Types of Law in Relation to Types of Social Solidarity

Excerpts from Emile Durkheim, The Division oj Labor il! Society, Free Press
of Glencoe, 1964, pp. 68-132.

Since law reproduces the principal forms of social solidarity,we

have only to classify the different types of law to find therefrom
the different types of social solidarity which correspond to it. It
is now probable that there is a type which symbolizes this special
solidarity of which the division of labor is the cause. That found,
it will suffice, in order to measure the part of the division of labor,
to compare the number of juridical rules which express it with
the total volume of law. [ ... J
To proceed scientifically, we must find some characteristic
which, while being essential to juridical phenomena, varies as they
vary. Every precept of law can be dcfined as a rule of sanctioned
conduct. Moreover, it is evident that sanctions change with the
gravity attributed to precepts, the place they hold in the
conscience, the role they play in society. it is right, then, to
classifiy juridical rules according to the different sanctions which
are attached to them.
They are of two kinds. Some consist essentially in suffering,
or at least a loss, inflicted on the agent. They make demands Oll
his fortune, or on his honor, or on his life, or on his liberty, and
deprive him of something he enjoys. We call them repressive. They
constitute penal law. It is true that those which are attached to
rules which are purely moral have the same character, only they
are distributed in a diffuse manner, by everybody indiscriminately,
whereas those in penal law are applied through the intermediary
of a definite organ; they are organized. A~ for the other type, it
does not necessarily imply suffering for the agent, but consists
only of the re/lirn of things as they were, in the re-establishment of
troubled relations to their normal state, whether the incriminated
act is restored by force to the type whence it or is
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law and Social Structure
Emile Durkheim
annulled, that is, deprived of all social value. We must then
separate juridical rules into two great classes, accordingly as they them. civil law, more generally in every type law
have organized repressive sanctions or only restitutive sanctions. restitutive sanctions, the legislator takes up and solves the two
The first comprise all penal law ; the second, civil law, commercial questions separately. He first determines the obligation with all
law, procedural law, administrative and constitutional law, after possible precision, and it is only later that he stipulates the man-
abstraction of the penal rules which may be found there. ner in which it should be sanctioned. For example, in the chapter
Let us now seek for the type of social solidarity to which each of the French civil code which is devoted to the respective duties
of these two types corresponds. [... J of married persons, the rights and obligations are announced in
The link of social solidarity to which'repressive law corres- a positive manner; but no mention is made of what happens
ponds is the one whose break constitutes a crime. By this name when these duties are violated by one or the other. We must go
we call every act which, in any degree whatever, invokes against elsewhere to find this sanction. Sometimes it is totally lacking.
its author the characteristic reaction which we term punishment. Thus, article 214 of the civil code orders the wife to live with her
To see the nature of this link is to inquire into the cause of husband; we deduce from that that the husband can force her to
punishment, or more precisely, to inquire what crime remain in the conj1,!&al domicile, but this sanction is nowhere
consists of. [... J formally indicated; lienal law, on the contrary, sets forth only
The method of finding the permanent and pervasive element sanctions, but says nothing of the obligations to which they cor-
crime is surely not by enumerating the acts that at all times respond. It does not command respect for the life of another, but
in every place have been termed crimes, observing, thus, kills the assassin. It does not say, first off, as does civil law:
characters that they present. For if, as it may be, they are Here is the duty; but rather: Here is the punishment. No doubt, if
which have universally been regarded as criminal, they are the action is punished, it is because it is contrary to an obligatory
smallest minority, and, consequently, such a method would rule, but this rule is not expressly formulated. There can be
us a very mistaken notion, since it would be applied only one reason for this, which is that the rule is known and accepted
exceptions. These variations of repressive law prove at the by everybody. When a law of custom becomes written and is
time that the constant characteristic could not be found aUIUlll! codified, it is because questions of litigation demand a more
the intrinsic properties of acts imposed or prohibited by definite solution. If the custom continues to function silently,
rules, since they present such diversity, but rather in the without raising any discussion of difficulties, there is no reason
that they sustain with some condition external to them. [... J for transforming it. Since penal law is codified only to establish
In effect, the only common characteristic of aU crimes is a graduated scale of punishments, it is thus the scale alone which
they consist in acts universally disapproved of by members can lend itself to doubt. Inversely, if rules whose violation is
each society. We ask ourselves these days whether this reproba- punished do not need a juridical expression, it is because they are
tion is rational, whether it would not be wiser to see in crime only the object of no contest, because everybody feels their authority
a malady or an error. But we need not enter upon these discus- (cf. Binding, 1872, p. 6 ff.). [... J
sions; we seek to determine what is or has been, not what ought The functioning of repressive justice tends to remain more or
to be. Thus~&fthe reality of the fact that we have just established less diffuse. In very different social systems, it does not function
is not contestable; that is, that crime shocks sentiments which, through the means of a special magistracy, but the whole society
for a given social system, are found in all healthy consciences. participates in a rather large measure. In primitive societies,
[... J where, as we shall see, law is wholly penal, it is the assembly of
Every written law has a double object: to prescribe certain the people which renders justice. This was the case among the
