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SECOND DIVISION

DATU MALINGIN (LEMUEL G.R. No. 240056

T ALINGTING y SIMBORIO),
Tribal Chieftain, Higaonon- Present:
Sugbuanon Tribe,
Petitioner, PERLAS-BERNABE, S.A.J,
·Chairperson,
- versus - HERNANDO,
INTING, .
P03 ARVIN R. SANDAGAN, P03 DELOS SANTOS, and
ESTELITO R. AVELINO, P02 BALTAZAR-PADILLA,* JJ.
NOEL P. GUIMBAOLIBOT,
HON. PROSECUTOR III
JUNERY M. BAGUNAS and HON.
JUDGE CARLOS 0.
ARGUELLES, Regional Trial Promulgated:
Court, Branch 10, Abuyog, Leyte,
Respondents.
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _ ._ - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

DECISION

INTING, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Mandamus I with prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction filed by Datu Malingin (Lemuel Talin.gting y
Simborio) (petitioner-) praying that the Court (a) declares Branch 10,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Abuyog, Leyte to be without jurisdiction to
settle disputes involving Indigenous Peoples (IP); (b) orders Prosecutor
III Junery M. Bagu·n as (respondent Prosecutor) to refrain from
prosecuting cases involving IPs; and (c) declares Police Officer (PO) III
Arvin R. Sandagan, PO3 Estelito R. Avelino, PO.2 Noel P. Guimbaolibot
(respondent Police Officers) guilty of Arbitrary Detention (collectively
respondents).
On leave:
1
Rollo, pp. 3-3 I.

, __
Decision 2 G.R. No. 240056

The Antecedents

Through the criminal Informations issued by respondent

Prosecutor, petitioner was accused of having carnal knowledge of a 14-
year-old minor, AAA,2 on six occasions by force, threat, intimidation
and by taking advantage of superior strength. Consequently, Criminal
Case Nos. 3821 , 3822, 3823, 3824, 3825 and 3826 were filed against
him for rape and raffled with the RTC presided by Judge Carlos 0.
Arguelles (respondent Judge). 3

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash4 on the ground of

lack of jurisdiction. He averred that he was a member of the Higaonon-
Sugbuanon Tribe, an indigenous group. According to him, pursuant to
Sections 65 5 and 66,6 Republic Act No. (RA) 8371 ,7 the criminal cases
filed against him should be resolved first through the customary law and
practices of the indigenous group he belonged to and thereafter, the
issues must be referred to the National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (NCIP).

2
The identity of the victim or any information to establish or compromise her identity. as well as
those of her immediate fami ly or household members, shall be withheld pursuant to Republic Act
No. (RA) 76 10, "An Act Providing for Stronger Deterrence and Special Protection against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination, and for Other Purposes;" RA 9262, "An Act Defining
Violence against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes;" Section 40 of A. M. No. 04-1 0-1 I-SC,
known as the " Rule on Violence against Women and Their Children," effective November 15,
2004; People v. Cabalquinto, 533 Phil. 703 (2006); and Amended Administrati ve Circular No. 83-
201 5 dated September 5, 201 7, Subject: Protocols and Procedures in the Promulgation,
Publication, and Posting on the Websites of Decisions, Final Resolutions. and Final Orders Using
Fictitious Names/Personal Circumstances.
3
As culled from the Motion to Quash filed by petitioner with Branch I0, Regional Trial Court,
Abuyog, Leyte, rollo, p. 38.
' Id. at 38-39.
5
Section 65. Primacy of Customa,y Laws and Practices. - When disputes involve ICCs/IPs,
customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.
6
Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCI P, through its regional offices, shall have
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs: Provided, however,
That no such dispute shall be brought to the NC IP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies
provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a ce1tification shall be issued by the
Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has
not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing ofa petition with
the NCIP.
7
The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 240056

On August 31 , 201 7, respondent Judge issued a Joint Order8

denying the Motion to Quash for lack of merit. He ratiocinated that the
invocation of petitioner of the provisions of RA 8371 was misplaced. He
specified that RA 8371 covered only disputes concerning customary law
and practices of Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) and did not
extend to those recognized by regular courts such as violations of RA
83539 and the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Proceedings before the Court

Undeterred, petitioner filed the present petition contending that

mandamus is the only available remedy in order to ensure that the
victims of violations of cultural rights are given reparation.

