baguio City, Branch I, dismissing the three MOTION TO DISMISS filed by both plaintiff and
complaints for annulment of titles in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, intervenor Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company
1069 and 1070 entitled "Republic of the Philippines, and the of all the three civil cases, it clearly shows that
Plaintiff, versus, Manuel Dumyung, et al., Defendants, upon the issuance of said Free Patents on November
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, Intervenor" for 26, 1960, the same were duly registered with the
1
being without merit. office of the Register of Deeds of Baguio and Benguet,
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 122 of Act 496, as
Director of Lands, commenced in the Court of First Instance amended, and consequently, these properties became
of Baguio City Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 for the private properties of the defendants, under the
annulment of Free Patents Nos. V-152242, V-155050 and operation of Sec. 38 of said Act; hence, these titles
V-152243, and of the corresponding Original Certificates of enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as Torrens
Title Nos. P-208, P-210 and P-209, on the ground of titles (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Ciriaco Carle, G. R.
misrepresentation and false data and informations No. L-12485, July 31, 1964). It is therefore clear that
furnished by the defendants, Manuel Dumyung, Fortunate OCT Nos. P-208, P-209 and P-210 belonging to the
Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan, respectively. the land defendants are now indefeasible and this Court has no
embraced in the patents and titles are Identified as Lots 1, power to disturb such indefeasibility of said titles, let
2 and 3 of survey plan Psu-181763 containing a total area alone cancel the same.
of 58.4169 hectares, more or less, and situated in the The records of this case further disclose that the
Municipal District of Mankayan, Sub-province of Benguet, defendants are ignorant natives of Benguet Province
Mountain Province. The Register of Deeds of Baguio City and are members of the so-called Cultural Minorities
was made a formal party defendant. of Mountain Province, who are the same persons
The complaints in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 are accused in the dismissed criminal cases, based on the
2
all dated September 22, 196 l. same grounds. It should be noted that these cases fall
3
The defendants filed their respective answers. squarely under Sec. 3 of Rule III of the New Rules of
11
The Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, petitioner Court.
herein, filed motions for intervention dated February 5, They plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by
4 5
1962 in the three (3) civil cases which were granted. the Director of Lands, and the intervenor, Lepanto
The complaints in intervention alleged that a portion of the Consolidated Mining Company,, filed separate motions for
titled lands in question-.ion is within the intervenor's reconsideration of the order dismissing Civil Cases Nos.
12
ordinary timber license No. 140-'62 dated July 7, 1961 1068, 1069 and 1070. Both motion for reconsideration
13
expiring and up for renewal on June 30, 1962 and another were denied by the trial court. Thereupon the
6
portion of said lands is embraced in its mineral claims. intervenor, Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, filed
The defendants in the three (3) civil cases filed an amended the instant petition.
joint answer with counterclaim to the complaint in The petitioner assigns the following errors:
7
intervention. The said amended joint answer was I
8
admitted in an order dated September 10, 1972. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
Before the hearing on the merits of the three (3) civil cases, ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE OF PRIVATE
the plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines represented by the RESPONDENTS WERE 'INDEFEASIBLE' SIMPLY BECAUSE
Director of Lands, filed in the Court of First Instance of THEY WERE ISSUED PURSUANT TO THE REGISTRATION OF
Baguio City three (3) criminal cases for falsification of THE FREE PATENTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
public document. 9, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2358, II
2359 and 2360, against the defendants Manuel Dumyung, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE
Fortunato Dumyung and Dumyung Bonayan, private RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE BENEFITS OF
respondents herein, for allegedly making untrue REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3872.
statements in their applications for free patents over the III
lands in question. The proceedings on the three (3) civil THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
cases were suspended pending the outcome of the criminal ACQUITTAL OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE
cases. CRIMINAL CASES FOR FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
After the presentation of evidence by the prosecution in DOCUMENTS BARRED THE CIVIL ACTIONS FOR
the three (3) criminal cases, the defense filed a motion to ANNULMENT OF THE FREE PATENTS AND CANCELLATION
dismiss the same on the ground that the accused had OF THE ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OF THE PRIVATE
14
complied with all the legal requirements in the acquisition RESPONDENTS.
of their patents which were duly issued by the Director of Timber and mineral lands are not alienable or disposable.
Lands and that they are not guilty of the alleged The pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act,
falsification of public documents. Commonwealth Act No. 141, provide:
In an order dated December 6, 1967, the trial court Sec. 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of
sustained the theory of the defense and dismissed the the public domain; but timber and mineral lands shag be
three (3) criminal cases, with costs de officio, for governed by special laws and nothing in this Act provided
insufficiency of evidence to sustain the conviction of the shall be understood or construed to change or modify the
9
three (3) accused. administration and disposition of the lands commonly
Thereupon, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss dated called 'friar lands' and those which being privately owned,
October 12, 1968 in Civil Cases Nos. 1068, 1069 and 1070 have reverted to or become the property of the
on the following grounds: (1) extinction of the penal action Commonwealth of the Philippines, which administration
carries with it the extinction of the civil action when the and disposition shall be governed by the laws at present in
extinction proceeds from a declaration that the fact from force or which may hereafter be enacted.
which the civil might arise did not exist; (2) the decision of Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the
the trial court acquitting the defendants of the crime Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to
charged renders these civil cases moot and academic, (3) time classify the lands of the public domain into —
the trial court has no jurisdiction to order cancellation of (a) Alienable or disposable,
the patents issued by the Director of Lands; (4) the (b) Timber, and
certificates of title in question can no longer be assailed; (c) Mineral lands,
and (5) the intervenor Lepanto has no legal interest in the and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such
10
subject matter in litigation. lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
The Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I, dismissed administration and disposition.
the three (3) civil cases because:
The principal factual issue raised by the plaintiff, Republic SEC. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who
of the Philippines represented by the Director of Lands, is not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares and
and the intervenor, petitioner herein, is that the lands who since July fourth, ninth hundred and twenty-six or
covered by the patents and certificates of title are timber prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated,
lands and mineral lands and, therefore, not alienable. either by, himself' or through his predecessors-in-
Without receiving evidence, the trial court dismissed the interest. a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands
three (3) cases on the ground that upon the issuance of the subject to disposition- or who shall have paid the real
free patents on November 26, 1960, said patents were duly estate tax thereon while the same has, not been
registered in the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Baguio occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the
pursuant to Section 122 of Act 496, as amended, and said provision of this chapter, to have a free patent issued to
properties became the private properties of the him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed
defendants under the operation of Section 38 of the Land twenty-four hectares.
Registration Act. The trial court concluded that these titles A member of the national cultural minorities who has
enjoy the same privileges and safeguards as the torrens continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself
title, and Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-208, P-209 and or through his predecessors-in- interest, a tract or tracts
P-210 of the defendants are now indefeasible. of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955,
In its order denying the motion for reconsideration the trial shall be entitled to the right granted in the preceding
court said, paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he
On the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the files his free patent application he is not the owner of
Director of Lands to dispose of the properties since they any real property secured or disposable under this
are within the forest zone, the court finds Republic Act provision of the Public Land Law.
No. 3872, to clear this point. Section 1, amending There is no evidence that the private respondents are
Section 44 of the Land Act in its second paragraph states: members of the National Cultural Minorities; that they
A member of the national cultural, minorities who have continously occupied and cultivated either by
has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest the
himself or through his predecessors-in- interest, a lands in question since July 4, 1955; and that they are not
tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not the owner of any land secured or disposable under the
since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the right Public Land Act at the time they filed the free patent
granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: applications. These qualifications must be established by
PROVIDED, that at the time he files his free patent evidence. Precisely, the intervenor, petitioner herein,
application, he is not the owner of any real property claims that it was in possession of the lands in question
secured or disposable under this provision of the when the private respondents applied for free patents
Public Land Law. thereon.
The 'preceding paragraph' refers to the It was premature for the trial court to rule on whether or
right of a person to have a free patent issued to not the titles based on the patents awarded to the private
him, provided he is qualified, which in this case the respondents have become indefeasible. It is well settled
Director of Lands has the jurisdiction to dispose, that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of
whether the land be disposable or not. This public domain classified as forest or timber and mineral
provision of law, certainly, applies to herein lands. Any title issued on non-disposable lots even in the
defendants. The reason for this law is explicit and hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value, shall be
16 17
could very well be seen from its EXPLANATORY cancelled. In Director of lands vs. Abanzado this Court
NOTE, which reads: said:
'Because of the aggresiveness of our more enterprising 4. To complete the picture, reference may be made to
Christian brothers in Mindanao, Mountain Province, and the learned and scholarly opinion of Justice Sanchez in
other places inhabited by members of the National Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, a 1968 decision. After a
Cultural Minorities, there has be-en an exodus of the review of Spanish legislation, he summarized the
poor and less fortunate non-christians from their present state of the law thus: 'If a Spanish title covering
ancestral homes during the t ten years to the fastnesses forest land is found to be invalid, that land is public
of the wilderness where they have settled in peace on forest land, is part of the public domain, and cannot be
portions of agricultural lands, unfortunately, in most appropriated. Before private interests have intervened,
cases, within the forest zones. But this is not the end of the government may decide for i what Portions of the
the tragedy of the national cultural minorities. Because public domain shall be set aside and reserved as forest
of the grant of pasture leases or permits to the more land. Possession of forest lands, however long, cannot
agressive Christians, these National Cultural Minorities ripen into private ownership.' Nor is this all He
who have settled in the forest zones for the last ten reiterated the basic state objective on the matter in
years have been harassed and jailed or threatened with clear and penetrating language: 'The view this Court
harassment and imprisonment. takes of the cages at bar is but in adherence to public
The thesis behind the additional paragraph to Section policy that should be followed with respect to forest
44 of the Public Land Act is to give the national lands. many have written much, and many more have
culture, minorities a fair chance to acquire lands of the spoken, and quite often, above the pressing need for
public domain' ... forest preservation, conservation. protection,
It is for this reason — that is, to give these national development and reforestation. Not without
cultural minorities who were driven from their ancestral justification For, forests constitute a vital segment of
abodes, a fair chance to acquire lands of the public any country's natural resources. It is of common
domain — that Republic Act 3872 was passed. This is the knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green
new government policy on liberation of the free patent cover on our lands produces a number Of adverse or ill
provisions of the Public Land Act emphasizing more effects of serious proportions. Without the trees,
consideration to and sympathy on the members of the watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply
national cultural minorities, which our courts of justice are emptied of their contents. The fish disappears.
15
must uphold. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease
The trial court assumed without any factual basis that the to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains,
private respondents are entitled to the benefits of Republic the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion
Act 3872. The pertinent provision of Republic Act No, 3872 results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that
reads: wreak havoc and destruction to property — crops,
SECTION 1. A new paragraph is hereby added 1--o livestock, houses and highways — not to mention
Section 44 of Commonwealth Act Numbered One precious human lives, ...'
Hundred-d forty-one, to read as follows: The acquittal of the private respondents in the criminal
cases for falsification is not a bar to the civil cases to cancel
their titles. The only issue in the criminal cases for 20. Republic vs. Court of Appeals and dela Rosa (GR No. L-
falsification was whether there was evidence beyond 43938, April 15, 1988)
reasonable doubt that the private respondents had CRUZ, J.:
committed the acts of falsification alleged in the The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural
informations. The factual issues of whether or not the wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth even if
1
lands in question are timber or mineral lands and whether the land where the discovery is made be private. In the
or not the private respondents are entitled to the benefits cases at bar, which have been consolidated because they
of Republic Act No. 3872 were not in issue in the criminal pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly
case. applied.
There is need to remand these cases to the trial court for These cases arose from the application for registration of a
the reception of evidence on (1) whether or not the lands parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa
in question are timber and mineral lands; and (2) whether on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children,
the private respondents belong to the cultural minorities Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in
and are qualified under Republic Act 3872 to be issued free Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots
patents on said lands. and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the
WHEREFORE, the order dismissing Civil Cases Nos. 1968, application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots
1969 and 1970 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto,
2
is hereby set aside and said cases are remanded to the trial respectively, in 1964.
court for further proceedings, without pronouncement as The application was separately opposed by Benguet
to costs. Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge
SO ORDERED. Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9,
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro and and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau
3
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur. of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto
testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue
of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5
from her father shortly after the Liberation. She testified
she was born in the land, which was possessed by her
4
parents under claim of ownership. Alberto said he
received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto,
who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his
predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and
camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She
was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time,
who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's
5
father. Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and
6
the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, Alberto his
tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from
7
that year to 1964.
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral
claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22,
1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who
located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on
October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet
had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of
the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its
construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its
geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side
8
cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all
of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral
claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25,
1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the
mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased
from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which
has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual
assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of
9
tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon.
