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Oman's foreign policy : foundations and practice

Majid Al-Khalili
Florida International University, [email protected]

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 FLORIDA INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Miami, Florida

OMAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICE

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by

Majid Al-Khalili

2005
To: Interim Dean Mark Szuchman
College of Arts and Sciences

This dissertation, written by Majid Al-Khalili, and entitled Oman's Foreign Policy:
Foundations and Practice, having been approved in respect to style and intellectual
content, is referred to you for judgment.

We have read this dissertation and recommend that it be approved.

Dr. Nicholas Onuf

Dr. Charles MacDonald

Dr. Richard Olson

Dr. 1Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor

Date of Defense: November 7, 2005

The dissertation of Majid Al-Khalili is approved.

Interim Dean Mark Szuchman

Clege of Arts and Scenps

Dean ouglas Wartzok

University Graduate School

Florida International University, 2005

ii
@ Copyright 2005 by Majid Al-Khalili

All rights reserved.

iii
 DEDICATION

I humbly dedicate this dissertation to my parents.

iv
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I could not have produced this dissertation alone. I would like to thank the

committee members for their invaluable help and advice, especially Professor Olson for

his constructive criticism; Professor Onuf for his kindness, encouragement and personal

attention; Professor MacDonald for his seemingly limitless patience and infectious

positive attitude; and most especially, Professor Mesbahi for being my mentor and guide

over the course of my studies-you were generous with your time and insights, and for

these, as well as the countless discussions that have greatly expanded my knowledge-I

am eternally grateful.

I would also like to thank Jane MacDonald and Paola Roy for proofreading my

work; the Dissertation Year Fellowship, without which this dissertation would not have

been possible; as well as the Department of International Relations at FIU-I am truly

grateful for the outstanding opportunities that I have enjoyed here.

Good friends also have encouraged and supported me in my efforts these last few

years. Thank you, Alla Mirzoyan-if not for your intelligent and practical advice, this

dissertation would never have progressed as quickly as it has. I am inspired by your

strength, energy and positive attitude. Thank you, Alex Barder for sufficiently diverting

my attention away from the difficult task at hand with your interesting discussions in

political theory. Thank you, Fabian Romero for prodding me along with your quick wit

and good humor. Your solid advice, too, has served me well. Thank you, Serge Akl for

challenging all of my assumptions during those long hours at the blue tables. Thank you,

Andy Correa for the steaks and the good times. Thank you, Ronald, Uri and Emily for the

coffee breaks. Thank you, Cecilia Novella for your gentle and patient companionship.

v
Many thanks to my three angels Kathy, Mary, and Martha. Finally, thank you Darwish

Kaiyal for being my friend.

vi
 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

OMAN'S FOREIGN POLICY: FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICE

by

Majid Al-Khalili

Florida International University, 2005

Miami, Florida

Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor

The object of this dissertation is to record and analyze the foreign policy of the

Sultanate of Oman from the early twentieth century until 2004. It challenges the central

assumption of the contemporary scholarship on the subject that Muscat's modem foreign

policy begins in 1970. It is often presumed that the pre-1970 era does not merit a

thorough investigation to understand Muscat's modus operandi today. This study argues

that for a comprehensive understanding of Muscat's foreign policy since 1970, the

frontier of the historical analysis of Oman's regional and international involvement

should be pushed back to the 1930's, when the young Sultan Said assumed power over

the country divided by the "Treaty" or the "Agreement" of Sib. Indeed, the thrust of this

research lies at once in repudiating the conventional wisdom regarding both the persona

of Sultan Said and the customary political/historical narrative of Said's reign. The critical

analysis of this period is utilized to rebut the pervasive and largely inaccurate historical

narrative of the events prior to 1970, to recount an original interpretation of the period,

and to use the narrative as a preamble for subsequent foreign policy directions and

initiatives. Furthermore, this dissertation covers the gaps in the literature resulting from

the absence of any materials that either record or analyze Muscat's foreign policy from

vii
1996 until 2004. In addition, his study provides new information and a fresh analysis of

the international relations of the region, including great power rivalry, especially the

competition between the United States and Great Britain, and the attitudes of major

regional actors, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.

The use of a thorough historical inquiry is vital to support the central claim of this

dissertation; therefore, a large section of this dissertation is based almost exclusively on

archival materials collected from the British Public Records Office, the University of

Oxford and the Library of Congress. This project represents the most comprehensive use

of archival materials on the subject matter to date.

viii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. IN TR O D U C T IO N ...... ... ............................................ ...................................... 1

Approach to Analysis..............................................3

II. THE LEGACY OF HISTORY ................................................................................ 4

The Geography of Oman ......................................................................................... 4
Oman and Ibadism...................................................................................................8
The Arrival of the Portuguese (1507-1650)..........................................................14
The Rise of the Sultanate: Ahmad ibn Said Al-Bu Said (1744-1783)..................16
Imam Sultan Ibin Ahmad (1792-1804).................................................................17
Sultan Said bin Sultan (1806-1856)......................................................................20
The Death of Sultan Said and the Return of the Imamate ..................................... 21

III. THE REIGN OF SULTAN SAID ......................................................................... 24

Revisiting the Reign of Sultan Said.......................................................................24
The 1950's Crisis ................................................................................................... 40
British Objectives and Muscat's Policies .............................................................. 64
Muscat between the Arab League and the United Nations....................................70
The Dhofar Rebellion and the End of Said's Reign ............................................ 107

IV. OMAN'S FOREIGN POLICY (1970-1989) ...................................................... 126

The Sultanate of Oman: Old and New Challenges .............................................. 126
The End of Dhofar's Rebellion............................................................................143
The Sultanate's Strategic and Security Conceptions ........................................... 157
The Sultanate of Oman, the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet Invasion of
Afghanistan .............................................................................................. 165
The Sultanate of Oman and the Gulf Cooperation Council.................................175

V. OMAN'S FOREIGN POLICY (1990-2004) ...................................................... 185

Muscat and the Gulf War (1990-1991) ............................................................... 185
Muscat and Regional Security ............................................................................. 187
Muscat's Policy Toward Iran and Iraq in the 1990's...........................................195
Muscat and Yemen .............................................................................................. 224
The Sultanate of Oman and the Arab-Israeli Conflict ......................................... 230
Muscat, Washington and the Persian Gulf...........................................................241
The Sultanate of Oman and September 11 ................................... ....... 247

VI. C ON C LU SIO N .................................................................................................... 268

ix
BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................278

APPENDICES ....................................................................... .............................. 294

VITA ............................................................................................................................ 306

x
 I.

INTRODUCTION

The Persian Gulf region has been one of the most sensitive and tumultuous areas

in international politics in the last three decades. Indeed, given the strategic importance of

the area, its rich resources, the graveness of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the tensions of

three Gulf wars. A wealth of literature has arisen on Arab governments and politics,

ideology and state building, political evolution and intellectual trends, is instantly

recognizable. Yet, as Korany and Dessouki point out in Foreign Policy of Arab States

(1991), the literature on the foreign policy of Arab states is notably lacking. Hinnebusch

and Ehteshami reach a similar conclusion in their Foreign Policies of the Middle East

States (2002). If this inopia exists for such major regional states like Egypt, Syria, and

Saudi Arabia, the dearth of studies on Oman's foreign policy can hardly be surprising.

British expatriates have dominated the literature on Oman (Phillips 1967;

Townsend 1977), and their writings are fascinating testaments to the complexities of

Oman's history. They offer valuable insights. Nonetheless, they remain the products of

participant-authors, especially British soldiers serving Sultan Said during his campaign to

quell the Imamate challenge of the 1950's and to resolve the 1965-1975 war in Dhofar.

This literature, however, is less about Oman than it is about its military operations and

the intricacies of counter-insurgency (Akehurst 1982; Smiley 1960, 1975; Fiennes 1995).

John Peterson's Oman in the Twentieth Century (1978) and John Wilkinson's The

Imamate Tradition of Oman (1987) arguably constitute the most important works on

1
Oman. Both, however, only touch on Oman's foreign policy, and even Calvin Allen's

Oman: The Modernization of the Sultanate (1987), only allocates ten pages to Muscat's

external relations. Carol Riphenburg's Oman: Political Development in a Changing

World (1998), devotes a chapter to Oman's foreign policy, but relies exclusively on

secondary source, especially Anthony Cordesman (1997) and Joseph Kechichian (1995).

Even the most recent book on Oman by Calvin Allen and Lynn Rigsbee II (2000)

contains only an elementary chapter on Oman's foreign policy.

Dissertations are not helpful either. They tend to focus on 1) Oman's history in

Africa (Bhacker 1994), 2) the political economy of the Sultanate (Alabdulkarim 1997),

and 3) British and American involvement in Oman (Rigsbee II 1990; Timpe 1991;

Gawlik 1982; Fehmi; 1967).

One exception is Kechichian's study on the Sultanate's foreign policy Oman and

the World: the Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy (1995), which chronicles the

Sultanate's external relations between 1970 and 1995. Kechichian recounts Oman's

major challenges: 1) facing the insurgency in Dhofar, 2) relating to the Gulf Cooperation

Council (GCC), 3) reacting to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 4) avoiding sides in the

Iran-Iraq War, and 5) positioning itself in the Arab-Israeli conflict. His conclusion

emphasizes that Oman has practiced an unusually "independent" foreign policy.

Despite its value, Kechichian's study cannot avoid the shortcomings symptomatic

of the literature on Oman: the almost total absence of analysis of the foreign policy of the

periof of Sultan Said (the father of the present Sultan and ruler of Oman from the 1930's

until his overthrow in 1970). Interestingly, it appears that the 1930-1970 period shaped

Omani foreign policy more than it is generally appreciated.

2
 In sum, we see little substantial treatment of Oman's foreign policy in the early or

formative period (1930-1970) and even less-literally nothing-on its foreign policy

after 1996. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is not only to revisit and reanalyze

the foreign policy of the Sultanate of Oman from early twentieth century through the

mid-1990's, but also to extend the account through 2004.

Approach to Analysis

This study will examine published materials on Oman and include the literature of

various academic disciplines such as international relations, history, geography,

sociology, and diplomatic history. English and Arabic sources will be consulted in this

dissertation.

The unique contribution of this dissertation lies in the extensive use of primary

sources including archival materials collected by the author at the British Public Records

Office, the Middle East Center at the University of Oxford, and the Library of Congress.

Significantly for the reader, the archival references will be footnoted indicating the title,

the year, and when possible, the author of the source.

3
 II.

THE LEGACY OF HISTORY

The Geography of Oman

The history of Oman has been shaped by three recurrent themes: the tribal world;

the history of the Ibadi imamate; and the struggle between inhabitants of Oman and

foreigners over control of Oman's coastal provinces. Until the reign of Sultan Qaboos,

the name of the modern state, "The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman", calls attention to

these three themes (Wilkinson 1972: 67). Equally important in shaping Oman's history, is

the geography of the region. The modern state is bordered by the Republic of Yemen and

Saudi Arabia on its western boundaries and in the north by the United Arab Emirates,

while its shores overlook the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Oman

is almost an island. The vast desert of the Rub Al-Khali, or Empty Quarter, separates it

from the rest of the Arabian Peninsula. It is no wonder that the country has long looked

outward to the Indian Ocean, South Asia and East Africa, while it has simultaneously

looked inward to the Arab world. The "seaborne influence of trade and overseas

expansion has traditionally competed with the landborne influences of tribalism (a

consequence of Arab immigration) and Islam (culmination in the imamate structure)

(Peterson 1987: 4). Partly due to the geography of Oman, two traditions have evolved.

The first tradition is that of the "interior" and is commonly described as inward looking

and governed in accordance with Ibadi Islam. The second tradition is that of Muscat

which sees Oman as a "commercial, maritime power, whose merchants traded from one

4
 end of the monsoon world to the other, from China to the Sofala coast in East Africa, at

least as far back as the eighth century A.D., and which periodically developed an

overseas empire" (Wilkinson 1987: 1). This expansion left the state with an exclave of

territory in Gawadur on the Pakistani Makran coast until 1958, and an East African

community centered on Zanzibar that was ruled by the Dynasty of Al-Bu Said until the

rebellion of 1964 (Wilkinson 1987: 1).

"Oman" did not always mean the same geographic region as it currently

encompasses (Risso 1986: 1). The Dhofar region became part of Oman only under Sultan

Said in 1829. Conversely, the Arabian Gulf coast of geographical Oman, formerly called

Peninsular Oman, Trucial Oman, or the Trucial Coast, has gradually disengaged itself

from political affiliation with the rest of Oman. In 1971, it became the independent

federation of the United Arab Emirates (Peterson 1984: 976). The British Political

Resident at the Gulf from 1953-1958, recorded in his book Footnotes in the Sand that

The nomenclature is confusing. In my time the state was referred to as 'Muscat'

in all ordinary usage. 'Oman' was generally used for the interior. In order to
emphasize the sovereignty of the Sultan over the whole area, the more formal
term came to be 'Muscat and Oman'. Now 'Oman' has been adopted as the name
of the whole state. Confusion is increased by the occasional use of the term
'Trucial Oman' in earlier records to cover the area of the Trucial States, now
known as the United Arab Emirates (Burrows 1990: 88).

Defining the geographical boundaries of Oman is made even more difficult by the

references made to the Sultan of "Muscat and Oman" as opposed to the "Imamate of

Oman". Writing about the Imamate territories and boundaries throughout much of the

2 0 th century, a British expert on the region commented that the boundaries of the

Imamate simply cannot be defined with exactitude, due to the absence of agreements with

adjacent states indicating the extent of national territories (Rentz 1952: 9). The name

5
Oman, just like most names of geographical regions, may be used in numerous ways,

depending upon who is using it and the context in which it occurs. By and large, the

name Oman is customarily applied "to the whole of the great bulge of the Arabian

Peninsula between the Trucial Coast on the Persian Gulf and that part of the southern

coast of Arabia running from Ras al-Hadd to the vicinity of the island of Masirah" (Rentz

1952: xxvi). This usage is evidenced in the application by Westerners of the name Gulf of

Oman to the arm of the Arabian Sea on which the city of Muscat is located. In eastern

Arabia itself, however, most of the inhabitants use the name Oman only to refer to the

interior of the bulge. As such, Muscat lies outside of Oman, and so does Batinah, the

region northwest of Muscat between the mountains and the sea. Accordingly, Oman

begins at the mountains of the Hajar, the chain that sweeps down along a course roughly

parallel to the outer edge of the bulge (Rentz 1952: xxvi).

Generally, Imamate authority extended to what has been termed "Oman Proper",

the boundaries of which are formed by the Jabel al-Akhdar [Green Mountain] massif of

the Hajar Range in the east and the Rub al-Khali desert in the west. To the north, Oman

Proper gives way to al-Dhahirah province somewhat south of Ibri; to the south, Oman

Proper extends to al-Sharqiyyah province and the Wahibah Sands. The domains of the

Sultan on the other hand are composed of: (1) the district of Muscat and Matrah, (2) the

long stretch of coast called the Battinah between the Western Hajar and the sea, (3) the

northern peninsula know as Rus al-Jibal, (4) territories in the vicinity of Ras al-Hadd, and

(5) the region of Dhofar to the east of Hadhramaut (Rentz 1952: 4).

Within the domain of the Imamate's authority, the area of the interior,

traditionally referred to as Oman lies in the

6
 uneroded limestone plateau of the Jabal [this is the Jabel Al-Akhdar, or the Green
Mountain] ... the ultimate bastion of the Omani fortress... but it is the villages of
the Ghadaf, Jauf and 'Sumail Gap' which are the real heartland of Oman and the
specific area to which the name Oman tends to apply (Wilkinson 1972: 69).

The economy of this area was determined and developed in pre-Islamic times by

Persian settlers who, in the tradition of Persia and Central Asia, used subterranean

tunnels, or (qanat), for irrigation. The Persian population was initially challenged by the

immigration of various Arab tribes into Oman in the pre-Sasanid times of the second

century AD. With the rise of Islam, the Persian ruling class was evicted from Oman.

Power transferred to the Arabs. Within few years, however, the Caliphs abandoned direct

administration of Oman. For much of the ensuing 150 years, Oman was left to the

Julands who had ruled before the rise of Islam (Wilkinson 1972: 71-4).

The Persian settlers' introduction of qanat tunnels helped create a "village" life,

rather than a strictly nomadic one. As a result, Oman evolved differently from much of

the other Arab Gulf states. To understand the difference, two terms must be explained:

Bedu and Hadar. The first refers to the Bedouin, who are the nomads of the desert. The

second refers to the settled population, or town dwellers. In Oman, the hadar culture

became dominant, while in Gulf societies, norms and customs were mainly acquired

through the bedu culture. The political history of Oman and the rest of Eastern Arabia

attest to this difference. Gulf Arab States became distinct political entities in relatively

recent times, while the acknowledgement of a legitimate central authority in Oman has

long been an established tradition. As Peterson asserts

While the culture of the Gulf largely emanates from the desert, Omani culture has
grown our of a long history of continuous cultivation, predating the arrival of the
Arab tribes and complemented by the country's ancient traditions as a secure

7
 fastness for the Ibadi sect of Islam against a wide range of both Islamic and
European invaders (Peterson 1977: 298).

Oman and Ibadism

The roots of badi Islam, the most significant force in Omani politics, emerged in

Iraq's Basra. There the foundations of a "national" concept that would eventually take

hold in Oman developed. Al-Basra was the center for the Arabs of the Persian Gulf

during Islam's Empire of the East. One of the most important tribes to settle in Basra was

the Azd Arabs from central Oman. Omani Azds were granted a section of Basra, where

they could settle and attend to their needs and those of subsequent Omani migrants. By

the end of Muawiyah's reign, the Azd of Basra became one of the most formidable

groups in the eastern Caliphate. Under their general, Muhallab ibn Abi Sufrah, the Azd

extended the power of Islam to Khursan and fought the Khawariji [those who seceded

from the true path] whose heresy is universally acknowledged among all surviving

Islamic sects (Wilkinson 1972: 74).

The Khawarij had three main sects: the Azariqa, the Suriya and the Ibadia. The

first two were fanatic groups that declared that those who did not join them were

polytheists and therefore deserved death. Conversely, the Ibadia were respected members

of the Basra community-many were wealthy and powerful merchants-who did not

share Khawarij fanaticism. They were known as "the quietists" (qaadah) (Wilkinson

1972: 74-75). These affluent merchants of Basra were reported to have "organized

trading expeditions to China...penetrated all the Muslim lands, however distant they

might be" (Lewicki: 1971: 65). They also trained missionaries called Hamalat Al-ilm,

"the carriers of knowledge", to spread their teachings (Lewicki: 1971: 65).

8
 Ironically, the Ibadis, who see themselves as "a moderate sect of Islam" (Hoffman

2004: 209), have been accused of being Khawarij, but for them the term is synonymous

with extremism, an epithet reserved for sects like the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia

(Wilkinson 1987: 150). As a result, Ibadi scholars take great pains to distance themselves

from the Khawarij. Of the three Khawarij groups, only the Ibadia have survived. They

formed a small group in Libya; Tunisia; Algeria; and Tanzania, but only in Oman did

they attain a majority of the population.

The only position that the Ibadia shares with the Khawariji is that Uthman, the

third Caliphate of Islam, has failed the Muslim community. From this fundamental issue

"stems the idea that the powers and duties of the leader of the community (Imam al-

Muslimin) are prescribed by the Prophet through the Koran and the Sunnah (to which

may be added Ijma in Oman). If the leader 'breaks this Islamic constitution, then it is the

duty of the Islamic community actively to disassociate itself from him (barah), and he

looses their support (wilayah)"' (Wilkinson 1972: 75). Therefore, the Ibadia would not

recognize any hereditary right to the tribe of the prophet Mohammed (Quraish), or the

Prophet's descendents from his daughter Fatima, to the leadership of Islam (Caliphate).

The leadership of the Muslim community, they argued, belonged to the most qualified

among the community, in accordance with the prophet's teachings. The leader, or the

Imam, is elected by members of the community composed of the Uluma (religious

scholars), and the notables of the community. His candidacy must be submitted for the

people's approval.

Such a community must have a leader, an Imam. This principle was developed by
the chief 'alim' of "Abd al-Malik b. Humayd's Imamate (207-26/823-41), Musa
b. 'Ali (177?-230/793-844), as follows: 'No army is raised, no banner held, no

9
 fighting men commanded, no legal punishments (hudud) ordered, no judgment
(hukm) given, except through the Imam. The Imam is an obligation (Farida) as
shown by the consensus of the umma, muhajrun and ansar [i.e. the members of
the original Muslim community]' (Wilkinson 1987: 154).

As to the relationship between Ibadia and the rest of Islam, there were four

possible paths that allowed the community to exist under any circumstances. Under

Zuhur, the community could have an open manifestation of the Imamate. In Difa, the

community is militarily defensive and has a restricted Imamate. Under Shira, the

community sells itself "in God's cause" and openly opposes tyranny. On the fourth path,

the community may not

even be able to constitute itself as an imama under an imam at all. In that case
there is a whole further range of situations concerning concealment (kitman),
deriving from the principle of taqiya (prudence given rise to dissimilation)
involving compromise with non-constitutional rulers (jababira) (Wilkinson 1987:
154-156).

Ibadi Muslims often point that while they are interested in and read the literature

of other sects of Islam.

Non-Ibadis hardly ever look at Ibadi literature. Descriptions of Ibadism in the

work of medieval Sunni scholars like Ibn Hazm are full of inaccuracies. Modern
scholarship on Ibadism has been scant, and has tended to focus on its political
dimensions [an exception is Wilkinson's The Imamate Tradition of Oman]
(Hoffman 2004: 201).

Early Islamic historians say very little about the Ibadia. Initially, the Ibadia did

not engage in open revolt as the Khawarij did. Rather they tried to gain the support of the

people for their convictions. They also solicited support from some of the orthodox

Caliphs by means of treaties (Lewicki 1971: 52). The founder of Ibadism, Abdullah ibn

Ibada, exchanged letters with the Umayyad Caliph Abd Al-Malik (685-705), whom he

wished to convert to his doctrine (Lewicki 1971: 61).

10
 This conciliatory attitude, however, eventually came to an end. Iraq's governor at

the time, Al-Hajaj, didn't like the growing zealotry of the Ibadia community in Basra, nor

did he like their close ties to the Muhallabs (the Muhallabs were strongly allied to the

Omani Azd tribe and many of them were Ibadia). Al-Hajaj began exiling many of the

Ibadia to Oman. Included in the group was their intellectual leader Gaber ibn Zaid, an

Azd tribe member from Nizwa, which would become the capital of the Imamate in Oman

(Lewicki 1971: 68-71). His arrival as well as that of many other important scholars

greatly enhanced Ibadi influence in Oman. Oman eventually became a center for dissent

against the Umayyads. This forced Al-Hajaj to send an ill-fated expedition to Oman in

697. A second expedition, however, successfully defeated the tribal alliances under the

Julandas, who then fled to East Africa. Dissention continued never the less, and after the

death of Al-Hajaj, the Muhallabis regained control over Iraq and the Julandas regained

control of Oman (Landen 1967: 45). In 748, an Omani chief named Talib Al-Haq led the

conquest of Medina. It took the Umayyads only a few months to regain Medina, but

shortly thereafter, they were overthrown by the Abbasids, who moved the capital of the

Caliphate to Baghdad (Riphenburg 1998: 24).

Although it is not clear when the Ibadi set up their own Imamate in Oman, the

evidence suggests it was shortly after the fall of the Umayyads in 750 AD (Bathurst

1972: 90). Like the Umayyads before them, the new power in Baghdad, were intolerate

of an independent Imamate in Oman outside of Baghdad's control. The history of the

Imamate struggle against the Abbasids over the control of Oman is beyond the scope of

this work, but Omani texts bitterly denounce the Abbasid invasion led by Muhammad bin

Nur who systematically devastated Oman and sent the Imam's head back to Baghdad as a

11
gift. The harsh method employed by Ibn Nur, called Ibn Bur (wasteland) in Omani

chronicles of the period, left Oman bitterly opposed to Abbasid rule. In 896 AD, Bin Bur

left Oman and assigned control of it to his governor in Nizwa. The governor was

eventually ousted. (Riphenburg 1998: 28). No less than ten successive attacks were

carried out against Oman in the span of 200 years. Each invasion attempted to destroy the

Ibadi community, which refused to acknowledge the Caliphate or pay taxes. All

invasions, no matter how successful initially, were eventually defeated (Townsend 1977:

30).

The First Imamate, which reached its zenith in the ninth century AD, has captured

the imagination and has become the ideal for future Ibadi political aspirations in Oman.

Although the rule of the Yaaribah imams in the seventeenth century rivals and perhaps

surpasses it in both wealth and political muscle, the First Imamate, still represents in

Ibadi imaginations, the nearest approximation to a just and legitimate polity. The modern

revival of the Ibadi Imamate, during the eighteenth century (under Abu Nabhan Jaid Al-

Kharusi (1734/5-1822); Said bin Khalfan Al-Khalili (1868-1871) and, eventually, Salim

ibn Rashid al-Kharusi (1913-20) and Muhammad ibn Abd Allah al-Khalili Alkharusi al-

Yahmadi al-Azdi (1920-54)) "was profoundly influenced by the model of the First

Imamate" (Wilkinson 1972: 76).

Although the institution of the Imamate should have been anything but dynastic,

there have in fact been five dynasties in Oman: The Julanda's; the Yahmad-Khruse (and

their descendents, the Kharus and the Khalili's); the Nabahina (who called themselves

Kings); the Yaariba; and the Al-Busaid (who eventually became hereditary Sultans,

12
rather than Imams) (Wilkinson 1987: 9). The establishment of an Omani "state" (whether

Imamate, or kingship) followed a similar historical cycle: elected Imams were

succeeded by secular dynasties which were overthrown by familial squabbling

and groundswells of religious indignation. This pattern was the natural
culmination of the centrifugal tendencies of the tribal system and the democratic
ideals inherent in the Ibadi faith (Peterson 1978: 20).

Both the tribal nature of Omani society and the significant restraints of the Ibadi

"state" served to undermine the future well being of the Imamate institution. While the

Imam's residence represents the focal point in the Ibadi community, physical power

remains vested in the hands of the leaders of the community. The Imam has no recourse

to a standing army independent of what the "faithful" would provide. A standing army

under the authority of an individual may easily denigrate to despotic power. As such,

military force can be raised only through the local tribes whose duty is to respond to the

Imam's call in times of crises (Wilkinson 1972: 77-79). The Ibadi archetypal state as

such, fulfilled the basic

requirements for a national political authority without threatening the existing

tribal concern for autonomy. The imamate in effect served as a super-tribe for the
entire country, and the selection of Nizwa as its capital simply reflected its
strategic location in the midst of the Arab tribal heartland (Peterson 1987: 3).

An Imam is an elected leader of the community. He is the embodiment of a

religious and temporal leader of the community. As such, the election was the function of

both the "uluma" (religious scholars) and the tribal leaders. Indeed, without the support

of either group, it is doubtful whether an Imam could effectively rule. In Oman the two

broad tribal confederations are those of the Hinawi and the Ghafiri. Both tribes must

support the Imam in order for him to be recognized as a national leader rather than just

the representative of a particular group. Primary identification with the tribe or with ones

13
kin, and tribal self-containment (which fosters fierce independence) created a

decentralized, centrifugal system. Peterson called it a "complex and interlocking network

of alliances [which] caused many local disputes to expand and embrace more than just

the initial tribes involved" (Peterson 1984: 983). Even when an overwhelming tribal

allegiance to the Imam had been achieved, the Imam served more as a mediator of a loose

political organization, rather than as its ruler. The Imam needed a thorough knowledge of

tribal politics and political acumen to maintain the well being of the polity in the face of

various tribal interests and even intrigues. Although Ibadi religious tenets had legitimized

the role of the Imam as the head of the community, they also restricted his powers

through the lack of any military force (Peterson 1984: 984). The availability of troops to

quell domestic or external threats depended upon the Imam's ability to rally the tribes to

a cause. As Wilkinson critically attests

It is easy to see that the Ibadi politico-religious ideology is an impractical basis

for the permanent development of a state. It automatically develops a cycle which
encompasses its own downfall. As the country is united so does its wealth and
prosperity increase and the religious ideal weaken; the leadership becomes the
prerogative of a single group degenerates into temporal power (Saltanah). There
ensues a struggle for power in which tribal 'asabiyah is brought into play and
every potential weakness in the country exploited until full-scale civil war is the
outcome. The situation is usually resolved by one or more of the parties calling in
an outside power, normally with disastrous results for the Omanis in general. This
is the story of the First Imamate, of the Nabahinah, of the Yaaribah and of the Al
Bu Said (Wilkinson 1972: 78-79).

The Arrival of the Portuguese (1507-1650)

In 1507, the Portuguese under the command of Albuquerque sacked and forced

into submission the entire Omani coast: Ras Al-Hadd, Qalhat, Quryat, Muscat, Suhar and

Khur Fakkan. For the ensuing thirty-two years the Portuguese forces maintained effective

14
control of the area. During that period they faced numerous revolts at Quryat and Suhar

in 1522, at Muscat and Qalhat in 1526, and at Bahrain in 1529, however their first serious

challenge came in 1624 with the election of a new Imam, Nasser bin Murshid Al-Yaaribi.

(Bathurst 1972: 92). Nasser suppressed a number of revolts throughout the country then

gradually dislodged the Portuguese from the coast. He captured Suhar in 1643

(Riphenburg 1998: 30-1).

Nasser's successor, Sultan bin Said Al-Yaaribi (1649-1679), captured Muscat in

1650 and attacked Portuguese strong holds in East Africa. From 1652 onward, the

Portuguese began losing all their ports in East Africa. Mombassa, their last stronghold,

surrendered to the Yaariba in 1665. Portuguese possessions in India and elsewhere also

suffered Yaaribi attacks: Bombay in 1661; Diu in November 1668 and January 1676;

Bassein in 1764; and Kung (Persia) in 1670. When the Portuguese attempted to regain

control of Mombassa in 1678, their fleet was scattered by the arrival of Omani ships

(Bathurst 1972: 99). Two successive Imams, Balarab bin Sultan (1679-1692) and Saif

ibn Sultan (1692-1711), continued the expansion of Oman's authority throughout the east

African coast. By the end of the seventeenth century, the term empire was used to

describe Oman's possessions, or empire, which extended from "East Africa, with Pemba,

Zanzibar, Patta, and Kilwa all governed by the Yaaribah governor at Mombassa, to

Bahrain, which was occupied in 1700" (Riphenburg 1998: 30-1).

Oman also defended Persia from the Yaaribi. Imam Balarab bin Sultan

"demanded, inter alia, of the Shah (without even the courtesy of a formal address) exactly

the same privileges as the old European power had enjoyed, that is half of the customs: in

exchange the Omanis would station twenty ships to defend the Persian coast" (Wilkinson

15
1987: 48). Imam Sultan bin Saif II (1711-1719) attacked and captured Qisham, Larka

and Bahrain, though he was repulsed at Hormuz. After failing to convince European

powers to limit the expansion of the Yaariba, Nadir Shah, who assumed control over

Persia after the fall of the Safavids, created the nucleus of a navy, which he used to

invade Oman. This was relatively easy because of rivalries that erupted among the

Yaarriba. One of the contenders for the office of the Imamate, Sayf bin Sultan II, around

1737-8, requested the support of Nader Shah against his rivals. The Persians thus entered

Oman to aid Sayf, but eventually carried out an open invasion of the country from their

base at Julfar in 1743. Repulsing the Persian attack was left to the founder of a new

dynasty, Ahmad Al-Busaidi (Wilkinson 1987: 48).

The Rise of the Sultanate: Ahmad ibn Said Al-Bu Said (1744-1783)

Ahmad Al-Busaidi was the governor of Suhar under the Yaariba before he

became the Imam of Oman in 1744 and the founder of a new dynasty. He was

responsible for defeating the Persians at a battle in Sohar. Al-Busaidi was a man of

considerable administrative skills and an active merchant who encouraged his subjects to

trade outside of Oman. In 1776, he allied himself with the Ottoman Turks against the

Persians and sent an Omani fleet to help the Turks break Karim Khan Zand's blockade on

Basra. In return, the Ottomans waived taxes on Omani merchants involved in the

profitable coffee trade between Yemen and Iraq. (Kelly 1980: 108). Ahmad's actions in

Basra also brought him good relations with the British who had moved their factories

from Bushire to Basra in 1763. By 1773 the East Indian Company had an Omani

representative in Muscat (Wilkinson 1987: 50). Ahmad's leadership rested more on his

16
mercantile resources, his personal influence, and wealth rather than on the traditional

tribal support and territorial conquest. The Al-Busaid "sought no religious sanction for

their authority; they were content to rely on the prestige of their house and the military

force they commanded, and, in later days, on the support lent them by their allies the

British" (Rentz 1952: 13). His successors in the Al-Busaid dynasty would follow in his

footsteps by directing their considerable skills to enterprises outside of Oman: trade with

India and East Africa, and conquests in the Gulf. Eventually they shed the title Imam.

Only Ahmad's immediate successor, who ruled very briefly, proclaimed himself an

Imam. Instead, they preferred Sayyid (Lord), which did not indicate descent from the

Prophet's family. After 1861, the title Sultan was used, a title that was first applied by

Europeans to address the rulers of Oman. Oman's history was beginning to witness a

significant shift away from the world of the interior, to Muscat as the center of political

and commercial power (Kelly 1980: 108).

Imam Sultan Ibin Ahmad (1792-1804)

Sultan was without a doubt a worthy successor to the founder of the Al-Busaid

dynasty. He devoted his reign to overseas expansion and to consolidation of Muscat's

power in the southern Gulf. Muscat's authority expanded over Gawadur on the Marakan

coast and Chabar on the Persian coast. By 1798, after a short military campaign, Sultan

obtained the customs authority for Bandar Abbas and the islands of Hormuz, Qisham,

Hanjam, and Minab. This opened the door for trade with the markets of southern Persia

where control over the Strait of Hormuz was secured and followed by obtaining the

profitable salt deposits of Hormuz (Riphenburg 1998: 34-5).

17
 His reign however was beset by various external threats that continued to plague

Muscat well after his death. The Utub, who occupied Bahrain in 1783, were considered

rival merchants who traded directly with India and bypassed both Muscat and Bandar

Abbas. The first campaign against the Utub was carried out in 1799, after which they

promised to pay a transit tax and a tribute equal to half the amount that they had

previously paid to Persia.

Once Sultan withdrew to Muscat, however, the Utub formed a strong alliance

with the powerful Wahhabi leadership who would continue to pose a threat to Oman for

centuries to come. The Wahhabi's first excursion into Oman involved the attack and the

occupation of the Burami oasis in 1799. They formed an alliance with the Qawasim in

Ras-Al-Khaima. Muscat's commercial interests were now under a serious threat. Faced

with Saudi occupation of the Buraimi oasis, Sultan gathered his forces and marched to

Buraimi to expel the Saudis. The defeat forced Sultan to pay a tribute to the Saudi emir

and to allow a Saudi agent to reside in Muscat itself. Sultan attempted to limit Saudi

influence by allying himself with the Sherifs of Mecca in 1803, but the alliance did not

bear any significant results. The Saudi threat, however, was neutralized temporarily by

the death of their leader Emir Faisal later that year (Riphenburg 1998: 36). Rather than

wait for the Saudi threat to materialize again, the Imam attempted to forge another

alliance with a different force in the region. When the Pasha of Baghdad refused to pay

the custom charges levied on Omani imports to Baghdad, Imam Sultan sailed to Basra's

port in 1804 and threatened reprisals. Unexpectedly, the Pasha and the Imam both agreed

to commit Ottoman and Muscat forces to a joint attack against the Saudis. This venture

18
never materialized, since Sultan was attacked on his return to Oman and lost his life

(Risso 1986: 179-80).

It was also during Sultan's reign that Oman became embroiled in British and

French schemes over the control of the western Indian Ocean. Bonaparte had already

invaded Egypt in 1798, and his letters to Muscat and to India's Tipu Sultan caused the

British concern. Muscat had already enjoyed relations with France through the slave trade

on the Island of Mauritius. To counter possible French designs on Muscat, the British

dispatched their diplomats to Imam Sultan. He in turn promised his friendship to England

especially after the East India Company agreed to purchase more Salt. Additional treaties

followed between Oman and Great Britain in 1798 and 1800. These agreements were

"unlike the treaties Britain signed with the Gulf Sheikhs later in the nineteenth century,

they were neither imposed by force nor did they turn Oman into a protectorate"

(Riphenburg 1998: 36). Despite the treaties between both countries, Imam Sultan refused

to allow the British a factory in Muscat. His successor, Sayyid Bader, cemented Muscat's

alliance with Britain through a joint attack of Qawasim bases (Wilkinson 1987: 54). Yet,

as Bhacker asserts,

Ultimately Britain managed to achieve its goals at little coast to itself because the
Albusaidi rulers of the second half of the nineteenth century found themselves
totally powerless to assert their own legitimate rights. The roots of this impotence
can be traced back to the time of Sultan b Ahmad who, as a result of the Wahhabit
threat to his dominions and the Qasimi/Utabi challenge to Muscat's commerce,
felt compelled to sign the 1798 Treaty with Britain, overawed as he was at the
time by the unrelenting march of the British military machine as it rolled through
India acquiring more and more territories and triumphing over all those who
resisted its advance, notable among whom were the French and the ruler of
Mysore, both former commercial allies of Oman (Bhacker 1994: 197).

19
 Sultan Said bin Sultan (1806-1856)

Sultan Said was barely 17 years of age when he seized power from Sayyid Badir.

The main threats to his leadership came from Saudi Arabia, the Qawasim of Ras Al-

Khaimah, and the Utub of Bahrain. The Saudi threat was temporarily neutralized when

Egypt's Mohammed Ali invaded the peninsula in 1811 (Allen 1984: 44). After various

attempts to subjugate both Ras-Al-Khaimah and Bahrain, Sultan Said turned to England

for aid. England eventually took control of the defeated Trucial Coast (1819). The

treaty agreement that followed led to the establishment of the Trucial system and
with it the divorce of Trucial and Sultanate Oman. From now on 'Julfar' was
independent and under British control. Soon the Gulf itself became an extension
of the British-Indian domain and Oman was totally excluded from it politically
(Wilkinson 1987: 54).

Furthermore, the British refused to assist Sultan Said against the Utub of Bahrain.

They allowed the latter to join the Trucial system and warned the Sultan against future

attacks (Riphenburg 1998: 37). The British also exerted enormous pressure on the Sultan

to suspend the highly profitable slave trade coming from the Sultan's African colonies.

The Sultan concluded the first antislavery treaty with the British government, acting

through the East India Company, in 1822 (Townsend 1977: 42). In 1839, Said concluded

another treaty of commerce with Great Britain according to the terms of which "'the

subjects of Her Britannic Majesty shall...have full liberty to enter, reside in, trade with

and pass with their merchandize through all parts of the dominions of His Highness the

Sultan of Muscat" (Rentz 1952: 17-18). The French also signed a treaty with Sultan Said

in 1807. A treaty of commerce followed in 1844, which essentially granted the French the

same "freedom of movement throughout the territories of the Sultan of Muscat that had

20
been granted in 1839 to the British" (Rentz 1952: 17-18). A treaty with the United States

was signed in 1833, which granted U.S citizens

free liberty to enter all the Ports of His Majesty and stated that those citizens
'resorting to the Ports of the Sultan for the purpose of trade, shall have leave to
land, and reside in the said ports'. In addition the treaty provided that the
President of the United States 'may appoint Consuls to reside in the Ports of the
Sultan where the principal commerce shall be carried on' (Rentz 52: 17-18).

By 1829, Sultan Said added Dhofar, part of the Sultanate's geographical territory,

to Oman's domain and he also controlled the Swahili coast (Tanzania and Kenya). (East

Africa had already come under Oman's influence through the Yaariba and was the only

place left for the Sultan to expand after the British involvement in the Gulf.) Sultan Said

decided to live in Zanzibar. In fact, after 1832, the Sultan was almost permanently absent

from Muscat, preferring to attend to his domains in Africa. Muscat's affairs, and in turn

those of Oman, were left in the hands of a governor while the port's financial

administration was left to Indian agents (Riphenburg 1998: 39).

The Death of Sultan Said and the Return of the Imamate

After the death of Sultan Said, his dominions were divided between two of his

sons through the British mediated Canning Award. Thuwani bin Said was to rule Muscat,

while his brother, Majid ibin Said, presided over Zanzibar. As such, both Zanzibar and

Muscat became two separate and independent Sultanates'. The Sultanate of Zanzibar was

much wealthier than Muscat, and it was agreed that Muscat would receive an annual

payment of 40,000 Maria Theresa dollars. Thuwaini's reign lasted from 1856-1866, and

was followed by that of Salim's ibn Thuwani. Salim's reign, however, was immediately

challenged by the new forces of the Imamate under the leadership of Imam Azan bin Qais

21
Al-Busaidi. By 1869, Azzan captured both Muscat and the Buraimi. His Imamate

however lasted only from 1868 to 1871. The Sultanate arose again under Sultan Turki ibn

Said who reigned from 1871 to 1888. His reign was continuously challenged by both his

nephew, ex-Sultan Salim bin Thuwani and that of the Imamate forces that continued to

attack Muscat. British involvement was paramount in safeguarding Muscat against future

attacks by the forces of the interior. The British declared publicly in 1866 that 'their

determination to afford Sayyid Turki active support in case of attacks on Muscat had the

salutary effect of maintaining peace during the remainder of his life" (Rentz 1952: 34-

35).

The reign of Sultan Faysal bin Turki (1888-1913) witnessed the most flagrant

aggression against Muscat's sovereignty as a byproduct of British and French schemes in

Muscat. First the Sultan agreed to a French proposal to open a coaling station at Muscat

and to fly the French flag on his fleet. Then the British ordered him to board a British

flagship and witness the bombardment of Muscat unless he withdrew his agreement with

France. Worse yet, he was forced in 1899 to renounce his previous agreement with the

French in a public speech. Faysal's rule "lapsed into oblivion. He died in October 1913 as

the British reestablished their influence in Oman, the reconstituted imamate threatened

the authority of the ruler in Muscat, and the government lay in shambles" (Kechichian

2000: 187).

Salem Al-Kharusi was elected Imam in 1913. He first occupied Nizwa and then

moved against Muscat. Sultan Faysal died in October of that year, and was succeeded by

his son Taimur who reigned from 1913 to 1931.The British had to land troops in Muscat

to guard it against the Imamate forces, and continued to do so for the next 5 years.

22
Burdened with extensive debts and continuous rebellions, Sultan Taimur attempted to

abdicate. When England refused his requests, he began to spend as much time as possible

in Dhofar and abandoned the administration of Muscat to a council of ministers under a

British advisor (Kelly 1980: 113).

In 1920, the relationship between Muscat and the Imamate of Mohammad Al-

Khalili (1920-1954) was governed by the so-called Treaty of Sib. By 1932, a new leader,

Said bin Taimur (Sultan Said), had become the Sultan of Muscat. His internal and

external policies are the focus of this work and form the foundation of Oman's foreign

and domestic relations for the next seventy-five years.

23
 III.

THE REIGN OF SULTAN SAID

Revisiting the Reign of Sultan Said

The period of the reign of Sultan Said (between his ascension in 1932 and until

his overthrow in 1970) was undoubtedly one of the most important periods in the modern

history of the Sultanate. The tumultuous events that led to the establishment of the

modern state of the Sultanate of Oman if untangled, can give some important indicators

about the foundations of Oman's foreign policy and its specific directions.

To execute this chapter effectively, four avenues of research will be used. First, it

is necessary to make the most of scarce data about the ruler's decisions, pronouncements

and actions for the duration of his reign. Subsequently, an extensive use of the archives is

imperative in order to provide an insight into the motives of all actors involved whether

in London, Riyadh, Muscat or Abu-Dhabi. This chapter will repeatedly be punctuated by

various statements-as well as memos, reviews, and notes-quoted from the archives,

providing the reader with a carefully constructed record of the historical genesis of

Muscat's most important challenges during the reign of Said. Third, an examination of

the major strategic problems facing Muscat as well as Sultan Said's actions and

statements, highlight his course of action and the attendant considerations that affected

his choices.

Finally, an examination and assessment of the most salient events of the reign of

Sultan Said, and a clarification of the literature are essential. Conventional wisdom has

24
depicted Sultan Said as the classic tyrant who compensates for his administrative

incompetence with brutal authority. He is portrayed this way without adequate

explanations or analysis.

The spectrum of accusations thrown at Sultan Said by the conventional wisdom

ranges from a hostile attitude towards education' leading to the underdevelopment of the

country, to hoarding away the country's wealth to his personal Swiss bank accounts

(Halliday 1974: 277), and further, to outright complicity in British imperialism. Indeed,

the "evidence" most often given for the latter includes 1) the sale of Gawadur; 2) his

attempt to unite the country under Muscat's authority; 3) the lease of Masirah to the

British Royal Air Force; and 4) the Buraimi Oasis dispute.

No leader in the modern history of the Arab Gulf States has been more vilified

than Sultan Said. One of his harshest critics claims that Sultan Said was "one of the

nastiest rulers the world has seen for a long time" (Halliday 1974: 275). Such views

typify the conventional wisdom repeatedly observed by the writings on Oman, albeit

sometimes with less directness, (Halliday 1974; Morries 1977; Smiley 1975; Finnes

1975; Thwaites 1955; Searle 1975; Clements 1980; Hill 1977; Narayan 1979; Haqley

Sultan Said did what he could for education given the financial situation at the time.
It should be
emphasized that the Sultan had nothing against education per se; not even female education; an attitude that
many did not share in the Gulf. As Pridham observes:
Female illiteracy in each of Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia was estimated to be 98 per cent in the
mid-1970s, and since female education was legalized in Saudi Arabia only in 1960 (when it had existed in
both secular and religious forms in Oman for years) there seems to be no justification for singling Oman
out for censure. Far from there being a taboo, it must be realized that the first official girls school was
ordered by Sultan Said and opened in 1970 (Pridham 1986: 136).

25
1977; Graze 1982; Eicklman 1984: Wikan 1982; Kaylani 1979; Foda 1958; Joyce 1995).

There are few sympathetic narratives (Phillips 1966; Peterson 1978: Skeet 1974).

Confusingly, some of the Sultan's critics have contradicted their own accounts. In

an article published by Peterson in Middle East Policy (Peterson 2004: 125), the author

comments on Sultan Said's isolation, observing that "Even when Oman finally joined the

ranks of oil producers, Sultan Said had no interest in joining either OPEC or OAPEC. His

sole concession to membership in international bodies was a successful application to

WHO." 2 In the endnotes of an earlier work, however, Peterson presents a different

account of the same subject. There was:

... an abortive attempt to join the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in
the late 1940's and another attempt in 1962 to join the World Health Organization
(WHO): Ismail bin Khalili al-Rasasi was even sent to Geneva as an observer but
Arab League lobbying prevented Omani membership...Another abortive attempt
initiative came in 1967 when Said announced that he was sending an application
for membership to OPEC but nothing seems have come of it (Peterson 1976:
105).

Petty and incomprehensible behavior is often cited by various sources as

examples of Sultan Said's tyranny: the Sultan attempted to "shut the country by among

other things, banning sunglasses and severely restricting education and foreign travel"

(Miller 1997: 35) and "kept from the populations whole series of objects, including

medicines, radios, spectacles, trousers, cigarettes and books" (Halliday 1974: 275). This

is repeated by Wikan (Wikan 1982: 6) and by Graz (Graz 1982: 16) adding that under

2 It should be noted that Muscat's application to the WHO was resisted by a "coalition of Muslim
and communist states-Iraq, Mali, Sudan, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Republic-spoke against it" (Joyce 1995: 89).

26
specific circumstances even shoes were forbidden. Subsequently we are told that such

behavior can only be explained by some form of mental illness (Kaylani 1979: 573).

What is absent from these stories is the original source. For example, there is no

reference to the source of the following passage: "According to one story he [the Sultan]

used to make them [slaves] swim in the swimming pool constructed in front of his palace

in Salalah while he shot pellets from a tun at the fish" (Narayan 1979: 75). Neither does

the author claim that such information was obtained firsthand by his or her own

investigations. When claims made by Miller and others (for example regarding the

banning of glasses and radios) were investigated, they were traced back to a surprising

source: Pravda, the Soviet central propaganda mouthpiece. After a visit by special

correspondent A. Vassilliev on the 2 9 th of September 1969 to the "liberated" areas of

Dhofar (please note that the author is only writing on a specific and rather small area of

the country), he reported:

That the inhabitants of this town were forbidden from wearing shoes, spectacles,
listening to the radio, or flying in aeroplanes ... We entered liberated villages
under the thunder of welcomes for the Soviet Union...The most dangerous
[captured enemies] were taken out to the town of Muscat and thrown in to the
[SIC] pie of horrible prison of Jut Galal...Here people are made fun of for the
amusement of the prison warders, eyes are gouged out, people are kept years
without light, others have poisonous snakes thrown at them, still others are left to
the mercies of hungry rats.3

The British embassy in Moscow did not fail to take notice:

You may be surprised to learn that Pravda of 29 September devoted almost half a
page to a long report from the 'liberated regions' of Oman... Such accounts of

3 FCO 8 1072: The Rebellious Mountains of Dhofar: A report from the liberated areas. Special
correspondent of Pravda: Author A. Vasiliev Pravda: 29 September 1969.

27
 liberation struggles are of course standard fare for the Pravda-reader. In this case
however, the diet was improved by the addition both of some fascinating statistics
(30% of the population of Salalah are slaves), and of some light relief (the sultan
rarely moved from his Salalah palace even before 1966, preferring the delights of
his harem and pornographic films). ... It does also seem odd that Pravda should
have referred throughout to the 'Persian Gulf; one might have expected more
attention to Arab sensibilities in an article specifically about 'Arab liberation'.4

Under closer scrutiny, reports such as Pravda's prove to be dubious at best. They

represent, for the most part, a superficial description of the past state of affairs. The

Sultan himself wore spectacles and sunglasses, and, as a glance at the book, Old Oman,5

would show, so did many of his subjects. Radios, contrary to the conventional wisdom,

were not forbidden and were surprisingly common and popular. A writer in the early

1940's estimated that there were 50-100 sets in the Muscat-Matrah area, and in the

1950's, tribal Sheikhs visiting the capital avidly sought the new battery-operated

portables as gifts. While it is true that Sultan Said placed restrictions on automobiles

ownership, he did not forbid them. Permission from the Sultan was required for the

importation of any vehicle other than saloon cars and short-wheelbase Land Rovers.

These restrictions were security measures, an attempt to prevent continual smuggling of

arms and mines by saboteurs during the unrest of the 1950's and 1960's; Lories and

larger Land Rovers were, therefore, controlled but not forbidden (except to those deemed

security risks) (Pridham 1986: 134). The following is a passage from the record of a

4 FCO 8 1072: The Dhofar War: British Embassy, Moscow: 29 September 1969.

5 This is a book that is supportive of the conventional wisdom with many pictures.

28
meeting between Sultan Said and Her Majesty's Government (HMG) representative

which may shed some light on Sultan Said's personal views:

As regards the restrictions on personal liberty, he preferred to call them

regulations and there was much misunderstanding about them. A large number of
them e.g the regulations about the form of dress, reflected the traditional Omani
way of life...Many of his people, especially those in the mountains, were very
conservative and suspicious of foreigners and innovations; and rapid changes,
especially any changes affecting religious matters, would arose their hostility and
upset the unity and the balance of the country.6

Observers of Persian Gulf States, past and present, would note that some of the

restrictions mentioned above are not exclusive to Oman, yet curiously, journalists, as well

as scholars, have singled out Sultan Said as an object of reproach.

Alternatively, those who worked closely with Sultan Said attest to his moderation,

and reveal a remarkably different image. Their testimony, however, is absent from most

of the literature. Wendell Phillips observed that the Sultan (contrary to the extravagances

of the ruling families of other Gulf States) "owned no Cadillacs, airplanes, or yachts,

prefers to drive desert jeeps and trucks himself' (Phillips 1966: 166). Townsend,

described Sultan Said as "a most frugal man [who] lived a simple life" (Townsend 1977:

57). McLeod Innes wrote of Sultan Said as "a ruler who was never a tyrant, a man of

great charm, great dignity, and great integrity, whom I was proud to serve" (Innes 1987:

285).7

6 FCO 8 569: Confidential: Record of Conversation with the Sultan of Muscat. 22 December
1966.

7 Phillips Wendell (1921-1975) was an American oilman and an archeologist. He first entered
Oman in the late 1950s after his expulsion from Yemen by the Imamate forces. In Oman, he gained the
confidence of Sultan Said bin Taymur spending considerable time with him in Salalah. He is also the

29
 To develop a proper perspective, it will be necessary to return to the reign of

Sultan Said. A memo, dated 17 July 1958, introduces Sultan Said to Britain's Prime

Minister upon a proposed visit to London:

The Sultan of Muscat and Oman, an independent monarch, Sayyid Said bin
Taimur, was born in 1910 and succeeded his father on the latter's abdication in
1932. The Sultan was educated in Baghdad and India and speaks excellent though
slow English. He is a dignified person, inclined to be retiring, reserved and
formal. He has a genuinely deep feeling for his relations with the British Crown
and H.M government. He is normally addressed as 'Your Highness'. He is very
shrewd ruler and able negotiator, who runs his country almost single-handed. He
does not consider himself, nor is he, the same kind of person as other Arab rulers.8

A key to understanding Sultan's Said's reign lies in the political and financial

situation of his father's government. The reign of Sultan Taimur bin Faisal was besieged

by a resurgence of the Imamate forces that culminated in the Imamate of Salim bin

Rashid Al-Kharusi (1913-20)9 and Muhammad b. Abdullah Al-Khalili (1920-54).10 The

author of two books on Oman: Oman: A history and Unknown Oman. John Townsend worked for both
Sultan Said and his son, Sultan Qaboos. He first visited Oman in late April 1969. Neil McLeod Innes, was
invited to Oman in 1953 to become Sultan Said's adviser. Apparently Sultan Said had more advice than he
could possible cope with for he immediately informed Mr. Innes that his Job was to "tell Her Majesty's
Government what I want, not the other way around. Your title would be Minster of Foreign Affairs" (Innes
1987: first page).

8 PREM 11/4923: Secret: Visit of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman: 20 August
1958. There is also
another memo from the British Foreign Office refers to how the Sultan in a previous negotiations
concerning the Royal Air force Facilities, 'conducted the negotiations entirely on his own and most
capably' (PREM 11/4923). It should be noted that these memos are by no means the exception.

9 The Imamate challenge goes further in history than the dates mentioned. First it was the Imamate
of Azzan Bin Qays who actually ruled Muscat as Imam from 1868 to 1871. The adoption of modus vivendi
and autonomy for the interior was gained during the reign of Taymur Bin Faysal (1913-1931) when the
Agreement of Al-Seeb was signed in 1920 (Duke 1976: 105).

10 It was during the Imamate of Al-Khalili that the Agreement

of Seeb, or the Treaty of Seeb,
depending on whom you talk to, was signed on 25 September 1920, between the representatives of the
Imam, and the Sultanate through the mediation of R. E. L. Wingate at the village of al-Seeb. The agreement

30
state's finances had collapsed." Only two years after his graduation from secondary

school in Mayo College (1922-1927), Said returned home to head a Council of Ministers

set up by his father at the "advice" of the British. At issue was the growing financial

crisis that kept Muscat either bankrupt, or on the verge of bankruptcy for approximately

seventy-five years. That situation needed immediate attention:

apart from some rather erratic exports of dates and fish, the Treasury relied almost
entirely on customs receipts, the Zanzibar subsidy and, later, the oil concession
rental. The amount was pitifully small; in 1931, according to the Sultan, the total
budget was only about 50,000 (Skeet 1974: 164).

By assuming presidency of the Council of Ministers, Said was, in essence, de

facto Sultan. In 1930, one of his first acts as head of the Council of Ministers was to

dismiss his father's Finance Minister, Bertram Thomas. By July 1931, he had appointed

himself Minister of Finance and had balanced the budget. He maintained budget

surpluses despite a prolonged drought in Oman and a worldwide depression (Allen 2000:

ushered in the beginning of 35 years of peace. Under its terms, the Imamate representatives pledged to: (1)
live in peace with the Sultanate; (2) not restrict trade and travel with the coast; (3) return fugitives from
justice, and (4) honor claims of coastal merchants. The Sultanate, in turn, agreed to: (1) not charge more
than 5 percent duty on exports from the interior to the coast; (3) impose no restrictions on entry to and exit
from coastal towns; (4) return fugitives from interior justice and not interfere with the tribes internal affairs
(Duke 1976: 105).
The statement issued by Sultan Said bin Taimour on 1 January 1968 clearly
indicates the
condition of the state finances upon his succession. He states that "at the time the government Budget was
no more than Rps. 700,000 ($50,000) from which the Sultanate had to pay the cost of the government
machine, repay the balance of the loan and meet various other items of expenditure, including the
customary gifts and presents to the tribal sheikhs and delegations, since, outwardly, the Government
appeared very rich ... the reader may be surprised to learn that when we took over the reins of power the
Sultanate's Treasury was completely empty" (Townsend 1977: 193).

31
3)12 Throughout his reign, Said maintained a simple fiscal philosophy: do not spend what

you do not have (Allen 2000: 4).

In November 1931, Sultan Taimur requested that the British accept his abdication

with the ascension of his son as Sultan, citing medical reasons (Vine 1995: 487). The

British, however, refused to accept the abdication until January 1932. In his early

twenties Sultan Said had inherited a government that lacked sufficient resources for early

success. His own strong determination to restore fiscal soundness became his paramount

goal and was essential for political unification under Muscat's authority.

The young Sultan asserted his authority with respect to the British from the

earliest periods of his reign. In August of 1937, he embarked on a visit to Europe and the

United States (Bailey 1988: 425). London's Political Resident thought that he at least

should have been informed of the trip. In a letter addressed to the Sultan, the Political

Resident expressed surprise that Bin Taimur did not follow the customary practice of

making his travel arrangements as well as contacts with foreign powers through Her

Majesty's Government (HMG) (El-Solh 2000: 150). In an elaborate and dignified

answer, the Sultan stated that:

There is no doubt that We realize what are the Treaty Relations that exist between
Us and the British Government. We do not think that Our writing directly to the
President of the U.S.A.13 would make a breach of the provisions of the Treaty.

According to Allen, "Said kept the budget in balance through the early 1950's with an income
at about Rs 645,000 per year, drawn largely from customs revenues, the Zakat tax on dates from the
interior, a British subsidy of Rs 86,400 (the Zanzibar subsidy), and miscellaneous fees" (Allen 2000: 17).

13 "After a sight-seeing tour, which included a visit to Hollywood, Saiyid Said went on by train to
Washington, where he was to be the guest of the United States Government for 10 days. Wearing Omani
national dress, the Sultan and his party were welcomed at Washington station on 3 March 1938 by the

32
 Further, as you are aware, there are Treaties between Us and the Government of
the U.S.A. and France and We have to write to them directly on certain occasions
when necessity calls for it...But should We have any such communications in the
future and We consider that it is Our interests to send them through His Majesty's
Government We would be pleased to do so, in view of the advantages that this
will give to Us. Otherwise We shall continue to act in accordance with the old
procedure which is usual to Our Government, and shall not in the least
inconvenience His Majesty's Government and their officials 14 (El-Solh 2000:
220).

In July 1932, the Sultan visited India' 5 on a three-month tour and this time, the

Political Resident expressed no "surprise". The earlier reaction was due to British

concerns about "subversive anti-British propaganda being conducted by the Italian

Government in various parts of Arabia" (Porter 1982: 44). As the British Ambassador to

the United States commented, "If, for example, the Sultan should make a trip to Europe

Secretary of State Mr. Cordell Hull...The Sultan lunched with President Roosevelt on 4' March and that
evening was the guest of honor at a state dinner given by the Secretary of State... From London, he went to
Paris, where he was received by the President of the French Republic" (Bailey 1988: 426).

14 It should be noted that the British Foreign Office hearing of the upcoming visit
of the Sultan
were not totally sure as to what exactly was the position of the Sultan of Muscat. As the following quote
demonstrates:
We should remember that the Sultan is an independent Sovereign and not a Protected Trucial
Sheikh and it is for consideration whether, on his personal arrival in this country he should not be received
by a Foreign Office representative. The position of the Sultan of Muscat in regard to his Majesty's has
recently been examined in a memorandum...this memorandum shows that so far treaty agreements and
similar undertakings are concerned His Majesty's Government have practically no ground, other than a
promise given by the Sultan on his accession to be guided by their advice in important affairs... (El-Solh
200: 170).
15In India, the Sultan was received by the Viceroy at Simla. The remarks of the Viceroy
in his
annual report give us a hint to the personality of young Sultan Said: "His Highness, who carries an
exceedingly shrewd head on his young shoulders, takes a keen personal interest in the administration of his
State and evinces considerable strength of character in dealing with problems that confront him." (Bailey
1988: 425).

33
and should either desire or be induced to visit Rome, he felt certain that his Government

would be seriously concerned" (Porter 1982: 44).

Said's domestic and foreign policy in essence revolved around two objectives: the

restoration of Muscat's complete authority over the areas administered by the Imamate

and the elimination of the debts accrued by the previous administrations. The fiscal

weakness of the country had allowed undue influences on the government.16 This fact is

clearly illustrated by a conversation between Sultan Said and a member of the British

government:

When he had succeeded his father in 1932 the income of the Sultanate was 50,000
a year. For many years he had no resources with which to effect improvements
and he had always been determined, as he still was, not to borrow as this would
put his country under the influence of his creditors. It was for the lack of
resources not lack of will that his country had remained backward, and in many
respects still was so. However he had for long been maturing plans, which he had
committed to notebooks"7 , for the development of his country when resources
became available. Since 1958 H.M.G had made certain grants for which he was
extremely grateful; these had mad modest improvements possible. Now with the
prospect of oil revenues he planned to embark on his wider plans. These would
include no palaces or Cadillac's for himself and his family. He wished to live
comfortably but not luxuriously.18

16 To fully appreciate Sultan Said's position and to further understand the Sultanate's
finances
before and during his tenure, please refer to Appendix III, which contains Sultan Said's own address to the
people of Oman in 1968.

In reference to the notebooks, Innes write that in a conversation with Sultan Said regarding
development plans, the Sultan informed Innes that he has "been thinking about these developments for a
very long time, and I have all my own plans for them recorded in these little books, for references when we
have the money to realize them." (Innes 1987: 200).

18 FCO 8 569: Confidential: Records of Conversation with the Sultan of Muscat: 2 2 nd December
1966.

34
 Wendell Phillips corroborates Sultan Said's concern in the late 1950's. The

Sultan's view was that "certain conditions in Oman inherited from the past are not really

my fault, and if I do not have the funds to change these conditions where change is

desired, it is still not my fault; if however, I do have the means and do not improve my

people and my country then I should be ashamed" (Phillips 1966: 166).

The literature depicted the Sultan as a passive agent in the face of dramatic

events. The death of Imam Al-Khalili in May 1954 initiated the first phase of the removal

of the Imamate as a significant force in Omani politics. As early as the 1930's, and

certainly during and after WWII, Sultan Said was already contemplating the extension of

Muscat's authority over the territories controlled by the Imamate. In the late 1920's and

throughout the 1930's, the British Royal Air Force endeavored to open up the air route

from Britain to India and to the territories of the Far East19 (Bailey 1988: 560). When the

threat of yet another war became clear at the end of 1930's, the importance of air routes

and military bases became even more crucial to London. Sultan Said supported the allies

against the Axis powers and consented to creating three bases 20 on the Sultanate's

19 The amount of written material on the subject of aviation in the files of the British
Consulate at
Muscat is very considerable. No fewer than 52 out of the 472 files or about 9% are devoted to aviation
matters, totaling some 6,600 pages. What is the more remarkable is that Saiyid Said, first as President of
the Council of Ministers (1930-32) and then as Sultan appears to have handled the whole of the Omani side
of this complex correspondence himself (Bailey 1988: 560).

20 It should be noted that Sultan Said though cooperative made it clear that these facilities were for
the period of the war only. In fact,
he drew up regulations for British service and civilian personal stationed in the Sultanate so as to
avoid possible misunderstandings and conflict with the resident population. These achieved their
objectives. Once the war was over, he insisted on the prompt implementation of the agreed withdrawal
arrangements. (Bailey 1988: 560).

35
territories, and to the opening of his ports and harbors for the British Navy (Joyce 1995:

40).2 He clearly saw that British interests and his own would coincide in this matter.

Firstly, at that time, Muscat could not afford the development of extensive modern

landing fields (fields that could by used by a future Omani airforce). Secondly, the

payments for the use of these facilities provided much needed revenue. Most importantly,

however, is the fact that

Exploration parties looking for suitable sites gradually extended the influence of
the Sultanate over some of the remote areas which had been lost during the reign
of his father, Saiyid Taimur. Almost from the moment of his accession Saiyid had
had to face a serious rebellion of the tribes. Provided the exploration parties did
not venture into positively hostile areas, Saiyid Said gave them both permission
and support to carry out their task. In this way he steadily extended his zone of
control, especially along the coastal areas beyond Ras el Hadd (Bailey 1988: 561).

Sultan Said's effort to extend his authority over Imamate-controlled areas was

already bearing fruit by the mid 1930's. He settled various tribal disputes within Imamate

territories and improved relations with tribal leaders often through gifts. As Bierschenk

comments:

This policy to outbuy the Imam, who was unable to compete with it financially,
was remarkably, successful. Between 1937 and 1939, the Sultan of Muscat was
visited by the two leading Sheikhs of the Eastern Province (al-sharqiqa, Ali
Abdullah al-Hamuda of the Bani Bu Ali and Isa Salih al-Harthi, leader of the
Hinawi faction of the Omani tribes, Sheikh Ahmad Muhammad, the son-in law of
the Imam, as well as by the leading men of the Dharihirah tribes. They all left
Muscat showered with gifts and arms (Bierschenk 1989: 213).

21 "... in September, at the outbreak of hostilities, the political resident called on

the sultan to
inform him that Britain and France were at war with Germany. The sultan was repelled by the Axis powers.
He had no sympathy with either their methods or their goals, and he was not interested in using the
opportunity to distance himself from Britain. Sultan Said immediately expressed his readiness to render
such assistance as was within his power." (Joyce 1995: 40).

36
 By 1945, the Sultan's rising stature among the tribes of the interior combined with

the advanced age of Imam Al-Khalili 22 (Peterson 1984: 286), set the stage for the Sultan

to request British support to extend his authority to the areas administered by the

Imamate. Sultan Said was well aware however that he could not move into the interior as

long as the Imam lived.2 3 Undoubtedly, he was testing British commitment when and if

22 "When Muhammad's health began to fail in the mid-1940s, Sultan

Said ibn Taymur initiated
correspondence with the major tribal shaykhs and invited them to Muscat-his goal being the abolition of
the imamate after Imam Muhammad's death. The Imam, however, clung to life for nearly a decade
longer..." (Peterson 1984: 286).