Petitioner also argued that respondent Prosecutor committed grave

abuse of discretion when he failed to observe the rights of members of
an indigenous group. He claimed that the IPs are not included in the
persons subject of the country's penal laws because they have the right
to use customary laws and practices to resolve disputes. 10

Petitioner, likewise, ascribed grave abuse of discretion against

respondent Judge arguing that the latter did not take into account that the
cases cognizable by regular courts do not include those covered by RA
8371. 11

Finally, petitioner posited that respondent Police Officers

committed Arbitrary Detention because they detained him without
warrant on June 3, 2017. 12

Meanwhile, respondent Judge in his Comment 13 countered that the

petition should be denied outright because of its procedural infirmities.
He stressed that mandamus is the applicable remedy when the
complained act involved a ministerial duty. He asserted that he is
exercising judicial, not mere ministerial function, and the issue of lack of
8
Rollo, pp. 43-45.
" The Anti-Rape Luw of I 997.
10
Rollo, pp. 12, 15.
11
Id.at 15.
12
ld.at ll-1 2.
13
Id. at 62-67.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 240056

jurisdiction is a matter proper subject of a certiorari petition, not a

petition for mandamus.

Respondent Judge also contended that the petition was filed out of
time. He posited that petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration
on the denial of the Motion to Quash which is a sine qua non condition
in the filing of a petition for certiorari; and that the direct resort to the
Court is unjustified and, thus, violative of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts.

Furthermore, respondent Judge contended that the pet1t1oner

cannot rely on RA 8371 because he is not exempt from criminal
prosecution under the RPC; that followir.g the principle of generality,
penal laws are binding to all persons within the ten-itorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines; that rape cases are excluded in the claims or disputes
involving the rights of petitioner as a supposed member of ICCs or
IPs; and that to subscribe to the submissions of petitioner that he is
exempt from criminal prosecution by a regular court is to surrender
police power and grant him criminal immunity which he is not entitled
under the law.

On the other hand, respondents Prosecutor and Police Officers

manifested 14 that they adopt the Comment filed by respondent Judge and
prayed that the petition be dismissed for utter lack of merit.

Issue

May the Court issue a writ of mandamus to compel respondentJ

Judge and Prosecutor to desist from proceeding with the rape casesi
against petitioner and declare respondent Police Officers guilty ofi
Arbitrary Detention?

Our Ruling

The Petition for Mandamus lacks merit.

14
See Manifestation for the Adoption of the Comment of the Hon. Judge Carl os A rguelles, id. at 71 -
72, 82-83.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 240056

Non-observance of the doctrine

of hierarchy ofcourts.

Section 5( 1), 15 Article VIII of the Constitution provides that the

Court exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus. It shares this
original jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA as provided for under
Sections 9(1) 16 and 21(1Y 7 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129. By reason of
the shared jurisdiction, the immediate and direct recourse to the Court is
frowned upon following the doctrine of hierarchy of comts. 18

Specifically, the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts guides litigants

on the proper forum of their appeals as well as the venue for the issuance
of extraordinary writs. As to the latter, even if the RTC, the CA, and the
Court have concurrent original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, litigants
must, as a rule, file their petitions, with the court below and failure to do
so will be sufficient for the dismissal of the case. 19

This doctrine serves as a "constitutional filtering mechanisms" to

allow the Court to focus on its more important tasks. The Court is and
must remain the court of last resort. It must not be burdened with the
obligation to deal with suits which also fall under the original
jurisdiction of lower-ranked courts.20 Moreover, direct recourse to the
Court is allowed only in exceptional or compelling instances. There
being no extraordinary circumstance that was established here, then the

15
Section 5( 1), Article VIII, CONSTITUTION:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the fo llowing powers:
( I) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition. mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
16
Section 9( I), Batas Pambansa Big. 129 provides:
SECTION 9 . .Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:
(I) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, cerliorari, habeas corpus,
and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction[.]
17
Section 2 1( 1), Batas Pambansa Big. 129 provides:
Section 21. Original .Jurisdiction in Other Cases. - Regional Trial Courts shalI exercise original
jurisdiction:
( I) In the issuance of writs ot certio,-ori, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranlo, habeas
corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any pan of their respective regions[.]
18
See Ha Datu Tawahig v. Lapin id, G. R. No. 22 1139, March 20, 2019.
19
See Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of 7hmsportalion and Communications, G.R. No. 2 17158,
March 12,201 9.
io Id.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 240056

non-observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts warrants the

dismissal of the case. 2 1

Invocation of the provisions of

RA 8371 is insufficient to evade
criminal prosecution.

At any rate, even if the Court sets aside the failure of petitioner to
abide by the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the Petition for Mandamu~
will still fail as it is not a proper recourse to compel respondents to defer
from pursuing the criminal cases against him.

Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for

mandamus is an appropriate remedy when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person: (1) unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office,
trust, or station; or (2) unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. Added to
this, it must be shown that there is " no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law" that may be availed of by the
aggrieved person.

