CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE GUIDE

BAIL IS THE SECURITY GIVEN FOR THE TEMPORARY RELEASE

OF A PERSON WHO HAS BEEN ARRESTED AND DETAINED BUT
WHOSE GUILT HAS NOT YET PROVEN IN COURT BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT.

People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Escobar

G.R. No. 214300, July 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
On October 6, 2008, RTC denied the first petition for bail of Escobar as
well as the CA on March 8, 2011. Subsequent development on his case,
Escobar compelled to file a second petition for bail. On April 26, 2012, RTC
denied on the ground of res judicata. On March 24, 2014, CA overturned and
granted Escobar's second petition for bail.
Escobar was suspected of conspiring in the kidnap for ransom of Mary
Grace Cheng-Rosagas, daughter of Filipino Chinese Robert Cheng, owner of
Uratex foam and two others ( Torres & Burca ). On June 18, 2001, Mary Grace
and bodyguard Torres and driver Burca were passing Malcolm Hall at UP
Diliman, when a vehicle blocked their way.
Kidnap For Ransom (KFR) leader Rolando Villaver and some suspects
traveled and detained Mary Grace in Batangas and transfer to Club Solvento, a
resort owned by Escobar. Kidnappers negotiate and Cheng paid 15 million
pesos and Mary Grace et al was released.
Cancio Cubillas, the driver of the KFR group, became the state witness
and executed an extrajudicial
confession and implicated Escobar as an adviser to Villaver and received
ransom money.
On February 17, 2004, amended information was filed before RTC,
charging Escobar as a co-conspirator in the KFR. On February 14, 2008,
Escobar was arrested. On June 3, 2008, Escobar filed his first petition for bail,
however, RTC denied Escobar's petition.
On March 8, 2011, Escobar appealed at the CA but was denied. On
October 27, 2011, Escobar filed a motion for reconsideration but still denied by
the CA. Sometime in January 2012, Escobar left in detention while the other
accused who had active participation in KFR had been granted bail, Escobar
noticed the release of Rolando Villaver.
On January 27, 2012, Escobar filed his second petition for bail before
the RTC. On April 26, 2012, RTC denied Escobar's second bail petition on the
ground of res judicata. On January 14, 2013, Escobar appealed before the CA.
On March 24, 2014, CA granted the petition for bail of Escobar, however, the
bail was not notarized nor approved by the RTC.
Prosecution appeals to the CA but was denied. On November 6, 2014, the
prosecution through the office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for review
under rule 65, assailing the approval of Escobar's second bail petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Escobar's second petition for bail is barred by res judicata
2. Whether or not Escobar should be granted bail.

1
 RULE 114 - BAIL

RULING:
Escobar's second bail petition is not barred by res judicata as this
doctrine is not recognized in criminal proceedings, expressly available in civil
cases as found in rule 39 of the Civil Procedure and is excluded in the Rules of
Criminal Procedures.
Bail is the security given for the temporary release of a person who has
been arrested and detained but whose guilt has not yet proven in court beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Assuming that this case allows for res judicata as applied in civil cases,
Escobar's second bail petition cannot be barred as there is no final judgment.
Escobar is granted bail, however, it must be contained in a public document
and approved by the RTC.

2
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE GUIDE

WHILE BAIL MAY GENERALLY BE GRANTED AS A MATTER OF RIGHT

PRIOR TO THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED, THOSE CHARGED
WITH A CAPITAL OFFENSE IS GRANTED BAIL ONLY WHEN THE
EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS NOT STRONG.

Janet Lim Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 224162, November 07, 2017
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
On September 16, 2013, the Office of the Ombudsman received the
report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), regarding its investigation
on several persons, including Napoles, former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
(Enrile) and his former Chief of Staff, Atty. Jessica Lucila Reyes (Reyes). NBI
recommended to prosecute Napoles, former Senator Enrile, Reyes, and several
other named individuals for the crime of Plunder for essentially
misappropriating former Senator Enrile’s Priority Development Assistant Fund
(PDAF) through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that were selected
without the required bidding procedure.
Thus, in an Information dated June 5, 2014, Napoles, together with
former Senator Enrile, Reyes, Ronald John Lim and John Raymund De Asis,
were charged with Plunder filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Information
stated that: the accused unlawfully amassed P172 Million pesos through a
combination or series of overt criminal acts: repeatedly receiving kickbacks or
commissions funded from Enrile’s PDAF targeting Napoles’s NGOs as recipients
which turned out to be ghosts or fictitious, thus enabling NAPOLES to
misappropriate the PDAF proceeds for her personal gain and taking undue
advantage of their official positions to the prejudice of the Republic.
A petition for Bail was filed by Napoles on July 7, 2014, arguing that the
evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to prove her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. She particularly assailed the credibility of the State witnesses (otherwise
referred to as whistleblowers) as these are allegedly mere hearsay, tainted with
bias, and baseless. Citing the res inter alios acta rule, Napoles submitted that
the testimonies of these whistleblowers are inadmissible against her.
In view of Napoles’ application for bail, the Sandiganbayan conducted
bail hearings. The Sandiganbayan denied the petition for Bail for lack of merit.
Thus, a petition for certiorari was filed before the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed Resolutions
denying Napoles’ application for bail.

RULING:
NO. The prosecution bears the burden of proving that evidence of
Napoles’ guilt of the crime is strong.
This right to bail is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, except when the
accused is charged with a capital offense.