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance
with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which
provided that:
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in
the philippine Islands both surveyed and unsurveyed are
hereby declared to be free and open to exploration,
occupation and purchase and the land in which they are
found to occupation and purchase by the citizens of the
United States, or of said islands.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its
objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered
was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover,
by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation
10
under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court * denied the application, holding that the
applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and
11
ownership of the land sought to be registered. The
applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which
reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the segregated from the public domain and the property
applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v.
12
respecting their mining claims. In other words, the Court Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed.,
of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is
over the land while at the same time reserving the sub- perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United
surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining States of the right of present and exclusive
claims. possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals
invoking their superior right of ownership. The Republic has within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the
filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the
that neither the private respondents nor the two mining locator's right before as well as after the issuance of
companies have any valid claim to the land because it is the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested
not alienable and registerable. property right by virtue of his location made in
It is true that the subject property was considered forest compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in
land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, the government until patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152)
but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio
and Atok at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and
declared that: Quirico Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within Phil. 259, 265-266)
the June Bug mineral claims of Benguet and the "Fredia It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had
and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek Mining
claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the
claims of James E. Kelly, American and mining locator. owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he
He filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his
mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership,
Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly is as good as though secured by patent.
claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet We agree likewise with the oppositors that having
Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made complied with all the requirements of the mining laws,
improvements on the June Bug mineral claim consisting the claims were removed from the public domain, and
of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted the not even the government of the Philippines can take
required affidavit of annual assessment. After World away this right from them. The reason is obvious. Having
War II, Benguet introduced improvements on mineral become the private properties of the oppositors, they
claim June Bug, and also conducted geological mappings, cannot be deprived thereof without due process of
13
geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948, law.
Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the
religiously paid the taxes. Commonwealth Constitution against the alienation of all
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several lands of the public domain except those agricultural in
claims of Harrison registered in 1931, and which Atok nature for this was made subject to existing rights. Thus, in
representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that:
of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the
claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company. public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and
The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and
and Emma mineral claims of Atok having been perfected other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to the
prior to the approval of the Constitution of the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development,
Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the public or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines
domain and had become private properties of Benguet or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the
and Atok. capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any
It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of
under consideration was perfected prior to November the inauguration of the government established under
15, 1935, when the Government of the Commonwealth this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception
was inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at of public agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and no
that time, as construed and applied by this court license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid development or utilization of any of the natural
location of a mining claim segregated the area from the resources shall be granted for a period exceeding 25
public domain. Said the court in that case: The moment years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
lands located, and perfected his location in accordance development of water power, in which case beneficial
with law, the power of the United States Government to use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on
enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had November 8, 1935, declared:
become mineral lands and they were exempted from Any provision of existing laws, executive order,
lands that could be granted to any other person. The proclamation to the contrary notwithstanding, all
reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935
include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, within lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826
if a valid mining location is made upon public lands of the Revised Administrative Code which would be valid
afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or and subsisting location except to the existence of said
reservation does not affect the validity of the former reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting
location. By such location and perfection, the land locations as of the date of their respective locations.
located is segregated from the public domain even as The perfection of the mining claim converted the property
against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 to mineral land and under the laws then in force removed
14
U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546). it from the public domain. By such act, the locators
"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the
not only to segregate the area from the public government, without need of any further act such as the
domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over
15
ownership of the claim and the right to a patent it. As the land had become the private property of the
therefor upon compliance with the terms and locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they
conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid did, to Benguet and Atok.
location of a mining claim, the area becomes
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such or for any purpose other than mining does not include
private property was subject to the "vicissitudes of the ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the
ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or minerals which may be found on or under the surface.
abandonment or, as the private respondents aver, by SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and
acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by utilize, the minerals included within all areas for which
the de la Rosas is not available in the case at bar, for two public agricultural land patents are granted are
reasons. excluded and excepted from all such patents.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and
continuous, adverse and exclusive possession submitted by utilize, the minerals included within all areas for which
the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of Torrens titles are granted are excluded and excepted
ownership. They themselves had acquired the land only in from all such titles.
1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its
earlier alleged possession of their predecessors-in- name implies, is intended for the benefit of the State, not
16
interest. The trial judge, who had the opportunity to of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all
consider the evidence first-hand and observe the minerals that may be found in public and even private land
demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential
not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is
a showing that it was reached with grave abuse of the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are
17
discretion or without sufficient basis. discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in- the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the
interest of the de la Rosas had really been in possession of permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
the subject property, their possession was not in the The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in
concept of owner of the mining claim but of the property supposing that the rights over the land could be used for
as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The
mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land. correct interpretation is that once minerals are discovered
They were not disputing the lights of the mining locators in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted
nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to
them in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of
that she was aware of the diggings being undertaken its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to
18
"down below" but she did not mind, much less protest, mineral land and may not be used by any private party,
the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said including the registered owner thereof, for any other
land. purpose that will impede the mining operations to be
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner,
conflict of interest" between the owners of the surface he is of course entitled to just compensation under the
rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation
21
rather doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the proceedings.
owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights
also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to the property in question by virtue of their respective
19
to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid ruling, the mining claims which they validly acquired before the
land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands
the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to
difficult to understand, especially in its practical vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land
application. was not and could not have been transferred to the private
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could
owner will be planting on the land while the mining locator its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining
will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
well because he may interfere with the operations below WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated
and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that of the trial court dated
crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any
the miner, go without encroaching on each other's rights? pronouncement as to costs.
Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub- SO ORDERED.
surface rights? Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ.,
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible concur.
and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half
mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land
must be either completely mineral or completely
agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the
land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to
be so and became mineral — and completely mineral —
20
once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining
operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath,
it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if
only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and
was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the
surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is
Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and
minerals belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development or utilization, shall be
limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations,
or associations, at least 60% of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right,
grant, lease or concession at the time of the
inauguration of government established under the
Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of
land for agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential,
 21. Cruz vs. DENR Secretary (G.R. No. 135385, "(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the
December 6, 2000) G.R. No. indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction,
135385 December 6, 2000 development or exploration of minerals and other natural
RESOLUTION resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral
PER CURIAM: domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization
for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, of natural resources therein for a period not exceeding 25
assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of years, renewable for not more than 25 years; and
Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the "(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve
Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules). the ancestral domains and portions thereof which are
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required found to be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves,
1
respondents to comment. In compliance, respondents wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest
2
Chairperson and Commissioners of the National cover or reforestation."
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-
agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, encompassing definition of "ancestral domains" and
filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in "ancestral lands" which might even include private lands
which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) violate the
3
pray that the petition be dismissed for lack of merit. rights of private landowners.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) defining the powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and
and Secretary of the Department of Budget and making customary law applicable to the settlement of
Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor General a disputes involving ancestral domains and ancestral lands
consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view on the ground that these provisions violate the due process
4
that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that clause of the Constitution.
it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous These provisions are:
peoples and prays that the petition be granted in part. "(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed process of delineation and recognition of
of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. ancestral domains and which vest on the NCIP
Ponciano Bennagen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional the sole authority to delineate ancestral domains
Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups and ancestral lands;
of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed their Motion for "(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon
Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending the certification by the NCIP that a particular area is
constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of an ancestral domain and upon notification to the
the petition. following officials, namely, the Secretary of
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of
(CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of
Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an Justice and Commissioner of the National
expression of the principle of parens patriae and that the Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said
State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the officials over said area terminates;
rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like "(3) Section 63 which provides the customary
indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the law, traditions and practices of indigenous
petition be dismissed. peoples shall be applied first with respect to
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary
Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation succession and settlement of land disputes, and
for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation
al.), filed a motion to Intervene with attached Comment-in- thereof shall be resolved in favor of the
Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. indigenous peoples;
that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that "(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws
the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed. and practices shall be used to resolve disputes
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and involving indigenous peoples; and
organizations were granted. "(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
5
the parties and intervenors filed their respective rights of the indigenous peoples."
memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II,
adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing. Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following 1998, which provides that "the administrative relationship
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the of the NCIP to the Office of the President is characterized
ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of
State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as well policy and program coordination." They contend that said
as minerals and other natural resources therein, in Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, executive departments under Section 17, Article VII of the
6
Article XII of the Constitution: Constitution.
"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of Petitioners pray for the following:
ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines "(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I],
ancestral lands; 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and
that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, invalid;
bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within "(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing
ancestral domains are private but community property of the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP
the indigenous peoples; to cease and desist from implementing the
"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which assailed provisions of R.A. 8371 and its
defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral Implementing Rules;
lands; "(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights the Secretary of the Department of Environment
of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains; and Natural Resources to cease and desist from
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights implementing Department of Environment and
of the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands; Natural Resources Circular No. 2, series of 1998;
 "(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing 22. Republic vs. Peralta, et al., En Banc (G.R. No. 150327,
the Secretary of Budget and Management to June 18, 2003)
cease and desist from disbursing public funds for DECISION
the implementation of the assailed provisions of CALLEJO, SR., J.:
1
R.A. 8371; and This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of
"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53440 which upheld
commanding the Secretary of Environment and the orders, dated February 5, 1999 and May 6, 1999, of the
2
Natural Resources to comply with his duty of Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 13.
carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to The Antecedents
control and supervise the exploration, On September 26, 1994, Marilyn A. Peralta, Rosie A.
development, utilization and conservation of Lavalan, Grace A. Reyes, Alberto B. Alonday, Mercy B.
7
Philippine natural resources." Alonday, Rochelieu B. Alonday, Azucena B. Alonday,
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Benedicto B. Alonday, and Janeta A. Baluran filed a
Court voted as follows: complaint for recovery of possession and ownership of real
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan property with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Branch 13, against the defendants Republic of the
Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the Philippines, the Regional Executive Director of Region XI of
validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged (DENR) and the Conservation Officer in said region. The
provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part plaintiffs alleged therein, inter alia, that they are the heirs
II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of of Benedicto B. Alonday who applied for and was granted
1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, Homestead Patent No. V-11244 by the then Secretary of
and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be Agriculture and Natural Resources (DENR) over Lot 3561
interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of with an area of 237,898 square meters; the said lot was a
natural resources and should be read in conjunction with portion of Lot 2988 of the Guiang Cadastre located in
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other Guiang, Davao City and that on the basis of said patent,
hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely Benedicto Alonday was issued Original Certificate of Title
on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable No. P-275 over the said property by the Register of Deeds;
controversy and petitioners do not have standing to they purchased the said property from their father
question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371. Benedicto and were issued on April 25, 1988 Transfer
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the Certificate of Title No. T-134231 in their names; the
petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion property was allegedly alienable and disposable property
expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, within Project 1-B, certified on January 13, 1931 as per LC
and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Map No. 1412 approved by the Director of Bureau of
He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections Forestry, as confirmed by the letter of the petitioner
58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await Regional Director, dated February 15, 1994; they had been
the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have in possession of the said property as owner thereof since
been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a November 1965 and that some time in 1969, officers of the
separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, Bureau of Forest Development (BFD) sought his permission
and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, to use a portion of said property with an area of five
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the hectares; the BFD caused the construction of a big concrete
separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug. building on said portion of the property; on June 28, 1971,
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the Benedicto’s lawyer wrote a letter to the BFD demanding
necessary majority was not obtained, the case was that it vacate the said portion of his property on which the
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the building was constructed but said letter was ignored; on
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule February 24, 1979, Forest Conservation Officer Marion
56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is Abundio, Sr. asked permission from Benedicto to allow the
DISMISSED. BFD to install on a portion of the subject property
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the consisting of twenty-five square meters a small generator
separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, to provide electricity to the existing building and
Mendoza, and Panganiban. compound of the Philippine Eagles Acclimatization and
SO ORDERED. Breeding Center; Benedicto did not give his assent to these
requests of the aforenamed government officials despite
which they still caused the construction of the building and
installation of the generator unit; the plaintiffs demanded
that the defendants vacate the property on July 14, 1994
but the latter refused. The plaintiffs prayed that after due
proceedings judgment be rendered in their favor and that
the defendants be ordered to vacate the subject property
and pay the plaintiffs damages and litigation expenses.