23 Muhammad Abdullah al-Khalili, the Imam elected just prior to the signing
of the Agreement of
al-Sib, was a "Wealthy notable who sold his personal estates to sustain the imamate as its resources
dwindled, was the twentieth of a long line of imams selected from his immediate tribal group." (Eicklelman
1985: 4).
The Sultan prudently realized that "The Imamate... was noteworthy for the religious and political
qualifications of its leader, the order prevailing in its domain... As long as the Imam Muhammad lived,
there could be no personal or tribal challenge to the imamate" (Peterson 1987: 6).
The reader should not assume that the relation between the Imam and Sultan Said was less than
cordial. Sultan Said was in regular correspondence with the Imam (though he never addressed him as such)
and with the Imam's permission Imamate personnel were employed by the Sultan including the Imam's
own brother. A prominent Sheikh, who worked as a judge for the Imam, and for the Sultan confirmed that
although initially there was suspicion between the two, it was not long before they developed mutual
respect (Eickelman 1985: 11).
To have a better understanding of the Imamate traditional institution, I will reproduce here a first
hand account of Imam Al-Khalili through Dr. Wells Thomas of the American Christian Mission who first
met him in 1941:
We were led past crowds of people standing outside the fort-through a large outer gate and a
smaller inner gate and then up two flights of stairs to the majlis or audience chamber of the Imam. When
our eyes became adjusted to the dim light of the interior, we saw a thin old man wearing a large white
turban on his head and sitting on a rug at the further end of a rather long room. On his right were a couple
of other old men similarly attired and on either side of him were seated his bodyguard [I met both of his so-
called bodyguards. They are brothers who bear the Imam absolute love and devotion even after more than
half a century has passed since his death] of armed men. When we entered he arose to shake our hands and
then his frailness was even more apparent, for he seemed to sway a bit when he was in the upright position
and his handclasp was not strong. He indicated with his hand that he wanted me to sit next to him but when
I protested and said that Mr. Dykstra was my elder and also my spiritual adviser he asked Mr. Dykstra to sit
on his right and me on his left. The coffee and halwah were next passed and then the rose water was
sprinkled over us. While this was going on he asked us numerous questions about our purpose in leaving
our country to live and work in Muscat. When we answered him that Jesus, the Anointed one, whose
followers we were, ordered his followers to go to all nations to teach me His doctrines, heal the sick and
share with all men the good news of the Injil (the Arabic word for the Gospels), he said, 'Do you believe

37
the opportunity materialized. Specifically, Sultan Said sought British assurances of air

support by the Royal Air Force when the time was ripe (Bailey 1988: 428). The

disappointing answer came on 12 June 1946, at a meeting at the India Office in London.

Both the Foreign Office and the War Office "were reluctant to support the use of air

power for operations against recalcitrant tribesmen, particularly in an independent state,

because of its effect on world opinion, even though it was at the request of the Ruler"2 4

(Bailey 1988: 428). Probably Sultan Said had earlier recognized that British help might

not materialize. Within three months of the end of the war he had requested that British

relinquish the facilities in accordance with the agreement of 1939. In 1946, both the

French and the British Governments drafted agreements for landing sites in long-haul

that God is One?' When we said 'yes' he said, 'You are not idolaters or kafirs, you are 'people of the
book'. We believe you are mistaken in some of your doctrines but we respect you because you fear God,
the Praised and Exalted One; therefore you may proceed in safety on our land. May God give you skill and
wisdom to heal the sick man. I will send another guide to take you to your patient...' This began a long and
happy acquaintance with this most unusual Muslim spiritual leader. He lived very simply. He and his one
wife and daughter lived in two or three rooms in part of the great round tower fort of Nazwa. His only
visible possessions were a few worn rugs, two score books, a few mattresses, pillows and blankets, a rifle, a
dagger and a few changes or raiment. He was known to be a just and strict disciplinarian. Murderers and
thieves were usually tracked down and punished-the former were turned over to the relatives of the
murdered person to be dealt with, the means of retribution being modeled in the fashion of the murder.
Theft was usually punished by imprisonment. On more than one occasion I saw prisoners, bearing shackles
around the ankles of each of which was fastened, by means of three-foot-long chains, heavy iron balls,
sitting with the soldiers at the entrance of the fort, drinking coffee and conversing quite cheerfully. He was
kind and sympathetic to the poor, orphans and widows. During his lifetime most of the income from sale of
dates from palm gardens belonged to the awqaf, or department of religious endowments, was given to the
poor and needy. He himself was incorruptible and remained a poor man until the day of his death (Phillips
67: 187).
24 The future of the interior obviously loomed large in the Sultan's calculations for he
continued to
press the point. A report by the Political Resident, Sir Rupert Hay, on a conversation with Sultan Said
demonstrates this, "The Sultan said that without R.A.F. support, he had had to abandon his plans since
without this assistance, he could not deal with any armed resistance he might meet. He still believed that
once the Imam died, the tribes would find it in their interest to turn to him as their temporal leader" (Bailey
1988: 429).

38
routes to the Far East. The Sultan's response dated September 1947, was a firm refusal, at

least as far as the French are concerned:

As far as we can make out the matter has been clarified but just to make it more
clear and to avoid any misunderstanding we should like to point out that it is
understood that the French Military Aircrafts shall not fly over or land in our
territories as they have not got the right to do so (Bailey 1988: 561).

The reunification of Oman under Muscat was propelled further by renewed

postwar interest in oil exploration. Richard Bird, a representative of the Iraq Petroleum

Company, which had concession rights in Oman at the time, had entered Oman in 1948

as far as Ibri (an area under the control of the Imam) without Sultan Said's consent. Said

was understandably furious and rightfully concerned that London might begin to regard

Oman's interior as composed of congeries of independent tribal leaders. The incident

serves to "indicate both the thinness of his effective control in some parts of the country

and his early recognition that boundaries and effective rule were essential tests of

sovereignty for international purposes" (Eickelman 1985: 13). In addition, any oil

reservoirs in Oman were most likely either in, or adjacent to, the interior of the country.

From its inception to the end of the 1940's Sultan Said's reign had been a period

of asserting authority and independence from London's long shadow. The unification of

the country under Muscat's control was near. During the 1950's however, internal and

external crises appeared (like the Buraimi Oasis dispute 25 and the Imamate challenge of

25 This is an extremely complex conflict with thousands of pages of primary sources

now
available from various sources. See for example, The Buraimi Memorials 1955, which contains five
volumes and The Buraimi Dispute Contemporary Documents 1950-1961.

39
1957) that were sources of long-term discord for the country, enduring into the reign of

his son Sultan Qaboos (in 1970).

The 1950's Crisis

The Buraimi Oasis dispute and the Imamate challenge of 1957 were linked from

their very beginning and in varying degree, to the absence of internationally defined

borders in southeastern Arabia, and to the Saudi exploitation of this jurisdictional lacuna.

The genesis of the two disputes is dissimilar (Kelly 1959: 1). In the 1930's, the British

Government, acting on behalf of Oman and the Trucial Sheikhs attempted to negotiate

agreed boundaries 26 with the newly united kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Though never

settled, the Saudis essentially felt that their claim over more territories was justifiable.

Buraimi27 was part of those territories.

Al-Buraimi is a strategically 28 located oasis in the interior of eastern Arabia and a

juncture of the major routes to the Persian Gulf (through the town of Abu Dhabi), the

Gulf of Oman (via al-Wadi al-Jazzi) and the al-Dhahirah province of Oman. It is

26 For a full discussion of border disputes on the Arabian Peninsula, see John
C. Wilkinson's
Arabia's Frontiers: The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert, London and New York: I. B
Tauris and Company limited: (1991) p. 3-109. An excellent primary resource can be found in The Aramco
Reports on Al-Hasa And Oman 1950-1955.

27 To see the Saudi position, see A. S. Sahwell's "The Buraimi Dispute." The Islamic
Review, V.
44, 1956.

28 As Kelly points out, "whoever holds the oasis can dominate the Trucial Shaikhdoms to the
north and the Sultanate of Oman to the east and, conversely, no invading force from the west, bent on the
subjection of those principalities, could afford to bypass Buraimi and leave the lines of communications
exposed." (Kelly 1956: 323).

40
composed of nine villages, three controlled by the Sheikh of Abu-Dhabi, and six by the

Sultan of Oman. The Saudi attempts to dominate the oasis can be traced to the early

1800's when Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab incited the Najdis to conquer the

area. In 1819, the Sultan of Oman expelled the Najdis from the oasis. They returned in

1830 only to be subsequently expelled by Imam Azan Ibn Qays in 1869.

In 1949, after protests that a party of American oilmen had traveled within Abu

Dhabi territory without the authorization of the Sheikh, the Saudis put forward a claim of

much to the territory of the Sheikdoms, including Buraimi. The British rejected the claim,

but they did agree to discuss the matter further with Riyadh. Nonetheless, results

materialized. In August 1952 a Saudi force seized Hamsa, one of the Omani villages of

Buraimi. 29 Subsequently, Riyadh sent a message to Imam Al-Khalili announcing that the

authorities in Saudi Arabia had felt compelled to appoint a Saudi representative given the

repeated requests by Saudi subjects in Oman. Furthermore, the message called on the

Imam to join forces with the Saudis to expel the "foreign" influences in Oman; this was

coupled with an offer of a large, cash "gift", which the Imam declined. 30

The Saudi attempts to "divide and conquer" had failed. In fact, both the Sultan

and the Imam had recognized the impending danger, and immediately had begun to raise

29 An excellent reference to different issues pertaining to the Buraimi dispute

and beyond is
Husain M. Al-Baharna's The Arabian Gulf States: Their Legal and Political Status and Their International
Problems, 2nd ed., Beirut: Librairie du Liban: (1975) p. 196-238.
30 Al-Khalili wrote in protest to the Saudi governor of Buraimi: "Your statement that in view
of
repeated requests from your subjects in Oman to appoint a representative on your behalf among them, you
have appointed Turki bin Abdullah bin 'Uteishan, has astonished us, because we do not know that you have
subjects in Oman" (Bierschenk 1989).

41
the forces necessary to expel the Saudis from Buraimi.3 For Sultan Said this provided a

golden opportunity to unite Muscat with the interior. The Sultan sent the Imam 100

camels, ammunition, rifles, and money to facilitate sending his own militia from the

interior to Buraimi. Omani tribes from various regions responded to the call; merchants in

Muscat supplied the entire expedition with the needed foodstuffs and ammunition. By 7

October 1952, an assembled force of 8,000 tribesmen assembled at Suhar. The entire

expedition, however, came to a standstill on 18 October and eventually disbanded

(Eickelman 1985: 13). Under heavy pressure from the United States, the British

government directed Leslie Chauncey, the British consul in Muscat, to advise Sultan Said

to forego the expedition. British and U.S. governments assured Sultan Said that a

diplomatic solution could be reached. Sultan Said demanded that Chauncey "hand him

the message in full view of his army and remain at his side while he read it to them, so

that they would understand that the British Government, not the Sultan, was responsible

for this cowardly withdrawal" (Holden 1966: 107).

Sultan Said's prestige and standing among the tribes suffered tremendously. From

this event came the future accusations of Said's subservience to British interests.

Meanwhile, the Buraimi dispute was transformed from what was essentially a local

dispute into a significant crisis involving the United States and Saudi Arabia on one hand

and Great Britain, Muscat, and the Trucial Sheikdoms on the other. Acceding to US

31 In a confidential document this correspondence is affirmed, "When Saudi

Arabia agent arrived
in Buraimi oasis in August 1952, Mohammed Bin Abdullah wrote to the Sultan expressing his concern and
showed the latter that he was ready to join with the Sultan in forcibly ejecting the Saudis" (FCO 371
126878: Confidential: Note to be handed to the Prime Minister: Date not available).

42
pressure, London agreed to accept arbitration with Saudi Arabia in Geneva in September

1955. The Saudis, however, had no intention of abiding by the "stand still agreement".32

On behalf of the Sultan of Oman and Abu Dhabi British forces eventually moved in and

forced the Saudis out of Buraimi. In Washington, the news was not well received to say

the least. The Foreign Office was

'thrown into rage' on receiving messages from the Americans, one saying that we
should go back to arbitration on Buraimi otherwise the Saudis 'will be very
annoyed' and might take us to the Security Council; the other 'practically
ordering us' to call off the impending move by the Sultan of Muscat to reassert
his authority in the interior of Oman generally (Harrison 1959: 107).

And it is with the latter "impending move" that we must concern ourselves with at

the moment.

From the beginning of Said's reign, Imam Al-Khalili's "nation-wide reputation

for integrity and piety had been a considerable stabilizing influence in the country"

(Phillips 1967: 186). In May 1954, with the death of Al-Khalili, a "good deal of the fire

went out of the Imamate movement" (Kelly 1959: 12). His successor Ghalib bin Ali al-

Hinai, had served first as a judge then as an assistant under Al-Khalili. A 1982 interview

with Sheikh Ahmed Muhammad al-Harthi, a participant in the election for the new Imam,

gives a sense of the events surrounding the election of Ghalib. The notables who gathered

at Nizwa upon the death of Al-Khalili were divided into three parties. A minority of those

present called for resumption of the status quo, with limited contact with the outside

32 FCO 8/62: Confidential: Qateri Interest in the Buraimi Question: 6 February

1967.
A copy of a summary of the Buraimi problem "In October 1955 the Trucial Oman Levies
reoccupied the Buraimi Oasis, capturing document which established Saudi bribery and subversive
activities beyond all doubt."

43
world. Another faction (not party to the selection process) called for the interior to be

under the Sultan's rule. The third faction favored the acceptance of military and financial

aid so that interior Oman, recognized by the Arab league and the United Nations, might

become a separate nation (Eickelman 1985: 173). The third faction would win the day.

In summer 1954, the new Imam worked hard to assert his authority. In a bold

move, Imam's Ghalib's dynamic and younger brother, Sheikh Talib ibn Ali, seized the

town of Ibri when the inhabitants seemed to be hesitant to acknowledge Ghalib's election

as Imam (Kelly 1964: 185). A more sinister reason behind this act was the importance of

Ibri to the Imamate as an essential station to maintain direct contact with the Saudi

outpost at Al-Buraimi (Peterson 1984: 287). In October 1954, Sultan Said responded by

sending a detachment of his forces, reoccupying Ibri without opposition (Philips 1967:

189). Henceforth, the relationship between Muscat and Nizwa-the Imamate's capital-

deteriorated to the point of no return.

Sultan Said may have tolerated Imam Ghalib's move into Ibri, had it not been for

the momentous action that ensued. On 25 November 1954, the Imam forwarded via his

brother, Talib ibn Ali, a request for full membership to the Arab League for the

"Kingdom of Oman" (Allan 1957: 22). The Imamate sought to capitalize on the surge of

Arab nationalism, and thus identify its struggle with a broader appeal that had far more

resonance in the Arab world than the Imamate cause.33 The application was infused with

Islamic connotations emphasizing that Oman was an independent state, governed by

This is certainly Landen's argument, p. 419.

44
Islamic Law, or sharia (Kechichian 1995: 42). As the issue lingered in the Arab League

and then in the United Nations, the Imamate cause became closely identified with Arab

nationalism and the various forms of anti-colonialism.

The Imamate's application for membership in the Arab League was a clear

demonstration that Said's schemes for a gradual reintegration of Oman under Muscat's

authority were not working. A second indicator occurred in September 1955 when the

news reached Muscat that an Egyptian intelligence major arrived in Nizwa via Saudi

Arabia in order to organize the Imamate forces (Eickelman 1985: 14). There is a question

as to why the Sultan failed to take a firm action against Nizwa for more than a year. For

Landen this was to be expected since for him, Said was "more a spectator than initiator of

events" (Landen 1967: 420). Joyce shares the same assessment assuring us that "Sultan

Said did not like to make decisions" (Joyce 1993: 93). After all, the Sultan was out of the

country on a trip spanning Baghdad, Bahrain, and London for more than a month in

summer 1955.

On the other hand, the lack of a firmer, more immediate approach by Sultan Said

to the events could be justified by the high risks associated with failure in the new

environment. If anything, Sultan Said showed political acumen by allowing time for a

careful planning and efficient execution of his plans. No Sultan had entered the

Imamate's capital Nizwa in over a century. To enter Nizwa with military force and the

possibility of bloodshed would antagonize the local population, including Muscat's

supporters. A premature attack on Nizwa, given the meager forces at the Sultan's

disposal and the likelihood that the Imamate forces were well equipped through Saudi

might fail with untold consequences for Muscat. Said's trip to London becomes of key

45
importance. London was the only ally likely to provide the necessary political and

military aid. Indeed, London encouraged Sultan Said to eliminate Ghalib's threat

throughout 1954. Said was thankful for the verbal support, but he preferred words to be

followed with substantial military aid.

The record shows that in addition to visiting and dining with the Queen of

England, the Sultan had several meetings at Whitehall. The discussions centered on the

possible elimination of the Imamate as a political force. Was British support certain in a

possible showdown with the Imamate? If so, to what extent would the British involve

themselves? The Sultan was informed that any assistance provided would be limited, and

that it would likely involve some air support and less than ten technical advisors in the

field (Timpe 1991: 184-90). Timpe argues that London's unwillingness to offer more

substantial aid was a manifestation of a British desire for the Sultan to fail: an

opportunity for the British to demonstrate their importance. The Sultan was well aware of

Britain's importance, however as his journey to London at this time indicates. Far more

probable is that Britain forestalled involvement to mitigate the effects of prior clashes

with the United States (remember the Buraimi dispute).

In September 1955, the Buraimi arbitration talks between Britain (acting on

behalf of Abu Dhabi) and the Sultanate broke up in Geneva after the resignation of the

British delegate, Sir Reader Bullard. According to British sources, Saudi bribes of the

members of the Tribunal had by now convinced HMG that a diplomatic solution was not

at hand. Sultan Said's opinion had been vindicated: He had been convinced from the

beginning that the Saudis were bargaining in bad faith. The Sultan had thought that their

primary objective was to instigate uprisings throughout the interior of Oman with calls

46
for independence while actually seeking Saudi suzerainty over the interior of Oman

(Timpe 1991: 195).

On 26 October 1955, Trucial Oman Scouts3 4 "escorted" Saudi forces out of the

oasis. This seemed to end the dispute over Buraimi or as Halliday and the majority of the

literature asserted, after 1955 "the Buraimi dispute was dormant: Muscat administered

three villages, and Abu Dhabi six. The Saudis did not accept the outcome, but decided to

leave matters as they stood" (Halliday 1974: 281). In reality, however, the Buraimi

dispute continued to be of primary importance to various regional states, and a source of

serious discord between London and Washington.

Once the Saudis were removed from the area, Sultan Said began his advance

against the Imamate forces with remarkable swiftness and success. Rustaq, which was an

important area for the Imamate and was being defended by Talib ibn Ali (the Imam's

brother), was captured in four days without casualties (Talib escaped to Saudi Arabia).

Nizwa, the Imamate's capital, fell on 15 December 1955, with only one shot being fired.

Sultan Said departed from his residence at Salalah on the Indian Ocean, and drove across

deserts and mountains to enter Nizwa triumphantly on 24 December 195535 (Morris

1957: 148). Imam Ghalib abdicated and returned to his native village Sait, while other

prominent tribal leaders followed suit. This was undoubtedly an important day for Sultan

34 For a good history on the Trucial Oman Scouts, see Michael Russel and Clayton's Two Alpha
Lima: The First Ten Years of the Trucial Oman Levies and Trucial Oman Scouts, 1950-1960. London:
Janus: (1994).

For a full description of Sultan's Said's triumphant tripe, and his entry into Nizwa where he
received the allegiances of tribal leaders, please see Jane Morris, Sultan in Oman: 1957.

47
Said. His long efforts to assimilate the interior had been accomplished. He was the first

Sultan to visit the interior in over a century. 36 To conclude the victory, the Sultan

organized a royal trip of his new domains: Adam, Nizwa, Ibri, Buraimi, Suhar, and the

Batinah coast. While 4,000 tribesmen gathered on the grounds of the famous Nizwa

fortress, a representative of the Sultan (with the Sultan standing beside him) read a

speech. He had come to Nizwa to unite the country and stop the shedding of Muslim

blood, he assured the gatherings. He promised amnesty to all those who accepted his rule:

"the past will not be brought up again" (Eickelman 1985: 15). The Sultan did not make

any

radical changes in the social and religious life in the tribes of Central Oman after
this operation. Nor did he replace existing leaders by his own nominees. The only
persons who were still un-reconciled were the Imam's brother, Talib, who sought
sanctuary in Saudi Arabia and one or two ambitious hangers-on who went to
37
Egypt.

F. C. L. Chauncy, the British Consul-General, wrote the following:

I am impressed with the detailed knowledge of his country and amazing sense of
judgment and timing which the Sultan has shown and his courage in adversity and
the resilience and staying power which have enabled him to achieve this personal
triumph... Experienced, his views are always sound, and even if they do not
sometimes accord with our own, they are invariably worth consulting. He
can...act very quickly and resolutely in case of need and procrastination is usually
only encountered when he is in fact testing a proposal or staving off something in

36 The reader however should not be under any illusion of Sultan Said's intimate knowledge
of
events throughout the country including the interior. "In spite of the physical distance which separated the
Sultan from the majority of his subjects while he lived at Salalah, he had extraordinary accurate knowledge
of what was going on throughout his territory by means of written messages and visitors coming to see him
form all over the interior" (Harrison 1959: 92).

FCO 371 126878: Confidential: Note to be handed to the Prime Minister: The date is not
available in this document, but it is safe to assume that it was after 1957.

48
 which he genuinely had no faith. His success may fairly be said to have been due
to his having studied and removed mutatis mtandis [with due alterations of
details] the reasons for his predecessors' failures (Timpe 1991: 202).

Unfortunately for Sultan Said and the country, this triumph was short lived, and a

fresh rebellion ensued. 38 While in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Talib and his supporters

established a "government in exile" and an "Imamate Office" in Cairo. Establishing the

"Imamate Office" in Cairo would take advantage of the spirit of Arab nationalism

promulgated by Nasser. Saudi Arabia provided refuge, money, while Radio Cairo was the

"platform from which they could simultaneously project both the impression of

independence and the claim of having been abused by the Sultan and his "foreign allies"

(Kelly 1964: 264). On 14 June 1957, Talib ibn Ali led a new group called the Oman

Revolutionary Movement (ORM) into Batinah and eventually to the interior of the

country. Talib went to visit his brother, the former Imam who was allowed to retire with

the promise of good behavior, in the village of Sait (in central Oman) (Innes 1987: 206).

The area was under siege by the Sultan's regiment but they were soon outnumbered and

had to withdraw. Talib's forces had recaptured the former Imamate capital (Peterson

1978: 183). According to a secret memo sent to the Foreign Office,

38 Not surprisingly, Sultan Said was to blame for this, according to some of the literature.
"Whether he was still smarting the British initiative which caused him such loss of face in 1952, or whether
he wished to punish his enemies, or whether he wished to move in his own way but was too slow, is not
clear. The fact is that nothing was done, and a new revolt led by the escaped leaders of the 1955-6 civil war
broke out in 1957". (Townsend 1977: 62). More to the point was the role external actors played in
fermenting this revolt. As Air Vice-Marshall M.L. Heath, in a 1960 journal article pointed out, "...the more
peaceful atmosphere that followed the conclusion of the Agreement of Sib would not have been shattered,
nor would the recent troubles have been prolonged had not outside powers, in particular Saudi Arabia,
sought to stoke the flames, for the Imam's financial and military support was supplied directly by Saudi
Arabia, who recruited, trained, supplied and paid for the 'liberation army of free Oman"' (The Times
London 1957: 9).

49
 the military reverse was due to bad leadership; technical failures of mortars and
antique guns to destroy the fort; refusal of tribal auxiliaries to face automatic fire;
the lack of local intelligence leading to ambush at Nizwa of the forces
withdrawing from Sait; and collapse of morale following this due to the
inexperience of the men and the lack of seasoned N.C.O.'s. 39

The message that came from Muscat to the Foreign office in London reveals the

level of desperation, and the centrality of Buraimi to the parties concerned:

In view of the disaster which has overtaken the Sultan in Central Oman, I think
we should now allow for the possibility of [grp.undec] movement from Saudi
Arabia aimed at taking Buraimi and so linking-up with the ex-imam's supporters
in Central Oman. I recommend, therefore, that very urgent thought be given to
protecting Buraimi which is now, more than before, a key point. This is to my
mind more important than Central Oman which must be regarded for the time
being as definitely lost to the Sultan. We must hold Buraimi securely to be able to
reach Fahud which is now the center of the Sultan's forces.40

The actions of Muscat, Riyadh, or the Sheikdoms were largely going to be

determined by the degree of support received from either Washington or London. A

quick review of Britain's position on the Middle East is necessary to fully appreciate the

implications on Muscat's possible course of action.

In the 1950's, England was the dominant power in the Middle East, and wished to

remain so for the foreseeable future. The United Kingdom's reliance on cheap oil to

stabilize an otherwise weakening economy necessitated the ability to project authority

and power within the region. More importantly, however, many in London believed that

Britain's position as a great power throughout the world relied heavily on their continued

influence in the Middle East. To that end, the Suez Canal alone boasted of 80,000 British

39 FO 371 126878: Secret: From Muscat To Foreign Office: 26 July 1957.

40 FO 371 126875: From Muscat To Foreign Office: 16 July 1957.

50
troops; Aden had numerous naval facilities; air squadrons flew over Iraq; and finally, a

string of protectorates dotted the Persian Gulf. Regional interference in Omani politics

came not only from Saudi Arabia (as in the case of Buraimi), but also from Egypt under

it's rising star, Nasser, and Iran under Prime Minster Mossadeq (Perersen 1992: 72).

Given the United States' global commitments, Washington had limited resources

to commit to the Middle East. This gave the British room to maneuver in the region-an

assumption that proved to be subsequently disastrous and possibly contributed to the

Suez crisis. Yet, for London to retain its supremacy in the Middle East and in order to

avoid major disagreements, there had to be a mutual respect and understanding between

its and Washington's sphere of influence. To that end, Prime Minister Churchill visited

President elect, Dwight D. Eisenhower, in January 1953. Eisenhower did not share

Churchill's enthusiasm. In his diary he recorded that "Churchill was old-fashioned and

feeble, and surely due for retirement." "Anglo-American unity," Eisenhower wrote, "was

nothing but a ploy to maintain British influence in the Middle East; the re-creation of the

wartime alliance was inappropriate now, and of little value" (Perersen 1992: 74).

While England perceived King Saud's behavior over Buraimi as reckless and

sustainable only with Washington's support (Memid 1956: 63), Dulles had nothing but

scathing remarks about the British and French presence in the Middle East, and described

both in a trip to the Middle East on 6 September 1953 as "milestones around our neck"

(Perersen 1992: 76).

Whether the Buraimi dispute had a direct result in undermining the Anglo-

American alliance, and could have eventually led to the rupture of the Atlantic Alliance

during the Suez crisis is beyond the scope of this research. However, one can confidently

51
claim that the Buraimi dispute had far more repercussions upon the alliance than both

powers expected. After the Suez crisis, Dulles4 1 explained to a reporter that

the recent chains of events in the Middle East had very largely stemmed from the
British action in the Buraimi Oasis. If the effects could be reversed and an Anglo-
Saudi agreement secured King Saud could be detached from Egypt 42 , possibly
join the Baghdad Pact, and the United States might be able to do likewise
(Perersen 1992: 89).

The British Prime Minister of the period during the Suez Crisis, Anthony Eden,

wrote in his memoirs that "During the Suez crisis, I learnt that the United States 4 3

Government had regarded our action during the autumn of 1955 in furthering the

reoccupation of Buraimi by the Sultan of Muscat and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi as an act

of aggression" (Eden 1960: 373). Eden continued to maintain that his actions over the

Suez were justified, as a short Cabinet paper written by him indicates. More importantly

41 President Eisenhower and Dulles seem to both agree that it was Britain that was
responsible for
the weakening of the Anglo-American relations, and citing Buraimi as a contributing factor. The president
informed Dulles that "the British had gotten themselves into a box in the Middle East. They have been
choosing the wrong places in which to get tough. He mentioned Bruaimi where they had only succeeded in
incurring the hatred of the Saudis" (Perersen 1992: 88).

42 Relations between Saud and Nasser were indeed warming up to the point
where Saud was
following Egypt's tactics in appealing to the Iraqi and Jordanian masses to rise against their leaders. More
ominously for the United States was the fact that "when Nasser announced in September 1955 the
conclusion of an arms deal with the Soviet Union, which brought the latter into the Arab region for the first
time, Saud supported the move and went on to sign the military alliance with the Egypt the next month"
(Safran 1985: 79).

43 For a good discussion on the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and London's entanglement in
the Buraimi dispute, see Hart T. Parker's Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security
Partnership. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press (1998).

52
for our purposes, he pointed that "It may be that the United States attitude to us in the

Middle East dates from our refusal to give up Buraimi" 44 (Harrison 1959: 87).

Certainly as early as 1953, the Eisenhower administration was already under

pressure from Riyadh to do something about "British aggression". The following excerpt

from a declassified Memorandum of conversation between United States Secretary of

State John Foster Dulles and Crown Prince Saud ibn Abdul Aziz in May 18, 1953, is

instructive:

The Crown Prince claimed that the US had deserted the Saudis in their dispute
with the UK over Buraimi, that UK actions constituted aggression against Saudi
Arabia, and that President Truman had stated that any aggression against Saudi
Arabia would be of concern to the US. Secy. of State Dulles replied that the US
had tried to use its influence with the UK to bring about a peaceful solution, and
the UK had expressed its desire for neutral arbitration; in any case the US could
not promise to go to war with the UK over Buraimi. "Mr. Dulles asked Prince
Saud to tell him frankly whether it was in the interest of America and Saudi
Arabia that American engage in war with Britain? The Crown Prince replied by
asking whether it was in the interest of America that the British take aggressive
action against Saudi Arabia.15

Buraimi was obviously of key importance to Saudi Arabia for even when

Eisenhower sent a letter of condolence on the death of the founder of the Kingdom, King

Ibn Saud, the new King Saud Al-Saud saw this as an opportunity to bring up the Buraimi

44 It should be noted that at the elite level of policy makers between Washington and London,
there was a serious dislike, to say the least, between Dulles and Eden:
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles despised Eden's habits of calling people 'my dear' and
though the Prime Minister vain and weak. A presidential adviser said 'he had never met a dumber man'
than Eden, and this view of the Prime Minister was held by others in Washington. Eden certainly came to
reciprocate such negative opinions... (Kandiah and Staerck 2000: 155).

45 Memorandum of Conversation [John Foster Dulles, Sec of State, US; Saud ibn Abdul Aziz,
Crown Prince, Saudi Arabia; other US and Saudi officials]: Secret: Eisenhower Library, Papers as
President of the U.S., 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File) 18 May 1953.

53
dispute. In his replay, he expressed his appreciation for the efforts of the United States in

the Buraimi dispute, but also expressed his "disappointment that these efforts have not

been more successful." 46

In Muscat the political situation in the country was escalating dangerously with

Talib's successful foothold in the interior, and eventual occupation of Nizwa in July 1957

(Peterson 1984: 280). Sultan Said's hard work and plans to unify the country under

Muscat, and to limit Muscat's dependence on Great Britain-by relieving the country of

its debts-were unraveling. Not only did Muscat lack the resources to match Talib who

was receiving generous aid from the Saudis, but also Britain, Muscat's oldest and closest

ally, had just emerged from the disastrous Suez crisis. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan

wrote in his memoirs that after 1956, "to embark single-handed upon a further military

enterprise, even of a modest character, seemed at first to some of my colleagues

hazardous and even foolhardy" (MacMillan 1972: 271).

In addition, London was being hounded from almost every quarter in the Middle

East by the rising tides of Arab nationalism, and anti-imperialism. In the Gulf region,

Saudi Arabia had already cut diplomatic relations allegedly in protest over the Suez crisis

debacle. In other words, London had to be considerably more cautious and tactful in her

actions with the new rebellion. Also, Washington had no sympathy for London's

pleadings. Indeed, when Crown Prince Abdullah of Iraq asked Dulles what he "thought

the real attitude of King Saud was toward Iraq and the Baghdad Pact" Dulles replied,

46 Memorandum: Department of State: Secret: Issue Date:

8 Dec 1953.

54
"that one of the great hurdles to overcome was the rather belligerent attitude of the

British along the Arabian Sea, particularly in relation to Oman." 47

Meanwhile, Sultan Said recognized that he clearly lacked the forces necessary to

dislodge the rebels from the interior of Oman. He had no alternative but to request British

aid, which although forthcoming, was weak and hesitant (Peterson 1984: 289). On 16

July 1957, the Sultan wrote to the British Consul General in Muscat requesting

assistance:

You have full knowledge of the situation which has now developed as Nezwa and
I feel that time has now come when I must request the maximum military and air
support which our friend Her Britannic Majesty's Government can give in these
circumstances, as on those past occasions which have so cemented our friendship
and for which I bear lasting gratitude...Events are now moving so fast that I need
hardly add that the speed which support can be given will be vital to its value, and
I shall be very grateful if you will take up the matter with Her Britannic Majesty's
Government accordingly (Phiilips 1967: 204).

Although the British were hesitant to provide aid, the initial results were

promising. Nizwa fell to the Sultan on 11 August 1957 however the leaders of the rebels

and their supporters managed to escape to the Jabal Akhdar (green mountain). Al-Akhdar

is a

sheer limestone massif between forty and fifty miles in length and twenty miles
wide, with a fertile plateau at six thousand feet and peaks rising to nearly ten
thousand feet at the summits; the approaches to the mountain led through narrow
ravines which could be held by a few determined marksmen against an army
(Smiley 1975: 13).

47 Secretary Dulles reports on conversation with Crown Prince Abdullah of Iraq. Department Of
State Secret: Issue Date: 5 Feb 1957.

55
 Dislodging the rebels was obviously going to be an arduous task. As Philips

contends,

... throughout the rest of 1957 and the long months until June 1958, the military
operations consisted of small groups of fighters going up one track to another and
returning to base after twenty-four to forty-eight hours. On the Sultan's side there
were no deaths and only four men were wounded (Philips 1967: 210).48

According to David Smiley, the Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF),

this grim situation was only improved when a

British mission led by Julian Amery visited Muscat in January, 1958, and in the
following July, during the Sultan's visit to the UK, there was published an
Exchange of Letters between HMG and the Sultan which covered the provision of
assistance in the expansion and reorganization of the Sultan's Armed Forces and
in financing a civil development program (Smiley 1975: 13).

Joyce contends, however, that

although Whitehall agreed to provide subsidies that would permit him to improve
the quality of his army, to establish an air force, and to begin a development
program, for almost three months, from May to July 1958, the Sultan remained in
London, removed from events in his country (Joyce 1993: 91).

This assessment is neither fair nor valid. The above line of argument ignores the

fact that this may have been Sultan Said's method of pressuring Whitehall to act. By

remaining in London, Sultan Said was at the center of the events of his country, not at the

periphery. He recognized that without substantial British aid, the interior might be lost

with or without his presence. He also recognized, as Joyce herself points out, that

48 The following document numerates exactly the number of casualties as of

March 1959.
The following statement was included in the Army Estimates published on 19 February (Smd. 699):
Numbers. The total of British troops involved at any one time was about three hundred; the
sultan's forces are not large but it is not our responsibility to reveal numbers.
Casualties. Total British casualties over the past year or so were of the order of five killed and five
wounded (PREM 11/4960: Confidential: From Foreign Office to Certain of Her Majesty's Representatives:
Operation in Muscat and Oman: 4 March 1959).

56
Whitehall depended on him to secure "an interest vital to our own position in the Gulf,

that is the control of the interior" (Joyce 1993: 98). She adds that the Sultan was

considered an "outstanding negotiator, cool and careful"(Joyce 1993: 98). It seems more

probable that Sultan Said was vying for time while requesting more aid. Ever since the

"Agreement," great progress had been made in reorganizing and reequipping the Sultan's

forces. Records from the British Army indicate they were, "...still not sufficiently trained

to carry out unassisted the difficult though small-scale military operations involved in an

occupation of the Jebel " 4 9

As a top-secret document from the Ministry of Defense indicates that by 12

August 1958, the rebels were still a force to contend with, and actually were gaining new

ground:

The situation in Oman has become serious for three main reasons.

(a) The limited harassing action we have been allowed to take has proved
ineffective against the rebels.

(b) The blockade of the Jebel Akhdar with the troops available has been one in
name and does not appear to have seriously interfered with the supply of arms to
the rebels. Indeed so good is the supply that Talib has been able to step up his
operations to include 81 M.M. mortaring of SAF camps and the use of heavier
mines.

(c) The political situation amongst the tribes on and near to the jebel Akhdar is
deteriorating. Recent reports show that this deterioration is spreading. For these
reasons it is clear that this situation cannot be allowed to continue but must be
settled now and that nothing less than a full scale operation will bring this about.

49 PREM 11/4960: Confidential: From Foreign Office To Certain Of Her Majesty's

Representatives: Operation In Muscat and Oman: 4 March 1959:

57
 Now however the rebel forces with Saudi Arabian small support have been built
up and contain in addition to small arms, a plentiful supply of mines, mortars and
possibly heavy machine guns and wireless."

Despite knowing perfectly well that the Saudis were behind the supply of

weapons, London never acknowledged it publicly, because it feared the consequences of

upsetting the Saudis or more importantly their Washington backers as the ensuing secret

telegram distributed to the commonwealth on 19 July 1957 indicates:

You may now inform Commonwealth authorities that this revolt against authority
of the Sultan had broken out in Central Oman; and that Sultan has appealed to
United Kingdom Government for help, which will be given as necessary though
the precise forms it will take have not yet been decided...You may add that we
have ample evidence that revolt has been inspired and fomented by Egyptians and
Saudis and sustained by arms smuggled from outside, but that in any publicity
which becomes necessary we shall do our utmost to avoid making accusations
with King Saud. This may be difficult as the press will no doubt get hold of the
facts...you should not give the impression that this incident provides ground for
international concern. It should be represented as a minor outbreak of local
trouble, with which we are dealing on routine precautionary lines."

It is rather remarkable that while lives were being lost in Oman (British as well as

Omani) due to continued supplies of weapons (especially mines) from Saudi, London's

reaction was so low-key. Smiley reports that by the end of 1958, the British began to

... have casualties, sometimes fatal, from the heavy American mine, although
fortunately its bulk and weight made it harder to smuggle. The ideal answer, of
course, would have been for us to stop the mines at source, in other words to
persuade the Americans either to stop supplying them to the Saudi Army or to

50 PREM11/4960 100752: Top Secret: Ministry Of Defense: 12 August 1958.

In another Top Secret document, London expresses the same anxieties: "Even if we did mount a
large operation of this kind, it is extremely doubtful whether our blockade would be sufficiently effective to
compel the dissidents to surrender" (PREM 11/4960 100752-10: Top Secret: September 1958).

FO 371/126878: Secret: Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations

Office: 19 July
1957.

58
 exercise some control over their use. I know we tried, but the Americans were
brutally unsympathetic. Their reply was that they supplied the mines to Saudi
Arabia under their military Aid Program, and it was not their concern how the
Saudis chose to employ them (Smiley 1967: 50).

Riyadh, on the other hand, continued to deny that it was the source of the arms. A

top secret document from the Department of State records that King Saud was alleging

that the "arms Ghalib and his followers have now were brought there by the Government

of India by agreement between Nasser and Nehru concluded through Krishna Menon." 52

Washington certainly had other concerns more important than British "sensibilities", as

the following record indicates:

Since the Oman rebellion began, I have seen Mr. Dulles three times. Throughout,
he has been studious enough to avoid anything which could be construed as
interference or comment. But that does not mean that the United States
Government are not deeply concerned. They are alarmed on two main counts.
First they are worried lest their recent efforts to win King Saud away form Nasser

52 Amb. Wadsworth reports on information given to him by King Saud

regarding arms sent to
Oman (Department of State: Top Secret: Issue Date: 29 July 1957).

It should be noted that leaders of the Imamate have attempted to find an understanding with the
United States, maybe at the advice of Saudi Arabia, and in the hope that Washington might pressure
London to withdraw its support to Sultan Said. Look at the following text handed to the United States
Embassy in Cairo.
Following is text of communication handed to the United States Embassy in Cairo in Cairo by
Mohammed el Hararthy in the name of 'Saleh bin Ida el Harathy, Amir of Sharqiah and representative of
the Imam of Oman, Dammam, Saudi Arabia.'
Noting the official statements of the British Government concerning the promise to give military
help to the Sultan of Muscat against the Imam of Oman, and as this promise has been carried out, we in the
name of Imam of Oman, his free people, justice, humanity and international pacts, ask you to stop British
Government where she is and prevent her from intervening between us and the Sultan, in order that the
blood of innocent old people, women and children may not be shed, for we are not the aggressors, but the
Sultan, with the aid of the English, acting on their incitement, violated the Convention, occupied Oman and
attacked us without any forewarning. Their military intervention has not ceased since this time, violating
the Convention concluded between the Sultan and US. We ask you to intervene to stop fighting and permit
negotiation, with a view to establishing peace between us and the aggressors, in order the frontiers of
country of Sultan may be respected on condition our frontiers and independence our country are respected,
and in order to restore to us our rights. (FO 371 126880: From Washington to Foreign Office: 6 August
1957).

59
 will be prejudiced. Secondly, they are always anxious when force is threatened or
used by others than themselves. They argue that no one can tell where such things
may lead from small beginnings and they calculate that, in the last resort, they are
the only power on the Western front who can carry any ultimate involvement to a
final conclusion. These worries are now beginning to find their way into the
American Press.

-I do not, of course, suggest that the Americans are on balance wise."

The press started covering the story, as expressed in an editorial of the New York

Times dated 6 August 1957, under the headline "Mediterranean Balance Sheet." The

editorial stated that

As the revolt is fed with arms smuggled from or through Saudi Arabia, this
intervention threatens to bring Britain into conflict with King Saud who sides with
the United States against Nasser on the Communist issue, but could now be forced
back into Nasser's arms.

Great Britain attempted to placate the United States' concern over Saudi Arabia,

by proposing a joint US-UK assessment of the Persian Gulf. The response from the State

Department states was a courteous refusal

In our view, UK-Saudi Arabian relations remain the key to improving US-UK
understanding on Persian Gulf problems...the basic differences arising form our
respective approaches to these problems...these approaches are unlikely to
modified by a joint assessment in the absence of an indication of UK willingness
to take the necessary steps to reestablish relations with Saudi Arabia on a
satisfactory basis.55

54 FCO 371 126877: Secret: From Washington to Foreign Office: 25 July 1957.

In a response to Embassy Analysis of U.S.-U.K relations in the Persian Gulf (Department Of

State: Issue Date: 18 Dec 1957).
The following is the State Department Official statement on the outbreak of the 1957 fighting:
Following is statement made by the State Department spokesmen today.
Begins:
The Sultan of Muscat, while not formally under British protection, has had close relations with the
United Kingdom and has in the past requested British assistance in meetings tribal problems. The area of
inner Oman is essentially a tribal area where matters of sovereignty in Western sense have not been of

60
 Whatever the source of the weapons at the disposal of the rebels, clearly for the

Sultanate and the British troops, the mines were of the greatest threat. According to P.S.

Alfree, the mines were "an imperial headache...at the height of the plague, we lost two

and sometimes three trucks blown up in one day. We had no wealth of lorries and

certainly none to spare, so this was developing for us into something like the U-boat

blockade was to Britain" (Alfree 1967: 162-67). In addition, Oman's infamous heat was

taking its toll on the Sultan's forces. In Nizwa, the temperature reached 125 Fahrenheit in

the shade and limited British troop's operations until the "cooler weather began in

October. As a matter of fact, of the fifty British troops attached to me, forty-five had to be

flown out to hospital suffering from heat exhaustion and two more died of it" (Smiley

1967: 61). Things began to change for the Sultan's forces by November 1958 when

British troops from the Special Air Service (SAS) arrived. They were "the coolest and

most frightening body of professional killers I have ever seen" (Alfree 1967: 114). After

identifying possible routes onto the plateau, the first incursions into the plateau began in

December, but faced fierce resistance. They had to call for further SAS reinforcements to

carry out the final assault in January 1959. By February 1959, the Al-Akhdar was under

major importance. Revolts against the Sultan's rule in the area have occurred in the past. While the United
States does not have direct and extensive information on the current difficulties, the department has been
generally informed by the British. The matter appears to be a small-scale action involving a limited are and
small forces. While certain of the participants of the current revolt have been recently in Saudi Arabia,
inner Oman is not an area where Saudi Arabia has claimed sovereignty. The United States has no specific
information on reports of outside arms in the area but it is not uncommon for tribes in this are to obtain
them from the Outside. The area where the revolt has occurred appears to be clearly within a concession
area of the Iraq Petroleum Company, of which approximately one-fourth is American. There are no claims
by any other companies. The United States hopes that the present difficulties can be resolved quickly (FO
371/126877: From Washington to Foreign Office: 26 July 1957: p. 10).

61
the Sultan's forces, but the main leaders of the rebellion again managed to escape to

Saudi Arabia. 56

The Suez crisis was a debacle, yet soonafter Britain was prepared to get involved

in Oman. The question is why. What would Britain have to gain by supporting the

Sultan? Was it oil, as many claimed? 57 Or was it the long-standing friendship between the

two countries? Should British involvement in Omani affairs be taken for granted? And

finally, and most importantly, what is Oman's role in all of this?

To attempt to answer these questions, it is necessary to return to January 1958.

According to David Smiley, the Commander of the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF), the

armed conflict between the rebels and the Sultan's forces in Oman was essentially at a

standstill. The Sultanate forces began to gain the upper hand only after an exchange of

letters between HMG and Sultan Said during his visit to England in July 1958 (Smiley

1960: 35). An important agreement, the 1958 Agreement, was signed and is reproduced

here:

In pursuance of the common interests of Your Highness and Her Majesty's

Government in furthering the progress of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, Her
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have agreed to extend assistance
towards the strengthening of Your Highness's Army. Her Majesty's Government

56 For accounts of the storming of Al-Akhdar, please see John Cooper's One
of the Originals
London: (1991) p. 147-55; Lofty large, One Man's SAS: London: (1987) p. 54-81; Tony Japes: SAS
Operation Oman: London: (1980) p. 11.

57 According to the Gulf Committee, oil is the primary reason for British involvement. This is
inaccurate primarily because no significant oil discoveries were made by 1955. Joyce also claims that
British involvement in Oman was to a large extent a question of oil when she quotes Noel-Baker statement
in the House of Commons: "Of course, it was for oil that the military operations in Oman were undertaken"
(Joyce 1993: 99).

62
 will also, at Your Highness's request, make available regular officers on
secondment from the British Army, who will, while serving in the Sultanate, form
an integral part of your Highness's armed forces. The terms and conditions of
service of these seconded British officers have been agreed with Your Highness.
Her Majesty's Government will also provide training facilities for members of
Your Highness's armed forces and will make advice available on training and
other matters as may be required by Your Highness.

Her Majesty's Government will also assist Your Highness in the establishment of
an Air Force as an integral part of Your Highness's armed forces, and they will
make available personnel to this Air Force.

Your Highness has approved the conclusion of an agreement for the extension of
the present arrangements regarding civil aviation and the use by the Royal Air
Force of the airfields at Salalah and Masirah.

We also discussed the economic and development problems of the Sultanate and
Her Majesty's Government agreed to assist Your Highness in carrying out a civil
development programme which will include the improvement of roads, medical
and educational facilities and an agricultural programme (Owtram 2004: 103).

Much of this agreement reiterates British support to Sultan Said, with the

exception of one part where Said purportedly approved the conclusion "of an agreement

for the extension of the present arrangements regarding civil aviation and the use by the

Royal Air Force of the airfields at Salalah and Masirah". This is in stark contrast to a

secret document that elaborated on the same "agreement":

As your Excellency is aware His Highness the Sultan of Muscat and Oman paid a
private visit to this country from the 2 6 th of May to the 2 7 th of July, and during
this time conducted negotiations with Her Majesty's Government.

2. In these negotiations Her Majesty's Government pursued four main objectives.

These were, to confirm the arrangement provisionally agreed as the result of Mr
Julian Amery's mission to Muscat in January concerning the reorganization of the
military and civil administration of the Sultanate; secondly, to complete the
details of the extension, to which the Sultan had agreed in principle in January, of
facilities for the Royal Air Force at Masirah and Salalah; thirdly, to persuade the
Sultan to agree for a satisfactory settlement with the Government of Pakistan and

63
 Gwadur; and finally, to discuss with the Sultan the improvement of his relations
with Saudi Arabia. The first three of these objectives were achieved, but no
progress was made with the fourth.58

British Objectives and Muscat's Policies

In this document Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are at the forefront coupled with the

hope for a completion for an extension for the Royal Air Force facilities at Masirah. Yet,

the exact nature of British interests and objectives in supporting Sultan Said are still not

evident; for that we need to look at a confidential British document describing British

Objectives in Muscat on 17 July 1958:

" In supporting the Sultan as part of our general policy in the Persian Gulf we
wish to strengthen him enough to avert any renewed necessity for open
intervention by British forces.

* We wish to retain the R.A.F. facilities in Masirah and Salalah which are granted
to us by the Sultan.

* We need to protect the oil interests of the British-managed Iraq Petroleum

Company, a subsidiary of which holds the concession for the promising oil areas
in Central Oman.

* We must encourage the Sultan to compose his differences with his neighbors,
particularly Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, since these differences are an
embarrassment in our own relations with these countries. 59

Because of Britain's importance to Muscat, and because no serious study of

Muscat's foreign policy during this period can be conducted without taking into account

58 PREM 11/4923: Secret: Visit of The Sultan Of Muscat and Oman: 20 August
1958.

59 PREM 11/4923-100752: Confidential: Sultan of Muscat and Oman: 17 July 1958.

64
Britain's interests and objectives, an analysis of these objectives and the details of Said's

response to each follows.

1. In supporting the Sultan as part of our general policy in the Persian Gulf we wish to
strengthen him enough to avert any renewed necessity for open intervention by British
forces.

British involvement in Omani politics is centuries old. Neither Muscat nor

London wanted an intimate involvement in Oman's internal affairs. Sultan Said, strove

throughout his life to keep close relations with London-as long as he could control them

to his own advantage. He understood that seeking Britain's help against the rebels would

only give more credence to the accusations made either internally or externally of his

subservience to British "imperialism", at the expense of his "Arab brothers", but he had

no choice. He lacked the necessary resources in sufficiently trained men and military

hardware, and faced a rebellion that although was small in numbers, was better equipped

and supported by two of the most significant players in Arab politics at the time, Egypt

and Saudi Arabia. Sultan Said had to turn to London or risk the creation of a full-fledged

state that might eventually swallow Muscat itself.

As for London, the timing of Sultan Said's request for aid, shortly after the Suez

crisis and during its tension with the United States over Buraimi, could not have been

worse. British credibility and prestige had to be maintained. The British dilemma was to

assert its credibility among the regional allies and avoid the appearance of aggression

against another Arab nation as Nasser and Saudi Arabia had made it seem. The 1958

Agreement between Muscat and London was more or less an attempt to provide that

delicate balance. As the following document from the Foreign Office to Washington

clearly indicates:

65
 As you also know we have tried to avoid giving the Sultan the kind of help which
can be represented as a large-scale British military intervention in Arab Affairs.
On the other hand, if we do not bring this matter to a successful determination, the
friendly elements in the Arab world will think that we have no longer the power
to give an effective help. I have already had an enquiry from a visiting Sheikh
from Kuwait as to whether we are still capable of giving effective help to those
whom we have promised to support."...One possibility was to mount a large-scale
operation with British troops to clear the mountain once and for all. We have
decided against that because it is precisely the kind of operation which would be
grist to Nasser's propaganda mill."0

In fact, the official Foreign Office view was very much opposed to military

operations in Oman. Arguing that the operation might be "stopped in the United Nations

before it got under way and that in any case it would cause a great public outcry.... The

Foreign Office have the very definite impression that the Sultan has realized that he

61 The Prime Minister

cannot expect us to go on pulling his chestnuts out of the fire..."

concurred as recorded in a minute dated 28 August 1957 indicates: "The war seems to be

beginning again... We can stand a lot more of this, in the hope of getting the rebels. But

the ungrateful Sultan should be told he cannot order our air about at will." 62 Yet again,

Whitehall realized that "whatever the theoretical legal position, we are regarded in the

Gulf and indeed generally as protecting Muscat and failure to do so would have

repercussions elsewhere." A British representative in Dubai reported that the "Oman

60 PREM 11/4960-100752: Top Secret: From Foreign Office to Washington: 18 November 1958.

61 PREM 11/4960-100752: Muscat: 4-9-1958.

62 FO 371/126885: Foreign Secretary: Copy of Minutes by the Prime Minster: 28

August 1957:
from Bahrain.

66
affair" was harming Britain's reputation in the Trucial States, "the more so perhaps

because it has not yet succeeded in finishing off the rebellion" (Joyce 1993: 92).

London could have disengaged itself from the 1958 Agreement because of the

frustration coming from Whitehall at Sultan Said as indicated in the following record:

Record of Conversation Between the Minster of State and his Highness the Sultan
of Muscat and Oman.

Mr. Profumo said that at this point he would like to go back to the Secretary of
State's warning that, if another crisis broke out, the kind of risks which we had
been willing to run in 1957 would make it impossible for us to assist the Sultan in
the same way as we had done last time. The object of our help last time was to put
the Sultan in a position to defend himself without recourse to outside assistance.
We could not, however, go on pouring out arms, money and men to provide a
makeshift military solutions to a problem which was essentially political and
economic...

The Sultan said that one important point not mentioned by Mr. Profumo had been
the fact that the rebels were being helped from outside his country. The Sultan
was not up against the rebels only but also against Saudi Arabia and Cairo. What
was going on was being forced on the Sultan by other people, and largely because
the Sultan himself was being accused of friendship with the British.63

Yet, possible alternatives were simply unfeasible:

4. There are alternative courses to the proposed increased program:

(a) Some form of disengagement.
(b) To continue our aid only to the extent of the program decided in 1958 at an
annual cost of 80,000.
(c) To give a guarantee of protection to the Sultan, enabling us to dispense with
expansion of his forces.

All these courses have disadvantages... Briefly, the Foreign Secretary concludes
that disengagement would be dishonorable and imperil our material interests in
the Gulf; that to peg the subsidy at about 800,000 a year would be ineffective; and
that a guarantee would make British military intervention, with all its undesirable

63 PREM 11/4960-100752: Secret: Record of Conversation Between the Minister

of State and his
Highness the Sultan of Muscat and Oman in the Foreign Office on Thursday, 13 August 1959.

67
 consequences, almost inevitable in the event of any serious threat to the Sultan's
position. Thus, he concludes that there is virtually no choice but to meet the
increases coast that is now seen to be necessary for the kind of assistance agreed
in 1958.64

The British required a balancing act between supporting Muscat; acting in

Britain's best interests; living up to its responsibilities to the Arab Gulf states (many of

which were not full fledged states yet) without undermining its relations with Saudi

Arabia; and, importantly, guarding the Persian Gulf against Nasser.65 Arab and non-Arab

capitals felt the brunt of Nasser's pressure to limit, if not end, British presence. The

following lengthy cable illustrates the spirit of the times:

The Iraqi press and public were slow to begin to take an interest in the Omani
rebellion. Once they had done so the reactions were uniformly critical of Her
Majesty's Government and often hostile...As I have reported...the Iraq
Government at first hoped that the whole affair would be over before they were
compelled by events to take a stand; at that stage their only concern was to ensure
that nothing was said publicly to suggest that we were using our staging post
facilities at Habbaniya to assist our military effort so that they could no be
accused by the other Arab countries of assisting imperialism against their "brother
Arabs"...in the end they found themselves obliged to commit themselves, and at
this point, despite their correct understanding of the statue of the Sultan, they do
not appear to have doubted that the right course was to stand with the other Arabs
in disregard of what they knew to be the right cause. This was because the
initiative in pressing for action in the Security Council was taken by the Saudi
representative and they feared that any hesitation would throw King Saud back
into the arms of Nasser at this critical Juncture. The Foreign Ministry were
extremely distressed at having to support a view of the status of Oman with which

64 PREM 11/4960-100752: Secret: Prime Minister-Muscat and Oman: 13 Jul 1960.

65 As Nordan
observed,
Once the Imam of Oman is allowed to be free under any local urge or outside instigation, the
Sultanate of Muscat as well as the Imamate of Oman and also the Trucial Oman will be engulfed by the
surge of nationalism and Qatar, Bahrain and other Persian Gulf area will slip out of British hands in no
distant future. Such nationalistic signs have already forced her to grant independence to Kuwait at the head
of the Persian Gulf, though military protection is still provided (Nordan 1963: 14).

68
 they did not believe, but Ministers were inclined to take the line: "Surely you
would prefer that we should sign an objectionable letter attacking you about this
unimportant affair that that we should risk damaging our rapprochement with
Saudi Arabia which we, urged on by you, have so laboriously achieved." The
Government was undoubtedly right in thinking that they would have incurred
unpopularity if they had not gone along with the other Arabs in attacking the
United Kingdom. From the start they allowed the press, which is feelings its oats
under the new administration, to follow the line put out by the Egyptians and 'The
Voice of the Arabs". Once this has happened they could not have put the machine
into reverse without strong and unpopular measures. So the Omani rebels became
"heroic Arab nationalists" struggling to be free; the British were "aggressors" and,
because of exaggerated reports of the fighting, "bloodthirsty imperialists". The
rebels became accepted as the protagonists of a progressive modern force and the
Sultan as the representative of a reactionary servility to imperialism...I think we
must draw from this affair two conclusions. First the use of British forces in
Oman or in the Persian Gulf in the future would inevitably tend to range the Iraqi
press, public opinion and Government against us, in varying degrees, but more
strongly than on the present occasion. We could not hope that reactions will be
slow or so restrained, and the effect upon our relations with the Iraq may well be
serious."

The following cable was sent from a British representative in Tehran on 27 July

1957:

I had already spoken to the Minster of Foreign Affairs after dinner on July 24. I
did again formally and in full this morning to Political Director general. Their
reactions were to the same effect, viz: fear of a "Second Suez...I am afraid that
this situation, unless quickly liquidated, will prove very awkward for us here. It is
raising again all the old Suez bogies-anti-colonialism, Moslem solidarity, dislike
of violence, alleged contempt of the United Nations, etc. 67

The Foreign Office in Amman, tried to use their good relations with King Hussein

to remind King Saud that "we remain anxious for the restoration of the old friendship

between our two countries and that we for our part do not desire that the Oman episode

66 FO 371/ 12685: British Embassy, Baghdad. 23 August 1957.

67 FO 371 126878: FROM TEHRAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE: 27 July 1957.

69
should delay this process. We are anxious to play the matter down and we hope that there

is a corresponding desire on King Saud's part not to turn present events into an issue of

Arabs against the West."6 8 At the same time, London persistently tried to convince Sultan

Said to mend fences with King Saud of Saudi Arabia pointing out that:

In the face of the Egyptian and Communist threat in Arabia it was particularly
important to find some way of improving relations between the Sultan and the
Saudi Government. The Sultan's view was that relations should first be restored
between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, after which it might be easier to
establish more friendly relations between the Sultanate and Saudi Arabia. Indeed,
he thought it would be positively dangerous to have an apparent detente at present
since this would merely increase the opportunities open to the Saudis for the
penetration of Oman. The Sultan withdrew the agreement which he had given in
January to the suggestion that he might meet King Saud in certain circumstances.
He did not consider that there were any problems other than Buraimi which could
be usefully discussed with the Saudis, since Buraimi was the key to everything
else.69

Muscat between the Arab League and the United Nations

Although the actual war in Central Oman was over by January 1959, the political

battle moved to the halls of the Arab League and the United Nations, where it remained

for more than a decade. In December 1954, an obscure entity called the Imamate

contacted Arab League authorities. The council was uncertain how to proceed. Ironically,

it called on Saudi Arabia and Yemen to provide advice on the matter (Landen 1967: 419).

Apparently the Imamate was very much a mystery to the Arab League authorities, so

much so that at one point during the early meetings dealing with the question of Oman's

68 FO 371 126878: Confidential: From Foreign Office: Telegram No.1575 to Aman: 27 July
1957.

69 PREM 11/4923: Visit of The Sultan Of Muscat and Oman: 20 August

1957.

70
membership application, several distinguished members of the Arab League "adjourned

to the library in a futile attempt to locate the 'state' in question on the map...a 'state'

without government, without boundaries and without recognition as a state by any other

state" (Philips 1967: 194). The council of the Arab League needed time to investigate and

postponed action on the pending application. Finally, on 14 October 1955, the Arab

League reached a resolution on the pending membership in a manner that illustrated its

lack of desire to face the issue (Timpe 1991: 207).

The Council decided to request those member Arab states, who have not yet

expressed their views on the question, to formulate their point of view regarding this

[question], to the Council of the Arab league at its next session, so it may take a decision

regarding the admission of the imamate to the League (Khalil 1962: 177).

Six months later another resolution dated 22 October 1956 recommended:

1-Continued efforts by the Member States should ensue until the Imamate of
Oman recovers its rights and liberty.

2-Member States should instruct their delegates to the United Nations to address
the present hardships of the Imamate at the forthcoming session of the General
Assembly (Khalil 1962: 177).

The findings are significant for they illustrate that the Imamate failed to gain

recognition as a nation, and consequently as a member of the Arab League. Because

some of the League member states treated the issue as an internal problem of Oman, they

preferred to refer it to the United Nations rather than deal with it themselves (Timpe

1991: 208). Thus, on 13 April 1957, the "Question of Oman" was raised in the United

71
Nations by the representatives of eleven permanent Arab states (Egypt, Iraq7 0 , Jordan,

Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen) who called on the

President of the Security Council to convene so they could consider:

The armed aggression by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland against the independence, sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the
Imamate of Oman. In addition, the letter accused London of subjecting the people
of Oman to armed aggression, which had taken the form of "full-scale war,
involving the use of modern destructive weapons-such as rockets, bombers,
Venom jets, armored cars, heavy mortar and machine guns-and military
operations by British sea, air, and ground forces.'

This happened again on 15 August 1957. The Security Council received a cable

from an Arab member of the United Nations requesting that they "convene an urgent

meeting" to deal with the question of Oman and consider the "extreme gravity of the

situation in that part of the Arab world." A letter dated 22 November indicated the role of

Saudi Arabia and the importance of Buraimi, and added that the United Kingdom, as a

70 Not every country on that list was enthusiastic about this matter, but some arm twisting by
Egypt and Saudi Arabia went a long way as the following telegram indicates:
I am doing my best to persuade the Iraqis to take a lead in preventing the ventilation of this issue
in the General Assembly, but I fear that they will in the last resort follow the wishes of the Saudis. Indeed,
the Prime Minster probably thinks we are not sufficiently appreciative of his efforts to keep Saud on our
side...the Egyptians so maneuvered matters that they were able to say to the Saudis: 'you see, you want this
badly but the Iraqis are reluctant to support you' and the Iraqis had then to cave in (From Bagdad to
Foreign Office: 28 August 1957).
71 F0371/126883: United Nations Security Council: Letter Dated 13 August
1957 from the
Permanent Representatives of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria
and Yemen Addressed to the President of the Security Council.
In an attempt to put pressure on London through the use of public opinion, the ex-imam would
conduct interview where he described the level of Sultan forces brutality, and the courage of his supporters.
However, at times exaggerations take the best of him as Phillips indicates:
The New York Times on 3 August 1959, featured a Cairo interview with Ghalib who is quoted as
saying that "British troops and R.A.F. have killed 25,000 Omanis and destroyed thirty-two villages. The
insurgents in turn have killed 20,000 British troops since 1955 and shot down thirty R.A.F. planes and
destroyed six hundred armored vehicles...but if 20,000 British sons ever failed to come home to 20,000
loving British mothers over any campaign anywhere in Arabia we would not need Ghalib to announce the
fact to the world (Phillips 1967: 217).

72
"prelude to the conquest of Oman, had seized the Saudi oasis of Buraimi" (Al-Marayati

1966: 103)

The agenda failed to obtain the affirmative votes of seven members and was not

adopted. The question of Oman was subsequently considered at three sessions of the

General Assembly (Fehmi 1967: 13). Although Prime Minister Macmillan requested that

the United States vote against inscription, Eisenhower replied that "we can recognize that

the common goals which we have cannot always be best achieved by our necessarily

always taking a uniform public position." 72 The United Kingdom delegation to the United

Nations reported that the Security Council debate on inscription was the following:

"Against inscription: the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Cuba, and Colombia; for

inscription: the Soviet Union, Iraq, Sweden and the Philippines; abstentions: 73 the United

States. The representative of China did not exercise his vote. The item therefore failed." 74

72 Cable: Department Of State: Secret: Issue Date: 19 Aug 1957.

British frustration at
Washington's position, and the importance of Saudi Arabia to the United States can be clearly seen in the
following declassified telegram involving the respective representatives of both countries discussing the
upcoming inscription or lack therof in the U.N:
I told Mr. Murphy that from the point of view of Anglo-United States relations I wanted to leave
no doubt in his mind of the dangers involved in our not acting and being seen to act together...I said that
the State Department might consider that the problem was one of procedure. But I must warn him that from
the point of view of Anglo-American relations, it was a good deal more than that...Mr. Murphy replied that
he would not wish to dispute that. But he hoped that Her Majesty's Government would realize that the
United States Government was not going to obtain may thanks in the Arab countries for abstaining. The
Saudi Arabian Minister had been to see him and had been quite emotional in demanding United States
support (FO 371/126883: Secret: Washington Telegram No. 1578 to Foreign Office: 15 August 1957).

73 In China, the People's Daily commented that by its abstention, Washington "was actually
backing the British aggressors against the Arab people's fight for independence.. .Realising its awkward
position in the middle East...the United States was relying on clandestine dealings with Britain in exchange
for British support of United States subversive activities against Syria" (Behbehani 1981: 167).

74 FO 371 126884: From New York To Foreign Office (United Kingdom Delegation to the United
Nations) 20 August 1957.

73
The permanent representatives of the Arab states, however, did succeed on 29 September

1960, in placing the question of Oman on the agenda. Between 1960 and 1963, the

"question of Oman was considered by the Special Political Committee, although none of

its recommended resolutions were adopted by the Assembly" (Kechichian 1995: 44).

The heart of the matter, and the confusion over the question of Oman was clearly

articulated by the representative of Chile over a number of issues: Why did the Sultan not

send a representative to the Assembly to defend his case? Did Oman and Muscat

constitute a single state or two separate entities? Was the principle of self-determination

at issue or was it a matter of the dismemberment of a sovereign state? Was the Treaty of

Sib an international treaty between two sovereign independent states or was it only an

agreement between the Government of the Sultan and Omani tribal chiefs concerning

internal matters? What was the present situation in Oman? Was there oppression? Were

the inhabitants fighting foreign troops or did peace exist? (Fehami 1966: 28).

The Secretary General created a fact-finding mission to clarify issues and look

into the events reported in a letter dated 7 March 1963 by the head of the office of the

Imamate of Oman in Cairo. The letter reported "horrible massacres committed by the

colonial forces against the innocent citizens" (Fehami 1966: 31). The mission headed by

de Ribbing, Swedish Ambassador to Spain, visited Oman from 25 May 1963 to 9 June

1963. Members of the mission had absolute freedom to go wherever they pleased,

including the so-called stronghold of the rebels, in Jabal Al-Akhdar. They were able to

74
meet with about twenty government officials, interview eighty-six representatives, and

explain the purpose of the visit to approximately twelve hundred people assembled at

meetings. Attempts were made by many Arab delegates of the General Assembly to

validate alleged statements by those interviewed about continued fighting, however,

many meetings occurred without the presence of a government official and mission

members were "unable to hear one single shot in the most remote area of the country, or

to detect a single sign of the excitement usually generated by a fight" (Fehmi 1966: 35).

Disappointed with the report, the Arab states "backed by a comfortable Afro-Asian, anti-

colonial majority, convinced the Assembly to establish another committee (the Ad Hoc

Committee) to emphasize the case of the rebels. Subsequently, another committee of

twenty-four was established but was denied entry into Oman" (Fehmi 1966: 37).