obligations, and to define the sanctions which are attached to ancient Germans (Tacitus, Germania, Chapt. 12). In Rome,
18 while civil affairs were given over to the praetor, criminal matters
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Law and Social Structure Emile Durkheim

were handled by the people, first by the curile comites, and then, conditions of existence, its mode of development, just as individ-
beginning with the law of the Twelve Tables, by the centurial ual types, although in a different way. Thus understood, it has
comites. Until the end of the republic, even though in fact it had right to be denoted by a special word. [... J
delegated its powers to permanent commissions, the people We must not say that an action shocks the common conscience
remained, in principle, the supreme judge of this type of process. because it is criminal, but rather that it is criminal because it
In Athens, under the legislation of Solon, criminal jurisdiction shocks the common conscience. We do not reprove it because it
partly rested in the' HAtala', a vast assemblage which nomi- is a crime, but it is a crime because we reprove it. As for the
nally comprised all the citizens over the age of thirty (cf. intrinsic nature of these sentiments, it is impossible to specify
Gilbert, 1881, p. 138). Then, among Germano-Latin peoples, them. They have the most diverse objects and cannot be en-
society, in the person of the jury, intervened in the exercise compassed in a single formula. We can say that they relate
of these same functions. The diffused state in which this part neither to vital interests of society nor to a minimum of justice.
of judicial power is thus found would be inexplicable, if the AU these definitions are inadequate. By this alone can we recog-
rules whose observation it assured, and, consequently, the senti- nize it: a sentiment, whatever its origin and end, is found in
ments to which these rules correspond, were not immanent in all consciences with a certain degree of force and precision,
consciences. It is true that, in other cases, the power is wielded by every action which violates it is a crime. [... J
a privileged class or by particular magistrates. But these facts do It is an error to believe that vengeance is but useless
not lessen the demonstrative value of the preceding, for simply is very possible that, in itself, it consists of a mechanical and
because collective sentiments are enforced only through certain aimless reaction, in an emotional and irrational movement, in an
intermediaries, it does not follow that they have ceased to be unintelligent need to destroy; but, in fact, what it tends to destroy
collective while localizing themselves in a restricted number of was a menace to us. It consists, then, in a veritable act of defense,
consciences. This delegation may be due either to the very great although an instinctive and unreflective one. We avenge ourselves
mUltiplicity of affairs which necessitate the institution of special only upon what has done us evil, and what has done us evil is
functionaries, or to the very great importance assumed by certain always dangerous. The instinct of vengeance is, in sum, only the
persons or certain classes and which makes them the authorized instinct of conservation exacerbated by peril. Thus, vengeance is
interpreters of collective sentiments. [... ] far from having had the negative and sterile role in the history
"The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citi- of mankind which is attributed to it. It is a defensive weapon
zens of the same society forms a determinate system which has its which has its worth, but it is a crude weapon. As it has no realiza-
own life; one may call it the collective or common conscience. No tion of the services which it automatically renders, it cannot,
doubt, it has not a specific organ as a substratum; it is, by defini- consequence, regulate itself; but it responds somewhat hap-
tion, diffuse in every reach of society. Nevertheless, it has specific hazardly to blind causes which urge it on and without anything
characteristics which make it a distinct reality. It is, in moderating its activities. Today, since we better understand the
independent of the particular conditions in which individuals end to be attained, we better know how to utilize the means at
placed; they pass on and it remains. It is the same in the pur disposal; we protect ourselves with better means and, accord-
and in the South, in great cities and in small, in different ingly, more efficiently. But, in the beginning, this result was
sions. Moreover, it does not change with each generation, J>btained in a rather imperfect manner. Between the punishment of
on the contrary, it connects successive generations with . t9day and yesterday there is no chasm, and consequently it was
another. It is, thus, an entirely different thing from necessary for the latter to become something other than itself
consciences, although it can be realized only through them. It accommodate itself to the role that it plays in our civilized
the psychical type of society, a type whiCh has its properties, ;~9cieties. The whole difference derives from the fact that it now
20 21
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Law and Social Structure Emile Durkheim

were handled by the people, first by the curile comites, and then, conditions of existence, its mode of development, just as individ-
beginning with the law of the Twelve Tables, by the centurial ual types, although in a different way. Thus understood, it has
comites. Until the end of the republic, even though in fact it had right to be denoted by a special word. [... J
delegated its powers to permanent commissions, the people We must not say that an action shocks the common conscience
remained, in principle, the supreme judge of this type of process. because it is criminal, but rather that it is criminal because it
In Athens, under the legislation of Solon, criminal jurisdiction shocks the common conscience. We do not reprove it because it
partly rested in the' HAtala', a vast assemblage which nomi- is a crime, but it is a crime because we reprove it. As for the
nally comprised all the citizens over the age of thirty (cf. intrinsic nature of these sentiments, it is impossible to specify
Gilbert, 1881, p. 138). Then, among Germano-Latin peoples, them. They have the most diverse objects and cannot be en-
society, in the person of the jury, intervened in the exercise compassed in a single formula. We can say that they relate
of these same functions. The diffused state in which this part neither to vital interests of society nor to a minimum of justice.