The plaintiffs appended as annexes to their petition copies
of the aforesaid title and letters of the BFD officials. In their
answer to the complaint, the defendants, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), interposed the special
and affirmative defenses that: (a) the complaint did not
state a cause of action against them; (b) the building
constructed by the defendants was within the perimeter of
the Mt. Apo National Park, a forest reserve under
Proclamation No. 59, as amended, of the President of the
Philippines, and not on the plaintiffs’ property; (c) the
installation of a generator unit did not push through; (d)
Project 1-B, under which the subject property was
declassified as alienable and disposable property per Land
Classification Map No. 1412, should not prevail over
Proclamation No. 59, as amended; (e) the suit was against
the State which cannot be sued without its consent; (f) the
plaintiffs failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
 3
before filing their complaint. The defendants prayed that the defendants allegedly failed to perfect their appeal from
the complaint be dismissed. the decision of the court within the reglementary period.
The parties filed their respective pre-trial briefs. After the On August 11, 1997, the RTC received the defendants’
requisite pre-trial conference, the RTC issued an Order, notice of appeal.
dated August 29, 1995, constituting a panel of Meanwhile, the presiding judge of Branch 13 retired, and
commissioners composed of Engineer Roderick R. for a time, the said RTC branch remained vacant. On
Calapardo, as Team Leader, and Gregorio Cenabre and January 28, 1999, the RTC, through the newly-appointed
Engineer Rogelio Zantua, as members, to conduct a judge, issued an order giving due course to the defendants’
relocation survey and determine if the respondents’ appeal declaring that they still had a period of five days
property is part of the Mt. Apo National Park. After the from July 18, 1997 when they received a copy of the order
survey, the panel submitted its report to the trial court, expunging their notice of appeal or until July 23, 1997
dated November 7, 1995, stating that: "the land in case is within which to perfect their appeal from the June 11, 1997
92,216 square meters within the certified Alienable and Order. Since the defendants filed their notice of appeal on
Disposable (A & D) Lands while the remaining portion of July 22, 1997, they had perfected their appeal within the
145,682 square meters is within the Mt. Apo National Park reglementary period. The RTC further declared that
4
Reservation." although the defendants’ May 30, 1997 Motion for
In their comment on the report, the plaintiffs claimed that Reconsideration was defective, the Rules of Court should
the survey team altered the boundary line of their property be liberally construed. The RTC forthwith directed the
in the course of the survey and that the team did not take branch clerk of court to forward the records of the case to
into account Project 1-B per Land Classification Map No. the Court of Appeals.
1412 approved by the Director of the Bureau of Forestry. On February 5, 1999, however, the RTC issued an ex parte
The defendants, on the other hand, insisted that the survey order dismissing the defendants’ appeal on its finding that
team did not alter the boundary line of the property and in light of jurisprudence brought to its attention, they failed
that it took into account Project 1-B and Land Classification to perfect their appeal within the reglementary period.
Map No. 1412 in conducting the survey and preparing its When the defendants received the February 5, 1999 Order
report. On motion of the plaintiffs and with the conformity of the RTC, they filed a motion for reconsideration thereof,
of the defendants, through Assistant Solicitor General set for hearing on February 19, 1999. On February 8, 1999,
Aurora P. Cortez, the RTC issued an order on March 7, 1997 the RTC issued an order declaring that the hearing set on
declaring that there were no factual issues involved in the February 19, 1999 was mooted by its Order dated February
case and that it would decide the case on the basis of the 5, 1999 which dismissed the defendants’ appeal. The
pleadings and memoranda of the parties as well as the plaintiffs filed on February 10, 1999 a motion for execution,
commissioners’ report. claiming that the RTC decision had become final and
On May 6, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the executory. On February 18, 1999, the RTC issued an order
plaintiffs and against the defendants finding and declaring granting the plaintiffs’ motion and ordered the issuance of
that the property occupied by the defendants was part of a writ of execution. The defendants filed a Motion for
the plaintiffs’ property. The RTC ordered the defendants to Reconsideration dated February 26, 1999 of the February
vacate the property, restore possession thereof to the 5, 1999 Order of the RTC dismissing their appeal and their
plaintiffs and remove all the improvements thereon made opposition to the issuance of a writ of execution. The
by them. The decretal portion of the decision reads: defendants were unaware that in the interim, the RTC had
In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered already granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a writ of
sustaining the validity and legality of the plaintiff’s right of execution on February 18, 1999. The plaintiffs opposed the
ownership and possession over that parcel of land covered defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration dated February
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-134231 of the Registry 26, 1999.
of Davao City. Defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the On May 6, 1999, the RTC issued an order denying the
portion of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. defendants’ motion for reconsideration and at the same
T-134231 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City alluded to time denying the plaintiffs’ motion for execution on the
by the plaintiffs and to restore peaceful possession of the ground that public policy prohibited the issuance of a writ
same to them. Defendants are further ordered to remove of execution against the government. The RTC recalled the
5
all the improvements they have introduced thereon. writ of execution it earlier issued.
The RTC declared that the report of the panel did not take Thereafter, the defendants, now the petitioners, filed with
into account Property 1-B for LC Map 1412; hence, the said the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
report had no probative weight. According to the RTC, the of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended, for the
torrens title of the property prevails over the relocation nullification of the February 5, 1999 and May 6, 1999
survey of the panel of commissioners and that the Director Orders of the RTC alleging that the:
of Forestry declassified the respondents’ property pursuant I
to Section 1827 of the 1987 Revised Administrative Code. RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
On May 30, 1997, five days before the expiration of the DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
period to file an appeal, the defendants filed, through JURISDICTION IN ISSUING ITS ORDER DATED FEBRUARY 5,
registered mail, a motion for the reconsideration of the 1999 AND ORDER DATED MAY 6, 1999.
RTC decision. On June 11, 1997, the RTC issued ex parte an II
order expunging the said motion for reconsideration on the RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
ground that it was a mere scrap of paper for failure of the DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
defendants to incorporate any notice of hearing as JURISDICTION IN SUSTAINING THE VALIDITY AND LEGALITY
required by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. OF OWNERSHIP OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OVER A
Unaware of the June 11, 1997 Order of the RTC, the PARCEL OF LAND COVERED BY TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF
6
defendants filed on July 14, 1997 a Manifestation with TITLE NO. 134231.
Notice of Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration dated July On April 27, 2001, the CA rendered its decision denying due
7, 1997 appending thereto a notice of hearing of their May course and dismissing the petition for certiorari. The
30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration. appellate court held that petitioners’ May 30, 1997 Motion
In the meantime, on July 18, 1997, the defendants received for Reconsideration of the RTC decision did not comply
a copy of the June 11, 1997 Order of the trial court with Section 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, as amended;
expunging their motion for reconsideration. On July 22, hence, a mere scrap of paper which did not toll the running
1997, the defendants filed their notice of appeal from the of the reglementary period for appeal. Thus, the RTC
decision of the court. The plaintiffs, for their part, filed a decision had already become final and executory.
motion to dismiss the appeal of the defendants on the According to the appellate court, the RTC did not commit
ground that their May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioners’
was a mere scrap of paper; hence, the motion did not toll appeal therein. As such, they were not entitled to a writ of
the running of the reglementary period for appeal. Thus, certiorari. The CA further held that the petitioners, through
the negligence of the OSG, failed to perfect their appeal. that his omission was sheer inadvertence, caused by heavy
The CA opined that to nullify the title of respondents over pressure of work in preparing numerous pleadings and in
the subject property, the petitioners should have instituted the almost daily attendance in court for naturalization
a petition for reversion, and not a petition for certiorari cases and those for nullity of marriage, among others.
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended. Other than the barefaced allegations of Solicitor Padilla, he
The petitioners filed the instant petition for review on offered no specific details as to what pleadings he prepared
certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the decision of and the hearings he attended which prevented him from
the CA. The petitioners allege that the appellate court complying with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
committed reversible error in finding and declaring that Court. Moreover, if Solicitor Padilla was able to prepare
they failed to perfect their appeal from the decision of the within the reglementary period the May 30, 1997 Motion
trial court within the reglementary period. The CA likewise for Reconsideration, he offered no valid justification for his
allegedly erred when it held that the RTC did not commit failure to incorporate in said motion or append thereto a
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of simple one-paragraph notice of hearing which could have
jurisdiction when it dismissed the petitioners’ appeal via its been accomplished in a few minutes. What is so
February 5, 1999 Order. The petitioners contend that by nettlesome is that the May 30, 1997 Motion for
dismissing their petition, the CA thereby sustained the Reconsideration of petitioners was signed not only by
validity of the respondents’ title despite strong evidence Solicitor Padilla but also by Assistant Solicitor General
that the said property is part of the public forest and, Aurora P. Cortes. Even if Solicitor Padilla, through his
therefore, inalienable. The petitioners further argue that negligence, failed to incorporate in said motion for
even if their notice of appeal was belatedly filed, the rule reconsideration the requisite notice of hearing, the
on perfection of appeals should be suspended and that Assistant Solicitor General should have noticed the
their appeal should be given due course on grounds of omission before she affixed her signature thereon and
equity and substantial justice. They submit that if their sought the immediate rectification thereof by Solicitor
appeal is not reinstated, the Republic of the Philippines will Padilla before said motion was filed. She did not. She
be deprived of a part of the Mt. Apo National Park offered no valid explanation for her faux pas either. The
consisting of no less than 145,682 square meters. The general rule is that the clients are bound by the mistakes
12
petitioners cite the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Court and negligence of their counsel.
7
of Appeals. In a case of recent vintage, the Court took to task the OSG
The petition is meritorious. for its lackadaisical attitude and complacency in the
The Court agrees with the CA that the OSG was negligent handling of its cases for the government and reminded the
when it filed on May 30, 1997 the defective motion for OSG that:
reconsideration. Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court … just like other members of the Bar, the canons under the
provides that a motion for reconsideration or a motion for Code of Professional Responsibility apply with equal force
a new trial shall be made in writing stating the ground or on lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall be served official tasks. These ethical duties are rendered even more
by the movant on the adverse party. Such written notice is exacting as to them because, as government counsel, they
that prescribed in Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of have the added duty to abide by the policy of the State to
Court. Under Section 4, paragraph 2 of said rule, a notice of promote a high standard of ethics in public service.
hearing on a motion shall be served by the movant to all Furthermore, it is incumbent upon the OSG, as part of the
the parties concerned at least three days before the date of government bureaucracy, to perform and discharge its
hearing.1âwphi1 Section 5 of the same rule requires that duties with the highest degree of professionalism,
the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties intelligence and skill and to extend prompt, courteous and
13
concerned and shall state the time and place of the hearing adequate service to the public.
of the motion. The requirements, far from being merely Trite to state, this Court is impelled to do so anew in this
technical and procedural as claimed by the petitioners, are case.1âwphi1 The CA cannot be faulted for ruling that
8
vital elements of procedural due process. having lost their right of appeal through the negligence of
Since the Rules of Court do not fix any period within which the OSG the petitioners are not entitled to a writ of
14
the said party may file his reply or opposition, the trial certiorari under Rule 65 of 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure.
court would have no way of determining whether the However, prescinding from all the foregoing, this Court
adverse party agrees or objects to the motion and, if he grants not only petitioners’ plea that it suspend its own
objects, to hear him on his objection. Hence, the need for rule on the perfection of appeals but also directs the
the movant to set the time and place of hearing of its reopening of the trial of the case for the parties to adduce
9
motion. The requirements entombed in Sections 4 and 5 their respective evidence. The Court excepts this case from
of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and non- the said rule in the interest of justice, to avert a grave
compliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro miscarriage of justice to the State through the negligence
forma; a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court of the OSG. The State has the right to adduce its evidence,
has no right to receive and which the court has no testimonial and documentary. Courts should proceed with
10
authority to act upon. In cases of motions for a new trial caution so as not to deprive a party of this right but,
or for the reconsideration of a judgment, the running of instead, afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity
the period for appeal is not tolled by the mere filing or for the proper and just disposition of its cause, free from
11 15
pendency of said motion. the constraints of technicalities. The trial court no less
In this case, the petitioners, through the OSG, received on declared in its January 28, 1999 Order that although the
May 20, 1997 the decision of the RTC; hence, they had until petitioners’ May 30, 1997 Motion for Reconsideration was
June 4, 1997 within which to file their motion for defective, the Rules of Court should be liberally construed
reconsideration or for a new trial or to perfect their appeal only to make a volte face and issue ex parte an order
from said adverse decision. Although the petitioners filed dismissing the appeal of the petitioners and canceling the
the motion for reconsideration dated May 30, 1997 within hearing on the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration set
the reglementary period, said motion failed to comply with on February 19, 1999.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15. The records show that there is What is involved in this case is a portion of land consisting
no proof that the respondents were actually served with a of no less than 145,682 square meters or less than fifteen
copy of said motion, as required by Section 10, Rule 13 of hectares which they claim is part of the Mt. Apo National
the Rules of Court.1avvphi1 The OSG did not bother to file Park as shown by the relocation survey of the panel of
an amended motion for reconsideration containing the commissioners. The case is one of public interest. If the
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of aforesaid property is, indeed, part of the forest reserve as
Court. claimed by the petitioners but their right to adduce their
The OSG offered no valid justification for its failure to evidence is foreclosed by the dismissal of the present
comply with Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court petition, the said property would be forever lost to the
except the self-serving claim of Solicitor Evaristo M. Padilla
 16
prejudice of the State. In Republic v. Imperial, this Court 23. Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation
held that: vs. Court of Appeals (189 SCRA 792)
The need, therefore, to determine once and for all whether CORTES, J.:
the lands subject of petitioner’s reversion efforts are This case arose from proceedings to annul a 1912 decision
foreshore lands constitutes good and sufficient cause for of the land registration court.