By 8 January 1965, the Ad Hoc Committee submitted its findings and again the

report was inconclusive. The committee expressed the belief that the question of Oman is

a "serious international problem, requiring the special attention of the General Assembly;

that it derived from imperialistic policies and foreign intervention in Muscat and Oman"

(Fehmi 1966: 63). Having attributed the unrest and suffering of the people to this

problem, the committee, therefore, believed that "all parties concerned should enter into

negotiations to settle the question without prejudice to the positions taken by either side

and should refrain from any action that might impede peaceful settlement" (Fehmi 1966:

63). The question of Oman remained open well after Sultan Qaboos's accession to the

throne in 1970.

The Arab countries request the inclusion of the item in the agenda because it is a
colonial issue; Great Britain objects on the ground that it is an internal question;
meanwhile a majority is easily gathered to vote for inclusion. The debates have

75
 the same themes: accusations and counter accusations, assertions and denials. The
upshot is a committee of a sort coming out with a report reaffirming as ever the
right of the people of Oman to self-determination (Fehmi 1967: 70).75

The single most important aspect of these debates for our purposes is the debates

over the meaning of the Treaty of Sib, or the Agreement of Sib that was signed at the

village of al-Seeb by the tribal leaders of Oman's "interior" and the Sultanate on 25

September 1920. Through the mediation of R. E. L. Wingate, The document ushered in

thirty-five years of peace. Under its terms, Imamate representatives pledged to: (1) live in

peace with the Sultanate; (2) not restrict trade and travel with the coast; (3) return

fugitives from justice, and (4) honor claims of coastal merchants. The Sultanate, in turn,

agreed to: (1) charge no more than 5 percent duty on exports from the interior to the

coast; (3) impose no restrictions on entry to and exit from coastal towns; (4) return

fugitives from interior justice; and (5) not interfere with the tribes' internal affairs.

"Despite its controversial nature, no authentic text of this agreement was presented to that

body; it has been invoked by numerous delegations" (Fehmi 1966: 4). Sultan Said refused

75 Here is a sample of the debates raging in the U.N. through the words of the United Kingdom
mission to the U.N:
The Sultanate of Oman and Muscat is a sovereign and independent state. It follows therefore, Sir,
that under the charter of the United Nations, neither this Committee, nor the Committee of 24, no any other
body of this Organization, can have the right or the competence to discuss the internal affairs of a sovereign
and independent State like Muscat and Oman ... under an arrangement freely entered into between two
sovereign and independent states the British enjoy facilities for tow Air Force staging posts...They are not
military bases, and they are used to refuel and service aircraft, when this is necessary, on routine flights to
the Far East...There are no British forces in Muscat and Oman. There are-however-as we have made
clear in previous debates-some fifty officers and men serving on [sic] secondment with the Sultan's
Armed Forces. These are not mercenaries or soldiers of fortune; they are personnel on [sic] secondment on
exactly the same bases as those seconded by other independent countries (FCO 8/580: United Kingdom
Mission to the United Nations: 8 December 1967).

76
the British request to publish the agreement claiming that the publication of the text76 ,

even with the statement that the agreement is dead, will open the door for argument." "

In his memoirs, the main architect of the Agreement, Sir Ronald Wingate,

describes the difficulty of the initial negotiations:

76 The New York Times published an unofficial version on 13 August 1957. Also,
I came across
another unofficial translated copy from the Arab Information Center of the British Public Record Office
(FO 371 126884):
THE TREATY OF SIB 1920
In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
This is the peace agreed upon between the Government of the Sultan, Taimur ibn Faisal, and
Shaikh Isa ibn Salih ibn Ali on behalf of the people of Oman whose names are signed hereto, through the
mediation of Mr. Wingate, I. C. S., Political Agent and Consul for Great Britain in Muscat, who is
empowered by his Government in this respect and to be an intermediary between them. Of the conditions
set forth below, four pertain to the Government of the Sultan and four pertain to the people of Oman. Those
pertaining to the people of Oman are:
Not more than five percent shall be taken from anyone, no matter what his race, coming from
Oman to Muscat or Matrah or Sur or the rest of the towns of the coast.
All the people of Oman shall enjoy security and freedom in all the towns of the coast.
All restrictions upon everyone entering and leaving Muscat and Matrah and all the towns of the
coast shall be removed.
The Government of the Sultan shall not grant asylum to any criminal fleeing from the justice of
the people of Oman. It shall return him to them if they request it to do so. It shall not interfere in their
internal affairs.
The four conditions pertaining to the Government of the Sultan are:
All the tribes and Shaikhs shall be at peace with the Sultan. They shall not attack the towns of the
coast and shall not interfere in his Government.
All those going to Oman on lawful business and for commercial affairs shall be free. There shall
be no restrictions on commerce, and they shall enjoy security.
They shall expel and grant no asylum to any wrongdoer or criminal fleeing to them.
The claims of merchants and others against the people of Oman shall be heard and decided on the
basis of justice according to the law of Islam.
Written on 11 Muharram 1339, corresponding to 25 September 1920
This version is similar to the one in a booklet made by The Gulf Committee (not exactly friendly
to Sultan Said): The Oman War 1957-1959: A Critical History. Gambel Street, London: Russell Press Ltd.
(1974) p. 12. The text of the document can also be found in Robert G Landen's Oman Since 1856:
Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional Arab Society. Princeton: (1967) 403; and David Holden's
Farewell to Arabia. London: (1966) 249-50.

77 FO 371 126878: From Muscat to Foreign Office: 28 July 1957.

This is in contrast to the Egyptian claim found in Egyptian Economic and Political Review by Dr.
Ezeldin Foda in March 1958: "the British Foreign Office has attempted to suppress the publication of the
text and terms of the Treaty of Sib. This in itself suggests that the Treaty is worthy of study."

77
 This was fatal, and I knew that I could not possibly agree to it on behalf of the
Sultan, for this would mean that the Sultan acknowledged another ruler, and a
ruler who was already an elected spiritual leader and an admitted temporal
representative of the tribes. From such an acknowledgment it was only one step
further for the spiritual leadership and temporal representation of the tribes to
develop into a claim for the spiritual and temporal leadership of all Oman. The
word Imam was omitted from the body of the document, which simply read as a
conditions arranged between the Sultan's Government and isa bin Salih as
representing the Omani (Wingate 1959: 89).

On the signing of the Agreement, Sir Ronald observes:

It was signed by me on behalf of the Sultan, with his full authority, and granted to
the tribal leaders of Oman, all of whom signed individually, the right of self
government, or nor-interference by the Sultan in their internal affairs, in return for
peace and for the payment of the customary dues at the ports in the territories
controlled by the Sultan. The question of sovereignty was never mentioned. Had it
been, there would have been no agreement. It recognized the facts of the situation,
a situation which was not a new one, but had been a source of controversy and
conflict for three quarters of a century. For in Arabia allegiance is tribal, and the
tribe had no defined boundaries. Yet the existence of a Coastal Sultanate, a tribal
confederation, and a religious leader, who would claim through election the
temporal allegiance of the tribes, had, up till then, made impossible a modus
vivendi where, by agreement, the coast and the interior each looked after its own
affairs, while remaining in friendly contact (Wingate 1959: 89).

Supporters of the Imamate argued that the Agreement established an independent

"Imamate of Oman", as opposed to the "Sultanate of Muscat". Thus, British aid and

involvement in Oman from 1957 to 1959 were attempts to aid the Sultanate of Muscat to

subjugate an independent Imamate of Oman. Furthermore, if the question of legitimacy

were raised at all, it would be directed to the Sultanate of Muscat, which was itself only

two hundred years old, and which since 1891 could be considered to be a British

protectorate or a vassal (Foda 1958: 13). Equally important was the fact of Britain's

interference in Oman's affairs (the reference here is to both Muscat and Nizwa) was

immoral and contrary to United Kingdom obligations under the U.N. Charter (Foda 1966:

101). This last point seems to contradict the earlier contention that the Sultanate of Oman

78
(Muscat) was a protectorate of Britain and if that were the case, then the British would

have been obliged to aid it.

The response from Muscat via the British representative at the U.N was the

following. First, the

sovereignty of the Sultans over the whole of Muscat and Oman has long been
recognized internationally, e.g., by international treaties concluded with them, for
example, by Great Britain in 1891 and again in 1951; by the United States in 1833
and 1958; France in 1846 and by India in 1953.78

In addition, the British Government had never regarded the protectorate regime

pertaining to the lower Gulf States before their independence in 1971 as applicable to the

Sultanate of Oman. Although the Agreement of Sib did grant autonomy to the tribes of

the interior, it did so under the overall jurisdiction of the Sultan. Therefore it cannot be

deemed, under any circumstance, an international instrument binding two states. Sultan

Said did not recognize the treaty as binding, since he reasoned that it had lapsed on the

death of his father. The Agreement of Sib, for Sultan Said, was simply a temporary

78 This view has been expressed in an enclosed booklet that has been prepared by Her Majesty's
Government primarily for distribution through the British Information Services overseas. (Muscat and
Oman 19 November 1962: 14). This conclusion is also supported by The Arabian Gulf States: Their Legal
and Political Status and their International Problems first published by the University of Manchester in
1968.
The Sultanate of Oman may be regarded, for all purposes of statehood, as an independent State in
close treaty relations with the British Government. An examination of the specific provisions of her treaties
with the British government, to which reference has been made above, will show that there is nothing in
these treaties which subjects her, either explicitly or implicitly, to a protectorate status. Moreover, there are
the following factors which show that Muscat always has, and retains, for all practical purposes, her
position as an independent state: The independence of Muscat was affirmed by the Anglo-French
Declaration of 10 March 1862.The independence was reaffirmed later by the decision of the Hague Court
of Arbitration, dated 8 August 1905. 2-At present, Muscat maintains treaty relations not only with the
United Kingdom, but also with the United States, France and other States. In all such treaties the
sovereignty and independence of the Sultanate has been recognized by the foreign States concerned
(Hussain 1975: 67).

79
arrangement between his father, and the tribes of the interior to ensure peace after the

fighting of 1913.

An Arab Scholar writing in 1975 supports the British contention that the Sib

Agreement did grant Nizwa an internal independent character of its own under which

Nizwa reserved full authority in terms of administration, taxes, and "laws". As

exemplified in the provisions concerning the extradition of criminals however

there is nothing in the treaty which shows that the Sultan by signing it had in fact
intended to relinquish his sovereignty over Oman, although he did not expressly
assert it. There does not seem any reference in the treaty to the independence of
Oman or to the government of the Imam. Instead, the reference is being made to
the people Oman (Hussain 1975: 242).

Finally, Sultan Said questioned whether the Imamate had lived up to its proper

Ibadi election thereby casting doubts on Ghalib's legitimacy. 79

The question of Oman's legal status as a possible protectorate was important to

British policy makers independent of the proceedings in the United Nations or the Arab

League. Parliamentary questions back in London demanded to know by what right

London was intervening in Oman. Was there any obligation to assist the Sultan in

maintaining internal security? If not, what was Britain's legal position in regard to

79 There were definitely some intrigues surrounding the election process. This is affirmed by none
other than one of the most loyal supporters of the imamate institution, the son of Al-Salmi, a famous Omani
historian who wrote Nahdat al-Ayan bi-Hurriyyat Oman (in Arabic only, Cairo 1961). As far as Sultan Said
was concerned, Ghalib and his supporters are rebels. When the U.N mission arrived in Oman, he handed
them "Photostats of passport applications, one of which was submitted by Talib, the brother of the Imam,
dated 1954. That was, in his view, proof that Talib, and also others who had submitted similar passport
applications previously, considered themselves 'subjects of the government of Muscat and Oman"'
(Fehami 1967: 45).

80
military intervention?" If the Sultanate were legally considered a protectorate, Secretary

of State for Foreign Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd, would not have had to stand in front of the

British parliament justifying British military presence in Muscat. The Parliament was

wary of a "second Suez" so British aid to Sultan Said had to be justified to a skeptical

audience.

On 29 July 1957, Secretary Lloyd, read a statement to the Parliament in which he

states that the

decision of Her Majesty's Government to give help to the Sultan was made for
two reasons. First, it was at the request of a friendly ruler who had always relied
on us to help him resist aggression or subversion. Secondly, there is the direct
British interest involved and I have no need to stress to the House the importance
of the Persian Gulf (Timpe 1991: 228).

Lloyd then went on to indicate British obligations and interests in the Gulf:

In the gulf, we have certain formal and implicit obligations to the rulers of
sheikhdoms under our protection to protect them against attack. This is generally
understood throughout the area and it has always been assumed that Her
Majesty's Government would honor her obligations." The difference between a

80 F0371/126879: Telegram to Washington No. 2947: Oman: 22

July 1957.

81 A confidential text titled "Legality of British Military Assistance for Sultan of Muscat,"
clearly
indicates that though London has no binding treaty to aid the Sultanate, it has provided such assistance
many times before. The following is the text from the Foreign Office:
Her Majesty's Government has no treaty obligation to provide military assistance to the Sultan.
Our legal position is, however, perfectly clear and satisfactory...Briefly there is nothing to stop one
government from acceding to the request of another to assist in maintaining the integrity and independence
of the latter.
Her Majesty's Government has intervened at the Sultan's request on numerous occasions in the
past...The writer of the text found it necessarily to add that 'if critics subsequently go back to the summary
authorities, particularly Lorimer's Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, there are passages which could be quoted
against Her Majesty's Government's present policy'. For instance, it is noted (Lorimer, p. 466): 'The
Government of India in 1834 positively declined to undertake the responsibility of maintaining the integrity
of the continental possessions of the Imam of Muscat against the Wahhabis, remarking that 'if we were
once to commit ourselves by a declaration of our intention to support that Chief, this line of policy must be
followed up at an expense, and it is impossible to set limits to the waste of blood and treasure which might
ensue in consequence.'

81
 formal obligation of a long standing relationship of friendship" is not readily
apparent to the local rulers and people. If we were to fail in one area it would
begin to be assumed elsewhere that perhaps the anti-British propaganda of our
enemies had some basis to it and that Her Majesty's Govemment were no longer
willing or able to help her friends (Timpe 1991: 230).

The author then includes a copy of an incomplete history of British assistance given to Muscat:
'Instances When British Military Assistance Was Provided For Muscat And Oman At Sultan's
Request Up To 1939. (Not necessarily complete).
1809 British and Sultanate troops recapture from the Wahabis.
1821 British troops participate in retaliatory expedition against Beni Bu Ali tribes in the jaalan.
1830 British Naval demonstration of support for the Sultan at Muscat.
1833 British Naval demonstration of support for the Sultan at Muscat.
1834 British political Resident threatens rebel Hamud.
1845 Wahabis gather tribes to threaten Muscat. British ships patrol Batinah coast and on
Resident's protests the Wahabi Amir withdraws.
1865 British support Sultan with arms against Wahabis and prevent Trucial Shaikhs from
intervening. Resident sends ultimatum to Wahabi Amir in nejd and on expiry bombards his ports, Qatif and
Dammam. H.M. Ships take action against rebellious Janabah tribesmen.
1867 Resident threatens Turki, a rebel against the Sultan, and R.N. ships protect Matrah.
1874 British ships shell forces of the rebel Ibrahim bin Qais at Masna'ah and recover Suwaiq for
the Sultan.
1877 H.M.S Teazer uses shellfire to protect Muscat against rebel forces.
1886 British authorities in Aden frustrate attempted descent on Dhofar.
1897 Dhofar recovered for Sutlan from rebels with British naval assistance.
1913 British forces protecting Muscat town defeat rebel attacks at Bait al Falaj (January and
October).
1914 British forces repel rebels from Barkah.
1916 British troops defeat rebels under Imam at Ruwi.
1920 British warship proceeds to Masan'a and Sur, and inflicts punishment for defiance of Sultan.
1922 Royal Navy bombard Khadra to help Sultan's forces in reduction of rebellious Yal Sa'ad.
1928 Muscat gunboat escorted by Royal Naval ship, bombards Sur. Royal naval ship latter
bombards Sur again.
1930 Royal naval ships and Muscat gunboat bombard places belonging to Shaikh of Khassab in
Musandam peninsula.
1932 Royal Air Force and Royal Naval operation compels Beni Bu Ali to obey Sultan' (FO
371/126879: Confidential: Legality of British Military Assistance for Sultan of Muscat: 26 July 1957).
82 The Foreign Office did not attempt to give British aid on the bases of 'treaties", as the following
record indicates: Lord Stansgate has already been told that we agreed to intervene in Muscat, not on the
basis of an treaty with the Sultan but in reply to a specific request by him for aid on the basis of a long-
standing friendship and in connection with him and his predecessors (FO 371 126878: The Legality of
British Military Assistance to Oman: 25 July 1957).

82
 The Imamate upheaval had been confined to a small though important area and

the greater part of Omani tribes did not lend support to the former Imam. If they had, "it

would have been impossible for the Sultan (British or no British) to hold the rebels in the

Jabal Akhdar area, and they, for their part, would never have remained in their refuge had

they been able to command tribal support in Oman" (Phillips 1967: 206).

2. We wish to retain the R.A.F. facilities in Masirah and Salalah which are granted to us
by the Sultan.

Masirah is "a large island, measuring some 40 miles (65 km) in length and up to

10 miles (16km) in width. It lies 10 miles off the south-eastern coast of the Sultanate"

(Bailey 1998: 135). In 1930, British Lt. Col. M. C. Lake, the political officer from the

Residency at Aden, had landed on the island to evaluate whether the island was suitable

for the construction of a landing-ground for aircrafts as part of a potential development of

air routes from the United Kingdom to India. On the outbreak of WWII, Sultan Said

offered a general authorization to the Royal Air Force to use all air facilities available in

the Sultanate, including Masirah. These facilities were in turn requested by the United

States Army Air Corps in 1942 along with permission to construct various buildings for

maintenance and personnel. The Sultan granted these requests with the understanding that

some conditions had to be observed: stone buildings were to revert to the Sultanate intact,

and all American personnel were to accept and abide by the local rules (Bailey 1995:

138-141).

For decades London had been satisfied with what was an ad hoc arrangement with

Sultan Said concerning Masirah. The request had been made on the basis of a need and in

83
turn approval had been granted. The importance of the island for London had been

military in nature, as the following secret memo indicates:

It was agreed with Mr. Parsons that the question of phasing out our dependence
on Masirah should also be raised. Masirah has been such a sacred cow with the
Ministry of Defense that this suggestion may come as something of a shock to
some quarters of the MOD. Presentation of the idea may be important and since
the implications of giving up Masirah go wider than Arabia Department's
responsibility.83

Between the years of 1957 and 1959, as Muscat struggled with the Imamate force,

all would change. One of the conditions for granting support to Sultan Said was the

continuous use of Masirah by the British Royal Air Force, according to the Agreement of

1958. Whitehall now wanted a 99-year lease for Masirah with the possibility of an

extension. This was a significant departure from the previous ad hoc arrangements.

As your Excellency is aware His Highness the Sultan of Muscat and Oman paid a
private visit to this country from the 2 6th of May to the 2 7 th of July, and during
this time conducted negotiations with Her Majesty's Government.

5. The Sultan handled the negotiations on Royal Air Force facilities entirely on
his own, and most capably. He succeeded in his object of keeping the
arrangements as closely as possible to the existing arrangements. He also made it
clear that he intended to exact the maximum rental which the market would bear,
and in the end he obtained a total of 17,000 compared with the previous 6,000 a
year (15,000 a year for the facilities at Masirah, and 2,000 a year for those at
Salalah). These figures were acceptable to Her Majesty's Government, but it is
doubtful whether the total could have been restricted to a reasonable sum if the
British delegation had started with a higher opening bid that the 8,000 which was
offered. The Sultan expressed some concern during the exchanges over Masirah
about the possible consequences for the Sultanate of the use by Her Majesty's
Government of the facilities there which he thought might involve his country in a
major war. In the end, however, he accepted Mr. Amery's explanations of the

83 FCO8/1667: Secret: Masirah and Salalah: 9 September

1971.

84
 uses to which the leased area would be put, and understood that in legislating for a
period of 99 years it was difficult to be very precise.84

The available literature on Oman either makes a passing mention of Masirah, or

describes the importance of the island solely in the context of the post-1970 period. It

neglects to mention that London sought a 99-year lease of Masirah. In other instances,

Masirah is mentioned for the mere purpose of depicting Sultan Said as a subservient

agent of British imperialism. 85 Yet, Masirah was a key component of the 1958 agreement,

and the simple fact that Whitehall was looking for a 99-year lease in contrast to the usual

short ad hoc arrangements signifies the introduction of important new variables that

should be investigated. Equally important is the clause stating that the 99-year lease had

proved to be a contentious point between London and Sultan Said. For the latter point the

following record dated 18 August 1960 between Sultan Said and Her Majesty's

Government representative is clear:

Mr. Walmsley showed to the Sultan the original record of the meeting between
the Sultan and Mr. Julian Amery, prepared by Mr. Amery and presented to the
Foreign Secretary, containing the sentence "on the question of the jurisdiction the
Sultan said he had come round to the view that Her Majesty's Government should
have the full jurisdiction over the British Service personnel in the leased area for
the full duration of the lease.

The Sultan said that he did not recall having used the words "for the full duration
of the lease". The record had not been cleared with him at the time of the visit to
London in 1958, and he had not signed any document which committed him on

84 PREM 11/4923: Secret: Visit of The Sultan Of Muscat and Oman: 20 August
1958.

85 This is even true of books that deal exclusively with foreign policy (Kechchian 1995) as much
as it is of books that deal with the general political history of Muscat (Allen 2000); or historical and
political developments (Peterson 1976); and various articles such as in Kaylani's work that uses Masirah as
an indication of Said's subservience to London (Kaylani 1979).

85
 this subject. So far as he was concerned the position was that Her Majesty's
Government had jurisdiction in the leased area of Masirah on the basis of
exchange of Letters of 1951 and the further Exchange of Letters of 1955. When
the time came for him to deal with the 1951 Exchange of letters, which was due to
expire on December 31, 1961, the question of jurisdiction in Massirah would of
course be dealt with at the same time.86

When the subject was raised once again on 24 August 1960, the Sultan remained

unconvinced:

Mr. Heath...Her Majesty's Government had been working on the assumption that
jurisdiction in the leased area was assured for 99 years...The Sultan said that he
had not signed anything relating to the surrender of jurisdiction for 99 years. He
had discussed jurisdiction in 1958 with Mr. Julian Amery but he did not
remember saying about 99-year period. 87

(Unfortunately, due to the present inaccessibility of the archives I am unable to

verify which of the claims proved accurate, however, Masirah did revert to Oman in

1977). Differences of interpretation aside, the questions remain: Why did London request

a lease at that particular juncture and why is the island a significant part of the 1958

agreement?

Masirah had an importance for the British Defense Department that other British

government agencies, such as the Arabian Department, did not quite understand.

London's 1971 Foreign Office review of long-term policy in the Persian Gulf maintained

that "support of UK forces stationed in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore depends

upon the continued availability of the CENTO air route or, if necessary, its less desirable

86 PREM 11/4960 100752: Secret: Record of Meeting Between the Lord Privy Seal and the Sultan
of Muscat and Oman in the Foreign Office at 12 Noon on 24 August 1960.

87 PREM 11/4960 100752: Records of Meeting between the Lord Privy Seal and
the Sultan of
Muscat and Oman in the Foreign Office at 12 Noon on 24 August 24 1960.

86
alternatives.. .Integrity of the CENTO route rests upon continued security of tenure in

Cyprus, Masirah and Gan and of the overflying rights over Turkey and Iran." 88

An earlier, perhaps more accurate assessment of the importance of Masirah was

made in the review of 1959. It stated that "strategically, Masirah island is important,

though not essential as a stepping stone to the far east. Masirah is essential so long as we

have to conduct military operations on any scale within the Gulf itself' (Timpe 1991:

270). This is not to claim that Masirah is not important as a staging post or as a stepping

stone to either the far East or South-East Asia, but rather to demonstrate the primary

importance of Masirah: to protect British interests within the Gulf itself.

3. We need to protect the oil interests of the British-managed Iraq Petroleum Company, a
subsidiary of which holds the concession for the promising oil areas in Central Oman.

The 1958 document uses the word "promising" to describe the discovery of oil,

yet as early as 1925 and as late as 1956, the results of oil exploration in Oman had always

been disappointing. Most of the oil companies had refocused their energies on Kuwait

and Saudi Arabia. Admittedly, oil was found in 1957, however its viscosity made it too

expensive to utilize (Allen 2000: 8-17). By contrast, oil was found almost immediately in

Bahrain and, in Kuwait, oil fields were developed so quickly that by 1953 Kuwait

became the largest oil producer in the Gulf. In short, although the agreement points to

protecting "promising" Omani oil fields as a key component of British objectives in

Oman in 1958, in reality Omani oil played a minor role. London's desire to lease Masirah

88 FCO 8/1667: Review of Long term Policy in the Gulf:

3 September 1971.

87
for 99 years was an effort to secure oil interests in the rest of the Persian Gulf, especially

in Kuwait. When Secretary Lloyd had to justify London's involvement in Oman in July

1957, he had concluded that Her Majesty's Government was bound to help a friendly

ruler like Sultan Said and that "there is the direct British interest involved and I have no

need to stress to the House the importance of the Persian Gulf' (Timpe 1991: 228). A

memo from 1960 called The Future Policy Report was circulated to various Ministers

attesting to Britain's oil interests:

While we have at present no alternative to maintaining our political obligations to

the Persian Gulf Rulers, and particularly to the Ruler of Kuwait, it should be the
object of our policy over the next ten years to create a situation in which they can
be terminated without undue damage to the security of our oil supplies and the
general political stability of the area. 89

In the same secret memo, the Foreign Secretary describes specific British

objectives in the Persian Gulf and divides them into three categories: 1) Economic:

access to oil produced in the Persian Gulf states. The oil and the sterling balances of

Kuwait are particularly important; 2) Political: treaty obligations and defense of the area

against the spread of Russian influence; 3) Strategic: maintenance of rights over

Masirah. 90

Masirah was important as a staging post to protect Kuwait (Timpe 1991: 269).

The significance of Kuwaiti oil to the British economy is further demonstrated in the

89 PREM 11/4960 100752: Secret: Prime Minister-Muscat and Oman: 13

July 1960.

90 PREM 11/4960 100752: Secret: Prime Minster-Muscat and

Oman: 13 July 1960.

88
record of a discussion between Sir Roger Stevens of the Foreign Office and Mr. Lewis

Jones of the United States State Department:

Mr. Lewis Jones said he had heard that H.M.G. were rethinking the British role in
the Persian Gulf...Sir Roger Stevens said that there was no specific "rethinking
process" going on..." everything turned on Kuwait: nothing else was of really
vital importance, and indeed our other positions in the Gulf and even Aden itself
were maintained ultimately in order to secure Kuwait (Timpe 1991: 269).

On 27 July 1960 a minute submitted to the British Prime Minister clarifies the

role of Oman with regards to Britain's oil interests:

In general terms, however, there is no doubt that the stability of Muscat and our
strategic rights in the Sultan's territory are important for preserving the position of
the United Kingdom in the Persian Gulf area as a whole, including Kuwait. In this
context there are very valuable commercial and financial interests at stake....So
far our most important oil interests are centered round Kuwait. But there are
prospects of development further South in the Gulf area and in the East Aden
Protectorate. If these were to materialize, Oman would play an even more
important part in their protection."'

So while protecting the possible finds of commercially viable oil in Oman may

have been one of Britain's stated interests, it was not the main driving force behind

British involvement in the 1950's. It was only when oil in commercial quantities finally

was discovered in Oman in 1964, that Oman's relative importance became elevated. The

following memo was sent from the British Prime Minister in summer 1964:

The Press reports that oil has been discovered, possibly on large scale, in Oman
suggests that covetous eyes may soon be turned to this area afresh. Would it be a
good thing if the Official Defense Committee had a look at our arrangements for
safeguarding our interests in Oman and preventing any attempt at a "take-over",
whether by overt means or by subversion? 92

91 PREM 11/4960-100752: Secret: Prime Minister: 27 July 1960.

92 PREM 11/ 4932-100752: Prime Minister: 27 July 1964.

89
4. We must encourage the Sultan to compose his differences with his neighbors,
particularly Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, since these differences are an embarrassment in
our own relations with these countries.

In July 1958, the date of the British objectives, the world had just witnessed the

brutal overthrow of the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq. In 1955, the Iraqi government and

Turkey had concluded a most important agreement that would lead to the short-lived

arrangement in 1958 known as the Baghdad Pact (and which also included Iran, Britain,

and Pakistan). These events together with the merging of Egypt and Syria that same year

ended all illusions that a key Arab country would be tied to the Western camp. As

Nasser's successful bid to draw more Arab countries away from the West gained ground,

the British encountered mounting pressure to support more vigorously those who

regarded themselves the "true" friends of Her Majesty's Government. In this instance,

both Islamabad and Riyadh considered themselves to be allies of HMG, at least as far as

containing Nasser was concerned. Both countries also had claims on Oman's territory.

Saudi Arabia's claim involved the Buraimi oasis. Pakistan was aggressively pursuing an

old claim on Gawadur. Islamabad argued that Gawadur must be returned to Pakistan

since members of the Baghdad Pact were attempting to draw King Saud away from his

previously close relations with Egypt's Nasser. Pakistan's Foreign Minster Firoz Khan

Noon "warned that it would be impossible for Pakistan to support the sultan unless finally

the Omani ruler agreed to relinquish Gawadur" (Joyce 1995: 77).

90
 Gawadur is an enclave on the Makran coast of Pakistan that had been part of the

Sultanate from the late eighteenth century until its sale to Pakistan in 1958. A description

of Gawadur in 1945 indicates that

it had a population of 52 Omanis and 6830 Baluchis who were Muscat subjects,
400 Khojas, followers of the Agha Khan, 120 Hindus and some 371 others who
were British subjects, making the total of about 7773 in all. Of these, 5, 975 lived
in the town of Gawadur (Bailey 1988: 614).

As early as 1948, Islamabad had approached Sultan Said through the appointed

British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Sir Rubert Hay, to look into Sultan Said's

position should Pakistan wish to negotiate for Gawadur. The Sultan had answered that he

"could not willingly part with any of his dominions" (Bailey 1988: 615). Islamabad

raised the issue again in 1949 when Sultan Said visited Pakistan. The Sultan however was

not interested and Pakistan's appeals for intervention to Whitehall fell on unsympathetic

ears. By 1954, Islamabad through London offered to lease the area in perpetuity. The

lease draft that was agreed upon by both Islamabad and London was presented to the

Sultan in January 1955 via the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, Sir Bernard

Burrown. Once again Sultan Said rejected the offer while indicating that he might be

willing to negotiate, but only with London's participation (Joyce 1995: 69). Why was the

Sultan suddenly willing to negotiate? Was he serious about these negotiations or was he

vying for time?

The so-called draft lease reached Sultan Said in January 1955. By this time, the

first Imamate forces had already taken over the interior and more importantly the

Imamate leadership had approached the Arab League for membership. London's

assistance was imperative, and Whitehall knew that Sultan Said would be hard pressed to

91
resist mounting British pressure. London, argued Whitehall, was taking the brunt of anti-

British propaganda from the Arab world for defending Sultan Said. 93 Pakistan may have

taken this opportunity to follow suit and lash out at Muscat and London if Gawadur was

not relinquished. The Sultan, argued Whitehall, was obliged to London "to purchase such

support as is possible for our efforts to represent his cause abroad" (Joyce 1995: 73). For

the Sultan, a clear rejection of the offer, as in earlier times, was not prudent due to the

importance of London's support to quell the rebellion. Thus, he opted for negotiations,

while making the case that Muscat did not have the power to collect the rent from

Pakistan if and when the Pakistani government stopped the payments. London's

participation in the agreement would be vital to ensure the observance of all conditions

agreed upon by all the concerned parties. Without British participation, Said argued, he

would be forced to reject Pakistan's offer. Furthermore, Said was well aware of

Whitehall's position against a third party bargaining between Muscat and Islamabad. In

essence, the Sultan appeared to oblige British requests, while repeatedly maintaining his

earlier assertion: "[Sultan] could not willingly part with any of his dominions" (Joyce

1995: 70).

93 An example of this is an article that appeared in the Pakistani press blaming the British for not
doing enough for Pakistan:
Some Arabs, particularly those from the Persian Gulf States, are usually born smugglers. Be it
diamonds or gold, opium or hashish (charas), limousines or unimportable silks, one can count on a
particular type of Arab to deliver them. Operating from Gawadur, with the help of the local Mekrani
population, they have coolly deprived the Government of Pakistan of scores of rupees in import duties
(Joyce 1995: 72).

92
 The pressure to sell Gawadur did not subside. Writing in 1957, Sir Bernard

seemed to be among the few who continued to stress the importance of selling Gawadur

to Pakistan, while showing some sympathy for Sultan Said:

We are asking him to take a gamble with an important part of his patrimony in
circumstances in which many of the determining factors are unknown, such as the
presence of oil both in Muscat and in Gawadur, the future general policy of
Pakistan... (Joyce 1995: 74-75).

It is puzzling that Sir Bernard would mention the possibility of finding oil in

Gawadur when he knew, or at least should have known, that hope for finding oil had been

abandoned in Gawadur as early as 1939 (Joyce 1995: 67). Sir Bernard's sympathy

notwithstanding, by July 1958 Sultan Said had finally capitulated and agreed to sell

Gawadur. Joyce claims that the Sultan's reluctant agreement came "not out of concern for

Pakistan, but in order to help the British" (Joyce 1995: 79). This is highly unlikely. If

Said's desire was to please London, then he would have relinquished Gawadur in 1955

when the pressure first started mounting. Indeed, he could have relinquished Gawadur as

early as the late 1940's given his desire to rid Muscat of its crippling debts. Furthermore,

Sultan Said was not the man likely to relinquish part of Muscat's territory to please

London. If anything, throughout his life, he had attempted to regain Muscat's authority

throughout Oman, rather than reduce Muscat's holdings, however distant. Even if he did

want to 'please' London, certainly there were many other ways London could have been

pleased, not the least of which involved initiating contacts with Saudi Arabia. Sultan Said

agreed to relinquish Gawadur for reasons which became clear in a conversation between

Sultan Said and Britain's Secretary of State:

Secretary of State Julian Amery, 'The point he had in mind was that the position
which the Sultan took up on Gwadur must inevitably affect Her Majesty's

93
 Government handling of the agreements on the matters, particularly with regard to
their presentation in Parliament and elsewhere and in regard to timing. Pakistan's
interest in Gwadur led them to very interested in the other matters. The Pakistanis
knew that the Sultan was having discussions with Her Majesty's Government.
Their pressure was mounting. If the Sultan did nothing about Gwadur, the
Pakistanis might do something at any moment which would make the Sultan's
position very difficult, and which Her Majesty's Government could not
94
prevent.'

This meeting took place in June 1958 at the height of Imamate control of Al-

Akhdar Mountain and a month before the July "Agreement" of 1958. The crux of the

Secretary's comments to Sultan Said that "Pakistanis might do something at any moment

which would make the Sultan's position very difficult, and which Her Majesty's

Government could not prevent", is nothing short of a veiled threat. If and when Pakistan

opted for a military solution and occupied Gawadur, HMG would be either unable or

unwilling to restrain Islamabad. As such, Sultan Said would stand to lose both: the

territory and the possibility of renting or selling the enclave. Peterson's brief

interpretation of the sale of Gawadur rests on the conclusion that the rebellion of 1957-

1959 was simply beyond the financial capabilities of the Sultan, and thus he was forced

to sell the enclave (Peterson 1976: 87-88). It is undeniably more realistic than Joyce's,

but not entirely accurate either. Careful reading of a secret record from the Prime

Minister's office may shed some light. The record summarizes the most salient points

discussed and agreed upon by Sultan Said in a private visit to London between 25 May

and 27 July 1958:

94 PREM 11/4923 100752: Secret: Records of Conversation Between the Secretary of State and
His Highness the Sultan of Muscat and Oman at the House of Commons On Thursday, 12 June 1958, at 4
p.m.

94
 The Sultan stayed his hand on Gwadur until towards the end of the talks. He had
been given to understand that Her Majesty's Government would not necessarily
make a settlement on Gwadur a pre-condition of agreement on the subsidy.
Nevertheless, care was taken to avoid completing the arrangement for the subsidy
until the Sultan had both shown his willingness to transfer Gwadur and had
indicated the probable size of his requirements for the rent of Masirah.95

A casual reading of the document seems to vindicate Peterson's conclusion,

namely that the sale of Gawadur was due to the revenue needed to finance the campaigns

against the rebels. However, this is not the case. Whitehall was well aware that if the

money gained from the sale of Gawadur was sufficient for Sultan Said's financial

requirements to carry out the campaign against the Imamate forces, then threatening to

withhold assistance until the sale of Gawadur was finalized was useless (since the

finances needed for the campaign presumably would be already available from the sale of

Gawadur). Realistically, both the Sultan and Whitehall knew that the sale of Gawadur

would not produce sufficient funding for the military campaign against the Imamate

forces. To make the point, Said had insisted upon certain conditions for the sale: he

demanded that the amount should be

3 million as compensation for loss of revenue and that he should have a lien on 10
per cent of any profits resulting from the discovery of oil for 25 years from the
date of the commercial production. The Sultan also attached importance to the
continued supply of recruits from Gawadur for his army. 96

95 PREM 11/4923: Secret: Visit of The Sultan of Muscat and Oman: 20 August 1958.

96 Ibid.

95
 Comparing this to the amount of subsidies granted to Muscat, it becomes clear

that the sale of Gawadur was not going to generate the necessary capital. Subsidies would

be a necessity:

As regards the subsidy involved in the proposals for military reorganization and
civil development97 in the Sultanate, the talks were delayed during the first weeks
of the Sultan's stay when it became clear that the costs of the assistance which
Her Majesty's Government had undertaken to give were considerably in excess of
the estimates made at the time of Mr. Amery's mission...In the event, after a
major reduction in the building programme for the army as envisaged in January,
the amount of the subsidy was agreed by Her majesty's Government at about
$540,000 total capital and about $375,000 recurrent expenditure in a normal year,
an increase of $176,000 and $4,000 respectively over the figures in January. 98

Gawadur was not sold to finance the campaign; the amount was simply too small

to accomplish the task at hand, especially since the exact estimate of the sale price would

be difficult to ascertain. A steady and secure flow of subsidies clearly was more

important than the one time sum the sale of Gawadur could provide. For all intents and

purposes, the possibility that Pakistan would occupy Gawadur militarily, and the Sultan's

need for British support to suppress the Imamate's rebellion eventually forced Sultan

97 It should be noted that Said was not of the view that civil development programs was necessary
to defeat the Imamate forces. As Peterson observes the "Sultan was particularly adept at manipulating
situations to suit himself. After the British had prevented his campaign to regain al-Buraymi in 1952, he
shrewdly acquired British support in 1958 without committing himself to anything more than an additional
subsidy for development" (Peterson 78: 57). Timpe also makes the same point when he states that the
British development program would have been very expensive and the Sultan
would have been faced with the decision wither to reduce his financial reserves or to borrow the
money from the British. Neither option was acceptable to a man who had paid his father's debts to the
British and had initiated and then scrupulously adhered to a financial management system that precluded
foreign debt. The Sultan knew that he may not have been able to stop the British development program, but
he was not willing to pay for it. He manipulated the British Government so that they paid the entire coast of
the civil development programs, at least through 1958-59 (Timpe 1991: 310).

98 PREM 11/ 4923: Secret: Visit of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman: 20 August 1958.

96
Said to relinquish Gawadur. As late as November 1955, the Foreign Office reviewed the

Gawadur issue:

... unlike other gulf rulers, the Sultan of Muscat was an independent ruler. He did
however, lean heavily on British support and had steadfastly refused to negotiate
with the Pakistanis except through London. Nevertheless, the Foreign Office was
still unable to convince the Sultan to sell Gawadur. The Sultan professed "to fear
posterity if he traded away his ancestral rights (Joyce: 1995: 73).

If the Gawadur issue had been resolved to the satisfaction of some of the parties at

least, Buraimi, proved to be much more of a quandary for all parties concerned. A

complex web of events and personalities became entangled with what seemed to be a

wretched fight over a territory completely devoid of oil. The extent of diplomatic

maneuvering, energy, and time spent on this issue, as evidenced in British Archives, let

alone the archives in Riyadh, Muscat, and Abu Dhabi is confounding. Was Buraimi only

a means to an end? Was it the prestige of a nation state or that of a King and Sultan? 99

What role did Muscat play? And was London ever an honest party?

By the late 1950's, the threat to Muscat from the interior had been shattered, yet it

was by no means eliminated. Equally important was Muscat's struggle with a new and

much more dangerous foe emanating from Southern Oman (Dhofar). Beginning in 1965,

communist-inspired guerilla attacks were proceeding with increasing success against

Sultan Said. Moreover, London's decision, under Harold Wilson (reflected in the "White

99 The British were very much aware of this, and they would even repeat it themselves to Saudi
policy makers as in the following conversation between British Ambassador and Prince Fahad at the time:
"The Ambassador said the he recognized that for King Feisal the Buraimi affair was not simply a question
of a piece of land: his pride was engaged and his feelings were very strong" (FCO8/964: Confidential:
Record of conversation between the British Ambassador in Saudi Arabia and Prince Fahd, Second Deputy
Prime Minster, at Taif on 8 July 1969).

97
Paper" document of 1967) to end nearly a century and a half of British dominance in the

Gulf by 1971 raised eyebrows among the Gulf leaders who were mindful of external

threats not only to their stability, but also to their very existence. The threats stemmed

from the rising tide of pan-Arabism. Within the Arabian Peninsula, London had

recognized the weakness of the Trucial Principalities as well as their importance to

British interests, and had proposed a federation of nine-the seven Trucial States plus

Qatar and Bahrain. Such a federation, London presumed, would create a more viable

political and economic entity that would survive British departure at the end of 1971.

Most Gulf rulers were anxious over the British decision and attempted to reverse it with

whatever means they thought appropriate at the time:

-The Political Resident said that the purpose of his visit to the Ruler was to inform
the Ruler of H.M.G's decision on the offer made by Shaikh Zaid and other Gulf
Rulers to contribute to the coast of maintaining British military forces in the Gulf.
This offer had been made by Shaikh Zaid to the Minster of State during the
latter's visist to Abu Dhabi on 9 January, 1968 and more recently to the Political
Resident by the Ruler of Bahrain, Qatar and Abu Dhabi. On this occasion the
Ruler of Dubai had asked for an early reply form H.M.G to the offer.

-The official reply from H.M.G which the political Resident had been instructed
to deliver to the four Rulers concerned was that while H.M.G were grateful to the
Rulers for their offer and appreciated the spirit in which it had been made they
regretted that they could not accept the offer...there was a financial reason for
withdrawing H.M Forces from the Gulf but another reason was the decision not to
maintain overseas forces in a global basis.'

100 F01016/760: Confidential: Records of Conversation between the Political Resident and the
Ruler or Abu Dhabi in Abu Dhabi on 30 January, 1968. British foreign Secretary commented to the daily
star in 1967 that British withdrawal was necessary for "if we attempted to keep an effective military
presence in that area after 1971, much more that local costs are involved. It would place a sever burden on
the logistic backing required from our forces which would then be concentrated here in Europe" (Daily Star
(Beirut) 27 Jan. 1968).

98
 Only two countries were missing from this group: Oman and Saudi Arabia. As far

as Oman was concerned, British withdrawal' 0 ' did not concern Muscat since London was

not withdrawing her forces from Muscat. In addition, in light of Muscat's poverty, Sultan

Said was in no position to offer financial incentives to London. The Saudis on the other

hand, were hostile to the proposed federation. They reasoned that the federation would

never succeed, and worse yet, might open the door for "progressive" elements to

penetrate this weak entity to the disadvantage of Riyadh. Two key factors led the Saudis

to finally welcome the federation. First was Nasser's crushing defeat in 1967, coupled

with the subsequent moderation of Egypt's regional foreign policy. Second was the

opportunity this withdrawal presented to Riyadh to exert her hegemony over the region

especially in areas where she had failed in the past (Mordechai 1974: 16). About no area

was Riyadh more adamant than Buraimi.

When the question of the proposed federation was posed to Faisal, he made it

clear that this federation must "not include Buraimi which was Saudi territory."1 02 Saudi

representatives had in fact made glaring threats against Sultan Said, and, as the following

record indicates, against Zaid of Abu Dhabi:

Pharon [King Faisal's advisor] then said that Zaid should have regarded to his
long-term interest: it was obvious that the British would leave the Gulf in a few
years time and Zaid would then have to face the Saudis alone and be in no
position to resist should they then wish to assert sovereignty over Buraimi. The

101 For a detailed discussion on British withdrawal from the Middle East, see Abadi, Jacob (1982)
Britain's Withdrawal From the Middle East. 1947-1971: Princeton NJ: Kingston Press.

102 FCO 8 45: Confidential: Saudi Arabia and the Gulf: British Embassy: 17 January 1968.

99
 Saudis know this well and are prepared to wait these few years if necessary
though they would like an amicable settlement earlier. For the King and Saudis
this matter is entirely one of prestige: the Regime must be able to show to Saudi
Arabia and the world that Saudi Arabia has regained her sovereignty over Buraimi
... they could not contemplate now letting it be seen by the people of SA and
elsewhere that a country of SA position and strength had weakly had to concede
their claim to a small place like Abu Dhabi.'*3

London, on the other hand, made it clear to Riyadh, that Whitehall did not enjoy

the amount of power over the Gulf rulers that Riyadh continuously alleged:

I told Pharaon that he really must not see the wicked hand of the British in every
failure of a Gulf Ruler to accept Saudi proposals...in a case like Buraimi, so long
as Zayid maintained his position and had good arguments to support it we were
bound by treaty to take his side; and in any case we could not, even if we wanted
to, impose our advice upon him. The Saudis should realize that Gulf Rulers might
sometimes find it convenient to say that, though they were willing to accept a
Saudi suggestion, the British would not let them; but it was seldom true.104

The Saudis were obviously not impressed with the "alleged" autonomy of Gulf

rulers; as the Saudi Ambassador clearly articulated:

I was talking to the Saudi Arabian Ambassador on the 13 February...brushed

aside the suggestion that Zaid was in any way a free agent in this. It was the
British Government who had called the tune over Buraimi...Zaid had face to
save, Britain had face to save; the Sultan had face to save and Saudi Arabia had
face to save; the only way that this could be done would be for the four parties to
administer the area under some sort of condominium.' 5

To claim that Gulf rulers had absolute control over the affair of Buraimi is a

dubious conclusion, but to insinuate that "it was the British Government who called the

tune over Buraimi", is equally improbable. Abu-Dhabi is a small place, but it was ruled

103 FCO 8/60: Confidential: Jedda to Foreign Office: 1 October 1967.

104 FCO 8/60: Confidential: Abu Dhabi/Saudi Relations: 27 March 1968

105 FCO 8/59: Confidential: Buraimi: document date is 16 February 1967.

100
by a shrewd man who understood perfectly well, maybe even more than the British

themselves, King Faisal's strengths and limitations. He set out to meet the King, and

stayed in Riyadh from 12 April through 16 April 1967. Zaid's words were in the Bedouin

tradition even more obliging. He said that "[SIC] King Faisal was his father and he the

son King Faisal must tell his son what he wanted of him in way of help and co-

operation...urging him to speak as 'one who was great to one who was small, as one who

10 6 These words were masking the simple fact that Zaid had
was admired to his admirer."'

recognized, as evident in his own words, that "he had two enemies, Nasser and Saudi

Arabia." 107

Nothing concrete came out of the visit except maybe for Zaid himself who saw

the visit as an opportunity to assess Riyadh's true intentions. London was pushing Zaid to

be flexible (although what was meant by flexibility is not clear) with King Faisal and to

look for a final solution. Shaikh Zaid's words were encouraging according to London.

This optimism was not well placed for Zaid's own subtle, but clear, words undoubtedly

indicated that Buraimi would not be relinquished: "It is possible to take blood from any

106 FCO 8/59: Confidential: H.B.M. Political Agency, Abu Dhabi: Shaikh Zaid's Visit to Saudi
Arabia: 19 April 1967.
It should be noted that Faisal was not a man to be cajoled with sweet words; he was a remarkable
personality in Saudi history, and probably the single most important figure to influence Saudi history after
his late father. In a reproduced remark below made few months after the meeting; Faisal either recognized
that the negotiations were going no where with Zaid, thus the threat, or he was simply venting his
frustration: "Referring [to] Buraimi he declared that, if he wanted to, he could overthrow Zaid within
twenty-four hours by suing Zaid's own people, but he would resist the temptation to take such action
because he did not approve of settling disputes by violence" (FCO 8/60: Confidential: British Embassy:
Buraimi: 29 October 1967).
107 A4-35 FCO 8/59: Confidential: H.B.M. Political Agency, Abu Dhabi: Shaikh Zais's
Visit to
Saudi Arabia: 19 April 1967.

101
part of a man's body, without killing him, except from his heart." 0 8 He however kept

informing London of his support for an amicable solution with Faisal, and his

understanding (which he repeatedly communicated) that Faisal's dignity and prestige

must be preserved in this matter, especially since the "continued failure to solve the

problem was placing him in an increasingly humiliating position vis-'-vis the Arab

League because his enemies were exploiting his apparent inability to stick up for Saudi

Arabia's." 109 Zaid's own prudent assessment of Faisal and the situation, as he returned

from his visit, explains it best:

So far as the Saudi position was concerned, Zaid's considered that the visit had
made two things quite clear:

a) that the Saudis, from the King Faisal downwards, were tired of the dispute and
wanted to bury it for at least a time; but
b) they were greatly afraid of President Nasser and seriously worried about the
situation inside Saudi Arabia. Indeed the Saudis seemed obsessed with their own
domestic problems and had no real energy left for matters outside their borders.

Zaid accepted that the combination of these two points meant that King Faisal
could not be seen publicly to give up his claim, though Zaid believed that he
would do nothing to pursue it while circumstances remained as at present...On
the other hand, Zaid said he was under no illusions about the long term...and that
he believed that when the Saudis were relieved of their dear Nasser, they would
inevitably raise the Buraimi claim again unless they had been persuaded to drop it
0
meanwhile."

108 FO 8/59: Meeting Between King Faisal and Shaikh Zaid: 11 April 1967

109 FCO 8/59: Confidential: British Political Agency, Abu Dhabi: 11 April 1967.

110 FCO 8/59: Confidential: Priority: Bahrain to Foreign Office: 18 April 1967.
Even the late King Hussein of Jordan was becoming involved in this Buraimi dispute, as the
following letter from Hussein to Zaid indicates:
Translation
H.H. Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan.

102
 What was more urgent, and more important in Sheikh Zaid's mind was where the

British stood in all of this, as the following memo illustrates:

The Ruler {Shikh Zaid} said that he agreed with all you had said; but he wished
to be assured on one point; HMG's position. It seemed that in these days
whenever a country got angry with HMG the latter gave into it. Now King Faisal
was playing a two-stringed lute, one string being HMG and the other Abu Dhabi.
If both strings were in tune King Faisal would be able to play a tune suitable for
dancing. But if they were not in tune the music would be bad and the dancers
would be thrown out of step. Moving away from his metaphor, Shaikh Zaid said
that he knew his own policy and he though he knew HMG's...Were HMG's and
his policies the same?'"

I send to Your Highness, my dear brother, my sincere greetings and best wishes for health,
happiness and prosperity.
I have received Your Highness' letter dated 18 Muharram 1387. I was very pleased by Your
Highness' praise of the mission we sent for Your Highness' services and that of your sister country. I was
also very pleased to hear from H.E Sayyid Ahmad al Tarawneh of Your Highness' care and solicitude for
the mission. I should like Your Highness' my brother to be assured that nay service we can offer to your
sister country in the sphere of management, organization of services and steadying the framework of
government on sound technical bases, making use of the experience we have acquired-we feel we re
offering this service to ourselves and shall not hesitate to favour your sister country with valuable skills
even as ourselves, hoping to spare you dear country the experience of right and wrong we have largely
suffered in the past.
I was grieved to hear from Your Highness that frontier problems remain between you and sister
Saudi Arabia. I cordially thank Your Highness for acquainting me with what passed between you and His
Majesty my brother King Faisal. Even if you had not given me the details I should have been considered a
party to the problem, since our struggle against the forces of evil and heresy, which threaten us all, obliges
us all to support each other and put an end to anything which tends to cause any misunderstanding or
disagreement.
On this basis I promise Your Highness that I shall return to the charge and speak with my brother
His Majesty king Faisal. If necessary I shall myself get into personal contact with him. I am confident that
we shall together be able to produce a universally satisfactory solution to this question. To this end I hope
you will find it convenient and useful to furnish me with your poinht of view in writing with details, in the
hope that this will help me to act as mediator towards a solution which will satisfy everyone.
We await with extreme longing the fixing of the date of your visit to your county and people in
Jordan. May God help and protect you and guide you to his pleasure, and grant us the victory he promised.
Usual ending
(signed) Husseing Bin Talal
Amman 2 Safar 1387 A.H.
11 May 1967 A.D.

FCO 8/59: Confidential: British Political Agency, Abu Dhabi: Meeting Between King Faisal
and Shaikh Zaid: 11 April 67.

103
 London's position on the Buraimi dispute vis-a-vis Muscat, Abu-Dhabi, and

Riyadh, coupled with the question of the federation and British policy in the region, is

accurately reported in this remarkably candid memo sent from the British Embassy in

Jedda on 25 June 1969. It is reproduced here almost in its entirety due to its importance to

this chapter:

As always, it is what the King wants that matters. My estimate at present is that he
is sincere in saying that he wants the Federation of the Nine to work and that
although he is depressed and anxious about the prospects for it, he dose not have
an alternative option which he is consciously pursuing-except in the vague sense
of believing that Saudi Arabia will not tolerate a repetition of South Arabia in the
Gulf and "will have to act" if that is threatened. I believe that his support for the
Federation derives from his naturally caution, from the advice he receives from
people... from his realisation that if Saudi Arabia starts throwing her weight in
the Gulf area, the beneficiaries may be Saudi Arabia's enemies, and from his
belief that he cannot afford to antagonize the Iranians, or engage in competition
with them-support for the Federation is a way of getting others to keep their
hands off... [in reference to Buraimi]...Here, I think what counts is the question of
face-honour, as Feisal calls it; jealousy and irritation at Zaid's prosperity and the
way in which it has enabled him to out-smart the Saudis; and similar frustration at
the knowledge that H.M.G have out-smarted him by 15 years of fair words and
stalling, which remains basically our policy on the Buraimi dispute...I do not
think, then, that we can really talk of a "Saudi policy" on this issue...the King is
ruled by two conflicting principles: he must support the idea of a U.A.E because it
meets all the right criteria of good statecraft and good Arabism; at the same time
he wants Buraimi as a child wants to go to the circus, and when nanny put him off
until there is only a day or two left before the circus leaves town, he becomes
frustrated and petulant. His head may tell him to give up the struggle; his pride
will not let him. He racks his brains to think of something to do, but there is
nothing. So he continues to wriggle and grin and to kick nanny in the shins...So
what do we do? There is a case for saying we should do nothing; just keep calm
and let him go on kicking. It is after all almost inconceivable that Saudi Arabia
will invade Abu Dhabi either before or after we leave...But if there is to be a
solution, one side had to give way. We surely must rule out any idea of neutral
zones or condominiums as suggested...If it were possible that the offer of a piece

104
 of territory other than Buraimi-even access to the sea at Khor el Odaid-would
satisfy Feisal, then I might recommend that we should seriously consider urging it
on Zaid. But all evidence available at present suggests that this would not do the
trick...In spite of discouragements, we must therefore continue to press the
suggestion which you will see was put forward by our side at all three meetings:
that Feisal should offer, on condition that the U.A.E." 2 is established as a working
institution, a birthday present of the withdrawal of his claims on the member
states. This would more that save his honour: it would enhance it...But not now,
and not by us. Not now because the best time will be when the Bahrain issue is
settled and it can be represented to Feisal that if an Iranian can be magnanimous
to the new -born Union, how much more so should be its Arab uncle. And not by
us, because a climb down by Feisal would represent the successful conclusion of
fifteen years of British diplomacy-and he would know what we had done. Who
then might persuade him? Not his own advisers: they do not have the stature.
Perhaps the Shah? Perhaps the Rulers of Bahrain, Qatar and Dubai in a delegation
of friendly mediator and the scene would be right-three rulers entreating their
revered senior to make a generous gesture." 3

If Riyadh agreed to meet and negotiate with Shaikh Zaid, it took a much harder

line with Sultan Said, as a report from the British embassy in Saudi Arabia indicates:

... I must state the obvious, namely that Faisal does not like the Sultan because the
latter is sitting in what Faisal considers to be his territory...Buraimi is Faisal's
blind spot and it is even blinder in the case of the Sultan because it was from the
Sultan's sector that we expelled the Saudis by force in 1955. Faisal was Foreign
Minister at the time and this humiliation has rankled deeply ever since...what
Faisal is after is Buraimi. Perhaps, too, Faisal sees the Sultan as a major barrier to
the assertion of Saudi sovereignty in South East Arabia." 4

112 It should be noted that Sultan Said's opinion on the future

of the Union of Arab Emirates,
proved to be prophetic:
though there were too great inherent differences between Bahrain and Qatar on the one hand and
the Trucial States on the other for a Union embracing them all to stick together. He thought a Union
consisting only of the Trucial States could be brought into being relatively easily if Qatar stopped
interfering (FCO 8/585: Confidential: Notes on Conversation between the Sultan and the Political Resident
between 12 and 14 May 1968).
113 FCO8/964: Confidential: British Embassy, Jedda: Saudi/Abu Dhabi Relations. 25 June 1969.

114 FCO 8/583: Secret: King Faisal's Relations with the Sultan: British Embassy: 19 April 1967.

105
 The situation in Muscat was no better; the Sultan's position regarding Riyadh

seemed to have hardened over time:

The Sultan's thinking remains dominated by the Saudi aggression of the early
fifties and the total duplicity they practiced in support of their policy of
expansion, by the Saudi support of the cause of the Imam from 1956 until
recently...by the rebels have in the past been able to cross Saudi Arabia to enter
Dhofar with arms...The Sultan considers that HMG have always been soft on the
Saudis. We were in his eyes proved wrong to have restrained him from turning
Turki out of Buraimi in 1952, to have believed in the possibility of an honest
arbitration, and to have tried to persuade him to make concessions over the
Buraimi rebels...we are not therefore well placed to convince him that there has
been a genuine change of heart on the part of the Saudis" 5 ... By the same token I
think that it is essential that James Craig and others in Jedda should peg away at
educating the Saudis...about the common interest of the two countries in keeping
out subversion and communist infiltration (exemplified by the Dhofari rebel who
was killed inside the Sultanate, but near the P.R.S.Y border on 24 June, and was
found to be wearing a Mao Tse Tung badge and carrying a communist automatic.

115 The ensuing record basically repeats the same themes, but with one exception, and
that is the
idea that Faisal was "confining himself to harmless hospitality [of the exiles]":
We had considered briefing you to speak to King Faisal about the possibility of a rapprochement
between himself and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman...The main point is that as seen from the Sultanate
the obstacle to better relations have arisen from the Saudi side (sheltering exiles, arms and facilities for
rebels, etc.). We believe King Faisal is now confining himself to harmless hospitality to the Sultan who
whatever his interests in compromise, will not make any move before, as the aggrieved party, seeing a clear
improvement in the Saudi attitude...One possibility, which was suggested by the Political Resident when
he arrived here on leave, is that the Saudis might take some initiative in killing off the increasingly
pointless UN debates on Oman...The Saudis might be able to argue that with Israel as the main point, this
is no year for the Arabs to stir up other issues which can only serve the Soviet occupiers of Czechoslovakia
and extend Communist scope in the Arab world (FCO 8/583: Confidential: Saudi/Sultanate Relations:
Foreign Office, 23 August, 1968).
I doubt that Faisal was ever willing to compromise with Sultan Said; and this "harmless
hospitality" did not seem to stop the Saudi's from distributing such handouts as late as September 1968, as
revealed in the following record:
I enclose in a translation a copy of a leaflet which arrived at the Agency yesterday in an envelope
bearing a Beirut postmark:
Now that the mass of Saudi Arab people have despaired of the United Nations organization and
the Security Council as a means of recovering the usurped potion of Saudi-Omani territory which is ruled y
the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and bys some of the Rulers of the Protected States, as the young Saudi
warriors call to the attention of Said citizens their struggles and battles in order to recover this holy portion
of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and in particular the sacred oasis of Buraimi and surrounding territory for
which we shall sacrifice our hearts and souls. The day of liberation from the hand of imperialists and his
lackey, the Sultan of Muscat, is at hand. We call you, O Saudis, to sacrifice and martyrdom for the sake of
Allah (FCO 8/964: Confidential: British Political Agency-Abu Dhabi: 15 September 1969).

106
 If the Saudis should come around to a real rethinking about Buraimi, so much the
better, but I realize that this is unlikely to happen soon."'

The Dhofar Rebellion and the End of Said's Reign

Whether Buraimi was the King's "blind spot", or whether Sultan Said stood in the

way of Saudi hegemonic ambitions remained a moot point. By the 1960's Muscat had to

contend not only with Saudi support for the Imamate forces, but also with a combination

of Communist and nationalist inspired rebels in southern Oman (the region of Dhofar).

Riyadh continued to deny support for such groups, but both British as well as American

7
archives of the period indicate that Saudi Arabia was supporting the Dhofari rebels."

What is surprising about Saudi support, as a confidential State Department assessments

states, is that while the Saudi Government continues to permit "arms believed to originate

in Kuwait and Iraq to transit Saudi territory for Omani rebels and the Dhofar Liberation

Front...the Saudis seem to be mistakenly looking at Dhofar exclusively in the context of

their traditional dislike for the Sultan and overlooking the danger to themselves of a
118
potentially hostile regime on their periphery."

116 FCO 8/583: Secret: British Residency, Bahrain: Saudi Omani Relations: 9 July 1968.

117 Faisal denied that training was taking place: "Indicating that the scope of this assistance
has
been expanding. I understand that Faisal has denied that military training is being given in Saudi Arabia to
the rebel recruits; but the evidence suggests that not only Omani but also Dhofari rebels are receiving
military training at Taif. The reports have also mentioned other kinds of help to subversive movements in
the Sultanate" (FCO 8/583: Secret: British Residency Bahrain: King Faisal's relations with the Sultan: 4
April 1967).
118 Summary of annual U.S policy assessment toward Saudi Arabia: Departement
Of State:
Confidential: Issue Date: 30 Mar 1966.

107
 As the report indicates even Kuwait, (the word "even" is warranted here because

such support was expected from a radical state like Iraq, but not from Kuwait which had

neither sympathy for the rebels, nor a bone to pick with Sultan Said), supported the

Imamate and had an Imamate office at its capital. Presumably the consolidation of

Muscat's authority should be in Kuwait's best interest, argued the British Consulate in

Muscat. This would be true since the more vulnerable his position, the greater would be

the threat for the Saudis to

grab Buraimi and for the Iranians to grab the southern side of the Gulf of Hormuz:
and presumably one this which Kuwait can do without is the start of a practice
whereby large powers in the Gulf grab territory from smaller neighbors... an
essential prerequisite will be their ceasing to recognize the imam and, in general,
their hampering rather than helping the activities in Kuwait of those of the
Sultan's subjects who are working to overthrow him.' 9

119 FCO 8/638: Confidential: British Consulate General, Muscat: 31 August

1968.
Apparently there was some hope/optimism that Kuwait would cease to support the Imamate cause
and the rebels, as the following record indicates:
Since I came back from leave I have noticed a perceptible increase in Kuwait interest in the
Sultanate...It is perhaps natural that this should be so: our decision to leave the Gulf has increased Kuwaiti
interests in the Sheikhdoms for which we have in the past been responsible and, for the time being at least,
made it constructive.. .It is as if the Kuwaits have just realized that he is a man to be reckoned with when
they are thinking of the future of the Gulf; and their main interest is in his attitude to the U.A.E and the
prospects of his joining it in some way...Is that they recognized this and that some people (including
himself) were thinking that it was about time that the Imamate Office was closed down (FCO 8/683:
Confidential: British Embassy Kuwait: 20 August 1968).
However, this hope was misplaced as the following record shows:
Like you I am a little skeptical of the chances of the Kuwaitis taking any action against the rebels
or closing down the imamate office. I imagine that they would first have to hoist in fully that they are
backing a very lame horse, and that they would still then need to consult the Saudis about risking the
reactions of the Arab League and 'progressive' opinion. We are however all for them consulting the Saudis
inasmuch as this might put the Saudis to take a fresh stock (FCO 8/638: Confidential: Kuwait and the
Sultanate: Foreign Office: 11 September 1968).

108
 Just when it seemed that Muscat was finally in control of the country and that the

Imamate cause was defeated militarily, new and old dangers joined forces and put in

motion a chain of events that eventually led to Sultan Said's abdication in 1970.

The cause of the Imamate may have begun as a defense of an Omani/Ibadi

institution it was, however, dead by the day the rebels worked with Saudi Arabia and then

became entangled with Pan-Arab causes. Halliday's assertion is that "the Imamist

movement was incapable of leading a mass struggle against imperialism because of its

own class interests and because it relied on a traditional tribal military system. It had

failed and was discredited" and, therefore, the task of leading and "freeing the people of

Oman awaited a more determined revolutionary leadership" (Halliday 1974: 284).

Halliday, however, completely misses the mark. The whole notion of a "struggle against

imperialist forces" is alien to the Imamate. Even the vocabulary must have sounded quite

bizarre, if not altogether unintelligible. Indeed the Imamate movement failed, and was

discredited because it abandoned its original social and religious base for a broad struggle

against imperialism. The Imamate struggle had become under Saudi aid and Egyptian

rhetoric an essential part of the Arab nationalist struggle, the fight for Arab socialism, or

the struggle against the imperialist forces. In other words, the Imamate cause had lost its

authenticity and simply degenerated into symbols and slogans of an entirely different

cause.

While Arab nationalism is a complex phenomenon and a very modern one, the

Imamate core was and remains fundamentally religious/tribal with deep roots that are

essentially local. The language of an "Army of Liberation", with its nationalistic zeal

may have aroused the curiosity of some, but indifference was evidently the dominant

109
mood. How could the cause of the Ibadi Imamate be enhanced by the portrayal of the

Imamate

to the world at large as an instrument of revolutionary nationalism; with the

issuing of pronouncements in Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad about a shared faith
in Arab socialism; with public affirmation of solidarity with a weird miscellany of
alien governments and causes; and with the soliciting of pecuniary aid in capitals
as far as London and Peking (Kelly 1980: 118).

Furthermore, Riyadh had been historically hostile to the Imamate for various

religious and not so religious reasons. Wahhabi antipathy toward Ibadia and their

Imamate is centuries old.12 0 Thus, for the Imamate to seek support from Riyadh must

have been intolerable for many of the Ibadia religious and tribal leaders.

Ironically, even Beijing was enlisted to support the Imamate cause. Yet what also

is surprising is the almost total absence of scholarly interest in China's role in supporting

the Imamate. Very little is discussed by Peterson, Townsend and Allen. Despite the fact

that China's connection with Oman's 'nationalist' movement was its first political

involvement in the Arabian Peninsula (Behbehani 1981: 164), initial contacts were

through the Imamate office and the Chinese embassy in Cairo during the 1950's.121

120 For a short review of the Wahhabi onslaught on Oman, see Kelly's (1956). "The Buraimi
Oasis Dispute." International Affairs. 32: 318-326.

