Collision between the bulk

Insert Furness
carrier document title and
Melbourne
the yacht Riga II

North of Bowen,
Location | Date Queensland | 26 May 2012

ATSB Transport Safety Report

Investigation
[Insert Mode]
Marine Occurrence
Occurrence
Investigation
Investigation
XX-YYYY-####
295-MO-2012-006
Final – 12 December 2013
Cover photo: Australian Transport Safety Bureau

Released in accordance with section 25 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003

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Published by: Australian Transport Safety Bureau

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Addendum
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Safety summary
What happened
At 2156 on 26 May 2012, the bulk carrier Furness Melbourne and the yacht Riga II collided about
15 miles north of Bowen, Queensland.
Riga II was dismasted and its hull was damaged but no-one was seriously injured and the yacht
was towed into Bowen by a volunteer marine rescue vessel.
Furness Melbourne was not damaged and, after rendering assistance to the yacht, continued its
voyage.

What the ATSB found

The investigation found that a proper lookout was not being kept on board either vessel in the time
leading up to the collision.
Furness Melbourne’s lookout had sighted Riga II’s starboard sidelight prior to collision but the
officer of the watch made a series of assumptions based on limited information and concluded that
the light was from a distant navigation buoy rather than another vessel that presented a risk of
collision.
Riga II’s watchkeeper did not visually identify Furness Melbourne’s navigation lights in time to
make an effective appraisal of the situation, did not set the yacht’s automatic identification system
(AIS) unit on a range scale that would provide adequate warning of approaching vessels and
when alerted by the AIS of the approaching ship, misinterpreted that information.

What's been done as a result

In the past 25 years, 60 collisions involving ships and small vessels have been reported to the
ATSB and its predecessor, the Marine Incident Investigation Unit. Of these, 39 have been
investigated.
The findings from these investigations have invariably included the failure of the watchkeepers on
board one or both vessels to keep a proper lookout and the absence of early and appropriate
action to avoid a collision.
The safety lessons from these investigations have been included in the published investigation
reports. A number of safety bulletins that aim to highlight the risks and educate seafarers with
regard to the similar contributing factors have also been published.
These documents and further safety related information can be downloaded at:
[Link]/[Link]

Safety message
This incident again emphasises the need for those charged with the navigation of vessels of all
types and sizes to keep a proper lookout and to take early and appropriate action to avoid a
collision in accordance with the international collision regulations.
Contents
The occurrence ........................................................................................................................1
Context ......................................................................................................................................6
Furness Melbourne 6
Riga II 6
Navigation lights 6
Holbourne Island and Nares Rock lights 7
Safety analysis .........................................................................................................................8
First sighting of Furness Melbourne 8
Lookout 8
Lookout on board Riga II 8
Lookout on board Furness Melbourne 10
Detectability 13
Automatic identification system (AIS) 13
Radar reflectors 13
Previous incidents 14
Findings ................................................................................................................................. 15
Contributing factors 15
Other factors that increase risk 15
Safety issues and actions ................................................................................................... 16
Failure to keep a proper lookout 16
General details ...................................................................................................................... 17
Occurrence details 17
Furness Melbourne 17
Riga II 18
Sources and submissions .................................................................................................. 19
Sources of information 19
References 19
Submissions 19
Australian Transport Safety Bureau .................................................................................. 20
Purpose of safety investigations 20
Developing safety action 20
 ATSB – MO-2012-006

The occurrence
1
At 1410 on 26 May 2012, the 190 m geared bulk carrier Furness Melbourne (Figure 1) sailed
from Townsville, Queensland, after loading a part cargo of lead slabs and zinc concentrate. The
ship was bound for Portland, Victoria, to load mineral sands before departing the Australian coast
bound for Europe.
Figure 1: Furness Melbourne

Source: ATSB

By 1542, Furness Melbourne was well clear of Townsville and its course was altered to 106º (T)
2
and speed increased to 11 knots (Figure 2). The auto-pilot was engaged and the master handed
over the conduct (con) of the ship to the officer of the watch. The duty seaman was posted as a
lookout.
Figure 2: Section of navigational chart Aus 4620 from Townsville to Whitsunday Islands

Source: Australian Hydrographic Service

1
All times referred to in this report are local time, Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) + 10 hours.
2
One knot, or one nautical mile per hour equals 1.852 kilometres per hour.

›1‹
 ATSB – MO-2012-006

Meanwhile, the 13.6 m yacht Riga II (Figure 3) was en route to Townsville. At 1542, the yacht was
3
about 9 miles east of Gloucester Island (Figure 2) on a course of 303º (T) and making good
about 6.5 knots. The skipper and his wife (the yacht’s owners), their friend and grandson were on
board. They had sailed from Cid Harbour in the Whitsunday Islands earlier that afternoon on the
first leg of a cruise to far north Queensland.
Figure 3: Riga II

Source: Riga II’s skipper

By 1930, Riga II had reached a position nearly 6 miles west of Holbourne Island, very close to the
4
123·5º - 303·5º charted ‘preferred route’ (Figure 2). The yacht’s auto-pilot was set to make good
its planned course of 303º (T) and the wind (15 to 20 knots from the south) was abaft the port
5
beam. The starboard leeway meant that the heading varied between 295º and 300º. The skipper
was on watch, keeping a lookout while the others on board either rested or slept. While the yacht’s
automatic identification system (AIS) unit was switched on, the radar was switched off.

At this time, Furness Melbourne was on a 123º (T) course following the 123·5º - 303·5º preferred
route in the opposite direction to Riga II. At 2000, when the third mate took over the bridge watch
from the chief mate, the ship was about 42 miles west-northwest of Holbourne Island. The duty
seaman on watch also changed. The weather conditions recorded in the ship’s log book noted
‘overcast skies, good visibility, fresh southerly breeze and rough seas’.