relaxing procedural rules and granting the third and fourth In 1912, the Tribuna del Registro de la Propiedad (Court of
motions for extension to file appellant’s brief. Petitioner’s Land Registration) of Zambales, through Judge James
appeal presents an exceptional circumstance impressed Ostrand, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 6431,
17
with public interest and must then be given due course. confirmed the title of Justo de Perio over two (2) parcels of
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the land in Zambales. On August 28, 1912, Decree No. 9328
respondents as it ordered the petitioners to vacate that was issued by the court ordering the registration of the two
portion of the subject property occupied by them and to (2) parcels of land in the name of De Perio. On December 6,
return possession thereof to the respondents, without 1912, Original Certificate of Title No. 48 of the Registry of
requiring the parties to adduce evidence on the factual Deeds of Zambales was issued to De Perio. Parcel No. 1
issues of (a) whether or not the property covered by the consists of an area of eleven thousand six hundred ninety-
title of the respondents is part of the Mt. Apo National Park seven square meters (11,697 sq.m.) while Parcel No. 2
(a forest reserve); (b) whether or not the building consists of three hundred forty thousand eight hundred
constructed by the petitioners is inside the forest reserve; twenty square meters (340,820 sq.m.). In 1936, a portion
and (c) whether or not the petitioners installed a generator consisting of ten thousand four hundred square meters
unit in the respondents’ property. (10,400 sq.m.) of Parcel No. 2 was sold to the Province of
It bears stressing that the trial court formed a panel of Zambales. The sale was annotated at the back of OCT No.
commissioners to conduct a relocation survey of the 48. In 1954, OCT No. 48 was cancelled and TCT No. T-1369
subject property. The panel of commissioners found that was issued to Mercedes de Valencia pursuant to an
145,682 square meters which is a portion of the Mt. Apo extrajudicial settlement of De Perio's estate. In 1962, De
National Park had been included in the respondents’ title Valencia sold Parcel No. 1 to Ricardo Baloy. Baloy was
to the subject property. The trial court ignored this and did issued TCT No. T-7696 in 1966. In 1967, De Valencia
not even bother to receive the parties’ respective evidence subdivided Parcel No. 2 into five (5) lots (Lots 2-A to 2-E).
on the said report. The panel of commissioners was not TCT No. T-1369 was cancelled and TCT Nos. 11865, 11866,
even called to testify on its findings. The appellate court 11867, and 11869 were issued to De Valencia. TCT No. 11
will be able to review on appeal the decision of the trial 868, corresponding to the portion previously sold to the
court and ascertain whether there has been a travesty of Province of Zambales, was issued to the Republic of the
justice to the gross prejudice of the State. Philippines. In 1970, De Valencia sold the lots covered by
The respondents will not suffer substantial prejudice if the TCT Nos. 11865 and 11866 to petitioner Sta. Monica
trial is reopened. The records show that the trial court Industrial and Development Corporation. TCT Nos. 11865
denied respondents’ motion for a writ of execution and 11866 were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-12054 and T-
although the trial court had dismissed the appeal of the 12055 were issued to petitioner. Petitioner consolidated
petitioners. The respondents did not even assail the order the two (2) parcels of land and subdivided them into five
of the trial court. hundred thirty-six (536) residential lots which it sold to
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the individual buyers.
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 53440 is REVERSED AND In 1985, respondent Republic of the Philippines, through
SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Davao the Solicitor General, filed with the Court of Appeals a
City, Branch 13, dated February 5, 1999 and May 5, 1999 in complaint for the annulment of the decree in LRC No. 6431,
Civil Case No. 23,168-94 are SET ASIDE. The said Regional OCT No. 48 (issued to De Perio), TCT No. T-1369 (issued to
Trial Court is DIRECTED to reopen the trial to enable the De Valencia) and TCT No. T-7696 (issued to Baloy).
parties to adduce their respective evidence. The Office of Respondent alleged that the decree in LRC No. 6431 was
the Solicitor General is hereby directed to represent the null and void for lack of jurisdiction because the land was
petitioners during the trial. No costs. inside the U.S. naval reservation and that it was still within
SO ORDERED. the forest zone in 1912, having been released therefrom
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, only in 1961, and hence cannot be the subject of
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, disposition or alienation as private property. Named
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., defendants were De Valencia and her husband, Baloy and
concur. his wife and the Register of Deeds of Zambales. The case
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06259.
The Baloy spouses filed their answer to the complaint.
With leave of court, petitioner intervened and filed an
answer-in-intervention. Later, petitioner filed its first
motion for preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense
of res judicata, which the Court of Appeals denied.
Petitioner did not seek reconsideration thereof.
Trial on the merits ensued. The Republic offered its
evidence, consisting of a land classification map prepared
by the Director of Forestry in 1961 to prove that the land
became alienable and disposable only in 1961, and rested
its case. Petitioner then proceeded to present its evidence.
This was, however, cut short when the Republic moved to
amend its complaint to include as party defendants all the
other transferees of the land and, thereafter, filed its
amended complaint. Petitioner again moved for a
preliminary hearing on its affirmative defense of res
judicata in an effort to shorten the proceedings.
The Court of Appeals, holding that res judicata cannot be
invoked as a bar to an action for annulment of judgment on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, denied the motion.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied,
hence this petition.
After the comment and reply were filed, the Court gave
due course to the petition and, as required, the parties
filed their respective memoranda.
On April 2, 1990, the Court set the case for hearing on May it must be presumed that they agreed
7, 1990 because, as stated in the resolution: with the court that the said lands were
...after deliberating extensively on it, really agricultural lands. It must be
the Court finds the need to hear the pointed out that the question as to
oral arguments of the parties on issues whether the two parcels of land in
which are considered determinative of question are agricultural lands and not
the case, including the following: timber lands is a question of fact and
1. the nature and classification, under the finding of Judge Ostrand that they
the pertinent laws traced back to the are agricultural can not be reviewed by
turn of the century, of the two parcels this Honorable Court at this point in
of land decreed and originally titled in time [Petitioner's Memorandum, pp. 8-
1912 to De Perio; and 9; Rollo, pp. 211-212].
2. the legal considerations that Additionally, petitioner argued that the boundaries of the
compelled the Government to seek the two parcels of land, as described in Decree No. 9328,
annulment of the decree of the Court debunk the contention that they are forest lands. The
of Land Registration issued in favor of parcels of land were bounded by privately owned property.
De Perio, his title, and the titles of his Moreover, they were described in the notice published in
successors-in-interest. the March 1912 issue of the Official Gazette, pp. 766-767
The parties were heard in oral argument and thereafter as "lying within the Civil Reservation, town site of
they were required to submit their memoranda in Olongapo, situated in the municipality of Olongapo,
amplification of their arguments. Province of Zambales, P. I." [Annex "A" of Petitioner's
The question presented before the Court is whether or not Memorandum; Rollo, pp. 222-223].
respondent CA committed reversible error of law in On the other hand, the public respondent, through the
denying petitioner's motion for preliminary hearing on its Office of the Solicitor General, contended:
affirmative defense of res judicata. Records disclose that by virtue of
As iterated in a long line of cases, the following requisites Proclamation dated November 11,
must concur for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a 1908, then Governor-General James F.
subsequent case: (1) the judgment must be final; (2) the Smith reserved for naval purposes
judgment must have been rendered by a court having certain lands of the public domain in
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the Subic, Zambales which included the
judgment must be on the merits; and (4) there must be parcels of land embraced under
between the first and second actions, Identity of parties, of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 48
subject matter, and of causes of action [San Diego v. secured by De Perio in 1912. It was only
Cardona, 70 Phil. 281 (1940); Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., in 1961 that such Proclamation was
Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September revoked by a subsequent issuance,
30, 1963, 9 SCRA 72; Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, G. R. No. L- Proclamation No. 731, issued by then
26523, December 24, 1971, 42 SCRA 589; Aroc v. People's President Garcia on February 2, 1961
Homesite and Housing Corporation, G.R. No. L-39674, and such portions already classified as
January 31, 1978, 81 SCRA 350; Republic v. Alagad, G.R. No. alienable and disposable and not
66807, January 26, 1989, 169 SCRA 455; Vencilao v. Vano needed for government purposes were
G.R. No. declared open for disposition under
L-25660, February 23, 1990]. R.A. No. 274, in relation to C.A. 141 and
In contending that the judgment in LRC No. 6431 should be Act No. 3038. This means that the
annulled because the land registration court had no lands, subject matter of the case, were
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, the portions of the U.S. naval reservation
respondent Republic puts in issue the presence of the and were declared open for disposition
second requisite. Therefore, the ultimate issue before the only on February 2, 1961 [Public
Court is whether or not the land registration court had Respondent's Memorandum, p. 3;
jurisdiction over the two (2) parcels of land claimed by De Rollo, p. 230].
Perio, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner herein. Public respondent then reiterated that "[a]t the time
Necessarily, the resolution of this issue requires an inquiry Original Certificate of Title No. 48 was issued on December
into the nature of the subject parcels of land in light of the 9, 1912, the parcel of land covered by the title was still
laws prevailing at the time the judgment in the land within the forest zone and it was not until January 31, 1961
registration case was rendered. that said land was released by the Bureau of Forest
Petitioner's primary argument, as summarized in its Development as alienable and disposable under Land
memorandum, was as follows: Classification Map No. 2427" [Ibid].
17. It must, therefore, be presumed It also added that "Land Classification Map No. 665 dated
that in LRC Case No. 6431, the court June 7, 1927 ... shows that the parcels of land covered by
found from the evidence adduced by OCT No. 48 were still part of the unclassified public forest
the parties that (1) the two parcels of at the time of the registration" [Public Respondent's
land in question were agricultural lands Memorandum, p. 4; Rollo, p. 231].
as the phrase is used in Act No. 926, (2) Weighing the arguments raised by the parties, we find that
Justo de Perio had been in the open, the Republic has failed to make out a convincing case for
continuous, exclusive and notorious the annulment of the decree in Land Registration Case No.
possession thereof for at least 10 years, 6431. It has been established that the land registration
before July 26, 1912, and (3) his court had jurisdiction over the two (2) parcels of land, and
possession of the said parcels of land that OCT No. 48 and the Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
was in the concept of owner; and thus derived from OCT No. 48 are valid.
the court confirmed Justo de Perio's Act No. 926, known as the Public Land Act, which was
title thereto and ordered their enacted into law on October 7, 1903 but which took effect
registration in his name. If the Attorney on July 26, 1904, was the law applicable to De Perio's
General, the Director of Forestry, the petition for confirmation of his title to the two (2) parcels
Director of Lands and the Director of of land. It provided:
Public Works opposed the application, SEC. 54. The following-described
then it must be presumed that the persons or their legal successors in
court declared the said two parcels of right, occupying public lands in the
land to be agricultural lands over their Philippine Islands, or claiming to own
opposition. If they did not oppose, then any such lands or an interest therein,
 but whose titles to such lands have not developed by petitioner into a subdivision and hundreds of
been perfected, may apply to the Court residences have been built thereon. At this point in time,
of Land Registration of the Philippine that portion of land developed into a subdivision cannot,
Islands for confirmation of their claims by any stretch of imagination, be conceived as forest land.
and the issuance of a certificate of title Anyway, the area wherein the two (2) parcels of land are
therefor to wit: found, were released from the unclassified public forest
xxx xxx xxx and the territory comprising the Subic naval reservation
6. All persons who by themselves or way back in 1961.
their predecessors in interest have Moreover, it is now almost thirty (30) years since the land
been in the open, continuous, was released in 1961. In a few more months, the
exclusive, and notorious possession and possessors of the land would acquire title to the portions
occupation of agricultural public lands, they adversely possess through acquisitive prescription,
as defined by said act of Congress of without need of title or of good faith, pursuant to the Civil
July first, nineteen hundred and two, Code [Art. 1137].
under a bona fide claim of ownership Finally, we find the need to emphasize that in an action to
except as against the Government, for annul a judgment, the burden of proving the judgment's
a period of ten years next preceding nullity rests upon the petitioner. The petitioner must
the taking effect of this Act, except establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
when prevented by war or force judgment is fatally defective. When the proceedings were
majeure shall be conclusively presumed originally filed by the Republic before the Court of Appeals,
to have performed all the conditions the petitioner contended that when the decree in favor of
essential to a government grant and to De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912 the parcels
have received the same, and shall be of land were still part of the inalienable public forests.
entitled to a certificate of title to such However, petitioner's case rested solely on land
land under the provisions of this classification maps drawn several years after the issuance
chapter. of the decree in 1912. These maps fail to conclusively
xxx xxx xxx establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and
In other words, a person who had been in open, the years prior to that. Before this Court, petitioner
continuous, exclusive and notorious session and reiterates said 'contention and refers, for the first time, to
occupation of public agricultural land for a period of at a 1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a
least ten (10) years prior to July 24, 1904 could petition for naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of
the confirmation of his title over the land he had so land are parts thereof. These, for reasons discussed earlier,
possessed and occupied. are insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor
The land registration court confirmed De Perio's title to the of the decree's regularity, more so when we consider that
two (2) parcels of land after due notice and hearing. From notice of the application for registration and the date of
this, the following conclusions may be derived: hearing thereof, addressed to the Attorney General, the
1. that the two (2) parcels of land are agricultural as Director of Lands, the Director of Public Works and the
defined by law, i.e., that they are neither timber land nor Director of Forestry, among others, was published in the
mineral land [Mapa v. Insular Government, 10 Phil. 175 Official Gazette and that Governor General Smith's
(1908)]; Proclamation of 1908 itself recognizes private rights.
