2008-5435/14/63-1-8

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF OCCUPATIONAL HYGIENE

Copyright © 2008 by Iranian Occupational Health Association (IOHA)
IJOH 10: 108-113, 2018

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

P-HAZOP: A New Extended HAZOP (Hazard and Operability)

Study for Risk Analysis of Pipelines

HEMN ZAREI1, OMID KALATPOUR2

1
M.Sc. Student, Department of Occupational Health Engineering, School of Health, Jundishapur University of
Medical Sciences, Ahvaz, Iran;
2
Center of Excellence for Occupational Health, Research Center for Health Science, School of Public Health,
Hamadan University of Medical Sciences, Hamadan, Iran.

Received December 07, 2017; Revised April 20, 2018; Accepted May 11, 2018

This paper is available on-line at http://ijoh.tums.ac.ir

ABSTRACT
Due to the high potential consequences of pipeline accidents, it is necessary to manage the inherited risks in
the pipeline sectors. Several techniques are available to identify hazardous situations; however, it is crucial
that the selected tool is tailored to the scope of work. HAZOP study is one of the most accepted techniques
adopted by experts to identify hazards. Despite the wide application of HAZOP in process industries, this
method is not suitable for pipelines. In this study, a new extension of HAZOP (P-HAZOP) was introduced
through integrating the classic HAZOP and Kent’s method. This research focused on detecting a new sort of
deviation from the design intent in pipelines. A previously conducted HAZOP study for a pipeline network
was re-conducted using P-HAZOP. A large number of newly detected deviations demonstrated more coverage
of the P-HAZOP for the pipeline scope. Finally, it is recommended to improve the traditional HAZOP for
pipeline applications.
KEYWORDS: Pipeline risk, HAZOP, Risk identification, Kent’s method, Deviation

INTRODUCTION serious source of damaging risks [3]. Many

Transportation of Hazardous Materials regulators stipulated strict requirements for
(HAZMAT) is a major source of risks, which managing pipeline risks. There are also several
threatens many industries as well as the public tools for identifying and assessing the risks of
population. Pipeline networks are known as the most firms. One of the most popular techniques to
common way for the safe transport of HAZMATs. identify the process risks is HAZOP (Hazard and
These networks are distributed among many Operability), which is employed as a powerful tool
industries and their clients, including the public for the identification of operational and safety risks
population. Although transporting hazardous [4]. The HAZOP study focuses on procedures and
materials by pipelines seems safe, it involves its safety aims at recognizing probable deviations from the
problems. Although the frequency of the pipeline intended design. This method is a systematic,
accidents is low, the high potential for their highly disciplined, and experience-based approach
consequences can overwhelm the low frequency. that is suitable for most of the complex systems [5].
Accident databases reveal that pipelines conveying HAZOP is a commonly used hazard analysis
hazardous materials have the same level of risk as method and many studies have focused on re-
refinery installations [1]. The pipeline industry has adapting HAZOP since the emergence of the
experienced at least 8 major explosions and more than process safety concept [6]. HAZOP is an intuitive
55 deaths only in the year 2014 [2]. Pipelines are laid technique that has been designed to inspire the
in areas where are not usually under the control of inductive thinking by experts to identify hazards
industries. In addition, the passage of pipelines and operational deviations while examining a
through high-risk areas, such as the crowded regions, process and a system [7]. However, similar to the
makes the situation more dangerous. Therefore, high other risk identification techniques, the HAZOP
potential consequences, lack of control, and passage has a specific and limited scope. This technique is a
through high-risk areas have made the pipelines as a more suitable tool for complex systems with a wide
range and interacting process parameters, while
Corresponding author: Omid Kalatpour
Email: [email protected] pipelines are relatively simple systems. The process
P-HAZOP: A New Extended HAZOP … ijoh.tums.ac.ir | 109