At 2051, the third mate began playing music on a personal computer. From time to time, he
hummed or sang along with the music and, sometimes, chatted with the lookout. The visibility
remained good and they could not see any ships or other traffic nearby. The s-band radar, AIS
unit and both very high frequency (VHF) radios were switched on.

3
A nautical mile of 1852 m.
4
The relevant note on the Aus navigational charts states: This is a preferred route and has not been surveyed in
accordance with the IMO/IHO standards for recommended tracks, but is the preferred route for vessels having regard
to charted depths. The attention of vessels meeting on the preferred routes is drawn to the International Regulations for
the Prevention of Collision at Sea (1972), particularly Rules 18 and 28 in regards to vessels constrained by their
draught.
5
All headings referred to in this report are true headings.

›2‹
 ATSB – MO-2012-006

Shortly after 2100, the seaman reported a white light fine on Furness Melbourne’s port bow. The
third mate told the seaman that the light was a distant lighthouse. At this time, Holbourne Island
6
and Nares Rock, both of which were fitted with lights, were a little over 30 miles away (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Section of navigational chart Aus 826 showing area west of Holbourne Island

Source: Australian Hydrographic Service with annotations by the ATSB

At about 2118, the lookout reported that the white light he had seen earlier was flashing. The third
mate could see no radar targets in the general direction of the light and told the lookout that it was
the distant lighthouse that he had previously mentioned.

At 2142, the seaman reported a green light fine on the port bow. The third mate thought the green
light was from the isolated danger beacon on Nares Rock and he told the seaman that the light
was a distant ‘light buoy’. In fact, the green light was the starboard sidelight of Riga II, which was
about 4 miles away.

At 2144, the third mate adjusted Furness Melbourne’s heading to starboard from 123º to 128º, to
pass further away from what he mistakenly believed was Nares Rock. At 2146, he adjusted the
heading back to 125º and, 2 minutes later, again to 128º. He then adjusted the heading back to
123º. He sang and hummed along with the music as he had during the past hour.
7
At about 2149, Riga II’s AIS unit ‘target alarm’ sounded. Alerted, the skipper’s wife called the
skipper to come inside the cabin and have a look at the AIS display. Together, they noted from the
AIS data that the approaching ship was making good a course of 122º (T) at 11.5 knots. They also
switched on the yacht’s radar.

6
The lighthouse on Holbourne Island is 115 m high and has a white light that flashes three times every 15 seconds. It
has a nominal range of 11 miles. The isolated danger beacon on Nares Rock is a minor light and has a much lower and
less bright white light that flashes two times every 5 seconds.
7
This estimated time is derived from an analysis of all the available evidence. This analysis is discussed in the ‘Safety
Analysis’ section of the report.

›3‹
 ATSB – MO-2012-006

Shortly afterwards, Riga II’s skipper, who had not yet visually sighted Furness Melbourne, went
back on deck to look for the ship. Within a minute, he saw its green sidelight fine on his starboard
bow. He decided to alter course to port and, by about 2151, Riga II’s heading had been altered
10º to port. The skipper then altered the yacht’s heading a further 10º to port to a heading of about
280º, with the aim of passing well clear of the ship.

Just after 2153, Furness Melbourne’s lookout reported that the green light he had been observing
seemed very close. Riga II was now less than 1 mile ahead of the ship and the two vessels were
closing at a combined speed of nearly 18 knots. In response to the seaman’s report, the third
mate checked the radar and the AIS unit and saw no target in the direction of the green light.

At 2154, the third mate adjusted Furness Melbourne’s heading to 128º.

Riga II’s AIS unit now indicated that the ship was making good 127º. The skipper’s wife passed
this information to the skipper, who exclaimed in surprise to his wife about what the ship appeared
to be doing. At 2155¼, she called Furness Melbourne on VHF channel 16 and identified her
vessel as Riga II. The yacht was now about 200 m from the ship’s bow.

Alerted by the unexpected radio call to his ship, the third mate stopped humming. A few seconds
later, he broadcast on VHF channel 16 that the ship’s course was being altered to starboard. He
then ordered the seaman to engage hand steering.

At 2155¾, the skipper’s wife called Furness Melbourne again and asked its intentions. At about
the same time, the skipper saw the ship bearing down on the yacht and shouted for his wife to
brace herself.

The third mate responded to the call from Riga II, stating that he was going to starboard and
asked for a port to port passing. He could no longer see the yacht’s green light when he ordered
the rudder hard-to-starboard.

At 2156, Furness Melbourne’s heading was about 130º when it collided with Riga II in position
19º 35.88’S 148º 01.37’E. The ship’s starboard anchor and/or some part of its flared bow
contacted the yacht’s mast and brought it down and the yacht scraped along the ship’s starboard
side.

At 2156¼, the skipper’s wife called Furness Melbourne and reported the collision. A few seconds
later, she reported that Riga II had been dismasted. The yacht’s navigation lights (mounted on the
mast) had gone out and the third mate could not see the yacht. He thought that the yacht was on
the port side and, at 2157¼, ordered hard over to port to swing the stern of the ship away from it.

At 2157¾, the third mate ordered the rudder amidships and called the master, asking him to come
to the bridge. The master hurried from his cabin to the bridge to find the third mate on the bridge
wing looking for a boat he thought the ship might have collided with.

At 2159, the master ordered a heading of 122º. He adjusted the radar’s gain and clutter settings
and identified a small target close by on the starboard quarter. He then sighted a dim light in the
direction of the target and thought it could be from a torch.