3
 RULE 114 - BAIL

While bail may generally be granted as a matter of right prior to the

conviction of the accused, those charged with a capital offense is granted bail
only when the evidence of guilt is not strong. The trial court is thus granted the
discretion to determine whether there is strong evidence of guilt on the part of
the accused. The trial court may also deny the application for bail when the
accused is a flight risk, notwithstanding the prosecution’s evidence on the guilt
of the accused.
In exercising this discretion, the trial court should receive the parties’
evidence at a hearing duly scheduled for this purpose. The prosecution and the
accused are granted reasonable opportunity to prove their respective positions:
on the part of the prosecution, that the evidence of guilt against the accused is
strong, and on the part of the defense, the opposite. The hearing is summary
and limited to the determination of the weight of evidence for purposes of
granting or denying bail.
Since Napoles was charged with the crime of Plunder, which carries the
imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua, she cannot be admitted to bail when
the evidence of her guilt is strong. As a trial court, the Sandiganbayan, in turn,
possessed the jurisdiction to hear and weigh the evidence of the prosecution
and the defense.
It should not be forgotten that the purpose of the bail hearing is to
determine whether the accused is entitled to provisional liberty before
conviction. To require more from the prosecution, as well as from the trial court,
effectively defeats the purpose of the proceeding.
The Court ruled that the prosecution was able to establish that Napoles
participated in the implied conspiracy to misappropriate public funds and
acquire ill-gotten wealth. Here, the implied conspiracy among Napoles and her
co-accused was proven through various documentary and testimonial evidence
showing that they acted towards the common goal of misappropriating the
PDAF of former Senator Enrile.
Clearly, the prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence supply
interlocking pieces of information that when taken together, provide a complete
picture of the indispensability of the participation of Napoles in the scheme to
misappropriate public funds for the benefit of select individuals, by using the
NGOs as conduits for the PDAF projects of former Senator Enrile. The
directions and instructions she gave to her former employees constitute a clear
evidence of her active participation, not mere acquiescence or presence, in the
conspiracy.
Thus, the petition for bail was correctly denied.

4
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE GUIDE

IN A PETITION FOR BAIL HEARING, THE COURT IS TO CONDUCT ONLY A

SUMMARY HEARING, MEANING SUCH BRIEF AND SPEEDY METHOD OF
RECEIVING AND CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT AS IS
PRACTICABLE AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE OF THE HEARING
WHICH IS MERELY TO DETERMINE THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE FOR
PURPOSES OF BAIL.

Janet Lim Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 224162, February 6, 2018
Reyes, Jr., J.

FACTS:
On December 20, 2017, petitioner Janet Lim Napoles filed a motion for
the reconsideration of the Court's Decision dated November 7, 2017, the
dispositive portion of which reads: “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated October 16, 2015 and March 2,
2016 of the Sandiganbayan in SB-14-CRM-0238 are AFFIRMED, there being no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the Sandiganbayan.”
The assailed decision of this Court upheld the Sandiganbayan's
Resolutions dated October 16, 2015 and March 2, 2016 denying Napoles'
application for bail, there being no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan.
Napoles now invokes the ruling in Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, which
was promulgated on July 19, 2016. According to Napoles, the ruling in
Macapagal-Arroyo should have been applied to her case.
In a demurrer to evidence, as in the case of Macapagal-Arroyo, the
accused imposes a challenge on the sufficiency of the prosecution's entire
evidence. This involves a determination of whether the evidence presented by
the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
The stage at which the accused may demur to the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence is during the trial on the merits itself-particularly, after
the prosecution has rested its case. This should be distinguished from the
hearing for the petition for bail, in which the trial court does not sit to try the
merits of the main case. Neither does it speculate on the ultimate outcome of
the criminal charge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
denying Napoles' application for bail which involved a preliminary
determination of her eligibility to provisional liberty.

RULING:
In this hearing, the trial court's inquiry is limited to whether there is
evident proof that the accused is guilty of the offense charged. This standard of
proof is clearly different from that applied in a demurrer to evidence which

5
 RULE 114 - BAIL

measures the prosecution's entire evidence against the required moral certainty
for the conviction of the accused.
The distinction between the required standards of proof precludes the
application of Macapagal-Arroyo to the present case. The Sandiganbayan's
denial of the demurrer to evidence in Macapagal-Arroyo was annulled based on
the paucity of the evidence of the prosecution, which failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that former President GMA was the mastermind of the
conspiracy to commit plunder. In other words, there was a final determination
of former President GMA's innocence of the crime charged.
The stage at which the accused may demur to the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence is during the trial on the merits itself-particularly, after
the prosecution has rested its case. This should be distinguished from the
hearing for the petition for bail, in which the trial court does not sit to try the
merits of the main case. Neither does it speculate on the ultimate outcome of
the criminal charge. The Court has judiciously explained in Atty. Serapio v.
Sandiganbayan the difference between the preliminary determination of the
guilt of the accused in a petition for bail, and the proceedings during the trial
proper, viz.:
It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe, this
Court held that in a petition for bail hearing, the court is to conduct
only a summary hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and
consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is merely to
determine the weight of evidence for purposes of bail. The court
does not try the merits or enter into any inquiry as to the weight
that ought to be given to the evidence against the accused, nor will
it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence
may be offered therein. It may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding
unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable minimum
the amount of corroboration particularly on details that are not
essential to the purpose of the hearing.
The resolution of this issue does not involve an inquiry as to whether
there was proof beyond reasonable doubt that Napoles, or her co-accused as
the case may be, was the main plunderer for whose benefit the ill-gotten wealth
was amassed or accumulated. These are matters of defense best left to the
discretion of the Sandiganbayan in the resolution of the criminal case. It was
sufficient that the denial of her bail application was based on evidence
establishing a great presumption of guilt on the part of Napoles. Lastly, the
other issues raised in Napoles' Motion for Reconsideration merely reiterated the
earlier arguments that this Court has already resolved. For this reason, the
reconsideration of the Court's earlier Decision is unwarranted under the
circumstances.
Thus, the Court resolved to DENY the present Motion for
Reconsideration.

6
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE GUIDE

BAIL IN THE AMOUNT FIXED MAY BE FILED WITH THE COURT WHERE
THE CASE IS PENDING, OR IN THE ABSENCE OR UNAVAILABILITY OF
THE JUDGE THEREOF, WITH ANY REGIONAL TRIAL JUDGE,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL JUDGE, OR
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL JUDGE IN THE PROVINCE, CITY, OR
MUNICIPALITY. IF THE ACCUSED IS ARRESTED IN A PROVINCE, CITY,
OR MUNICIPALITY OTHER THAN WHERE THE CASE IS PENDING, BAIL
MAY ALSO BE FILED WITH ANY REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF SAID
PLACE, OR IF NO JUDGE THEREOF IS AVAILABLE, WITH ANY
METROPOLITAN TRIAL JUDGE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL JUDGE, OR
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL JUDGE THEREIN.