2. that De Perio had been in open, continuous, exclusive WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the Court of
and notorious possession and occupation of the two (2) Appeals is ordered to DISMISS CA-G.R. SP No. 06259.
parcels of land for at least ten (10) years prior to 1904; SO ORDERED.
3. that his possession and occupancy was under a bona fide
claim of ownership; and
4. that under the law De Perio had title to the land as of
1904, although it was confirmed only later in 1912.
These conclusions serve as premises to arrive at other
conclusions determinative of the case.
If the land is agricultural as defined by law, and as
confirmed by Judge Ostrand, it could not have been forest
land as claimed by public respondent, the subsequent land
classification map notwithstanding. This conclusion is
supported by the fact that the two (2) parcels of land were
in the Olongapo townsite and were bounded by privately-
owned land.
If De Perio had title to the land in 1904, although still
imperfect, then it could not have been prejudiced by the
proclamation of Governor-General Smith in 1908 which
reserved for naval purposes land in Subic, Zambales. Said
proclamation recognized the existence of private rights,
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
...por la presente exceptuo de venta o
colonizacion hasta nueva orden y
separo para reserva naval, salvo los
derechos privados, todos y cada uno de
los terrenos publicos comprendidos
dentro de los siguientes limites, a
saber: [Proclamation del Gobernador
General de las Islas Filipinos, 11
Noviembre 1908, para. 2, 6 O.G. 1885
(2 December 1908)].
Public respondent has also failed to explain the Republic's
sudden interest in the annulment of the decree and the
certificate of title issued to De Perio and the subsequent
titles issued to his successors after some seventy-three (73)
years of inaction and after a portion of the land has been
24. Director of Forestry vs. Villareal (G.R. No. L-32266 grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into
February 27, 1989) fisheries which became a common feature of
settlement along the coast and at the same time of
CRUZ, J.: the change of sovereignty constituted one of the most
The basic question before the Court is the legal productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of
classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares, as they which would destroy vested interests and prove a
are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest public disaster.
lands, they are not alienable under the Constitution. If they Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands
are considered public agricultural lands, they may be and so susceptible of private ownership.
acquired under private ownership. The private Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically
respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged declared, despite the above-cited case, that mangrove
by these criteria. swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of it did in the Administrative Code of 1917, which became
mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the
January 25, 1949, alleging that he and his predecessors-in- purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except
interest had been in possession of the land for more than as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public
forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all
the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. forest reserves of whatever character.
After trial, the application was approved by the Court of It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this
1
First Instance. of Capiz. The decision was affirmed by the definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the
2
Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to Montano case when two years later it held in the case of
7
this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that Jocson v. Director of Forestry:
the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject ...the words timber land are always translated in the
to private appropriation. He asks that the registration be Spanish translation of that Act (Act of Congress) as
reversed. terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner translation and that a better translation would be
and the private respondent agree that the land is 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English means
mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant
contention between the parties is the legal nature of would never be called a tree in English but a bush, and
mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants
forestal and therefore not disposable and the private growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The xxx xxx xxx
issue before us is legal, not factual. The fact that there are a few trees growing in
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to a manglare or nipa swamps does not change the
the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the earlier American general character of the land from manglare to timber
organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public land.
domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-
grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:
forest lands. This classification was maintained in the 'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil.
Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase agricultural
until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
new charter expanded the classification of public lands to acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral
include industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, lands.
and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to Whatever may have been the meaning of the term
3
provide for other categories. This provision has been 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of Congress
reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the
4
present Constitution. Philippine Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the lands, and all public lands that are not timber or
charter in force when this case arose, only agricultural mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands,
5
lands were allowed to be alienated. Their disposition was whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares,
provided for under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
forest lands were not subject to private ownership unless The definition of forestry as including manglares found
they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so in the Administrative Code of 1917 cannot affect
released for alienation. rights which vested prior to its enactment.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands,
6
Government, promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps the trial court should have considered them
or manglareswere defined by the Court as: agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then
... mud flats, alternately washed and the rights of appellants are fully established by Act No.
exposed by the tide, in which grows various kindred 926.
plants which will not live except when watered by the The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda.
8
sea, extending their roots deep into the mud and de Centenera v. Obias, promulgated on March 4, 1933,
casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the
constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand declared for a
exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent unanimous Court:
cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition
wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the that the land covered by the application there are
useful nipa palm propagated thereon. Although these mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1,
flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion but we think this opposition of the Director of
that they cannot be so regarded in the sense in which Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been
that term is used in the cases cited or in general definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest
American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the
them are not available for purpose of navigation, and Act of Congress.
they may be disposed of without impairment of the No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was
public interest in what remains. merely based on the cases of Montano and Jocson. And in
xxx 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v.
9
Under this uncertain and somewhat Director of Forestry, with Justice Fernando declaring that
unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom had the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The
decision even quoted with approval the statement of the ensure that the laws be faithfully executed' and in
trial court that: accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove courts will step into the picture if the rules laid down by
species grow, where the trees are small and sparse, fit the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it
only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are is claimed that they are not being correctly observed by the
not of commercial value as lumber do not convert the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating
land into public land. Such lands are not forest in with each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of the
character. They do not form part of the public domain. Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our
10
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, the Court, citing natural resources.
11
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, reiterated the ruling in the In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the
Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or President of the Philippines the function of making periodic
mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, classifications of public lands, thus:
whether they are used as nipa Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of
swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands. the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there shall from time to time classify the lands of the public
is also a line of decisions holding the contrary view. domain into:
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural (a) Alienable or disposable,
12
Resources, promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled "that (b) Lumber, and
the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of (c) Mineral lands,
swamp lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public and may at any time and in a like manner transfer
domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands. such lands from one class to another, for the
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of purposes of their administration and disposition.
13
Forestry, the Court was more positive when it held, again Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and
through Justice Gutierrez: disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
cannot be classified as forest land because it is not Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to
thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although time declare what lands are open to disposition or
conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the concession under this Act.
classification of forest land in accordance with Section With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9
1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the of the same law provides:
petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section For the purpose of their administration and
1821 of the said Code as first, second and third groups disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable
are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they or open to disposition shall be classified, according to
contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is the use or purposes to which such lands are
still subject to land registration proceedings because destined, as follows:
the property had been in actual possession of private (a) Agricultural;
persons for many years, and therefore, said land was (b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
already 'private land' better adapted and more valuable productive purposes;
for agricultural than for forest purposes and not (c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes;
required by the public interests to be kept under forest and
classification. (d) Reservations for townsites and for public and
The petition is without merit. quasi-public uses.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public The President, upon recommendation by the
domain does not lose such classification simply because Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest from time to time make the classifications provided
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may for in this section, and may, at any time and in a
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by similar manner, transfer lands from one class to
kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do another.
not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative
places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa Code states as follows:
palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves-
may also be classified as forest land. The classification is Revocation of same. - Upon there commendation of
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the
have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks Department Head, the President of the Philippines
like. Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest' is may set apart forest reserves from the public lands
released in an official proclamation to that effect so and he shall by proclamation declare the
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural establishment of such reserves and the boundaries
lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall not
imperfect titles do not apply.' be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate remain as such for forest uses, and shall be
14
Appellate Court, where this Court agreed with the administered in the same manner as public forest.
Solicitor General's submission that the land in dispute, The President of the Philippines may in like manner
which he described as "swamp mangrove or forestal land," by proclamation alter or modify the boundaries of
were not private properties and so not registerable. This any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any
case was decided only twelve days after the De Porkan such proclamation, and upon such revocation such
case. forest reserve shall be and become part of the public
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels lands as though such proclamation had never been
there is a need for a categorical pronouncement that made.
should resolve once and for all the question of whether Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural
mangrove swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands. purposes. - Lands in public forest, not including forest
The determination of this question is a function initially reserves, upon the certification of the Director of
belonging to the legislature, which has the authority to Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more
implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and
of the public domain (and is now even permitted to provide not required by the public interests to be kept under
for more categories of public lands). The legislature having forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to
made such implementation, the executive officials may be agricultural lands.
then, in the discharge of their own role, administer our With these principles in mind, we reach the following
public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it
comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as into private property.'
defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were
Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so agricultural in nature, the proof the private respondent
determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably
decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own meager and of dubious persuasiveness. The record
discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to contains no convincing evidence of the existence of
date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the
the executive department. More importantly, the said original transferor of the property, let alone the fact that
provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been
unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown that the informacion
conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of
The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. property and that the land has been under the actual and
We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty
17
classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. These
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have matters are not presumed but must be established with
to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That definite proof, which is lacking in this case.
determination having been made and no cogent argument Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private
having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges respondent were practically the only basis used by the
but to apply it. And so we shall. appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over
Our previous description of the term in question as the land in question. Tax declarations are, of course, not
pertaining to our agricultural lands should be understood sufficient to prove possession and much less vest
as covering only those lands over which ownership had ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held in
18
already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917 countless cases.
became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not
legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of established his right to the registration of the subject land
a duly acquired property right protected by the due in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.
process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the
15
Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, where legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the
the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains
as 1909, before it was much later classified as timberland. unamended up to now, mangrove swamps
It follows from all this that the land under contention being or manglares form part of the public forests of the
admittedly a part of the mangrove swamps of Sapian, and Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the
for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by Constitution and may not be the subject of private
the Bureau of Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be ownership until and unless they are first released as forest
considered forest land. It could therefore not be the land and classified as alienable agricultural land.
subject of the adverse possession and consequent WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET
ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of ASIDE and the application for registration of title of private
his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This
released as forest land and reclassified as agricultural land decision is immediately executory.
pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may SO ORDERED.
issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano,
Code. Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino,
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
16
mangrove swamps approved by the Director of Lands, to Fernan, C.J., took no part.
prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain,
however, that the mere existence of such a plan would not
have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as
forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is
ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of
Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the
aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the
authority to determine whether forest land is more
valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a
basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for
private ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition
of lands of the public domain that until timber or
forest lands are released as disposable and alienable
neither the Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of
Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or
otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads,
sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes,
fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to
administer and dispose of swamp lands or mangrove
lands forming part of the public domain while such
lands are still classified as forest land or timber land
and not released for fishery or other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural
resources that forest land cannot be owned by
private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse
possession which can be the basis of a grant of title
in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot
commence until after the forest land has been
declared alienable and disposable. Possession of
25. Republic vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 155450, August square meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion
6, 2008) was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of
DECISION issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not
CARPIO, J.: alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the
The Case disputed portion was classified as alienable and disposable.