Meanwhile, Riga II’s skipper and his wife were assessing the damage to the yacht. No-one on
board was seriously injured. At 2202, the skipper’s wife broadcast an urgency message on VHF
channel 16 and then called Furness Melbourne. The master answered her call, exchanged
necessary information and advised that he would assist. He then turned his ship around to render
assistance to the yacht.
At 2210, Furness Melbourne’s master reported the collision to authorities ashore, advising that the
ship was providing assistance to Riga II. The authorities began preparing resources ashore to
respond.

›4‹
 ATSB – MO-2012-006

By 2300, Furness Melbourne had arrived near the disabled Riga II. The yacht’s sails and rigging
had fouled its hull and propeller. The master ordered a lifeboat lowered to assist the yacht’s crew
while he manoeuvred the ship to shelter the yacht from the wind and waves.

At 2353, the volunteer marine rescue (VMR) vessel Rescue Bowen departed Bowen to assist
Riga II. By this time, Furness Melbourne’s starboard lifeboat was in the water and approaching the
yacht with tools that had been requested to cut the rigging that was fouling the hull.

At 0130 on 27 May, Rescue Bowen arrived on the scene and approached Riga II. With Furness
Melbourne providing a lee, the VMR rescue crew began connecting their vessel’s tow line to the
yacht. By 0206, Rescue Bowen had connected the tow line and, shortly afterwards, began towing
Riga II towards Bowen at a speed of about 6 knots.

Furness Melbourne’s crew recovered the lifeboat and, at 0237, after the master had confirmed
with authorities that the ship was no longer required to assist, the passage to Portland was
resumed.

By 0647, Riga II had been safely towed into Bowen and secured in the marina. In addition to
losing its mast, sails and rigging, the yacht’s hull, handrails and paintwork on the starboard side,
were damaged. The internal support of the mast had moved, as had some cabinetwork and
internal lighting.

›5‹
 ATSB – MO-2012-006

Context
Furness Melbourne
Furness Melbourne was fitted with navigational equipment required for a ship of its size. The two
Japan Radio Company (JRC) radars, an s-band JMA-9932-SA and an x-band JMA-9922-XA, had
automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) functions. Other bridge equipment included a JRC JHS-182
automatic identification system (AIS) transceiver and two JRC JHS-32B very high frequency
(VHF) radios.
At the time of the collision, Furness Melbourne was managed by Fukujin Kisen, Japan. The ship
had a crew of 21 Filipinos, all of whom held Philippines-issued qualifications appropriate for their
positions on board the ship.
The master had 18 years of seagoing experience, of which the last 3 years had been in
command. He had been on board Furness Melbourne for about 4 months.
The third mate first went to sea in 2005 as a seaman. In 2009, he gained a certificate as an officer
in charge of a navigational watch and, in 2011, first sailed as third mate. He joined Furness
Melbourne, his second ship as third mate, in Townsville, 10 days before the collision.
The duty seaman had 8 years of experience as a seaman. He had been on board Furness
Melbourne for about 6 weeks.

Riga II
Riga II was a 13.6 m sloop rigged yacht constructed from aluminium and composite materials. The
yacht was fitted with a diesel engine but, at the time of the collision, it was under sail and the
engine was not being used.
Riga II was crewed by its owners (the skipper and his wife) and their friend. All three held a Swiss
international certificate for operators of pleasure craft (Permit B). Each had more than 25 years of
sailing experience in different parts of the world. Over that period, they had sailed together a
number of times.
After purchasing Riga II in 2007, the skipper and his wife began sailing around the world in the
yacht with their friend frequently accompanying them as circumstances permitted. In September
2011, their leisurely paced voyage brought them to Bundaberg, Australia. They returned to Europe
for a few months before resuming their voyage in May 2012, after their friend and 11 year old
grandson had joined them to sail north along the coast of Queensland.
The yacht’s navigational equipment included a SIMRAD CX-44 radar, a NASA MARINE AIS radar
receiver and two VHF radios (SIMRAD and ICOM).

Navigation lights
The International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea, 1972, as amended
(COLREGS) require all vessels to exhibit specific lights (commonly known as navigation lights)
from sunset to sunrise.
8
The navigation lights of a power-driven vessel underway consist of a masthead light forward, a
second masthead light abaft of and higher than the forward one (mandatory for vessels 50 m or

8
A masthead light is a white light placed over the fore and aft centreline of a vessel and is visible over an arc of the
horizon of 225º, and fixed to show it from right ahead to 22.5º abaft the beam on either side of the vessel.

›6‹
 ATSB – MO-2012-006

9 10
more in length), sidelights and a sternlight. Furness Melbourne was exhibiting all of these lights
at the time of the collision.
A sailing vessel under way is required to exhibit sidelights and a sternlight. If the vessel is less
than 20 m in length, these lights may be combined in a lantern at or near the top of the mast. Riga
II was fitted with such a combined lantern. At the time of the collision, the yacht was exhibiting the
lights in that lantern.