121 China's political support to the imamate can be clearly seen from the announcements made by
China's embassy in Cairo:
The Chinese people sympathize with the Omani people in their struggle against imperialism,
Chinese Ambassador Chen Chia-Kang told the Director of Oman office, Mohamed Al-Harsy [al-Harithi]
when the latter called on the Ambassador today. The Omani representative told the Ambassador about
British aggression in Oman and asked whether he had received the memorandum of the Arab League
soliciting support for the Omani people from the Bandung Conference countries. The Ambassador said he
had received the memorandum and would forward it to his government as soon as possible. (Behbhani 81:
166).

110
Although China's offer of military aid in 1957 was rejected by the Imamate, this did not

end contacts and culminated in a visit by Sheikh Saleh bin Isa Al-Harthy, one of the main

leaders of the Imamate, to Beijing from 29 January to 20 February 1959. There he met

Mao and Zhou (Huwaidin 2002: 103). It should be noted that from 1955 to the palace

coup of 1970, China continued to "associate the former Sultan Said's rule with British

imperialism and the oppression of the Omani people." China has "never denounced any

other Arab head of state over such a long period and with such intensity" (Behbehani

1981: 164). In turn, the Imamate representative being interviewed in Cairo declared that

All Asian-African countries were united in opposition to imperialism and Oman

would soon send delegations to all Asian and African countries, including China,
to explain the Omani cause and ask for help. As regards China, he affirmed the
Omani people's full support to the just struggle of China to restore Taiwan; he
also asked that the best wishes of the Omani people be conveyed to the Chinese
government and people, thanking them for their support of the Omani struggle.
He emphasized that he was in complete agreement with Chariman Mao Tse-tun's
statement that 'imperialists and all reactionaries are paper tigers' (Behbehani
1981: 164).

Rhetoric aside, the Imamate had been reluctant to accept military aid from

Beijing. The record shows that as late as 1969, the Imamate movement, or at least its

leadership, continued to resist assistance beyond political and moral support from South

Yemen, the USSR and China. A memo from the British Embassy at Beirut dated 5 March

1969 bears witness:

he regarded the matter as now with urgency in that there were proposals for
substantial aid from the PRSY, made, I understand, three or four months ago,
which the Imam and his associates were under strong pressure to accept. They did
not wish to do so because they were doubtful of the motives of the Adenes and in
any case did not wish to become indebted to or involved with people of their ilk.

111
 Their young men, however, did not share these inhibitions, and they feared that, if
no solution could be arrived at, their control over the Omani rebels would
disappear.1

Imamate representatives were simply not willing to go as far as accepting military

and logistical aid from avowed Marxists. Yet, we should not discount the possibility that

such support was not offered by the date specified above. The representative may have

been bluffing to pressure London to the negotiating table. After years of violent and not

so violent resistance the leaders may have recognized the futility of their struggle.

According to Behbehani, China's support for the Imamate was essentially over by 1968.

Behbehani concludes that the lack of Beijing's military aid to the Imamate forces was not

only the product of the latter's reluctance, but also a simple reality that the Imam did not

have either a regular or an irregular army. And it was not possible to send Omanis to be

trained in China; most members of the "nationalist movement" were already being

trained in Syria and Iraq (Behbehani 1981: 171).

It seems more likely however that Beijing recognized that the Imamate was a

spent military force though it was still a political player outside of Oman. More

importantly, Beijing recognized that the newly founded Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF)

that was dedicated to the "liberation" of the area of Dhofar from Sultan Said's rule was a

much more attractive alternative than the Imamate movement. The DLF was founded in

1962 and was composed of Dhofari insurgents and other exiles. Egypt allowed the group

to open an office in its capital while Iraq provided military training and aid (Allen 2000:

122 FCO 8 1072: Confidential: Omani Rebels: British Embassy,

Beirut: 5 March 1969.

112
27). When the Independent People's Democratic Republic of Yemen was established in

1967, the DLF expanded its activities. Since a more reliable supply of weapons and

support was closer to home. The most daring act for the DLF came in April 1966 "When

a group of Qara tribesmen loyal to the DLF but also serving in Said's bodyguard, the

Dhofar Force, attempted to assassinate the Sultan" (Allen 2000: 27). The attempt failed,

but it helped to isolate Sultan Said from the population. After the incident he hardly

ventured out of his palace (Peterson 78: 58). Indeed, Sultan Said's isolation was so

complete that "rumors were rife inside as well as outside the country that he was actually

dead and that the British ruled Oman in his name" (Peterson 1978: 68).

It was no longer sufficient to liberate Dhofar from Sultan Said, however, as the

movement adopted a much more militant Marxist ideology calling itself the Popular

Front for the Liberation of the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). By 1969, another group of

malcontents and Omani exiles belonging to various leftist organizations formed the

National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf

(NDFLOAG) in Iraq (Allen 2000: 27). The PFLOAG was ideologically akin to Beijing

and South Yemen, better organized, and more committed to the overthrow of Sultan Said.

As Behbehani asserts from 1968 to 1972, China was the only foreign nation that gave

military assistance to the PFLOAG (Behbehani 1981: 164). As to why China was the

choice of the DLF instead of the much more resourceful Soviet Union, the spokesman of

the PFLOAG commented "China at the time was championing 'world revolution through

armed struggle'; the contact with the Chinese embassy in Cairo began after the June war

during which Arab officials' feeling was one of disappointment at the lack of Soviet aid"

(Behbehani 1981: 164). In contrast to the Soviet Union that "sought to maintain

113
government-to-government ties, China moved toward supporting the anti-Western

imperialism struggle in South Yemen and the guerrilla war in Dhofar" (Huwaidin 2002:

103). It should be noted that just as Imamate leadership was not disposed to accepting

military aid from South Yemen, or from the "Marxists", the DLF also was not inclined to

work with the 'reactionary' Imamate movement. An Omani revolutionary speaking in

1971 made the following evaluation of the 1957-9 uprising:

The most important thing to say about Imam Ghalib's movement is that it
represented a clash within the imperialist camp. It was a conflict between the
Imam and Said bin Taimur, i.e. a conflict between an absolutist regime and a
caricature of that obsolete regime, represented by the Imam himself. When we say
that it is a conflict within the imperialist camp, we mean that behind Said bin
Taimur and Imam Ghalib were Britain on the one hand and America and Saudi
Arabia on the other. However, although the Imam's movement represented a
clash within the imperialist camp, it did have a sizable mass support; the masses
who supported the Imam supported him mainly as a patriotic reaction to the
British occupation of the interior of Oman in 1954 (Halliday 1974: 284).

Probing China's interests in assisting the PFLOAG is beyond the scope of this

chapter, but by the end of the 1950's the Sino-Soviet alliance was deteriorating rapidly,

and Beijing began to regard the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula as "an area of

Chinese-Soviet rivalry as well as a stage to wage a campaign against Western

imperialism" (Calabrese 1990: 862-75). Surprisingly however, the British Political

Resident in Bahrain was not sure Peking was actively involved in supporting the

PFLOAG as late as January 1969. He wrote

Soviet Bloc Involvement in Dhofar...

So far as can be judged from here, the Southern Yemen Government is not
actively concerning itself with events in Dhofar, but is acquiescing in support

114
 being given to the Dhofari rebels from Southern Yemen territory. This support
may be coming from Moscow, from Cairo and possibly from Peking (although
presumably not all in concert).'

Whether the Imamate representatives were bluffing or not, the Political Resident

in Bahrain had certainly concluded that the Imamate was a spent force. The following

record dated 3 September 1968 demonstrates it:

I entirely agree with the line you took about the Imamate Movement and its office
in Kuwait. I think it is broadly true that the Imam (ex-Imam to be pedantic) is a
dead duck; his present prospects of starting a successful rebellion in the Sultanate
are negligible. But the movement still has some capacity for mischief. The Imam
and Talib remain dependent on Saudi hospitality, and periodically try to extract
larger subsidies from the Saudis; they must try to present themselves as an
effective military force as well as a unified political movement (of course they are
neither)."

The sacrifice of authenticity in order to marshal the support of Pan-Arab

nationalists did cost the Imamate its core supporters, or would be supporters; yet it gained

new converts who did not care about the Imamate per se, but about the larger issues of

the Arab world and the genuine desire to modernize the Sultanate. It was simply more

123 FCO 8 1072: Confidential: Soviet Bloc involvement in Dhofar: British Residency,
Bahrain: 21
January 1969. Another document reproduced below clearly indicates that England was not up-to-date in
China's involvement in Oman:
Among the various things which led up to the present situation in Southern Yemen, the most
crucial was the decision of the British Government, in the winter of 1965/66, to clear out and have neither
defense nor other commitment in the territory. That decision involved the probable consequences that the
political structure we had created would collapse, and the very likely consequences that influences
unwelcomed to us might move in...At all events, the decision duly led to a state of affairs in which there
was nothing much we could do, short perhaps of financial assistance on a scale which was no on in effort to
bribe the regime...But the paucity of information which you suffer from here; indeed about all we know
about possible Chinese involvement with the Dhofaris is what has been reported from Muscat ... In short,
we shall certainly check to ensure the best collation possible; but I am a bit dubious how far we cold get
better information by increasing effort or, in immediate circumstances at least, whether we could yet
prepare a reliable assessment of the possibilities of trouble in the future." (FCO 8 1072: Arabian
Department-Soviet Block involvement in Dhofar: 6 February 1969).

124 FCO 8/638: Confidential: Muscat and Oman-British Residency, Bahrain:

3 September 1968.

115
acceptable than the alternative-a thoroughly Marxist insurgency. This along with a new

wave of insurgents in Dhofar proved to be a challenge that Sultan Said was not able to

overcome. The question is why? Why was there a significant discontent in all parts of the

country that led to a serious rebellion in Southern Oman? Why had Sultan Said's

diligence, patience and prudence, that had served him well in prior decades, failed him

now? Was he personally responsible for this gathering danger that he failed to contain?

Or were the circumstances simply beyond his control requiring totally different measures

than his temperament was made for?12 5

From 1958 till the day of his abdication, Sultan Said was to spend the entire

decade at Salala rather than at the capital Muscat. Colonel Smiley recounts Said's

explanation:

'You may wonder, Colonel Smiley,' he once observed in a rare mood of

expansion, 'why I never show myself in Muscat. I will tell you why. If I go to
Muscat I will be surrounded by supplicants, all asking me for money. I have no
money to give them, and so they will go away discontented. Therefore it is better
if I stay here in Salalah' (Smiley 1975: 40).

This should not be dismissed as a hollow justification. Tribal societies do expect

access to their leaders the way they do in modern societies. And more importantly, the

leader is expected to provide, within reason of course, for various members of tribes for

whom the leader is responsible. This is not considered charity but a duty.

125 This is the view that Skeet espouses when he asserts that Sultan Said "has worked in this way
for so long, that it seems most improbable that he can adjust now to something more attuned to the
requirements of the 1960s, let alone the 1970s. That is one of the great problems of Oman." (Skeet 1974:
163).

116
 Also, Muscat was becoming increasingly less secure. A car belonging to the

Minister of External Affairs had been bombed in 1958; the Minister of the Interior

became the target of another explosion in 1959-he barely survived. By 1961, land-mine

explosions directed against both civilian and military targets had become ever more

sophisticated and deadly, as evidenced by the sinking of the British liner-the DARA-

with over 200 lives lost (Burdett 1997: Preface).

Those who fought against the Sultan and those who provided the most convincing

critique of his leadership rightfully pointed to the dismal state of development in the

country. This was especially true at a time when other countries of the Arabian Peninsula

were actively pursuing developmental projects and services for their populations with

newly acquired oil wealth. Yet, the Sultan remained for the good part of the 1960's

indefatigably opposed to any major developmental project. If development of the country

was the catalyst that might have begun the process of defeating the various groups

conspiring against Muscat, or at least limiting their potency, why was Sultan Said so

reluctant to begin the process at once? Part of the answer lies in Said's frugality and

restraint since the early 1930's:

These 1930's virtues which were his biggest mistake, because financial restraint
became a way of life and an end in itself. Even the income from oil which could
have met the expectations of his people was not spent because mentally Sultan
Said could not attune to the new prosperity (Clement 1980: 64).126

126 Kelly also expresses the same opinion when he states that "For the rest
of his life he was to be
haunted, however irrationally, by the specter of another descent into penury" (Kelly 1980: 119).

117
 For Sultan Said, falling into debt again, as had his predecessors, represented a loss

27 He simply was
of autonomy and was not an option that he was willing to undertake.

not willing to allocate funds for projects if he did not have the absolute assurance that he

would be able to sustain all of the future expenditures required. Such guarantees were

simply not possible prior to 1968 when oil was finally being sold in commercial

quantities. It seems that the "lessons the Sultan learned from his budget balancing

exercises of the thirties and forties have been so deeply imprinted on his mind that he

finds it almost impossible to comprehend a situation where such exercises are a total

irrelevance" (Skeet 1974: 164). Yet, as Peterson rightly points out:

Against that, it may be argued that British development subsidy of 1958 had given
him the opportunity to set up development programmes which he resisted. Said's
probable counter to this would have been that the development subsidy ended
before the state began receiving oil revenues (a matter of months): 'Had there
been no economy in expenditure we would have had no financial reserves, and we
would not have able to bear the burden of what we spent those months.' In this
regard, it is significant to note that when the oil revenues were finally relaised,
Said's started his own capital development programme and a fairly ambitious one
at that. The problem was that it was too slow to obtain results: development
efforts had become obvious only by 1970, which was too late (Peterson 78: 58).

The danger to the country from Sultan Said's "fiscal policies" at home, coupled

with the isolation of Muscat in the region, had begun to compromise the territorial

integrity of the country. In Dhofar, as time passed, the rebellion gained more ground and

scored serious blows at the Sultan's expense. Nothing clearly indicates this fact more

127 The Sultan's own words are revealing in this matter: "...for we did not want to overburden
the
Sultanate's finances and weigh them down with new debts, after having paid off al the old ones. Doubtless
it would have been easy to obtain money in various ways, but this could only have been by a loan with
interest at a set percentage rate. This amounts to usury, with which I completely disagree, and the religious
prohibition of which is not unknown" (see appendix III).

118
than a report submitted by Oldman, the Sultanate Defense Secretary, in which he states

that

In the longer term, if things go badly this autumn, we cannot rule out the
possibility of the Sultan eventually being forced to abandon Dhofar. In that event
it is difficult to predict what he reaction would be in the rest of Oman with the
implications for the continued use of Masirah as a staging post.128

Most scholars, although aware of the threat to the Sultanate's territorial integrity,

often speak only of Dhofar and overlook the danger to other regions (specifically to Al-

Batinah and Al-Sharqiya), which, though not as obvious as that of Dhofar, was

nonetheless just as real. The following paragraph is a part of a report by the British

Consulate General touring Al-Batinah:

...The Batinah remains, therefore, relatively prosperous. It is, however, an

artificial prosperity. People have no incentive to grow more as it is cheaper to buy
food from outside. This; disease among both the dates and the limes; the
diminishing market for dates; and; the conservatism of the people themselves in
their material demands, all add up to a declining agricultural economy. There is
no other industry apart from fishing which is traditional and static. The only
compensating feature is that some new date and lime gardens have been
established by Omanis who have returned to settle on the Battinah after acquiring
sufficient capital for this purpose outside the country...Finally an intriguing
thought remains with me after my tour. If the Batinah is so economically
dependent on the Trucial States and the Sultan does nothing to arrest the trend,
how long will it be before economic dependence will be transferred into political
dependency 29? Alternatively, is there a seed here for future conflict, especially if

128 FCO 8/1667: Secret: British military involvement in Oman: 10 September 1971.
This report was submitted in 10 of September 1971, which means that despite Qaboos' accession
and his prudent and intensive campaign against the rebels, they were still a force to contend with.

129 The political dependence that the Consul General speaks of should have been clear as early as

1966 when the British political Agent in Dubai, D.A Roberts, threatened Sheikh Saqar of Ras Al-Khaimah
from an attempt to take over Muscat's territory on the Musandam Peninsula. In his letter to the Consul,
Roberts comments: It is gratifying to see that my warning to Sheikh Saqr had some effect but it is clear that
so long as the people of the Musandam Peninsula are dissatisfied they will continue to scheme with Shaikh
Saqr or anyone else to improve their lot. The Sultan's refusal to do anything about this area will remain a
constant source of trouble and embarrassment for us here. I hope that when his oil money starts to come in

119
 the UAE takes on a more definite shape and the sultan after the construction of his
port in Mutrah, sees more clearly the need for the Batinah to become part of its
hinterland?43

In another region, Al-Sharqiya, the danger of open rebellion may have been

unlikely, due to the presence and influence of Sheikh Ahmad Al-Harthi, the leading

Sheikh of the area. However, the discontent at what was essentially an economic problem

might have escalated into a political one:

Shaikh Ahmad recalled that he had been instrumental in unifying the country
under the Sultan's rule...Basically, Shaikh Ahmad main complaint was that the
Sultan's failure to provide employment opportunities had obliged the able bodies
men to find work outside of the country. This by itself did not matter so much
since they sent money back to their families in the interior, but it was the new
ideas they learned and their discontent when they paid brief visits to their home
area which pointed to the real dangers. These were the evil influences especially
communism to which the young men were being exposed and which were driving
them away from the religion and traditions of their country.' 3

Sultan Said simply failed to see that time was not on his side, and refused to deal

with the Dhofari rebellion as a political problem, rather than merely a military campaign.

The Sultan was not one to opt for a "heart and mind campaign", let alone envision a full

strategy to counter the insurgents beyond military means:

... Sultan still taking a depressingly hard line on the Dhofar problem. He was
robustly determined not to be browbeaten by the rebels, whose movement he saw
as essentially rooted in South Yemen, and he claimed that he would do whatever

he may be pressed to spend some of it on his subjects here in the north (FO 371/185364: Consul General
Carden to D. A. Roberts, Political Agency Dubai: 14 December 1966).

130 FCO 8/1074:Confidential: A Coastal Trip from Sur to Sohar: British Consulate
General:
Muscat: 14 October 1969.

131 FCO 8/1422: Confidential: Shaikh Ahmad al Harthi: British Consulate

General Muscat: 4
April 1970.

120
 was necessary to develop SAF so that it would overcome the rebels. He had
shown no disposition to consider political methods for dealing with the rebellion.
This was all very discouraging for given that the Sultan's financial and manpower
resources were limited, and the expansion of his military effort which in any case
might be too slow and too late, he would be made to go even more cautiously on
development expenditure.' 2

As far as the Sultan was concerned:

... The Jebalies were rebels, brigands and outlaws, they had to be treated
accordingly. No mercy should be, or would be, shown to them as this would be
weakness and the jebalis would only be encouraged in believing that their present
course was right. It was not his way or his tradition to show mercy to a wrong
doer and he had to be punished until repented; only then was the time for
kindness."'

Within the region itself, various capitals continued to lend support to those

opposing the Sultan either by providing military training and assistance1 3 4; hosting the

exiled leaders either of the imamate or that of the Dhofari rebellion; lending diplomatic

support; or allowing the exiled leaders to establish offices at their capitals and lend their

various national news outlets to be the mouth piece of the rebels. Iran remained an

132 FCO 8 1072: Secret: [Title not available]: 25 November 1969.

133 FCO 8 1072: Confidential: Dhofar: British Consulate General, Muscat: 30 October 1969.

134 Simply to reaffirm what has been already asserted earlier, please
look at the paragraph below,
and bear in mind that this is already 1970:
In the light of one or two recent reports I wonder if it is any longer safe to say, as you do in your
paragraph 15, that the Saudis have written off the Omani old guard. I appreciate that in principle they may
well regard the subversive threat to the Sultanate as a threat to themselves, and in particular that they may
apprehensive about the extent to which the Iraqis are taking over the ORM and its assets. It may therefore
have been a fear of losing of influence with the ORM that prompted them recently to collect a batch of
hundred odd "loyalists" rebels and send them up to Kuwait; these men, whether or not with Saudi
connivance, make sense from the Saudi point of view to let these Omani get into the wrong hands, in spite
of the reported agreement between the ORM and the Iraqi that they are to be kept separated from the more
radical Omanis whom the Iraqis are already training, for the Saudis can hardly believe that such an
agreement will be observed (FCO 8/1422: Secret: Saudi Arabia in the Gulf: British Residency, Bahrain: 14
April 1970).

121
exception. It became quite clear that Tehran, unlike Riyadh which shared Tehran's

antipathy toward the Marxist influence in the region, was acutely aware that the success

of the Dhofari rebellion might set in motion incalculable consequences for the region:

When I saw the Political Under-Secretary at the Foreign Minister [Iran's] on 7

march, he expressed great anxiety about reports of the present state of Muscat and
Oman...He said he felt HMG should do something soon to allay current
discontent there...He refered to the influence of Chinese Communists: and also
said that he thought the existence of a future Union of Arab Emirates would be
very precarious if Muscat were in hostile hands...there is some danger that the
Iranians would use any Anglo-Iranian dialogue as a vehicle for pinning on United
Kingdom the responsibility for any threat to Gulf stability which might appear
from Muscat and Oman in the post-1971 situation. Against this, however, it is
very much in our general interest to convince the Iranians that we are hoping and
trying to leave the Gulf in stable conditions and thus check any thoughts that may
be emerging here that we are doing no more than brushing all the latent security
problems under the carpet. And if we cannot do this it would at least be prudent to
show the Iranians that we have assessed the situation and concluded (if we dare
say this) that Oman is not likely to be a major threat in the immediate period after
our withdrawal.'

The conclusion that "Oman is not likely to be a major threat in the immediate

period" was certainly not true. London was well aware that Muscat was in serious danger,

and even up to 1971, might have to abandon Dhofar. However, Whitehall kept the

message to Tehran the same, as the following record indicates:

It seems to me that we must take this question in slow time and consider say two
or three months hence whether we can say anything substantive to the Iranians,
following our coming contacts with the Sultan. For the time being, I think that
Denis Wright should continue to speak to the Iranians on current lines and feed
them any publishable pieces of information to show that development is making

135 FCO 8/1428: Confidential: Muscat Oman: British Embassy Tehran: 11 March 1970.

122
 progress. I would not advocate handing over a security assessment of the
Sultanate at present.136

If a competent "security assessment of the Sultanate" were made, it would have

vindicated Tehran's suspicion that Muscat security and along with it the rest of the Gulf,

was under a real danger.

The territorial integrity of the country was under a serious threat: (1) The

strengthening threat of the Marxists/Arab-nationalists in Dhofar; (2) the continuing claim

of the Imamate representatives debated at the United Nations for an independent state in

the interior of Oman;(3) the crippling immigration of capable men from both Al-Sharqiya

and Al-Batinah, with the latter region moving ever closer economically to the future

Sheikhdoms of United Arab Emirates. 3 7 The situation was exacerbated by Said's refusal

to approach the Dhofar crisis as a political problem rather than a purely a military'38 one;

136 FCO 8 1428: Confidential: Sultanate/Iran Relations-British Residency Bahrain: 24 March

1970.
137 More is described in the following confidential
report:
The homogeneity of Oman and the Trucial States may now become a political factor of increasing
importance. With that in mind I record here the factors which contribute to it:
(a) geography;
(b) Tribes in Oman have sections which live in the Trucial states and vice versa
(d) a large part of the Sultanate is linked by trade to Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Probably more than
90% of imported goods consumed by people as far South as Ibri ans Sohar
(g) throughout the last century Abu Dahabi and the Sultanate were in alliance thanks to the threat
from Saudi Arabia (FCO 8 849: Confidential: Sultanate-Trucial States Relations-British Consulate General:
20 April 1968).

138 Paying more attention to the military aspect of the Dhofar rebellion did not necessarily mean
that all was well as far as the various military needs of the Sultan forces as the following record indicates:
... No one can doubt the professional skill of the British officers who lead the Omani and Baluch
soldiers, but one can beg leave to doubt the quality of SAF's supply organization and services...to give an
example, it is difficult to conceive that anywhere else a military force of SAF's size and make-up in Dhofar
would go into action without a military hospital...Serious SAF casualties are flown up to Bahrain by
courtesy of the RAF and RAF SRN at Salalah does what he can to help the doctor with drugs etc...It is

123
in addition the ever sluggish pace of development, and the British presence were causes

of intense propaganda.139 Said's son Qaboos realized that the situation could be tolerated

no more. The entire country was either in active subversion, or moving in that direction.

On 12 June 1970 when the Sultan's forces based at Izki were attacked by the NDFLOAG.

The attack was repelled and many of the attackers were either killed or captured. The

audacity of the attack combined with the information obtained from the prisoners about

caches of Chinese arms in Matrah, Sur, and Muti (Allen 2000: 28) made a clear

demonstration that a fundamental change in policy was required or the country could be

lost. Trouble spots in different parts of the Sultanate signified the wide presence of

plotters, a competent organization, and a strong presence of sympathizers.' 40 According

to a secret memo from the British Consulate General in Muscat:

consideration like these and the Sultan's closed mind to means other than punishment for dealing with his
rebels that make me gloomy about the situation in Dhofar (FCO 8 1072: Confidential: Current situation in
Dhofar: British Consulate General Muscat: 7 November 1969).

1 Skeet's comments about such propaganda are worth noting:

Such propaganda is not based on any logic, and so it seems to be worth making a few objectives
and, I hope, cool remarks. This is that no British soldier, nor any other foreigner for that matter, can enter
the Sultanate without the express permission of the Sultan. The second is that every British soldier serving
in SAF is under command of the Sultan, who himself pays them (directly if on contract, via the British
Government if they are seconded). The third is that, apart from those serving in SAF, no British soldiers are
on Sultanate territory unless, with prior permission, they are carrying out some training exercise. I am
under no illusions that the third statement is wide open for cynical interpretation. All right, interpret it
cynically; but if you do not happen to be a cynic, bear in mind that it can imply what it says (Skeet 1974:
175).
140 FCO 8/ 1422: Secret: Security Situation in Oman: British Consulate General, Muscat: 17 June
1970.
SAF's investigations now make clear that members of the political 'cells' in Mutrah, Summail and
Nizwa, which they have long had under surveillance, were involved in incidents of 12 June...Inevitably,
recent events are now common knowledge here and this has led to a crop of rumours stimulated by the
distribution of subversive literature not only in Nizwa, but also in Summail, Muscat and Matrah.

124
 The explosive charge at he Nizwa camp was of a type used by SAF and its
location suggests that it was placed at a bout the same time as the Izki incident.
Since the subversive literature-Communist inspired and inciting Omanis to raise
up and free themselves from the 'Imperialists'-was also distributed on the same
night, there is prima facie evidence to indicate that the incidents were part of
some overall plan. Aden Radio apparently claimed a few days before the incidents
that an uprising was being planned both in Oman and the Gulf which suggests that
PFLOAG may have been responsible...The incidents have highlighted the
Sultan's lack of wisdom in limiting SAF's access to the Sharquiya and refusing to
establish an Oman Gendarmeries post at Sur. As CSAF commented to me this
allows his enemies a free run over a large sector of the country. 4'

To save the country, the future Sultan, Qaboos bin Said, had to act, and act he did:

When your predecessor engaged in general policy discussions with the Sultan in
May Sayyid Said was polite but unyielding. Development in the sultanate would
go at the pace he determined for it and any attempt by ourselves to interfere in his
internal affairs would be unwelcome. While he might rebuff us and other who
wished to see the Sultanate survive, it became clear in June that elements hostile
to his rule were intensifying their efforts to destroy it. A series of incidents in
Oman revealed that a new organization, the National Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (NDFLOANG) had embarked upon a
campaign of unrest and had picked as its main target the Sultan's armed forces.
This proved to be the final piece of evidence required by the Sultan's only son to
convince him that his father's policies had brought the Sultanate to the brink of
despair. For several months he had disclosed his anxieties about the state of the
country and, in particular, he feared what he described as the contamination of
Dhofari minds by the Communists. From June onwards Sayyid Qaboos knew he
had to act and supported by a small group of loyal followers in Salalah he
initiated an almost bloodless palace coup on 23 July.4 2

141 FCO 8/1422: Secret: Security Situation in Oman: British Consulate General, Muscat:
15 June
1970.
142 FCO 8/1669: Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Sultanate of Oman: Annual
Review for
1970: 4 January 1971.

125
 IV.

OMAN'S FOREIGN POLICY (1970-1989)

The Sultanate of Oman: Old and New Challenges

The accession of Sultan Qaboos to the throne began a remarkable period in

Oman's modern history. Known as "the Renaissance" in the Sultanate's history, this

period's achievements are fully documented and clearly demonstrated to any observer of

Gulf affairs or to any visitors of the Sultanate.' It is not only the incredible speed with

which socio-economic developments took place that is the object of this research but also

the Sultanate's importance in regional and international foreign policy. The use of

archives is paramount once again in revealing the challenges that Muscat had to face, and

in documenting new subtleties that the literature on the Sultanate has often overlooked.

Almost without exception, every single book or article (of which Oman is the subject) in the
bibliography used in this research make a point of narrating the amazing developments that took place in
the last few decades. In fact, most of the books on Oman which generally deal with socio-economic
developments and modern history dedicate chapters on Sultan Qaboos successful modernization drive. The
following information from "Middle East Policy" (volume IV, March 1996) is sufficient to demonstrate the
rapid remarkable changes undertaken since his accession:
Infant mortality rates prior to 1970 were 159 per 1,000 live births, roughly equivalent to Bolivia,
the poorest country in Latin America. By 1995, it has dropped to 22 per 1,000 live births, similar to that of
Venezuela or Russia. The public school enrollment rate in 1970 was three percent of the eligible age group
of the population. By 1995, it has risen to almost a 100 percent. In 1995, the gender gap has disappeared,
and almost 100% of eligible females at the primary level get enrolled every year.
For another journal article, the reader is advised to look at Middle East Insight (volume 9, 1992),
which has dedicated a long section tracing different facets of developments in the Sultanate since Qaboos's
accession.

126
 Rather than outlining the challenges the Sultanate faced at the outset of Sultan

Qaboos' accession, three personal commentaries from the period will serve as an ideal

conduit to understanding the Sultanate's seemingly insurmountable domestic and

international challenges. First is the 1971 Annual Review:

The steps then taken by the new Sultan to establish his rule were rapid, effective
and decisive. His family pledged their loyalty to him, the citizens of Salalah, in
scenes of great jubilation, showed where their feeling lay and messages of support
poured in from all parts of the Sultanate. In a succession statement the Sultan
expressed his growing anger and dismay at the inability of his father to use the
country's wealth for the needs of the people. He promised to establish forceful
and modern government, and to create as rapidly as possible a happier and more
secure future for all...If this view reads like a modern fairy tale it is good that it
should, since it is true. The handsome young Prince did drive out the wicked old
King but whether Sayyid Qaboos will live happily ever after is the question that
dominates the reminder of this review. There can be few countries less developed
that the Sultanate. It had, until July, no communications, apart from two graded
roads, only three primary schools, and one hospital...To start afresh, therefore, in
the second-half of 1970 with a hostile neighbor to the west and with an
increasingly uncertain future for the Gulf States to the north, could only be a
formidable and uncertain undertaking for the new regime...By the end of 1971
the most severe test facing Government may be the decisions it takes on the best
use of scarce financial resources, since Oman is by no means a wealthy country.
The Budget for this year is currently estimated to be $43 million of which defense
will take $21 million. The civil side of Government has still to demonstrate that it
will have the ability to spend the $22 million it proposes to spend during the year,
but, as the needs of the country become more apparent, the pressures on the
regime to meet them will become more intense.2

Second is the assessment of the British Political Resident:

Oman is a sick country. Unnaturally governed by the former Sultan its

development under his successor, Sayid Qaboos, is now impede by poverty,
ignorance and disease. If Oman merely suffered these familiar afflictions of the
third world, it would be possible to leave this post more sanguine about the future

2 FCO 8 1669: Confidential: Sultanate of Oman: Annual Review for 1970.

Her Majesty's Consul-General, Muscat, to Her Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf: 4
January 1971.

127
 since with oil wealth and international assistance, the new regime could begin to
make headway against the neglects of the past. But Sayid Said left a further
legacy to his successor. This is the almost total absence of a credible Omani
ruling class. Those who were able, adventurous, modern minded or politically
aware left Oman in disillusionment...I mention these salient feature of the former
regime, since I believe they go far to explain Oman's political climate and the
current inability of Sayid Qaboos's government to match their promises with
deeds...I suspect that more violent battles will be fought in the newspapers of
Beirut than in the foothills of the Jebel Akhdar.3

Third is the impression of Oman by the British Ambassador to Muscat:

The Dhofar rebellion drags on. The Sultanate might not survive for very long
unless it achieves victory, negotiates a political settlement or effectively contains
the rebels ...

Oman has in recent months applied for membership of the United Nations and the
Arab League as well as for membership of some of the United Nation Specialized
Agencies. They were admitted to WHO in May, despite the opposition of PDRY
and the abstention of Saudi Arabia. Oman has also attempted to break out of its
former isolation by sending missions to the Arab capitals in June suggesting the
establishment of diplomatic and only Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia have so far
agreed. The Arab group at the United Nations have decided that Oman's
application for the United Nations membership ought to be postponed until they
have obtained membership of the Arab League and Tariq's idea of bypassing that
body has thus not been successful. The basic difficulty, apart from the implacable
opposition of PDRY, is the position of the former Imam Ghalib and the other
former Omani rebels who have not already returned home. Tentative moves
towards rapprochement so far made by the Sultan have been unsuccessful but he
has not given up, though it is ironical that the Sultan is prepared to allow Ghalib
to return with the title of Mufti and to offer Talib a Government post, which is
exactly what Fiasal of Saudi Arabia has recommended. There seems to be a
blockage of communication somewhere. The Omanis are nonetheless suspicious
that the Saudis wish to keep the Ghalib issue alive as a cover for their traditional
ambition in Oman as well as in the Trucial States and Omani memories of former
Wahabi incursions remain bitter. If Oman is successful in gaining wider
international acceptance the external pressure on the country from PDRY might
be somewhat eased. However there is a danger that certain Arab countries may
demand, as some of them already have, a lessening of British influence as a price

3 FCO8 1680: Confidential: British Consulate General Muscat: 24 April 1971. This assessment
was written by the British political resident in Bahrain visiting Oman.

128
 for recognition and closer relations. Meantime this is the only Embassy in Muscat,
though the Indians are likely to exchange diplomatic relations with Oman soon.4

These assessments indicate an unpromising future for the Sultanate, to say the

least. The two major challenges facing Muscat, apart from a lack of socio-economic

development, were the growing strength of the insurgency in Dhofar and the Imamate

challenge. Conventional wisdom is correct in its analysis of the Dhofar insurgency as the

primary danger to the survival of the Sultanate. The literature is incorrect in presuming

that the Imamate cause had been crushed by the late 1950's. Comments are frequently

made that the "question of Oman" remained in the halls of the United Nations, but

immediately after the accession of Sultan Qaboos, the problem seemed to vanish. The

following paragraph is an example of the standard interpretation of the period:

Qaboos promptly set about the task of legitimizing his rule to a larger world. On 2
June 1971...Oman wrote to the Security Council applying for membership in the
United Nations. As a result of this application, the Special Committee on the
Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to colonial Countries and Peoples dropped Oman from its list of
countries under consideration. The committee's decision enhanced the credibility
of Oman, which was duly admitted to the United Nations on 7 October 1971.
Qaboos also joined the newly formed Arab League. These diplomatic moves
made it very difficult for the insurgents to claim that he was a British puppet
(Mockaitis 1995: 76).

Oman's admission to the United Nations is mentioned as a footnote. Its

membership in the Arab League is treated with even less importance. Moreover, joining

both institutions is treated as a "natural progression" of events after the accession of

Sultan Qaboos. Nothing could have been further from the truth.

4 FCO 8/1676: Confidential: Impression of Oman: 5 August 1971. The First and the Last: Her
Majesty's Ambassador at Muscat to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

129
 The Sultanate's membership in both institutions is an important moment in the

country's history, and deserves to be adequately investigated. These memberships were

essential to a country as isolated as the Sultanate. In addition, the regime faced a

determined insurgency while its very legitimacy was being debated at the U.N. In reality,

the likelihood that the Sultanate's membership in both institutions would be rejected was

high. Furthermore, the real battle for Oman's membership to the United Nations lay in

the halls of the Arab League and in the intricate labyrinths of regional politics. Muscat

had viewed the Arab League as a stepping-stone for its admission to the U.N., but

without that step, membership in the U.N. would have been highly unlikely. A secret

memo from the British Consulate General in Muscat dated 28 December 1970, asserts

that the

results of the recent General Assembly proceedings on Oman have only served to
reinforce the point that, if the Sultanate aspires to membership of the United
Nations and the Arab League next year something will have to be done about the
continuing political influence in the Arab world of the Oman Rebel Movement
[this is in reference to Sheikh Ghalib]. 5

Ghalib, in turn, has sent two petitions to the United Nations objecting to the

Sultanate's possible membership to the U.N.:

U Thant
Secretary General
United Nations Cairo, 10 June 1971
New York

[Sic] the United Nations General Assembly has taken many successive descisions
since 1961 to 1971 all these decisions condemn and ask for abolishing the British

FCO 8 1672: Secret: The Sultanate and ORM: British Consulate General, Muscat: 28 December
1970.

130
 imperialism from Oman and giving the Omani people the right to decide his own
fate by his own self but Britain has not carried out these decisions on the phter
side she began to tell lies and disfigure facts Britain secretely asked her agent the
Sultan of Muscat to ask for joining the United Nations the Omani people ask you
to execute effectively the United Nations decsions before deciding anything
concerning the Sultan applications to join the United Nations

Ghalib Bin Ali

Imam of Oman 6

During the same month, the representative of the PDRY informed the United

Nations that Oman could not be admitted to the U.N before admission to the Arab

League.

United Kingdom Mission To The United Nations

845 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022
17 June 1971:

Permanent Representative of the PDRY called on Francios de La Gorce on 11

June to describe to him the position of the Arab group on Oman. Ambassador
Ismail told him that the decision was:

(a) Oman should not be admitted to the United Nations before admission to the
Arab League.
(b) Before being admitted to the United Nations Oman must comply with the
March Resolution of the Arab League, i.e. that a Fact Finding Mission of the Arab
League should visit Oman in order to investigate the matters covered in the
Report of the Committee of 24.'

6 FCO8 1674.
Another petition was sent the following month essentially repeating the same objection:
Two Petitions from Ghalib Bin Ali, Imam of Oman, concerning Oman.
The situation in Oman had not changed being under the [SIC] succumb of foreign rule. We
strongly object Oman to be a member of United Nations. We beseech you to carry out the UNO
regulations. We request you to distribute our memorandum to Security Council and UNO Assembly (FCO
8 164: 22 July 1971).

7 FCO 1674: Confidential.

131
 The three key states that could have blocked Oman's admission to the Arab

League were Saudi Arabia (which supported Ghalib), South Yemen, and Iraq (both of

which were supporting the PFLOAG). This is clearly spelled out in the following

confidential record:

You will remember that at the March meetings of the Arab League Council the
Secretary General was asked to make a fact finding trip to the Gulf and Oman and
to report back, so that the Council could consider Oman's application for the
membership at the September meeting....The Saudis, South Yemenis and the
Iraqis could argue that without this preliminary step Oman's credentials could not
be properly assessed, and could thus ask for consideration of Oman's application
to be deferred again. The Hassouna mission may be quietly forgotten. If, however,
two or more countries objected (e.g. because the question of the Imam Ghalib had
not been settled by then) this would be enough to block Oman's membership for
the time being.

Though King Faisal was more willing to deal with Sultan Qaboos than with his

late father, the question of Ghalib remained a stumbling block between the two states:

The Saudi Arabian Ambassador told me at lunch on 25 June that he had been very
impressed by the Sultan who he thought was an extremely nice and well-
intentioned young man. As we already know, he had had a long talk with him
about all aspects of Saudi/Omani relations. He had told him that he did not think
the problem of the Buraimi villages need be too difficult. It could either be left in
abeyance or would be settled if the Abu Dhabi problem were settled. The major
issue was that of Ghalib. He had advised the Sultan to write a letter to King Faisal
abetting out what he was prepared to do for Ghalib.9

Sultan Qaboos was well aware of the urgency of Saudi demands in terms of its

support of Ghalib. Here he saw some form of accommodation that both parties could

accept without losing face. This is especially true given the fact that many Arab

8 FCO 8 1676: Confidential: British Embassy Cairo: 28 July 1971.

9 Confidential: Saudi/Omani Relations: 28 June 1971.

132
governments were not willing to support the Sultanate's membership without some form

of accommodation with Ghalib, as the following record indicates:

I told Sultan that we had heard that the Lebanese Government intended to support
Oman membership of the Arab League but that the Lebanese also had stressed the
importance of an accommodation with Ghalib. The Sultan assured me once again
that he fully intended to take this matter up as soon as he got back to Muscat. The
Sultan said he thought his contacts with the Saudi Ambassador in London and
Shaikh Sa'ad of Kuwait had been useful... The Sultan told me that he understood
that he was to be invited to the 2, 5 0 0 th anniversary celebrations of the Iranian
monarchy and that he would probably accept. He asked me if I knew whether
King Faisal would be going. I said he was certainly invited and would probably
attend. The Sultan agreed that this might be a good opportunity for him to meet
Faisal for the first time on mutual grounds, though obviously there would be little
opportunity for any serious discussion.*

Finding an accommodation with Ghalib, however, was not necessarily an easy

task. Skeet writes of an agreement reached in Beirut between Sheikh Ghalib and the

Sultanate that eventually led to the Sultanate's membership to the Arab League (Skeet

1992: 58). Refuting this claim is a confidential record from the British Embassy asserting

that "Since the Beirut meeting the prospects for reconciliation between the Imamate

exiles and the Sultan seem remoter than ever." 1 King Faisal's attitude to Oman, as the

US ambassador asserted "will never be on a satisfactory footing until the problem of

Ghalib can be overcome. He mentioned specifically the idea of Ghalib being given the

title of Mufti."12

10 FCO 8 1673: Confidential: 9 July 1971.

FCO 8 1671: Confidential: British Embassy, Muscat: 20 September 1971.

12 FCO 8 1679: Confidential:

1971.

133
 London, after receiving positive indications from Muscat, immediately took the

opportunity to contact Washington, and appeal for its influence in Riyadh:

To immediate Washington Telegram number 1510 of 27 May

1. There have been several indications that Qaboos would agree to Ghalib having
the title of Mufti provided he gives up all pretensions to the Imamate and agrees
to live quietly in Oman.
2. We agree that the key to Saudi/Omani relations lies in a satisfactory solution to
the question of Ghalib. We see no objection to Murphy asking members of the
King's party whether any progress has been made. The important thing seems to
be for the Saudis to make informal and direct contact with the Sultan. Between
them they should be able to settle the difficulties over Ghaliv in Arab fashion...
3. Otherwise we suggest that the State Department should urge on the Saudis and
if possible Faisal himself the importance of establishing friendly relations with
Oman. They might point out that it looks astonishing to outside would that the
UAR, Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait and others can sponsor Oman for membership of
the WHO, while the Saudis abstain on the vote and PDRY and Albania vote
against it."

In this accommodation, Saudi Arabia, an archconservative, and PDRY found

common ground in their rejection of Oman's membership to the Arab League. The

Sultanate was admitted to the Arab League in late September 1971, and yet as late as 20

September 1971, the Sultanate's successful nomination could still have failed.

Shaikh Saud Alkhalili (Leader of the Delegation) had informed that sultan that in
Cairo Omar Saqqaf had raised every possible objection to Oman's application to
join the league...Saud said that apart form Saudi Arabia and PDRY every other
Arab League member particularly Algeria and Syria supported Oman's
admission...Adding that it was ironical to observe a country like Saudi Arabia
uniting with PDRY in opposition to Oman's admission to the league."

FCO 8/ 1679: Confidential: [No date available, but probably 1971].

14 FCO 8 1676: Confidential: Received in 20 September

1971.

134
 In Muscat, frustration at Riyadh's reluctance to support the Sultanate's

membership to the Arab League was becoming apparent."1

During my discussion with the Sultan on 27 September I showed him Cairo

Telegram No.4 to Muscat (Not to all). He said that he still had hopes that the Arab
League would reach a favourable decision on Oman's membership at their
meetings on 29 September...His people had never expected that the discussion to
be concluded before that date. He agreed that it would be a mistake to rush
Oman's applications for membership of the United Nations until she had either
joined the Arab League or assured herself of the active support of the Egyptians...
The Sultan added that he did not know what more he could do to satisfy King
Faisal about his intentions towards Ghalib. He was quite sure that the Arab
League, all the Arab countries, and Ghalib himself knew that he was willing to
welcome Ghalib back to Oman and appoint him Mufti... He was now willing to

Both ensuing records highlight the Sultanate's dilemma with the Arab
league.
First,
Arab League: Oman had applied for membership of the Arab League but did not take the
institution very seriously. In this they were at one with the Egyptians. No progress had been made at the
League meeting at Ambassadorial level, but he hoped that Oman would get in when the ministerial session
was held later this year. If Oman was not accepted then 'to hell with them'. There were several Arab states
which would recognize Oman, including the Egyptians, and the Arab League would thus be outflanked.
Application for the Arab league had in any case only been a stepping-stone for membership of the United
Nations. Certain Arab countries, including Iraq, had urged Oman to do something to help them over the
position of Ghalib, but there was a limit to what could be done. There was no possibility of recognizing the
Imamate, but Ghalib and Talib could return as private individuals. The Kuwaitis were at present acting as
self appointed mediators, but he did not know if anything would come of this (FCO 8/1676: Confidential:
Record of A Meeting with Tariq: 3 May 1971).
Second,
Interview with Omani Sultan Qaboos and his Prime Minister Tarok Ben Taymour, have been
published in Beirut this week by the weekly A. Sayyad and its sister Daily Al Anwar. The two Omani
leaders spoke about present conditions in their country, relations with Britain, the other Gulf Emirates and
the Dhofar revolution. Here is a report from our contributor in Beirut:
'Sultan Qaboos who took over power from his father last year, said that his country was facing
opposition on almost every front. He specifically referred to the opposition to Oman request for
membership in the Arab League. This opposition is championed mainly by the Government of South
Yemen. Qaboos said that the South Yemeni delegate at the Arab league claimed that a revolution was
going on in Dhofar, therefore, Oman could not be permitted to join the League as an independent state. The
Omani Sultan went on; 'The Aden delegate forgot that a day earlier his country's Information Minister
announced that revolution was going on in Headhammaur. Why, then, should South Yemen be permitted to
be an Arab League member?'
The Prime Minister Tarek Ben Taymour said it was not true that Chinese Communist experts were
with the Dhofari rebels. He added that some of the rebels might have been to China where they got some
training, but there were no Chinese in Oman." (FCO 8/1710: Arabic Tropical Programs: Friday, 2.7.71)

135
 readmit every exile who was prepared to live at peace and renounce the idea of an
independent Imamate and this included Suliman bin Himyar and Saleh bin Isa as
well as Ghalib and Talib. 6

It may seem odd that the above discussion is primarily concerned with the Saudi

objection to the Sultanate's membership to the Arab League when Iraq and the PDRY

were of the same opinion.17 After all, both states had close relations with the Soviet

16 FCO 8 1676: Confidential: Received 29 September 1971.

17 Iraq's position toward the entire issue can be described as an incoherent vacillation
between
rejecting the Sultanate's bid for membership, and supporting it. In the end, however, as the two ensuing
records demonstrate, Iraq chose to support the Sultanate.
First,
The Iraqi press of 19 April carried a brief account of a meeting the previous day between Vice
President Ammash and Ghaleb. Ammash was quoted as outlining to them Iraq's attitude on the measures
required to "guarantee the independence of Oman, the freedom of its people and their legitimate struggle
against imperialism and foreign occupation (FCO 8 1676: Confidential: British Embassy Baghdad p. 60: 22
April 1971).
Second,
Iraq's Foreign Policy And Iraq/Oman Relaitons
In the course of a long and turgid review on 'The balance sheet of Iraq's foreign policy', which
has filled up the third page of the Baghdad Observer for 3 days in a row this week, the only passage of
much interest concerned Oman.
Inter alia, this states that 'when a delegation of the Sultanate visited Iraq to explain its view point
[presumably this refers to the visit in February] Iraq laid stress on a number of demands as principal
conditions for recognizing the Sultanate, namely:
Declaration of Oman's independence.
Non-participation in foreign alliances and blocs;
Elimination of foreign bases;
Reaching an understanding with the patriotic elements;
Limitation of all foreign infiltration and emigration (sic);
Release of all patriotic prisoners.'
This is a much harder line that we thought at the time that the Iraqis were taking (see, for instance,
your own letter from Baghdad of 13 March to Anthony Acland in the FCO). You will recall that we
thought then that the only pre-condition to recognition that the Iraqis had insisted on was that a suitable
solution should be found to the Ghaleb problem (FCO 8 16178: Restricted: British Embassy Baghdad: 28
July 1971).
And Third,
Iraq's policy was [according to an Iraqi official], as he had explained to the Ambassador, to you,
and to me, earlier in the year, to help Oman enter the Arab League and also the UN as soon as possible -
which would be when a reasonable compromise had been worked out over Ghaleb. Iraq was not 'among
those states which were trying to obstruct Oman's entry onto the world stage.' (FCO8 1678: Confidential:
British Embassy, Baghdad: 13 August 1971).

136
Union, which was capable of vetoing18 the Sultanate's membership to the United Nations

regardless of the support of the Arab League. As such, both states should have received

more attention in this narrative than hitherto articulated. Had it not been for the fact that

neither Iraq nor the PDRY could effectively lobby either the Soviet Union or other Arab

governments, that would have been the case. The ensuing memo from the British

representative at the United Nations may shed some light on the matter.

United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations

845 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y.10022

3....there are two main problems. First, the fact that Oman is not a member of the
Arab League and second that the Oman question is still on the Assembly's
agenda. He added that there were two aspects to the latter problem: the Imamate
and the Liberation Front. Clearly nothing can be done about the latter (and
consequently about the attitude of the PDRY) but this was not important. The
main problem was to do something about the Imam. This would not only remove
Saudi Arabia's difficulties but also those of a number of others, who would be
able to argue that the settlement with the Imam had changed the situation and thus
justified the dropping of the Oman question from the agenda and their supporting
Oman's application for membership...
4. None of the Arabs to who I have spoken, including the Kuwaitis and the
Saudis, seem to be prepared to comment at this stage. I have not yet had a chance
to speak to Adnan Raouf (Iraq).
5. Meanwhile, according to the French, the Soviets Mission are taking the line
that there is no hurry but that this is clearly a matter for the Arabs to decide."

18
See the following record:
Confidential
United Kindgdom Mission To The United Nations
845 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022
The Acting Permanent Representative of Sudan dully buttonholed me in the UN today and, having
explained that he was speaking as this month's Chairman of the Arab League, went on...he already spoken
to the Soviets Mission and to the French. Malik had assured him that the Soviet attitude would be
determined by the decision of the Arabs and, without actually saying so, had implied that this meant that he
would if necessary, be prepared to veto a resolution recommending Oman's admission (FCO 8 1674: 18
June 1971).

19 FCO 8 1674: 8 June 1971.

137
 Two statements require explanation: The first concerns the PDRY's implacably

negative position regarding the Sultanate's admission, and the note that "this was not

important"; second, is the Soviets' attitude that it is "clearly for the Arabs to decide". The

British Representative would never have referred to the PDRY attitude toward the

Sultanate's application to the Arab League as unimportant, had he thought that the PDRY

could lobby the Soviets to block membership. The Representative may have recognized a

few simple facts. Firstly, it had been over a year since the demise of Egypt's Nasser.

Since then Cairo and Riyadh had quickly improved their relations. This is clearly

demonstrated in Riyadh's role in the 1973 war. If two important states in the region were

willing to support the Sultanate's applications to the Arab League, it certainly was not

appropriate for the Soviets to block such a nomination for the sake of the PDRY. The

Soviets had been successful in establishing diplomatic relations with Kuwait as early as

1963, and had sought to further relations with the rest of the Arab Gulf states (Katz 1986:

1143).20 Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, Moscow's attempts to improve its

relations with Iran would have been hampered by blocking the Sultanate's admission to

20 Kuwait's importance to Moscow can be seen from its earliest statements about the PFLOAG. In
1969, for instance, Soviet commentary recognized that the Front asserts it indebtedness to "scientific
socialism". An early 1969 Soviet comment said that the Front's activities, formerly limited to Muscat and
Oman, "have now been extended to the whole of the Gulf area...the aim is to eliminate all vestiges of
British colonialism and drive the foreign monopolies out" (Yodfat 1983: 30).

138
the United Nations, given that Muscat and Tehran seemed to be on good terms from the

earliest periods of the new regime.2'

The Sultanate's membership in the Arab League was without a doubt the ticket

required for its admission to the United Nations. Even the Soviet "veto" was conditioned

by the decision taken by that body.

United Kingdom Mission To The United Nations

845 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022

... Thirdly, it was pointed out by several speakers that the /soviets veto would be
available to prevent Oman's admission if the Arab League had not reached a
favorable decision on the question before it was considered by the Security
Council.

3. Among those who have given me an account of the meeting is Adnan Raouf
(Iraq), who added that he had warned Baghdad as far back as January that an
Omani applications might be forthcoming in the next few months and drawn
attention to the problems which this would present both in the Arab context and
from the point of view of the United Nations. While his government seemed to
have given some consideration to the Arab aspect, they appeared to have ignored
the latter entirely. He claimed to think that problem here at the UN was very real
and that it would be extremely difficult for the UN to admit as a member country
which they had previously considered to be non-self governing unless there was
some change in the situation which they could point to. When I pressed him,
however, he admitted that he thought that a visit by the Secretary-General of the
Arab League, for example, would do the trick.22

How the Sultanate was admitted to the Arab League in the face of Saudi

reluctance is clearly portrayed in the following record and explains the formula found to

preserve King Faisal's prestige:

21 As Peterson asserts, "The interest appeared as early as Qaboos's accession in 1970 when the
Shah sent a congratulatory cable to the new Sultan. The establishment of diplomatic relations in August
1971 was followed by several meetings between the two rulers" (Peterson 1977: 285).

22 FCO 8 1674: 17 June

1971.

139
 When the Ambassador called on Dr. Hassan Sabri al-Khouly on 9 October al-
Khouly gave him an account of Oman's admittance to the Arab League, for which
he claimed a measure of credit.

[SIC] [al-Khouly] had told King Feisal that it was clear that Oman was going to
be admitted to the Arab League and that it was a matter of considerable surprise
to many people in the Arab world to ding Saudi Arabia and the PDRY in the same
camp opposing Omani admission...al-Khouly suggested that if Saudi prestige
required the king to maintain his opposition to the first session of the of the Arab
League Council a solution could be found by not admitting Oman at the session
but agreeing that it should be admitted a forthnight later. The King had acquiesced
at this suggestion. Al-Khouly had therefore attended the Arab League Council
and, when he found the majority to be in favour of admitting Oman there and
then, he argued that the decision should be postponed for 15 days and that
thereafter Oman should be admitted without further discussion. This caused a
good deal of argument since many of the delegates wanted to know they had to be
put off by unconvincing answers, though al-Khouly suggested that they had had a
good idea of what was afoot."

Riyadh, then, was of fundamental significance to the Sultanate's membership in

both the Arab League in September 1971 and the United Nations in October 1971. The

Sultan visited Riyadh in December 1971 for an important meeting with King Faisal.

Kechichian claims that "although the visit to Riyadh was successful, it did not produce

the expected level of support longed for by Sultan Qaboos. Without even a formal

communique, this was a significant mark of recognition" (Kechichian 1995: 72). It is

difficult to locate the standards that Kechichian used to judge the success of the Sultan's

visit, but if part of the visit was the normalization of relations between the two states, and

the final termination of the Imamate issue (which in itself represents a complete victory

for the Sultanate) then the mission was a success. It would be no exaggeration to assert

that the Sultan's visit to Saudi Arabia with its attendant consequences for the exiled

23 FCO 8 1676: Confidential: British Embassy Cairo 13: October

1971.

140
Imam was the final deathblow to the institution. Furthermore, Kechichian's claim that

His Majesty's visit did not receive a "formal communique, itself a significant mark of

recognition", is inaccurate. The following record asserts:

The following statement was issued by the Royal Court prior to the departure of
the Sultan yesterday afternoon 14 December.

'After his Majesty Faisal Ibn Abdul Aziz reviews with his brother His Majesty
Sultan Qaboos Bin Said Bin Taimur, the Sultan of Oman, ...the two leaders
stressed the essential need for the steadfast adherence to the Islamic creed in order
to face the violent currents blowing over the atmospheres of this region: And to
make such a creed as a beacon for the illumination of their way in all their deeds
to develop the area. They also stressed the necessity of safeguarding the Arab
eternal heritage. They are of the opinion that their faithful and constructive
cooperation with all the Arab states in the region will realize the security and
stability for this sensitive part of the world.

After his Majesty King Faisal listened to a statement by his Majesty Sultan
Qaboos on the development of the situation in the sultanate of Oman: To the wise
policy pursued by his Majesty the Sultan for the interest of his country: And to the
sincere desire felt by His Majesty King Faisal from His Royal brother the Sultan
to call upon all Omanis to return and to contribute to the progress and prosperity
of Oman [SIC] Sultanate, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia declares its recognition of
the Sultan of Oman wishes her a full-scale success and the brotherly people of
Oman progress and prosperity. The kingdom affirms its support for this Sultanate
so long as she proceeds on the road which will enhance the prestige of Islam and
unite the Arab ranks. The two sides agreed to settle all problems with the spirit of
fraternity and amity.' "

A confidential note elaborating on the Sultan's visit, by a British Representative,25

accurately assessed the importance of the visit and the subtle political language contained

in the joint statement issued above:

24 FCO 8 1679: Confidential: Received on 16 December 1971.

25 The record in the archives does not indicate who or where did the assessment
originate from,
but most probably it is either from a British representative in Saudi itself, or from the British representative
in Bahrain.

141
 This announcement issued in effect as a joint statement, is a bonus for Qaboos in
return for his adherence to Faisal's prescription of Islam as the panacea for the
troubles of the area and his invitation to all Omanis to return home (Which
provides Faisal with the necessary face saver in respect of the Imam and his
supporters-we do not know if Ghalib has accepted), Qaboos has gained formal
recognition of Oman without mention of Boundaries by the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (And promotion from Azimat (Highness) to Jalalate (Majesty).2 6

The statement issued by both leaders asserted the Islamic character of the region,

but considering that various forms of Pan-Arabism were still a force to reckon with, the

language becomes understandable. Faisal was a self-designated champion of maintaining

the Islamic character of both the Arab and the Muslim World. Since the 1960's, when

Riyadh was confronting Nasserite Pan-Arabism, Faisal asserted that the organizing

principle of regional politics is Islam, not Arabism. The Saudi initiative to establish the

Islamic Conference Organization in 1969 was but one step toward that goal. Sultan

Qaboos faced a determined insurgency in his own country, which was publicly Maoist in

its orientation, had no scruples in asserting Muscat's adherence to the Islamic creed in

facing the region's challenges. Most importantly, for Muscat, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, the

recent rapprochement between Muscat and Riyadh paved the way for the final

termination of the Buraimi dispute. In 1974, Riyadh abandoned its claim to the Buraimi

Oasis, with both Oman and Abu Dhabi dividing it amongst themselves (Allen and

Rigsbee 2000: 192).

26 FCO 8 1679: Confidential: 15 December

1971.

142
 The End of Dhofar's Rebellion

Gaining regional and international legitimacy for the new regime was indeed

extremely important, not only for the sake of political legitimacy outside of the country,

but also for propping up military and political aid from states that now were willing to

extend their support to the Sultanate. General Johan Graham, who assumed command of

the Sultan's Armed Forces in early 1970, depicted the deteriorating situation:

In Dhofar the ado [enemy] had by the Spring of 1970 established themselves over
the whole of the Jebel. The moral of the civilian population was low and many
were unsympathetic to the SAF. By night the ado were coming down on the Plain
for mine laying and ambushes, to probe the defenders of RAF Salalah or to
engage Dr's hedgehogs with RCL and mortar fire (Mockaitis 1995: 74).

Simply put, the Sultanate was on its way to losing the war. Describing the

ideological and strategic imperatives of the PFLOAG, Muhammed Ahmad Ghasani, a

responsible member of the executive committee of the general command of the

movement, stated:

In accordance with the experience of the Chinese revolution under the leadership
of the great Chairman Mao, our people's Front has formulated a line of self-
reliance, depending on the broad masses of poor people to carry out a protracted
people's war, and using the countryside to encircle the cities and seize the cities
ultimately, thus developing the revolution to the whole of the Arabian Gulf to
defeat and drive out the British colonialists...The colonialists can no longer
succeed in stamping out the flame of ' 19 th June' [1965] revolution, because we
have the weapon of Mao Zedong's thought. The great truth that 'political power
grows out of the barrel of a gun' has taken deep root in the hearts of our people.
We the people of Arabian Gulf don't believe in the fallacies of 'parliamentary
road' and 'peaceful transition'. Our unshakable beliefs is: the counter-
revolutionary violence of colonialism can be liquidated only with the
revolutionary violence of the people; the independence of the motherland can be
achieved only through the barrel of a gun; and the liberation of the people can be
obtained only through battles of bloodshed (Huwaidin 2002: 202).

With the establishment of a PFLOAG office in Aden and the forging of ties with

various countries, at various times, such as China, Iraq, Cuba, Libya, and radical

143
Palestinian organizations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), the PFLOAG

became a force to reckon with. Steadily, as more sources of support emerged, PFLOAG

was able to extend its territorial control throughout the western part of Dhofar resulting in

the capture of a major town Rakhyt in August 1969. The rebels sought to buttress their

domination over the 'liberated' areas "by forced collectivization of land, political

indoctrination in Marxist-Leninist dogma, and strengthened ties with the PDRY

hinterland, as evidenced by the beginning of a road from Hawf, in PDRY, to Rakhyut"

(Peterson 1977: 281). John Akerhurst, commander of the Dhofar Brigade during the last

part of the campaign, reported that at its height, in 1970-71, PFLOAG's strength was

2,000 full-time guerillas, 4,000 part-time militiamen, and an uncertain number of

potential sympathizers in the midst of the Dhofari population (Katz 1986: 112).

In Muscat, Sultan Qaboos began to initiate a totally different strategy to counter

the growing strength of the PFLOAG. He immediately recognized that socio-economic

factors were just as important as military means. 27 The scope and the speed of social and

economic reforms throughout the Sultanate in general and Dhofar in particular proved to

be a key factor in ending the insurgency. As Akehurst commented at the end of the

27 The military cost of battling the insurgency proved to be daunting, as the following
quote
indicates: During the Qaboos period of the Dhofar war (1970-75), the military budget increased rapidly,
with military expenditure starting from a low in 1970 of $123 million (15.2 per cent of GNP), and rising in
1971 to $144 million (15.9 per cent of GNP), in 1972 to $242 million (25 per cent of GNP), and in 1973 to
$366 million (37.5 per cent of GNP). Following a slight decline in 1974 to $283 million (28.3 per cent of
GNP), military expenditure was again up in 1975 to $645 million (40.9 per cent of GNP) (Allen & Rigsbee
2000: 65-66).

144
insurgency, much of the "the Sultan's victory was due to rapid and continuous civil aid

efforts made wherever government forces took control of a village, which gave the local

population an incentive for seeing that the guerrillas did not return" (Katz 1986: 112).

Central to the conclusion of the insurgency was the way in which the government pleaded

its case to the population in Dhofar. Using the distribution of transistor radios delivered

freely to every part of the region, the authorities disseminated messages constantly

conveying the promise of new hope and dignity under the new regime. Qaboos' messages

delivered as early as October 1970 gave an account of the history of the struggle. The

Sultan cautioned his people of the danger to their way of life:

The weapons they use and the uniforms they wear come from the countries of
communism and, far worse, the Chinese communists, with Chairman Mao's little
Red Book and all its doctrines are forcing the people of the Jebel to reject the
Holy Koran and their traditional way of life...a new life is already open to the
people of Dhofar-this new life will bring them the benefits of security, medicine,
schooling, and work, exactly as in the rest of the Sultanate (Mockaitis 1995: 77).

In addition, he notably promised a benevolent pardon for the insurgents who were

willing to put down their arms (Mockaitis 1995: 77).

Although the statements made by Sultan Qaboos in 1970 refer to China's role in

supporting the PFLOAG, by 1971 Chinese aid was essentially over. A number of

developments convinced Beijing to alter its Middle East policy: the Soviet invasion into

Czechoslovakia, the Brezhnev Doctrine, and more ominously the escalation of Sino-

Soviet arms clashes. As a result, Beijing started to accept US policy in the Persian Gulf

and Arabian Peninsula region while cultivating friendly relations with the independent

states of the region. Particularly alarming for Beijing was Moscow's successful bid in

signing two treaties of friendship and cooperation with both India and Iraq in August

145
1971 and April 1971. This pressured China to establish diplomatic relations with both

Kuwait in March 1971 and Iran in August 1971. China attempted to limit Soviet

influence in the region (through Iraq), by establishing relations with both Iran and Kuwait

(Huwaidin 2002: 104-5). China's approval of US role in the Persian Gulf, and its concern

over Soviet penetration is best demonstrated in a memorandum submitted to President

Nixon in March 1973 by Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the US President for National

Security Affairs, describing his meetings with Mao and Zhou in February 1973:

In literally every region of the world the Chinese see the Soviet hand at
play...Mao and Zhou urged us to counter the Russians everywhere, to world
closely with our allies in Europe and Japan, and to take more positive action to
prevent the Soviets filling vacuums or spreading their influence in an area like the
Middle East, Persian Gulf, Near East, south Asia and Indian Ocean (Burr 1999:
112; Huwaidin 2002: 106).

Muscat's direct concerns, however, was the end of Beijing's military and political

support for all national liberation movements in the region. Beijing recognized that

continued support for the PFLOAG would only hamper its efforts in establishing good

relations with countries of the region, and thus play into Moscow's growing influence in

both Iraq and South Yemen. According to Hashim Behbehani, who interviewed several

PFLO officials after the war in 1972, Beijing called on PFLOAG to confine its aims to

Oman. Since PFLOAG refused, Chinese aid was terminated. Even though the PFLOAG

finally did comply with Chinese wishes in 1974 and changed it name to Popular Front for

the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), Beijing remained indifferent. By 1972, PFLOAG had

replaced Chinese aid with aid from the Soviet Union (Katz 1986: 113). Indeed, the

reversal of the Chinese position went so far as to support the efforts of regional states

against the PFLOAG, as exemplified by China's foreign minister Chi Pengfei's visit to

146
Iran in 1973, during which he supported the Shah's decision to send troops to the

Sultanate against the PFLOAG. Furthermore, the Foreign Minister reassured Iran that

Beijing had no ties with subversive activities across the Persian Gulf (Creekman 1979:

115-17). Expressing Chinese fear that a power vacuum created after the British

withdrawal might be filled by the Soviet Union, Chi Pengfi, stated in a speech delivered

in Tehran on 14 June 1973 that:

At present, the situation in the Persian Gulf is arousing general concern. The
intensified expansion, infiltration, and rivalry by certain Big powers are gravely
menacing the peace and security of this part of the world. Iran is an important
country in the Persian Gulf and you have every reason to feel uneasy at this
situation. We have consistently held that the affairs of a given country must be
managed by the country itself, and the affairs of a given region must be managed
by the countries and the people of that region, and the world affairs must be
jointly managed by all countries. Iran and some other Persian Gulf countries held
that the affairs of this region should be jointly managed by the Persian Gulf
countries and brook no outside interference. This is a just position and we express
our firm support for it (Huwaidin 2002: 104-5).