1 2
This is a petition for review of the 21 May 2001 and 25 On 19 October 1998, private respondents filed a motion to
3 10
September 2002 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in dismiss. Private respondents alleged that petitioner failed
CA-G.R. SP No. 47965. The to comply with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court because the
21 May 2001 Resolution dismissed petitioner Republic of real ground for the complaint was mistake, not lack of
the Philippines’ (petitioner) amended complaint for jurisdiction, and that petitioner, as a party in the original
reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and proceedings, could have availed of the ordinary remedies
declaration of nullity of titles. The 25 September 2002 of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
Resolution denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. remedies but failed to do so. Private respondents added
The Facts that petitioner did not attach to the complaint a certified
On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan true copy of the decision sought to be annulled. Private
4
(trial court) issued Decree No. 381928 in favor of spouses respondents also maintained that the complaint was
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag), barred by the doctrines of res judicata and law of the case
11
predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of and by Section 38 of Act No. 496. Private respondents
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan (private respondents), also stated that not all the heirs of spouses Carag were
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. brought before the Court of Appeals for an effective
151, containing an area of 7,047,673 square meters resolution of the case. Finally, private respondents claimed
(subject property), situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 that the real party in interest was not petitioner but a
July 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of certain Alfonso Bassig, who had an ax to grind against
5 12
Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11585 (OCT private respondents.
No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag. On 3 March 1999, petitioner filed an amended complaint
On 2 July 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation and
13
the encumbrance expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. declaration of nullity of titles.
Two transfer certificates of title were issued: Transfer The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
6
Certificate of Title No. T-1277, issued in the name of the On 21 May 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of complaint because of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
100,000 square meters and Transfer Certificate of Title No. matter of the case. The Court of Appeals declared:
7
T-1278, issued in the name of the private respondents, The rule is clear that such judgments, final orders
covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters. and resolutions in civil actions which this court
On 19 May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and may annul are those which the "ordinary
others filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
Department of Environment and Natural Resources or other appropriate remedies are no longer
(DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition requesting available." The Amended Complaint contains no
the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the such allegations which are jurisdictional neither
annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the can such circumstances be divined from its
trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion allegations. Furthermore, such actions for
of the subject property which was allegedly still classified Annulment may be based only on two (2)
as timber land at the time of the issuance of Decree No. grounds: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
381928. Neither ground is alleged in the Amended
The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an Complaint which is for Reversion/Annulment of
investigating team to conduct ground verification and Decree, Cancellation and Declaration of Nullity of
ocular inspection of the subject property. Titles. It merely alleges that around 2,640,000
The investigating team reported that: square meters of timberland area within Lot 2472
A) The portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 as shown in Cad. 151, had been erroneously included in the
the Plan prepared for spouses Carag, and covered title of the Spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria
under LC Project 3-L of Tuguegarao, Cagayan, was Turingan under Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T.
found to be still within the timberland area at the No. 11585 issued on June 2, 1930 and July 19,
time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. of 1938, respectively; that hence, such adjudication
the spouses Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, and/or Decree and Title covering a timberland
and the same was only released as alienable and area is null and void ab initio under the provisions
disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on 27 May Finally, it is clear that the issues raised in the Amended
1994. Complaint as well as those in the Motion to dismiss are
B) Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag factual in nature and should be threshed out in the proper
and others have possessed and occupied by trial court in accordance with Section 101 of the Public
14
themselves and thru their predecessors-in- Land Act. (Citations omitted)
interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, covered Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 25
by LC Project 3-L of LC Map 2999, since time September 2002 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied
8
immemorial. the motion for reconsideration.
Thus, the investigating team claimed that "a portion of Lot Hence, this petition.
2472 Cad-151" was "only released as alienable and The Issues
disposable on 22 February 1982." Petitioner raises the following issues:
In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal 1. Whether the allegations of the complaint
Division of the Land Management Bureau recommended to clearly stated that the ordinary remedies of new
the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of trial, appeal, petition for relief and other
OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with appropriate remedies are no longer available;
the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the 2. Whether the amended complaint clearly
recommendation. alleged the ground of lack of jurisdiction;
On 10 June 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree 3. Whether the Court of Appeals may try the
No. 381928, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a factual issues raised in the amended complaint
complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and and in the motion to dismiss;
9
declaration of nullity of titles on the ground that in 1930 4. Whether the then Court of First Instance of
the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of
the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000
 timberland in favor of respondent spouses collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan; such judgment or final order in any action or
5. Whether the fact that the Director of Lands proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred
18
was a party to the original proceedings changed by laches.
the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to Since petitioner’s complaint is grounded on lack of
the then Court of First Instance over the land; jurisdiction over the subject of the action, petitioner need
6. Whether the doctrine of res judicata applies in not allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
this case; and petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
7. Whether Section 38 of Act No. 496 is longer available through no fault of petitioner.
applicable in this case. Third, the Court of Appeals ruled that the issues raised in
The Ruling of the Court petitioner’s complaint were factual in nature and should be
While the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the threshed out in the proper trial court in accordance with
19
complaint on procedural grounds, we will still deny the Section 101 of the Public Land Act.
petition because the complaint for annulment of decree Section 6, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides:
has no merit. SEC. 6. Procedure. - The procedure in ordinary
Petitioner Complied with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court civil cases shall be observed. Should a trial be
First, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to necessary, the reception of evidence may be
allege either of the grounds of extrinsic fraud or lack of referred to a member of the court or a judge of a
15
jurisdiction in the complaint for annulment of decree. Regional Trial Court.
We find otherwise. In its complaint and amended Therefore, the Court of Appeals may try the factual issues
complaint, petitioner stated: raised in the complaint for the complete and proper
11. In view of the fact that in 1930 or in 1938, determination of the case.
only the Executive Branch of the Government However, instead of remanding the complaint to the Court
had the authority and power to declassify or of Appeals for further proceedings, we shall decide the
reclassify land of the public domain, the Court case on the merits.
did not, therefore, have the power and Complaint for Annulment of Decree Has No Merit
authority to adjudicate in favor of the spouses Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan the said to adjudicate to spouses Carag the disputed portion of the
tract of timberland, portion of the Lot 2472 Cad- subject property. Petitioner claims that the disputed
151, at the time of the issuance of the Decree portion was still classified as timber land, and thus not
and the Original Certificate of Title of the said alienable and disposable, when Decree No. 381928 was
spouses; and such adjudication and/or Decree issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner admits that the
and Title issued covering the timberland area is adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject property,
null and void ab initio considering the provisions outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and
of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Philippine disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in
constitution. 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government, not
xxxx the trial courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify
15. The issuance of Decree No. 381928 and O.C.T. lands of the public domain.
No. 11585 in the name of spouses Antonio Carag Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of
and Victoria Turingan, and all the derivative titles judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the
thereto in the name of the Heirs and said person of the defending party or over the subject matter of
20
spouses, specifically with respect to the inclusion the claim. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
thereto of timberland area, by the then Court of conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force
21
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), and at the time of the filing of the action.
the Register of Deeds of Cagayan is patently Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se
22
illegal and erroneous for the reason that alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular Government, we ruled:
said Court and/or the Register of Deeds of From the language of the foregoing provisions of
Cagayan did not have any authority or law, it is deduced that, with the exception of
jurisdiction to decree or adjudicate the said those comprised within the mineral and timber
timberland area of Lot 2472 Cad-151, zone, all lands owned by the State or by the
consequently, the same are null and void ab sovereign nation are public in character, and per
initio, and of no force and effect se alienable and, provided they are not destined
16
whatsoever. (Emphasis supplied; citations to the use of the public in general or reserved by
omitted) the Government in accordance with law, they
Petitioner clearly alleged in the complaint and amended may be acquired by any private or juridical
23
complaint that it was seeking to annul Decree No. 381928 person x x x (Emphasis supplied)
on the ground of the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone,
the subject land, specifically over the disputed portion, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in
which petitioner maintained was classified as timber land accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed
and was not alienable and disposable. alienable.
Second, the Court of Appeals also dismissed the complaint In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed
on the ground of petitioner’s failure to allege that the portion had been declared as mineral or forest zone, or
"ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law,
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available." during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land
17 24
In Ancheta v. Ancheta, we ruled: classification maps petitioner attached to the complaint
In a case where a petition for annulment of also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was
judgment or final order of the RTC filed under part of the forest zone or reserved for some public
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and
of jurisdiction over the person of the Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994,
defendant/respondent or over the nature or contained no statement that the disputed portion was
25
subject of the action, the petitioner need not declared and classified as timber land.
allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in
26
new trial or reconsideration of the final order or 1930 was Act No. 2874, which provides:
judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the
available through no fault of her own. This is so recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
because a judgment rendered or final order and Natural Resources, shall from time to time
issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and classify the lands of the public domain into -
void and may be assailed any time either (a) Alienable or disposable
 (b) Timber and court issued a decision for the issuance of a
(c) Mineral lands decree which was the basis of an original
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer certificate of title to the land, the court had
such lands from one class to another, for the already made a determination that the land was
purposes of their government and disposition. agricultural and that the applicant had proven
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had that he was in open and exclusive possession of
declared the disputed portion of the subject property the subject land for the prescribed number of
timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. years. It was the land registration court which
2874. had the jurisdiction to determine whether the
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition land applied for was agricultural, forest or
only those lands which have been declared alienable or timber taking into account the proof or evidence
disposable. Section 8 provides: in each particular case. (Emphasis supplied)
SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision
open to disposition or concession which have for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial
been officially delimited and classified and, when court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject
practicable, surveyed, and which have not been property, including the disputed portion, applied for was
reserved for public or quasi-public uses, not agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court
appropriated by the Government, nor in any determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses
manner become private property, nor those on Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a
which a private right authorized and recognized certificate of title. The government, which was a party in
by this Act or any other valid law may be the original proceedings in the trial court as required by
claimed, or which, having been reserved or law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring
appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had
the Governor-General may, for reasons of public jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its
interest, declare lands of the public domain open decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and
to disposition before the same have had their beyond review.
boundaries established or been surveyed, or The finality of the trial court’s decision is further recognized
may, for the same reasons, suspend their in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which
concession or disposition by proclamation duly provides:
published or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral
supplied) lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
private lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may of potential energy, and other natural resources
be made under any law, are not covered by the of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition, exploitation, development, or
disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se Philippines, or to corporations or associations at
alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance owned by such citizens, subject to any existing
with law. right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of
Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the the inauguration of the Government established
classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts had under this Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all
Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain
not become private property prior to the enactment of Act belong to the State, it recognized that these lands
No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed were "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
portion was not land on which a private right may be concession at the time of the inauguration of the
29
claimed under any existing law at that time. Government established under this Constitution." When
27
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the the Commonwealth Government was established under
Republic sought to annul the judgment of the Court of First the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag had already an
Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court, existing right to the subject land, including the disputed
because when the application for land registration was portion, pursuant to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by
filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest the trial court.
land. The Republic also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was We DISMISS petitioner Republic of the Philippines’
forest or agricultural land since the authority to classify complaint for reversion, annulment of decree, cancellation
lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit.
28
in Act Nos. 926 and 2874. The Court ruled: SO ORDERED.
We are inclined to agree with the respondent
that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the
Governor General to declare lands as alienable
and disposable would apply to lands that have
become private property or lands that have been
impressed with a private right authorized and
recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By
express declaration of Section 45 (b) of Act 2874
which is quoted above, those who have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of
acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may
file an application with the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and these applicants
shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title. When the land registration
26. Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, En considered null and void ab initio. It contends that during
Banc (G.R. No. 127245, the oral argument, the Solicitor General stated that initially
January 30, 2001) it is the government which has the burden of proof to show
EN BANC that the title of the Spouses Gana is invalid or not legal but
Gentlemen: the burden is shifted to private respondents once the
Quoted hereunder for your information, is a resolution of government has established the fact that the title was
this Court dated JAN 30 2001. issued before the land had been declared as alienable and
G.R. No. 127245(Republic of the Philippines vs. CA, et al.) disposable; that since the land covered by OCT No. 4216
G.R. No. 127022 (Firestone Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA, et al.) was still part of the unclassified forest land in 1927, the
Before us are (1) two (2) motions for reconsideration of our then CFI of Rizal sitting as a land registration court, which
decision dated September 2, 1999 filed by petitioner took cognizance of the land registration case and all the
Republic in G. R. No. 127245 and by petitioners Firestone proceedings conducted therein including but not limited to
Ceramics, et al. in G. R. No. 127022, (2) private respondent the issuance of the published notice of initial hearing in the
Peltan's motion to dismiss dated September 15, 2000. 1927 issue of the Official Gazette were invalid, that land
We shall first rule on the procedural issue. Private registration courts at the time the Ganas filed their
respondent Peltan filed a motion to dismiss alleging that application, had no power nor authority to determine
the Republic's petition was filed one day late, thus the whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land
judgment appealed from has become final and executory. subject of registration since the authority to classify lands
We find the same to be unmeritorious since it is already was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act
too late to raise the issue at this stage of the proceedings Nos. 926 (1903) and 2874 (1919).
and we rule that justice will be best served if these cases Petitioner Republic also claims that private respondents'
will be decided on their merits rather than on mere reliance on Section 45 of Act No. 2874 at this final stage of
technicality. the proceedings, which only indicates that the Gana
We now consider the merits of these cases. spouses instituted their application for land registration on
(1) G.R. No. 127245 confirmation of imperfect title supposedly grounded on
In G. R. No. 127245, petitioner Republic moved for their alleged "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
reconsideration on the following grounds: possession and occupation" is fraught with untenable
I. THE RULE ON RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY TO THE implications since OCT No. 4216 was not evidenced by any
INSTANT CASES; judicial record, decision or decree; thus private
II. ASSUMING WITHOUT respondents invocation of "private rights" is hearsay and
ADMITTING THAT RES JUDICATA MAY BE self serving.