Teodora Altobano-Ruiz vs. Hon. Ramsey Domingo G. Pichay

A.M. No. MTJ-17-1893, February 19, 2018
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
Complainant Ruiz and Paran are the accused in an adultery case, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 2562, which is pending before the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Trece Martires City, Cavite, presided by Judge Gonzalo Q.
Mapili, Jr. On March 19, 2014, accused Paran was apprehended at his
residence in Quezon City by police authorities from Parañaque City by virtue of
the Warrant of Arrest dated March 12, 2014 issued by Judge Mapili. He was
detained for several days at the Parañaque City Police Station.
On March 22, 2014, accused Paran filed an application for bail before
Branch 78, MeTC, Parañaque City, which was promptly approved by
respondent Judge Pichay after the accused posted a cash bond of P12,000.00.
On the other hand, Ruiz voluntarily surrendered before Judge Mapili and was
temporarily released on bail upon posting a cash bond of P12,000.00.
Ruiz alleged that Judge Pichay had no authority to approve Paran's
application for bail since the latter already had a pending criminal case for
adultery in another court, and he was actually arrested in Quezon City which
was outside Judge Pichay's territorial jurisdiction.
On August 10, 2015, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) directed
Judge Pichay to submit his comment on the complaint against him
In his Comment dated November 27, 2015, Judge Pichay countered that his
assailed Order dated March 22, 2014 was rendered in good faith and in strict
adherence to and faithful compliance with his duties mandated under the
Constitution and the Rules of Court. He insisted on his court's jurisdiction over
accused Paran's application for bail because the latter was detained at the
Parañaque City Police Station, as shown in the Certificate of Detention issued
by SPO4 Dondie Oliva Aquino. He further averred that he acted on the bail
application on the same date that it was filed, which was a Saturday, in order to
give effect to the accused's constitutional right to bail. Finally, Judge Pichay
asserted that his action was neither tainted with malice nor did he receive
financial gain in resolving the application with dispatch.

ISSUE:

7
 RULE 114 - BAIL

Whether or not respondent Judge Pichay, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan

Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 78, Parañaque City is guilty of gross ignorance of
the law and gross misconduct in connection with the latter's act of granting bail
in favor of Francis Eric Paran.

RULING:
The Court adopted the findings of the OCA, except as to the
recommended penalty. Section 17 (a) of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 which governs the approval of
bail bonds for criminal cases pending outside the judge's territorial jurisdiction
is instructive, to wit:
Section 17. Bail, where filed. — (a) Bail in the
amount fixed may be filed with the court where the
case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of
the judge thereof, with any regional trial judge,
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or
municipality. If the accused is arrested in a province,
city, or municipality other than where the case is
pending, bail may also be filed with any Regional Trial
Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available,
with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.
The foregoing provision anticipates two (2) situations. First, the accused is
arrested in the same province, city or municipality where his case is
pending. Second, the accused is arrested in the province, city or municipality
other than where his case is pending. In the first situation, the accused may file
bail in the court where his case is pending or, in the absence or unavailability
of the judge thereof, with another branch of the same court within the province
or city. In the second situation, the accused has two (2) options. First, he may
file bail in the court where his case is pending or, second, he may file bail with
any regional trial court in the province, city or municipality where he was
arrested. When no regional trial court judge is available, he may file bail with
any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal circuit trial
judge therein.
However, in the instant case, the case where Judge Pichay approved Paran's
bail bond and issued release order was not pending before his sala. As correctly
pointed out by the OCA, although accused Paran was detained at the Station
Detention Cell, Parañaque City Police Station, he was nevertheless arrested at
his residence in Quezon City. Considering that Paran was arrested in Quezon
City, he could also file his bail application before any branch at the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, and in the absence of any judge thereat, then before
any branch of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. Paran could have
also filed his bail application before the MTCC, Trece Martires City, where his
case was pending.
Indeed, the only circumstance where Judge Pichay can exercise authority to
rule on Paran's bail application is if the latter, who was detained in Parañaque
City, was not yet charged with a criminal offense in another court, pursuant to
Section 17(c), Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, in the

8
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE GUIDE

instant case, there was already a pending criminal case against Paran before
the MTCC, Trece Martires, Cavite as shown in the Certificate of
Detention attached in Paran's application of bail. In fact, Paran's arrest was by
virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by Judge Mapili of the MTCC, Trece Martires
City. More importantly, Judge Pichay likewise failed to prove that there was no
available judge to act on Paran's application of bail in the said respective courts.
Clearly, Judge Pichay's approval of Paran's bail constituted an irregularity
arising from his lack of the authority to do so.
It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have been formulated and
promulgated by this Court to ensure the speedy and efficient administration of
justice. Failure to abide by these rules undermines the wisdom behind them
and diminishes respect for the law. Judges should ensure strict compliance
therewith at all times in their respective jurisdictions. Judge Pichay cannot
excuse himself from the consequences of his action by invoking good faith. As a
judge, he must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands as he is expected
to maintain professional competence at all times. Since Judge Pichay presides
over MeTC-Br. 78 in Parañaque City, his territorial jurisdiction is confined
therein. Therefore, to approve bail applications and issue corresponding release
orders in a case pending in courts outside his territorial jurisdiction, constitute
ignorance of the law so gross as to amount to incompetence.
While the Court agreed with the findings of the OCA, it, however, did not
agree with its recommendation in so far as the penalty to be imposed since this
is not Judge Pichay's first administrative infraction. In Spouses Marcelo v. Judge
Pichay, Judge Pichay was found guilty of violating Section 9, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court for undue delay in resolving the pending incidents relative to Civil
Case No. 2004-286 and was fined in the amount of P12,000.00. In A.M. No. MTJ-
10-1763 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 09-2209-MTJ), Judge Pichay was also held
administratively liable for the same offense. Thus, considering also Judge
Pichay's previous administrative infractions, the Court found it apt to impose the
maximum amount of fine upon him.

9
 RULE 114 - BAIL

BAIL IS A MATTER OF RIGHT WHEN THE OFFENSE CHARGED IS

PUNISHABLE BY ANY PENALTY LOWER THAN RECLUSION PERPETUA.
BAIL BECOMES A MATTER OF DISCRETION IF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED IS PUNISHABLE BY DEATH, RECLUSION PERPETUA,
OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT THAT IS, BAIL WILL BE DENIED IF THE
EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG.

People of the Philippines v. Novo Tanes y Belmonte

G.R. No. 240596, April 03, 2019
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
On April 6, 2011, an Information was filed against Novo Tanes y
Belmonte (Tanes) for violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Tanes pleaded not guilty to the charge. On April 10, 2015, he filed a
Petition for Bail. The RTC conducted hearings on October 7, 2015, November 4,
2015, and February 3, 2017 for the bail application.
The RTC found that the evidence of Tanes' guilt was not strong because
there was doubt as to whether the chain of custody in the buy-bust operation
was preserved. Thus, the application for bail was granted.
The CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Order of the RTC which
granted Tanes' application for bail.