The note about intensified infiltration by certain "Big Powers" naturally referred

to the Soviets, who, according to Yodfat, saw that their efforts to penetrate the region by

diplomatic means (establishing relations with the newly, or soon-to-be, independent

Emirates) had not yet materialized. As the date for British withdrawal from the Gulf area

approached, they boosted their aid for revolutionary elements directed against existing

regimes. The Soviets believed that the "events in the PDRY would be repeated in the

Gulf area, with the PFLOAG playing the same role as the PDRY's NFL. They concluded

that since the situation in Oman was fairly similar, it should therefore yield similar

results" (Yodfat 1983: 14). In other words, the Soviets erroneously calculated that the

insurgents might win the war.

147
 Since Sultan Qaboos' accession, the new government had received nothing but

scathing commentary from both Soviet officials and the Soviet propaganda machine.

They accused the Sultan of being a British puppet whose reforms were simple ploys to

deceive the masses. As Katz asserts, "none of Moscow's commentary about Oman has

ever been favorable, nor has Moscow called for diplomatic ties with Muscat as it has with

the other governments of the region with which it does not have relations" (Katz 1986:

118). Soviet aid to the PFLOAG, however, was never direct, since this could have

adversely affected the Soviet relations with Iran. Soviet arms arrived from Iraq and

through South Yemen, as part of its aid to that country (Yodfat 1983: 14).28

Soviet aid, notwithstanding, by early spring 1973 it became apparent that the

Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF), were beginning to gain the upper hand. The SAF were

able to marshal 3500 combatants and some forty-five aircraft against an insurgency

totaling approximately 2000. This success was without a doubt owed to Sultan Qaboos'

ability to mobilize outside support largely from Britain and Iran (Peterson 1977: 284).

The British motives in the Persian Gulf and by extension in the Sultanate were clearly

articulated in the following secret record.

28 Regarding actual Soviet military aid to the insurgency, look at the following quote:
Moscow supplied a modest quantity of weapons via South Yemen, including 122-mm Katyusha
rockets, PRG-7 recoilless rifles, antitank rockets, anti-personnel mines, mortars, machine guns, rifles, and
ammunitions. In August 1975 the PFLO began using Soviet SA-7 surface-to air missiles (SAMs) including
the more advances SA-7B version...In 1973 Cuban military advisers arrived in South Yemen, and these
were believed to have helped to train Omani revels at several camps in PDRY. Omani guerrillas also went
to China, North Korea, and the USSR at various stages of the conflict... Soviet military advisors were never
seen in Dhofar (Katz 1986: 115).

148
 British interests in the Gulf, up to and beyond British military withdrawn are that
the oil which constitutes about 40 per cent of British...oil imports annually,
should continue to flow reasonably and that British companies continue to benefit
from very large investments...that no hostile power, especially the Soviet union,
should be seriously to damage these...that development in the Gulf should not
damage British relations with Iran...weaken the cohesion of CENTO or put at risk
British overflying rights in Iran; that the use of staging and broadcasting facilities
at Masirah.2 9

By April 1971, SAF included forty-nine seconded British officers, seventy-one on

contract and approximately sixty pilots. As the war drew to an end in 1975, British

presence had mushroomed to 700, including 220 officers in private contract, sixty Special

Air Services (SAS) 30 members, and seventy-five servicemen from the Royal Engineers.

In addition to the role British personnel played, British equipment and weapons were a

dominant factor during the war effort (Peterson 1977: 285).

In some respects, the Shah's objectives and those of Her Majesty's Government

coincided in Oman, giving rise to close cooperation. Tehran's involvement in Dhofar

reflected the Shah's alarm over a potential Communist "penetration on his southern flank,

in addition to the northeast". Consequently, he declared that PFLOAG represented the

"forces of subversion, destruction, chaos and murder," and enthusiastically championed

Sultan Qaboos' efforts (Peterson 1977: 286). According to Marschall (2000: 9), the

Shah's involvement signaled to Marxist regimes as well as to revolutionaries that radical

29 F0106/756: Secret: British Interests In The Persian Gulf: 2 September

1969.

30 A report in the Manchester Guardian, a weekly newspaper, appeared in 8 January 1972,

puts the
number of the SAS operating in Oman only at twenty-two in contrast to Peterson's numbers indicated
above.

149
movements will not be allowed to threaten Tehran's interests in the Persian Gulf.

Elaborating on the matter, a British diplomat stated:

In the Dhofar rebellion, the British-Iranian relationship is of interest. Britain did

not provide any troops but officers who worked together with the Iranian military.
Iran being involved as an equal partner with Britain was important for the Shah,
as it confirmed his view of Iran's position as a global power (Marschall 2003: 9).

One can hardly overemphasize the role Iran played in wining the war in Dhofar.

This was not only due to its military aid, as shall be discussed, but also undoubtedly to its

political muscle. Iran's military aid started as early 1973, with Iranian paratroopers

already stationed in Oman. They were instrumental in clearing the Thamarit road in

December (once available, the archives of the period might indicate even an earlier date;

given that Sultan Qaboos and the Shah had already held several meetings by then). Their

role however was not acknowledged until February 1974 (Peterson 1977: 286).3

Estimated numbers of Iranian forces operating in Oman vary from one scholar to another.

Marschall (2003: 9) suggests that numbers approximate between 30,000 and 35,000

troops (This seems to contradict the numbers given by experts of the region that are

available to this research).32 Peterson puts Iranian troops stationed in Oman between

3500 and 5000 troops (Peterson 1977: 286). Katz (1986: 112) puts the numbers between

31 It may not be a coincidence that the Sultanate's acknowledgment of Iranian participation came
in February 1974, the same month and year when the PFLO held a press release on 7 January 1974 in
Beirut. The press conference was meant to indicate the cooperation of the "imperialist forces" against the
"people's revolution in Dhofar" (Worker's World 1974)

32 The only source that this research came across that corroborates Marchall's
estimation of
Iranian troops in Oman, is the article cited in the above footnote. Needless to say, a press conference by the
PFLO is liable to exaggerate Iranian involvement. Another report by the People's World, not exactly
friendly to Muscat either, cites the PFLOAG itself as a source of the number of Iranian forces in Oman
stating that "up to 3,000 Iranian troops are fighting in Oman, together with air force and naval units"
(People's World 1974).

150
4,000-4,500."3 Peterson claims that large Iranian presence may be explained not only by

the Shah's self-perception as the guardian of the Persian Gulf, but also by its potential for

combat experience for the Iranian troops:

The crack ranger battalions of the 1973 Operation Thimble had been replaced by
units of decidedly lesser quality which were rotated out at frequent intervals in
attempts to give many elements as much battle experience as possible. However,
this policy resulted in alarming losses among Iranian combat forces, reportedly
consisting of over a quarter of the 400 total deaths suffered by the Sultanate and
its allies throughout the entire rebellion (Peterson 1977: 286).

Variations of numbers notwithstanding, the Iranian troops and air support were

positively instrumental in ending the insurgency in Dhofar (Safran 1985: 138).34 While

Iranian Phantom F-5s patrolled the PDRY border, "Iranian destroyers shelled that part of

the Dhufar coast then under rebel control. The Iranians were at the center of Rakhyut's

recapture in January and played a prominent role in the 'big push' of December"

(Peterson 1977: 286). Iran also

The Dhofar insurgency is well documented from various sources and perspectives. The
bibliography is rich with documentation of books and articles that documents that period, none of which
supports Marschall's number. For a small comprehensive sample, look at D.L. Price, Oman: Insurgency
and Development. Conflict Studies, No. 53d (Jan. 1975) and Fred Halliday, Arabia without Sultans
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), especially the chapter on "Guerrilla War in Dhofar," p. 304-360. Price
visited Muscat and Dhufar, and writes from a pro-British viewpoint while Halliday visited Dhufar and his
writes from the insurgency's perspective. For further information, see bibliography.

34 Safran asserts that

Iran's greatest assertiveness manifested itself in the final years of Faisal's reign in the scope of its
military intervention in Oman. Early in 1973 it had sent some helicopters complete with crews to help the
sultan against the PFLOAG. By early 1974 the Iranians had a full combat brigade, a substantial air force
complement, and supporting services in Oman, and these were rotated periodically to give combat
experience to as many troops as possible. By the beginning of 1975 the Iranians forces had helped the
sultan decisively turn the tide against the rebels. Although this development relieved the Saudis and Gulf
principalities of a major source of trouble, it set a precedent of Iranian intervention on the Arab side of the
Gulf that w all the more ominous for the lack of an alternative to it (Safran 1985: 138).

151
 built a radar facility and stationed eight F-5 fighters as Thumrait until the arrival
of Oman's12 Jaguar fighter-bombers in 1977. The Iranian connection proved to
be particularly important in light of the British withdrawal from the RAF facilities
in Salalh and Masirah Island in March 1977 (Allen and Rigsbee 2000: 65-66).

It was rather ironic that most Arab countries were either hostile, neutral, or

extended little help to the Sultanate in the initial stages of the war in Dhofar (Sultan Said

had to face a similar situation with one exception-not a single Arab country was willing

to help). Libya, for example, wavered between support for the Sultanate and a diatribe of

accusations and threats. This was culminated by Qadhafi's invitation for the PFLO to

have a representative in Tripoli. By 1975, Qadhafi had started passing Russian SAM-7

missiles to PFLO and at various times, remarked that if foreign troops were not

withdrawn, the Sultanate would be invaded, presumably by Libya itself. Jordan was a

notable exception in the Arab world by providing troops and equipment to the Sultanate.

Amman, however, had to withdraw its troops after being pressured (one would assume by

fellow Arab countries) to pull out its troops within six months. The idea of Arab troops

fighting along side Iranian troops against fellow Arabs was not acceptable (Peterson

1977: 289-90)35

It had been more than ten years since the beginning of the Dhofar war, and rebel

positions seemed to be as steady. In January 1975, General Perkins, the commander of

the Sultan of Oman's Armed Forces, wrote:

35 There were reports however of an Egyptian force totaling 200 stationed in Oman in 1979,
replacing Approximately 1,000 Iranian troops that had to be withdrawn when the Iranian revolution
occurred (Allen & Rigsbee 2000: 65-66).

152
 By the end of January 1975 the long Dhofar War was well into its tenth year.
Government forces, compromising the Sultan's Armed Forces (SAF) and an
Iranian Brigade, had recently secured important areas but at a stiff price. The
enemy, the People's Liberation Army, controlled politically by the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Oman (PLA and PFLO), appeared as resilient and skillful as
ever, certainly still well supplied. None of us present could see the end; yet
victory was only ten months away (Perkins 1979: 38).36

By December 1975, Sultan Qaboos declared his government's final victory in the

Dhofar rebellion.37 Superior military strategy won the Sultanate the war in Dhofar, but

that victory to a significant degree was enhanced by the favorable regional

environment. 38 Within the same month that the Sultan declared victory, it was "reported

that PDRY Foreign Minister Muti had visited Jedda for talks, after the Saudis had begun

moves to mediate a PDRY-Oman agreement" (Safran 1985: 285).

The question is why now? Why did the Sultanate's wealthier neighbors, Saudi

Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, not provide substantial

36 Indeed, the Guardian was reporting in June 18, 1975 that "Oman rebels fight
on", with "PFLO
units conducted[ing] daily raids against enemy supply lines and troop movements".

The PFLO predictably however, did not recognize this defeat, and even until 1977, its
leadership continued to claim that the "Omani revolution is not over and has not been defeated." (Worker's
World 1977).
38 Statements from the PFLO by the end of 1975, continued to claim that the struggle
was still
active with the support of the "socialist camp", which was more of a wishful thinking, as the ensuing quote
demonstrates:
The PFLO was described as the 'largest, best organized and most active detachment of the
region's liberation forces', succeeding in creating 'liberation regions' in Dhofar and fighting the Sultan's
troops. The PFLO 'relies on the moral and other help of a number of Arab countries', particularly the
PDRY, Iraq and other states. Their struggle 'meets with the understanding and support of the peoples of the
socialist community'. This statement was carefully worded, expressing support but making no concrete
promises of aid or anything else from the Soviet Union (Yodfat 1983: 42-43).
According to Marr, by 1978, Iraq sharply revered its support for the pro-Soviet regime in South
Yemen, after an episode involving the assassination of an Iraq Communist professor working in Aden and
the arrest in Aden of the Iraqi diplomats suspected of the deed (Marr 1985: 244).

153
aid earlier despite the fact that the war in Dhofar posed a real danger to them as well?

Once the war was over, however, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait all became eagerly

involved in attempts to mediate between the Sultanate and the PDRY. After South

Yemen, Iraq had been the second most important supporter of the rebels since the

beginning of the insurgency. Although the mediation was partly aimed at ending the

leftist threat to their own governments, it is equally convincing that "their action

regarding the southern part of the Peninsula was equally motivated by resentment over

Iranian soldiers on Arab soil" (Peterson 1977: 288).

In this light, the 1975 Algiers accord between Iran and Iraq appears to be

particularly significant. This agreement was supposed to have "completely eliminated the

conflict between the two countries" (Mostyn 1991: 141). Although Iraq's support for the

insurgency in Oman was not part of the accord, a case can be made that an understanding

was reached where the "1975 Algiers accord between Iraq and Iran also contributed to

the collapse of the Revolution, for after it was signed, Iraq discontinued aid to Dhufar.

Shortly afterwards, Iraq and Oman established diplomatic relations for the first time"

(Zahlan 1998: 132). As Safran states:

Partly to help counter the Shah's leverage, Iraq established diplomatic relations
with Oman in February 1976, a after having terminated its assistance to the
Dhofar rebels. In March 1976, partly with the same motive in mind, the Saudi's
established diplomatic relations with the PDRY for the first time and in the same
month mediated an agreement between it and Oman, formally ending the Dhofar
rebellion on the basis of PDRY's withholding all aid to the rebels in exchange for
Oman's asking all foreign forces (mainly Iran's) to leave the country (Safran
1985: 268).

Certainly, Sultan Qaboos recognized that the presence of Iranian troops in Oman

could serve the Sultanate in multifaceted ways. The leaders of Arabian Peninsula tended

154
to look at Iran suspiciously (a perception that was justified by Tehran's occupation of the

Gulf islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs in November 1971). By insisting on

Muscat's need to keep Iranian forces in Dhofar, Muscat was pressuring the Arab Gulf

States to compel South Yemen and Iraq to end their support for the insurgency.

The United States' direct involvement in the Dhofar war was negligible. In 1973,

the Sultanate became eligible for U.S. military aid through the Foreign Military Sales

Program. Between 1973 and 1976, the Sultanate purchases did not exceed two million

dollars. This was more of a symbolic gesture since the equipment arrived in 1976; a year

after the war has been won (Rigsbee 1990: 70).39 As Peterson rightly argues:

Much of the international concern over the war in Dhufar focused on the
ideological schism of the struggle and the high stakes involved, i.e. the Gulf with
all its petroleum wealth. Thus, it is not surprising that the 'domino theory' was
frequently mentioned and the comparison with Vietnam made. The similarity
resulted in a paradox in US policy. Fearful that a rebel victory would result in
eventual Communist control over all the Gulf, the US sought to guarantee the
Sultanate's victory. Yet, traumatized by the Vietnam experience, there could be
no direct involvement. Consequently, the US encouraged Britain in the role of
principle supporter, invoked the Nixon Doctrine to wage war by Iranian and
Jordanian proxy and kept its own profile suitably low. Its closest connection came
during Sultan Qaboos's first visit to Washington in January 1975 when the US
requested landing rights at the then British RAF base on al-Masirah Island-
beyond that, American involvement in Dhufar was limited to the sale of a few
arms and helicopters (Peterson 1978: 193).

39 The US department has confirmed however, as early as February 1975 that

two U.S military advisers are training military instructors in Oman...to use newly delivered two
anti-tank missiles obtained from the United States. The New York Times reported Feb 9 that the...missiles
will be used...against Marxisit guerrillas in...Dhofar. The report went on to cast doubt on the value of anti-
tank weapons against a highly mobile guerrilla force which has no armored cars or tanks and moves on foot
or by camel (International Bulletin 1975).

155
 The end of the war could be attributed to a number of factors. Among them was

the external military aid: British, Iranian, and Jordanian. So, as Zahlan asserts,

was the scale of Oman's oil revenues after 1973 which provided the Sultan with
numerous advantages: he was able to spend lavishly on upgrading his defense
forces; and he was able to provide the province of Dhofar with many social and
economic reforms, thus tackling the original reasons for the Revolution (Zahlan
1998: 132).

Amnesty was granted to all Dhofaris who were willing to put down their arms.

Moreover, many were appointed by the Sultan to senior positions in the government

(Zahlan 1998: 132). The author seems to be implying that if the same resources were

available to Sultan's late father, the results would have been the same. This evaluation is

utterly erroneous. The role of Sultan Qaboos' personal leadership in the outcome of war

cannot be overemphasized. The Sultan was a

professional soldier, and thus defense and security were of paramount concern.
Qaboos readily admitted that his own military experiences, meaning Sand Hurst,
service in the British Army on the Rhine, and the Dhofar war, were major
influence on his life (Allen and Rigsbee 2000: 65).

His political acumen from the start of the war proved itself in linking socio-

political factors with military objectives. 40 As we have seen in the last chapter, Sultan

Said was either unwilling or unable to demonstrate the same political imagination.

40 As Skeet's rightly asserts, "Nothing could have been accomplished

without the attitude,
inspiration and leadership of Sultan Qaboos himself' (Skeet 1992: 51).

156
 The Sultanate's Strategic and Security Conceptions

The end of this long war unquestionably brought with it a newly-found status to

the Sultanate. Only a few years earlier, the country was called "Muscat and Oman and

Dhofar", although the latter was seldom appended to "Muscat and Oman". Qaboos'

resolve and determination to end this artificial divide and create a unified country was

evident from his earliest announcements made in August 1970, when he declared that

henceforth the country was to be known as The Sultanate of Oman (Skeet 1992: 51).

Regionally and internationally, the world took notice of the Sultanate's victory. The

country's strategic value, the involvement of various countries in the conflict, the scale of

the war itself, and Muscat's successful modernization were all noteworthy. Without a

doubt, the country's experience of the war was a decisive factor in the rebirth of Oman as

a country whose voice is relevant and indeed important. This became apparent in

subsequent years "when the discussions about Gulf security developed in the later 1970's

which ended with the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Oman's

opinions were influential and necessary to the debate in a way that would have been

inconceivable a few years earlier and pre-1970 would not even have been sought" (Skeet

1992: 51).

This was already clear from one of the earliest efforts to establish a Gulf security

formula on 16 July 1975. As the Ministers of Arab Gulf states, Iraq, and Iran were

attending the Islamic Conference meeting at Jidda, Riyadh elicited their accord on a set

of standards regarding Gulf Security. Specifically, Riyadh sought few key principles:

(1) exclusion of the superpowers from the region; (2) denial of foreign military
bases; (3) military cooperation among Gulf countries to ensure freedom of

157
 navigation; (4) peaceful resolution of regional disputes; and (5) a collective
guarantee of the territorial integrity of countries of the region (Safran 1985: 267).

Essentially, these principles or standards recognized a common denominator of

external threats as an alliance of Gulf countries with superpowers; perceived security

issues principally in terms of relations among Gulf countries, and called for the bare

minimum in military cooperation (the latter is not even conceived necessarily on a full

collective basis) (Safran 1985: 267). For various reasons, these principles were simply

unacceptable for various states in the region. When, Muscat, for instance appealed that all

"littoral states extend financial support to the joint Iranian-Omani naval patrols in the

Straits of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia and the UAE objected, proposing instead that security

arrangements be worked out within the 'Arab Nation"' (Kechichian 1995: 115). For both

Muscat and Tehran, the idea that foreign troops (British and Iranian forces still engaged

in Dhofar) must be pulled out of the area, was unrealistic and uncalled for, given that in

Dhofar Soviet aid was still channeled through South Yemen. 4 1 Baghdad, on the other

hand, argued that collective arrangements were unnecessary; rather cooperation in the

form of bilateral arrangements between individual states should be a norm. It allowed

Baghdad to pressure individual counties such as Kuwait or the United Arab Emirates. In

41 As a matter of fact, the Sultanate's cooperation with Iran increased significantly

that year, as the
following quote from February of 1975 indicates:
The British commander of Oman's defense forces ... says that the Shah has guarantee air support
aginst foreign intrusion of Oman's air space as requested. On 2 January the International Herald Tribune
had reported that Iran had extended its naval presence in Oman under an agreement with it for joint naval
operations in the crucial Strait of Hormuz. The Omani minister of state for foreign affairs, Qais Abd al-
Moneim al-Zawawi, said that Iran would have the major responsibility for implementing the agreement
which was aimed at keeping the waters on both sides of the Strait 'secure and free'. He denied that the
operations were a threat to Iraq, saying 'We are committed to a policy of free passage...There is no reason
for Iraq to be concerned that Oman or Iran will hinder it use of the strait.' (Mostyn 1991: 140).

158
addition, the regional states frowned on the professed exclusion of the superpowers as

being

directed at their Soviet connection but having no effect on the 'organic'

connection of Iran and Saudi Arabia and the United States. They wanted the
denial of foreign bases to apply to American base rights in Bahrain but not to the
Soviet presence in their own Umm al-Qasr naval base (Safran 1985: 267).

In Muscat, the exclusion of foreign forces from Dhofar, without a concrete

commitment that troops and resources will be provided for the war effort, was

understandably perceived as unrealistic and even dangerous. Second, Muscat was already

engaged as early as September 1974, in negotiating with the U.S. on terms under which

landing rights were sought for Masirah Island. Arrangements were reached only after the

Sultan's visit to

Washington in January 1975, where he met President Ford, Secretary of State

Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and CIA Director
William Colby... The move was interpreted as a sorely needed counteraction
against the growing Soviet presence in the region (Kechichian 1995: 145-46).42

Riyadh, however, was still hopeful that its proposed scheme would eventually

gain the approval of the countries of the Arabian Peninsula at least. To that end, Saudi

Minister of Interior Prince Nayef ibn Abd Al-Aziz, toured the Gulf countries in October

1976 to promote a pact on internal security along the same Saudi scheme mentioned

earlier. Kuwait, fearing Iraq, and Oman with its special relationship with Iran, called

42 The following is a commentary from the Christian Science Monitor in the 13 February 1975:
According to State Department sources in Washington, the U.S. request to use the British airbase in
Masirah Island off the coast of Oman was made by Henry Kissinger to Sultan Qaboos when the latter
visited Washington in January. These sources assert that the move was initiated by Kissinger himself, and
that neither the State Department, the Pentagon, nor the national Security Council had anything to do with
it.

159
instead for a regional security scheme that included both Iraq and Iran. A conference took

place in Muscat, on 25 November with the participation of Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Saudi

Arabia, Qatar, Iraq and Iran (Safran 1985: 267).

This conference, like previous ones, was destined to fail. Once again, different

security concerns of each state precluded the possibility of a common formula and

understanding of what constitutes Gulf security, let alone a formal alliance or agreements

between the Persian Gulf States. 4 3 Muscat's relations with Tehran were again a key factor

in the conference. At this juncture, it is important to remember that Riyadh played a key

role mediating between the PDRY and the Sultanate of Oman in ending the PDRY's

support for the PFLO. Once diplomatic relations were established between the PDRY and

Riyadh on 10 March 1976 (a watershed event for both states that had no diplomatic

missions since 1967) Riyadh attempted although unsuccessfully to bring about

reconciliation between Oman and South Yemen. The efforts did succeed however in

mediating a cease fire premised on South Yemen's withholding of all aid to the PFLO, in

exchange for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the Sultanate. The agreement

underscored the common interest between Saudi Arabia and PDRY in getting Iran
out of Oman, but was also a source of continuing friction between them, since the
Saudis expected PDRY to cease aiding the rebels but could not themselves deliver
the withdrawal of Iran's force (Safran 1985: 285-286).

43 According to Safran, "Five working papers were submitted by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, and
the UAE respectively-the Saudis typically avoided submitting one their own name to avoid loss of face and
to give themselves maximum room for maneuver. The proposals ranged from a comprehensive defense
alliance suggested by Iran, through various proposals for loose cooperation in such matters as security
information and nonaggression agreements, to a complete rejection of the need for any collective alliance.
The deliberation took place in an atmosphere suffuse with tension and mutual suspicions and ended with no
agreement on any of the proposals" (Safran 1985: 267).

160
 Yet again, Muscat demanded a regional security agreement before asking the

Iranians to leave. When the demand was not met, Muscat

concluded an agreement with Iran in January 1977 calling for the reduction but
not the complete removal of Iran's military presence. The mutual Saudi-PDRY
recognition of the preceding March did not therefore lead to an exchange of
ambassadors between the two countries, and Saudi assistance to PDRY remained
at a modest level" (Safran 1985: 286).

There were simply too many differences between the parties concerned on what

constitutes security and how best to secure the Persian Gulf for the Muscat summit to

succeed. There was no consensus on the status of foreign fleets in the Persian Gulf, on

how best cooperate militarily to guarantee the safety of navigation, and on whether

military facilities should be granted to Western powers. Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf

monarchies identified different sources of tensions in the region, and, as a consequence,

conceived of different security arrangements (Kechichian 1995: 116). The Sultanate's

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs captured the prevailing mood by noting that "it is

apparent that the present atmosphere is not suitable to reaching a formula for mutual co-

operation. There are many reservations and many options to clear up first" (Kechichian

1995: 116). Qaboos recognized that "separate arrangements would have to be reached

with Iran and Iraq but that another effort should also be made to join the Arab monarchies

together. In an appeal to his fellow rulers, he asked for the establishment of a $100

million Common Defense Fund that would be responsible for safeguarding the security of

the Straits (Kechichian 1995: 116).

Sultan Qaboos' resolve to procure serious and reliable security arrangements

between the countries of the Persian Gulf, as a precondition for withdrawal of Iranian

forces and for ending the American presence in Masirah Island, in the face of Iraqi and

161
Arab Gulf states pressure, was the beginning of a sense of independent foreign policy

initiatives. In fact, as early as 1971,

India's support of Oman at the UN was reciprocated by the Sultan Qaboos in

1971 during the debate over Bangladesh. Unlike the majority of Arab states,
Oman abstained notwithstanding it nascent membership status. It was the only
Muslim state not to fully support Pakistan (Pradhan 1999: 77).

In 1977, despite the pressure from Arab countries, Muscat supported Egyptian

President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 (after all, Oman was one

of the three Arab countries that supported the Sadat initiative), the subsequent US

brokered Camp David accords of 1978, and the bilateral peace treaty between Egypt and

Israel in March 1979. When Baghdad invited Sultan Qaboos to attend the October 1978

"Rejectionist Front Summit", as a response to President Sadat's visit to Israel, the Sultan

declined. When another invitation was issued for the Foreign Ministers to meet in

Baghdad on 27 March 27 1979, Muscat once again decided not to attend. Baghdad's

harsh response came from Saddam Hussein, when he declared through the Iraqi paper Al-

Thawra: "We regard every Arab ruler who does not implement the summit decisions as a

traitor. It is therefore our duty to instigate his people against him and to provide them

with the necessary means to topple him" (Safran 1985: 285-286). According to

Kechichian,

Qaboos declined the invitation not only because he thought that the Summit was
unnecessary, but because he did not believe in joining 'rejectionist' fronts. Oman
would not join a pack dominated by weak ideas and even weaker concepts. This
was more than a technical matter. (Kechichian 1995: 108).

Even after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Muscat continued to regard

the Camp David accords as the foundation for a possible resolution of the Arab-Israeli

conflict. The Sultan declared that

162
 the Camp David accords had been and still were the only means that achieved a
constructive step in the direction of reaching a peaceful solution to the Middle
East issue. We believe it is necessary to regard Camp David accord as alive, and
that every effort designed to attain further progress should be based on it (Pasha
1999: 115-6).44

It is logical therefore that in 1983, official Muscat through its Foreign Minister,

Yusuf al-Alwai "took the unusual step of calling upon Arab nations to recognize Israel,

since Israel will remain in existence" (Katz 1986: 123).

Outside of the Middle East, the Soviets vilified Oman for approving the Camp

David Accords and for not breaking diplomatic relations with Cairo, as was the case with

most of the Arab States. The Soviets had other reasons to denounce the Sultanate's

foreign policy either in official comments or through its propaganda machine, namely the

establishment of diplomatic relations between Oman and the PRC in 1978, which the

Soviets perceived as "as part of the two countries efforts to form a broader anti-Soviet

alliance" (Katz 1986: 123). Only a few years after the Dhofar war, and despite China's

early involvement, the representatives of two countries met in London to sign a joint

communique in May 1978. It stated:

The Government of the People of China and Government of the Sultanate of

Oman have decided to establish diplomatic relation at ambassadorial levels as
from may 25, 1978, and to exchange ambassadors. The Government of the

44 Sultan Qaboos continued to press the point that peace between the Arabs and Israel is vital to
the region; a peace that protects the "full rights of the Palestinian people", as indicated in the ensuing
interview with Middle East Insight in 1992:
I [Qaboos] certainly feel that a general peace between Israel and the Arab countries is vitally
desirable, and that all should work to this end energetically and constructively. I think the need for this
general peace is becoming more and more recognized by those counties which have a direct interest in this
matter and, in spite of the occasional setback, I feel that great progress has been made towards this end. As
for Oman, you may be sure that we will do all we can to further the aim of a just and final settlement which
will protect the full rights of the Palestinian people.

163
 People's Republic of China firmly supports the Government of the Sultanate of
Oman in its just cause of safeguarding its nationally independence and developing
the national economy. The Government of the Sultanate of Oman recognizes the
Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government
representing the Chinese people. The two governments have agreed to develop
friendly relations and cooperation between the two countries on the basis of the
principles of mutual respecting for state sovereignty and territorial integrity,
mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality
and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence (Huwaidin 2002: 203).

Indeed, the communique expressed one of Beijing's key priorities in the region:

recognizing Beijing as the only legitimate representative of all of China. It should be

noted, however, that the Sultanate still allowed a Taiwanese trade mission to remain in

the Omani capital of Muscat (Huwaidin 2002: 204). As the new ties were established, an

editorial in the Chinese People's Daily commented on the Sultanate's strategic and

political significance:

Oman situated in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula occupies a position of
strategic importance as it is the threshold linking the Gulf with the Indian Ocean.
It suffered historically from aggression and oppression by imperialism and
colonialism, and the people have waged a heroic struggle against imperialism and
colonialism in order to achieve national independence. Today, the Omani
Government is dedicating its efforts to the struggle in defense of national
independence and of the development of national economy. Following in foreign
affairs the principles of neutrality and non-alignment, Oman advocates unity and
co-operation among the countries in the Gulf and Red Sea and opposes big power
concentration there. All this earns the firm support of the Chinese Government
and people (Huwaidin 2002: 204).

A number of key factors prompted both Muscat and Beijing's to establish

diplomatic relations. China's motives were mainly driven by a concern over Soviet

penetration of South Yemen and Iraq as a prelude to an overall domination of the Persian

Gulf region. In addition, China recognized that its relations with Oman might open the

door for other states in the region to establish relations with Beijing, while terminating

their ties with the Taiwanese government. This was particularly true of Saudi Arabia,

164
which was one of the key states with which Taiwan enjoyed diplomatic relations (the

others were South Korea and South Africa) (Huwaidin 2002: 205).

As far as Muscat was concerned, the establishment of diplomatic relations with

Beijing intended to put a complete end to any possible future support that China might

lend to the PFLO. In addition, the Sultanate's shared concern with Beijing regarding

Soviet penetration in and around the region was also a key factor in Muscat's decision to

establish diplomatic relations with Beijing. The Sultanate reasoned that diplomatic

relations with China would serve as counter-weight to the Soviets. Sultan Qaboos said:

The Soviet Union is pushing forward a scheduled and fixed policy of

expansionism in this region. This policy is no way different from the savage acts
of the old colonialists during their time. This has been obvious for some time,
undoubtedly, the Soviet Union has two intentions: ultimately gaining control of
the Middle East, in particular, the oil region; and second, carry out expansion
towards the Indian Ocean in order to control African countries and then the entire
Far East (Huwaidin 2002: 205).

The Sultanate of Oman, the Iranian Revolution

and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

The year 1979 proved to be one of the most eventful years in the history of the

region: the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were watershed

events that continue to reverberate to our present day. These events reinforced the

Sultanate's regional and global significance stemming from its geographic position in the

southeast corner of the Arabian Peninsula overlooking the Strait of Hormuz and the

entrance of the Gulf, and controlling the apex of the Indian Ocean. Although Muscat

shares with Tehran the sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, it should be stressed that

all of the designated traffic lanes through which tankers navigate "are all on the Omani

165
side of the dividing line: so in fact Oman is responsible for the protection of all the tanker

traffic through the Strait of Hormuz" (Dunn 1992: 48). Within a year, Muscat found itself

between two of the Middle East's most radical regimes: PDRY to the immediate south

and the revolutionary Islamic Republic of Iran across the Gulf to the north.

Among the six, his [Sultan Qaboos's] country alone straddled the Hormuz Strait.
Omani land, the narrow and isolated tip of the Musandam Peninsula, stuck out
into the center of the strait. Sultan Qaboos and the Shah had undertaken the patrol
of the strait together. What was Qaboos to do with the revolutionary leaders in
Tehran? (Ramazani 1986: 122).

Less significantly, was a situation taking place in Afghanistan: "...since the

December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan...the presence of Soviet troops in that country,

now numbering close to 100,000, have been positioned a mere 300 miles-less than an

hour's flying time-from Oman's borders" (Duke 1987: 179). However, the most

difficult development for the achievement of Soviet goals in the region was the

resurgence of American resolve, exemplified by the Carter Doctrine, 45 the U.S. naval

buildup in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman and the determination to proceed quickly

with the establishment of the Rapid-Deployment Force (RDF). All the rulers balked at

basing the RDF or admitting they would cooperate in the venture even to the extent of

allowing the United States to pre-position equipment (Page 1987: 154-5).

Muscat's immediate response varied from attempts to maintain correct, if not

warm relations with Iran, to a resolute call for the Persian Gulf states and the

45 The Carter Doctrine stated:

An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an
assult on the vital interests of the USA, and as such as assault will be repelled by any means necessary,
including military force (Skeet 1992: 83).

166
international community to share in the responsibility in safeguarding the Straits. Muscat

dispatched a delegation headed by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Alwai bin

Abdullah, to meet with Khomeini. Alwai was informed in Tehran that agreements signed

by the previous regime would be honored, and that Iran would work closely with Oman

to ensure regional security. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Minister declared that

"Iran is our neighbor, we have close historical, religious and geographic links with her

and we are eagerly looking forward to expanding pure relations with her in all fields in

order to make the region a safer place to live in" (Kechichian 1995: 101). In addition,

Muscat dispatched another mission, headed by Muscat's former ambassador to Iran, to all

Gulf countries including Iran, calling for the preservation of freedom of navigation

through the Strait of Hormuz, and the financial and technical support of major

industrialized countries. 4 6 The mission however was aborted,

not only because of the Iranian preferences to go it alone, but also because of a
visit the Iraqis made to Bahrain and Kuwait in order to sabotage the mission. The
Iraqi newspaper Al-Thawra, the mouthpiece of the Ba'th party, charged that the
'Omani plan' was 'a new imperialist alliance.' The plan was suspect form the
very beginning, because the sultan had a well-known preference for closely
cooperating with the West in security matters. Long before the Soviets invaded
Afghanistan, for example, he advised the Americans: 'What we need is a clear
drawing of the line against Soviet involvement in the area.' 'The U.S position,' he
added, 'should be clear without ambiguity. You should not allow the Russians to

46 Muscat's diplomacy was also evident in India, as Pradhan

points out:
Just a few months after the invasion, Oman's Deputy Prime Minister for Security Affairs, Sayyid
Fahar bin Taymur, visited India. The Omani minister held discussion with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
about military ties between the two countries. He specifically sought to strengthen and expand Indo-Omani
relations in military training and counterterrorism. That Oman could frankly discuss these security matters
with India despite the latter's close proximity and friendship with the Soviet Union went a long way in
reinforcing the element of mutual trust in Indo-Omani relations (Pradhan 1999: 83).

167
 undermine your friends and, in the process, America itself (Ramazani 1986:
122).

The Sultan not only demanded clear commitment from the United States to

protect the security of the Persian Gulf, but also to consider a possible role of NATO in

the region. In one of his interviews he wondered

Why countries friendly to the West, that have the strategic location, possess vital
resources for the industrial world and hold common interests with the West, are
not invited to join NATO as associate members or observers, thus becoming an
integral part of the Western defense system (El-Rayyes 1987: 198).

Illustrating his unfailing realism, Qaboos commented in another interview given

on 15 December 1979 that "if the big powers find that their interests in the region are

threatened, they will not seek permission from me or anybody else to intervene..." (El-

Rayyes 1987: 198). Seven months later, Sultan Qaboos took a bold decision that was

denounced by almost every Arab capital: Muscat signed the US-Oman military access

agreement in June 1980, allowing the U.S. military use of Omani facilities. This was in

exchange for

assistance in upgrading four of Oman's airfields and the provisions of military

and economic credits, the agreement stipulates that US forces, upon the
Sultanate's invitation, be allowed access to Omani military facilities in the event
of a regional confrontation requiring Western intervention...Pursuant to this
agreement, the Sultanate has been the only GCC member state-and apart from
Morocco, Egypt, the Sudan and Somalia, the only Arab country-to conduct joint
exercises with US military forces... In addition, the US has spent more than a
quarter of a billion dollars in connection with holding three joint training
exercises with Omani forces in 1981, 1982, and 1983, and in improving facilities
at Masirah, Khasab, Thamarit and Sib, including provisions for fuels and
ammunition storage, housing, landing-strip extensions, new electricity generating
and desalination plants, aircraft maintenance and warehousing. As Anthony
Cordesman has noted, the improvements to the facilities at Masirah alone 'will
give Oman a modern air base to cover its seacoast that is outside the effective
range of most Iranian and Yemeni fighters, and the tacit guarantee of over-the-
horizon reinforcement from the US without having sacrificed any aspect of
Omani sovereignty' (Duke 1987: 186-191).

168
 To counter the cries of denunciation coming from various Arab capitals, Oman's

Information Minister stated that "The US must have access to our facilities but only on

request. It is up to us to say yes or no. We will never allow the facilities to be used

against neighboring or friendly countries." Immediately after, Oman and the US carried

military exercises called "Bright Star" on a regular annual basis. 47 The Sultanate's

Minister of State of Foreign Affairs, Alwai bin Abdullah, stated that the exercises were

being conducted with a state that is a

friend of all the area states. On this basis, the maneuvers could not be interpreted
as being directed against any Gulf State. The United States was a country which
has transcended the stage of friendship to the point where it could be said that it
was an allied state, despite the fact that there was nothing written in this respect
(Pasha 1999: 111).

The response however from all of the Arab Gulf countries was one of critique and

accusations. Bahrain's Foreign Minister stressed that "the defense of the Gulf must be

undertaken by the states of the area, and any request by any foreign state for bases or

facilities will be rejected" (Gawlik 1982: 49). He further commented that

There is no organization in the Gulf area that supports Oman's steps to grant
facilities or military bases in the area. The act of bringing U.S. forces into the area
would complicate matters and would render the dangers of conflict and
competition between the U.S. and the USSR in the area more possible and more
serious (Gawlik 1982: 49).

Kuwait's reaction was even stronger expressed in both the Prime Minister and the

Foreign Minister's rejection of the presence of American forces in the region. Kuwait's

47 Muscat carried out military exercises with a number of states including India. After Sayyid
Fahar bin Tymur's visit to India in March 1989, successful Indo-Omani discussions on military cooperation
"resulted in a two-day joint naval exercise-the first ever joint military exercise between India and a Gulf
state-of the coast of Oman in January 1993" (Pradhan 1999: 84).

169
Foreign Minister demanded that all major powers should withdraw their fleets from the

Gulf and neighboring area, and thus, "keep this important strategic region of the world

away from international conflicts" (Gawlik 1982: 49). United Arab Emirates emphasized

that:

It is true that the Arab Gulf states have condemned the Soviet military
intervention in Afghanistan...however, their position on Afghanistan was decided
at the Islamic Conference ... and their awareness of the Soviet danger dose not
mean that they should accept foreign forces. Just as they reject and condemn any
Soviet expansion, the Gulf States, on the basis of the same independent national
will, reject U.S. protection (Gawlik 1982: 49).

Whereas the Saudis were content that there were no foreign "bases" in Saudi

Arabia, Iraq responded by condemning the Soviet invasion, which was followed by a call

for an Arab charter which states that

The presence in the Arab homeland of any foreign troops or military forces shall
be rejected and no facilities for the use of Arab territory shall be extended to them
in any from or under any pretext or cover. Any Arab regime that fails to comply
with this principle shall be proscribed and boycotted both economically and
politically as well as politically opposed by all available means (Gawlik 1982:
50).48

For its part, Muscat denied that the agreement granted the U.S. a base insisting

that it was a facility that could only be used with Muscat's approval. 49 On 18 November

48 Not to be outdone, Libya and PFLO also condemned the agreement.

49 The agreement is very clear. It does not mean the establishment of American bases as that term
is generally used. The installations involved will remain absolutely under Omani control, with no American
military personnel stationed on them. The agreement does stipulates that the US may have access to Omani
facilities, under specific conditions, if and when that may be necessary, with Omani permission to be
granted in each case (Mahrouki 1986: 14).

170
1980, on the occasion of the Sultanate's 1 0 th National Day, the Sultan commented on

Muscat's motives behind the agreement:

Oman has given repeated and, we regret to say, largely unheeded warnings about
these dangers. We have invited our brothers to join with us and aid us in
preserving the stability of the area-not only vital to ourselves but to the whole
world-but to no avail. Therefore, threatened as we are-and we still have vivid
and bitter memories of the realities and form of that threat-we have had no other
choice than to seek the assistance of those who will provide us with the means to
defend ourselves (Oman Ministry of Information 2001).

Speaking with more directness, the Sultan stated in an interview that:

I would like to reveal one of the reasons behind this agreement (with US on
facilities). The strategic location of Oman and the possible threats, however
remote, made it indispensable that Oman should enlarge it military establishments
and airports. Consequently, we asked the GCC brothers to help us in this task,
particularly as our oil resources are very limited in comparison to theirs. The
required improvements involved about $2 billion, a sum which most brothers
declined to spend, while the US showed readiness to finance these projects. That
is how we came to agree on the facilities (Pasha 1999: 111).

In another interview, the Sultan went into even further details explaining Oman's

decision:

We must make clear that the questions of facilities has been overblown and given
different interpretations. Some have even gone as far as saying they are bases in
the guise of facilities. This is unthinkable from the outset, and we refuse to
discuss it in any way. However, because of the conditions created in the world,
and our area in particular, if was necessary to have to have some kind of
understanding between us and our friends, without specifying a particular state.
Also, while the United States is on one side of the international scale, it has
become necessary for the area that there be a balance because the opposite side
has become heavy and the Eastern Camp's presence has become
large...particularly in South Yemen and Ethiopia as well as Afghanistan in the
north, which is only 300 nautical miles from here. 50 As for the U.S. naval

50 This is in reference to the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR in
October 1979
with Aden, and later signed with Libya and Ethiopia creating the pro-Soviet Aden Pact in August 1981.
Taken together, the "two countries effectively transfer a powerful Soviet presence into the Red Sea, whose

171
 presence, Oman has nothing to do with it-it is in the Indian Ocean and not under
the sovereignty of a particular state.

It is in our interest that there be an understanding with the other superpower,

because in the case of extreme necessity, God forbid, the area will need the
United States. Therefore, there must be arrangements facilitating the rendering of
U.S. aid.

The United States is prepared to develop our airfields and ports. It would be of no
avail to lose such an opportunity to develop the facilities. As for the use of such
facilities for anything, this will be by our request. On this basis, the Sultanate has
welcomed giving facilities to the Unites States. This is all there is to it."

Indeed, Oman's insistence on using the term "facility" rather than "base" was not

merely for public consumption. As Acharya maintains:

In the case of these "arrangements [military facilities], host country intentions in

granting access could not be confirmed until actual clearance was received at the
onset of a particular crisis. Even in the case of Oman, the GCC member most
sympathetic to the U.S strategy in the region and the only one in need and receipt
of American military and economic aid, U.S. discretion in using the facilities was
limited and uncertain (Acharya 1989: 113).

This is further confirmed in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report in

1984 which "concluded that the U.S.-Omani 'agreement was predicated on assisting the

United States in meeting a potential Soviet threat to the region. Oman did not commit

itself to United States use of these facilities to meet threats originating from within the

waters are important to the Gulf states as the only possible outlet for the petroleum trade should travel in
the Gulf generally or through the Straits of Hormuz become impossible (Hameed 1986: 73-4).
In addition, the Sultanate's apprehension had been
heightened by an awareness of its less-than- perfect air and maritime defense system and Soviet
access to the PDRY's naval facilities at Aden and the Indian Ocean island of Socotra. Of additional
concern is Soviet access to PDRY land bases-and soon to be completed new air base-near the Omani
border (Duke 1987: 192).
51"Interview with Sultan Qaboos of Oman," Al-Majallah, 1-7 1992, p.12-17: FBIS-MEA-V-82-
089, 7 May 1982.

172
 2
region" (Acharya 1989: 114). As the following memorandum to national security

advisor Zibiginew Brezeinski illustrates:

My old friend Stephen Groueff, now Public Relations Adviser to the Omani
Embassy, invited me to lunch today...The Omani Ambassador left for home
consultations last night in connection with what Stephen termed 'current
misunderstandings'...The Omanis have interpreted our desire for facilities as
relating primarily to their own security, which they see most directly menaced by
South Yemen. They envision no U.S military presence of consequence unless and
until Oman itself is endangered directly. They do not envision Oman as a staging
area for American operation toward Iran or Iraq, Afghanistan or other more
distant points."

The simple fact is that the agreement met significant needs of both Washington

and Muscat. Given the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution, and the

looming threat of war between Iraq and Iran, the Unites States needed access to facilities

or bases outside of its traditional points of operation in the Indian Ocean and the Persian

Gulf region: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Diego Garcia. For various reasons, all three were

viewed to be inadequate for meeting United States needs in the area in the light of new

environment. Bahrain, for example, was home to U.S. Middle East Force, but it was too

small for significant military activity. Moreover, being in the Gulf, Bahrain's ability to

assist large ships such as aircraft carriers was negligible. Saudi Arabia's military facilities

It should be noted that the agreement length was five years, and when the negotiations for
renewal took place in 1985,
The negotiations were more difficult than many American officials had anticipated. As so often
happens in such cases, Department of Defense lawyers sought stronger "status of-force" provisions and
endeavored to include provisions that would have made these Omani facilities virtually American bases.
Not only did the Omanis reject this, but on their part, they sought to limit more closely US use of Omani
military facilities (Ellits 1988: 33).

Memorandum: National Security Council: 26 March 1980. Memorandum for: Zbiginew

Brzezinksi. From: Paul B. Henze: Subject: Oman and the U.S Relationship.

173
are more than adequate for various military uses, but could be very costly politically for

both Riyadh and Washington due to the Saudi status in the Arab and Muslim world.

Diego Garcia, on the other hand, is too far away from the Persian Gulf especially for

daily operations. Muscat, therefore, was an ideal point of access in the region given that it

lacked both the logistical and the political problems of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain

(Rigsbee 1990: 70-3).

The Sultanate's motives for the agreement varied (Kechichian 1995: 148). As

articulated by Sultan Qaboos in his interview, Muscat recognized possible threats to its

security, and wished to obtain U.S. assistance in modernizing its military facilities, an

assistance that was not forthcoming from his wealthier neighbors. One may assume that

these "threats" emanated from Tehran, however it is more likely that Muscat was more

concerned with both South Yemen and the Soviet Union. After all, the Sultanate was the

only Arab state in the region that was in complete agreement with Washington in

recognizing the Soviet Union as the main threat to the Persian Gulf (Pool 1994: 276;

Graze 1982: 175). In addition, Qaboos was able to extract a

side-letter to the agreement in which there is a formal undertaking by the US to

support Oman in the event of aggression against the Sultanate. Excluding
President Truman's letter to Ibn Saud this was the only case of such an agreement
between the US and an Arab county until after the Kuwait War of 1991 (Owtram
2004: 151).

An alliance with a major power was motivated chiefly by strategic concerns, but

one should not discount the economic dimension of the agreement. A salient reason

behind the Qaboos' decision was Muscat's lack of great wealth in comparison to the rest

of the Arab Gulf states. The war in Dhofar, and the requirements for building a modern

state were extremely expensive for Muscat's modest resources.

174
 The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however threatening, was soon to be

superseded by a closer threat: the Iran-Iraq war which began with Iraq's invasion of Iran

on 22 September 22 1980. For Muscat, this was a double tragedy and a strategic hazard.

First, the war was preceded by the Iranian revolution, which removed the most important

regional deterrent to a possible Soviet advance in the Gulf. The new regime,

notwithstanding its promises for security cooperation with the Sultanate in the Straits as

mentioned earlier, was visited by a delegation of the People's Front for the Liberation of

Oman (PFLO) in April 1979. Muscat simply ignored this visit, and reiterated its position

(which it kept throughout the ordeal of the war) that the Iranian Revolution is an internal

matter (Kechichian 1995: 101). Second, the spill over of the conflict to the Sultanate was

a real possibility that Muscat could not dismiss. Importantly, this was not necessarily a

question of supporting subversive acts against the Sultanate, as occurred in Iraq or later in

Kuwait, or by supporting indigenous dissidents, as was the case in Bahrain in late 1981

(Peterson 1987: 170). As Ramazani pointed out, the

Iranian geo-strategic challenge to Oman is unique. Omani shorelines (1,005

nautical miles) lie mainly outside the Persian Gulf, but the isolated 51-mile
Omani enclave that lies within Gulf waters looks Iran straight in the eye across
the strategic Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian challenge to Oman, therefore,
interconnects uniquely with the Iranian challenge to all Gulf States at the Strait of
Hormuz... 'joint Iranian-Omani patrol of the Strait of Hormuz' that has been set
up by the two monarchs [the Shah and the Sultan] was scrapped by the
revolutionary regime, resulting in Oman undertaking unilateral military efforts-
with the help of the United States-to keep a watchful eye on the strategic
waterway (Ramazani 1986: 13).

The Sultanate of Oman and the Gulf Cooperation Council

Ironically, the war between Iran and Iraq "forced" the creation of the long sought

after Gulf Cooperation Council composed of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi

175
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on 25 May 1981. The Iran-Iraq war was

certainly not the main motive behind this organization; rather it was a combination of

events such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the impact of the revolution on the

region, and the concern over a possible American intervention in the area. The Iran-Iraq

was "a precipitative factor at the inception of the GCC, but only later did it become a

primary concern of GCC members" (Ramazani 1986: 114).

Since the inauguration of the GCC, the Sultanate was the strongest advocate of

defense cooperation in the GCC body. Twinam argues that GCC members were not

interested in security cooperation at the pace Muscat advocated. This was primarily the

case because, as he explained, the GCC was emphasizing the

need to keep superpower rivalry out of the Gulf. More likely was a concern to
play the delicate and dangerous game with Iran as subtly as possible. It was
important to keep the GCC from appearing as a defense pact aimed against
Khomeini's revolution (Twinam 1987: 37).

Yet, we know from statements that were made by Sultan Qaboos that this

conclusion is not accurate:

To be perfectly frank, I say that here in Muscat we do not believe it to be in the

interest of security in the Gulf that Iran feels we intend to establish an Arab
military pact that will always be hostile to it, or that we are about to from a joint
force, whose main task is to fight Iran...There is no alternative to peaceful co-
existence between Arabs and Persian in the end, and there is no alternative to a
minimum of accord in the region (Kechichian 1995: 104).

Graz rightly points out that

Oman, despite the old friendship with the Shah, managed to stay neutral, refusing
to join in the condemnation of Iran by the Arab foreign ministers meeting in Tunis
in September 1987. The inevitable result was, once again, that it was charged with
lack of Arab fervor (Graz 1990: 215).

If anything, the Sultanate has consistently pursued an evenhanded approach to the

first Iran-Iraq war. It refused to make any attempts to structure the Gulf Cooperation

176
Council (GCC) as an anti-Iranian front. More importantly, Oman has encouraged Gulf

States to engage Iran if only to ensure the safety of the Straits. The confusion seems to

arise from the Sultanate's conception of what arrangements the GCC should adopt to

ensure the security of its members. As Calvin explains:

Oman has led opposition to a GCC defense pact. Qaboos opposes both an
integrated military structure and formal alliance in favor of strong independent
defense forces with close cooperation in training and exercises. Two specific
concerns are that an alliance might be perceived by Iran as an Arab military pact
against the Islamic Republic and the conditions by which the GCC's rapid
deployment force will be permitted to intervene in any member state. Sultan
Qaboos has also been at odds with his neighbors on the role that the United States
should play in defense policy. Oman favors close cooperation, as demonstrated by
its access agreement and joint military exercises, whereas other members wish to
distance the organization from both of the great powers (Calvin 1987: 115).54

In an interview, Sultan Qaboos articulated his views on the fundamental need of

the GCC states to work closely with the West:

We want to look after our own affairs and have the capacity to do so under normal
circumstances. After all, why have we bought so many weapons? If there should
be a major armed confrontation we would like to have advice on military planning
and borrow expertise from our friends. We do not want their soldiers...But in the
ultimate scenario where all odds are against us, I do not see how we can avoid
asking our friends from outside and all those who want to see this region stable
and peaceful (Pasha 1999: 113-4).

54 In the following quote, Skeet traces the different positions taken by various states within the
GCC on Gulf security, and elaborates on Muscat's position:
The GCC was off the ground, but its main thrust was inoperative. At the February meeting in Taif
the Saudi security proposal was for bilateral agreements between members; Oman still wanted joint
protection of navigation in the Hormuz Straits, Kuwait admitted no external threat. These positions were
repeated in March and May. A the end of August [1981] at a Foreign Ministers conference, again in Taif,
Oman restated its position in a formal paper which said that in view of Soviet activities in the region the
Gulf States should give priority to cooperation with the US and other Western countries. Its military clauses
provided for setting up a joint naval force for the protection of the Gulf; for holding periodical joint
maneuvers; and for unifying the GCC members' aerial defense systems (Skeet 1992: 94).

177
 Indeed, Arab Gulf states were strongly against great powers' presence in the

region adopting a declaratory policy that emphasized the preservation of Gulf security by

Gulf States. If this policy were rigorously applied, the US forces would have been barred

from the Persian Gulf, while Soviet forces (even if one assumed then that they would

have withdrawn from Afghanistan), would have still been positioned at its edges. In light

of

the Gulf Arab states military inferiority in relations to Iraq and Iran, of the
reappearance of hostility between those two in early 1980 and of the potential for
instability aroused by Iran's ideological proselytizing of Shiite minorities across
the Gulf, this policy must have been seen in Moscow as a prescription for the
continued weakness of the Gulf Arab States (Page 1987: 154).

Muscat saw that the GCC's inherent military limitations were in stark contrast to

either Iran or Iraq, and cautioned the other members:

We do not possess the military capacity to confront Iran...joint maneuvers by the

GCC member states do not mean we have an Army capable of shouldering the
security of the Gulf region. Possessing advanced weaponry is not enough
(Kechichian 1995: 104).

Muscat's emphasis on cooperating with the West, and granting military facilities

to the United States was consistently coupled with a declared policy of neutrality toward

Iran and Iraq. This balance was not violated even despite the fact that the Sultanate's

navy was involved in a 'showdown' with the Iranian navy in 1980, when Muscat claimed

that Iran violated Omani waters. Muscat also refused to allow Iraqi air force to make use

of Omani facilities or airspace to attack the Islamic Republic, and protected all shipping

across the straits, which was Iran's primary outlet for its oil transportation (Allen and

Rigsbee 2000: 184). This is however not to assume that Muscat was oblivious to the

178
possibility that its neutrality may not spare it from the spillover effect of the Iran-Iraq

war. The 1983 Sultan Qaboos' assessment of Iran was ominous:

They are going to cause problems because there are going to use subversive
mechanisms in the area, and that is going to create some instability...But we are
very determined to prevent them from threatening, intimidating or overthrowing
the present government (Kechichian 1995: 103)."

The above remarks notwithstanding, Muscat continued to follow its declared

policy of active neutrality throughout the war. The Sultanate's position toward the Iran-

Iraq War was clarified by Sultan Qaboos' interview given to the Beirut weekly, Monday

Morning in late 1983:

In any war situation, there is a possibility of hostilities getting out of hand. That's
why I believe every possible step-on the national, regional and international
level-should be taken to stop the [Iran-Iraq] war. I understand from the Iranian
declarations that Iran will not follow through its threats with steps on the ground
unless all its oil facilities are crippled or destroyed. In such a situation, the
Iranians will have nothing to lose. I believe too that the Iraqis are wise enough to
evaluate what they are doing (Kechichian 1995: 10-11).

This position proved to be useful for all parties concerned, whether inside or

outside of the region, as an Omani official explained:

Oman always played a dual role. Oman dealt with the war according to its point
of view that we should not be drawn into the conflict because Oman will be there,
Iran will be there, no matter what government, so the only solution is to keep
talking to them. At the same time, Oman did not isolate itself from the region, it
was a part of the GCC. This dual policy was encouraged by the West-the US
and Britain used Oman. Washington asked Muscat many times to mediate with
Iran, especially when there were US casualties in the Gulf. Even Iraq did not
object to this Omani role. Saudi Arabia was not happy because it did not want to

When Iran threatened to close the Straits in mid-1983 and overthrow "retarded" rulers, the
Omani ambassador to Kuwait, stated the "strategic Strait of Hormuz is Omani territory and neither Iran nor
any other country has the right to interfere in Oman's internal affairs... [We] will not accept this nor allow
it to occur" (Kechichian 1995: 103).

179
 see anybody take the initiative. They wanted to be the leaders of the GCC, all
decisions should be taken from Riyadh. But Oman had the influence to stop the
deterioration of the relationship between the Gulf and Oman. Oman defused the
tension many times (Marschall 2003: 91-92).

Elaborating on the same subject, H.H. Sayyid Haitham, Secretary General of the

Omani Foreign Minister at the time said:

The war produced some negative reactions from our neighbors towards Iran.
During the first year, it was not clear for Oman what direction the war would take.
We did not want to be allied to either party. We were neutral, we had no interest
in continuing this war. This was very much appreciated by Iran, but it made a
number of neighbors very unhappy.

We looked far ahead and saw that GCC had no strength against Iran and Iraq.
Also, being Iran's neighbor, it was not wise making an enemy. In the beginning of
the 1980's, Iran kept its distance from Oman. They were not sure because the rest
of the GCC was different. Our approach began in 1985. In 1986, the visits started,
first junior officials, then senior officials. From then on they increased steadily.
There were always visits by Foreign Ministers and the Embassies played a great
role as well. But we only mediated if we could see the way to success (Marschall
2003: 92).56

The Secretary's remarks that Oman's neutrality made some "neighbors" unhappy,

probably referred to Kuwaiti reaction to Qaboos' appeal for a dialogue with Iran at the

56 Elaborating on Oman's "neutrality" in the Iran-Iraq war, the Under Secretary

further remarked
that Muscat's position "makes common sense, when you look at how this war started, and what is its
outcome. Moreover, do not forget that Iran is a Moslem country. And our national interest was not
threatened" (The Middle East Magazine, May 1989).
The magazine further comments that:
it is interesting to note how Omani citizens who hold no official position and have no reason to be
diplomatic are quite frank about their feelings towards Iraq and Iran." 'It's clear that Iraq attacked Iran',
says a young Omani intellectual, who claims that most people in Oman feel their country should be neutral
between Iraq and Iran. 'We do not trust Saddam Hussain', he says. 'We remember his support to the
Dhofar uprising, and we know he is a merciless dictator'. On the other hand, this young man, who is part of
the Omani establishment, and by now way subversive in his way of thinking, objects to the 'unfair
treatment' by the Western press of the Iranian revolution. He wonders 'how we can choose between a so-
called socialist Iraq that we know too well, and a government of Islam that has not had the time to establish
itself. Expressing the hope that the Iranians understand that 'it was not a war with the Arabs but with Iraq',
he concludes, 'How could we choose between Arabism and Islam? It is a big choice.'

180
GCC summit of December 1987. The Kuwaitis remarked not without sarcasm that it was

not difficult to speak of a dialogue when one is far away from danger. Ironically, Oman is

in fact the only GCC state that shared a border with Iran. As Graz explains:

The Strait of Hormuz, at its narrowest, measure less than 24 miles across. Oman
and Iran, like most coastal states, have declared a 12-mile limit for their territorial
waters. In consequence there are no international waters between them and in fact
they overlap slightly and for a few more miles beyond only the thinnest silver of
international seas separates them. The navigation schemes pass through Omani
waters (Graz 1990: 216).

Muscat's mediation was paying off for all parties concerned. In 1987 and 1988,

the Sultanate repeatedly used its office to repatriate Iranians, killed or injured during the

engagement with American forces in and around the Strait (Graz 1990: 215). It is true

that Oman supported the 1987 GCC-LAS summit resolution condemning Iran's

aggression in the Gulf, but it is equally true that Muscat rejected UN, LAS, and GCC

resolutions threatening to collectively sever diplomatic ties with Iran (Kechichian 1995:

105). After the 1987 hajj [pilgrimage] incident between Iran and Saudi Arabia over

quotas and demonstrations, Oman again was at the center of the mediation efforts

between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and between Iran and the GCC. After Riyadh broke

diplomatic relations with Tehran in April 1988, Foreign Ministers of both states met in

Muscat in May 1989. Muscat was also active in promoting the implementation of

UNSCR 598 calling for a cease-fire between the parties. Certainly, Muscat was

"relieved" when Iran and Iraq finally accepted a cease-fire on 20 August 1988. Oman's

Minister of Information Abdulaziz bin Mohammed Al-Rowas stated that

Oman was deeply concerned that its long term interests with Iran would be
permanently affected by the war. 'History and geography' dictate our foreign
policy goals towards Iran, he posited, and 'these are permanent features'
(Kechichian 1995: 105).

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 It was no surprise then that the GCC officially commissioned Muscat to mediate

between Iran and Iraq. 57 Muscat's position regarding the peace talks was articulated by

the Omani Undersecretary of the GCC, Said al-Maskery:

All Gulf attempts [to bring peace talks] should concentrate on backing the UN
Secretary General's efforts...The Iranian government's general approach had
changed since Rafsanjani came to power. We always hear positive statements.
But it depends on his ability to carry out in practice what he says...I think that if
Iran wishes to develop relations with the GCC states, it must be convinced of the
need to improve relations with Saudi Arabia (Marschall 2003: 103).

Just as the Sultanate was a key mediator between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Iran

and the GCC countries, the Arab Gulf states were also instrumental in the improvement

of the PDRY-Omani relations, which led to the normalization agreement of October

1982. Under Omani tutelage in November 1981, only few months since the establishment

of the GCC, the GCC sent two military missions to determine the extent of the threat

posed by South Yemen to the Sultanate (Peterson 1987: 172-3). By January 1982, when

Muscat's mediation to end the war was not only limited to the parties concerned directly [Iran
and Iraq] but was extensively followed with outside powers such as Pakistan and China. As Kechichian
notes in the following quote:
with Yusuf bin Alwai, acting as the chairman of the GCC Ministerial Council, discussed GCC-
Pakistani relations with Islamabad officials in March 1986. The visit sought assistance to end the Iran-Iraq
War, especially to limit third-party arms sales to both belligerents, but failed to achieve its stated
objectives. Alwai did not give up and returned to Pakistan a year later. A positive spin was added to the
visit, namely, that Oman and Pakistan had 'the closest of relations', but what interested the Sultanate most
was Islamabad's cooperation in defusing tensions throughout the region...Muscat argued that if Islamabad
meant to play a positive role in the area, then this was as good time as ever to help reduce tensions by
advocating that both Iran and Iraq restrain their military activities (Kechichian 1995: 233).
China was also approached by Muscat to reduce tensions in the region by supporting Security
Council Resolution 598, as Kechichian argues:
When Iran accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, which called for a cease-fire
between the two belligerents, Oman expressed a formal appreciation to Beijing for playing a positive role.
The recognition was reiterated by the Under Secretary for Political Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Sayyid Hitham bin Tariq, during his September 1988 visit to China, where he discussed new steps
that could be taken to further reduce tensions in the Persian Gulf States...Qaboos also thanked China for its
support of Resolution 598 at the Security Council, further indicating that there was more substance to these
remarks than diplomatic protocol required (Kechichian 1995: 195).

182
the next GCC Defense Ministers' meeting took place, South Yemeni threat was the main

focus of the discussions. Politically, both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates played a

key role in mediating between the Sultanate and the PDRY. Finally, recognizing the

PDRY's serious economic needs, Riyadh approached the PDRY with an economic

package, but linked its assistance with a change in Aden's political behavior (Kechichian

1995: 93). Once diplomatic relations with Muscat's long time adversary were established,

the establishment of diplomatic relations between Oman and the Soviet Union should not

have come as such a surprise":

In September 1985, out of a clear blue sky, Oman suddenly announced that it was
establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Even the British
diplomats, still the best connoisseurs of the Sultanate, were surprised by what had
long been considered the most anti-Soviet country in the Middle East. The
Americans were more than surprised; they were furious. They told the Omanis
what they thought warning them of all the dire consequences of a Soviet
diplomatic offensive in the Gulf; the Omanis politely told them to mind their own
business (Graz 1990: 214).

Describing, the United States reaction, Ellits commented:

The statement was made without any consultation with or notice to the US and an
American government spokesmen subsequently commented that the US had been
taken by surprise by the announcement. Oman, as a sovereign state, is of course at
liberty to contract diplomatic relations with any other state that it wished, but the
Omani action is substance and procedure was especially embarrassing to an
administration that sees the Soviets are irrevocable evil, that is determined to keep
them out of the Gulf area, and that sometimes myopically expects all friendly

58 There were signs that a potential rapprochement between Muscat and Moscow were in
the
cards. Kechichian states that
After Oman and the PDRY "normalized" their ties in late 1982, Moscow commentaries toward the
Sultanate displayed a noticeable difference in tone. Instead of condemning Oman for its joint military
maneuvers with Western forces, the criticisms were reserved for Washington, portraying the Sultanate as a
victim of U.S. "militarism." In addition, instead of denouncing the Sultan personally, the Soviet blamed
other government officials including Yusuf bin 'Alwai, One of the Dhufari rebellion leaders who later
became Qaboos' minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Kechichian 1995: 166).

183
 governments to see the Soviet in the same light that it does: as solely responsible
for every political problem that exists in the Middle East (Ellits 1988: 35).

Page claims that "available evidence suggests that Moscow was not consulted by

Aden and did not approve [of the normalization agreement between Muscat and Aden].

Nevertheless, the "favorable fallout in the Gulf from the PDRY-Oman deal and a

subsequent friendly PDRY-Saudi meeting did enhance Moscow's acceptability among

the Gulf States" (Page 1987: 161). This is doubtful since Oman's Foreign Minister

readily acknowledged that Moscow had "undoubtedly helped the Sultanate by improving

relations between states of the Arabian Peninsula," without identifying the PDRY, but the

inference was clear (Kechichian 1995: 170). In addition, "Saudi Arabia, despite

occasional statements of its leaders about resuming diplomatic relations with the USSR,

usually has opposed in GCC forums Kuwaiti urgings that this be done" (Ellits 1988: 35-

6).

The narrative of Oman's relations with the regional and global players reveals a

remarkably distinctive style

characterized by reliance on policies of balance and maneuver to maintain

security. The tendency is to avoid direct confrontation if at all possible. It has
tried to sidestep over identification with any regional power whenever possible. In
this, it seeks to avoid offending any regional player as well as to protect itself
against the possibility that today's ally may become tomorrow's enemy. When
confrontation is thrust upon it, Oman will choose sides and take a stand... When
the crises passes, however, Oman once again seeks some regional ground,
avoiding, when feasible, alliances that are too close and enmities that are too
intense. This style has proved resilient in the post-Gulf War period and has
manifested itself in terms of Oman's self-defense, regional balancing, and
relations with the United States (Riphenburg 1998: 184).