of judicial power is thus found would be inexplicable, if the AU these definitions are inadequate. By this alone can we recog-
rules whose observation it assured, and, consequently, the senti- nize it: a sentiment, whatever its origin and end, is found in
ments to which these rules correspond, were not immanent in all consciences with a certain degree of force and precision,
consciences. It is true that, in other cases, the power is wielded by every action which violates it is a crime. [... J
a privileged class or by particular magistrates. But these facts do It is an error to believe that vengeance is but useless
not lessen the demonstrative value of the preceding, for simply is very possible that, in itself, it consists of a mechanical and
because collective sentiments are enforced only through certain aimless reaction, in an emotional and irrational movement, in an
intermediaries, it does not follow that they have ceased to be unintelligent need to destroy; but, in fact, what it tends to destroy
collective while localizing themselves in a restricted number of was a menace to us. It consists, then, in a veritable act of defense,
consciences. This delegation may be due either to the very great although an instinctive and unreflective one. We avenge ourselves
mUltiplicity of affairs which necessitate the institution of special only upon what has done us evil, and what has done us evil is
functionaries, or to the very great importance assumed by certain always dangerous. The instinct of vengeance is, in sum, only the
persons or certain classes and which makes them the authorized instinct of conservation exacerbated by peril. Thus, vengeance is
interpreters of collective sentiments. [... ] far from having had the negative and sterile role in the history
"The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citi- of mankind which is attributed to it. It is a defensive weapon
zens of the same society forms a determinate system which has its which has its worth, but it is a crude weapon. As it has no realiza-
own life; one may call it the collective or common conscience. No tion of the services which it automatically renders, it cannot,
doubt, it has not a specific organ as a substratum; it is, by defini- consequence, regulate itself; but it responds somewhat hap-
tion, diffuse in every reach of society. Nevertheless, it has specific hazardly to blind causes which urge it on and without anything
characteristics which make it a distinct reality. It is, in moderating its activities. Today, since we better understand the
independent of the particular conditions in which individuals end to be attained, we better know how to utilize the means at
placed; they pass on and it remains. It is the same in the pur disposal; we protect ourselves with better means and, accord-
and in the South, in great cities and in small, in different ingly, more efficiently. But, in the beginning, this result was
sions. Moreover, it does not change with each generation, J>btained in a rather imperfect manner. Between the punishment of
on the contrary, it connects successive generations with . t9day and yesterday there is no chasm, and consequently it was
another. It is, thus, an entirely different thing from necessary for the latter to become something other than itself
consciences, although it can be realized only through them. It accommodate itself to the role that it plays in our civilized
the psychical type of society, a type whiCh has its properties, ;~9cieties. The whole difference derives from the fact that it now
20 21
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Law and Social Structure Emile Durkheim

produces its effects with a much greater understanding of what it Since, therefore, the sentiments crime offends are, III any
does. But, although the individual or social conscience may not given society, the most universally collective that there are;
be without influence upon the reality that it clarifies, it has not since they are, indeed, particularly strong states of common
the power to change its nature. The internal structure of pheno- conscience, it is impossible for them to tolerate
mena remains the same, whether they be conscious of it or not. particularly if this contradiction is not purely
We thus reach the conclusion that the essential elements of affirms itself not only by words, but by acts - when it is thus car-
punishment are the same as of old. ried to its maximum, we cannot avoid rising against it passion-
Arid in truth, punishment has remained, at least in part, a work ately. A simple restitution of the troubled order would not
of vengeance. It is said that we do not make the culpable suffer in suffice for us; we must have a more violent satisfaction. The force
order to make him suffer; it is none the less true that we find it against which the crime comes is too intense to react
just that he suffer. Perhaps we are wrong, but that is not the much moderation. Moreover, it cannot do so
question. We seek, at the moment, to define punishment as it is itself, for it is thanks to the intensity of the reaction that it
or has been, not as it ought to be. It is certain that this expression keeps alive and maintains itself with the same degree of energy.