The present petition falls within the first instance cited above
considering that petitioner contends that respondents neglected their
duties that the law required of them to do. This being so, for a writ of
mandamus to be issued, there must be the concurrence of petitioner's
legal right and a corresponding ministerial duty imposed by law upon
respondents which they failed to perform. 22

Petitioner's legal right must be clearly shown and the pet1t1on

must also prove that respondents indeed neglected to do a ministerial
duty mandated by law. In contrast with discretionary duty, ministerial
duty does not involve the exercise of judgment. It is a duty where an
officer or tribunal, for that matter, undertakes one's tasks in a prescribed
manner and in compliance with the law, without regard to one's own
judgment.23

21
Saint Mary Crusade to Alleviate Poverty of Brethren Foundation, Inc. v. Judge Riel. 750 Phil. 57.
68 (20 15).
22
lihaylihay v. Tan. G.R. No. 192223. July 23.2018.
2
' Id. , citing Samson v. Barrios, 63 Phil. 198, 203 ( i 936).
Decision 7 G.R. No. 240056

Notably, the foregoing requirements were not established in the

case.

First, petitioner failed to show that he has a clear legal right which
respondents had violated.

To stress, petitioner relied on Sections 65 and 66 (on the

jurisdiction of the NCIP), RA 8371 in arguing that respondents have no
jurisdiction to prosecute him for his supposed criminal liability.
However, his postulation is untenable because RA 8371 finds
application in disputes relating to claims and rights of ICCs/IPs. This is
not the case here.

Let it be underscored that petitioner's indictment for Rape has

nothing to do with his purported membership in an ICC, but by reason of
his alleged acts that is covered by the RPC. At the same time, RA 8371
does not serve as a bar for criminal prosecution because crime is an
offense against the society. 24 Thus, penal laws apply to individuals
without regard to his or her membership in an ICC.

Definitely, customary laws and practices of the IPs may be

invoked provided that they are not in conflict with the legal system of
the country. There must be legal harmony between the national laws and
customary laws and practices in order for the latter to be viable and valid
and must not undennine the application of legislative enactments,
including penal laws. 25

6
The recent case of Ha Datu Tawahig v. Lapinid2 (Ha Datul
Tawahig) also involved a petition for mandamus against a judge an~
prosecutor in relation to the prosecution of another IP member and tribal
leader for rape. Therein petitioner also relied on the provisions of RAj
83 71 maintaining that he was not covered by penal laws.

The Court explained in Ha Datu Tawahig that the intention of our

laws to protect the IPs does not include the deprivation of courts of its
24
Ha Datu Tawahig v. Lapinid, supra note l 8, citing P.J. Ortmeier, Public Safety and Security
Administration 23 ( 1999).
25 Id.
26
G.R. No.221139, March 20, 20 19.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 240056

jurisdiction over criminal cases. This means that members of the ICC
who are charged with criminal offenses cannot simply invoke the
provisions of RA 8371 to evade prosecution and the possibility of
criminal sanctions.

Interestingly, herein petitioner raised substantially the same

arguments as the petitioner in Ha Datu Tawahig. For this reason, the
Court reiterates Our earlier pronouncement that one's membership in al1j
indigenous group shall not hinder the filing of a criminal case against the
concerned person. This being the case, it follows that no right of
petitioner, as an alleged member of an ICC, was violated by the filing of
rape charges against him. Thus, the first requirement for the issuance of
a writ of mandamus is lacking.

Second, petitioner did not prove any ministerial duty on the part of
respondents which they neglected to perform.

In prosecuting a criminal case, the State, through the public

prosecutor, exercises its police power and punishes those who are found
guilty, through the determination by the court of law. Undeniably,
criminal prosecution and the court's adjudication pertain to discretionary
duties, not ministerial functions, because they requ ire respondents
Judge, Prosecutor and even respondents Police Officers to act in
accordance with their own judgments and consciences uncontrolled by
anyone. Overall, when the law requires and grants a public officer the
ri ght to decide on how he or she shall perform one's duty, then
he or she is vested with discretionary functions,27 as in the case of
respondents.

Verily, in the absence of a clear legal right on the part of petitioner

and the corresponding ministerial duties required by law on respondents
that they neglected to perform, then a writ of mandamus cannot be
issued.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Mandamus is DISMISSED.

27
lihaylihay v. Tan, supra note 22, citing Sy Ha v. Gulang, 117 Phil. 798, 805 ( 1963).
Decision 9 G.R. No. 240056

SO ORDERED.

HEN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ESTELA &~Lt's-BERNABE
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson

RA~RN~NDO
,~
EDGARDO L. DELOS SANTOS
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On leave)
PRISCILLA J. BALTAZAR-PADILLA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

ESTELA M~R~RNABE
Senior Associate Justice
Chai,person
Decision 10 G.R. No. 240056

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the

Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.