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 V.

OMAN'S FOREIGN POLICY (1990-2004)

Muscat and the Gulf War (1990-1991)

The end of the 1980's appeared to signal a period of relative stability in the

Middle East particularly in the Persian Gulf region. This optimism seemed to be justified

given the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the dramatic events taking place in the Soviet

Union, Central Europe, and Germany that culminated with the end of the Cold War. The

1991 Gulf War, precipitated by Baghdad's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, brought

an abrupt end to this optimism and thrust the Middle East yet again into the center of an

international crisis.'

Muscat's response to Baghdad's invasion of Kuwait was in accordance with that

of the international community. Officially, the Sultanate affirmed its position that Iraq's

invasion of Kuwait set a dangerous precedent, threatened the stability of the international

order, and represented a direct challenge to the integrity of the United Nations. Muscat at

once condemned the invasion and called upon Iraq in the strongest of terms to withdraw

from Kuwait (Allen and Rigsbee 2000: 185-86). In August 1990, the Sultanate initiated a

Saddam Hussein simply failed to grasp the changing nature of the international
order.
Occasionally during the crisis following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Baghdad acted as if the old assumptions
of the Cold war still applied. Various attempts by Baghdad to revive the Cold War competition between
Moscow and Washington were destined to fail. Indeed, the "attitude of the USSR at the time and the few
resources, diplomatic or otherwise, it was able or willing to expand on behalf or Iraq, graphically illustrated
the collapse of the old order" (Tripp 2002: 185).

185
resolution condemning the invasion at a meeting of the Arab League. In the meantime,

the Omani Foreign Minister traveled to New York and Washington to discuss the merits

of the United Nations sponsored coalition force against Baghdad (Kechichian 1995: 157-

58). Muscat's diplomatic initiatives to counter this new crisis were not limited to the

Middle East or Washington and London. Recognizing the growing importance of China

in the region, Qaboos dispatched a senior adviser, Omar Al-Zawawi, to Beijing to meet

with the Chinese President. At the meeting, China's President, Yang Shangkun, affirmed

Beijing's opposition to Iraq's invasion and called for an unconditional withdrawal from

Kuwait (Kechichian 1995: 196). Muscat was assessing China's role in a future settlement

of the crisis, since China's permanent membership in the Security Council. More

important was Muscat's recognition that China still retained "a formidable presence in

the region, primarily by continuing to sell arms to Iran and Iraq. True to its long term

foreign policy principles, Muscat focused on the effect of such sales rather than simply

on immediate gains" (Kechichian 1995: 196).2

Along with its diplomatic activities to counter Iraq's aggression and deter it from

further advances, the Sultanate was a participant in both Desert Shield and Desert Storm

2 China's relations with the Persian Gulf states in general and Oman in particular continued to
improve throughout the 1990's. The key factor being the importance of access to Gulf oil for the fast
growing Chinese economy. As Huwaidin states
China reached an agreement with the Omani government to increase Oman's crude supplies to
China from less that 20,000 barrels per day in 1995, to 100,000 barrels per day in 1996. Later, Oman's
crude oil supplies to China jumped to about 230,000 barrels per day in 1997, enabling China to replace
Japan as the primary importer of Omani crude (Huwaidin 2002: 132).

186
between December 1990 and February 1991. Muscat deployed troops to Saudi Arabia.

Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly for the coalition forces, Muscat granted the

US access to critical air and seaport facilities in Oman and the authorization to use pre-

positioned U.S. equipment in various Omani facilities (Kechichian 1995: 157-58).

Indeed, this war demonstrated that Muscat's previous positions concerning the security of

the Persian Gulf were justified. As early as in December 1988, only a few months after

Tehran had accepted the Security Council's Resolution 598 calling for a permanent

cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq War, Sultan Qaboos traveled to Riyadh and argued for a new

vision for regional security. Qaboos reasoned that swift foreign policy initiatives were

needed to bring both parties into a new security framework before a possible future

conflict may erupt.4

Muscat and Regional Security

Unfortunately, "neither he nor members of his delegation were successful in

persuading their Saudi counterparts of the urgency to act decisively towards Iran and

Iraq. It was, as the monarch would recognize a "lost opportunity" (Kechichian 1995: 75).

3 According to Owtram, during the opening stages of the conflict "Omani troops were the only
GCC force able to communicate effectively with Western forces due to similarities in equipment and
procedures" (Owtram 2004: 173).

4 Omani officials were under no illusion that the end of Iran-Iraq war, necessarily left the GCC
member states in more secure environment citing the folly of "unconditional" support Iraq received from
Arab countries. An Omani official commented that the regional situation was in no way better after the war
than at the beginning and that the Arabs had not gained anything by supporting Iraq:
After eight years they could not contain the revolution, but the war stopped. But did the ceasefire
create balance in the region. No. Iraq was even stronger, the Iranian revolution continued with its slogans
and momentum, the GCC continued to be weak. The imbalance was still here (Marschall 2003: 97).

187
The basis for a collective arrangement that would include Iran, Iraq, and the GCC states

in a new security framework was found in UNCR 598, Paragraph 8. It was introduced by

the Iranian UN Representative (Marschall 2003: 153). An Omani official expressed

Muscat's support for the regional security arrangement in these words:

We could have used Resolution 598 after the Iran-Iraq war. Item 8 calls on the
United Nations Secretary General to arrange consultations between the two
belligerent parties and the other counties in the region to create stability in the
region. Consequently, the GCC Political Department organized a working group
which produced a White Paper: The Secretariat led by GCC Undersecretary Saif
al-Maskery, Oman, proposed to use this Resolution as an instrument either to
have an international agreement between the eight countries in the region for
security and stability in the region; or to hold an international conference and
issue a regional declaration to keep the Gulf countries stable and secured by all
countries together. A declaration has a moral and political obligation. If one party
does not fulfill the obligation, it won't affect the others, unlike an agreement.
Unfortunately, nothing happened, the suggestions were not accepted by the GCC
(Marschall 2003: 153).

Muscat's declared neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War, and its persistent policy of

engaging both sides rather than the unquestionably backing Iraq, proved prophetic. As the

following quote demonstrates, the support that members of the Gulf Cooperation Council

lavished on Saddam was staggering:

During the first two years of the war, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait
provided nearly $30 billion in grants and loans to Iraq. The Saudis reportedly
financed the Iraqi purchase of French weapons. From 1982 onwards, the direct
military ads stopped. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, instead, agreed to produce Iraq's
quota of 1.2 million barrels of oil per day on its behalf and transfer the proceeds
to Baghdad. Saudi Arabia also permitted the 650 kilometer long Iraqi pipeline on
the Saudi port of Yanbu free of charge having the intial capacity of 5,00,000 b/d
(Helms 1989: 23).

When the Gulf crisis of 1990 occurred, Saddam was quick to make overtures to

Iran in an attempt to secure Tehran's neutrality or possible support in the conflict. To that

end, Saddam unexpectedly announced that he was suing for peace with Tehran and was

188
unconditionally accepting all Iranian claims since the ceasefire, including the

reinstatement of the Algiers Treaty of 1975. Extremely concerned, both Kuwait and UAE

sent envoys to Tehran to block Iraqi initiatives aimed at winning Iranian support. On 22

August 1990, Kuwait's Foreign Minister arrived in Tehran and openly expressed his

countries' regrets over past mistakes toward Tehran. UAE Foreign Minister followed

with messages of reconciliation. Tehran accepted Saddam's offer of a formal settlement,

yet it unequivocally condemned Iraq's invasion, called for its unconditional withdrawal

from Kuwait, and offered to defend the other Gulf States from further aggression. It

should be noted that the decision to condemn the Iraqi invasion and to remain neutral in

the conflict was accompanied by heavy debates within the Iranian government. Many

hardliners called for supporting Iraq and fighting US forces and its allies to keep the Gulf

out of bounds for foreign powers (Hussain 2000: 180-81). Pragmatism, however, dictated

that accepting the foreign presence was a necessary evil. An intricate balance between

both positions was expressed by Iran's President Rafsanjani: "We have no objection to

them [foreign powers] obstructing aggression; anybody may help in anyway. However, it

would have been better if the regional counties would have done so" (Hussein 2000: 180-

81).

The Sultanate's previously stated position that granting the U.S. facilities in the

Gulf is important for the security of the GCC states, proved accurate (ironically, Kuwait

was the most vocal opponent among the GCC states of such an arrangement). Kechichian

argues that the "West in general, and the United States in particular, could not have

achieved their successes in the liberation of Kuwait were it not for the pre-positioned

equipment in Oman" (Kechichian 1995: 157). While rather exaggerated, this opinion

189
clearly indicates the importance of the facilities granted to the U.S. in Oman for

Operation Desert Storm.5 Omani facilities were equally essential for British forces as

well in their part of Operation Desert Storm: Operation Granby. 6 Although the Dhofar

War had ended more than two decades ago, Britain had continued to participate in

Oman's military affairs. There were roughly 500 British officers and NGOs seconded or

contracted to the Omani military. British military forces regularly trained Omani troops:

for example, the Royal Navy's Flag Officer Sear Training for Oman's new Muheet-class

Frigates and British SAS training of the Omani anti-terrorist task force. They also

assisted in surveillance of the border with Yemen. The British made regular use of Omani

facilities, maintained intelligence posts near Muscat and Qabl in the Musandam

Peninsula, and used the Omani base at Goat Island in the Strait of Hormuz. (Cordesman

1997: 205).

5 In particular, it was the U.S. Air force that benefited the most from the use of pre-positioned
supplies at Thumrait which saved Washington the equivalent of 1,800 C-14 airlift sorties, thus increasing
the quickness of the US build up during desert Shield (Cordesman 1997: 204).

6 The following extract illustrates vividly the utility of Omani facilities to allied forces following
the invasion of Kuwait:
The Jaguar wing led by Wing Cdr Jerry Connoly and its attendant fleet of transport left Coltishall
early on 11 August. After a stopover in Cuprus they proceeded to the Gulf then flew south to Oman-landing
at the desert airfield of Thumrait, 40 miles inland of the costal town of Salalah. There were good reasons
for this move so far south as 6 Squadron, Jaaguar Pilot Flt Lt Dick MacCormac explains: "The Omani air
force had Jaguars as well, we did training missions with them and they were pretty good to us down there.
It was of mutual benefit. They used to simulate air threats against us, bouncing us on training missions."
Also sent to Thumrait was one of four teams dispatched from the Mobile Servicing Section, based at Brize
North, whose job it was to refuel aircraft. "Because we're a mobile section my bags are packed to the
whole time" states Sergent Jim Carr. But we didn't know where we were going till we landed. The VC10
Captain said' Welcome to Thumrait. The time is eight o'clock local time-that was a shock to the system.
The Americans were already there and were very helpful I lending us ground refueling equipment. The next
day Hercs and VC10s started pouring in. We had to refuel them at three different locations, the four of us,
working 18 hours on, having a short break, then back to work again (Allen 1991: 6-7).

190
 Following the liberation of Kuwait, Muscat continued to pursue its independent

attempts to resolve the challenges facing the region. Its policies proved to be different

from other GCC member states, and also from Washington's. The devastating experience

of the Gulf War could have rallied members of the GCC to cement their security

integration and act decisively toward combining their resources. The Gulf War could

have become the defining moment that would accelerate Gulf integration. Instead, the

end of the war brought to the surface divergent perspectives and disputes among the

members of the GCC (Gause 1994: 130).7 These differences were reflected in their

relationship with Iraq, Iran, and their position on the security of the Gulf.

At the conclusion of the Gulf War on 3 March 1991, the six members of the GCC,

along with Egypt and Syria, met in Damascus in a U.S.-brokered effort to formulate the

structure of a permanent security force to protect Kuwait against future aggression. As

the nucleus of an Arab security force, Syria and Egypt would remain in the Gulf after the

7 To give an example of the disputes that began to 'resurface' amongst the GCC members as
mentioned by Gause, see the following interview with the Secretary General of the GCC in 1997:
There are concerns and fears that border problems in the region might erupt and create even more
problems at a time when the region is still suffering the effects of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. Is there any
inclination to tackle the Qatar- Bahrain problem in the context of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)?
(Al-Hujaylan) [this is the Secretary General] The Qatar-Bahrain dispute is not new. It is quite old. It dates
back 60 years, according to both sides, but the escalation occurred over the past 10 years but that has not
gone beyond statements in the media. It did not assume a military dimension. I believe that a comparison
between the Qatar-Bahrain border dispute and the so-called border conflict between Iraq and Kuwait is out
of the question. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was not the result of a dispute. We had never heard of a state
having border problems with a neighboring state leading to one invading the other, destroying its
sovereignty and entity, and rendering its people homeless, wiping out the identity of that country as a state
and as a homeland. The GCC has been genuinely and sincerely interested in promoting a solution to the
border dispute between Qatar and Bahrain. I want that dispute to be resolved within the framework of the
GCC states. That is why both parties to the dispute-Qatar and Bahrain-have (Abu-Husayn) There has
been no announcement of the start of any real measures to settle the Qatar-Bahrain dispute in the context of
the quadripartite committee. There is much confusion in the media. Could we have a clarification? (Qatar:
GCC Head on Border Disputes, Other Issues: FBIS-NES-97-002, 6 January 1997).

191
war, contributing troop contingents on a reimbursable basis. The Damascus Declaration,

termed "six plus two," soon came apart when differences developed over the merit of a

long-term Egyptian and Syrian presence in the Gulf. Iran, which had restored diplomatic

relations with Saudi Arabia in 1991, saw Gulf security as the responsibility of the Gulf

States alone and opposed a permanent Egyptian and Syrian military role in the region.

Nonetheless, Egypt and Syria remained committed under the agreement to send military

aid to Kuwait and the other Gulf States if a threat arose (Tarter 1994: 336-337). Egypt in

turn was opposed to any possibility that Iran might in the future be a part of a security

framework to guard Arab Gulf States. Differences between Muscat and Cairo over the

degree of the Iranian threat both to the Sultanate and to the region came to the fore during

Mubarak's visit in May 1993. For Egypt, Iran was both a strategic threat to Cairo's

influence in the region and a supporter of Islamic fundamentalism. Oman, on the other

hand, never made references to Iran as a 'strategic threat', and furthermore, perceived the

fundamentalist issue as an internal affair of Tehran (Allen and Rigsbee 2000).

Essentially, GCC states preferred to rely on the United States and other major Western

powers rather than on Egypt and Syria, let alone Iran, possibly believing that the

Egyptian and Syrian government have different agendas from those of the Gulf countries

(Dunn 1992: 208-209). Although on paper Kuwait supported the Damascus Declaration

and the inclusion of Egyptian and Syrian troops, its preference for US troops was well

known. The only GCC state to support Iranian participation in future security

arrangements to some extent was Oman. Muscat's support for an Iranian role in the

future of Gulf Security, however, had yet to appear in a concrete proposal or "Security

Arrangement" between the states of the Persian Gulf. As for the GCC, its Secretary-

192
General announced that Iran would not be given a direct role in the Gulf security system

(Pasha 2000: 140). At the 1991 Kuwait GCC Summit, Sultan Qaboos was entrusted by

the Council to chair the Higher Committee on Security, and to formulate postwar regional

security arrangements. Muscat seized the chance to encourage reconciliation between

Saudi Arabia and both Iran and Iraq. In addition, the Sultanate "assiduously vaunted the

notion of a 100,000 man strong GCC army despite opposition from the rest of the council

states" (Kechichian 1995: 89-90). Muscat's plan called for a force that would be separate

both from the national armies and from the small Peninsula Shield Force stationed in

Saudi Arabia. The plan also called for the establishment of a unified command. In

essence, "Muscat wanted to avoid a repetition of the crises that emerged during Operation

Desert Storm when national contingents, ostensibly attached to a multinational force,

remained under their own national commands" (Kechichian 1995: 89-90). Omani

officials commented that the true uniqueness of Muscat's proposal was that it afforded

GCC residents "...for the first time the opportunity to defend themselves, their own sons,

their countries and their resources." s Oman's proposal was rejected, prompting Sultan

Qaboos to express his frustration and disappointment with GCC progress in strengthening

security cooperation among the member states.9 The Sultan stated: "Certainly, I would

8 Interview with Oman's information Minister: Oman Daily Observer. 20 November

1991.

9 Kechichian cites various Omani officials expressing dismay at the lack of true progress in
security cooperation:
In April 1993, General 'Ali Majid Al-Mamari, the Minister of Palace Office Affairs, articulated
Muscat's anxiety at the lack of progress. He regretted the misunderstanding that existed on the proposal and
"expressed the hope that others will eventually correct their views." The GCC Assistant Secretary-General
for Political Affairs, Saif bin Hashil Al-Maskari, was more forthcoming when he concluded that

193
have liked to have seen more progress in this direction"; however, the proposal was never

enacted with various states citing budgetary constraints and disagreements over how a

genuinely collective GCC army should be commanded (Ram 1995: 561). In the daily

Arabic newspaper, Al-Saharq Al-Awsat, Alawi commented on the Omani proposal of

raising a 100,000 strong Gulf Army:

(Al-Husayni) Sultan Qaboos raised the idea of forming a Gulf army of 100,000
men. What has become of that idea? (Bin-'Alawi) That idea emerged immediately
after the war to liberate Kuwait. There were great fears. It was the product of
experience, but it emerged in the context of deterrence. We came to the
conclusion at the time that if another problem occurred, God forbid, the difficulty
that the Western allies would have would be in relation to infantry, armor, and
troops, whereas they have no difficulty with air forces or naval forces. To
complete the picture and to satisfy ourselves-you have asked about arms
purchases-the sultan put forward that idea to give ourselves reassurance. We
would probably not have had to use it, but it would have been a ready stick in his
hand. The thinking was about a strategic concept, at the request of the leaders.
What appeared in the media was the military aspect, but the plan was an
integrated one, with military, security, cultural, and economic aspects, in other
words a strategic deterrence concept, at the request of the leaders. What a
appeared in the media was the military, security, cultural, and economic aspects.
Now, we are not ready for that kind of concept. There are numerous obstacles.
That is why the plan has not materialized; but that does not mean that anything is
wrong. '

This bold proposal was hardly surprising in the context of Muscat's conventional

position, which has always been in strong favor of self-defense in a region where, despite

rhetoric to the contrary and enormous defense budgets, few countries maintain ground

"implementation of the military aspects of the [Damascus] declaration would be finalized on the basis of
separate bilateral agreements between individual states (Kechichian 1995: 90).

10 Interview with Yusuf Bin-'Alawi, Omani minister of state for foreign affairs, by
Huda al-
Husayni in Muscat: FBIS-NES-2003-1220, 5 December 1996, p. 17.

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forces adequate to deter even relatively small threats. Indeed, Oman has maintained a

"small (by world standards) but impressive (by Gulf standards) army, well trained and

disciplined. Beyond its own self-defense, Oman has recognized that the small states of

the Gulf must, as Benjamin Franklin remarked, 'hang together or assuredly [they] will all

hang separately"' (Pelletreau 1996: 20). At the same time, Muscat recognized that no

members of the Gulf Cooperation Council could single handedly mount a strong defense

designed to repel any of the major powers in the region, as was clearly demonstrated in

the second Gulf War. During the time "when it was utterly anathema to support any

public U.S. role in the Gulf, Oman was the only GCC state officially to grant the United

States access to military facilities in its territory" (Pelletreau 1996: 20).

Muscat's Policy Toward Iran and Iraq in the 1990's

As in earlier times, Muscat's policy towards both Iran and Iraq during the 1990's

continued to simultaneously accommodate and differ from other GCC members' policies.

On many occasions Muscat came into a direct conflict with Washington's polices." In

In an Interview with Al-Safir Magazine, Alwai was asked on this specific point: the clash of
interest between Oman's relations with Iraq and Iran in one hand, and the United States on the other:
(Maydani) You have ties with parties that Washington considers as enemies, such as Iran and Iraq.
Does this not affect your ties with the United States? (Bin-'Alawi) When we talk of relations with the
United States we mean bilateral ties between two countries, but naturally there are issues on which our
position is different from the United States. In our bilateral relations, we have no problems with anyone,
but in some issues relating to Arab and Islamic countries, there are differences. This, however, does not
mean that our ties are bad. (Maydani) How are your current ties with Iran? (Bin-'Alawi) They are strong
and advanced and based on trust. There are no problems between us. There are issues on which we differ
and we cannot deny this and say that our relations are perfect. But since we began our ties with Iran after
the revolution, we agreed that there is no need to be in agreement over everything. They have their own
views on some issues and we have our own different views. So the relationship is clear in this respect, and

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essence, Muscat's accordance with members of the GCC and Iran regarding Iraq was

reflected in two principles. First, the preservation of the territorial integrity of Iraq was

paramount. Second, the GCC demanded the full implementation of all the UN Security

Council resolutions passed after the invasion of Iraq.

The general agreement notwithstanding, from the early 1990's Muscat was

quietly working toward a conciliatory approach to both Iran and Iraq. Muscat's policy

toward Iraq particularly frustrated Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Their distress was reflected

during the GCC Foreign Ministers' Conference in April 1993 where the organization

failed to appoint the Omani candidate to a third three-year term as assistant secretary-

general for political affairs. Both Riyadh and Kuwait felt that Oman was 'too soft' on

from the beginning we have maintained this healthy approach (Omani FM on Gulf Security, Iran: FBIS-
NES-1999-1129, Monday, 22 November 1999).
Muscat and Iran certainly have different views regarding the presence of Western Powers in the
Persian Gulf as he elaborates in the same interview cited above:
(Bin-'Alawi) In general, the Western presence [in the Persian Gulf] is justified. (Maydani) Does
this justification still exist? (Bin-'Alawi) Yes. Just as we endeavor to join the WTO and are justified in
doing so, the Western presence in this region is justified as well, particularly considering the West's
economic interests, which justify such a presence. (Maydani) Thus, this presence serves the interests of the
West, not the Arabs. (Bin-'Alawi) It serves their common interests. We are now at the threshold of
globalization, and the interests of the Arab region have throughout history had a common nature with the
international powers. There was no stage in written history in which the Middle East was not a means of
communications and a connecting link of interests among countries. We cannot say now or in the future
that we live in isolation. This is absolutely out of the question. The West has interests in our region and we
do not object to these interests, nor does the West object to our investment and interests in Western
countries. So there are linked interests between the two parties and, therefore, the Western presence has its
justification. (Maydani) You said that the danger of military adventures has receded in the Gulf region, but
the Western presence is military. Does your argument justify this Western military presence? (Bin-'Alawi)
When you see that the investment of the Western countries in our region is estimated in the billions you can
understand that this presence is justified. (passage omitted) (Maydani) You have ties with parties that
Washington considers as enemies, such as Iran and Iraq. Does this not affect your ties with the United
States?

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Arab states that supported Iraq during the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis (Allen and Rigsbee

2000: 187).

Oman's quiet diplomacy to reintegrate Iraq into the Arab embrace was also in

direct conflict with Washington's "Dual Containment" policy toward Iraq. The "Dual

Containment" policy was formulated by Martin Indyk, a senior fellow for the Near East

and South East Asia on the National Security Council, to the Washington Institute for

Near East Policy on 18 May 1993. It essentially sought to isolate both Iraq and Iran

internationally. Iraq's isolation was to be achieved through stringent sanctions that would

eventually lead to the fall of Saddam Hussein, while isolating Iran was designed to

pressure Tehran to change its foreign and domestic behavior (Gause 1994: 190). This

policy received a resounding welcome in Israel, where Foreign Minister Shimon Peres

told the Knesset, "I admit, in all modesty, that it is better to let the United States, rather

than us, stand at the head of this campaign. Were we alone, it would make sense to lead

the fight. But if the U.S. wants to lead, its influence and connection are greater than ours"

(Jerusalem Post 1993). By 1998, however, containment of Iraq was replaced by a single

purpose of regime change. That year, the U.S. Congress announced that it had authorized

military aid to Iraqi opposition groups attempting to depose Saddam (this legislature later

became known as Iraq's Liberation Act) (Gawdat 1999: 453). This policy met with

skepticism from none other than Gen. Anthony Zinin, chief of the US Central Command,

covering the Gulf (New York Times 1998). In a Congressional hearing, the General

stated:

Even if we had Saddam gone, we would end up with 15, 20 or 90 groups

competing for power...History teaches us in this region that you can change
regimes if that's your goal but you could end up with Afghanistan, an Iran, a

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 Somalia. In the long run that could be more destabilizing ... it is stability in the
region that counts...And whatever you do to effect regime change-a noble
goal-it should be done with that in mind (Middle East International 1999).

In the Gulf, Muscat's stance echoed this view and maintained that it was futile for

Oman and members of the GCC to continue formulating their Iraqi policy on the basis of

a possible regime change in Iraq given that Saddam may survive indefinitely.12

Instead, the Gulf States should try to readmit him [Saddam] to the international
community through the Arab door-in terms they can influence rather than
waiting and being caught off guard when the Western powers eventually come to
terms with Iraq. Oman's position is that it is in its and the GCC's interest to adopt
a more conciliatory approach to both the big regional powers. Such a policy,
according to Omani officials, is preferable to accepting the dubious logic of dual
containment (Jarrah 1994: 12-13).

To that end, Muscat never broke relations with Iraq, and the Iraqi Ambassador

continued to reside in Muscat. Defending Muscat's diplomatic relations with Iraq, Omani

Information Minister Al-Rowas remarked that "we do not cut any diplomatic ties with

any country. We may freeze them or we may withdraw one of our diplomats but never

cut such relations completely" (Ghanim 2000: 98). Adding that Iraq would eventually

come back to the international community, he emphasized that, "When we open an

embassy, we open it with the people. This is our strategy, and all of the Arabs know it

very well" (Ghanim 2000: 98). More disconcerting for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in

particular, was Oman's willingness "...to work with whoever is in charge in Baghdad" as

12 One expert on Oman and the Persian Gulf commenting on Oman's relations
with both Iraq and
Iran stated the following:
Prudence and elementary strategic wisdom, therefore, drive Omani policies and attitudes vis-a-vis
Iran and Iraq. In the tradition of the famed Umayyad Caliph Mu' awiyya more than a thousand years ago,
Muscat places great value on holding onto its diplomatic strings to Baghdad and Tehran. Imbedded in such
policies is the maxim that nothing be allowed t break or harm Oman's ties to either of these two countries
lest the bilateral relationship degenerate to a stage beyond repair (Duke 1996: 7).

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expressed by Abdullah Ali al-Qatabi, President of Majlis al-Shoura (the Consultative

Council) (Gawdat 1999: 453).13 Clearly, in Muscat's view, UN Resolutions did not

require the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.14 This meant that a regime change in Baghdad

13 Echoing the differences between members of the GCC towards Iraq, The GCC's Secretary
General had this to say: As far as the GCC states are concerned, some, despite the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
did not sever their relations with Iraq, and some did. So, the question of Iraq's return to the Arab fold
depends on trust. For Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, that trust would depend on the attitude of the Iraqi regime.
That trust was destroyed when the Iraqi regime invaded Kuwait despite all the promises, undertakings, and
commitments made to prominent international figures such as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King
Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz and President Husni Mubarak. That trust was destroyed and has to be restored. Its
restoration requires some time (Qatar: GCC Head on Border Disputes, Other Issues: FBIS-NES-97-002, 6
January 1997).

14 For Kuwait, security for Kuwait and the Persian Gulf cannot be possibly achieved with Saddam
still in power, as clearly articulated in the following interview with Kuwait's Foreign Minister, Al-Sabah:
(Diyab) Do you think that Kuwait faces a real threat from the Iraqi regime? (Al-Sabah) I have a
conviction that no one can change and that is that; the threat remains. Saddam Husayn harbors ill intentions
toward Kuwait. That must remain at the top of our concerns and we should never lose sight of it. It is not
only to do with Saddam Husayn; for now, he is constrained and cut down to size. The question is who will
succeed him. That is another thing and it is the other side of the coin that I am talking about. We have had
bitter experiences since the days of 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim and up to Saddam Husayn. We hope things and
circumstances will change so as to serve the interests of Kuwait and Iraq itself. How much longer will Iraq
remain as it is now? That country has not been well for some time? It has been subjected to successive
blows and war after war. One needs to pause and take stock. The world must still remember the notion of
the new world order floated by former US President George Bush. That was a dream, but it has degenerated
into a new world chaos. That notion has worked in one region of the world but failed elsewhere. The Arab
world is in a mess. What we are looking for is a new world order that would ensure respect for legitimacy
and law and the UN Charter. The law of the jungle prevailing in certain Third World nations is fraught with
many problems. There is a total lack of political stability. (Diyab) And what's the solution? (Al-Sabah) We
are the problem. Every time we enter into a battle we use the conspiracy theory as a scapegoat. We are
always the victim of a conspiracy. Is that scapegoating or stupidity? If it is a conspiracy why do we get
ourselves embroiled in it to begin with? That's a sign of stupidity. Whatever we say, they will blame a
conspiracy. Even the Kuwait issue was said to be a conspiracy. I just cannot make sense of that kind of
thinking. How much longer will we remain captive to that mentality. If we do not change, we are sure not
to move forward. Our Arab world has fragmented and collapsed due to our differences over trivialities.
Where is our will if we have any left? The invasion of Kuwait was an ultimate scandal. An Arab state
invades another Arab state, tortures and displaces its population and conquers its territory and yet certain
Arab regimes take its side. What has happened to international legitimacy and international commitments?
Having sunk that low in 1990-91, we have to paThere are fateful issues that should be claiming our
attention instead. There are existential issues. Our region is a candidate for many conflicts and problems
and we have to brace ourselves for them, both in the Gulf and further afield in the Arab world. There is no
room left in the world for small-sized countries. "For" and "Anti" (subhead) (Diyab) What is meant by the
"anti" states? Much has been said about this term? (Al-Sabah) The term is self-explanatory and the facts
speak for themselves. (Diyab) The stand that these countries took on the invasion is well known. But six
years on... (Al-Sabah, interrupting) Even 60 years not just six years on. As long as we are dealing with the

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was not a prerequisite for integrating Iraq into a regional security arrangement. Muscat's

position was in stark contrast to the support received by Iraqi opposition groups bent on

the overthrow of Hussein from various regional and international powers. Since 1982,

Tehran had helped establish the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq

(SAIRI) as an umbrella for all the Iraqi Shia parties. Similarly, both the United States and

Saudi Arabia supported the Iraqi National Congress (INC) as the main group dedicated to

regime change in Iraq. Jordan also supported and hosted an Iraqi opposition group, the

Iraqi Accord. Moreover, Omani officials continued to make statements expressing

sympathy toward the Iraqi people suffering under the United Nations sanctions that

followed the invasion. To its credit, Muscat's media never vilified Saddam Hussein, just

as it never vilified Khomeini before him, in contrast to most Arab media. Thus it was less

difficult for the government in Muscat to receive envoys from Saddam's Iraq shortly after

the war to discuss reconciliation. When asked about the visit of Iraq's Foreign Minister to

Oman in 1995, Oman's Foreign Minster, Alawi, remarked:

[Hammudah] Was the visit of the Iraqi Foreign Minister Muhammad Said al-
Sahaf to Muscat on an Omani initiative aimed at realizing a specific objective, as
you mentioned during your explanations of some other matters?

same mentality that prevailed in 1990, how can one trust them? A country invades another country and
displaces its people and yet you find Arab regimes that I will not mention by name stand as spectators or
supporters of what has happened. How do you expect me to have any dealings with them? On what basis or
in what capacity? Some call their stand a mistake. How so? What happened was a major crime. If I invade
your house and rape your wife or daughters and the next day I come to you to say how sorry I am, would
you accept my apology? You would have been naive. The same mentality that existed in 1990 is still there,
unchanged. How, then can I be trustful? (Diyab) The same mentality of the "anti" states? (Al-Sabah) I am
talking about mentalities, not entities or states. I am talking about mentalities that existed then and continue
to exist today" (Kuwait: Kuwaiti Minister on Iran, Iraq, World Ties: FBIS-NES-97-297, Friday, 24 October
1997).

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 [Bin-'Abdallah] As members of the UN Security Council, it would not have been
proper for us to refuse the visit of the senior Iraqi official. This is because Iraq has
a problem at the UN Security Council and it wants to convey its views regarding
it to the Council member countries. We have no conflict over this matter either
within the GCC or with our Arab brothers in general. All of them, including the
GCC member countries, care about Iraq. Public opinion should not form the
impression from what they read in the press that the Gulf countries, and
particularly Kuwait, want Iraq destroyed. But Iraq must fulfill its obligations
toward the UN Security Council. We, for our part, are seeking to hold
consultations with Iraq to ensure implementation of the resolutions imposed on it.
I believe that this policy has succeeded in bearing fruit to a certain extent, the
most important result being Iraq's judicial recognition of the independence of
Kuwait. This is no easy or small matter. We view things from this angle and not
from the angle of the existence of a conflict between so and so nor from the angle
of sympathizing with one side to spite the other. There is no such thing at all."

Oman's perceived sympathy led many to believe that once Oman assumed the

Arab seat in the UN Security Council in January 1994, it would support the lifting of

sanctions against Iraq.16 Contrary to this, Muscat maintained resolute support for the

sanctions against Iraq while it attempted to ease the impact of sanctions on the Iraqi

people. When then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright visited

Muscat in February 1995, Sultan Qaboos seized the chance to discuss and draft a new UN

Security Council resolution which would have allowed Iraq more flexibility to sell oil

and use the proceeds for the purchase of humanitarian supplies for the Iraqi people

15 Deputy Foreign Minster Interviewed on Gulf Issues: FBIS-NES-95-077, 15 April 1995, p. 10.

16 For a detailed and disturbing account of the impact of sanctions on the Iraqi
civilians, see
Arnove, A., ed. (2000). Iraq Under Siege: the Deadly Impact of Sanctions and War. Cambridge, Mass:
South End Press.
For a discussion on the utility of sanctions for policy makers, see Baldwin, D. (1999). "The
Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice." International Security 24.

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(Dunford 1995: 63). In an interview with Arabic Newspaper, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Alawi

elaborated on the new Resolution 986:

(Bin-'Alawi) As you know, the Sultanate of Oman played a major part in

Resolution 986. The idea of the resolution was formulated here when Madeleine
Albright came here on a visit and met with Sultan Qaboos. The sultan raised the
issue for the first time, because no people should be left to starve. So the idea
emerged of coming up with a humanitarian plan, and she went back to submit a
draft resolution with Britain and Canada; but that was not the draft that Sultan
Qaboos discussed with her, nor was it the resolution that was later passed. That
idea was not put forward and it remained just a draft, and we therefore entered
into long discussions with them over six weeks or more on the articles of the
resolution, and we achieved what we achieved after the Russians and the French
introduced some amendments. So we were of the opinion that we had a moral
responsibility to see the resolution implemented. That is why contacts between us
and Iraq are continuing.'"

When the interviewer pointed out that as a member of the GCC, Kuwait "refuses

even to hear of accepting the fait accompli and coexistence with Iraq in order to seize the

Iraqi people's suffering", Alawi responded with the following comment:

(Bin-'Alawi) Allaying fear is a matter for the party concerned. When Kuwait
views the issue of openness to Iraq, it does so from a different angle. I could be
here in Oman, away from Iraq and having no problem with it, and I could view it
from a different angle. It is different for the Kuwaitis, who examine the matter
inch by inch. This is not a very old issue. The invasion occurred not more than six
years ago. We understand Kuwait's position and why it rejects openness, because
that would mean returning to the past situation. Openness, I believe, would be
difficult for Kuwait. Complete reconciliation is out of the question, but a situation
of "you stay where you are and I stay where I am, you at your door and I at mine"
could be achieved. Furthermore, the Iraqi question is linked not only to Kuwait
but also to the Security Council. There are certain commitments which Iraq must
honor to have the sanctions lifted. It seems to me that the wheel is beginning to
turn. We in Oman contributed positively to Resolution 986 for humanitarian, not
political reasons. The fact that the wheel of the resolution is now moving on a
political track is another matter. The aim was a humanitarian one. Furthermore,

17 Interview with Yusuf Bin-'Alawi, Omani minister of state for foreign affairs, by Huda al-
Husayni in Muscat: FBIS-NES-2003-1220, 5 December 1996, p. 17.

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 Iraq is an important country in the Arab world. Its weakness causes problems in
the Arab world. Iraq's return to the Arab fold is always desired. What happened
happened, and, as the saying goes, once water is spilled on the ground you cannot
rebottle it. As far as Kuwait is concerned, it has a right to take all the necessary
precautions and to entertain such fear. That will continue. We have seen similar
matters take scores of years to resolve. We all remember how, three or four years
ago, Japan began apologizing to the states it had invaded. That came after 50
years and a new generation. Therefore we cannot ask anything that is unrealistic
because that would be pointless; but I do not believe that Kuwait would object to
Iraq's peaceful return to the Arab fold, and I do not believe that it would object to
the lifting of the embargo against Iraq if the latter fulfilled all its commitments,
especially its commitments to Kuwait, and recognized Kuwaiti borders and
sovereignty. These are the demands of the international community. Then there is
the question of the missing persons, who have been called many things: hostages,
missing persons, POW's. (Fulfillment of) these commitments is important for
making coexistence between Iraq and Kuwait a coexistence of "good-
neighborliness" between two neighboring countries, each having its own views:
you where you are and I where I am. That is possible and not unlikely, but
reconciliation and a return to the status quo ante would be difficult.'

Among Gulf monarchies, Qatar and UAE eventually began to move closer to

Muscat's position. UAE restored its diplomatic ties with Iraq, and began humanitarian aid

shipments to the besieged country. In a conference entitled "The Future Prospects of

Kuwaiti-Iraqi Relations" that took place in Kuwait on 13-15 May 2000, Qatar's Foreign

Minister openly called for the rehabilitation of Iraq. Yet, he was careful not to call it an

initiative, but simply an idea (Ghanim 2000: 99). Two years before the conference

questions had been raised about unified GCC policy toward Iraq, as the following

interview with the Saudi Foreign Secretary demonstrates:

[Sa'ud] No, it is not correct to assume that the GCC nations do not have a united
position on how to handle the Iraqi regime. What appears to be initiatives or
moves on the part of some members of the GCC toward Iraq do not amount to a

18 Interview with Yusuf Bin-'Alawi, Omani minister of state for foreign affairs, by Huda al-
Husayni in Muscat: FBIS-NES-2003-1220, 5 December 1996, p. 17.

203
 policy at odds with that of those of the other members of our group. Such
individual moves must be seen in the context of each state of the GCC exercising
its sovereignty as an independent nation. Of one thing we must have no doubt,
and that is that all member states of the GCC denounce and have denounced
invasion as policy. All of them are against the fabrication of crises and
procrastination insofar as the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions
is concerned. All members of the GCC hold Iraq solely responsible for the fact
that the sanctions remain in place and for the terrible pain that the people of Iraq
are being made to suffer. At the same time, the GCC states, all of them, are in
agreement that the Iraqi regime must take the blame for the deteriorating
conditions in Iraq. As it was pointed out by His Highness Prince 'Abdallah bin-
'Abd-al-'Aziz, the Iraqi regime must quit the practice of pushing things to the
edge of precipice. His highness also emphasized that we were not about to tolerate
the Iraqi regime's provocative actions. His highness also stressed that we do not
accept the argument that says that there is a need for light at the end of the tunnel
but, instead, we insist on the removal of the tunnel that blocks truth and light. We
in the GCC member nations have no quarrel with the argument that there can be
no lifting of the sanctions before Iraq honors the relevant Security Council
resolutions.'

The Sultanate's opposition to U.S. "Dual Containment" also manifested itself

clearly in Muscat's relations with Tehran. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter

to trace the sources of the Dual Containment policy toward Iran specifically, it is vital to

bear in mind the context in which it originated as articulated by Gary Sick, the National

Security Advisor to President Carter:

The U.S. 'dual containment' policy toward Iran had a mixed parentage. As
indicated above, the original impetus and much of the subsequent momentum of
this policy originated with Israel. From the beginning, it was entwined with U.S.
policy on the Arab-Israel peace processes, the administration's most important
foreign policy initiative. It also resonated in U.S. domestic politics, including the
Clinton administration's efforts to maintain the strong support of the U.S. Jewish
community; but it also played extremely well with the Congress and with the
American public more generally, where the image of Iran was indelibly associated
with terrorism and with the hostage crises of the 1980's. There was also a
palpable yearning within the Washington establishment for an all-purpose enemy

19 Saudi Arabia: Prince Saud gives Press Conference: FBIS-NES-98-344, 8 December 1998.

204
 that would provide a focus for our strategic planning and justify agency budgets
in a period of retrenchment. Finally, it may be suspected, that harsh criticism of
Iran satisfied a desire for revenge against a regime that had humiliated the United
States and contributed greatly to the electoral defeat of President Carter. As a
member of Warner Christopher's team that negotiated the settlement of the
hostage crisis in 1980-81, I have some sympathy for that view (Sick 1996: 71)

Muscat, continued to have balanced relations with Iran and continued to advocate

the re-integration of Tehran into both the Gulf and the international community.20 When

asked about his reaction to the Dual Containment policy towards Iran, Sultan Qaboos

responded, "Iran is the largest country in the Gulf, with 65 million people. You cannot

isolate it" (Gawdat 1999: 454). The need to engage Iran was articulated by the Sultan in

other interviews as well. Without directly criticizing the US policy, he emphasized the

20 It may be instructive here to recall R. K. Ramazani's chronological Iranian-GCC relations from

1979 to the election of President Rafasanjani in 1989 where he locates four major factors that led to
"poisoning" of relationship between the two parties.
First, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeni's Islamic ideology...led Iran to take on both superpowers. The
United States, the "Great Satan," was the major object of vilification. The Soviet Union was the 'Lesser
Satan,' and, hence, America's friends in the Gulf were to be redeemed by revolutionary Iran, where a
'Government of God' had been established. Security in the Persian gulf could be achieved only if the Arab
peoples of the region reveled against the ruling monarchs and created governments similar to, but no
identical with, Iran's; cut their subservient ties with the United States; and acknowledged Iran's primacy in
the Gulf, primus inter pares.
Second, Iran's domestic politics contributed to hostile relations with the Gulf Arab states in two
ways. The crusade to export revolution satisfied no only Iran's ideological quest, but also helped the
Khomeinist factions to project domestic problems abroad in order to monopolize power at home. Freelance
revolutionaries threatened the Arab sense of security in the earliest phase of the revolution when, for
example, Ayatollah Ruhani called for the annexation of Bahrain...
A third factor was the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980...Saudi Arabia and Kuwait bankrolled Iraq's
war efforts, intensifying Iranian antagonism toward them. And Mubarack's Egypt aided the Iraqi war effort
by providing needed manpower, increasing Iranian hostility toward Cairo.
A fourth and final factor was the policies of the superpowers. The United States tilted increasingly
toward Iraq with intelligence and other kinds of help, and destroyed most of the Iranian navy offshore oil
fields during the tanker war. The Soviet Union supplied arms to its old ally Iraq, especially because at the
time Iran appeared to Moscow, as it did to Washington, to be the greatest of the two evil in the region
(Ramazani, 1998: 45-46).

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active participation of all regional states to safeguard the vital interests of both regional

states and the world community in the Persian Gulf region:

As I have indicated earlier, my principle concerns is that every state that has a
vital interest in Gulf security should play its full part, energetically and
constructively to maintain that security and to further the well-being of our
peoples. It can readily be understood that, given the fact that this region produces
a commodity that is vital to the rest of the world-oil-the whole international
community has an interest and responsibility in assisting in every way possible
the maintenance of peace and security in this region (Joyce 1995: 4).

Back in Washington, domestic criticism of the Dual Containment was best

articulated by former National Security Advisor to President Carter, Zbigniew

Brzezinski:

The Clinton administration's strategy for achieving this goal during the
president's first term was its attempted "dual containment" of Iraq and Iran. This
is more a slogan than a strategy, however, and the policy may not be sustainable
for much longer. In trying to isolate both of the Gulf's regional powers, the policy
lacks strategic viability and carries a high financial and diplomatic cost. Saddam
Hussein is still in power six years after his defeat at the hands of a multinational
coalition, and the international consensus on continuing the containment of Iraq is
fraying. The strident U.S. campaign to isolate Iran, in turn, drives Iran and Russia
together and the United States and its Group of Seven allies apart. Finally, the
imposing U.S. military presence that helps protect the members of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) from external threats is being exploited by hostile
elements to take advantage of internal social, political, and economic problems.
The advent of the Clinton administration's second term, together with the
imminent inauguration of a new administration in Iran following this May's
elections, provides an opportunity to review U.S. policies toward the Gulf and
consider whether midcourse corrections could improve the situation (Brzezinski
1997: 25).

It should be noted that President Clinton's adoption of "Dual Containment" in

1993 represents a significant shift from the previous administration's policy toward

206
Iran.2 In his Inaugural Address in January 1989, President George Bush mentioned the

Americans "held against their will in foreign lands," in a clear reference to the American

hostages in Lebanon. "Assistance can be shown here," he stated, and "Good will be long

remembered. Good will begets good will. Good faith can be a spiral that endlessly moves

on." In an informal Oval Office press conference later in the day, he added that "People

in the past facilitated the release of our citizens, and I'd love to see that happen again, and

I won't forget it" if it does. Such comments were recognized to be directed to Iran where

they were warmly received (Sick 1996: 61). Significant improvement of relations

between Washington and Tehran were further reinforced during and after the Gulf crisis.

This is clearly demonstrated in a statement delivered by James Baker, United States

Secretary of State during the Gulf Crisis, to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 6

February 1991. The Secretary identified five challenges to the newly envisioned world

order that must be pursued: greater security for the Persian Gulf; regional arms

proliferation and control; economic reconstruction and recovery; search for peace and

reconciliation in the Middle East; and reduction of U.S. energy dependence. More

specifically, in regards to the Persian Gulf states, Baker asserted that Gulf security must

be based upon "new and different security arrangements," that addressed the "role of

"In Washington's eyes," Ramazani wrote, "Iran was an 'international outlaw,' and posed in
President's Clinton's words, a 'threat to the national security, foreign-policy and economy of the United
States,' and was according to Newt Gingrich 'a permanent, long-term threat to civilized life on this planet"'
(Ramazani, 1998: 1).

207
local states, regional organizations, and international community" (Dispatch 1990).2 In

this arrangement, Iran was viewed as a major power in the Gulf, which must be engaged.

These statements were echoed by President Bush who stated that a country as big as Iran

cannot be possibly treated as an enemy by all countries of the region. The President

indicated that Washington wanted better relations with Iran and no animosity. As an

indication of Washington's good will, following the Gulf War, the World Bank extended

to Iran its first loan since 1987; an act that was undoubtedly made possible by the US

decision to remain neutral on the matter. Furthermore, in June of 1991, the US Treasury

allowed American companies to purchase 250,000 barrels of Iranian crude oil, which

officially resumed the Iranian oil sales to the United States ceased in 1987. On its part,

the Iranian government demonstrated good will and improved relations between the two

countries by releasing Jon Pattis, an American engineer who had been sentenced to ten

years on spying charges (Hussain 2000: 186).

Clinton's presidency however, significantly reversed this trend as evidenced by

the Secretary of State Warren Christopher's testimony before a Senate Committee upon

his return from a trip to the Middle East:

We think that Iran is one of the principle sources of support for terrorist groups
around the world. When I was in the Middle East, I found that to be a common
judgment among many of the leaders that I met with, that Iran was greatly feared
at the present time because of their support for terrorist groups...That their
determination to acquire weapons of mass destruction, I think, leaves Iran as an
international outlaw (Sick 1996: 67).

22 For a text of Secretary Baker's remarks, see "America's Stake

in the Persian Gulf." Dispatch 1.
10 September 1990.

208
 Muscat, on the other hand, has repeatedly rejected the premise that Iran posed a

fundamental threat to security and stability in the region. Instead, it asserted that a

prosperous and stable Iran would enhance and consolidate the chances of comprehensive

peace in the Persian Gulf and the whole of the Middle East (Gawdat 1999: 454). When

Iran acquired three Kilo class submarines from Russia, a step much criticized by the Gulf

States as detrimental to the stability of the region, Muscat refused to over-react, its joint

submarine warfare exercises with the US and the U.K notwithstanding (Allen and

Rigsbee 2000). Expressing sympathy towards Iranian rearmaments efforts H.H. Sayyid

Haitham, Secretary General of the Omani Foreign Ministry remarked "Iran after its war

with Iraq feels very weak. They think that US forces in the Gulf are directed against

them. So they have a reason to arm. It is an internal affair. There are no grounds for us to

feel threatened. We are not in confrontation with them" (Marschall 2003: 158).23 Tehran

for its part continued to assert that its armament was not designed for territorial conquests

or to threaten the Persian Gulf states. Iran' U.N. Ambassador remarked:

We are surrounded by turmoil. In the West, we have Iraq, which has attacked its
neighbors twice...In the east, we have Afghanistan; in the north, we have
republics with their own problems...It is very easy to make the case that we need
to keep our military capacity and buy some arms for defensive purposes. If the

23 It should be noted that Iran's military acquisitions were realistic given that Tehran has
lost half
of its military capability in the war with Iraq, while the other half was essentially obsolete. Second, as the
following quote demonstrates, Iran's military acquisitions were actually modest compared to the rest of the
region especially given Tehran's population, size, and security concerns:
... 1997 defense budgets rose, with Saudi Arabia in the lead ($18.4 billion), followed by non Arab-
States Turkey ($8.2), Israel ($7 billion, excluding U.S. military aid, in addition to $2 billion from arms
sales), and Iran ($5.8 billion). They were followed by Kuwait ($4 billion), the UAE ($3.7 billion), Egypt
($2.8 billion), Oman ($1.8 billion), Syria ($1.7 billion), Iraq and Libya ($1.3 billion each), Qatar ($1.2
billion), Lebanon ($592 million), Jordan ($548 million), Yemen ($414 million), and Bahrain ($402 million)
(El-Shazly and Hinnebush 2002: 81).

209
 Americans claim that this military expenditure is to threaten the states in the
Persian Gulf, that is a baseless accusation. I think they make this claim to sell
more arms (Mattair 1994: 130).

The Iranian government appreciated the Omani position, as expressed by an

Iranian official:

Our relationship with Oman was better than with other countries in the region.
Nowadays, it is the best. After the Gulf crisis we have been holding joint military
maneuvers; the Iranian Defense Minster visits Oman almost every year. Omani
mediation has always been welcomed by Iran, the Foreign Ministers have a good
relationship (Marschall: 2003: 115).

Indeed, Muscat remained Iran's main mediator and supporter in the GCC 24 by

concentrating on attempts to further a dialogue between the GCC and the Islamic

Republic. Its efforts bore fruits in March 1991 when full diplomatic relations were

restored between Riyadh and Tehran in a meeting that took place in Muscat (Marchall

2003: 114). This step was accompanied by Oman's continued efforts to negotiate Iran's

role in the future Persian Gulf Security arrangement. In his visit to Tehran in March

1992, Foreign Minister Alawi raised the possibility of Iran's consultative role in the

formation of future regional security arrangements. Military relations became a visible

element of the increased cooperation between Oman and Iran. In 1993, Rear Admiral

Shihab bin Tariq, Commander of the Royal Navy of Oman, visited Tehran, where he met

with the Iranian President Rafsanjani. The meeting ended with an announcement by

Shihab "that the two countries had agreed to cooperate in the maintaining security in the

24 These efforts did include Egypt as well where Muscat served "as a go between
for Cairo and
Iran concerning the freeing of Egyptian nationals drafted into the Iraqi army and taken as prisoners of War"
(Mattair 1994: 130).

210
Straits of Hormuz" (Kechichian 1995: 107). In 1995, Sultan Qaboos reiterated that he did

not regard Iran as "a long term threat to the stability of the region" (Kechichian 1995:

107). In 1996, after a highly publicized three-day visit, Alawi remarked in a statement to

Al-Sharq Al-Awsat:

I would rather not elaborate at present on the outcome of the good and open
dialogue between us and our Iranian brothers. I can, however, assure you that the
atmosphere, in all my meetings with the Iranian President (Hashemi-Rafsanjani),
with the Majles Speaker (Nateq-Nuri), and with the scholars, was excellent.
However, this fruitful action now requires us to bear the Prophet's saying in mind,
and 'use circumspection in one's endeavors.2 5

In Muscat, the Omani Minister stressed that "both Muscat and Tehran, in addition

to the other states in the region, wish to help achieve stability in the region., 26 Al-Awsat

cited the assessment of the visit by the experts on the Iran-Gulf relations as "reaffirming a

permanent channel for open dialogue between Iran and all the Arab Gulf states." 27 As a

sign of a remarkable improvement of relations, for the first time since the Revolution, the

Omani and Iranian navies began to exchange visits and port calls. In April 1995, Iranian

Navy commander Admiral Ali Shamkhani toured the Omani naval base at Wudam. In

March 1997, Oman's air force commander al-Aridi visited Iran "within the framework of

joint efforts by both sides to familiarize themselves with each other's capabilities,

OMAN: Channel for Oman-Iran Dialogue Opened; Nateq-Nuri To Visit: FBIS-NES-96-223, 19

November 1996.

26 OMAN: Channel for Oman-Iran Dialogue Opened; Nateq-Nuri To Visit: FBIS-NES-96-223,

19
November 1996.

27 OMAN: Channel for Oman-Iran Dialogue Opened; Nateq-Nuri To

Visit: FBIS-NES-96-223, 19
November 1996.

211
strengthen the bridges of trust, and boost the climates of mutual reassurance."28 He was

also to discuss ways for a practical formula for joint regional security arrangements to

establish security in the shared Gulf waters. He stated that

Iran is an influential neighboring state. We and Iran share the coasts of the Strait
of Hormuz, which is vital to countries, the region, and the world. Thus it is our
duty to protect it. The establishment of peace and security there is a joint
responsibility, so efforts must be coordinated between us our Iranian
brothers... [Oman] believes that the talk of political and economic cooperation
among the neighboring states is not enough to bring about an atmosphere of
regional peace and security while the military and security aspects are
marginalized in such dialogues. This is why we decided some time ago to break
this imaginary barrier and to sit down as military officials from both sides to hold
discussions so that matters can proceed in a balanced manner. Dialogues have
been held at navy level, and they are now being held at air force level. The
dialogue will continue over all military and security aspects.29

Muscat's Ambassador to Tehran added:

Muscat and Tehran can complement each other in coordinating stances on

regional security and exchanging expertise in modernizing the armed forces and
military industrializations. It is our right as neighbors co-operate and not be
content with importuning expertise from abroad, when there are great
opportunities to develop our regional expertise through bilateral and multilateral
co-operation (Marschall 2003: 163).

28 Al-Awsat reported
that
The Omani Air Force commander will be the most senior Gulf military official to visit Iran since
the visit to Tehran by Lieutenant General Shihab Bin-Tariq Al Sa'id, the Omani Navy commander, some
three years ago. It is worth mentioning that, thanks to the joint coordination between the two countries'
political leaderships, the Iranian and Omani Navies have been conducting regular joint meetings since that
time. The two sides are relying on their joint cooperation to guarantee security and stability in the Straits of
Hormuz, which both states border (Air Force Chief To Visit Tehran; Velayati To Visit Muscat: FBIS-NES-
97-069, Monday, 10 March 1997).

29 Omani Air Force Commander Visits Iran, Discusses Security: FBIS-NES-97-073,

Friday, 14
March 1997.

212
 This is how Deputy Foreign Minster Interviewed on Gulf issues expressed

Oman's view of Iran's status in the Gulf:

Iran is a Muslim neighboring country and has common interests with all the Gulf
countries. It is the duty of all who have common interests to safeguard these
interests and peace and stability. Thus we cannot have stability without taking
Iran into consideration...Naturally people exaggerate the size of the problem
between Iran and the Arab countries and they say that Iran constitutes a threat.
Since the beginning of the Iranian revolution in 1979, we have been hearing
claims that Iran was a threat to the Gulf countries or that the foreign presence
constitutes a threat to us. But throughout all these years we have not seen
anything happening in practice.

Muscat was obviously hoping that its attempts at "constructive engagement" may

well prove to be more a practical method of dealing with Iran than the US focus on "Dual

Containment". Muscat's foreign policy makers have supported strong US military

presence in the region, yet they warned that putting too much diplomatic and economic

pressure on Tehran might jeopardize the stability in the region.3 1 As such, "Oman's

relations with Iran are a part of a carefully calibrated network of relations with all other

Gulf countries (often mutually antagonistic) and its arrangements with external powers"

(Riphenburg 1998: 197). This is clearly the case with the Sultanate's excellent relations

with its neighbor the United Arab Emirates, which has strong reservations against the

possible reintegration of Iran into a regional security arrangement given its unresolved

dispute with Tehran over the three islands in the Gulf: Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and

Lesser Tunb. In 1971 when Iran expanded its presence in the region through the control

30 FBIS-NES-95-077, 04/15/1995.

31 Alwai stated "We see these difference between the West and Iran as a situation which might
jeopardize the stability in the region" ("Oman Frowns at US Iran Policy". UPI, Washington, 9 May 1996).

213
of the three islands, both Iran and Abu Dhabi were able at the time to arrange a joint

management of the Islands. However, in 1992 Tehran expelled the foreigners from Abu

Musa that were employed by UAE in medical clinics and power generation station.

Since then, UAE and along with it the GCC and the Arab League have called on Iran to

end its 'occupation' of the islands.33 In the following interviews conducted with Alawi in

1995 and 1996, the Foreign Secretary responded to various questions concerning Oman,

the UAE, and Iran that may shed some light on Muscat's stance on the issue:

[Hammudah] About the problem of the islands for example, [Bin-Abdallah] The
conflict over the question of the islands exists and cannot be denied. But we are

32 For a short perspective on both sides of the isle, see the following
chapters: The Islands
Question and An Iranian Perspective in Security in the Persian Gulf: Origins, Obstacles and the search for
Consensus. Sick, G. and L.G. Potter. New York, Palgrave

The Secretary General of the GCC, Al-Hujylan, had this to say on the Iran-GCC relations in the
context of the UAE-Iran dispute:
(Abu-Husayn) On the question of Iran's relations with the GCC, what are the prospects,
particularly in the wake of President Hashemi-Rafsanjani's call for cooperation? (Al-Hujaylan) First of all,
[SIC] spoke about future relations between the GCC and Iran, one sensed, from his interview with Al-
Sharq Al-Awsat, that there was a positive tendency to improve relations. The GCC states can only welcome
that. But let me speak frankly. Deeds not words are the deciding factor in international relations. Dealing
with Iran, no state can build relations on just the good words it hears. It would want to see that "good"
element implemented. The final statement of the Damascus Declaration states expressed the GCC states'
views regarding Iran quite frankly...the security situation and the occupation of the three UAE islands.
There is no minimum and maximum in relations with Iran. The minimum requirement is that it should
respond to the legitimate demands of the GCC states, especially the UAE, and it should understand the
concerns and fears of these states and respond to their demands. (Abu-Husayn) Iran is calling for dialogue.
Is there a possibility of forming a GCC committee for dialogue with Iran to solve the problem of the UAE
islands? (Al-Hujaylan) The UAE has frequently expressed an interest in dialogue to solve the problem with
Iran. That kind of proposal, at any rate, is not unlikely, but there are bilateral differences which should be
solved bilaterally to enhance trust between Iran and the GCC states. I believe that if the GCC states thought
that forming a committee to discuss the future of relations between Iran and the GCC would lead to the
fulfillment of the aspirations of the GCC states, they would not hesitate to do so. I also believe that before
bilateral dialogues with Iran could begin there should be agreement on the basis of such dialogues and what
they might lead to. Otherwise forming a committee and starting and ending the dialogue would lead to
nothing. That would only lead to more tension and lack of trust between Iran and any Gulf state. (Abu-
Husayn) Do you expect a dialogue between Iran and the UAE to settle their differences? (Al-Hujaylan) I
would not rule that out, on the basis of what Iran is saying about cooperation with the Gulf States (Qatar:
GCC Head on Border Disputes, Other Issues: FBIS-NES-97-002, 6 January 1997).

214
 all anxious to resolve it by peaceful menas and not to push these matters to the
brink of explosion, for example. [Hammudah] Could the reported presence of
6,000 Iranian soldiers, missiles, and artillery on these islands be conductive to
resolving this problem by peaceful means? [Bin-Abdallah] I cannot understand
the significance of the presence of one solider, 1,000 soldiers or 6,000 soldiers,
particularly in this region. There are 6,000 soldiers on Abu Musa island and
60,000 soldiers on the Iranian mainland, which is no more than 24 km from Abu
Musa island. This logic is intended only for local consumption. Since the distance
between us and the Iranian mainland is less than 24 km, what difference does it
make It make if they have 60,000 soldiers here, or 20,000 soldiers there. We
cannot see the logic behind this.34

In another interview Alawi clearly outlined Oman's position vis-a-vis the islands

question:

(Al-Husayni) Your relations with Iran are very good and Iran's relations with Abu
Dhabi are good-to-tense. By virtue of your relations with Iran, can you persuade it
to do anything about the islands, such as withdraw? (Bin-'Alawi) Listen, our
position in the GCC is clear. We will say nothing at all on this issue because it is a
bilateral issue. There has been much hardening of positions, making it difficult for
anyone to propose ideas, but, despite that, the brothers in the UAE are openly
saying that they will seek a settlement of the issue only by peaceful means, and all
they are saying at present is: If the problem cannot be solved bilaterally, why not
go to the international courts? Iran holds an opposite view. It refuses to go to the
International Court of Justice. As a result of the two viewpoints, there is tension.
Our position is clear. The Iranians and the UAE know it. We can add nothing to
that. (Al-Husayni) What is your known position? (Bin-'Alawi) We have told the
GCC what our position is. We believe that the UAE has a right to the islands.
That is the official position, but we will not be a judge. As long as there are
negotiations: The UAE is saying that we are negotiating but without achieving a
solution, so we have to refer the matter to the court to pass judgment. The Iranian
position is clear.35

34 Deputy Foreign Minster Interviewed on Gulf Issues: FBIS-NES-95-077, 15 April 1995, p. 10.

35 Interview with Yusuf Bin-'Alawi, Omani minister of state for foreign affairs, by Huda al-
Husayni in Muscat: FBIS-NES-2003-1220, 5 December 1996, p. 17.

215
 As far as the UAE was concerned however, Iran's occupation of the islands

constitutes the fundamental obstacle to any collective security arrangements that may

include Iran. In this context, a UAE paper claimed that

Iran with its 'king of kings' [shahinshahiyya] attitude has not abandoned its dream
of being the regional power as policeman and of setting down conditions in the
area. The revolution did not change these priorities...After the second Gulf War,
Iran started to reemerge as the regional power (Marschall 2003: 154).

Along the same lines, the Director of the Department of GCC and Gulf Sates

Affairs in the UAE Foreign Ministry asserted:

We cannot have a regional security arrangement because of Iran. To have a

reliable security arrangement, the first thing you need is trust. That's why we see
the solving of this islands dispute with Iran, as well as boundary problems within
the GCC as a pre-requisite. Since 1991, we detected some intention by Iran to
establish itself as the regional power after Iraq's defeat. They wanted to exercise
their influence...Iran very much opposed to the participation of foreign forces in
Gulf security. This is the gap between Iran and the UAE lies (Marschall 2003:
155).

However, the Director General was careful not to coin the issue as a military

threat:

Iran causes an acute problem because, from our point of view, Iran has occupied
the islands and declared sovereignty. The problem with Iran is that they do not
acknowledge that there is a problem. They are not willing to negotiate. The Shah
occupied the islands, but he was very cautious not to aggravate the situation.
Matters changes with the Iran-Iraq war, when Iran used the islands for military
purposes. Nevertheless, there was no threat during the war that Iran would attack
the UAE, even now Iran will not attack us. But we see that their hostile rhetoric
complicates the issue. The problem in Iran is that they have to meet internal
demands of different groups. They want to mobilize the people for the revolution,
so they mobilize them behind an external threat. It is not the islands which are
concerned but the revolution. Iran caused itself more problems by building the
airstrip on Abu Musa and the power station on Greater Tunb. This makes it more
difficult to withdraw and negotiate. They are complicating the situation more by
building these facilities. Nevertheless, we are pushing for negotiations. But we are
not pushing too hard because the situation might get out of control (Marschall
2003: 157).

216
 The Saudi point of view, although expressed without references to Iran's

"occupation of Arab lands", is, nevertheless, similar to the ones expressed by U.A.E. 36

This is how a Saudi official described Riyadh's diplomacy toward Iran before 1997:

Today, Iran is a much bigger threat to the Gulf than Iraq. Iraq is now contained.
Iran in the long run is much dangerous. Its arms build up signals hostile
intentions. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it would lead to a major disaster.
This is why the US must stay in the region. Iran cannot be part of a security
agreement. In the beginning, Saudi Arabia said we needed to include Iran in a
regional security agreement, but that was just rhetoric. We string them along. We
say: 'Let's talk in six months, let's discuss further.' We do not want to provoke
them. At the same time, we bring in the US. Saudi Arabia never had any
intentions of including Iran, but we speak softly (Marschall 2003: 156).

With the election of Khatami in 1997 a new level of rapprochement began to

emerge. While much credit for this rapprochement resides with Khatami's presidency;

Crown Prince Abdullah's role in these developments was equally important. As Okruhlik

asserts, "It is not at all clear that rapprochement would have occurred between Fahd and

Khatami as it has between Abdullah and Khatami. The impetus comes as much from

Saudi Arabia as from Iranian leadership" (Okruhlik 2003: 114). This was clearly

demonstrated in the Eighth Summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

hosted by Iran in 1997. At the Conference, the Crown Prince issued important statements

36 In an interview with Saudi Foreign Minister, Al-Fisal indicates GCC's willingness to work with
Iran concerning the UAE islands especially now that Khatami is the president:
[Sa'ud] We hope that the Iranian President Mohammad Khatami will act on the declared intention
of his administration to open up to the outside world. We also wish that the Iranian Government would
come up with hard and objective evidence that it is truly willing to reciprocate a desire on the part of the
GCC nations to forge the closest of ties with the Iranians. We think that if Iran showed a more serious
willingness to solve the question of the three islands that it occupied, that would be satisfactory proof that it
is really interested in building cooperative ties with the states of the Gulf region. There is a real opportunity
that Iran could seize to dramatize its constructive line in the best interest of stability and security of the
region (Saudi Arabia: Prince Saud gives Press Conference: FBIS-NES-98-344, 8 December, 1998).

217
that demonstrated the remarkable distance that Tehran and Riyadh had traveled to come

closer together in a relatively short span of time. The language used by Abdallah evoked

"the immortal achievements credited to the Muslim people of Iran and their invaluable

contributions through our glorious Islamic history" He referred to the summit as a

"historic meeting," and remarked that it was incumbent on the Muslims "to turn over a

new leaf in dealing with ourselves and in coexisting with others," and that it was an

obligation to remove the obstacles preventing cooperation in the hope of "making our

way toward a better future" (Ramazani 1998: 54). Remarkably, Kuwait's Ambassador to

Washington went as far as saying that "Kuwait is not concerned about Iran's nuclear

program. We think that Iran is on the verge of an internal explosion. It will explode much

earlier than it can develop a nuclear bomb. The power base of the regime is eroding

(Marschall 2003: 157).