of public vindication which finds its way again and again into the [... J
language of the courts is not a word taken in vain. In supposing Thus, the nature of collective sentiments accounts
that punishment can really serve to protect us in the future, we ment, and, consequently, for crime. Moreover, we see anew that
think that it ought to be above all an expiation of the past. The the power of reaction which is given over to governmental
proof of this lies in the minute precautions we take to proportion functionaries, once they have made their appearance, is only an
punishment as exactly as possible to th severity of the crime; they emanation of that which has been diffuse in society since
would be inexplicable if we did not believe that the culpable ought birth. The one is only the reflex of the other. The extent of the
to suffer because he has done evil and in the same degree. [... J first varies with that of the second. Let us add, moreover, that the
The nature of punishment has not been changed in essentials. institution of this power serves to maintain the common con-
All that we can say is that the need of vengeance is better science itself. For it would be enfeebled if the organ which
today than heretofore. The spirit of foresight which has represents it did not partake of that which inspired it and the
aroused no longer leaves the field so free for the blind action particular authority that it exercises. But it cannot participate
passion. It contains it within certain limits; it is opposed it unless all the acts which offend it are opposed and combatted
absurd violence, to unreasonable ravaging. More clarified, as those which offend the collective conscience, even though
expends less on chance. One no longer sees it tum against collective conscience is not directly affected. [... J
innocent to satisfy itself. But it nevertheless remains the soul Although punishment proceeds from a quite mechanical
penali ty. We can thus say that punishment consists in a reaction, from movements which are passionate and in great part
reaction of graduated intensity. [... ] non-reflective, it does playa useful role. Only this role is not
Every strong state of conscience is a source of life; it is where we ordinarily look for it. It does not serve, or else
essential factor of our general vitality. Consequently, everythin , quite secondarily, in correcting the culpable or in intimi-
that tends to enfeeble it wastes and corrupts us. There results ,UIUlll/S possible followers. From this point of view, its efficacy is

troubled sense of illness analogous to that which we feel when doubtful and, in any case, mediocre. Its true function is to
important function is suspended or lapses. It is then . social cohesion intact, while maintaining all its vitality
that we should react energetically against the cause that common conscience. Denied so categorically, it
us with such diminution, that we strain to do away with it in lose its energy, if an emotional reaction of the com~
to maintain the integrity of our conscience. [... ] did not come to compensate its loss, and it would
22
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Law and Social Structure Emile Durkheim

in a breakdown of social solidarity. It is necessary, then, that it be social life which the common conscience embraces and regulates.