RULING:
The right to bail is recognized in the Bill of Rights, as stated in Section
13, Article III of the Constitution:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
In this regard, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged with a capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage
of the criminal prosecution.
Thus, before conviction, bail is a matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. Bail becomes a matter
of discretion if the offense charged is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment that is, bail will be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong.
In this case, Tanes was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
9165 which carries the penalty of life imprisonment. Hence, Tanes' bail
becomes a matter of judicial discretion if the evidence of his guilt is not strong.

10
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE GUIDE

Applying the abovementioned standards to the present case, the Court finds
that, contrary to petitioner's assertions, the trial court did observe the rules to
be followed in granting or denying the bail application. Records show that the
RTC conducted hearings for the application of bail on October 7, 2015,
November 4, 2015, and February 3, 2017. In all these hearings, petitioner was
duly represented by its prosecutors.
The main thrust of the RTC's Order granting bail is that based on the
evidence presented during the bail hearings, the prosecution failed to prove that
the chain of custody over the seized drug had been preserved; hence, the
evidence of Tanes' guilt was not strong. The Court wholeheartedly agrees.
To recall, Tanes was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165. The elements for conviction
under said provision are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. The burden is on the State to prove not only these elements but also
the corpus delicti or the body of the crime.
In drug cases, the dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the
violation of the law. Consequently, compliance with the rule on chain of custody
over the seized illegal drugs is crucial in any prosecution that follows a buy-
bust operation. The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug
recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as
exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same
unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.
In this regard, Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 lays down the following
procedure to be followed in order to maintain the integrity of the confiscated
drugs used as evidence: (1) the seized items must be inventoried and
photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; (2) the physical
inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or
his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected public official, (c) a
representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the DOJ, all of
whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
In the present case, it appears that the buy-bust team committed several
procedural lapses concerning the chain of custody of the seized drug. In
particular, the RTC and the CA found that: (1) there was no representative from
the DOJ present during the buy-bust operation and the inventory; (2) the two
other witnesses (i.e., the media representative and the elected public official)
were not present during the apprehension and seizure of the illegal drug but
were merely called to sign the inventory sheet; and (3) no photograph was
presented showing the inventory of the seized shabu in the presence of Tanes
and the witnesses. These lapses in the chain of custody created doubt as to the
identity and integrity of the seized drug. Consequently, the evidence as to
Tanes' guilt cannot be characterized as strong.
There being non-compliance with the rule on chain of custody of the
drug seized during the buy-bust operation, the evidence of guilt for the crime of
illegal sale of drugs against Tanes is deemed not strong. Accordingly, he is
entitled to bail. The present ruling, however, should not prejudge the RTC's
ruling on the merits of the case.

11
 RULE 114 - BAIL

BAIL IS FILED BEFORE THE COURT WHERE THE CASE IS PENDING.

HOWEVER, IF BAIL CANNOT BE FILED BEFORE THE COURT WHERE
THE CASE IS PENDING, RULE 114, SECTION 17 (A) OF THE RULES OF
COURT GOVERNS. FURTHERMORE, A JUDGE OF ANOTHER PROVINCE,
CITY OR MUNICIPALITY MAY GRANT BAIL ONLY IF THE ACCUSED HAS
BEEN ARRESTED IN A PROVINCE, CITY OR MUNICIPALITY OTHER
THAN WHERE THE CASE IS PENDING.

Pros. Ivy A. Tejano v. Presiding Judge Antonio D. Marigomen and Utility

Worker Emiliano C. Camay, Jr.
A.M. No. RTJ-17-2492, September 26, 2017
Leonen, J.

FACTS:
Pending before, Regional Trial Court, Bogo City was a civil case for
declaration of absolute nullity of deed of absolute sale filed against Tejano
by Jose Andrino. This civil case was assigned to then Assisting Judge,
James Stewart Ramon E. Himalaloan, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 113-2011.
On July 19, 2012, Andrino moved that Presiding Judge Marigomen,
try the civil case because hearings had been repeatedly postponed by Judge
Himalaloan. Judge Marigomen granted the Motion. On September 17, 2012,
Administrative Order No. 137-2012 was issued where Judge Mario O. Trinidad
was designated as the new Assisting Judge of Regional Trial Court,
Bogo City, Cebu and to takecognizance of all the cases handled by the
former Assisting Judge, Judge Himalaloan and likewise be directed to take
cognizance of cases where Presiding Judge Marigomen inhibited, those newly
filed, and those where trial had not yet begun and civil cases where pre-trial had yet to
be conducted or terminated.
In 2013, while the civil case is pending, Tejano filed a criminal complaint
for violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act against
Andrino. This criminal case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City
presided by Judge Bienvenido R. Saniel, Jr.
On May 9, 2013, without a warrant of arrest, Andrino posted bail before Regional
Trial Court, Bogo City. In posting bail, where the case is not pending, Camay
assisted Adriano who was assigned on the said court. Subsequently, Judge
Marigomen ordered Adriano’s release. Tejano led before this Court an Affidavit-Complaint
against Judge Marigomen and Camay on June 21, 2013.
Tejano contended that Judge Marigomen refused to transfer the civil
case to Judge Trinidad, the newly-designated Assisting Judge, in violation of
Administrative Order No. 137-2012 alleging that Judge Marigo menissued the
Order of Release with no standing warrant of arrest against Andrino, in violation of Rule 114,
Section 1of the Rules of Court. As for Camay, Tejano charged him with violating
the Anti-Red Tape Act for allegedly fixing Andrino's bail application and
facilitating police assistance to Andrino.
Judge Marigomen granted Andrino's Motion to try the civil
case because of the circumstances that it had not been conducting hearings since
2012. Furthermore, he had not anticipated that a new Assisting Judge would be
assigned to the said court. Therefore, he continued hearing the civil
case. As to Andrino's bail bond, heapproved it in the exercise of his sound

12
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE GUIDE

discretion alleging that in applications for bail, the stringent application of the Rules of
Court may be relaxed in favor of the accused. For the part of Camay, he
admitted that he assisted Andrino in posting bail but only because he was
a public employee obliged to do so and denied that he was afixer and claimed that
he had no personal interest in the outcome of the civil case.
The Office of the Court Administrator found Judge Marigomen guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and of violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars.
However, it dismissed the complaint for violation of the Anti-Red Tape Act against
Camay. On June 14, 2017, Tejano led an Affidavit before this Court, stating that her filing of
the Complaint is "only a product of miscommunication." Thus, "in
order to move on," she declared that she waswithdrawing the Complaint she
had led against Judge Marigomen.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge Marigomen is guilty of ignorance of the
law and respondent Camay for violating the ARTA law for being a fixer.