The Sultanate cautious optimism regarding Khatami's presidency is reflected in

the following interview:

(Hammudah) What is the current position with regard to your relations with Iran?
I am asking this because these relations depend on the constant principles of
Omani foreign policy and the fact that Iran is a Muslim and neighboring country.
What form have these relations taken following Mohammad Khatami's
assumption of the presidency in Iran in the light of what numerous circles have
been saying, that Khatami's assumption of power indicates a change in the
orientations of the Iranian regime and that these orientations will be more
moderate in dealing with the Arab countries? What manifestations of change have
you detected in Iranian policy that makes it more or less acceptable to the Arab
countries? (Ben-'Alawi) The question of moderation is a controversial one. What
you might consider to be extremism I might consider to be moderation. Some
Arabs say that Iran should resort to moderation in its foreign policy while the
Iranians say that the Arabs should show moderation in their policies toward it.
The whole issue is a controversial one and cannot be easily resolved. But the fact
remains that Iran is a revolutionary country, which started to operate under
revolutionary conditions and is still working along this course. As is known,
revolutions normally move from one stage to another. The Iranian revolution is at

218
 present passing through a transitional period from a specific type of orientation to
a new type of orientation and this is not due only to foreign influences but
essentially to internal influences. When 30 million people vote in favor of one
person to be the president of the republic, this is something of great and far from
simple significance. I believe this vote is not a reward to one particular person but
a methodical movement of the Iranian revolution from one stage to another that
was imposed by internal conditions and not outside considerations, such as the
claim that Iran was an extremist country or that it supports terrorism and such
claims. Such claims are of no importance to the Iranians. What is really important
to them is the internal Iranian social, cultural, and political interactions. Thus Iran
is passing through a transitional period and this is a matter that concerns them.
They are best placed to know where their interests lie and how to achieve them.
As to their relations with Oman, they have always been stable, thereby
guaranteeing continuity. We have nothing to complain about in the field of
bilateral relations. As regards the region as a whole, there are numerous negative
aspects in the Iranian policy toward some countries. The Iranians are aware of this
and so are the people here in the Gulf. Nevertheless, we have noted lately,
following President Khatami's election, that a new development and contacts
have been taking place in accordance with the concept of interests."

However were the close contacts or interests shared between Muscat and Tehran

as various quotes cited by officials of both countries demonstrate, Muscat's and Tehran's

position on Gulf security fundamentally differ. While Oman's conception of Gulf

security is tied to Western commitment and continuous presence in the region, Iran

Oman: Omani Aide on Doha Forum, Regional Issues: FBIS-NES-97-336, Tuesday, 2 December
1997.
It should be noted that commentator's on Oman's foreign policy often stress Muscat's "realism" in
its international affairs, and its emphasis on interests, as in the following excerpt dealing with Muscat's
relations with India:
.a word must be said about the role religion has played in shaping Indo-Omani relations-
especially in the context of Oman's attitude towards the vexed Indo-Pak dispute over Kashmir and the
continued Pakistani efforts to provide a religious color (Hindu vs. Muslim) to what has been basically a
politico-territorial question. Religion has never been a factor in Indo-Omani relations. In other words,
Oman's identity-of being a Muslim state-and therefore its solidarity with (an)other Muslim country(ies)
on the basis that identity have never guided/influenced Muscat's bilateral dealing with New Delhi. Indo-
Omani relations have been too strongly anchored in a clear-cut perception and understanding of each one's
national interest to be affected by such extraneous determinants, based on primordial loyalties, as religion.
Apart from this realpolitik consideration, there is another angle to Oman's refusal to use religion as a
political lever in its foreign policy calculations/decisions. And that is the influence of the tolerant Ibadhi
tradition/teachings on its foreign policy formulations (Pradhan 1999: 82).

219
perceives Western presence as the primary cause of insecurity and instability in the Gulf.

As Iran's Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi stated:

[We] believe the presence of forces outside our region will not help to strengthen
regional security, but will in itself serve as an element of tension. Existence of
crises provides an excuse for the presence of these forces...Their presence will
turn the region into a military barrack, cause greater instability, lead to
proliferation of conventional and non-conventional weapons, pollute the
environment and in the long turn impede political, social and economic
development of the countries of the region...We have consistently believed that
security in the Persian Gulf cannot be "imported," and the accumulation of a huge
arsenal of weapons will not help improve the security situation (Lotfian 2002:
123).

An opposing view rooted in an unwavering sense of realism is articulated by

Oman's Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the ensuing candid interview. This lengthy

interview superbly encapsulates Muscat's fundamental views on security of the Persian

Gulf and as such, it is cited verbatim from the record:

(Al-Husayni) I have noticed that in the UAE there is fear of Iran's stockpiling of
arms. Foreign Minister Rashid al-'Abdallah has spoken of strategic imbalance in
the region. What do you in Oman think? (Bin-'Alawi) Iran is a neighboring
country and so is Iraq: That is a fact, but we do not believe that there is a military
or security imbalance. There can be no balance between Iraq and Iran, therefore
there must be a third party to ensure that balance. There can be no balance
between Iran and Iraq because the balance is in Iraq's favor at some times and in
Iran's favor at others. Therefore, if we want to maintain (a balance), there has to
be a third party to ensure it. The Iraq-Iran war occurred when there was no such
third party. (Al-Husayni) Who do you mean by third party? (Bin-'Alawi) The
third party had always been the presence of the Western states. We saw how the
Iraq-Iran war occurred as soon as Britain left the Gulf. As soon as there was an
imbalance between Iraq and Iran, the Kuwait problem occurred. There must,
therefore, be a third party to ensure balance. That is why there is a third party.
(Al-Husayni) Who is it now? (Bin-'Alawi) Our Western friends: either the United
States, or Britain, or France. They have interests which they care about. The
conflict is basically over these interests. So these states are present and they
represent balance. You can say or imagine that the West and the United States see
their interests in the Gulf as national interests. That presence exists now and will
continue to do so for scores of years to come. The balance is there. There is no
imbalance. That [imbalance] will occur when there is no third party. (Al-Husayni)
Can you guarantee that the third party will prevent any aggression attempt against

220
any Gulf state? (Bin-'Alawi) War is not the aim, or rather the origin. Deterrence
is. War will not occur if there is deterrence and will occur if there is no deterrent.
(Al-Husayni) Is there such as deterrent now? (Bin-'Alawi) Yes, there is. And I do
not believe that Iran will fight the Gulf states, and I do not believe that Iraq will
repeat its mistake, as long as the deterrent is there. But, despite that deterrent,
differences may remain unresolved and without the solutions we desire, therefore
we, the small states in the Gulf, will continue to have such fear (Al-Husayni) of
being swallowed up? (Bin-'Alawi) It is no longer possible for us to be swallowed
up. The world is no longer a world in one country can swallow up another. Such
episodes are finished and done with. No country can invade another any more.
(Al-Husayni) Are you satisfied with the present deterrent force in the Gulf? Do
you not notice that it imposes certain decisions on some Gulf states? (Bin-'Alawi)
The decisions you mean would be imposed regardless of means or methods. That
is the reality. If you go to the market place you will notice that the big stores
attract more people. That, briefly, is the reality in the Gulf now. (Al-Husayni) But
a small store might have very special goods. (Bin-'Alawi) A small store has only
its own special clients, but everyone goes to the big store, at least to browse. (Al-
Husayni) Here you are not browsing. The big store has come to you and opened
its doors in your grounds. (Bin-'Alawi) Everyone has now entered the big store.
The meaning here is that close cooperation with friends is one of the GCC's
strategies, one of its firm and meticulous strategies. The Iranians know that and so
do the Iraqis. Iraq and Iran have come to understand this situation. We know that
neither Iraq nor Iran is run by fools. Each state has figures who understand the
game well. They are politicians of leadership caliber. There are first-class
statesmen, especially in Iraq and Iran, because a large number of states neighbor
Iraq and each one has a problem of some kind. And the same thing applies to Iran.
Iran has problems with Afghanistan and has problems with Central Asia. It has
borders with Russia and problems with Pakistan. It has an assortment of
problems, therefore Iran cannot concentrate just on one region even though that
region is more important than any other to Iran. Reality makes it necessary for
Iranian officials to rise to the level of responsibility. The apprehension we have is
not a result of the existence of the Iranian revolution, because some of us had the
same apprehension even in the days of the shah, who had good ties with the West
when we had-as we still have-good ties with the West ourselves. As I said,
some of us had the same fears as now. For some time after the shah's demise we
used to say that we could protect ourselves, only to discover later that that was not
true. That is now clear. We are states and all states, large or small, have the same
scale of operation, respect, and sovereignty. The world is molded by and
interwoven with interests, and nobody can entertain the ideas which some used to
have. But politics from time to time require that one should express some inner
anxiety. (Al-Husayni) But it has been noticed that the third power in the region
almost deprives you of free and independent decision-making, and that reflects on
the average Gulf citizen. (Bin-'Alawi) I do not believe that to be true, and I speak
with awareness and understanding. For instance-and the readers can verify
this-when the United States wanted to use some bases in the Gulf states (during

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 the Irbil operation in northern Iraq), these states refused to respond. Therefore the
claim that the West has denied us the right to express our will and make decisions
is not true. We are friends, and we have similar and common interests. The West
is here with our agreement and approval. Maintaining a balance is one of the
interests we believe to be legitimate, therefore the claim by some parties, people,
or papers that the Western states or the Western alliance in the Gulf have imposed
anything on the people or governments of the Gulf or that the Gulf states are no
longer the masters of their own will and decision making is untrue, indeed it is out
of the question. (Al-Husayni) You say that the West has not deprived you of your
decision making freedom, yet the West, and particularly the United States, is
"stealing the wealth and resources" of the Gulf with arms deals and contracts.
You have just mentioned that you tried to defend yourselves but could not do so.
Is not that Western assistance costing you a fortune? (Bin-'Alawi) As I said, the
world is interlinked and interwoven. They did not come to us and to the other
Arabs and tell us to buy those arms. They did not say that. We were the ones who
sought to purchase those arms. That is exactly the situation which prevailed in the
Arab world in the sixties in relation to the Soviet Union. The Russians did not go
to the Arabs and tell them they must buy their arms whether they liked it or not:
The Arabs went and purchased the arms. (Al-Husayni) But you are paying cash
for the arms. The other Arab states purchased their arms on credit, which they still
owe. (Bin-'Alawi) There is no difference. That was the nature of the relationship.
The Soviets did not pressure them. It was the Arabs who did the buying. Some of
us paid cash for the arms, whereas the arms deals with Syria and Egypt were in
return for Syrian and Egyptian wealth and goods; the volume of arms was so
massive that they could not pay cash. The Soviets could ask whatever price they
liked, because the Arabs had no other option. At least in our case, if we do not
agree with the United States, we can turn to France, Britain, or Italy. 38

38 Interview with Yusuf Bin-'Alawi, Omani minister of state for foreign affairs,
by Huda al-
Husayni in Muscat: FBIS-NES-2003-1220, 5 December 1996, p. 17.
In an interview with the GCC's Secretary General, similar concerns regarding the security of the
Gulf, the West, and both Iran and Iraq are stated by Al-Hujaylan:
(Al-Bunyan) Do you agree with those who maintain that the Gulf region now needs political
arrangements more than it needs military arrangements? (Al-Hujaylan) Preserving the Gulf region's
security and stability is the main concern of the GCC states. The catastrophe of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait
destroyed the existing concepts and created new concepts about the right of legitimate self-defense. There
are two strong parties in the region: Iran and Iraq. Our experience with the latter has been very severe. The
GCC states need to concentrate on clarity of mind in order to devote their energies to serving the interests
of the people of these states. The states of the region must have a deep and 100-percent full conviction in
order to provide security in the region. Peace is a necessity for this region and it is in everyone's interest,
including Iraq and Iran, to build relations of sincere cooperation based on goodwill or conclude security
agreements between the various states of the region guaranteed by major international institutions such as
the Security Council. As regards the states which do not feel reassured about good intentions, and in the
absence of a guaranteed security zone, they should look for other ways of defending their security, namely

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 Indeed, in contrast to members of the Gulf Cooperation Council whose positions

vacillated between perceiving Iraq as a counter balance to Iran (especially during the Iran

Iraq war), or Iran as a counter balance to Iraq (post-Gulf war), Muscat recognized that

there could be no balance between the two states. As expressed by Alawi in the above

interview, a balance could only be ensured by a third party.

Essentially, Muscat's policies towards Iran have been characterized by a strong

sense of realism and pragmatism, which recognized real threats and attempted to deter

bilateral defense agreements. The GCC states, therefore, believe that they have a legitimate right to ensure
protection of their security by whatever means they deem appropriate because their peoples want to live in
peace, and the reason is the severe experience which overturned all concepts when Iraq invaded Kuwait
despite the fact that Kuwait and the GCC states had supported Iraq during its war with Iran, especially
when the balances of power shifted and Iraq was threatened militarily, prompting the GCC states and
especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to throw their weight (behind Iraq) so that Iraq could
emerge safely from that battle or confrontation with Iran. Relying on trust as a means of self-defense is,
therefore, no longer useful or viable. That is why political arrangements do not inspire confidence if they
are not coupled with guaranteed security arrangements. (Al-Bunyan) In other words, the region's security
will continue to be imported. (Al-Hujaylan) No, not imported. You must be aware of the world's links with
the Gulf region. Some 26 percent of the world's oil exports come from the Gulf, and the largest oil reserves
in the world are in our region. If the states of the region did not have these resources, which the industrial
world will continue to need, we would not have seen such world interest in it. The region is of extreme the
26 percent of the oil exports that come from this region came to a halt, the entire world economy would be
disrupted. One therefore cannot say that the region's security is imported. The GCC states have a right to
look for means of self-defense. That stipulation can even be found in the security protocol discussed
recently by the Dama (Al-Bunyan) including the possibility of concluding bilateral defense agreements?
(Al-Hujaylan) Brother, we have to be realistic. What Iraq did to Kuwait torpedoed and destroyed many
concepts. That is why states have every right to seek and resort to the means they deem appropriate for
their defense. (Al-Bunyan) I interpret what you are saying to mean that the dangers still exist. (Al-
Hujaylan) What dangers? (Al-Bunyan) So long as the industrial world needs our wealth, the dangers
remain. (Al-Hujaylan) No. The world is interested in this region because of its great economic importance.
(Al-Bunyan) But I am talking about conflicts. (Al-Hujaylan) We do not want any conflicts. It is in the
interest of all the region's states to cooperate in order to safeguard their security and stability and keep the
region free from tension and danger. Dangers would exist if the world took its hands off the region and,
consequently, the strong became stronger and the weak remained weak. These are the dangers. Had Kuwait
not been an oil producing and exporting country, the international coalition for the liberation of Kuwait
would not have materialized (Saudi Arabia: GCC's al-Hujaylan on Economy, Security Issues: FBIS-NES-
97-218, Wednesday, 6 August 1997).
Strategic importance not only to the Americans but also to the West. The interest of the West and
the Americans in the region stems not from a drive to serve the interests of the peoples of the region but
from the fact that they have vital interests in it.

223
them through cooperation both regionally and internationally. Oman pursued a "dual-

track policy towards Gulf security: as a strong advocate of closer defense cooperation

with the other conservative Gulf States and as a willing ally in providing the United

States with facilities needed to maintain its over-the horizon presence" (Pelletreau 1996:

22). A crucial element of this design was a constructive engagement of both Iran and

Iraq.

Muscat and Yemen

Muscat's distinct approach to both Iran and Iraq could also be seen in Oman's

initiatives in toward both Yemen and Israel. The unification of North and South Yemen

in May 1990 set forth a new stage in the relationship between Oman and the Republic of

Yemen. High-ranking officials of both states attended an official ceremony to sign the

Oman-Yemen border agreement in October 1992, which was ratified in December of the

same year (Allen and Rigsbee 2000: 189). Alawi stressed that the agreement was the

fulfillment of the Omani leadership's objective to coordinate polices with its southern

neighbor. Muscat had certainly made important concessions to Yemen, a fact readily

recognized by Yemen's Foreign Minister: "There would be no compensations to the

Omani Government or Omani citizens for areas whose ownership was transferred to

Yemen after the signing of the border agreement" (Kechichian 1995: 95-96).39

Remarking on the Agreement Alawi stated that

39 Indeed, Oman's 'compromises' on the issue of the border with Yemen, prompted reporters to
question Muscat's motives, as in the following interview:

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 the new agreement between the two sides will put an end to all problems so that
cordiality and cooperation will prevail in the Arabian Peninsula countries....The
three parties, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Oman, are now in a situation other than
that sought by the media organs, denying the existence of any outstanding
problem between the three parties about the signing of the border agreement
between the Sultanate of Oman and Yemen...The agreement signed by Yemen
and Oman became an international agreement after it was deposited with the
United Nations and the Arab League.40

The border agreement with Yemen was another stepping stone in realizing Sultan

Qaboos' objective to demarcate Oman's sea and land borders with all of its neighbors

(Diyab) It has been stated that Oman always takes a lenient attitude toward this matter in order to
secure a final agreement, just as happened with Yemen when Oman conceded scores of kilometers. Is this
true? (Ben 'Alawi) It is true. This is because if we had adopted the traditional method pertaining to the
agreements signed during the British presence in the region, we would not have reached any solution to this
problem. It is true that we conceded some territories to Yemen. They were lands inhabited by Omani and
Yemeni families that were divided between the two countries. Parts of these territories were inhabited by
Omani citizens while another part was inhabited by Yemeni citizens. Thus it was illogical for us to come
and say that there must be a dividing line. We feel it our duty to keep our doors open constantly to our
Yemeni brothers. They were going through a crisis and it was our duty to help them as much as we could.
True, we have theoretically conceded scores of kilometers, but in return we have gained much more than
that. We have gained the love of the Yemeni people. (Diyab) Do you think that this method is the best for
resolving such differences? (Ben 'Alawi) The important thing is that there should be mutual trust between
you and your neighbor. The brothers in Yemen said that this land would create problems for them. We did
not want them to have problems. On the contrary, we like to help them overcome their problems. If every
Arab country asked itself what it could offer its neighbors or its brothers that would cost nothing when they
were facing a problem, that Arab country would gain a great deal of love and cordiality and good-
neighborliness (Oman: Minister Views Regional Issues, Iraq: FBIS-NES-98-047, 14 Feb 98, p. 6).

40 Oman: Foreign Minister Says Border Accord With Yemen Final: FBIS-NES-98-217
Wednesday, 5 August 1998.
Alawi's refrence to Saudi Arabia is understandable since that state shares a border with both
Oman and Yemen. Apparently the Saudi's were not satisfied with the border agreement since they felt that
part of their own territory was compromised. Alawi's statements that the agreement is finally been given to
both the Arab League and the United Nations in August 1998 is a testament to it given that the agreement
was ratified in 1995. In fact, in July of 1998, Al-Awsat reported a visit by Alwai to Crown Prince Abdullah
of Saudi Arabia. It claimed that Gulf diplomatic sources in Jeddah confirmed Al-Sharq al-Awsat by saying
that
the message deals with the recent developments on the issue of the Yemeni-Omani border
agreement that was laid down at the Arab League and the subsequent memorandum by which means Saudi
Arabia drew attention to its rights and interests given the fact that it shares borders with both the Sultanate
of Oman and Yemen (Saudi Arabia: Oman Briefs Saudi Arabia on Oman-Yemen Border Issue: FBIS-NES-
98-201, Monday, 20 July 1998).

225
starting with Iran in 1972, Saudi Arabia in 1992 and UAE in 1993. In 1997, the

construction of the 243 km highway linking Oman's southern province Dhofar with

Yemen began. This left the maritime border with Pakistan as the only boundary left to be

demarcated (Pasha 1999: 118). Ironically, reactions to the border agreement with Yemen

were muted. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates issued no official

statements. Kuwait reserved its comments to a mere congratulatory cable (Kechichian

1995: 97).

However important was the border agreement with Yemen, a civil war that

ensued between North and South Yemen in 1994 threatened to undo all that was

accomplished. The crisis between the two Yemen's was expanding to the members of the

GCC states with an increasing pressure from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, to

support the breakaway Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY). Kuwait's support for the

rebel leaders in the South was without a doubt partly derived from Ali Abdullah Saleh's

support for Iraq during the occupation of Kuwait. Oman however carefully resisted all

pressure from GCC allies to support the rebel Democratic Republic of Yemen while

extending asylum to its leader Ali Salem Al-Baidh at the end of the fighting. This move

ensured the reaffirmation of proper relations between the two neighbors when president

Salih visited Oman in September 1994 (Allen and Rigsbee 2000: 189).41 As Kechichian

clearly articulated,

41 In an interview with Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Yemeni President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih

commented on
the 1994 civil war, and the border issue with Oman and Saudi Arabia:
As for our domestic problems, they have been dealt with, thanks be to God. The first was the issue
of separation in 1994 and was settled by a general amnesty decision. The other problems, namely the

226
 For Oman the issue was clear: How could the DRY enhance the Sultanate's
strategic position? Because Qaboos could not find a suitable answer to this
question, he stood firm, concluding that Sanaa would eventually win the war. This
assessment aside, the GCC was polarized and, since the War of Kuwait, had
drifted apart on regional security assessment. With a victorious Sanaa and an
intact border agreement, Oman could, once again, concentrate on the critical
political and economic linkages that were being established with
Yemen...Vindicated on at least one score, namely, Sanaa's victory on the
battlefield, Muscat could indeed coalesce the GCC to adopt more forthcoming
policies towards Yemen (Kechichian 1995: 98-99).

Qaboos was clearly determined to maintain close and friendly relations with

Yemen, and more importantly to support a United Yemeni front to prevent regional

powers from using Yemen's internal conflicts to destabilize the Arabian Peninsula: "by

holding both parties responsible for all of their actions, Muscat earned unparalleled

credibility in Sanaa, where a new understanding emerged on how critical Oman had

become to long term Yemeni interests" (Kechichian 1995: 255). Indeed, despite the

reservations from members of the GCC over Yemen's role in supporting Saddam during

the Gulf crisis 1990-1991,42 Sultan Qaboos visited Yemen and called upon the GCC to

demarcation of the borders, were first settled with the neighboring Sultanate of Oman according to the
principle of no harm to either side from a solution that satisfies both sides. It was a cordial settlement that
satisfied everybody in Yemen and in the Sultanate of Oman. As for the problem of the islands in the south
of the Red Sea with neighboring Eritrea, we have also settled it through international arbitration, which
satisfied us. What remains is the issue of the borders with neighboring Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is
the subject of discussion and continuous shuttle trips between Sanaa and Riyadh within the framework of
the memorandum of understanding, which calls for a friendly solution. It is the best that we can look for,
which would also be within the principle of no harm to either side. But if that result were impossible to
achieve in that spirit, then we would invoke the relevant article of the memorandum of understanding and
also the relevant article of the Al-Ta'if Institute, which states that in case of unresolved dispute through
bilateral and cordial means, the parties resort to arbitration. This would neither be shameful nor spoil the
friendship (Yemeni President on Foreign Policy: FBIS-NES-2000-0204, Friday, 4 February 2000).
42 Yemen condemned the Iraqi invasion and called upon Iraq to
withdraw from Kuwait, however,
it simultaneously opposed sanctions and military actions against Iraq. The importance of Yemen's position
at the time was due to the fact that it was occupying a seat at the UN Security Council, and as such, it was

227
consider admitting Yemen43 as a member of the organization (Pasha 1999: 118).4 Allen

and Regsbee (2000: 190) claim that by December 1996, Yemen formally requested

membership in the organization. Yet, an interview with Alawi at the same period records

the Foreign Minister stating that "all that has been reported is untrue. Yemen has not

submitted any official request to join the GCC." 45 It is important to note that Yemen did

submit an application to be a member of the GCC, as recorded by various media outlets

on of the fifteen states that decided on action by the international body. Kuwait naturally was not
appreciative of Yemen's position from the Gulf War, and diplomatic relations between the two states were
only restored in 1999 (Halliday 2002: 274).

43 In an interview with Yemen's Foreign Minister by Jordan's Al-Dastur, he was asked to specify
which countries, or country that advocated Yemen's full membership in the GCC. The Minister answers
that he "cannot speak about that. However, all the Gulf countries welcomed Yemen's inclusion, chiefly
Oman" (Yemeni Foreign Minister Discusses GCC Membership: FBIS-NES-2002-0103, 03 January 2002).

44 It should be noted that Jordan's support for Saddam Hussein during the Gulf crisis 1990-1991,
also did not affect relations between the two countries. In fact, "King Hussein's January 1992 trip to
Muscat, his first to the Gulf since Kuwait's liberation, was seen in part as an attempt to use Oman's good
offices to repair relations with other GCC states. Hussein's peace treaty with Israel in no way affected
relations between the two monarchies" (Allen and Rigsbee 2000: 201).

45 In this interview, Alwai also comments on Iraq's possible membership to the GCC, and Omani-
Yemeni relations:
(Al-Husayni) Has Yemen? (Al-Husayni) Let us assume that a solution were found to the problem
between Iraq and the Gulf states. Would it then be possible for Iraq to join the GCC? (Bin-'Alawi) That is
not the way to put the question. The question should be: What if the ground is ready and prepared? The
GCC is a council for cooperation in economic and commercial fields. The question of cooperation on
security and defense arose for our protection against what we were facing. We are states which depend on a
free market and free trade. So it would depend, whether in relation to Iraq in the future, or Yemen, or
anywhere else. Would their circumstances be parallel to ours? These matters cannot be viewed from a
political angle. We do not approach all issues from a political angle only. Politics are continuously
changing, but what matters is the essence and that essence is one of economics, development, and culture
(Al-Husayni) What is the state of your relations with Yemen? (Bin-'Alawi) Good, excellent, at their best.
There is much cooperation between us, but we and the Yemenis do not talk much. We prefer to proceed
calmly. (Al-Husayni) Is 'Ali Salim al-Bid still living in Salalah? And does he play any role? (Bin-'Alawi)
He has no role at all. He is a guest here, and we respect our guests. (Al-Husayni) Has Yemen sought his
extradition? (Bin-'Alawi) I have heard no such thing. They have made no request (Interview with Yusuf
Bin-'Alawi, Omani minister of state for foreign affairs, by Huda al-Husayni in Muscat: FBIS-NES-2003-
1220, 5 December 1996, p. 17).

228
in 1997. The two following interviews with Kuwait's Foreign Minister, Al-Sabah, and

the GCC's Secretary General, Al-Hujaylan indicates that Muscat's desire for Yemen's

membership in the GCC is highly unlikely. Both Al-Sabah and Al-Hujaylan employ a

similar language to deny Yemen's membership suggesting similar positions towards

Yemen's application on the part of the GCC:

(Al-Rashid) Yemen has often expressed a desire to participate in GCC summits.

Will the issue of Yemen be placed on the summit's agenda? What is your position
on Yemen's becoming the seventh member of the GCC? (Al-Sabah) The GCC's
basic law does not allow other states to join the GCC. The GCC's basic law
stipulates that for a state to join the GCC it must be a monarchy or an emirate.
The GCC basic law does not permit a state with a republican system to join the
GCC. (Al-Rashid) What if requests were to be made for amendment of the basic
law to allow states that are not a monarchy or emirates to join the GCC? (Al-
Sabah) We will discuss this issue when it is raised. But our view is that the basic
law does not allow states with republican systems to join the GCC. 46

(Al-Bunyan) On the subject of the Yemenis' desire to join the GCC, what was the
recent Doha summit's reply to them? (Al-Hujaylan) The Yemeni request or desire
was conveyed in a letter to the amir of Qatar, Shaykh Hamad Bin-Khalifah Al
Thani, and no reference to it was made in the final communique mainly because it
was not included in the items on the summit agenda. (Al-Bunyan) But the
chairman of the summit sent them a reply? (Al-Hujaylan) That is true, it was a
letter in reply to the one which President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih sent to him. (Al-
Bunyan) Did the Qataris bring it up at the summit? (Al-Hujaylan) I said that it
was not treated as an official item, and therefore the matter was limited to the
letter from the Yemeni President and Shaykh Hamad's reply. The summit leaders'
inclination is for increased cooperation with the Yemeni Republic as a sister state
and neighbor, but this cooperation does necessarily have to be through the GCC.
You know that, in order to consider any request to join the GCC, there must be an
amendment to the basic law, and in order to amend the law, there must be
consensus among the six member states in the GCC. If one state objects to the
principle of discussing the amendment, then any request to join will not be
discussed. This is one of the basic matters on which there must be unanimous
agreement. (Al-Bunyan) It seems that the rules of the GCC system do not allow

46 Kuwait: Kuwaiti Minister on Iran, Iraq, World Ties: FBIS-NES-97-297 Friday,

24 October
1997.

229
 any state to join the six member states? (Al-Hujaylan) The basic law must be
amended, and amending the law requires unanimous agreement even to consider
any request for admission to membership in order for six states to become seven
or eight, or...(Al-Bunyan) And membership is closed for now? (Al-Hujaylan) The
GCC is an international regional organization of limited membership, and
membership must be granted by amending the basic law, which, as I said, requires
the unanimous agreement of the six member states to that amendment.47

The Sultanate of Oman and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Sultanate's initiatives and contacts with the State of Israel also fell outside

the parameters of the GCC. Indeed in this in this area as well, Oman demonstrated a

distinct approach to the issue. Let us first recall that another source of threats to the

security of the Persian Gulf and by implication to the Sultanate resides with the Arab-

Israeli conflict. The Persian Gulf region is not immune to the effects of such conflicts.

Revolutionary forces in Iran used the Shah's support of Israel as evidence to his

subversion to US interests. While Gulf monarchies did not support Israel, they still felt

the fangs of Pan-Arabism and nationalist movements, and more recently Islamic

fundamentalism accusing them of their subservience to US and by extension to Israeli

policies. The strategic relationship between the Persian Gulf and the Arab-Israeli conflict

was demonstrated through the Arab oil embargo in the 1970's and the landing of Iraqi

scuds in Israel during the Gulf War. In fact, from the early days of the Gulf War Saddam

tied the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from the Gulf to the withdrawal of Israel. Israel on its

part has included Saudi Arabia "in the second of three concentric circles of countries to

47 Saudi Arabia: GCC Chief on EU Meeting, GCC Mechanisms: FBIS-NES-98-114, Friday, 24

April 1998.

230
which it must extend its strategic position" (Al-Alkim 1989: 175). Between 1977-1978,

for instance, Israeli' pilots would frequently fly over Tabuk area, and drop empty fuel

tanks on the runway to demonstrate their capabilities (Quandt 1981: 61). In 1988, when

Riyadh acquired silkworm missiles, Israel threatened to launch a preemptive strike

against the Kingdom. The threat to carry out such an attack, prompted the Kingdom to

declare that the "missiles do not carry nuclear warheads and they will not be used against

Israel." (Al-Alkim 1992). This was followed with another declaration in April 1988 (with

the advice of the U.S.) to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Al-Alkim 1992).

Essentially, Israel represents a credible threat not only to Iraq and Iran, as demonstrated

by the past Israeli attacks of Iraq's nuclear site, and its repeated threats to attack Iran, but

also to Arab monarchies. It seems highly unlikely that a war may ensue between a GCC

state and Israel, but as demonstrated above, it is not completely improbable either since

Israel has made previous threats to attack Saudi Arabia. Much more threatening for the

Gulf monarchies however, has been the failure of various peace initiatives between Israel

and the Arabs. In essence, the spill over effect to their own increasingly politicized

populations disenchanted with the future of Palestinians has manifested itself in various

forms of protest against their own governments' perceived incompetence. Secretary of

State James Baker recognized the linkage between a stable Gulf, and the resolution of the

Arab-Israeli conflict in a 1990 testimony given to the House, in which he argued that

"most telling argument" was that he [Saddam] was "the Champion of the Palestinians

who have no place to go and who are sorely put upon." As such, he argued, it was

important for Washington to find a solution to the Palestinian problem "because when we

do, the ground will not be so fertile as today" (New York Times 1998). The Clinton

231
administration however pursued the de-linking of the peace process from the Persian

Gulf. When Secretary Albright testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

on 10 February 1998, she specified that "Iraq and the peace process are two separate

issues, clearly very difficult ones." When Senator Chuck Hagel wondered "But surely

you believe that they're linked?" Albright responded "I would prefer not to make that

linkage" (New York Times 1998). Ironically, it was around that time when the linkage

between the Persian Gulf and the Arab Israeli conflict became vividly clear to the Clinton

administration. It was clearly demonstrated in a nearly unanimous Arab boycott of the

Middle East North Africa (MENA) economic conference held in Doha on 16-18

November 1997 when America's key Arab allies such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco

and others refused to attend despite US pressure. Albright who was in attendance for no

longer than four hours provoked several Arab complaints when she called on Israelis and

Palestinians to be "prepared to make decisions soon that will enable us to move forward

and reach agreements." Arab delegates protested this comment, which put an equal blame

on both parties of the conflict. Even Qatar's Foreign Minister, who represented the host

country stated:

I think it is wrong to lay equal blame on the Arabs and Israelis, because the blame
should be laid on Netanyahu's government...I believe that the Israeli
government's position is, as my lord his highness the emir said, the reason for the
stumbling of the peace process (Ramazani 1998: 51).

Saudi Arabia had to be particularly careful because it already had experienced two

bombing attacks on American-operated military compounds in November 1995 and June

1996. While it cannot be asserted that these attacks were a direct result of Saudi

cooperation with the United States in Desert Storm, one can make a case that an

232
unquestionable baking of Israel by the United States was creating a very tense situation

back in Riyadh. More pointedly, for the Monarchies of the Gulf, was the concurrence of

both American-led air strikes on Iraq, and the failure of the peace process. As Ramazani

notes

to be sure, Arab states were unanimously concerned about the plight of the Iraqi
people, but even that unhappiness was always places in the context of complaints
about American 'double standards' in their dealing with Iraq as contrasted with
Israel, no matter how untenable the comparison appeared in Washington...

But after the summit, no participating Arab state explained the linkage between
the failing peace process and the flopping economic summit more sagely that
Oman. Foreign Minister Yusuf Bin-Abdallah believed that the principle of 'land
for peace' had been established at the Madrid peace conference on the basis of
U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, and the economic track of the peace process went
hand in hand with the political track and enjoyed Arab support until Prime
Minister Netanyahu took power and 'rejected these arrangements.' He added that
'the distinguishing feature of the Doha conference is that it showed clearly that
peace cannot be founded on purely economic basis, for political stability
constitutes the primary condition for economic development,' and that required
progress in the peace process (Ramazani 1998: 51).

Muscat on its part, as discussed in the previous chapter, was a key supporter of a

comprehensive peace between the Arabs and the Israelis. Muscat supported the Egyptian

President Anwar Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, the US-brokered Camp

David accords of 1978, and the bilateral peace treaty between Egypt and Israel of March

1979 over the opposition from the majority of Arab States. 48 Since the early 1990's,

48 Duke observed that after the Arab states boycotted Egypt, Muscat consistently maintained
that:
sooner or latter, Egypt would have to be reintegrated into the Arab family of Nations. Oman
warned its fellow Arab and Islamic countries that a policy of rhetorically and politically denouncing
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's actions would wreck the Arab front. Worse, it argued that a policy of
ousting Egypt from the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference risked
dealing a body blow to pan-Arab and pan-Islamic sentiments and cooperation, entailing costs that, in
Oman's view, would be neither wise nor acceptable (Duke 1996: 10).

233
"Oman has been an active participant in all aspects of the multilateral peace-process

working groups created by the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991" (Bahgat 1999: 450).

The dramatic developments on the Arab-Israeli peace front after the Madrid Peace

Conference held in October 1991 have vindicated Oman's consistent policy towards the

issue, as PLP and Israel signed the Oslo accord in September 1993 and a peace treaty was

signed between Jordan and Israel on 26 October 1994. This was a time of great hope that

a final settlement between the Arabs and Israelis was finally on the horizon.

The period of 1993 and 1994 became the time when unofficial contacts between

both Tel Aviv and Muscat first took place at the UN Headquarters in New York. By

February 1994, the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, Yosi Beilin, met with a special

Omani envoy to further discuss contacts between the two countries. This was followed by

Muscat's willingness to host the April 1994 meeting of the Middle East multilateral

working group on water resources. Since Israel was a participant of that group, Oman

encouraged Tel-Aviv to send its representatives to Muscat. This marked the first-ever

official visit to an Arab Gulf State by Israeli delegates (Kechichian 1995: 253). Before

long, Oman, like other GCC states, removed its economic sanctions on foreign

companies dealing with Israel. In December 1994 Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin visited

Oman. Although the late Israeli Prime Minister's trip did not last for more than twenty-

four hours, "its occurrence showed Oman's intentions to follow its own path concerning

relations with Israel" (Allen and Rigsbee 2000: 207). Muscat's Ambassador to the Arab

League was sent to brief the Arab League on the outcome of the Rabin's visit. The Arab

sources stated that Rabin's visit to Oman was part of the efforts to advance peace process

on the "basis of Security Council Resolutions concerning the establishment of a

234
comprehensive, just, and durable peace."4 9 By 30 September 1995, Oman became the

first Gulf Arab state to have officially established trade relations with Israel. 0

After Rabin's assassination in November 1995, Oman sent a high-ranking

Minister to attend Rabin's funeral (Pasha 1999: 116). This was followed by Muscat's

invitation to the new Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres to visit Muscat on 1 April

1996. Prime Minister Shimon Peres came to Muscat with a large delegation of economic

and political advisors further indicating the potential for improved relations between the

two countries in various fields. In a joint statement, both Muscat and Tel Aviv stated that

their meeting "reflects the development of bilateral ties and is part of the support of the

Middle East peace process." 5 ' Peres added: "As for my visit here, again it is a

demonstration of how both Arabs and Israelis can build a new Middle East without wars,

without hatred, with economic cooperation."5 2 The visit resulted in an agreement between

both countries to have trade representatives on behalf of both counties. An Omani official

noted that the "decision of the two countries will contribute to better contacts between

49 Omani Envoy briefs League Chief on Rabin's Visit: FBIS-NES-95-001, 1 Jan 1995.
It should be noted that not long after Rabin's visit, there were reports circulating that both Oman
and Kuwait were already involved in Naval exercises with Israel. Both Oman and Kuwait denied that they
"would take part in a joint Israeli Arab exercises as reported in Tel Aviv." The Omani defense Minister
stated that "This report is without any foundation and has no bearing with reality" (Kuwait, Oman Deny
Naval Exercises With Israel: FBIS-NES-95-034, 20 Feb 1995).
50
By April 1995, reports were circulating that Oman had agreed to open an Israeli Liaison
Office
in Oman, which the Sultanate denied at the time (Request to Open Israeli Liaison Office Rejected: FBIS-
NES-95-082, 25 April 1995).

51 Oman: Peres Gets 'Red Carpet' Treatment During Visit: FBIS-NES-96-064, 1 April 1996.

52 Oman: Peres Gets 'Red Carpet' Treatment During Visit: FBIS-NES-96-064,

1 April 1996.

235
private companies in Oman and Israel and encourage cooperation in the areas of

investment and trade." 5 While back in Israel, the Foreign Ministry stated that "this

announcement is important for Israel because it is the first time that a Gulf country has

official relations with us." 54

Significantly, although Muscat's relations with Israel inevitably became an object

of discussions and debate in the Arab media, they were not condemned by the GCC:

(Al-Husayni) Some Arabs blame you and say that you were hasty in establishing
links with Israel, thus jeopardizing their maneuvers. Is it true that the Palestinians
were the ones who asked you to initiate contacts with Israel? (Bin-'Alawi) That is
what they called "rushing into something." Had we rushed, we would have spared
ourselves all the problems. The truth is that the only one who rushes is someone
who wants to be ahead of others, while the one who moves ahead fast is first to
arrive. International competition is for those who have the strength and the
willpower to go fast ahead of everyone else. Regrettably, we thought that it was
bad to rush. It has now become clear to some that that would have been
beneficial. At any rate, we work within the context of the general Arab approach
and we prefer to remain in the middle. What is important is that as a result of our
haste we gained unlimited international support. Imagine what the state of the
Palestinians would be like now if there had been no rush as they negotiated with
Israel. Omani, Qatari, Tunisian, Moroccan, Mauritanian, Jordanian, and Egyptian
contacts have given the Palestinians unlimited backing. That French President
Jacques Chirac went to Jerusalem. What we are saying is that war is not always
fought with the sword, that it can be fought with wisdom and vision.55

Omani Official Says Agreement with Israel to Boost Trade: FBIS-NES-96-020, 28 January
1996.

54 Omani Official Says Agreement with Israel to Boost Trade: FBIS-NES-966-020, 28 January,
1996.

In the following interview, the GCC's Secretary General comments on Oman's initiatives with
Israel in the context of the GCC:
(Abu-Husayn) What is your assessment of the Middle East peace process and the relations
between some GCC members and Israel, particularly the question of normalization? (Al-Hujaylan) First of
all, there is nothing in the GCC basic law that restricts the GCC member states in the free exercise of their
foreign policies provided that this does not prejudice the general interests of the GCC. That is why when
the Sultanate of Oman and Qatar took advanced political initiatives, they were exercising their sovereign

236
 At the time, it seemed that Oman's initiative toward Israel, noticeably followed by

Qatar, could have been the beginning of a diplomatic breakthrough between the GCC as a

block on one hand, and Israel on the other. Speaking of the organization's "constant

principles" vis-a-vis the peace process, the GCC Secretary General outlined the

following:

These constants will include the GCC's position vis-a-vis the question of peace in
the Middle East. For these countries have affirmed their conviction that peace is a
strategic option to which there can be no alternative. They will recall in this
regard their participation in the Madrid conference and the multilateral talks and
their support for the Oslo Accord and the other accords that followed it. They will
also recall the fact that two GCC member countries, namely the Sultanate of
Oman and the State of Qatar, have embarked on advanced diplomatic initiatives
toward Israel. This GCC position is closely dependent on the Israeli
Government's respect for the principles on which the peace process was founded,
namely land for peace, and the implementation of UN resolutions headed by
Resolutions 242, 338, and 425. If Israel were to abandon these commitments and
violate the accords it concluded or accepted, it would undermine the foundation of
the agreed peace...These constant principles also include the fact that peace
cannot be imposed by force and that the slogan of land for peace cannot be
replaced by the slogan for security for peace, as Binyamin Netanyahu demands.
They also include the principle that the only way to prevent the continuation of
bloody acts of violence and the squandering of innocent lives is to halt all acts of
confiscation of Palestinian lands, the persistent building of numerous settlements,
and the demolition of Palestinian homes, and also the repeated closures of the
West Bank leading to suffocation, humiliation of the people, and their subjection

rights and foreign policies (which is not a violation of the GCC basic law). A peace process was in progress
and the two states wished to increase contacts with Israel in support of the peace process, particularly after
the Oslo agreement and the Madrid conference, as far as the Palestinians were concerned, and the Israeli-
Jordanian agreement, and considering that peace has prevailed between Israel and Egypt since 1979. Other
states such as Mauritania, Tunisia, Morocco-all took advanced initiatives with Israel. When Israel began
to back down following Netanyahu's assumption of power (as his policies violated all the agreements
signed)... During the Damascus Declaration states' meetings in Cairo we heard from the foreign ministers
of Oman and Qatar that relations had stopped there and would not develop, and even that the two states had
informed Israel that unless it changed its policy on the peace process, each state would restrict its relations
with it. That also applies to the general Arab position (Qatar: GCC Head on Border Disputes, Other Issues:
FBIS-NES-97-002 Wednesday, 1 January 1997).

237
 to arbitrary and oppressive measures-all these are acts which arouse feelings of
anger and frustration and consequently lead to further acts of violence. The
constant principles also include the principle that the United States is almost the
only country capable of making Israel comprehend these facts by means of
persuasion and pressure. 56

Muscat's hopes of a comprehensive peace between the Arabs and the Israelis

came to a halt when Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu came to power in June 1996.

As far as Muscat was concerned, the new "Israeli Government has not honored the

agreements signed by the State of Israel. The Arabs cannot accept that fait accompli and

that peace. Even if the Arabs did, the Palestinians would not." 57 Muscat specifically cited

the continuation of the building of Israeli settlements on the West Bank. Although some

media outlets were reporting that Muscat welcomed Israeli participation in two

commercial exhibits that were held in Muscat during the months of March and April

1997, the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz reported in April 1997 that the authorities in Muscat

have asked Israeli firms not to come to the exhibits.58 Ha'aretz continued to claim that

Muscat had refused an Israeli diplomat entry into Oman where an Israeli trade office had

been operating since 1996 in a step toward normalization. Muscat also withdrew its trade

representative from Israel. 59 Qatar also suspended its contacts with Israel. Essentially, for

56 GCC Official on Albright Talks, Iran Ties: FBIS-WEU-97-259, Tuesday, September 1997.

57 OMAN: Minister on Regional Problems, Hopes: FBIS-NES-96-237, Thursday, 5 December

1996.
58 Israel, Oman: Israel Participates in Tow Commercial Exhibits in Oman: FBIS-NES-97-034,
13
February 1997.

59 Israeli Companies Banned From Oman's Trade Fair: FBIS-NES-97-097, 7 April 1997.

238
both Muscat and Doha, the normalization was aborted by what they perceived to be

Israel's inflexibility at the peace negotiations. Although normalization with Israel came to

an end, Muscat was always careful to state its "willingness to restore communications

with Israel and to exert any effort needed to move forward the peace process in the

Middle East." 60 Along the same lines, Qatar's Foreign Minister, Hamad Al-Thani, stated

after a meeting with his Israeli counterpart, David Levi, "that in the absence of any

progress in the peace process, namely on the Palestinian track, we won't change our

position." 61 By 1998, as indicated in the following excerpt, the chances of normalization

of ties between Oman and Israel were essentially over:

(Diyab) Do you have any contacts of any kind whatever with Israel? (Ben 'Alawi)
None at all. Basically there is no room for talk of such a thing. There is an Israeli
office in Muscat but it does not function and there is nobody in it. Israel
participates in a local research center (with headquarters in Muscat) like many
other countries. For its part, Israel too tries to keep contacts with us to a
minimum. This kind of thing also takes time. This thread which has been
established has its objective. Once the objective ends, there will be no need for the
thread. (Diyab) Does this mean that you will close down the Israeli office? (Ben
'Alawi) That is, of course, on the cards. We had given Israel the chance to serve
peace. Then came the new Israeli government (the Binyamin Netanyahu

Another report on the banning of Israeli participation stated specifically why the Sultanate froze its
relations with Israel recording that "the freezing of trade relations between the Sultanate of Oman and
Israel in light of the latter's decision to build settlement in occupied Jerusalem." (Oman Rejects Israeli
Participation in Computer Fair: FBIS-NES-97-097, 7 April 1997.
60 Israel, Oman: Israel Participates in Two Commercial Exhibits in Oman: FBIS-NES-97-034,
13
February 1997.
61 Qatari Foreign Minister Views Normalization with Israel: FBIS-NES-96-220, 12 November
1996.

239
 government) and matters developed in the way they did. Naturally, every chance
eventually runs out."

Indeed, the "Omani Secretary General for Foreign Affairs, Sayyid Haitham bin

Tariq al-Said, expressed great relief and optimism when Ehud Barak was elected as

Prime Minister in May 1999" (Bahgat 1999: 450).

(Maydani) Contacts between Oman and Israel were suspended some time ago.
Are there any contacts between you at present? (Bin-'Alawi) Our contacts are still
frozen. (Maydani) Is there any specific thing you are awaiting to resume these
contacts? (Bin-'Alawi) This issue is linked to the movement in the peace process.
The negotiations on the Palestinian and Syrian tracks are facing obstacles. We are
expecting moves by the Israeli party. Syria is not responsible for the suspension of
the negotiations because Israel suspended them. Syria is prepared to resume the
negotiations tomorrow but from where they left off. Every party has the right to
propose what he wants. Of course, Baraq is not the same as Rabin or Peres. But
the stands of people are tied to what they say. Speech is the basis in human
relations. It is not right for some to say that what was agreed on with others is
gone with them. Relations among people do not proceed in this way, otherwise
we would have to go back to square one in every stage of any negotiations.63

Essentially, Muscat took the initiative among the GCC states in its initiatives

toward Israel. As Kechichian argued:

Qaboos recognized that no Arab leader could champion the Palestinian cause
better that Yasser Arafat. He further reasoned that all ought to consider individual
long-term interests, as the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization did
in later 1993...After all, Qaboos welcomed Arafat in Muscat after the Oslo Talks
-when the entire Arab world shunned the Palestinian-and was not about to
allow anyone to dictate what policies the Sultanate ought to pursue (Kechichian
1995: 253).

Yet it is not clear to whom Kechichian is referring to when he states that Muscat

"was not about to allow anyone to dictate what policies the Sultanate ought to pursue".

62 Oman: Minister Views Regional Issues, Iraq: FBIS-NES-98-047, 14 Feb

1998.

63 Omani Foreign Minister on Gulf Security: FBIS-NES-1999-1129, 22 November

1999.

240
Certainly it was not the West, Arab States, or members of the GCC organization, all of

whom were represented in the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991. The only country that

was not supportive of Muscat's initiative toward Israel was Iran. However, we should

recall that Iran has limited its actions to no more than a mere critique in public

pronouncements. Muscat, on the other hand, made an effort to assuage Iranian concerns

over Muscat's rapprochement with Israel by sending its Foreign Minister to Tehran in

1996. The visit was seen as a "key to relieving the strain in Iranian-Omani relations, in

the wake of former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres' visit to both Doha and Muscat

and Iranian attacks on both visits." 64

Muscat, Washington and the Persian Gulf

The linkage between events in the Persian Gulf and the Arab Israeli conflict

became were even more pronounced in 1998 when President Clinton unleashed

Operation "Desert Fox," targeting Iraq for its expulsion of the United Nations Special

Commission which had been designated to verify the destruction of Iraq's weapons of

mass destruction.

... with each day the US-led air strikes, popular protest in the Arab world rose
sharply. Besides demonstrations in Cairo, Rabat (100,000-strong), Tripoli,
Amman, Beirut and Damascus, there was one in Muscat, the first such event in
the history of Oman. This, and the condemnation of the American military action
as "unjust aggression" by Jordan's parliament, followed by a similar resolution on
December 27 by the 16-member Arab Parliamentarian Union-providing the first

64 Oman: Official Will Relay GCC Viewpoint To Tehran: FBIS-NES-96-217,

Thursday, 7
November 1996.

241
 non-governmental, pan-Arabic forum on Iraq since the Gulf War-buoyed
Baghdad (Hiro 2001: 120).

Saudi Arabia was quick to stress that it would not allow the use of its territory and

military bases to deliver a military strike against Iraq. In a statement published by Al-

Sharq al-Awsat, Prince Sultan said "the Saudi Government has not received an official

request from the United States to provide military facilities to strike Iraq." He also

emphasized that the "the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia supports a peaceful solution if this

solution can be reached to end the crisis; however, the Kingdom supports all Security

Council resolutions and the need for Iraq to implement them." Another report claimed

that all the officials with whom U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen met during a tour

of the region's capitals called for intensifying political and diplomatic efforts to force the

Iraqi Government to retract from its decision to suspend cooperation with the UNSCOM

inspectors, and for refraining from using armed force, particularly if the objective behind

it is only muscle flexing. The report noted that "although the UAE condemns the recent

Iraqi escalation toward the international inspection teams, it is nevertheless opposed to

military action against Iraq." 65 UAE reasoned that a military strike against Iraq will not

help the UN inspectors in their task, "because any strike, regardless of its size, will have a

limited impact with regard to forcing Iraq to cooperate, and will cause further suffering

for the Iraqi people who are paying the price of the international blockade." In addition,

the UAE declared that the timing of the Iraqi escalation

65 Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia Not to Allow US to Use Territory

for Attack: FBIS-NES-98-319,
15 Nov 1998.

242
 was not right since it came at a time when some influential international forces
were busy trying to persuade the United Nations to carry out a comprehensive
review and assessment of the UN inspectors' task. This has clearly been an
embarrassment to these forces in front of those who believe that the Iraqi
leadership cannot be trusted. 66

The sources said that, unlike in the past, the latest Iraqi escalation does not have a

political cover, since it is a violation of the agreement that Baghdad signed with the UN

Secretary General with regard to the Inspection Committees' work. This placed an

additional burden on those who were trying to help Iraq end the blockade. In Muscat, an

Omani diplomatic source elaborated on his country's position on the crisis between Iraq

and the United Nations. "Baghdad has to implement all the resolutions concerning Iraq's

invasion of Kuwait, including allowing UNSCOM to do its work without any hurdles

being placed in its way." The diplomat added that Baghdad "is gradually losing the

friends who were supporting it," in a reference to the Security Council's recent

unanimous condemnation, which was supported by Russia, France, and China, which had

shown some sympathy toward Iraq in the past. On what Oman's position will be, should

a resolution be issued to put an end to the oil-for-food program, an Omani diplomat

commented: "First, we hope that matters will not reach that point, particularly in view of

the fact that the program is a humanitarian decision aimed primarily at easing the

suffering of the brotherly Iraqi people." 67

66 Saudi Arabia: Saudi Arabia Not to Allow US to Use Territory

for Attack: FBIS-NES-98-319,
15 Nov 1998.
67 Iraq: Gulf States Oppose Military Strike on Iraq: FBIS-NES-98-309,
5 Nov 1998.

243
 If Saddam had planned to use the combined outrage in the Arab world over the

bombing of Iraq and the suffering of the Palestinians to force the Arab States to condemn

the US-UK action and call for the lifting of UN sanctions, he miscalculated. This was

clearly demonstrated in the final statement issued by the 16th session of the Foreign

Ministers of the Damascus Declaration Member States (composed of GCC Member

States plus Egypt and Syria) in Doha on 12 November 1998, however, the Damascus

Declaration was intended by the GCC governments to demonstrate to their own citizens

that the Gulf war was not another example of their subversion to the "imperialists".

Voices of resentment and opposition were resonating throughout the Gulf and, as

Piscatori points out, the Islamic opposition in the Gulf was using the sanctions as an

evidence of the GCC states' conspiracy to destroy a Muslim neighbor. In the view of

tense domestic atmosphere, the document was carefully worded to condemn at length the

Israeli occupation from the outset, and as such ameliorate the effects of the lack of Arab

support to Iraq with a resounding support for the Palestinians. 68 It also called upon Iran to

68 As the following excerpt from the Declaration indicates:

In light of the Principles of the Damascus Declaration and the role played by the member states in
achieving Arab solidarity, serving the Arab nation's causes, and safeguarding the joint pan-Arab security;
in response to the requirements of the current critical and serious stage, particularly those related to the
Middle East peace process; and due to the regional and international developments, the foreign ministers
stressed their eagerness to adhere to and act upon the final statement issued by the Arab summit, which was
held in the Arab Republic of Egypt on 5 and 7 Safar 1418 Hegira, corresponding to 21 and 22 June 1996,
and the firm, principled positions adopted unanimously by the Arab leaders in order to bolster Arab
solidarity, to establish just and comprehensive peace, to serve the higher interests of the Arab nation, to
regain their usurped territories and rights, and to continue the active Arab move during the coming stage.
The foreign ministers reaffirmed their countries' stances that a just and comprehensive peace required the
return of all the occupied Arab territories in accordance with the relevant UN resolutions, especially
Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 425 calling for Israel's full withdrawal from the occupied
Syrian Golan to the lines of 4 June 1967, from southern Lebanon and Western al-Biqa', and from the
occupied Palestinian territories, including Arab Jerusalem; and guaranteeing that the Palestinian people
exercise their legitimate rights, including their right to return, to self-determination, and to the

244
end its alleged occupation of UAE islands,69 and finally stressed the importance of

combining the efforts member states to fight terrorism. Curiously enough, in a document

establishment of their independent state with Jerusalem as its capital. The ministers stressed their absolute
rejection and their condemnation of Israel's expansionist settlement policy in the occupied territories and
the Israeli Government's decision to expand the geographical boundaries of the holy city of Jerusalem and
alter its demographic composition as a flagrant violation of the provisions of international law, the Madrid
term of reference, and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly.
They also stressed their adherence to the resolutions of the international legitimacy, which calls for
rejecting any situation resulting from the Israeli settlement activity in the occupied Arab territories, urging
a halt to all Israeli settlement activities in the occupied Syrian Golan and the occupied Palestinian
territories, especially Jerusalem, and removing these settlements. The ministers expressed extreme concern
over the Israeli attempts to impose conditions on the implementation of Security Council Resolution No.
425 calling for Israel's withdrawal form southern Lebanon and its Western al-Biqa', voiced their rejection
of any interpretations that could introduce conditions to the implementation of this resolution, and stressed
the need for Israel to implement this resolution and withdraw from southern Lebanon and Western al-Biqa'
without any conditions. The ministers hailed the international consensus on the need to proceed with the
peace process on the basis of the resolutions of international legality and the land-for-peace principle. In
this regard, the ministers stressed their support for the Palestinian people and their leadership, urging Israel
to implement the provisions of the agreements reached between the Palestinians and Israelis, and abstain
from doing anything that may violate the pledges and obligations stipulated in them. The ministers noted
the efforts made by the US president, whose country is a sponsor of the peace process, and urged the
United States to continue its effort to get Israel to abide by the requirements of that process and to
implement its provisions. The ministers also stressed the need to resume negotiations on the Syrian track
from where they broke off and on the Lebanese track in order to secure Israel's full withdrawal from the
occupied Syrian Golan back to the 4 June 1967 line and from southern Lebanon and Western al-Biqa' and
to enable the Palestinian people to exercise their legitimate rights, including their right to self-determination
and the establishment of their independent state with holy Jerusalem as its capital. The ministers once again
urged the cosponsors of the peace process, particularly the United States, and also the EU, to play an
effective role in order to save the peace process and put it back on the right track, in accordance with the
Madrid term of reference and the resolutions of international legality. The ministers recalled what was
issued by the extraordinary summit held in Cairo and by the Arab League Council on the deadlock in the
peace process and Israel's disavowal of its commitments, which were agreed on within the framework of
the Madrid conference, as well as its refusal to resume negotiations on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks
where they left off. While recalling this, the ministers reasserted their position on Israel's intransigent
policy, including freezing economic conferences and multilateral meetings until tangible progress is
achieved on all tracks in the peace process. The ministers stressed the importance of freeing the Middle
East, including the Gulf region, from weapons of mass destruction, primarily nuclear weapons, and stressed
the need for Israel to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and accept the safeguards regime under the
supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Qatar: "Text" of Damascus Declaration
Statement: FBIS-NES-98-321, 17 Nov 1998).
69The ministers reviewed developments in Iran's occupation of the three Emirian islands,
Tunb
al-Kubra, Tunb al-Sughra, and Abu Musa, criticizing Iran's unacceptable allegations about the three islands
and its continued measures to entrench the occupation. They also reiterated the need for the Iranian
Government to respond to the serious calls made by the United Arab Emirates, the GCC, the Damascus

245
that was no less than ten pages long, and was intended to reflect the current crisis of Iraq,

Baghdad received a single paragraph warning Iraq of the 'consequences' of its actions:

The ministers discussed the current crisis between Iraq and the United Nations out
of their concern about the safety of the Iraqi people and their interests. They asked
Iraq to reverse its decision to halt cooperation with the UN Special Commission
and resume its full cooperation in accordance with the relevant Security Council
resolutions and the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Iraqi
Government and the UN secretary general in February 1998. The ministers said
that the Iraqi Government is to blame for any consequences of its refusal to
reverse its decision-consequences, which may expose innocents among the
fraternal Iraqi people to further disasters and tragedies. They expressed their hope
that the logic of reason and wisdom would prevail so that the United Nations can
reach a diplomatic solution to this crisis.70

Iraq continued to claim that it had fully cooperated with the U.N. inspectors over

its alleged weapons of mass destruction, and therefore the time has come to end the

crippling sanctions imposed on the country. The U.N. Security Council continued to

insist that U.N. inspectors must be allowed back into Iraq. For a brief period, there was a

glimpse of hope for Iraq with a new resolution passed on 17 December 1999. Under the

Resolution, sanctions could be suspended if Iraq were to cooperate with the inspectors

Declaration member states, and regional and international organization and groupings for finding a
peaceful solution to the crisis so that the positive trends of the government of President Mohammad
Khatami can gain the credibility required to build confidence, promote cooperation, and preserve security
and stability in the region. In this regard, the ministers stressed Emirian sovereignty over its three islands,
Tunb al-Kubra, Tunb al-Sughra, and Abu Musa, and voiced their absolute support for all the peaceful
measures and methods adopted by the United Arab Emirates to restore its sovereignty over its islands,
urging the Iranian Government to end its occupation of the three islands, refrain from trying to impose the
fait accompli policy by force, stop the setting up of Iranian installations on these island with the aim of
altering their demographic composition, cancel all measures, remove all the installations that have been
established unilaterally, and pursue peaceful means to resolve the dispute in accordance with the principles
of international law, including an agreement to refer the case to the International Court of Justice (Qatar:
"Text" of Damascus Declaration Statement: FBIS-NES-98-321, 17 Nov 1998).

70 Qatar: "Text" of Damascus Declaration Statement: FBIS-NES-98-321,

17 Nov 1998.

246
over a period of nine months. Baghdad however rejected the resolution and refused to

cooperate with the newly created United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and

Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) headed by Hans Blix. The saga of Iraq's crisis

continued to vacillate between Iraq's rejection of further inspections citing its

cooperation, and further U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding full and

unconditional access to what Iraq considered 'sensitive' cites.

The Sultanate of Oman and September 11

The saga however was put to an end by circumstances that neither Iraq, nor the

U.S., or the international community had anticipated: The terrorist attacks of 11

September on the United States. Once again, the Persian Gulf became the center of an

international crisis at the turn of a new decade (Iranian revolution in 1979, and Iraq's

invasion of Kuwait in 1990).

The United States' response to terrorist attacks was outlined in the President's

State of the Union address on 29 January 2002, which conveyed the essence of the U.S.

new defense strategy in two succinct sentences: "We must prevent the terrorists and

regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the United

States and the world...I will not wait on events, while dangers gather." The speech

famously singled out Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as constituting an "axis of evil." In

another speech, delivered on 1 June 2002, at his West Point Commencement speech,

President George W. Bush elaborated on the strategic shift since Cold War: "For much of

the last century, America's defense relied on the Cold War doctrines of deterrence and

containment. In some cases, these strategies still apply...if we wait for threats to fully

247
materialize, we will have waited too long...We must take the battle to the enemy...and

confront the worst threats before they emerge." In a more explicit language, Deputy

Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz argued at the International Institute for Strategic

Studies on 2 December 2002

The notion that we can wait to prepare assumes that we know when the threat is
imminent... When were the attacks of September 11 imminent? Certainly they
were imminent on September 10, although we didn't know it...Anyone who
believes that we can wait until we have certain knowledge that attacks are
imminent has failed to connect that dots that led to September 11 (Heisbourg
2003: 76).

In Muscat, the authorities voiced their concern of yet another possible war against

Iraq. Although the Sultanate has issued formal statements condemning the terrorist attack

of 11 September and made its facilities available for U.S. military campaign against the

Taliban in Afghanistan, another war on Iraq, in the words of Alawi during a GCC

Ministerial Council meeting,

will cause deep anti-American feeling and will provoke revenge and violence in
Arab and Islamic countries...The world cannot accept a weakened role for the
United Nations [in reference to President Bush's address to the United Nations on
12 September 2002 when he denounced the Iraqi leadership as posing a "grave
and gathering danger," called for the United Nations to act, and stated that "The
Security Council resolutions will be enforced...or action will be unavoidable"].
[Those who are] thinking they can impose law for their own benefit, they are
pushing the world into instability and chaos (Stratfor.com 2003).

He further deplored the way the international community, in contrast to Iraq, is

"silent...about what Israel is doing to the Palestinians and the blindness of the US will

not help bring peace and stability to the region"(Stratfor.com 2002).

In order to avert a possible U.S. attack on Iraq, Baghdad pledged publicly for the

first time, in an Arab summit meeting in Beirut on 27 March 2002, that it would not

interfere in Kuwait's internal affairs, and most importantly recognized Kuwait's borders.

248
Iraqi Foreign Minister Nagi Sabri stated, "We are for the prosperity and independence of

the state of Kuwait and also for the normalization of ties, diplomatic, economic,

political." More importantly, on 16 September 2002 Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabbri

sent a letter to U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan indicating that Iraq will accept the

return of U.N. weapons inspectors "without conditions." The following day, Iraqi Deputy

Prime Minister Tariq Aziz announced that "all the reasons for an attack have been

eliminated". However, the response from the White House was clearly pessimistic. White

House spokesman Scott McClellan described the move as "a tactical step" to avoid strong

U.N. Security Council action, and "as such, it is a tactic that will fail." Following this,

George W. Bush warned the UN Security Council that it "must not be fooled" by an Iraqi

offer to allow UN weapons inspectors to return, as the Pentagon moved ahead with

contingency planning for possible war. In a speech in Nashville, the President reiterated

his position "for the sake of liberty and justice for all, the United Nations Security

Council must act, must act in a way to hold this regime to account, must not be fooled,

must be relevant to keep the peace," and added that the "The United States remains

strong in our conviction that we must not and will not allow the world's worst leaders to

hold the United States and our friends and allies (subject to) blackmail or threaten us with

the world's worst weapons" (Times of Oman 2002).

The Sultanate, on the other hand, welcomed the positive steps taken by Iraq to

cooperate with the UNMOVIC committee and the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), saying that this positive and developing cooperation between Iraq and the

committee will lead to settling the pending issues. It also reiterated its hope to avert any

military action against Iraq which will jeopardize security and stability in the Gulf region

249
in particular and the Middle East in general, announcing that it backs peaceful initiatives

in dealing with this issue (Times of Oman 2002).71 To that end, Muscat welcomed Iraq's

Foreign Minister to Oman on 2 October 2002, delivering a letter from Saddam Hussein.7 2

Although the contents of the letter are unknown, it is safe to assume that Saddam may

have been attempting to use Oman's close relations with the U.S. to deliver assurances

regarding the return of U.N. inspectors. This also demonstrates Muscat's established

position as a mediator among states of the region, and between the states of the region

and international powers.

Baghdad's initiatives to avert war came to naught. On 19 March 2003, war began

with US raid targeting a meeting of Saddam with his advisors. On 21 March 2003, British

and American land forces entered Iraq, taking control of areas bordering Kuwait. By 9

April 2003, Baghdad fell to US troops. Shortly after, on 1 May 2003, President Bush

declared an end to the Iraq War. A swift victory for the United States and Great Britain,

the type of victory for which the GCC had hoped. While there was not a single GCC state

who "openly" supported the overthrow of the government of Iraq, there was no question

that the states of the GCC assisted U.S. and coalition partners' military operations in Iraq

(Foley 2003: 26). In many ways, this was expected. Military operations between the

71 In an interview with a Lebanese newspaper, Alawi suggested the formation

of an Arab
delegation to visit the US with a plan for the peaceful settlement of the crisis. He also added that a war
could definitely be destructive, not just to Iraq but to the whole region, particularly when every chance was
there for it to last long (Times of Oman 2003).

72 Iraqi Foreign Minister Delivers Saddam's Letter

to Sultan of Oman: FBIS-NES-2002-1006,
October 6, 2002.

250
United States and members of the GCC increased throughout the late 1990's in the

context of enforcing the sanctions against Iraq. U.S. air patrols with Operation Southern

Watch prevented Baghdad from moving its military forces south of the thirty-third

parallel. Southern Watch operated on a regular basis out of both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait

with support flights dependent on the cooperation of the other GCC members. In

addition, naval patrols designed to stop illegal Iraqi oil exports were enforced with

cooperation from all GCC members. In the wake of 11 September 2001, Washington was

able to rapidly gather its military forces for a campaign against the Taliban regime and al-

Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan. This rapid mobilization was in large part due to the

already well established U.S. presence in and cooperation with the Gulf monarchies

(Henderson 2003: 15). Even Saudi Arabia, the most publicly reluctant GCC member,

quietly allowed U.S. and British Special Forces to operate from its northern border areas

into Iraq (while denying the use of Saudi bases for air strikes) (Henderson 2003: 69).