Holbourne Island and Nares Rock lights

In addition to approved navigational charts, nautical publications, such as the Admiralty List of
Lights and Fog Signals, are required to be carried on board ships. These publications provide
information about lighthouses, beacons and similar traditional aids to navigation. This information
includes details of the lights fitted to these aids (for example, light characteristics and range). The
11 12
publications also include luminous range diagrams and geographical range tables that enable
mariners to determine the approximate range at which a light may be sighted.
13
The lighthouse on Holbourne Island is 115 m high and its light has a nominal range of 11 miles.
The light’s elevation gives it a significant geographical range, which means that in good visibility it
can be sighted at distances of much more than 11 miles. In this instance, it is possible that
Holbourne Island light was visible to the watchkeepers on board Furness Melbourne at a range of
about 32 miles.
Nares Rock is about 8 m high and of limited horizontal extent. The isolated danger has a beacon
fitted that has a light of limited intensity. The range and height of the light are not specified in
shipboard publications as it is a minor light designed to be observed at close range, not as a long
range navigational light. Hence it would usually be sighted at distances of no more than a few
miles.
Holbourne Island lies 3 miles north of Nares Rock. Preferred routes for all vessels (in a WNW-
ESE direction) are charted a couple of miles north of the island and a similar distance south of the
rock. Consequently, the watchkeepers on board vessels using these routes will normally sight
Holbourne Island and Nares Rock lights.
Holbourne Island light is a white light that flashes three times every 15 seconds and Nares Rock
light is a white light that flashes twice every 5 seconds. While the lights are both white and they
are located relatively close to each other, their distinctive characteristics make them readily
distinguishable. Furthermore, Holbourne Island light is much brighter than the light at Nares Rock
and will invariably be sighted well before the latter, making confusing one with the other extremely
unlikely.

9
Sidelights - a green light on the starboard side of the vessel and a red light on its port side, each visible over an arc of
the horizon of 112.5º and fixed to show it from right ahead to 22.5º abaft the beam on its respective side.
10
Sternlight - a white light placed near the vessels stern and visible over an arc of the horizon of 135º and fixed to show it
from right aft to 22.5º abaft the beam on either side of the vessel.
11
The luminous range of a light is the maximum distance at which it can be seen, as determined by its intensity and the
meteorological visibility.
12
The geographical range of a light is the maximum distance at which it can theoretically be seen, as limited by the
curvature of the earth, atmospheric refraction, the elevation of the light and the observer’s height of eye.
13
The nominal range of a light is its luminous range when the meteorological visibility is 10 miles.

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 ATSB – MO-2012-006

Safety analysis
First sighting of Furness Melbourne
When interviewed, Riga II’s skipper and his wife stated that the yacht’s AIS unit was set on
‘8 miles, 4 miles all around’ and that Furness Melbourne was at a range of 4 miles when the
yacht’s AIS unit alarmed, warning them of the ship’s presence. Since the two vessels had a
combined closing speed of nearly 18 knots, they would have closed that distance in about
13 minutes. This evidence suggests that the AIS unit alarmed at about 2143, 13 minutes before
the collision. They went on to say that the skipper then returned to the deck of the yacht and,
within a minute, identified the ship’s starboard (green) sidelight.
However, the above scenario is not consistent with all of the available evidence. Information from
Furness Melbourne’s voyage data recorder unequivocally shows that at 2143 Riga II was about
14
2 points to port of the ship’s heading line. In such a position, the yacht’s skipper could not have
seen the ship’s starboard (green) sidelight as he would have been looking at the ship’s port side.
The only navigation lights visible to him at that time would have been the ship’s port (red) sidelight
and its two white masthead lights.
Since the statements and actions of Riga II’s skipper support the fact that he identified the ship’s
starboard (green) sidelight, and reacted accordingly to it, it is more likely that he identified the ship
sometime well after 2143, when the starboard (green) sidelight and the starboard side of the ship
became visible to him.
Considering the relative headings and the combined speeds of the two vessels, the earliest this is
likely to have occurred was when the yacht was almost directly ahead of the ship and at a range
of less than 2 miles (about 6 minutes before the collision).
Therefore, it is more likely that Riga II’s AIS unit alarm activated about 7 minutes before the
collision, at about 2149, when the ship was at a range of about 2 miles.

Lookout
The COLREGS provide guidance to all mariners with regard to the actions that should be taken by
those responsible for navigating a vessel. Rule 5 Look-out states:
Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all
available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full
appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision.

Since the COLREGS applied to the watchkeepers on board both Furness Melbourne and Riga II,
they were both responsible for maintaining a proper lookout in order to determine if a risk of
collision existed, so that they could take appropriate action to avoid it.

Lookout on board Riga II

In the prevailing conditions, Furness Melbourne’s mast head light should have been visible to
15
Riga II’s skipper at a range of at least 6 miles. At a range of at least 3 miles, he should have also
been able to see the ship’s sidelight(s). However, while the skipper was keeping a visual lookout
during the period of time leading up to the collision, he did not identify Furness Melbourne before
the yacht’s AIS unit alarmed.

The skipper could not understand or explain why he did not see Furness Melbourne before the
yacht’s AIS unit alarmed. However, keeping an effective visual lookout from the deck of a yacht
can be difficult because of the obstructions to line of sight posed by the sails and rigging, the

14
One point of the compass equals 11.25 degrees.
15
COLREGS Rule 22: Visibility of lights

›8‹
 ATSB – MO-2012-006

movement of the yacht and the fact that the watchkeeper’s height of eye is only about 2 m above
sea level. Furthermore, the wind and spray encountered as a result of the weather conditions
could have detracted from the skipper’s attentiveness to his navigational task.
When the skipper identified the ship’s starboard (green) sidelight, he concluded that Furness
Melbourne was to starboard of the yacht and the two vessels were on reciprocal courses
(Figure 5). He thought that by altering course to port he was opening up the passing distance
between the two vessels. However, the two vessels were not on reciprocal courses, the yacht was
crossing the ship’s bow (Figure 6). Furthermore, the ship was probably at a range of less than 2
miles, not 4 miles as concluded by the yacht’s skipper.
Figure 5: The skipper’s mental image Figure 6: The actual situation

Source: ATSB Source: ATSB

As previously discussed, it is likely that the yacht’s AIS alarmed when Furness Melbourne was
identified at a range of about 2 miles. Since the range of the alarm (inner ring on the display in
Figure 7) is automatically set at half of the selected range scale (the outer ring on the display), the
AIS unit was probably set on the 4 mile range scale. This may be contrary to the information
provided by the yacht’s skipper and his wife, who stated that it was set on ‘8 miles, 4 miles all
around’. However, their statement does not clearly identify the selected range scale and, when
they were asked to clarify what they meant by this statement, they demonstrated that they did not
have a clear understanding of the operation of the AIS unit and its controls.