RULING:
The Court sustained the dismissal of the administrative charge for
violation of the Anti-Red Tape Act against Camay. Tejano failed to allege and
prove that he assisted with Andrino’s application for bail in consideration of
economic gain or any other advantage. The charge of gross ignorance of the law
against Judge Marigomen merits a more serious sanction.
Bail, as defined in Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, is “the
security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by
him or a bondsman. Based on this definition, the accused must be in custody
of the law or otherwise deprived of his or her liberty to be able to post bail.
Generally, bail is filed before the court where the case is pending. However, if
bail cannot be filed before the court where the case is pending, Rule 114,
Section 17 (a) of the Rules of Court governs. Furthermore, a judge of another
province, city or municipality may grant bail only if the accused has been
arrested in a province, city or municipality other than where the case is pending.
A judge not assigned to the province, city or municipality where the case
is pending but approves an application for bail filed by an accused not arrested
is guilty of gross ignorance of the law. The court further added that it is gross
ignorance of the law if a judge grants an application for bail in a criminal case
outside of his or her jurisdiction without ascertaining the absence or
unavailability of the judge of the court where the criminal case is pending.
While it is true that Tejano filed an Affidavit withdrawing her Complaint
against Judge Marigomen, withdrawal of an administrative complaint “does not
divest this Court of its disciplinary authority over court personnel.” This Court
cannot be bound by the unilateral decision of a complainant to desist from
prosecuting a case involving the discipline of parties subject to its
administrative supervision.
This Court sustained the dismissal of the administrative charge for
violation of the Anti-Red Tape Act against Camay. Tejano failed to allege and
prove that Camay assisted with Andrino’s application for bail in consideration
of economic gain or any other advantage.

13
 RULE 114 - BAIL

AS A RULE, ALL PERSONS CHARGED WITH A CRIMINAL OFFENSE

HAVE THE RIGHT TO BAIL. HOWEVER, PERSONS CHARGED WITH AN
OFFENSE PUNISHABLE BY RECLUSION PERPETUA CANNOT AVAIL OF
THIS RIGHT IF THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG.

Reynaldo Albas Recto v. People of the Philippines

GR No. 236461, December 5, 2018
Caguioa, J.

FACTS:
An Information for Murder was filed against petitioner Reynaldo Arbas
Recto for the death of Margie Carlosita. Thereafter, on May 23, 2011, Recto's
former counsel filed a Petition for Bail with the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor
City, Branch 89 (RTC). However, on April 11, 2014, the RTC issued an
Order denying Recto's Petition for Bail as it gave credence to the testimony of
prosecution witness Joshua Emmanuel Rabillas, son of Carlosita, that Recto
was the one who killed his mother. The RTC, in denying the Petition for Bail,
noted that "without, however, prejudging in any way the result of the case, the
Court is of the impression that the evidence of guilt is strong, and it is
incumbent on the part of the accused to take the witness stand to show
otherwise."
Trial on the merits then ensued. After the prosecution rested its case,
Recto filed a Demurrer to Evidence on June 22, 2015 for insufficiency of
evidence to hold him guilty of the crime of Murder. The RTC, however, denied
the Demurrer to Evidence.
Subsequently, on April 27, 2016, petitioner filed a Motion to Fix
Bail alleging that the prosecution was able to show that the crime charged
should be Homicide only and not Murder. He pointed out that Rabillas, who
was five years old at the time of the incident, testified that Carlosita was hit by
the bottle during a quarrel over money.
On June 8, 2016, the RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Fix Bail.
The RTC reiterated that it was of the impression that the evidence of guilt is
strong and that it was incumbent on Recto to take the witness stand and show
otherwise. As Recto had not taken the witness stand, then the RTC ruled
against the Motion to Fix Bail. Recto moved for reconsideration, but the same
was denied by the RTC on January 29, 2016.
Aggrieved by the Order of the RTC denying his Motion to Fix Bail, Recto
then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
CA. The CA affirmed the denial of Recto's Motion to Fix Bail. The CA reasoned
that Recto failed to show that the RTC's issuance of the Order was attended by
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the CA held that ''the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of
its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination." The CA, thus,
deferred to the RTC's assessment of the credibility of Rabillas' testimony, and
also relied on its judgment that the evidence of guilt was strong. The CA
ultimately dismissed the case. Recto then sought reconsideration of the
Decision, but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated January 11,

14
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE GUIDE

2018.
Recto thus filed this Petition on February 26, 2018. The People, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment on September 13, 2018.
Recto then filed his Reply on October 5, 2018.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing Recto's petition for certiorari.

RULING:
In this case, the denial of the Motion to Fix Bail by the RTC amounted to
an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law. The Order
denying the Motion to Fix Bail was thus issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess or jurisdiction.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses

punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.

The following Constitutional provision is implemented by the following

provisions of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. - All persons in custody

shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient
sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this
Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

xxx
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution
Thus, as a rule, all persons charged with a criminal offense have the
right to bail. However, persons charged with an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua cannot avail of this right if the evidence of guilt is strong.
In the present case, Recto was charged with Murder - an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the RTC was acting within its powers
or jurisdiction when it denied Recto's initial Petition for Bail. The RTC possesses

15
 RULE 114 - BAIL

sufficient discretion to determine, based on the evidence presented before it

during the bail hearing, whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
However, after the prosecution had rested its case, Recto filed a Motion
to Fix Bail on the ground that bail had become a matter of right as the evidence
presented by the prosecution could only convict Recto of Homicide, not Murder.
This Motion to Fix Bail was denied by the RTC, reiterating its earlier finding
that, in its judgment, the evidence of guilt is strong. This is where the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion, and the CA thus erred in upholding the
RTC's Order denying the Motion to Fix Bail.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, the RTC should have
determined whether the evidence of guilt is strong for Murder, as opposed to
simply determining if the evidence that he was responsible for Carlosita's death
was strong. As previously illustrated above, the evidence of Recto's guilt - for
Murder - was not strong. In sum, the RTC should have granted Recto's Motion
to Fix Bail.

16
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE GUIDE

BASIC IS THE PRINCIPLE THAT UPON SETTING A CASE FOR

ARRAIGNMENT, THE ACCUSED MUST HAVE EITHER BEEN IN THE
CUSTODY OF THE LAW OR OUT ON BAIL.