In Muscat the rhetoric stayed within the Arab consensus in the "months leading

up the war, but official criticism of the United States all but disappeared when the war

started. As it did with previous Western military actions in the Persian Gulf region, Oman

permitted U.S. and U.K. forces to use air bases with the Sultanate" (Foley 2003: 30). We

should also recall that Muscat's public statements and actions, as in the extensively cited

paragraphs throughout this chapter, made it clear that U.S. presence in the region is a

force of stability-the rhetoric against the Iraq war notwithstanding.

In essence, both Muscat and the GCC at large were resigned to U.S. actions in

Iraq. Previously, both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had refused to work with Baghdad as

long as Saddam Hussein was in power. Initially Muscat, the United Arab Emirates and

251
Qatar had displayed sympathy and willingness to work with the regime in Baghdad. Once

Washington was resolved to attack Baghdad, their interests resided with Washington

especially after the destruction of the old Iraqi guard. Members of the GCC reasoned that

a stable, democratic, unified, and wealthy Iraq could be a force of stability in the region,

and perhaps more importantly, a long term counterweight to Iran. This is especially true

given that the alternative, the failure to create a stable and unified Iraq, could lead to a

degree of instability in the Arab Gulf States themselves. A successful and emboldened

insurgency in Iraq with an increasingly militant Islamized ideology is undoubtedly bound

to carry its activities throughout the Gulf States particularly to Saudi Arabia. The May 13,

2003 attack in Riyadh that killed at least 29 and injured 184, including 10 Americans is a

clear example.

The dangerous implications of low intensity warfare in a region with the immense

strategic importance as the Persian Gulf cannot be overemphasized. It is where vital

issues such as access to oil reserves, the Arab-Israeli conflict, regional stability, and

radicalism all intertwine. The downfall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, while

certainly improving the security situation for Kuwait and for the region, does not change

facts of geography and history that limit the choices of even the most moderate future

Iraqi leaders. Territorial ambitions in Iraq toward Kuwait for example, predate Saddam

Hussein. Even before the 1958 revolution, Iraqi leadership has attempted to persuade the

British to include Kuwait in a confederation with Jordan and Iraq. After Kuwait's

independence in 1961, Iraqi leaders repeatedly claimed Kuwait as part of Iraq. The bitter

252
war between Iran and Iraq is bound to poison the relationship between the two states at

least in the short term. 3 Turkey has conducted its own "war" against Kurdish Workers

Party (PKK), inside Iraqi territory, and may attempt to divide the Iraqi Kurds to keep

them weak in order to project more influence in Iraqi Kurdistan (Alterman 2003: 154).

The issue of weapons of mass destruction, one of the primary reasons behind the invasion

of Iraq, will not necessarily disappear because of the change of leadership. States in the

region such as Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, Israel, and Iran all possess various types of WMD

and missiles. A future Iraqi leadership seeking its own WMD as a deterrent is probable, if

not necessarily desirable (Byman 2001: 153). In essence, "neither Iraq's transformation-

assuming that it can be achieved and sustained in the face of numerous obstacles-not

even democratic transformation of the greater Middle East is a panacea for all the

security threats and challenges that beset the Gulf region" (McMillan and Winner 2003:

161).

Specifically, the change of regime in Iraq will not end the rise of extremism in the

region, the proliferation of destabilizing military capabilities, drug trafficking, territorial

disputes, environmental disasters, and internal political challenges to stability. Moreover,

neutralizing the Iraqi threat, coupled with heightened local opposition within the Gulf to

As Byman asserts, the dispute

over Shatt al Arab waterway is particularly troublesome and likely to recur. The 1937 agreement
over the Shatt al Arab, on the Iranian border, had little support in Iraq. Iraqi rulers before Saddam have
claimed sovereignty over disputed parts of the Shatt and have even made claims to the Iranian province of
Khuzistan. Moreover, the long and bitter war with Iran has etched itself on the Iraqi consciousness. Even
more that Iraq's claim to Kuwait, troubled successor regimes may try to seize on the rivalry with Iran to
resuscitate their popularity in the event of economic difficulties or domestic unrest (Byman 2001: 154).

253
the U.S. military presence, will exert mounting pressure on the United States to reduce its

regional deployments and as such shift much of the burden of dealing with these

problems to the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council as well as Iraq.

Moreover, "as long as Washington's relationship with Iran, the largest and most powerful

Gulf state, remains hostile, there will be a need for an American military presence in the

area. A friendly regime in Baghdad might mitigate that need, but will not eliminate it"

(Gause 2003: 23 ). In short, the "U.S. victory in Iraq-its historical significance

notwithstanding-has not resolved many of the difficult security challenges that marked

the prewar security environment in the Gulf' (McMillan and Winner 2003: 162).

Iran remains a major strategic challenge to both the United States and to the

smaller Gulf States, regardless of the Iraq war. Bahrain, with its Shia majority, and the

United Arab Emirates, with its territorial dispute with Iran over three Gulf islands (Abu

Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb), both see Tehran as a greater threat than Baghdad

(Gause 2003: 23-24 ). However, one should not ignore the remarkable improvements of

relations between GCC member states and Iran since Khatami's presidency. As an

example, Saudi-Iranian trade reached $1.4 billion in 2001; Iran made agreements with

Kuwait in the spring of 2003 to supply this Gulf state with gas and water. In December

2002, the Kuwaiti Defense Minister had even emphasized the importance of military

cooperation with Iran and praised Iran's role in the region (Foley 2003: 27). Differences

with UAE notwithstanding, in 2002, Iran reserved the highest share of Dubai's external

trade. In fact, trade exchange between Iran and Dubai exceeded those of the eleven other

254
Middle East and African states, which have commercial ties with Dubai.' 4 The late UAE

president, Shaikh Zaid noted in December 2002 the "satisfactory development of

relations with Iran" in his annual National Day address. Moreover, President Khatami

was invited to visit the UAE in May 2003 (Foley 2003: 27). Muscat's relations with

Tehran continued to improve prompting both states to set various committees designed to

enhance political, commercial, and cultural exchanges. 5 President Khatami commented

that Omani-Iranian relations are excellent, and "should serve as an example to be

followed by other countries" (Times of Oman 2002).

These improvements of relations notwithstanding, relations between member

states of the GCC and Iran in general, and Iran and Oman in particular, could not be

adequately assessed without taking into consideration the attendant consequences of

Washington's increased hostility toward Tehran. Rather than welcoming the moves

toward detente and potential rapprochement between the GCC countries and Iran,

Washington remained mired in its own myopic vision of Iran's position and role in the

region. Ironically, Washington stands only to benefit from the GCC countries' efforts to

engage Tehran in expanding their joint cooperation on matters of mutual interest and

concern (Duke 2003: 423). This is especially true of Oman, which has to share the Strait

74 Differences with UAE notwithstanding, in 2002, Iran reserved the highest share of Dubai's
external trade. In fact, trade exchange between Iran and Dubai exceeded those of the other eleven Middle
East and African states, which have commercial ties with Dubai.

Oman's Minister of Petroleum said that both countries, "will cooperate in exploitation of the
shared, off-shore Hengam oil filed" (Iran, Oman to Cooperate in Exploitation of Hengam Oil Field: FBIS-
NES-2002-0422, 22 April 22 2002).

255
of Hormuz with Iran. However, President Bush's reference to Iran as another member of

the "axis of evil," along with Iraq and North Korea stated that terrorism was a major

concern:

Iran aggressively pursues these weapons [of mass destruction particularly nuclear
weapons] and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's
hope for freedom...They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the
means to match their hatred...The United States of America will not permit the
world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive
weapons (Sick 2003: 90).76

Although not specifically cited above, but repeatedly cited by various U.S.

officials, is Iran's opposition to the peace process between the Arabs and the Israelis, and

the repeated warning for Iran not to "meddle" either in Iraq or in Afghanistan. The

importance of Iran's choice of policies cannot be overestimated since it may carry a

direct impact on U.S. efforts to bring stability to Iraq and Afghanistan, maintain the

security of the Persian Gulf, and restart the Middle East peace process.

Muscat is naturally aware of all U.S. concerns regarding Iran, which are

essentially the same concerns of the previous administration with the exception that the

current Bush's administration willingness to use force against Tehran and US presence in

both Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite this and Muscat's close relations with Washington,

cooperation between Muscat and Tehran that was described by both sides as 'strategic'

76 It should be noted that U.S. accusations over Iran's nuclear programs extend to the early 1990's.
Under President Clinton, Moscow which was the only capital to cooperate in the nuclear field with Iran
publicly, came under intense pressure to terminate its cooperation with Tehran. When the United States
raised its concerns about Iran's intentions, the Russians repeatedly told Washington, 'if you have real facts,
let us study them.' Such requests were only met with flat refusals, however, invoking the need not to
compromise U.S. intelligence sources. Such reactions led Moscow to conclude that Washington's primary
concerns, as well as intelligence sources, originated in Israel and that perhaps U.S. intelligence was
questionable (Orlov and Vinnikov 2005: 53).

256
continued to progress. In what could be considered a diplomatic victory for Iran, both in

terms of world public opinion and diplomatic support from regional states, Muscat

welcomed President Khatami to Oman in a first visit by an Iranian President to the

Sultanate since the Shah. During the meeting both sides declared their common stand on

a number of issues. The two-day visit of President Khatami beginning on 6 October 2004,

was marked by extensive coverage in the Omani media and resulted in various bilateral

agreements between the two states.77 In a joint statement both sides "expressed common

views on a broad range of regional and international issues, notable Iraq, the Middle East

conflict, and International terrorism." Both leaders stressed the importance of

safeguarding Iraq's territorial integrity and the need to give the UN central role in this

regard. They welcomed Security Council Resolution 1546 which declared the end of

occupation and the handover of sovereignty to the interim government. They also

expressed their strong condemnation of Israeli repression of the Palestinian people and

their "full support for Syria in claiming the return of the Golan Heights and the right of

Lebanon to restore the rest of its territories in Shebba as per Security Council resolutions"

(Times of Oman 2004). Both sides also "stressed the right of nations to develop their

nuclear capacities for peaceful purposes in accordance with the non-proliferation treaty of

the International Atomic Energy Agency. They strongly condemned Israel's refusal to

Khatami's visit was not limited to meetings with Sultan Qaboos. The President also met with
various Omani officials including the Grand Mufti of the Sultanate, his Eminence Shaikh Ahmed Alkhalili.
The Omani Observer reported that "Both sides stressed the need for Muslim nations to eschew divisions
and to foster unity, harmony and constructive exchange within the Islamic world" (Oman Daily Observer
2004).

257
submit its nuclear installations to inspections, noting that Israel's stand contradicts all

international accords." And lastly, both emphasized "importance of differentiating

between terrorism and legitimate resistance" (Oman Daily Observer 2004).

Muscat was the only capital among the GCC states that issued joint statements

supporting Iran's positions on key issues, especially Iran's nuclear program. This was no

easy task given the international pressure on Iran, and the sensitivity of supporting Iran

when the United States has declared Iran to be part of the "axis of evil". However,

Muscat's previous foreign policy initiatives indicates Muscat's independent and at times

surprising moves. The government's previously declared position that constructive

engagement with Tehran rather than confrontation was based then and presently on key

substantial positive signs coming from Iran. In almost every single issue declared by

Washington as a point of contention with Iran: support for terrorism, attempts to sabotage

the peace process; nuclear ambitions; Iran's influence in both Iraq and Afghanistan,

Muscat observed evidence of Iran's responsible behavior that could even yield beneficial

results if Tehran were sufficiently engaged.

There are many remarks and public statements coming not only from the so-called

reformers, but from what Nikolas Gvosdev called "pragmatic conservatives", indicating

Iran's willingness to work with the U.S. on various issues. Ahamad Takakkoli, a leading

pragmatic conservative elected to the new Majlis candidly remarked, "We do not regard

relations with America ideologically as being either absolutely necessary like prayer and

fasting or absolutely forbidden like wine" (Gvosdev 2004: 39) Another conservative,

Rumania acknowledged, "By intervening in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Americans have

become our neighbors. We have to be realistic. One day, ties will have to be

258
reestablished." Echoing Rumania's remarks, another key figure of the pragmatic right,

Mohammad Java Karajan, who serves as an adviser to Khomeini, also observed, "It is in

our interest and in the interest of America to defuse the tensions between us and to move

toward good relations" (Gvosdev 2004: 40). Clearly, if the survival of the regime requires

foreign investment and an improved relationship with the United Sates, Tehran's

pragmatic conservative are willing to make the necessary adjustments (Gvosdev 2004:

39). Naturally, public statements are not enough to garner trust towards Iran, and as such

one must look for clear actions that indicate Iran's willingness to assuage international

concerns. One of the clearest examples of Tehran's willingness to shed its ideological

rhetoric and act pragmatically could be found in Iran's approach toward Central Asia and

the Caucasus (Hunter 2003: 139).78

One may contend however, that the lack of ideological fervor in Iran's foreign

policy in Central Asia or the Caucuses cannot necessarily be transplanted into the Persian

Gulf or the Middle East writ large. Without a doubt, it would be more difficult for the

Iranian regime to stop supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon, for example, than a Tajik

Islamist movement. Nevertheless, one can detect clear signs from Tehran in its approach

to the Middle East peace process that demonstrates the primacy of the 'national interest'

over ideological influences. Rafsanjani's remarks, which constituted a rebuke to

78 In this article, Hunster claimed that Iran's foreign policy was increasingly becoming de-
ideologized from as early as mid-1980's, largely as a result of the inevitable learning and adjustment
process that revolutionary regimes undergo. This process accelerated under the impact of Iran's defeat-or at
least its inability to win-the war with Iraq. Iran's loss led to national soul-searching and widespread
questioning of all aspects of the Islamic government (Hunter 2003: 139)

259
hardliners, is noteworthy: "To put the country in jeopardy on the ground that we are

acting on an Islamic basis is not at all Islamic" (Gvosdev 2004: 47). This is a reflection of

an Iranian internal debate over the efficacy of the form, as opposed to the substance of

supporting the Palestinians. Questions such as

why support for the Palestinian cause entails support for groups using violence.
Why does it undermine support for the Palestinians own elected representatives.
How does the adoption of radical solutions help the people in the region? Can Iran
not help diplomatically? Does a militant, rejectionist approach advances Iran's
national interest? What price is Iran willing to pay for such policies? (Chubin
2003: 104).79

Most importantly in this regard, was the fact that Tehran neither opposed the

peace plans sponsored by Saudi Arabia which were unveiled at the Beirut Arab Summit

of 2002, nor the road map announced that year by the Quarter (the United States, EU, the

United Nations, and the Russian Federation). President Khatami declared in 2003, that

Tehran would not oppose a peace agreement that is acceptable to the Palestinians, noting,

"We do not intend to impose our views on others or stand in their way." Indeed, if the

79 It should be noted that Iran's attempt to rid itself of its often stereotypical image as a supporter
of terrorism became very clear in Khatami's statements in January 1998 interview with CNN correspondent
Christiane Amanpour.
In well delivered remarks, the President addressed various issues between Washington and
Tehran, including Terrorism: 'We believe in the holy Quran that says: slaying of one innocent person is
tantamount to the slaying of all humanity. How could such a religion, and those who claim to be its
followers, get involved in the assassination of innocent individuals and the slaughter of innocent human
beings? We categorically reject all these allegations...Terrorism should be condemned in all its form and
manifestations; assassins must be condemned. Terrorism is useless anyway and we condemn it
categorically ... At the same time, supporting people who fight for the liberation of their land is not, in my
opinion, supporting terrorism. It is, in fact, supporting those who are engaged in combating state
terrorism."' When further asked, "Regardless of the motive, do you believe that killing innocent women
and children is terrorism, as for instance what happens on the streets of Israel?" Khatami replied, "It is
definitely so. Any form of killing innocent men and women who are involved in confrontations is
terrorism; it must be condemned, and we, in our term, condemn every form of it in the world.

260
international community restarted a viable peace process buttressed by a regional

consensus, it would be improbable for Tehran to persist with its lonely struggle on behalf

of radical Palestinian forces. A similar pragmatism has been introduced into Iran's

approach to anti-Israeli attacks in Lebanon. After the Israeli departure from southern

Lebanon in 2000, which was widely accredited to the Hezbollah's active military

resistance, Tehran has openly called for Hezbollah to display "prudence and self-

restraint" to prevent Israel from finding a pretext for attacking Lebanon again. In fact,

since the 11 September terrorist attacks, a string of Iranian officials, including Khatami,

have journeyed to Beirut and urged Hezbollah to behave with restraint vis-a-vis Israel in

order to prevent another crisis in the region. Remarkably, Iran even outlined terms for a

possible settlement between Hezbollah and the Israelis. Secretary of Iran's Supreme

National Security Council, Hassan Rouhani stated that "if Israel withdraws from the

Shabah farms [disputed territory along the Israeli-Lebanon frontier], then there will be no

justification for [Hezbollah's military] operations and [Hezbollah] can then turn to

political activity only" (Sick 2003: 47).

Beyond Iran's support for Hezbollah, Washington has accused Iran of supporting

Al Qaeda terrorists. 80 Public assertions that members of Al Qaeda were taking refuge in

80 Gary Sick argued in the ensuing quote that the issue of Al Qaeda ties to Iran became much more
pronounced after the bombing of Riyadh on May 2003:
The issue of potential Iranian ties with Al Qaeda took on much greater significance in May 2003
when three suicide car bombs exploded almost simultaneously in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Thirty-Five
people, including nine bombers, died in the explosions, which targeted housing compounds for Americans
and other Westerners living and working in the Saudi kingdom. The attack was carried out by a group of
Saudi militants, who had previously been identified by Saudi security forces and were on the run, operating

261
Iran across the border from western Afghanistan came from none other than Zalmay

Khalizad, the administration's special envoy to Afghanistan: "Hard-line, unaccountable

elements of the Iranian regime facilitated the movement of Al Qaeda terrorists escaping

from Afghanistan" (Sick 2003: 91). The head of Iran's Intelligence Ministry, Ali Yunesi,

acknowledged, for the first time, in 2003 that Iran was holding both "small and big

elements of Al Qaeda" (Gvosdev 2004: 47-8). Holding, Al Qaeda members, however, is

a far cry from claiming that Tehran has actively supported the group.

Those allegations strained credulity, however, given Iran's vigorous opposition to

the Taliban government in Afghanistan and its Al Qaeda supporters. Al Qaeda is a
Sunni Muslim group that espouses the views of the most extreme proponents of
the Salafi school (often called Wahhabi) school of Islamic thought, which regards
Shism, the religion practiced by most in Iran and by Hizballah in Lebanon, as
heretical. One can imagine some low-level tactical contact between the two
groups, particularly in view of their shared opposition to the Western presence in
the Gulf region. Claims of an alliance, however, lack evidence and logic (Sick
2003: 91-92).

Significantly, despite Iran's official opposition to subsequent attacks on

Afghanistan's Al Qaeda bases prior to 11 September, Tehran made no effort to interfere

and further cooperated on various issues ranging from humanitarian relief, search and

rescue, to other practical matters. Once the Taliban had been ousted, Tehran participated

positively and creatively in the Bonn talks to establish a new interim government in

Afghanistan. And when the Tokyo donor's conference took place in January 2002, Iran

under Al Qaeda's direction. Many of the perpetrators were arrested in the following weeks, but the United
States released unconfirmed intelligence reports that Iran was sheltering some senior Al Qaeda operatives
who may have been involved in planning the attack. Iran denied involvement, then announced that it had
several Al Qaeda members in custody, reportedly including some very senior individuals (Sick, G. (2003).

262
pledged a total of $560 million for the reconstruction of Afghanistan-the largest donation

of any developing country (Sick 2003: 90). Iran's cooperation with the U.S. was not

limited to Afghanistan. Indeed, a year before the commencement of war in Iraq, Tehran

had already sanctioned direct contacts between the Iran-based Supreme Council for the

Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the main U.S. backed

Iraqi opposition group at the time, Iraqi National Congress (INC). Notably Chalabi

traveled to Tehran in March 2002 and asked for Tehran's consent to open an office there.

Later in January 2003, Chalabi returned to Tehran for another round of meetings

regarding post-Saddam Iraq and was followed by another opposition leader, Jalal

Talebani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) (Ehteshami 2003: 123). Although

voices have been raised that Iran is cooperating with the U.S. in order to facilitate the

emergence of an Iraqi government favorable to it or even with the purpose of creating a

'satellite' state in Baghdad such remarks become increasingly dubious under closer

scrutiny. An Iranian official has stressed this point, claiming, "Iran's experience is not

possible to be duplicated in Iraq." Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi similarly stated, "No

Iranian official has suggested the formation of an Iranian-style government in Iraq."

Rouhani added that "Tehran does not want confrontation and friction with America over

Iraq" (Gvosdev 2004: 46). Authorities in Iran clearly recognize that any signs of

meddling in Iraq's internal affairs may be construed by the United States as a clear and

present danger to its long-term policy in the region. This would give Washington

continued pretexts for further confrontation and would likely jeopardize Iran's attempts

to improve relations with Turkey and other Gulf states (Foley 2003: 27-28). In addition,

even if we assume Iran pursued a course of directly interfering inside Iraq, the local Iraqi

263
Shia population would not necessarily be in league with such policies. Iraq's Shias are

composed of various communities that speak with several, and often competing voices,

tribal and religious. Perhaps most importantly of all, the emergence of the Iraqi Shia role

in Iraq is likely to further and even deepen the policy and doctrinal cleavages in Iran's

own unique Islamic political system.

In a country where both influence and political power are derived from religion
and the religious hierarchy, where Tehran and Qom stand united only through the
maintenance of the velayat w faqih system-rule through a clerical jurisprudential
system in which a senior cleric acts as the spiritual leader of the Islamic state-a
new and powerful source of religious authority beyond Tehran's control could act
as a lightening rod, seriously testing the doctrinal basis of a regime founded on
fairly narrow interpretation of Shia thought (Ehteshami 2003: 124).

Ironically, the U.S. and Iranian views concerning the future of Iraq have much

more in common than is usually assumed. Both countries support the development of a

pluralistic, decentralized government. One expert notes that a "democratic, inclusive Iraq

is likely to be a fractious, even polarized state too preoccupied with its internal squabbles

to resume its hegemonic Gulf policies" (Ehteshami 2003: 45). Despite its strident public

objections to the U.S. intervention, Tehran recognized the positive potentialities of

cooperating with the United States in achieving shared objectives; Iran has no wish to

witness a weak Iraq become a failed state as Afghanistan did. Deputy Foreign Minister

Hussein Adeli, recently noted, "We don't mind joining forces with all countries including

[the] Americans to do something over there [Iraq]." In April 2004, Rafsanjani himself

264
declared, "We helped the Americans in Afghanistan and are ready to do the same with

them in Iraq" (Gvosdev 2004: 46).81

Nonetheless, it does seem highly unlikely that Iran's relations with the U.S. will

improve in the face of Iran's nuclear ambitions, Iran's cooperation in both Afghanistan

and Iraq notwithstanding. While Iran insists that its nuclear ambitions are strictly for

peaceful uses, Washington alleges that Iran's nuclear programs point to the ultimate goal

of acquiring nuclear weapons.82 Muscat, as articulated earlier, supports Iran's right to use

peaceful nuclear energy. Yet, one cannot positively ascertain whether Muscat's position

toward Iran's nuclear ambitions arise from the confidence over Iranian claims, or from

Muscat's realization that Iran's path to the nuclear club is only a question of time. Due to

the complete absence of public official statements or opinions-beyond what has already

been quoted-over Iran's nuclear ambitions, one could only speculate as to why the

Sultanate chose to support Iran publicly in this tense period. The most probable

81 This is not to assume that Tehran would sit idle if its own interests are not taken into
consideration in Iraq: "Nobody should doubt that we cannot think of restoring to confrontation to dissuade
America and ensure the failure of its efforts and those of its allies." (Gvosdev 2004: 46)

82 Iran's nuclear ambitions, under the present regime, are tied to the origins of
the construction of
the Bushehr nuclear power plant. As Vinnikov explained:
The origins of the Bushehr saga began in August 1993 when, as part of long term trade and
cooperation program, two Russian-Iranian agreements on the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran
and on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were signed. Nuclear cooperation would consist of constructing
nuclear energy were signed. Nuclear cooperation would consist of constructing nuclear power plants in
Iran, cycling nuclear fuel, supplying research reactors, reprocessing spent fuel, producing isotopes for use
in scientific and medical research, and training Iranian nuclear scientists at the Moscow Engineering
Physics Institute (MEPhI)... How much did Russia actually gain from the Bushehr project? The exact
figures are classified, but open-source estimates ranges from $800 million to $billion. Even if the actual
amount were lower, the sum was impressive from Moscow's perspective, particularly at that time. The fine
print was even more appealing, with the Iranians agreeing to pay 80 percent of the Bushehr contract in cash
(Orlov and Vinnikov 2005: 51).

265
conclusion suggests that Muscat believes that Iran's transformation into a nuclear state is

not necessarily inevitable. Indeed, a "subtle debate regarding the strategic utility of

nuclear weapons and the value of crossing the nuclear threshold in fact underway.

Reformers have argued that the best means of preserving Iran's fundamental strategic

interests lies in conforming to its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations"

(Gvosdev 2004: 43). The debate over the strategic utility of nuclear weapons is not only a

point of contention between the so called "doves" and "hawks" within the government,

but even among the later camp:

Iran's defense minister, Ali Shamkhani, stressed, 'The existence of the nuclear
weapons will turn us into a threat to others that could be exploited in a dangerous
way to harm our relations with the countries of the region.' Ali Hashemi, a key
member of the Servants of Constitution and the nephew of Rafsanjani,
acknowledged, 'if we were to face new sanctions, naturally numerous problems
would have been created in the way of Iran's economic, social, and cultural
developments.' The centrist Entekhab newspaper, which is representatives of the
views of the new Right [what could be considered as conservative as opposed to
the reformers], also proclaimed, 'Accepting additional protocols"3 will create
some problems for us, but not doing so is not without consequences either'
(Gvosdev 2004: 44).

President Muhammad Khatami stated, "We have the right to use this knowledge

and you [the IAEA, international community] have the right to be assured that it would

be channeled in the right way." A member of the Majlis' National Security and Foreign

Policy Committee observed that, "if we do not sign the additional protocol, it will give

the impression that Iran is moving towards the non-peaceful use of nuclear energy. Thus

83 In June 2003, the Evian G-8 Joint Declaration sent Tehran a strong and unequivocal signal,
urging it to sign and implement an IAEA additional protocol which Tehran agreed to sign.

266
we must remove all doubts by talking to and negotiating with, other countries and signing

this protocol" (Chubin 2003: 105).

The saga over Iran's nuclear programs and its policies continues to attract a

diatribe of intense debate. There are more ominous signs of a possible attack on Tehran.

Nevertheless, Muscat's position toward Tehran will be marked, as it has been in the past,

with cautious pragmatism.

267
 VI.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation is the first systematic study of the foundations and practices of

Oman's foreign policy since 1995. While most of the literature on the subject matter

focuses on a narrow time period defined by the rise of the current Sultan Qaboos till the

present, this dissertation seeks to extend and reappraise the historical literature that

influences and properly contextualizes our understanding of modern Oman's place in the

world. It is necessary then to explore a persistent historical consciousness that gives an

indication of the motives behind the foreign policy decisions emanating from Muscat.

This rooted historical consciousness remains grounded in the tumultuous events that took

place during the reign of the previous Sultan. Thus, by reexamining the set historical

narratives from the 1930's to the 1970's we can better understand the significance of

foreign policy positions that Muscat remains beholden too. An accurate understanding of

Oman's consistent emphasis on the need for security, regional stability, and balance of

power remain inchoate without a return to the very foundations and experiences that

characterize the process of state-building which gave rise to modern Oman.

This process of reexamination first calls into question the entire edifice of

assumptions that, until now, tarnished the reign of Sultan Said ibn Taimur. The essential

claim remains that the literature concerning the period in question treated Sultan Said

either as a tyrant, an incompetent administrator, or as a tool of colonial England. This

view obscures the significant actions taken by the Sultan and, concurrently, the set of

268
perceptions that emerged during and after his reign. Thus it is argued that this period is

taken to be instrumental in formulating Oman's understanding of itself within the region

and the international arena as a whole.

The thrust of this research lies in reexamining the conventional wisdom regarding

both the persona of Sultan Said and the customary political/historical narrative of Said's

reign. It underscores the importance of Oman's modern political development: the attempt

of the Imamate to gain international recognition as an independent state separate from

Muscat's authority; the insurgency of the1950's followed by the intervention of regional and

international powers; the Dhofari rebellion; and finally an assessment of Sultan Said's

failure to lead the Sultanate. These were the major challenges facing Muscat during Said's

reign, and indeed, these are the major themes recounted in the prevalent literature on Oman.

The literature, however, has overlooked and often undermined the significant role Said

played in the Sultanate's political development from the early 1930's to 1970. What is often

overlooked is that the state of affairs which Sultan Said inherited when he came to power

was a government that was crippled by debt, incompetent leadership, and a significant, and

often intrusive, British influence in Muscat's domestic and external relations. Instead, the

beginning of Sultan Said's reign marked a forceful attempt to reassert Muscat's authority

throughout the interior via a set of political and financial reforms. First and foremost was the

replacement of the then British finance minister, Bertram Thomas, by Sultan Said himself.

This act itself had a dramatic symbolic significance in that it sent a message of renewed

independent authority vis-a-vis Whitehall. By the 1950's, however, internal and external

circumstances would force Sultan Said to backtrack on his independent policies and appeal

to the British for substantial aid. Much of the conventional literature argues that this

269
necessity for calling upon the British for assistance was the direct consequence of a

continued mismanagement of the country on the part the Sultan himself. However, this

claim is not consistent with, on the one hand, a continued legacy of British involvement in

Muscat's affairs for more than two centuries, and, on the other hand, the particular

geopolitical context of the 1950's, in which two nominal enemies, pan-Arab nationalist

Egypt and archconservative Saudi Arabia, found common cause in allying themselves with

Muscat's internal enemies, greatly diminished the freedom of movement that Sultan Said

could have had in responding to the imamate challenge. By consequence, the only recourse

left to Sultan Said-given that the United States was a de facto supporter of Saudi Arabia-

was again to compromise the independent policies first set forth at the beginning of his

reign. What must be emphasized, nevertheless, is that Sultan Said did not become a passive

agent for Whitehall's machinations throughout the region. Though geopolitical constraints

forced the Sultan into a position of working with the British, archival evidence demonstrates

a deeply complex and nuanced relationship.

From the British perspective, the situation in the 1950's was even more multifaceted

given its strong but waning influence throughout the region. The inherent motivations that

induced cooperation with Sultan Said were, in part, contingent upon a greater awareness for

the future geopolitical and economic alignment of the Persian Gulf States. Their desire to

protect the Persian Gulf from Nasser's influence, the persistent need to appease Saudi

Arabia, all the while living up to the responsibilities towards the other Persian Gulf States

were major considerations of the British during that crucial period. Though some of the

literature assumes that Omani oil remained the driving force for British motives, the

archives sufficiently demonstrate that Omani oil was a secondary consideration at best. By

270
contrast, the references to oil made by the British leadership focused on Kuwait and the need

to structure British policies towards protecting its influence there.

Aside from the continuous relationship between the British and Oman, this study

begins to reexamine the interaction between Oman and China. Though some previous

authors do intimate some facets of China's role within Oman during the 1950's and 1960's,

this is the first time that archival sources are systematically consulted and analyzed. China's

role is particularly illuminated through the earliest periods of the Imamate challenge and the

Dhofari rebellion: a rebellion that eventually brought the downfall of Sultan Said. Indeed, it

is at this stage that the archives clearly demonstrate Sultan Said's failure in envisioning a

political strategy beyond the mere application of brute force. Nonetheless, it is at that

particularjuncture where the conventional literature reduces the totality of Said's reign into

a singular moment of failure and impotence.

There is a tendency to compartmentalize and underestimate the connection between

the various crises facing Muscat during Said's reign. For instance, the Imamate challenge of

the 1950's is treated as a contained threat that withered away by the late 1950's with no real

consequences for subsequent events. By contrast, this work demonstrates that the conflict

over Buraimi, for example, (involving Riyadh, Muscat, London, Abu-Dhabi, and

Washington) had remarkable implications for the subsequent Imamate challenge, the Anglo-

American relationship, the Dhofari rebellion of 1965 and even the future government of

Sultan Qaboos. Reaching this conclusion is only possible through the use of primary sources

that include top-secret documents many of which are recorded and analyzed for the first

time in this research. An array of various classified memos, cables, notes, and documents

sharpens our understanding of the motives behind the actions of Muscat, Riyadh, and

271
London. Some of the archives display a remarkable candidness of British policies toward

Riyadh and disclose the difference between London's official foreign policy

pronouncements, and the objectives of Whitehall. The actual words of Sultan Said, King

Faisal of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Zaid of U.A.E., and various British Prime Ministers,

punctuate this project and convey more convincingly and intimately the spirit of the times.

As such, some previous conclusions that were accurate in their assessments are now

buttressed with newly discovered evidence, while many other conclusions are rejected

through the evidence of the archives and the forcefulness of a new analysis.

The archives are also used to demonstrate Muscat's foreign policy from 1970 to

1989. The archives detail Muscat's early challenges beyond the accustomed treatment of

the period. The historic step of the Sultanate's membership in both the Arab League and

the United Nations, while battling a determined insurgency, is carefully detailed and

analyzed. In contrast to the common account of the period, the Sultanate's admission to

both institutions is not treated as a foregone conclusion after Qaboos's accession in 1970.

Primary sources demonstrate the potential for rejecting the Sultanate's membership to

either institution. This dissertation provides the first attempt to convey the complicated

admission of the Sultanate to the Arab League and the United Nations and explains the

motives of key actors in either supporting or denying the Sultanate's admission.

Muscat's most important challenge in the early 1970's was the Dhofari rebellion,

a rebellion that involved local, regional, and international actors. The research deals with

the most important events from the early 1970's until 1989: the Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution of 1979, the 1981 facilities agreement with the United

States, and the Iran-Iraq war. The aim was not only to narrate the events, but also to

272
investigate the key interests and policies that inform Muscat's foreign policies in the

Persian Gulf. The analysis was concerned with a number of questions; what is the role of

Oman in the Gulf Cooperation Council? Do Muscat's interests converge or clash with

those of other Gulf States? What is the Sultanate's concept of Persian Gulf Security?

Would new alternative security arrangements be open to Muscat? The literature fails to

systematically explain the motives and the behavior of regional states toward Oman, and

in turn Muscat's actions in the region and beyond. Detailed analysis of Oman's relations

with regional states, as well as with international actors, is important for the narration of a

country's foreign policy. However, to have a comprehensive understanding of Muscat's

foreign policy, it is necessary that the narration is not restricted to Muscat's historical

relations with one country or another in a chronological fashion. Local, regional, and

international levels interconnect in a complicated web of actions and reactions that must

be analyzed and rendered intelligible to the reader. Muscat's relations with Tehran, for

example, will disclose how important it is to have a broad approach that connects local,

regional, and international developments in order to analyze Muscat's polices in the

Persian Gulf. Moreover, this example between Muscat and Teheran illuminates the

Sultanate's foreign policy objectives within the Persian Gulf, while simultaneously

serving as a prime example of Muscat's heightened sense of realism and independence.

Muscat refused to bandwagon with the US and its regional allies' anti-Iranian sentiment,

managed to maintain good relations with Tehran, and positioned herself as an honest

regional broker.

An attempt to explain and analyze post-1970 Omani foreign policy remains

incomplete without a reappraisal of the conventional narrative that describes Sultan

273
Said's reign. The positions taken vis-a-vis central regional issues such as the Arab-Israeli

conflict, the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, both Gulf wars, and Oman's role in the

Gulf Cooperation Council are often described as being uniquely independent. In

determining the merit of such a characterization, previous studies have either appealed to

a legacy of history that has its roots in Ibadi Islam or the capable leadership of Sultan

Qaboos as distinct from his predecessor. Though this study does not dispute the merits of

such conclusions, it does argue that it presents an incomplete explanation of Muscat's

past and contemporary foreign policy.

The historical roots that underline Oman's position in the world cannot be taken

to start at the 1970's with the rise of the current Sultan. The internal and external crisis

that plagued Oman from the 1930's to the 1970's had major formative consequences for

the post-1970 government. These various crises often pitted a friendless-with the

exception of the British at certain times-Sultanate against a kaleidoscope of external

actors that sought to undermine its sovereignty and authority. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq,

South Yemen, China, and the Soviet Union all participated at one time or another in various

capacities and with different means in the singular aim of destabilizing Muscat. This

historical consciousness on the part of the future Omani government could not have been

expiated with simply a change of government. Security thus consistently remains the

singular theme that runs through its major initiatives in the era of Sultan Qaboos. The

current emphasis on self-reliance, regional balancing, and the support of a major role for

the United States in the region while remaining at the fringes of great power politics point

to a deeply rooted fear of internal and external instability. What is most apparent in

appraising Muscat's regional role is not only a disparity with its Arab neighbors and

274
brethren concerning substantial political issues, but also the fact that Oman often

anticipates geopolitical trends. Oman's steady desire to see a resolution of the Arab-

Israeli conflict, for example-while standing with Egypt at the conclusion of the Camp

David Accords when all other Arab states have forsaken it-demonstrates a persistent

willingness to view the region in an entirely different lens. While it became more

fashionable for other states to support the peace process with the cajoling of the United

States, Oman anticipated such a geopolitical condition and was thus depicted as a

progressive ally. Furthermore, because of Oman's particular position of independence,

all the while remaining above the fray or regional disputes, it has assumed a particular

ability to serve as a mediator: Between the GCC and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the

United States and Iran, among others.

It should also be mentioned that Oman occupies a geo-strategic place that deeply

influences its relationship with major world powers. The Sultanate of Oman has a 1, 200-

mile coastline along the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea and the Indian

Ocean. It is adjacent to the sea-lanes leading to Europe and Asia, Iraq and Iran, and its

fellow members in the GCC. It is difficult to overemphasize Oman's role as the

gatekeeper to the Persian Gulf, and its role as a guarantor of one of the world's most

strategic lifelines, the Strait of Hormuz. The Iran-Iraq war, the Gulf War, and the United

States policy of dual containment all highlight Oman's strategic importance to the world,

and her role in maintaining the safety of the Straits.

The post-September 11 global environment has reemphasized Oman's geo-

strategic location in the region. The lead up to the second Gulf War in 2003 clearly

shows, on the one hand, Oman's reticence at the possibility of regime change in Iraq

275
alongside the possible consequences of destabilizing the region, and, on the other hand, a

continued cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom by allowing them

facilities and over-flight rights. Nonetheless, the cooperation with external powers does

remain nuanced and eclectic. In the case of Iran's nuclear program, Muscat was the only

actor within the Persian Gulf region to support the Iranian acquisition of peaceful nuclear

technology.

It is safe to assume that Oman's foreign policy from 2005 and beyond will display

similar characteristics as those of the previous decade; that is to say, a close alliance with

the United States and Western powers all the while seeking a balance between the major

regional powers of the region. Particularly vis-a-vis Iran, Muscat has sought and

continues to seek a general de-escalation of potential conflict. Within the Arabian

Peninsula, Oman will remain a strong advocate within the organization of the GCC for a

significant military expansion of forces under the command of that organization. While

other Gulf States remain susceptible to pan-Arab or pan-Islamic movements that seek to

bypass or overthrow the state, such as the recent radical Wahhabi-inspired attacks in

Saudi Arabia, Oman does not seem as vulnerable. The articulated difference that the local

Ibadi population posses with respect to other Gulf States in terms of its religious and

historical consciousness serves as a barrier to the appeals of the transnational political

identities of Arabism and Islam.

This work represents the first systematic attempt to record and explain Muscat's

foreign policy during the crucial period between 1990 and 2004. Most importantly

however, this dissertation brings to the fore the archival evidence collected in both

Britain and the United States. There remains, however, much to be discovered through

276
archival research in other states. This historical undertaking has repercussions on the

literature of both regional studies and small states-great power relations. A critical

reexamination of the history of Oman's foreign policy formation through archival

research demonstrated that there could exist unexplored narratives that challenge the

conventional wisdom. Likewise, a similar approach to other Middle East states can

uncover a different historical account that recontextualizes the foreign policy of states in

a more nuanced and different approach. For example, it was argued that the traditional

perception of Saudi Arabia as a persistent foe of any form of communist movement in the

Middle East was inaccurate in the case of their support for the radical communist Dhofari

rebellion. This demonstrates that small states can exhibit a wider range of foreign policy

choices than previously recognized. Moreover, the perception that the asymmetry that

characterizes relations between small states and great power translates itself into

restricted foreign policy alternatives for small states is inconsistent in the examples put

forward here of Sultan Said, Sheik Zaid, and King Faisal. This dissertation demonstrates,

by contrast, that small states with limited resources can conduct successful and distinct

foreign policies.

It is hoped that future research would be able to build upon this work by accessing

different archival material from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Egypt

and Russia amongst others. This continued scholarship would likely challenge our

conventional understanding of the foreign polices of Middle East states.

277
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APPENDICES

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 APPENDIX I

Imams of Oman

Eighth Century...................................................................................al-Julanda ibn Mas'ud

According to Arabic chronicles al-Julanda was the first Ibadhi Imam elected in
Oman, his election taking place about the middle of the eighth century.

Eighth to Twelfth Century ............................................................................... Many Imams

The Arabic chronicles list the names of many Imams who held office during this
period and the careers of some are described in considerable detail. There appear
to have been a few interregna, but none of long duration.

Twelfth to Fifteenth Century .................................................... The First Great Interregnum

No record has survived of Imams being elected during the period from about the
middle of the twelfth century to the early years of the fifteenth century. The
Arabic chronicles of Oman state that it is possible that there might have been
Imams all trace of whom has been lost, as the existing accounts for the whole
period are very brief. During this interregnum the petty princes styled Maliks
acquired power in different parts of the country, the most prominent among them
being the Nabhanis.

Fifteenth to Sixteenth Century..........................................................................Many Imams

A new Imam was elected in the early fifteenth century and was succeeded by a
number of other Imams over a period of about a century and a half. During this
time Europeans first entered the Persian Gulf in force, and the Portuguese
established themselves on the coast of the Gulf of Oman.

Sixteenth to Seventeenth Century........................................ The Second Great Interregnum

For a period of some sixty years, roughly from 1560 to 1624, there again appeared
to have been no Imams. The Nabhanis reached the climax of their power in this
period.

1624(?)-1743............................................................................ The Imams of the Ya'aribah

Beginning with Nasir ibn Murshid, who held office from 1624(?) to 1640(?), the
Imams for a period of over a century came from the tribe of the Ya'aribah. Early n
this period the Portuguese finally lost their grip on the coast. From about 1718 to
1728 Oman was torn by a civil war during the course of which factions of the
Ghafiris and the Hinawis emerged, and for a time the power of the Ya'aribah
became virtually non-existent, though the rule of the dynasty did not come to an
end until 1743.
1744(?)-1783(?)............... .............. Ahuiad ibn Said
.......................................................................

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The First Imam of Al Bu Sa'id
A man of humble origins, Ahmad rose rapidly to prominence and was elected
Imam after had had captured Muscat and expelled Persian invaders from the coast
of the Batinah in 1744. His rule was so successful that upon his death his son
Sa'id, though not nearly as a strong man, was elected Imam in his place.

1783(?)- 1830(?)..........................................................................................Sa'id ibn Ahm ad

The Second Imam of Al Bu Sa'id
Sa'id remained titular Imam until his death, though he lacked the capacity to
maintain his father's firm grasp on the affairs of the state. Sa'id's son Hamad had
effective control of the government from 1785(?) until his death in 1792, during
which time he made Muscat his residence. Sa'id's in the last year of his rule
remained isolated in al-Rustaq, while his younger brother Sultan gradually
acquired power and established himself as the real ruler in Muscat. Sa'id's ibn
Ahmad may be reckoned the last member in the direct line of Al Bus Sa'id to hold
the office of Imam.

1803(?)-1868..........................................................................The Third Great Interregnum

No attempt was made by Sa'id ibn Ahmad's successors in Muscat to secure
religious authority, and for sixty-five years no Imam was fond to fill the gap in
Ibadhi society left by this secularization of the rule of Al Bu Sa'id.

1846............................................................. Unsuccessful Attempts to Revive the Imamate

Despite the great prestige enjoyed by Sa'id ibn Sultan as ruler of Muscat and
Zanzibar, the Ibadhis of Oman were not content to have only a temporal ruler, as
indicated by their attempt to elect a new Imam at al-Rustaq in 1846. The office
was offered to Hamud ibn 'Azzan of Al Bu Sa'id, uncle of the 'Azzan who was
elected Imam some twenty years later, and to two other religious figures, but all
three declined the honor.

1868-1871........................................................................... 'Azzan ibn Qais of Al Bu Sa'id

A coalition of Ibadhi leaders captured Muscat in 1868 and the reigning Sultan,
Salim ibn Thuwaini, fled to India. 'Azzan ibn Qais was elected Imam of the
Ibadhis at Muscat in October 1868, his connection with the dynasty of Al Bu
Sa'id being regarded as a recommendation for his holding the office rather than a
bar thereto. Control of the state, however, devolved upon a triumvirate of leaders,
foremost among them was Sa'id ibn Khalfan al-Khalili, grandfather of the present
Imam [this is in reference to Imam Mohammed Al-Khalili]. During the revival the
Ibadhi state held control of the Dhahran, including al-Bahraini, and almost all of
the interior, as well as the coast of the Gulf of Oman, but the Imamate collapsed
early in 1871 when Turki ibn Sa'id, uncle of ex-Sultan Salim, gained a military
victory of Dhank and his supporters took Matrah, where Imam 'Azzan was killed.

1871-1913............................................................................. The Fourth Great Interregnum

With the reestablishment of secular rule in Muscat the chiefs of the interior
resumed their petty rivalries and no leader with sufficient religious prestige and

296
 political stability came forward to re-marshall the forces of the Imamate. Ibrahim
ibn Qais, brother of the late Imam, maintained himself independently at al-Rustaq
for more than twenty-five years following the fall of the Imamate. Salih ibn 'Ali,
the Ibadhi leader in the Sharqiyah, harried the Sultans in Muscat, and for his
forces even captured the city in 1895, retiring after payment by Sultan Faisal of a
substantial sum of money to Salih.

1898...............................................................Unsuccessful Attempt to Revive the Im am ate

In 1898 it appeared that the Imamate would be revived under Sa'ud ibn 'Azzan,
second son of the late Imam, who acceded to power in al-Rustaq upon the death
of his uncle Ibrahim ibn Qais in that year. A conference of Ibadhi leaders was
called in al-Rustaq, but no decisive steps were taken despite widespread
enthusiastic anticipation among the people of Oman.

1913-1920................................................................................ Salim ibn Rashid al-Kharusi

A desire for security and dissatisfaction with the policy of the Sultan of Muscat
encouraged the people of the interior to revive the Imamate in May 1913. Salim
ibn Rashid al-Kharusi was the first Imam elected in the twentieth century. After
being prevented by British intervention from capturing Muscat in January 1915,
the forces of the Imamate withdrew and turned to consolidation of the Imam's
position in the mountains and the transmontane regions. Throughout Salim's
tenure the British were active in support of Muscat and trying to mediate between
the Sultanate and the Imamate. Salim was assassinated by a Bedouin of Oman in
1920.

1920 to the "present" ................................................. Muhammad ibn Abd Allah al-Khalili

Immediately following the assassination of Imam Salim, the Ibadhi community
elected Muhammad ibn 'Abd Allah al-Khalili head of state, and he has held office
ever since. An attempt to expand to al-Buraimi in 1925 carried the forces to the
Imamate as far as 'Ibri, and after then the Imam has restricted activities to internal
matters. Now about sixty-five years old, Imam Muhammad rules principally
through the prestige of his religious office and relies for political support upon
Sulaiman ibn Himyar al-Nabhani of the Green Mountain and Salih ibn Isa al-
Harithi of the Sharqiyah, as well as numerous lesser chiefs.

(Reproduced from Rentz, G., and Foreign Office. Research Dept. (1997). Oman and the
South-Eastern Shore of Arabia. Reading: Ithaca Press.)

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 APPENDIX II

Sultans of Muscat

From 1803 to the Present .....................................................................

All of these rulers belong to the dynasty of Al Bu Sa'id. For the first two rulers of
this dynasty see the table of the Imams of Oman.

1803(?)-1804........................................................................................... Sultan ibn Ahmad

Sultan, who was in actual control of Muscat during the latter part of his brother
Imam Sa'id's reign, succeeded upon his brother's death in 1803(?) only to
temporal authority; he was not elected Imam or even considered for election.
Sultan met his end in 1804 in a minor affray at sea.

1804(?)-1856...............................................................................................Sa'id ibn Sultan

Sultan's two young sons, Salim and Sa'id, appear to have become nominal rulers
upon the death of their father in 1804, but Badr ibn Said, their cousin and an ally
of the Unitarians, set about to gain actual control of the state. Following almost
two years of confusion, Sa'id murdered Badr and was acknowledged as sole ruler
by his older brother Salim and other kinsmen. Sa'id's long reign, the expansion of
his authority to Zanzibar and East Africa, and his eagerly cultivated relations with
Europeans nations and the United States contributed to his fame. Although Sa'id
did not use the title Sultan for himself, he was in effect Sultan of both Muscat and
Zanzibar. Sa'id owed part of his success to the British, who intervened on several
occasions to maintain the integrity of his domains in Muscat. In October 1856
Sa'id died while on his way by sea from Muscat to Zanzibar.

1856-1866...............................................................................................Thuwaini ibn Sa'id

Upon the death of Sa'id ibn Sultan his son Thuwaini succeeded him in Muscat
and another son Majid in Zanzibar. The two halves of the realm were officially
separated from each other by the Canning Award of 1861, with Thuwaini as
Sultan of Muscat to be supported in part by an annual subsidy from the richer
state of Zanzibar. Thuwaini was murdered in February 1866 by his son Salim,
who succeeded him forthwith.

1866- 1868..............................................................................................Salim ibn T huw aini

Salim, a patricide and a weak character, had to ward off a serious challenge to his
right to rule on the part of his uncle, Turki ibn Sa'id. In October 1868 Salim was
expelled from Muscat by the forces of the Ibadhis, who elected 'Azzan ibn Qais, a
distant relative of his, to the position of Imam.

1868-1871................................................................................ Interregnum in the Sultanate

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 'Azzan as a religious leader did not take the title of Sultan. The British continued
for a time to recognize Salim as the legitimate Sultan, but about the beginning of
1870 they threw their support behind his rival and uncle, Turki ibn Sa'id. At no
time did they accord recognition to 'Azzan, who was killed in January 1871 when
the Imamate was overthrown by Turki's forces.

1871-1888..................................................................................................... Turki ibn Sa'id

On a number of occasions during Turki's long and uneasy rule his authority was
menaced by his brother 'Abd al-Aziz, by his nephew Salim, and by the Ibadhis of
the interior. Without British support and active intervention on such occasions,
Turki could not have maintained his position. Turki died a natural death in 1888.

1888- 19 13....................................................................................................F aisal ibn T urki

Faisal was faced by the reviving power of the Ibadhis of the interior throughout
his reign. The city of Muscat was captured by then in 1895, but the occupying
forces withdrew following the payment of money by Faisal to their leader, Salih
ibn Ali. The growing opposition to the Sultan in the interior culminates in the
election of al-Kharusi as Imam of Oman in May 1913. Faisal died in October of
the same year.

1913-1931................................................................................................. Taimur ibn Faisal

The British intervened with troops for the defense of Muscat and saved Taimur
from complete aubmergence by the forces of the new Imamate in January 1915.
During Taimur's reign al-Khalili succeeded al-Kharusi as Imam of Oman in 1920.
Taimur abdicated in November 1931 for reasons, according to official statements,
of poor health. The accession of his son took place three months later.

1932 to present........................................................................................... Sa'id ibn Taimur

At the age of twenty-one Sa'id succeeded his father and he has ruled continuously
since then. He is officially recognized by both the British and the American
Governments as Sultan of Muscat and Oman. Sa'id is well acquainted with lands
beyond Oman, having been educated in India and having made a tour around the
world in 1937-38 during which he visited the Untied States and Great Britain. At
present he is relying extensively on British experts in the administration of his
government, one of whom is in charge of foreign affairs while another commands
the Muscat Levies, the Sultan's main military force. Sa'id is known to have been
active in trying to expand the area of his authority at the expense of the Imamate
(and other independent states in Oman.)

(Reproduced from Rentz, G. Foreign Office. Research Dept. (1997). Oman and the
South-Eastern Shore of Arabia. Reading: Ithaca Press.)

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 APPENDIX III

The Words of Sultan Sa'id bin Taimur

The word of Sultan Sa'id bin Taimur, Sultan of Muscat and Oman, about the

history of the financial position of the Sultanate in the past and the hopes for the future,

after the export of oil.

We consider the first period to run from pre-1914 to 1920. The Government in the
era of our grandfather, Sultan Faisal bin Turki, and in the era before him had only a
simply way of dispatching all the affairs of the country; no budget, no planning and no
organization. Improvisation was the basis of all that was done and said. This was the
situation prevailing at that time in most Arab countries.
In 1913 (1331) our beloved father, Sultan Taimur bin Faisal, succeeded to the
throne on the death of Sultan Faisal bin Turki. He inherited a legacy of many debts and a
Government burdened with loans due to be repaid to the merchants of the country. This
situation continued and the debts increased until 1920, when, relaising it was not easy to
rule the country with its finances in such a state of weakness and disorganization, he
determined to improve the State finances by introducing modern methods. Finally it was
clear that his Government could make little progress until it was freed of its burden of
debts which, as we have said, were to a number of merchants in the country. He relaised
that it would be best to negotiate one major loans which would enable him to liquidate
the old debts and still have a surplus which could be used to achieve the desired reforms.
The only body able to meet his request was the Government of Britain India, which
agreed to lend him the money necessary to free himself from his debts on the
understanding that it would be repaid in 10 years. He decided at the same time to ask the
Egyptian Government for officials to reorganise the Customs. The Egyptian Governemtn
agreed and sent him three Customs experts who set about their work with a will. He also
engaged an English official, Mr. D.V. McMullum, to supervise the reorganisation of the
Finance Department. Thereafter the finances of the Government slowly recovered; there
were no deficits in the annual budget and the loan installments were paid regularly. The
English official engaged in 1920 stayed for only six months, however, and, in the absence
of a successor, Sultan Taimur appointed Mohammed bin Ahmaed al Ghashan, then Wali
of Matrah, as his Minister responsible for financial affairs. This situation prevailed until
the end of 1924, when ther was a deficit due to the negligence of responsible officer and
the maladministration of the Treasury Officer, as a result of which the State finances
were so shaken as to make it impossible to continue to repay the installments of the loan
at the proper time.
The second period begins in 1925 when, in view of the poor state of Government
finances, Sultan Taimur bin Faisal decided to engage a new official to reorganise them.
He selected an Englishman, Mr. Bertram Thomas, whom he appointed as Finance

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Minister, on a five-year contract, with a view to his improving the financial position of
the Government. (Mr. Thomas was the first Westerner to cross the Empty Quarter, doing
so from Dhofar to Qatar in 54 days). At the outset he exerted considerable efforts which
reduced a measure of improvement in financial affairs but unfortunately this
improvement was not maintained for more than three years, after which the financial
situation again deteriorated and the Government ceased to repay the installments of the
loan. This was due to the maladministration of the official referred to in the previous
period for he allowed Government spending to exceed the approval Budget. This led to a
deficit and disorder in State finances. The balance of payments was upset and unpaid
installments of the loan, and other expenditure, piled up, constituting a new debt,
additional to the balance of the pervious one.
In 1930 an economic slump struck the world. This affected the trade balance,
resulting in a sharp fall in Customs revenues, which were virtually the Government's
only source of revenue. While great hopes were pinned on Mr. Thomas to repair what
others had destroyed, he in fact brought the finances to ruin and left them in an even
sorrier state.
Thereafter Sultan Taimur bin Faisal considered engaging a financial expert to put
right what was wrong. In 1931 he engaged as his Financial Adviser, Mr. Hedgecok, an
Englishman and a senior official of the Iraqi Finances Ministry, who immediately set to
work with great vigor and determination to rescue the finances from the state they were
in as a result of Bertram Thomas' maladministration. He reduced salaries and cut
expenditure and was eventually ablt to put the financial records in order and to organize
proper Budgets. We reveal no secrets if we say that at that time the Government's Budget
was no more than Rps. 700,000 (50,000) from which the Sultanate had to pay the coast of
the Government machine, repay the balance of the loan and meet various other items of
expenditure, including the customary gifts and presents to the tribal Sheikhs and
delegations, since, outwardly , the Government appeared very rich. Mr. Hedgecok
deserves admiration and respect for what he did to reorganise the finances of the
Sultanate. Unfortunately however he did not stay long, resigning for private reasons after
8 months.
At that time was were Prime Minister with oversight of the Sultanate's financial
affairs. After the resignation of Mr. Hedgecock it was decided to appoint Mr. R.J. Alban,
and Englishman, as Financial Adviser. And then, on 2 Shawal 1350 (11 February 1932),
we succeeded to power upon the abdication, for reasons of health, of our beloved father,
Sultan Timur bin Faisal.
We gave our special attention to finance but found that because of the effects of
economic pressure on world trade we were compelled to reduce expenditure in various
sectors, our first economy being to halve the Sultan's Privy Purse. The reader may be
surprised to learn that when we took over the reins of power the Sultanate's Treasury was
completely empty. No doubt many of our contemporaries will recall what the financial
situation was like in those days.
However, thanks to painstaking efforts and close supervision of finances signs of
improvement became visible, and, as 1933 neared its end, debts had been liquidated and
the sums die to the merchants paid off. At the end of 1933 the Financial Adviser resigned
whereupon we assumed complete personal control of the Sultanates finances and the

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preparation of its annual Budgets. The improvement in Customs revenues continued (the
Sultanate having no other income to speak of) enabling us to raise officials' salaries and
to give attention to the welfare of the Sultanate. The financial position has continued to
improve until the present day.
The third period runs from 1939, with the outbreak of the Second World War,
until 1945. During this period prices rose and consequently so too did Customs revenues.
We further increased officials' salaries and undertook much needed reforms in various
parts of the Sultanate. From 1930 to this day there has been no financial deficit in the
Government's Budget and the Governemtn has been able to build up reasonable financial
reserves against emergencies, as well as meeting necessary expenditure in various fields,
especially that of defense, which swallowed up about half the Budget. We were anxious
to introduce various urgently-needed reforms for the welfare of the country, we found
that here was not enough leeway either in the Budget or in the reserves to support any
sort of planning, for we did not want to overburden the Sultanate's finances and weigh
them down with new debts, after having paid money in various ways, but this could only
have been only by loan with interest as a set percentage rate. This amounts to usury, with
which I completely disagree, and the religious prohibition of which is not unknown.
By now the financial position of the Sultanate will have been made plain to you
by the facts which we have set out for you, and which account for the inability of the
Government of the time to bring the country up to date. We were fully aware of the many
reforms which the country needed, but whilst the eyesight was long, the arm at that time
was short. Despite all this, however, we were never at a loss to undertake any work which
bought general benefit to the country whenever any work found a way to do so. For
example, when the opportunity occurred in 1940, during the war, we built the Saidiya
School in Muscat, the first Government building constructed after getting over the
difficult period. Similarly we made a number of improvements to Government centres
and forts in various Wilayets.
In 1958 our friends, the British Government, offered us financial assistance to
strengthen the Sultanate's Army; to introduce improvements in education; to set up
Health Centres in some of the Wilayets along the coast and the interior; to build
Experimental Farms to raise the standard of farming in the country; to construct roads
and other improvements. We accepted this with deep gratitude. There was a time limit to
it in that it was to continue only until the finances of the Sultanate improved. It continued
until the end of July 1967. During this interim period we depended upon such financial
reserves as we had. Had it not been for our economy and for our reserves, we would not
have been able to bear the burden in expenditure during these months. In particular the
allocation to the Sultanate Army took up a large part of our resources until the
Government obtained its share of oil revenues.
Now the oil flows from the fields at Fahud and Naith through the pipes to the
tanks at Mina al Fahl in Saih al Maleh (which ought now to b e called Saih al Huluw).
Soon the product of another field at Jibal near Fahud will flow to join the output of the
first two fields supplying the tanks at SAih al Huluw whence the oil is pumped out ot the
tankers anchored at Mina al Fahl to be carried away. Thus our dear country becomes
among the exporters of oil, and we can insert a new subhead in our Budget 'Oil
Revenues'. Yes only now that we know that revenue from oil will be coming in steadily

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can we consider and plan and estimate how to put into effect the various projects which
the country needs. We hope these revenues will continue to increase each year.
We ought at this stage to mention the relationship between the Sultanate and the
oil company. The first agreement was concluded in the middle of 1937. The company
paid a rent for the right to search for oil in Sultanate territory and this helped to
strengthen the Budget somewhat. In 1964, when oil was discovered in commercial
quantities in the Sultanate, the present Company suggested a revision of the agreement
signed between the Sultanate and the previous oil company, the new agreement to
correspond with similar agreements signed recently between various oil companies and
the Government of the oil exporting countries of the Middle East. The Sultanate agreed
and asked the Company to put forward a suggested revision for the Government to study.
In March 1967, after talks between the Sultanate and the Company, Agreement
were concluded giving the Government 50% of the oil profits, and the rights to 121/2%
of all oil exported. This accorded with the decision of OPEC, an organization formed of
some of the Middle East oil exporting countries. The Agreement included many other
matters bringing advantage and general benefit to the country.
All of this took place during the period in which Mr. F. Hughes was the
Company's General Manger and Representative. He was appointed by the Company to
negotiate the detailed revision of the Agreement and we found a complete understanding
of the situation on his part. Agreement on terms was reached with great ease, thanks to
the efforts displayed by him so that the Agreement should benefit both sides.
God willing, 1968 will be the start of a new era for our country which will see the
beginning of various plans which will be executed under the supervision of qualified
technicians and experts. Firstly we shall begin building offices for various Government
Departments; then houses for officials who will come from abroad; then step by step will
come various projects such as hospitals, schools, roads, communications, and other
necessary works including the development of fisheries, animals and agricultural
resources etc. until modern projects spread over the whole of the Sultanate, to each area
according to its needs. So long as oil flows the Government will match its flow with
continuing development for the welfare of the country. Naturally projects involve much
effort and hard work. The progress we see in other countries was not the work of a day,
but the result of efforts over long years. It takes time for results of projects for
improvement to be seen and there will be an unavoidable gap between the receipt of oil
revenues and the appearance of benefits for the populace. We are straining every nerve to
improve the lot of the country both in general and in particular.
An initial task is to increase the salaries of Government official which we
consider need to be increased and to establish a cadre to regularize promotion. We shall
reinforce the Government machine by adding to it a number of experts and technicians.
This will ensure that the Government has a modern administrative machine. The present
situation requires changes in the existing Government set-up.
There are urgent schemes to which we consider we must give priority.
1. Water-work on this project is being pressed ahead, and we hope that a water
pipeline to Muscat and Matrah will be laid within 21 months of the date of contract,
making pure water available to all.

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 2. Electricity-all the preliminary stages have been completed and work is going
ahead briskly. It is hoped that the company to which the project has been entrusted will
supply electricity to consumers in Muscat and Matrah next summer.
3. Matrah Port--because of Matrah's outstanding natural location secure
commercial position and reliable communications with the various parts of the Sultanate,
which make it the commercial capital of the country, we consider that we should make a
start on the construction of port facilities in the near future, to which the general Customs
Department will be transferred, and where steamers, sailing craft and motor boasts may
moor to load and discharge. Sufficient warehouses will be provided for the storage and
protection on incoming and outgoing goods.
4. Saidi currency-another project which will be given priority and special study
is that of currency. The Saidi currency will be based on the Saidi Riyal, sub-divided into
la Riyal and % Riyal. Bazias will be minted to meet the requirements of the people,
denominations being of 100, 25, 20, 10, 5 and I Baiza. The necessary announcement
about this will be made at the appropriate time.
When we talk about planning we must not forget the oil-bearing area and the
Duru tribe who live there. They must be given special attention and must get the projects
they need and which suit them.
Other plans will follow later, in order of importance. We must not forget that the
area of the Sultanate is more than 100,000 square miles, that its coastline is no less than
1,000 miles long and that its population is estimated at more than half a million.
We shall appoint a body, known as the Developmental Board, to execute such
plans as we decide upon. This body will be responsible for drawing up a Budget for each
project and for keeping in touch with experts, technicians and others whom it is necessary
to consult in connection with any desired project.
We shall also appoint a special Board for the water and electricity schemes. It will
oversee the progress of work and will ensure that the schemes conform with the
regulations fixed by the Government to safeguard the needs of the people.
We are now passing through a preliminary planning state for the projects which
enjoy priority because they are for the benefit of all. We are looking forward to a bright
future by which we guarantee rasiisng the standard of living of the inhabitants of the
Sultanate and increasing the income of the individual. We shall develop the country so as
to keep pace with the cavalcade of present-day civilisation. We shall ensure every benefit
and advantage for the populace and we shall pursue those developments which bring us
that which is best and preferable and is consonant with our people's heritage and ancient
history. However much we progress and move forward we must keep before our eyes our
true religion on which we place our reliance and traditions which are our heritage. There
are prohibitions of our religion which are inviolable for ever and there are customs which
can be altered without infringing the basic traditions of the country which are among the
glories or our worthy ancestors, which are a source of pride and which protect our very
existence. The Almighty said in his Book 'Say "work" and God will see your work'.
We ask Almighty whose works are great to inspire us to do that which is right, to
crown our efforts with success, bring us success in our enterprises and grant us victory in
our desires. We are humble towards him whose power in sublime and brings us success
in what is for the good or our Omani people and country.

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Published: January 1968. Copy in author's archives.

(Reproduced from Townsend, J. (1977). Oman: the making of a modern state. London,
Croom Helm.)

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 VITA

MAJID AL-KHALILI

1989-1993 BAS in Criminal Justice

Florida Atlantic University
Boca Raton, FL

1994-1995 Legal Editor

Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
Muscat, Oman

1997-1999 MAS in International Relations

Florida International University
Miami, FL

1999 Teaching Assistant

Florida International University
Miami, FL

1999-2002 Recipient: Comprehensive Scholarship

Florida International University
Miami, FL

1999-2003 Conference Organizer

Florida International University
Miami, FL

2001 Recipient: Distinction in All Fields

Ph.D. Qualifying Examination
Florida International University
Miami, FL

2001-Present Adjunct Professor

Florida International University
Miami, FL

2002 Visiting Research Associate

Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies
University of Durham
England

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 Visiting Research Associate
The Middle East Centre
Oxford University
England

2003 Recipient: Excellence in Teaching Award

Florida International University
Miami, FL

2004 Recipient: Dissertation Year Fellowship

Florida International University
Miami, FL

PUBLICATIONS & PRESENTATIONS

Al-Khalili, Majid, (2004). "Oman's Foreign Policy Toward Iran: An Assessment."

Presented at the Center for Iranian Research and Analysis (CIRA), Orlando, Florida.

Al-Khalili, Majid, (2004). "The Iraq War: Regional and International Implications."
Presented at the conference for Veterans of World War II (VFW), Miami, Florida.

Al-Khalili, Majid, (publication pending). Oman's Foreign Policy: Foundations and

Practice. Dissertation submitted to Florida International University, Miami, Florida.

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