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 ATSB – MO-2012-006

Figure 7: Photograph of Riga II’s AIS unit display taken after the collision when the scale
had been set to 2 miles

Source: Riga II’s skipper

What is certain is that the AIS unit did not provide the skipper with sufficient warning of the
presence of other vessels. Had the AIS unit been set on a larger and more appropriate range
scale, it would have provided the skipper with more time in which to properly appraise the situation
and the risk of collision.

While Riga II’s skipper was keeping watch during the period of time leading up to the collision, his
actions did not constitute a proper lookout. He did not identify Furness Melbourne’s navigation
lights at a range that would have enabled him to make an effective appraisal of the situation and
the yacht’s AIS unit was not set on a range that would provide adequate warning of approaching
vessels. When the AIS unit did alert him to the approaching ship, he misinterpreted that
information and concluded that it was at a range of 4 miles when it was probably at a range of
2 miles.

Lookout on board Furness Melbourne

Shortly after 2100, the lookout reported to the third mate that he had observed a light. The third
mate immediately assumed that the lookout had observed Holbourne Island light. At 2118, the
lookout reported that the white light he had observed was flashing. This information further
confirmed to the third mate that his assumption, that the light was Holbourne Island light, was
correct.
On both occasions, the lookout had identified Holbourne Island light. However, on each occasion,
the third mate made an assumption based on limited information. He did not follow a systematic
approach to confirm what had been observed. He did not take the light’s bearing, check the
bearing and range of Holbourne Island on the radar, check the information on the navigational
chart or the characteristics of Holbourne Island light.

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 ATSB – MO-2012-006

At 2142, the lookout reported a green light fine on the port bow and was told by the third mate that
it was a distant ‘light buoy’. At this time, Nares Rock was about 24 miles away. Again, the third
mate made an assumption based on minimal information and took no action to confirm what had
been seen. The seaman had, in fact, identified the light on the masthead of the approaching
Riga II which was about 4 miles ahead of the ship.

By 2148, the third mate had adjusted Furness Melbourne’s heading by 5º to starboard so that it
would pass further away from what he believed was Nares Rock. Despite the fact that the light
16
remained on a constant bearing, indicating that it posed a risk of collision, the third mate
continued to believe that it was Nares Rock light.
Just after 2153, the lookout alerted the third mate to the fact that he thought the green light he had
been watching to port was now very close. However, it was not until Riga II’s VHF radio call at
2155¼ that the third mate realised the light was probably that of the calling yacht. At about the
same time, the third mate lost sight of the yacht, probably because it had entered the blind sector
created by the ship’s cargo cranes (Figures 8 and 9).

The third mate now did not have sufficient time to properly assess the situation and the risk of
collision, so he acted instinctively and in accordance with the COLREGS. He engaged hand
steering and ordered hard-to-starboard.
Figure 8: View looking from the centre of Figure 9: View forward from the port side
Furness Melbourne’s bridge of Furness Melbourne’s bridge

Source: ATSB Source: ATSB

17
The third mate did not effectively use all available means at his disposal, including the
navigational chart and radar, to confirm at the earliest possible opportunity what he believed the
lookout had seen. Had he done so, he would have been alerted to the fact that Holbourne Island
and Nares Rock lights were white flashing lights.

Furthermore, had the third mate correctly appraised and monitored the situation, he would have
determined that the lone green light he was seeing was indicative of a yacht under way and that
18
Furness Melbourne was, therefore, the give way vessel. He could have then made a course
alteration that would have been readily apparent to the watchkeeper on board Riga II, about 14
minutes before the collision and passed well clear of the yacht. However, the third mate did not

16
COLREGS Rule 7: Risk of collision
17
ibid
18
COLREGS Rule 18: Responsibilities between vessels

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 ATSB – MO-2012-006

determine that the green light identified by the lookout was another vessel. Therefore, he took no
action to avoid what was a developing collision situation.
It is possible that the third mate had developed an expectation that at some point during the watch
he would see both Holbourne Island and Nares Rock lights. Then, when advised by the seaman
that he had observed a series of lights, he incorporated these pieces of information into his
existing mental model, interpreting the lights as being Holbourne Island and Nares Rock lights.
It is a known phenomenon of human cognitive processing that when people are faced with an
ambiguous situation, they will develop a theory to explain that situation and unconsciously seek
out information from the environment which is compatible with the beliefs they currently hold.
People will rarely attempt to prove themselves wrong and will often disregard or even fail to
19,20
observe information that would contradict their ideas. Despite there being information
available which might have alerted the third mate to his erroneous interpretation, he instead
interpreted that information in such a way that it confirmed his established ideas. This is commonly
21
referred to as confirmation bias.

There is no evidence that suggests the third mate’s performance was adversely affected by
fatigue. However, it is possible that he was distracted from his primary task, the safe navigation of
the ship, by his conversations with the seaman and the music that he was engaging with through
his constant humming and singing. Each person has finite cognitive resources available to attend
to and process information or perform tasks at any particular time. In general, if a person is
22
focussing on one particular task, then their performance on other tasks will be degraded. While
attending to the music and the conversation with the lookout would not have required high levels
of cognitive processing, it may have been sufficient to compromise the third mate’s attention to the
requirements of his navigational task.