Extra Excel International Philippines, Inc. v. Hon. Afable E. Cajigal

A.M. No. RTJ-18-2523, June 6, 2018
Del Castillo, J.

FACTS:
An Infomration for qualified theft was filed against Ike R. Katipunan,
complainant’s former Inventory Control Service Assistant. The case was raffled
to Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City with respondent as
Presiding Judge. Complainant alleged that after the filing of the Information,
respondent Judge did not set the case for arraignment nor issue a warrant of
arrest; instead, he granted the accusd’s Motion for Preliminary Investigation
and Motion to Defer Further Proceedings.
The Court of Appeals found grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge in granting the accused’s motion for preliminary investigation.
On March 24, 2014, complainant filed a Motion for Issuance of Hold Departure
Order, which motion remains unresolved. Respondent Judge eventually
arraigned the accused on June 9, 2014.
However, instead of ordering the accused’s commitment, and despite the
offense being nonbailabale, respondent Judge allowed the accused to go home.
On June 13, 2014, the accused filed a Petition for Bail. During the June 30,
2014 bail hearing, respondent Judge declared the Petition for Bail submitted for
resolution due to the absence of complainant’s counsel. On even date,
respondent Judge issued an Order granting the bail petition and denying the
motion for inhibition
According to the complainant, the foregoing events clearly showed
respondent Judge’s gross inefficiency, incompetence, gross ignorance of the law,
grave abuse of authority and evident partiality/

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law,
gross inefficiency, grave abuse of authority and evident partiality.

RULING:
YES. The Court ruled that the respondent Judge is guilty for gross
ignorance of the law, as regards his act of letting the accused go home after the
arraignment and the delay in resolving the motion for issuance of a hold
departure order despite the lapse of 90 days.
The Order granting the Motion for Preliminary Investigation may not be
proper inasmuch as respondent Judge based the Order on accused’s bare
allegation of non-receipt of notice from the Office of the Prosecutor, the Court
opined that the same did not necessarily amount to gross ignorance of the law.

17
 RULE 114 - BAIL

There was no showing that the respondent Judge issued the Order because of
the promptings of fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice, ill-will, bad faith or a
deliberate intent to do injustice. Indeed, it is axiomatic that not all erroneous
acts of judges are subject to disciplinary action.
However, the Court held that respondent Judge did not err in allowing
the accused to go home after his arraignment. They are neither persuaded by
respondent Judge’s claim that there was no reason for him to detain the
accused since there was yet no warrant issued for his arrest or that a petition
for bail had been filed. Basic is the principle that upon setting a case for
arraignment, the accused must have either been in the custody of the law or
out on bail. Another basic principle is that the judge must conduct his own
personal evaluation of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the
indictment. Needless to say, the failure of respondent Judge to conduct a
judicial determination of probable cause under Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court was exxacerbated by his act in allowing the accused to go home
without bail after arraignment. These acts were indicative of gross ignorance of
the law and procedure for which respondent must be called to account.
Lastly, the Court held that the respondent Judge was inefficient in failing
to resolve the motion for issuance of a hold departure order despite the lapse of
90 days. Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Conduct for the Philipine
Judiciary directs judges to “perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of
reserved decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.” Thus,
respondent’s failure to resolve complainant’s motion to issue a hold departure
order constitutes gross inefficiency which warrants the imposition of an
administrative sanction.

18
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE GUIDE

THE GRANT OR DENIAL OF BAIL IN AN OFFENSE PUNISHABLE BY

RECLUSION PERPETUA, SUCH AS PLUNDER, HINGES ON THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED IS STRONG. THIS REQUIRES THE CONDUCT OF BAIL
HEARINGS WHERE THE PROSECUTION HAS THE BURDEN OF
SHOWING THAT THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT IS STRONG, SUBJECT
TO THE RIGHT OF THE DEFENSE TO CROSS-EXAMINE
WITNESSES AND INTRODUCE EVIDENCE IN ITS OWN REBUTTAL.

Ramon “Bong” Revilla, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan [First Division]

G.R. No. 218232, July 24, 2018
Carpio, J.

FACTS:
An Information dated 5 June 2014 filed by the Office of the Ombudsman
in the Sandiganbayan charged Revilla, Cambe and Napoles, among others, with
the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 7080, as amended.
In a Resolution dated 19 June 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued warrants
of arrest against Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles. On the same day, Revilla
voluntarily surrendered to the Philippine National Police (PNP) and filed a
Motion to Elect Detention Facilities Ad Cautelam praying for his detention at
the PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame. On 20 June 2014, Cambe also
voluntarily surrendered to the Sandiganbayan and filed an Urgent Motion to
Commit Accused to Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) pending
trial of the case.
Revilla filed a Petition for Bail Ad Cautelam dated 20 June 2014; Cambe
filed an Application for Bail dated 23 June 2014; and Napoles filed a Joint
Petition for Bail dated 25 June 2014, together with co-accused Ronald John
Lim (Lim) and John Raymund De Asis (De Asis).
The Sandiganbayan denied the separate applications for bail filed by
Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles. The Sandiganbayan held that the prosecution
duly established with strong evidence that Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles, in
conspiracy with one another, committed the crime of plunder defined and
penalized under RA 7080; thus, they are not entitled to the constitutional right
to bail.
In a Resolution dated 26 March 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied for lack
of merit: (a) Napoles' Motion for Reconsideration dated 17 December 2014; (b)
Revilla's Omnibus Motion: (1) for Reconsideration, and (2) To Adduce Additional
Evidence dated 17 December 2014; and (c) Cambe's: (1) Motion for
Reconsideration dated 15 December 2014, and (2) Motion to Adduce Additional
Evidence and Request for Subpoena embodied in his Reply dated 28 January
2015.
Meanwhile, on 14 July 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the
Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed a Motion to Transfer the Place of Detention
of Accused Revilla, Cambe, and Napoles to the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP) facility in Camp Bagong Diwa or other similar facilities of the
BJMP. The motion states that the PNP Custodial Center is not a detention