affirmed forcibly at the very moment when it is contradicted, and The greater the diversity of relations wherein the latter makes its
the only means of affirming it is to express the unanimous aver- action felt, the more also it creates links which attach the individ-
sion which the crime continues to inspire, by an authentic act ual to the group; the more, consequently, social cohesion derives
which can consist only in suffering inflicted upon the agent. Thus, completely from this source and bears its mark. But the number
while being the necessary product of the causes which engender of these relations is itself proportional to that of the repressive
this suffering is not a gratuitous cruelty. It is the sign which wit- rules. In determining what fraction of the juridical system
nesses that collective sentiments are always collective, that the law represents, we, at the same time, measure the relative
communion of spirits in the same faith rests on a solid founda- portance of this solidarity. It is true that in such a procedure we
tion, and accordingly, that it is repairing the evil which the crime do not take into account certain elements of the collective con-
inflicted upon society. That is why we are right in saying that the science which, because of their smaller power or their indeter-
criminal must suffer in proportion to his crime, why theories minateness, remain foreign to repressive law while contributing
which refuse to punish any expiatory character appear as so to the assurance of social harmony. These are the ones protected
many spirits subversive of the social order. It is because these by punishments which are merely diffuse. But the same is the case
doctrines could be practised only in a society where the whole with other parts of law. There is not one of them which is not
common conscience would be nearly gone. Without this necessary complemented by custom, and as there is no reason for supposing
satisfaction, what we call the moral conscience could not be that the relation of law and custom is not the same in these dif-
conserved. We can thus say, without paradox, that punishment is ferent spheres, this elimination is not made at the risk of having
above all designed to act upon upright people, for, since it serves to alter the results of our comparison. [. .. J
to heal the wounds made upon collective sentiments, it can fill
this role only where these sentiments exist, and commensurately The very nature of the restitutive sanction suffices to show that
with their vivacity. Of course, by warning already disturbed the social solidarity to which this type of law corresponds is of a
spirits of a new enfeeblement of the collective soul, it can even stop totally different kind. What distinguishes this sanction is that it
attacks from multiplying, but this result, however useful, is is not expiatory, but consists of a simple return in state. Suffer-
a particular blow. In short, in order to form an exact idea ance proportionate to the misdeed is not inflicted on the one who
punishment, we must reconcile the two contradictory theories. has violated the law or who disregards it: he is simply sentenced
which deal with it: that which sees it as expiation, and that to comply with it. If certain things were done, the judge rein-
makes it a weapon for social defense. It is certain that it states them as they would have been. He speaks of law; he says
for the protection of society, but that is because it is !;;[Link],LUl nothing of punishment. Damage-interests have no penal charac-
Moreover, if it must be expiatory, that does not mean that ter; they are only a means of reviewing the past in order to rein-
some mystical virtue pain compensates for the error, but state it, as far as possible, to its normal form. [... J
that it can produce a socially useful effect only under this The pleader who has lost in litigation is not disgraced,
dition. honor is not put in question. We can even imagine these rules
The result of the preceding is this : there exists a social being other than they are without feeling any repugnance. The
arity which comes from a certain number of states of conS"'l~ll idea of tolerating murder arouses us, but we quite easily accept
which are common to all the members of the same society. modification of the right of succession, and can even conceive
is what repressive law materially represents, at least in so far its possible abolition. It is at least a question which we do not
it is essential. The part that it plays in the general integration /';""f'nse to discuss. Indeed, we admit with impunity that the law
society evidently depends upon the greater or lesser extent of itudes or that of usufructs may be otherwise organized, that
24 25
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Law and Social Structure Emile Durkheim

the obligations of vendor and purchaser may be determined in We shall recognize only two kinds of positive solidarity which
some other manner, that administrative functions may be dis- are distinguishable by the following qualities;
tributed according to different principles. As these prescriptions
1. The first binds the individual directly to society without
do not correspond to any sentiment in us, and as we generally do
any intermediary. In the second, he depends upon society because
not scientifically know the reasons for their existence, since this
he depends upon the parts of which it is composed.
science is not definite, they have no roots in the majority of us.
[... J 2. Society is not seen in the same aspect in the two cases. In
The relations governed by cooperative law with restitutive the first, what we call society is a more or less organized totality
sanctions and the solidarity which they express, result from the of beliefs and sentiments common to all the members the
division of social labor. We have explained, moreover, that, in group: this is the collective type. On the other hand, the society
general, cooperative relations do not convey other sanctions. In in which we are solidary in the second instance is a system of
fact, it is in the nature of special tasks to escape the action of different, special functions which definite relations unite. These
collective conscience, for, in order for a thing to be the object two societies really make up only one. They are two aspects of
common sentiments, the first condition is that it be common, one and the same reality, but none the less they must be dis-
is to say, that it be present in all consciences and that all tinguished.
represent it in one and the same manner. To be sure, in so 3. From this second difference there arises another which helps
as functions have a certain generality, everybody can have us to characterize and name the two kinds of solidarity.
idea of them. But the more specialized they are, the more The first can be strong only if the ideas and tendencies common
cumscribed the number of those cognizant of each of them. to all the members of the society are greater in number and
sequently, the more marginal they are to the common conSCIence. tensity than those which pertain personally to each member. It is
The rules which determine them cannot have the superior as much stronger as the excess is more considerable. But what
the transcendent authority which, when offended, makes our personality is how much of our own individual quali-
expiation. It is also from opinion that their authority comes, as ties we have, what distinguishes us from others. This solidarity
the case with penal rules, but from an opinion localized can grow only in inverse ratio to personality. There are in each
restricted regions of society. [... ] of us, as we have said, two consciences: one which is common to
This Jaw definitely plays a role in society analogous to our group in its entirety, which, consequently, is not ourself,
played by the nervous system in the organism. The latter has society living and acting within us; the other, on the contrary,
its task, in effect, the regulation of the different functions of represents that in us which is personal and distinct, that which
body in such a way as to make them harmonize. It thus makes us an individual. Solidarity which comes from likenesses is
naturally expresses the state of concentration at which the at its maximum when the collective conscience completely en-
ism has arrived, in accordance with the division of velops our whole conscience and coincides aU points with it.