Radar
The third mate checked the radar, looking for a target, when he was advised by the lookout that
the lookout had observed a green light fine on the ship’s port bow. However, he could not detect a
target. Later, after the collision, he checked the radar again when he was trying to determine
where the yacht was. Again he could not identify the yacht on the radar.

In theory, with Furness Melbourne’s radar properly adjusted, Riga II could have been visible on
23
the ship’s radar display at a range of up to 6 miles. However, the echo displayed was still
dependent upon the size, shape, aspect and composition of the yacht and the weather conditions
24
at the time. Furthermore, these types of echoes are often lost or seen intermittently when sea
clutter interferes with their detection, especially towards the centre of the radar screen.

When the master came to the bridge after the collision, one of his first actions was to adjust the
radar gain and clutter controls. The yacht’s target was then easily identified on the radar display.

Had the third mate correctly adjusted the controls on the ship’s radar, he may have determined
that the green light the lookout had identified was a vessel. As a result, he would have been in a
better position to make a full appraisal of the situation, the risk of collision and to take early and
appropriate action.

19
Kahneman, D. 2011, Thinking Fast and Slow, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York.
20
Reason, J. & Hobbs, A. 2003, Managing Maintenance Error, Ashgate, Aldershot.
21
Reason & Hobbs, 2003.
22
Kahneman, 2011.
23
Supplement to the Nautical Institute, Seaways, January 1994 – Radar detectability and collision risk.
24
ATSB Safety Bulletin 5 – Fishermen and Safety Awareness at Sea

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 ATSB – MO-2012-006

Detectability
It is important that, for their own safety and peace of mind, operators of small vessels abide by the
adage of ‘see and be seen’. They should keep an effective lookout at all times and ensure they
understand the operation and limitations of all their navigational equipment. They should also
ensure that their vessels are easily detected by watchkeepers on board other vessels.

Automatic identification system (AIS)

AIS is a VHF radio broadcasting system that transfers packets of data. The system enables AIS
equipped vessels and shore-based AIS stations to send and/or receive identification information
that can be displayed on an electronic chart, computer display, compatible radar or standalone
unit.
25
The Class A AIS system was developed for use by commercial shipping. It is a SOLAS
26
requirement for a Class A AIS unit to be fitted to vessels of 300 grt and upwards engaged on
international voyages, cargo ships of 500 grt and upwards not engaged in international voyages
and all passenger ships (more than 12 passengers), irrespective of size. Operators began
equipping ships with Class A AIS units in 2002.
More recently, the Class B AIS system has been developed for non-SOLAS commercial and
recreational vessels. Class B units are less expensive than Class A units and provide limited
functionality. While all Class A AIS units are transceivers (they transmit and receive data), a
Class B AIS unit can be either a ‘transceiver’ or ‘receiver’.
While there was no requirement for small recreational vessels to be equipped with AIS, Riga II
was fitted with a NASA MARINE AIS radar receiver. While the unit’s name included the term
‘radar’, it was not a radar. The unit displayed and monitored target information but, as a receiver
unit only, did not transmit a signal that could be detected by other AIS units. Since it transmitted
no ‘own ship’ information for use by other ships’ navigators, there was no available AIS
information on board Furness Melbourne that identified the yacht.
It is important for operators of vessels fitted with Class B AIS units to have a clear understanding
of the operation and limitations of their unit. Furthermore, if the unit is only a ‘receiver’, they should
also understand that it does not provide an output signal and hence, watchkeepers on board other
vessels are not provided with any AIS initiated information or warning.

Radar reflectors
Riga II was not fitted with a radar reflector because the yacht’s skipper believed that its aluminium
hull provided a good radar target. However, in this instance it did not because the yacht was
head-on to the approaching ship (a narrow target) and would have been only intermittently ‘visible’
27
to Furness Melbourne’s radar in the prevailing sea conditions. Riga II probably would not have
been an easily identifiable target on the screen of Furness Melbourne’s poorly adjusted radar.
The echo displayed on a ship’s radar screen is dependent upon the size, shape, composition and
aspect of the target vessel and the prevailing sea conditions. Small vessels constructed of
materials which are poor radar reflectors, like fibreglass or timber, operating in seas with wave
heights higher than the vessel’s freeboard can be very difficult to detect. It is important for small
vessel owners and operators to be aware of radar’s limitations, particularly when they are
operating in areas frequented by trading vessels, and to consider improving their vessel’s radar
detectability to minimise collision risk.

25
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended.
26
Gross registered tonnage.
27
The ATSB has published a safety bulletin titled Fisherman and Safety Awareness at Sea that outlines the limitations of
radar in more detail. This bulletin can be found at; [Link]/media/36729/Fisherman_safety.pdf

› 13 ‹
 ATSB – MO-2012-006

A radar reflector can significantly improve a small vessel’s detectability, particularly when fitted
high on the vessel and preferably in the standing rigging or on the mast of a yacht. A reflector may
be a simple and inexpensive passive reflector that improves a vessel’s radar reflection, or an
active reflector (radar transponder) that transmits a pulse when activated by an incoming radar
signal.
If Riga II had been fitted with a radar reflector or transponder, the target displayed on Furness
Melbourne’s radar would have been enhanced and hence more easily identifiable as a vessel
which presented a potential collision risk.