19
 RULE 114 - BAIL

facility within the supervision of BJMP under RA 6975 and their continued
detention in a non-BJMP facility affords them special treatment.
In a Resolution dated 4 September 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied the
motion for failure to advance justifiable grounds for Revilla and Cambe's
transfer. The Sandiganbayan held that detention in facilities other than a jail is
sanctioned in our jurisdiction and there is no law mandating that detention
prisoners shall only be detained in a jail supervised by the BJMP. The
Sandiganbayan also found that it was not shown that Revilla and Cambe were
granted benefits above the standards set for other detention prisoners.
In a Manifestation (Re: Unauthorized Movement of Accused Revilla on 14
February 2015) with Motion (For the Issuance of an Order Directing the
Concerned PNP Officials to Explain) dated 27 February 2015, the prosecution
alleged that Revilla was allowed to attend the birthday celebration of Juan
Ponce Enrile in the PNP General Hospital under the guise of a medical
emergency on 14 February 2015, bolstering its argument that Revilla's
detention in the PNP Custodial Center is improper.
In a Resolution dated 20 May 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the
motion for reconsideration of the prosecution for lack of merit. The
Sandiganbayan did not consider as sufficient reason the reported unauthorized
visit of Revilla to the hospital room of Enrile to justify his transfer to Camp
Bagong Diwa, since the concerned PNP officials have already been admonished
for failure to comply with the Sandiganbayan's Order.
On 27 October 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of
the Special Prosecutor, filed an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Attachment/Gamishment against the monies and properties of
Revilla to serve as security for the satisfaction of the amount of
P224,512,500.00 alleged as ill-gotten wealth, in the event that a judgment is
rendered against him for plunder. The motion states that there is an imminent
need for the issuance of the ex parte writ to prevent the disappearance of
Revilla's monies and properties found to be prima facie unlawfully acquired,
considering that the AMLC reported that many investment and bank accounts
of Revilla were "terminated immediately before and after the PDAF scandal
circulated in [the] media," and Revilla himself publicly confirmed that he closed
several bank accounts when the PDAF scam was exposed.
In a Resolution dated 5 February 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the
prosecution's motion upon finding of its sufficiency both in form and substance.
The Sandiganbayan held that the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment
is properly anchored on Sections I and 2 of Rule 57, and Sections 1 and 2 (b)
and (c) of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Writ of Attachment directed to the Acting Chief, Sheriff and Security Services of
the Sandiganbayan. On 10 July 2015, the Sandiganbayan granted the
prosecution's amendatory motion and issued an Alias Writ of Preliminary
Attachment, which included the properties under the known aliases or other
names of Revilla and his spouse, Lani Mercado.
Revilla filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan
denied in a Resolution dated 28 May 2015. The Sandiganbayan held that the
writ of preliminary attachment is not the penalty of forfeiture envisioned under
Section 2 of RA 7080, contrary to Revilla's argument. The Sandiganbayan
further elucidated that the issuance of the writ is an ancillary remedy which
can be availed of during the pendency of the criminal case of plunder, and it is

20
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE GUIDE

not necessary to await the final resolution of the bail petition before it can be
issued.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
the applications for bail of Napoles and Cambe (Revilla withdrew his
petition on this question)
2. Whether or not, as Cambe further alleged, the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion in relying on the concept of totality of evidence, which
only applies in writ of amparo cases
3. Whether or not Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the
prosecution's motion to transfer the detention of Revilla and Cambe from
the PNP Custodial Center to a BJMP-operated facility
4. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ordering the issuance of the
writ of preliminary attachment against Revilla's monies and properties

RULING:
1. NO. The Sandiganbayan did not abuse its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied bail to Cambe and Napoles, upon a finding
of strong evidence that they committed the crime of plunder in conspiracy with
one another. The SC cited the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, and ruled that thus,
the latter exercised its judicial discretion within the bounds of the Constitution,
law, rules, and jurisprudence after appreciating and evaluating the evidence
submitted by the parties.
During the bail hearings, both parties were afforded opportunities to offer
their evidence. The prosecution presented nine witnesses and documentary
evidence to prove the strong evidence of guilt of the accused. The defense
likewise introduced evidence in its own rebuttal and cross -examined the
witnesses presented by the prosecution. Only after both parties rested their
case that the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution, which contains the
summary of the prosecution's evidence. The summary of the prosecution's
evidence shows the basis for the Sandiganbayan's discretion to deny bail to
Cambe and Napoles.
In finding strong evidence of guilt against Cambe, the Sandiganbayan
considered the PDAF documents and the whistleblowers' testimonies in finding
that Cambe received, for Revilla, the total amount of P103,000,000.00, in
return for Revilla's endorsement of the NGOs of Napoles as the recipients of
Revilla's PDAF. It gave weight to Luy's summary of rebates and disbursement
ledgers containing Cambe's receipt of money, which Luy obtained from his hard
drive. The Sandiganbayan likewise admitted Narciso as expert witness, who
attested to the integrity of Luy's hard drive and the files in it.

21
 RULE 114 - BAIL

In finding strong evidence of guilt against Napoles, the Sandiganbayan

considered the AMLC Report, as attested by witness Santos, stating that
Napoles controlled the NGOs, which were the recipients of Revilla's PDAF. The
Sandiganbayan found that the circumstances stated in the AMLC Report,
particularly that the bank accounts of these NGOs were opened by the named
presidents using JLN Corp. IDs, these accounts are temporary repository of
funds, and the withdrawal from these accounts had to be confirmed first with
Napoles, are consistent with the whistleblowers' testimonies that they were
named presidents of Napoles' NGOs and they withdrew large amounts of cash
from the NGOs' bank accounts upon instruction of Napoles. The
Sandiganbayan also took note of the COA report, as confirmed by the testimony
of Garcia, that Revilla's PDAF projects failed to comply with the law, Napoles'
NGOs were fake, no projects were implemented and the suppliers selected to
supply the NGOs were questionable.

2. NO. We specifically held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis that the: "unique situations
that call for the issuance of the writ of amparo, as well as the considerations
and measures necessary to address these situations, may not at all be the same
as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court actions and
proceedings." Thus, the case of Razon should not have been applied in this case.
On the other hand, as we held in People v. Cabral: "even though there is a
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire
record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail
should be refused." Accordingly, an examination of the entire record totality of
evidence - is necessary to determine whether there is strong evidence of guilt,
for purposes of granting or denying bail to the accused.
We will not set aside the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan, absent
any showing that the Sandiganbayan exercised its discretion out of whim,
caprice, and outright arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of discretion.
Also, there is no need to prove that Cambe and Napoles likewise amassed,
accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 or that
Revilla talked with Napoles about their alleged agreement. The charge against
them is conspiracy to commit plunder. In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we held
that "the gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused
agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each
misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered
the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive
commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from
commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their
individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing,
accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for [petitioner
Estrada]."