APPLIED, THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE On the other hand, private respondents Margolles et al and
WHICH IS HIGHER AND MORE Peltan argue that this case must be decided on the basis of
COMPELLING THAN RES JUDICATA the law and jurisprudence in force during 1927-1929
WARRANTS THE EXEMPTION OF THIS covering the time when the application for registration was
CASE FROM THE RULE OF JUDICIAL filed in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406) and
PRECEDENTS; when OCT No. 4216 was issued; that it is not correct to say
III. THE LEGAL PRESUMPTION that no valid torrens title to land can be obtained by
IS THAT UNLESS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED individuals and entities in a land registration case unless
AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE, the land was previously covered by an executive
UNCLASSIFIED LANDS ARE NOT proclamation declaring the land as alienable and
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE; AND disposable. Respondents claim that property that was
IV. IF THE DECISION DATED already privately owned or under private ownership at the
SEPTEMBER 2, 1999 OF THIS time the Spanish crown ceded sovereignty over the
HONORABLE COURT IS NOT Philippine Islands to the United States remained private
RECONSIDERED PETITIONER STANDS TO property, even if the owner had not obtained a muniment
LOSE VAST TRACK (SIC) OF PRIME LAND of title to his property; thus, such person who has held the
NOW VALUED AT property under color of title may institute a land
ABOUT P27,892,900,000.00. registration case to have the property brought under the
Petitioner Republic submits that the decisions of this Court torrens system and have a title issue in his name; that even
1
in Margolles et al. vs. CA 230 SCRA 97., Peltan assuming that a particular piece of property was not yet
2
Development Corporation et. al. vs. CA 270 SCRA 83., and privately owned when the Spanish crown ceded
3
Goldenrod, Inc. vs. CA August 10, 1994 resolution.do not sovereignty, private individuals or entities who held
constitute a bar to the present case based on the rule "agricultural public land" openly, continuously, exclusively
of res judicata, as the said cases pertained to the and notoriously, in the concept of owners "for a period of
superiority of conflicting titles of the parties therein ten years next preceding the twenty-sixth day of July 1904
whereas the present case resolves on the validity of the were conclusively presumed to have performed all the
judgment covering a vast parcel of land rendered at the conditions essential to a "government grant" and to have
time when the land was still forest land; that the subject received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of
4
matter of the present case is the entire parcel of land title to such land, Section 54 (6) Act No. 926 of the
covered by OCT No. 4216 with an area of 996,175 square Philippine Commission otherwise known as the Public Land
meters, whereas the cited Margolles case involved only a Act.as a qualified possessor of "agricultural public land";
188,254 square meter portion of the land covered by OCT that there was no requirement under Act No. 926 that the
No. 4216. Petitioner insists that it was not a party in the land subject of a government grant must have been
Margolles case and that its cause of action in the present previously declared as alienable and disposable by the
case is based on the inalienability and indisposability of the Governor General. Respondents claim that it was under Act
subject land and consequent lack of jurisdiction of the land No. 2874 that the Governor General was given for the first
registration court over the same. Thus there is no identity time the authority upon recommendation of the Secretary
of parties or of subject matter, or of cause of action that of Agriculture to classify lands of public domain into
would justify application of the rule of res judicata. alienable and disposable, timber and mineral, and to
Petitioner Republic further contends that land not transfer such lands from one class to another, for the
5
classified as alienable and disposable remain so and it is the purposes of their government and disposition. Section 6
private claimant who bears the burden of showing that the Act No. 2874.Respondents submit that under Act No. 2974
Executive Department has in fact classified the land as just as in Act No. 926, such power of the Governor General
disposable and alienable; that under the regalian doctrine, did not affect lands that may have already become "private
all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within property" or have become impressed with a "private right
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State, authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid
6
thus, whatever title issued before such classification is law" Section 8 Act No. 2874.and the fact that such
properties were not previously covered by a declaration by registration of a parcel of land bears the burden of
the Governor General that these lands are alienable and overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be
disposable does not affect the validity of the titles of the registered forms part of public domain, compliance with
owners, e. g. the friar lands, the Hacienda de San Pedro this burden should be proven in the original proceedings
Macati, the Tuason Entail, the Hacienda de Maricaban, instituted by the Gana spouses in 1927, and must be legally
Hacienda de Navotas, the Piedad Estate, which were issued presumed to have been satisfied as a decree was issued in
before World II. The ownership of these parties who favor of the petitioners-spouses. Thus where a petition is
owned property during the Spanish regime was not filed to annul the said judgment on the ground that it is
affected by Act No. 926 or Act No. 2874, which referred fatally void, the burden of proving the nullity rests with the
only to public lands. They further contend that under the petitioner.
laws and jurisprudence in force at the time the proceedings In Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation vs.
8
in LRC Case No. 678 (GLRO Record No. 30406) were Court of Appeals 189 SCRA 792.this Court emphasized
conducted, and insofar as the confirmation of imperfect "that in an action to annul a judgment, the burden of
titles is concerned, the determination of whether land is proving the judgment's nullity rests upon the petitioner,
"agricultural public land" susceptible of registration in the and the petitioner must establish by clear and convincing
9
name of a private party, or "forest land" which is not evidence that the judgment is fatally defective." In that
susceptible of private ownership, is a question of fact that case, the petitioner contended in the proceedings filed by
the land registration court has the power and/or the Republic in the Court of Appeals, that when the decree
jurisdiction to determine on the basis of the judicially in favor of De Perio was issued by Judge Ostrand in 1912
prescribed or formulated test i.e., whether the land is the parcels of land were still part of the inalienable public
"more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it forests.However, petitioner's case rested solely on land
contains than it is for agricultural purposes?". classification maps drawn several years after the issuance
We resolve to deny the motion for reconsideration. of the decree in 1912 which maps fail to conclusively
Petitioner's arguments have been squarely discussed and establish the actual classification of the land in 1912 and
were duly considered in our decision and we reiterate that the years prior to that.Before this Court, petitioner
the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the petition to reiterated said contention and referred, for the first time,
annul judgment in view of the decision of this Court in the to a 1908 proclamation reserving the land in Zambales as a
Margolles case. Petitioner's contention that it was never a naval reservation and alleging that the subject parcels of
party to the Margolles case is not decisive of the issue. We land are parts thereof.The Court held that these maps are
have stated that absolute identity of parties is not required insufficient to overcome the legal presumption in favor of
but only substantial identity of parties for the application of the decree's regularity.The Court held that land
the rule on res judicata. We agree with the respondent classification maps drawn several years after the issuance
Court of Appeals that although petitioner was not a party of the decree in 1912 fail to conclusively establish the
in the Margolles case, its claim in the instant case and that actual classification of the land in 1912 and the years prior
of the losing parties in the Margolles case raised exactly the to that, and are insufficient to overcome the presumption
same argument and relied on the same evidence to justify in favor of the decree's regularity.
invalidation of OCT No. 4216, namely, that said title Respondents correctly posit that the court's jurisdiction is
supposedly covers unclassified public land (forest land) so determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing
10
that the CFI of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in of the action. Moran, Comment on the Rules of Court,
1929, did not acquire jurisdiction to adjudicate the subject Vol. 1, 1995 edition, p. 55.Jurisdiction over the subject
property in favor of the original applicants, the Gana matter is conferred by law and is determined upon the
spouses. Such a shared identity of interest as shown by the allegations made in the complaint, irrespective of whether
identity of the relief sought by one person in a prior case the plaintiff is entitled or not to recover upon the claim
and the second person in the subsequent case, i. e., to asserted therein, a matter that can be resolved only after
11
declare the nullity of OCT No. 4216, is sufficient to make and as a result of the trial. Ibid.It bears stress that what
7
them "privy in law" Valencia vs. RTC of Quezon City, 184 the petitioner sought to annul was the 1929 decision of the
SCRA 80; Comilang vs. Buendia, 21 486; Santos vs. Gabriel, land registration court which became the basis for the
45 SCRA 289; Widows and Orphans Associations v. CA, 212 issuance of OCT No. 4216. The law prevailing at the time
SCRA 360.for purposes of the operation of the rule on res the original land registration was sought, Act No. 2874
judicataor conclusiveness of judgment. (1919) entitled "An act to amend and compile the laws
The main argument of petitioner Republic in seeking relative to lands of public domain, or better known as "the
annulment of the decision of the then CFI of Rizal sitting as Public Land Act" pertinently provides:
a land registration court in LRC Case No. 672 (GLRO Record "Section 6. The Governor General, upon the
No. 30406) was that the court did not have jurisdiction recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
over the case because the property subject matter thereof Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the
was "forest land" since at the time the land registration lands of the public domain into-
case was filed in 1927, the Governor-General had not (a) Alienable or disposable,
issued a proclamation declaring the subject property as (b) Timber, and
alienable and disposable. (c) Mineral lands,
Since the petitioner is assailing the jurisdiction of the Land and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such
Registration Court which rendered the judgment in LRC lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their
Case No. 672 (GLRO Record No. 30406) that became the government and disposition.
basis for the issuance of OCT No. 4216 seventy (70) years xxx
ago relies on the very same evidence (FAO 4-1141 [1968] Section 8.Only those lands shall be declared open
implementing LC Map No. 2623 Project No. 13-A), (namely to disposition or concession which have been officially
land classification maps), that was judicially determined by delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed,
this Court as insufficient to conclusively establish the actual and which have not been reserved for public or quasi
classification of the land in 1929 and to overcome the public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in
overwhelming documentary evidence adduced to support any manner become private property, nor those on which a
the validity of OCT No. 4216, we are compelled to affirm private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any
the dismissal of the petition to annul the judgment which other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been
resulted in the issuance of OCT No. 4216. reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However,
We are not unmindful of the long settled rule that a the Governor General may, for reasons of public interest,
presumption lies in favor of state ownership and it is the declare lands of the public domain open to disposition
individual who claims that the land is alienable and before the same have had their boundaries established or
disposable who must present clear, positive and absolute been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend
evidence to over the presumption of state ownership. their concession or disposition until they are again declared
While it may be true that an applicant for original
open to concession or disposition by proclamation duly should and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the
published or by Act of the Legislature. opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority
xxx on forestry matters. But a mere formal opposition on the
Section 11.Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes part of the Attorney General for the Director of Forestry,
can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise: unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the
(1) For homestead settlement courts from giving title to the claimant." taking into
(2) By sale account the proof or evidence in each particular
13
(3) By lease. case. Ankron vs. Government of Philippine Islands, 40
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or Phil 10.
incomplete titles: Notably, petitioner Republic's petition for annulment of
(a) By administrative judgment in the respondent Court of Appeals contended
legalization (free patent) that the decree in favor of the Gana spouses was issued at
(b) By judicial legalization. the time when the subject land was still forest land,
Section 45. The following described citizens of the (unfortunately no copy of the 1929 decision is available)
Philippine Islands and the United States, occupying lands of and rested its case solely on the land classification map No.
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an 2623 Project 13-A which failed to conclusively establish the
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected actual classification of the land in 1929 or earlier.
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of Moreover, FAO No. 4-1 141 signed by then Secretary of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of Agriculture and Natural Resources Arturo R. Tanco, Jr, on
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title January 3, 1968, which provides:
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: "1, Pursuant to the provisions
xxx xxx xxx of Section 1827 of the Revised
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors Administrative Code, (hereby declare as
in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, alienable or disposable and place the
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural same under the control of the Bureau of
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of Lands for administration and disposition
acquisition of ownership, except as against the in accordance with the Public Land Act,
Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and subject to private rights, if any there be
ninety-four, except when prevented by way of force and to the conditions herein specified,
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have the portions of the public domain
performed all the conditions essential to a Government situated in the Municipalities of xxxxxxxx
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title, under the Las Piñas Province of Rizal which are
provisions of this chapter." designated and described as alienable or
We are inclined to agree with the respondents disposable on Bureau of Forestry Map LC
that it is legally doubtful if the authority of the Governor 2623 approved on January 3, 1968."