Previous incidents
In the past 25 years, 60 collisions involving ships and small vessels have been reported to the
ATSB and its predecessor, the Marine Incident Investigation Unit. Of these, 39 have been
investigated.
The safety lessons from these occurrence reports and investigations have invariably included the
failure of the watchkeepers on board one or both vessels to keep a proper lookout and the
absence of early and appropriate action to avoid the collision.
The safety lessons from these investigations have been included in the published investigation
reports. A number of safety bulletins that aim to highlight the risks and educate seafarers with
regard to the similar contributing factors have also been published.
Three of the more detailed investigation reports that analyse similar contributing factors are:
• Investigation number 240 - Collision between the bulk carrier Silky Ocean and the fishing
vessel Peter Crombie off the South Australian coast, 23 April 2007.
• Investigation number 249 - Collision between the fishing vessel Allena and the container
ship Northern Fortune off Bowen, Queensland, on 21 January 2008.
• Investigation number 268 - Collision between the bulk carrier Silver Yang and the yacht
Ella’s Pink Lady off Point Lookout, Queensland, on 9 September 2009
These documents and further safety related information can be downloaded at:
[Link]/[Link]

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 ATSB – MO-2012-006

Findings
At 2156 on 26 May 2012, the bulk carrier Furness Melbourne and the yacht Riga II collided
15 miles north of Bowen, Queensland. Riga II was dismasted and its hull was damaged but
no-one on board was seriously injured and the yacht was towed into Bowen by a volunteer marine
rescue vessel. Furness Melbourne was not damaged and, after rendering assistance to the yacht,
continued its voyage.
From the evidence available, the following findings are made with respect to the collision. They
should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual.
Safety issues, or system problems, are highlighted in bold to emphasise their importance.
A safety issue is an event or condition that increases safety risk and (a) can reasonably be
regarded as having the potential to adversely affect the safety of future operations, and (b) is a
characteristic of an organisation or a system, rather than a characteristic of a specific individual, or
characteristic of an operating environment at a specific point in time.

Contributing factors
• While Furness Melbourne’s lookout sighted Riga II’s starboard sidelight, the officer of the
watch was not keeping a proper lookout. He made a series of assumptions based on limited
information instead of following a systematic approach to confirm what had been observed. As
a result, he did not conclude early enough that the lookout had identified Riga II and that the
yacht posed a risk of collision.
• Riga II’s watchkeeper was not keeping a proper lookout. He did not visually identify Furness
Melbourne’s navigation lights in time to make an effective appraisal of the situation, did not set
the yacht’s AIS unit on a range scale that provided adequate warning of approaching vessels
and, when alerted by the AIS of the approaching ship, misinterpreted that information.

Other factors that increase risk

• In the past 25 years the ATSB and its predecessor have investigated 39 collisions
between trading ships and smaller vessels on the Australian coast. These
investigations have all concluded that there was a failure of the watchkeepers on board
one or both vessels to keep a proper lookout and that there was an absence of early
and appropriate action to avoid the collision. [Safety issue]

Other findings
• Riga II was not equipped with a radar reflector or an AIS transceiver unit, either of which would
have made it more readily detectable by the watchkeepers on board Furness Melbourne.

› 15 ‹
 ATSB – MO-2012-006

Safety issues and actions

The safety issues identified during this investigation are listed in the Findings and Safety issues
and actions sections of this report. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) expects that
all safety issues identified by the investigation should be addressed by the relevant organisations.
In addressing those issues, the ATSB prefers to encourage relevant organisations to proactively
initiate safety action, rather than to issue formal safety recommendations or safety advisory
notices.
All of the directly involved parties were provided with a draft report and invited to provide
submissions. As part of that process, each organisation was asked to communicate what safety
actions, if any, they had carried out or were planning to carry out in relation to each safety issue
relevant to their organisation.

Failure to keep a proper lookout

Number: MO-2012-006-SI-01
Issue owner: Fukujin Kisen and all other operators
Operation affected: Marine - Shipboard operations

Safety issue description:

In the past 25 years the ATSB and its predecessor have investigated 39 collisions between
trading ships and smaller vessels on the Australian coast. These investigations have all concluded
that there was a failure of the watchkeepers on board one or both vessels to keep a proper
lookout and that there was an absence of early and appropriate action to avoid the collision.

Proactive safety action taken by: Fukujin Kisen

Following this incident, Fukujin Kisen issued a safety instruction to all ships in its fleet highlighting
the need for watchkeepers to keep a proper lookout. They have also advised that, as a result of
the ATSB investigation, they will issue a further safety instruction prohibiting activities such as
playing music during a navigational watch.
Action number: MO-2012-006-NSA-016
ATSB comment in response:
The ATSB is satisfied that the combination of actions taken and proposed by Fukujin Kisen should
adequately address this safety issue.

Current status of the safety issue:

Issue status: Adequately addressed

ATSB safety advisory notice to: All persons charged with navigating a vessel at sea
Action number: MO-2012-006-SAN-015
The Australian Transport Safety Bureau advises all persons charged with navigating vessels at
sea to always maintain a proper lookout so as to identify other vessels early enough to make a full
appraisal of the situation and to take appropriate, early and effective action to avoid a collision.

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 ATSB – MO-2012-006

General details
Occurrence details
Date and time: 26 May 2012 – 2150 (UTC +10)
Occurrence category: Serious incident
Primary occurrence type: Collision
Location: 15 miles north of Bowen, Queensland
Latitude: 19° 35.20’ S Longitude: 148° 0.80’ E

Furness Melbourne
Name Furness Melbourne
IMO number 9403061
Call sign 3ESV3
Flag Panama
Classification society American Bureau of Shipping (ABS).
Ship type Geared bulk carrier
Builder Tsuneishi Heavy Industries, Philippines
Year built 2008
Owner(s) Drake Line, Panama
Manager Fukujin Kisen, Japan
Gross tonnage 32,387
Deadweight (summer) 58,729 tonnes
Summer draught 12.83 m
Length overall 190.0 m
Moulded breadth 32.2 m
Moulded depth 18.0 m
Main engine(s) MAN B&W 6S50MC-C
Total power 8,400 kW
Speed 14.5 knots
Damage: Nil