22
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE GUIDE

As for the weight given by the Sandiganbayan to whistleblowers'

testimonies, expert's testimony, AMLC report, the hard disk, disbursement
ledger and summary of rebates, we emphasize that for purposes of bail, the
court does not try the merits or enter into any inquiry as to the weight that
ought to be given to the evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate on
the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be offered therein. The
course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine
itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to substantial matters,
avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and cross-examination.

3. NO. However, both Section 3 of Rule 113 and Section 63 of RA 6975 are
inapplicable in the present case. It must be noted that Revilla and Cambe
voluntarily surrendered to the Sandiganbayan, and there is no opportunity for
the arresting officer to execute the warrants of arrest against them. Moreover,
the said rule merely refers to the duty of the arresting officer to deliver the
arrested person to the nearest police station or jail. The rule did not state about
the duty "to detain" the arrested person to the nearest police station or jail.
There is nothing in the rule referring to the place of detention of the arrested
person. In the same manner, there is nothing in Section 63 of RA 6975 which
expressly mandates and limits the place of detention in BJMP-controlled
facilities. On the other hand, it merely provides that: "there shall be established
and maintained in every district, city and municipality a secured, clean,
adequately equipped and sanitary jail x x x." When the language of the law is
clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only application.
Section 61 of the same law states that the BJMP shall exercise
supervision and control over all city and municipal jails, while the provincial
jails shall be supervised and controlled by the provincial government within its
jurisdiction. Evidently, a provincial jail is a place of detention not within the
supervision and control of the BJMP. From the law itself, there are places of
detention for the accused, which are not within the control and supervision of
the BJMP.
Thus, to argue, as the prosecution did, that Revilla and Cambe's
detention in the PNP Custodial Center afforded them special treatment because
it is not a jail supervised by the BJMP would be similar to saying that detention
of an accused in a provincial jail supervised by the provincial government would
afford such accused special treatment.

4. NO. In its Motion, the prosecution alleged that: "[Revilla] converted for his
own use or caused to be converted for the use by unauthorized persons the
sum of Php515,740,000.00 worth of public funds sourced from his PDAF
through 'ghost' projects." In Cambe v. Office of the Ombudsman, we agreed with
the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against Revilla and held that for
purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, "only facts sufficient to

23
 RULE 114 - BAIL

support a prima facie case against the accused are required, not absolute
certainty." Thus, we held that the prosecution's evidence established a prima
facie case for plunder against Revilla. Thus, contrary to Revilla's insinuations,
there exists a prima facie factual foundation for the attachment of his monies
and properties.
Contrary to Revilla's allegation, a writ of preliminary attachment may
issue even without a hearing.
Also, contrary to Revilla's allegation, there is no need for a final judgment
of ill-gotten wealth, and a preliminary attachment is entirely different from the
penalty of forfeiture imposed upon the final judgment of conviction under
Section 2 of RA 7080.

24
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE GUIDE

AS A MATTER OF RIGHT AND PURSUANT TO SECTION 4, RULE 114 OF

THE RULES OF COURT, ANY ACCUSED IS ENTITLED TO BAIL AS
GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION.

Samuel N. Rodriguez v. Hon. Oscar P. Noel, Jr.,

A.M. No. RTJ-18-2525, June 25, 2018
Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:
In the complaint-affidavit, Rodriguez stated that he took over the
operations of Golden Dragon International Terminals, Inc. (GDITI) after the Writ
of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (As Amended) dated January 28, 2014 was
implemented. The previous management, headed by a certain Cirilo Basalo
(Basalo), was supposed to cease from handling the operations of GDITI, but
when the latter deed the injunctive writ, Rodriguez led a motion for its re-
implementation, which was granted. Consequently, Rodriguez and the court
sheriff went to the port to inspect the operations and saw a truck reportedly
owned by Basalo transporting solid wastes from the docking vessel. Another
vehicle driven by Basalo suddenly came from behind with the intent to
sideswipe him. Then another vehicle stopped and a number of men pointed
their guns at him. Fortunately, he was able to run away and hide.
Rodriguez claimed that respondent issued a 72-hour temporary
restraining order (TRO) enjoining him from causing any act that might cause
violence and to maintain the status quo in GDITI. A Notice of special raffle was
also issued by respondent and was received by Rodriguez's aunt on the same
date. To his surprise, however, on July 14, 2015, the 72-hour TRO was
extended for another twenty (20) days, or way beyond the 72-hour period.
Rodriguez claimed that he was also not furnished a copy of the notice of hearing
relative to the extension of the TRO.
Respondent claimed that he issued the TRO on July 10, 2015, a Friday,
in his capacity as an Executive Judge. As no raffle could be conducted within
that 72-hour period as required by the Rules of Court because it was a weekend,
the special raffling was set the following Monday, or on July 13, 2015 with the
case eventually being raffled to him. Unfortunately, he could not immediately
act on it because he and his staff had to conduct hearings. Thus, the hearing
for the extension of the TRO — for the parties to maintain the status quo and
refrain from causing any act that might trigger violence — was set the day after,
or on July 14, 2015; Rodriguez, however, was not directed to cease and desist
from his business operations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for
violation of the Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct, Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Discretion, and Bias and Partiality.

RULING:

25
 RULE 114 - BAIL

To recount, Rodriguez charges respondent with administrative liability

because he issued the June 28, 2015 Temporary Release Order before the
petition for bail was filed with the OCC on June 29, 2015.
The argument is untenable. There is nothing in the law or the rules that
prevented respondent from acting on the bail application submitted to him on a
weekend. Accordingly, respondent acted in accordance with the rules in
granting the application for bail.
As regards the 72-hour TRO the Court agrees that respondent extended
the TRO beyond the period allowed by Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
Therefore, respondent had been remiss in the issuance of the Order extending
the TRO and the scrupulous observance of the requisites therefor. Under
Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8- 10-SC,
gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge.
The Court, however, observes that this is respondent's first infraction of
this nature in his sixteen (16) years of service in the Judiciary. Moreover, the
Court is satisfied with his explanation that he had to attend to his duties at the
EJOW, thus constraining him to delay by one (1) day the conduct of the
summary hearing for the extension of the TRO. Together, these circumstances
mitigate respondent's liability.
Hence, Judge Oscar P. Noel, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City, Branch 35 was reprimanded by the Court with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall definitely be
dealt with more severely by this Court. He is further reminded to be more
circumspect in the performance of his duties.

26