General to declare lands as alienable and disposable would categorically avoided intrusion into existing private rights
apply to lands that have become private property or lands and this pronouncement necessarily includes the issuance
that have been impressed with a private right authorized of OCT No. 4216 in 1929; "otherwise, certificates of title
and recognized by Act 2874 or any valid law. By express issued prior to 1968 could possibly be all
14
declaration of section 45 (b) of Act 2874 which is quoted nullified." Margolles vs. CA, supra.
above, those who have been in open, continuous, exclusive True, prescription does not run against the State. However,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural probably due to bureaucratic constraints, vast tracts of
lands of the public-domain under a bona fide claim of land acquired by private parties in urbanized areas like the
acquisition of ownership since July 26, 1894 may file an city of Manila and Quezon City were released from
application with the Court of First Instance of the province classification as forestland belatedly, or long after their
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims residential character as private property had become a
and these applicants shall be conclusively presumed to matter of judicial notice. It appears that the City of Manila
15
have performed all the conditions essential to a was declassified as forest land only in 1955 Republic vs.
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of Alano, CA-G.R. SP No. 08376.and Quezon City only on
16
title. When the land registration court issued a decision for October 24, 1989. See Comment to Motion for
the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original Reconsideration; p. 154, Rollo.As early as 1961, this Court
certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a stated that an attorney-at-law "should have known that no
determination that the land was agricultural and that the property around the City of Manila or in Quezon City is as
17
applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive yet not covered by torrens title". Republic vs. Aricheta, 2
possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of SCRA 469.In this case defendant claimed that he was a
years. It was the land registration court which had the possessor in good faith From petitioners-movants' own
18
jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was submission, Reply, pp. 14-15, Rollo, pp. 835-836.a part of
12
agricultural, forest or timber In Ramos vs. Director of Las Piñas comprising 1200 hectares was declared as
Lands, 39 Phil 175, Ramos instituted appropriate alienable and disposable on September 3, 1928, thus:
proceedings to have his title registered but opposition was "The map showing the area included in the
entered by the Director of Lands on the ground that Ramos 1200 hectares was destroyed during the Second
had not acquired a good title from the Spanish government World War, and it was in view of the loss of the
and by the Director of Forestry on the ground that the first map indicating the 1200 hectares that then Sec.
parcel was forest land. The trial court agreed with the Arturo Tanco issued FAO 4-1141 declaring the
oppositors and excluded parcel no. 1. This Court reversed entire Las Piñas as well as part of the adjacent
the judgment and ordered the lower court to register municipalities as alienable and disposable on
parcel no.1 in the name of the applicant. It rationalized as January 3, 1968."
follows: The implication is that the 1968 order was meant to
'If in this instance we give judicial sanction to a private confirm or reiterate the earlier declaration and serves to
claim, let it be noted that the government, in the long run affirm that indeed parts of Las Piñas, albeit the map
of cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public land can indicating this area has been lost, were already open to
be established as provided by law. When the claim of the disposition to private claimants long before the issuance of
citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular FAO 4-1141. Since there are extant numerous titles
19
piece of property collide, if the government desires to covering various portions of Las Piñas, Attached to
demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director respondents' Comment to the Motion for Reconsideration
of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof is a list given by the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal of at
that the land is not more valuable for agriculture than least thirty three (33) original OCTs to lands in Las Pinas,
forest purposes. Great considerations, it must be stated, issued before World War II indicating that there are
numerous titles other than OCT No. 4216 which covers classification of the land in question as alienable and
parcels of land in Las Pinas, most of which were issued disposable in 1968, and in view of the failure of the State to
earlier than 1929.any conflict or overlapping of titles institute reversion proceedings before 1968, any action to
should be litigated by the interested parties, as what cause the cancellation of subject title at this time should be
happened in the Margolles, Peltan and Goldenrod cases. subjected to assiduous scrutiny in the light of the existence
In sum, resurrecting the issue in Margolles will not only of numerous titles covering lands within the coverage of
seriously undermine the principle of res judicata, an old FAO-4-1 141 which encompasses 13,495 hectares in Rizal
axiom of law, "dictated by wisdom and sanctified by and Cavite. In Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng Giap and
20 23
age" Carandang vs. Venturaza, 133 SCRA 344.and a Sons 96 Phil. 447; See also Arsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs.
21
fundamental component in every jural system Ibid.that Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547., this Court upheld the title of an
prohibits relitigation of questions already settled by final alien who subsequently became a naturalized Filipino
judgment of the court, in this case, the highest court. before the State commenced escheat proceedings on the
Worse, considering that there are numerous certificates of ground that the "State is deemed to have waived its right
titles now in the hands of successors-in-interest of the to escheat the real property and the title of the alien
original awardees of OCT No. 4216, it will imperil the rule thereto becomes lawful and valid as of the date of its
on the indefeasibility of titles which is a basic underpinning conveyance or transfer to him". The court rationalized that
of the torrens system of land registration, and which was "if the ban on aliens from acquiring lands is to preserve the
precisely instituted to quiet title to land. Again, contrary to nation's lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim
the submission of the petitioner that the obtention of OCT would not be thwarted by making lawful the acquisition of
No. 4216 has caused "property rights (to be) unsettled and real estate by aliens who become naturalized citizens
destabilized, and the integrity of the torrens system before the State commences forfeiture proceedings." By
compromised", the relitigation of the question on the parity of reasoning, even assuming that it was convincingly
validity and genuineness of OCT No. 4216 would open the established that the subject land was indeed still classified
floodgates or pave the way for the assertion of numerous as forest land at the time of the registration proceedings in
conflicting claims to 13,495 hectares of land in Rizal and 1929, the fact that the same was eventually released or
22
Cavite covered by FAO-4-1141 This covers an appropriate classified as alienable and disposable should stay the hand
area of 13, 495,22 hectares, situated in Taytay, Las Pinas, of the Government in bringing an action to question the
Muntinlupa, Paranaque, Taguig an Pateros, province of title issued by a court of land registration, an action which
Rizal, and in Bacoor and Imus, Province of Cavite.which is in rem, considering that the same basic issue was already
were already titled prior to 1968. resolved with finality by this Court. Indeed, to annul
Finally, the area covered by FAO-4-1141 is 13,495.22 existing torrens titles derived from OCT No. 4216 which
hectares situated in six municipalities of Rizal and two was issued seventy years ago, only to enable the
municipalities of Cavite. Pursuing the petitioner's theory government to dispose anew the lands covered thereby to
that possession before January 3, 1968 could not have new or subsequent applicants would betray a subservience
ripened into ownership, the State would have to take to technicality that will not be in the public interest nor
action to cause the reversion of the innumerable parcels of serve our declared national land policies any useful
lands which were titled earlier than 1968. An attempt at purpose. This is a simple matter of equity and good sense.
this time to single out OCT No. 4216 for cancellation and (2)G.R. No. 127022
resurrect the contention that it is spurious and irregularly In G. R. No. 127022, petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al.
obtained, despite the pronouncement of this Court filed their motion for reconsideration with the following
positively and categorically vindicating that very same title assigned errors:
in three cases, betrays an unbecoming disregard for the I. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY
final judgment of the highest court and does not elicit ERRED IN HOLDING THAT HEREIN
sympathy. Indeed, it is time that the validity of OCT No. PETITIONERS' TITLES (DERIVED FROM OCT No.
4216 is put to rest. A-S-47) BEING ADVERSE TO OCT NO. 4216,
One final note, our reluctance to give overriding WERE DECLARED "AS NULL AND VOID" BY THE
significance to the Republic's invocation of the regalian DECISION RENDERED IN G.R. NO. 109490
doctrine stems from a consideration of the salient fact that (MARGOLLES CASE).
we are here dealing with land which although allegedly to II. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY
be originally of the public domain was eventually, if ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS, AS
belatedly, released for disposition to private claimants. MOVANTS-INTERVENORS IN THE CASE BELOW,
Thus the parties who have sought to assert their own title "HAVE NO MORE LEGAL INTEREST
in this case (by way of intervention) and in the cases of IN THE MATTER IN LITIGATION" OVERLOOKING
Peltan and Goldenrod (in petitions to cancel title) are IN THE PROCESS, THAT PETITIONERS' LEGAL
private parties who purportedly acquired subsequent INTEREST THERETO IS BASICALLY ANCHORED
certificates of title to, or interests in, the same land. In IN THE SUCCESS OF THE GOVERNMENT'S
short, the land in question has been the subject of PRESENT ACTION.
overlapping or conflicting claims of private parties. Had the III.THE HONORABLE COURT
Republic's cause of action been one to cause reversion to SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
the State of public land illegally titled because it cannot be PETITIONERS' TITLES LOST IN G.R. NO. 109490
alienated at all, e.g. military reservations, public parks, or (MARGOLLES CASE), "MAY NO LONGER BE
other lands devoted to public use, and for that reason REVIVED REGARDLESS OF THE OUTCOME OF
absolutely insusceptible of private ownership, the THE MAIN PETITION OF THE PETITIONER
government's plea would have compelled concurrence. As REPUBLIC", EVEN AS THE OBJECT OF
it is, petitioners Firestone, et al., the losing parties in the PETITIONERS' INTERVENTION IS TO AVOID
Margolles case, have asserted their "legal interest in the MULTIPLICITY OF SUIT, LACHES AND
success of the instant Government's action" (Motion for ESTOPPEL.
Reconsideration) to annul the 1929 judgment of the land IV. THIS HON. COURT GRAVELY
court on the basis of its subsequent title obtained in 1969 ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PETITION FILED BY
covering a portion of the property earlier titled in the name PETITIONERS IN THE INSTANT CONSOLIDATED
of the Gana spouses. CASE "ARE BARRED BY THE DECISIONS IN THE
Contrary to the Republic's posture in its initiatory and MARGOLLES AND PELTAN CASES".
amended petition, the State does not stand to be deprived Petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al., contend that there
of its patrimony, as the entire municipality of Las Piñas has was nothing in the three (3) cases cited in our decision
already been declared as alienable and disposable and if which declared petitioners' titles as null and void although
there is any reversion to be caused in favor of the Republic, petitioners' titles were, in effect, set aside in the Margolles
the land recovered would not be for public use, but for case on the ground of superiority of titles. They further
eventual disposition to other private persons. With the allege that their intervention is based on their legal interest
in the success of the government's action which is of direct
and material character because <="" span="">"either gain
or lose" by the direct operation and effect of the judgment.
They also contend that in the event that the government
succeeds and the mother title as well as the derivative
titles of the private respondents are voided, the Margolles
group had no valid cause to litigate upon the issue of
superiority of title in G. R. No. 109490 and petitioners'
derivative titles become the only title to the extent of the
188,424 square meters; that the intended revival of
petitioners supposed nullified titles in the instant
proceedings, by way of intervention, is imperative in order
to avoid multiplicity of suits, otherwise, without said
intervention, petitioners will have no other recourse but to
commence an entirely new action for the recovery of the
subject land or possibly to institute an action to reopen the
Margolles case thereby incurring unnecessary waste of
time, money and effort while, in the meantime, the voided
titles of the private respondents will have to be reverted
and consolidated in the name of the Republic to the
extreme prejudice of petitioners.
We cannot sustain the above arguments which are a
mere rehash of the arguments raised in their petition , and
which we have already passed upon in our decision.
Moreover, Firestone Ceramics, et al., were the private
respondents in G. R. No. 109490 (Margolles case), which
filed a complaint for annulment of titles, recovery of
possession, and quieting of titles against Patrocinio
Margolles et al. (private respondents in present petition).
What petitioners Firestone Ceramics, et al. sought to annul
in that case was OCT No. 4216. With the ruling of this Court
upholding the validity of OCT No. 4216 the necessary
consequence of such decision would be the nullification of
the titles adverse to OCT No. 4216. There is no question
that intervention is only collateral or ancillary to the main
action. Hence it has been held that final dismissal of the
principal action results in the dismissal of said ancillary
action. We find no reason to dwell on the other issues
raised in view of the fact that we are dismissing the
principal action of petitioner Republic.
WHEREFORE, respondent Peltan's motion to dismiss is
DENIED. The motions for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Republic and petitioners Firestone Ceramics et al. are
DENIED for lack of merit with FINALITY.
SO ORDERED. (Ynares-Santiago, J.-No part; Sandoval-
Guitierrez J.-No part ; Puno, J. -on official leave)
Very truly yours,
LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of Court