› 17 ‹
 ATSB – MO-2012-006

Riga II
Name Riga II
Flag Switzerland
Ship type Sailing vessel
Builder Allures, France
Year built 2007
Owner(s) Private
Draught 3.0 m
Length overall 13.6 m
Moulded breadth 4.25 m
Sail area 95 m2
Main engine(s) Volvo D2-55
Total power 41 kW
Damage: Significant

› 18 ‹
 ATSB – MO-2012-006

Sources and submissions

Sources of information
On 29 May 2012, investigators from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) attended
Riga II while the yacht was berthed in Bowen, Queensland. The skipper and both adult crew
members were interviewed. Photographs of the yacht and copies of relevant documents and
records were also obtained. The investigators also interviewed officers from Bowen Volunteer
Marine Rescue.
Later that day, the investigators attended the offices of the Great Barrier Reef Vessel Traffic
Service (REEFVTS) in Townsville, Queensland. The REEFVTS manager was interviewed and
copies of relevant documents were obtained.
On 2 and 3 June, the investigators attended Furness Melbourne while the ship was at anchor off
Portland, Victoria. The master and directly involved crew members were interviewed. Photographs
of the ship and copies of relevant documents and records, including data from the ship’s voyage
data recorder (VDR), were obtained.

References
The International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea, 1972, as amended
(COLREGs), the International Maritime Organization
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended, the International
Maritime Organization.
Kahneman, D 2011, Thinking Fast and Slow, Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York.
Reason, J & Hobbs, A 2003, Managing Maintenance Error, Ashgate, Aldershot.
ATSB Safety Bulletin 1, Ships and fishing vessels
ATSB Safety Bulletin 2, Ships and fishing vessels, an open letter to all masters and bridge
watchkeepers
ATSB Safety Bulletin 5, Fisherman and Safety Awareness at Sea
Nautical Institute, Seaways, January 1994. Radar detectability and collision risk

Submissions
Under Part 4, Division 2 (Investigation Reports), Section 26 of the Transport Safety Investigation
Act 2003, the ATSB may provide a draft report, on a confidential basis, to any person whom the
ATSB considers appropriate. Section 26 (1) (a) of the Act allows a person receiving a draft report
to make submissions to the ATSB about the draft report.
A draft of this report was provided to Riga II’s owners, Furness Melbourne’s master and third
mate, Fukujin Kisen, Wallmans Lawyers, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) and
Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ).
Submissions were received from Riga II’s owners, Furness Melbourne’s master, Fukujin Kisen,
Wallmans Lawyers, AMSA and MSQ. The submissions were reviewed and where considered
appropriate, the text of the report was amended accordingly.

› 19 ‹
 ATSB – MO-2012-006

Australian Transport Safety Bureau

The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) is an independent Commonwealth Government
statutory agency. The ATSB is governed by a Commission and is entirely separate from transport
regulators, policy makers and service providers. The ATSB’s function is to improve safety and
public confidence in the aviation, marine and rail modes of transport through excellence in:
independent investigation of transport accidents and other safety occurrences; safety data
recording, analysis and research; fostering safety awareness, knowledge and action.
The ATSB is responsible for investigating accidents and other transport safety matters involving
civil aviation, marine and rail operations in Australia that fall within Commonwealth jurisdiction, as
well as participating in overseas investigations involving Australian registered aircraft and ships. A
primary concern is the safety of commercial transport, with particular regard to fare-paying
passenger operations.
The ATSB performs its functions in accordance with the provisions of the Transport Safety
Investigation Act 2003 and Regulations and, where applicable, relevant international agreements.

Purpose of safety investigations

The object of a safety investigation is to identify and reduce safety-related risk. ATSB
investigations determine and communicate the factors related to the transport safety matter being
investigated.
It is not a function of the ATSB to apportion blame or determine liability. At the same time, an
investigation report must include factual material of sufficient weight to support the analysis and
findings. At all times the ATSB endeavours to balance the use of material that could imply adverse
comment with the need to properly explain what happened, and why, in a fair and unbiased
manner.

Developing safety action

Central to the ATSB’s investigation of transport safety matters is the early identification of safety
issues in the transport environment. The ATSB prefers to encourage the relevant organisation(s)
to initiate proactive safety action that addresses safety issues. Nevertheless, the ATSB may use
its power to make a formal safety recommendation either during or at the end of an investigation,
depending on the level of risk associated with a safety issue and the extent of corrective action
undertaken by the relevant organisation.
When safety recommendations are issued, they focus on clearly describing the safety issue of
concern, rather than providing instructions or opinions on a preferred method of corrective action.
As with equivalent overseas organisations, the ATSB has no power to enforce the implementation
of its recommendations. It is a matter for the body to which an ATSB recommendation is directed
to assess the costs and benefits of any particular means of addressing a safety issue.
When the ATSB issues a safety recommendation to a person, organisation or agency, they must
provide a written response within 90 days. That response must indicate whether they accept the
recommendation, any reasons for not accepting part or all of the recommendation, and details of
any proposed safety action to give effect to the recommendation.
The ATSB can also issue safety advisory notices suggesting that an organisation or an industry
sector consider a safety issue and take action where it believes it appropriate. There is no
requirement for a formal response to an advisory notice, although the ATSB will publish any
response it receives.

› 20 ‹
 ATSB Transport Safety Report
Investigation Marine Occurrence Investigation
Collision between the bulk carrier Furness Melbourne
and the yacht Riga II, North of Bowen, Queenslanld, 26 May 2012n,
Qld | 26 May 2012
295-MO-2012-006
Final – 12 December 2013
Australian Transport Safety Bureau

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