labor. Thus, on different levels of the animal scale, we can meas-:l1 But, at that moment, our individuality is nil. It can be born only if
ure the degree of this concentration according to the the community takes smaller toll of us. There are, here, two con-
of the nervous system. Which is to say that we can equally meas.. trary forces, one centripetal, the other centrifugal, which cannot
ure the degree of concentration at which a society has arrived flourish at the same time. We cannot, at one and the same time,
accordance with the division of social labor according to develop ourselves in two opposite senses. If we have a lively
development of cooperative law with restitutive sanctions. desire to think and act for ourselves, we cannot be strongly
can foresee the great services that this criterion will render inclined to think and act as others do. If our ideal is to present
[... J a singular and personal appearance, we do not want to resemble
26 27
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Law and Social Structure

everybody else. Moreover, at the moment when this solidaritYFuch less heavy than when society completely controls us, and
exercises its force, our personality vanishes, as our definition~t leaves much more place open for the free play of our initiative.
per~its. us to say, for we are no longer ourselves, but the col-~e~e, then, the i~dividuality of all grows at the same time as that
lectIve hfe. . pf Its parts. SOCIety becomes more capable of collective move-
The social molecules which can be coherent in this way caniment, !
at the same time that each of its elements has more freedom
act together only in the measure that they have no actions oftheir' f movement. This solidarity resembles that which we observe
own, as the molecules of inorganic bodies. That is why we propose mong the higher animals. Each organ, in effect, has its special
to call this type of solidarity mechanical. The term does not sig- hysiognomy, its autonomy. And, moreover, the unity of the
nify that it is produced by mechanical and artificial means. We organism is as great as the individuation of the parts is more
call it that only by analogy to the cohesion which unites the ele- arked. Because of this analogy, we propose to call the
ments of an inanimate body, as opposed to that which makes a olidarity which is due to the division of labor, organic.
unity out of the elements of a living body. What justifies this At the same time, the preceding analyses furnish us with the
term is that the link which thus unites the individual to society is means to calculate the part which remains to each of these two
wholly analogous to that which attaches a thing to a person. The; social links in the total common result which they concur in
individual conscience, considered in this light, is a simple depen- producing through their different media. We know under what
dent upon the collective type ancLfollows all of its movements, xternal forms these two types of solidarity are symbolized, that
as the possessed object follows those of its owner. In societies is to say, what the body of juridical rules which corresponds to
where this type of solidarity is highly developed, the individual each of them is. Consequently, in order to recognize their respec-
does not appear. Individuality is something which the societ tive importance in a given social type, it is enough to compare the
possesses. Thus, in these social types, personal rights are not ye respective extent of the two types oflaw which express them, since
distinguished from real rights. law always varies as the social relations which it governs.
It is quite otherwise with the solidarity which the division 0
labor produces. Whereas the previous type implies that indiVid)iReferences .
O t h . d'-I'!' Th: BINDING, K. (1872), Die Normen und Ihre Uebertretung,
ua Is resem bI e each 0 th er, th IS ype presumes t err luerence., vol. 1, Leipzig.
first is possible only in so far as the individual personality i GILBERT, G. (1881), Handbuch der Griechischen Staatsalterthiimer
absorbed into the collective personality; the second is possibl, vol. 1, Leipzig.
only if each one has a sphere of action which is peculiar to him~
that is, a personality. It is necessary, then, that the collectiv~
conscience leave open a part of the individual conscience iril
order that special functions may be established there, functionl:vI
which it cannot regulate. The more this region is extended, th(
stronger is the cohesion which results from this solidarity. llt1
effect, on the one hand, each one depends as much more strict('
on society as labor is more divided; and, on the other, tht
activity of each is as much more personal as it is more specialize~
Doubtless, as circumscribed as it is, it is never completely original
Even in the exercise of our occupation we conform to usages, t~
practices which are common to our whole professional brothe~l
hood. But, even in this instance, the yoke that we submit to
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