parameters in pipelines are few and mainly related Classic HAZOP: In the classic HAZOP, some
to the line flow. The use of traditional HAZOP for known process parameters (pressure, temperature,
pipeline studies would be boring, and it may not etc.) and guidewords (less, more, no, etc.) are
be able to identify all the hazards [8]. Therefore, combined to create a potential deviation from the
the common HAZOP may not be suitable enough design intent [4]. The guidewords are generally
for pipeline hazard identification. Despite this constant and the analysis is mainly focused on the
fact, many companies still insist on using HAZOP parameters. The identified high risk deviations
in their studies on risk analysis of pipelines. Field would be analyzed in more depth as needed. The
investigations revealed that many companies overall structure for finding the deviations is as
employ this technique for risk assessment of bellow:
pipelines and other complex systems. Several Process Parameter + Guideword= Deviation
reasons can persuade the process industries to use
HAZOP for pipeline systems. This affinity may be Because of the limited parameters of the
due to “the obligation of an organization to work pipelines, the general structure of the formula is very
with HAZOP”, “matching the applied technique simple.. This means that the implementation of the
with the risk assessment technique of other units HAZOP study for pipelines produces a small
or plants”, and “familiarity with HAZOP”. This number of similar deviations that focus mainly on
research aimed at improving the classic HAZOP the flow parameter. However, factors influencing
and making it more suitable for the use in pipeline pipeline integrity are so various that the current
risk assessment. To achieve this goal, Kent’s approach of HAZOP is unable to find all of them.
method and classic HAZOP were integrated. Therefore, an extended new group of deviations
Kent’s method is an excellent and comprehensive beyond the common process parameters is required
technique for risk management of pipelines [9]. to cover more situations.
This method has shifted the pipeline risk
management from the classic procedures to a new Node and Segment: In the common form of
approach [9]. The specificity of Kent’s method HAZOP, a complex system would be disintegrated
and the generality of classic HAZOP can provide into some nodes. Any node demonstrates a unique
a robust method for the risk management of process within that at least one parameter changes.
pipelines. This research is a new extension of For example, the pressure would rise. For pipeline
HAZOP, so-called P-HAZOP developed for the studies, due to the simple and long structure of the
risk management of pipelines. system, establishing nodes does not work. Instead,
the long body of the selected pipe could be divided
MATERIALS AND METHODS into some segments. The overall risk within a
segment differs from the other segments. The criteria
Literatures Review: Some attempts have been made for segmentation can be changed according to the
to expand the scope of classic HAZOP. As such, population density around the segments, soil
Dunjó et al. [5] made some efforts to extend the corrosivity, and pipeline class or even surrounding
scope of HAZOP [5]. New approaches have environment. Each segment could be studied like a
developed new versions of HAZOP by expanding node for complex systems.
the scope of hazard identification, taking into
account human factors, and making specific Creating the new deviations: To conduct the study,
corrections. Grossmann and Fromm suggested an an eighteen-kilometer underground methane gas
alternative mini-HAZOP study by excluding pipeline was selected in the south of Iran. The
irrelevant and trivial questions of the full HAZOP. In operating pressure was in the range of 8501000 psi
their research on full HAZOP, they stated that about and it is laid through the desert. A HAZOP team
90% of the questions did not provide new who previously had conducted the classic HAZOP
information on risks [11]. The main difference study for the pipeline was invited to integrate the
between the new extension and the full version of classic HAZOP and Kent’s method. The team
HAZOP is that this approach focuses on meaningful members included process engineers as the
deviations and eliminating duplicate and redundant operators, safety technicians, and some other
questions. In response to the newly emerged disciplines from the maintenance and
demands, the HAZOP technique has changed instrumentation department. The parameters, which
considerably. This is because of its capability to could influence the integrity and risks of the
innovate new extensions for more specific pipelines, are discussed in the Kent’s manual [18].
applications. Some modified HAZOP versions have The output of the Kent’s method is represented in
been developed in the past years to improve the Fig. 1. Each component contains several sub-
applicability of HAZOP [12], among which can be components. For example, the third party damage
pointed to HASPED [13], TOPHAZOP [14], index has 7 sub-components, including soil depth,
Multilevel HAZOP (HzM) [15], Goal Based activity level, above ground facilities, line location,
HAZOP [16-17], and Functional HAZOP [16-17]. public education, right–of–way condition, and
patrolling frequency. To innovate the new

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Fig. 1. Outline of Kent’s method for pipeline risk assessment [18]

deviations, the components and sub-components of approach; however, the new approach pointed them
the index sum were analyzed and all deviations directly. The repetitive deviations were the same as
applicable for pipelines were selected. Each the first study, while the exclusive deviations were
parameter that was noted in the manual as “an new and novel that and had not been pointed out
effective factor with influence on the safety of previously. As stated before, the final evaluation of
pipelines” was selected as a new deviation by the the proposed deviations showed that the most of the
leader and the team discussed the suggested item. proposed deviations belong to the novel deviations.
More than 37 parameters were found and entered Fig. 2 depicts the contribution of each group of the
into the judgment process. To accept a deviation as deviations.
a novel one, it was agreed that more than half of the An Illustrative Example: A case
team members should have consensus on it. A study was conducted for a group of utility,
cross table was made to mutually pair the old and feed, and product lines. Some of the most
new deviations. In addition, there were also some important lines were included in the study,
repetitive deviations, found in both the previous namely nitrogen, oxygen, chlorine,
and the new rounds. These deviations were ammonia, methane, benzene, and ethylene
excluded and only the novel deviations were listed. glycol pipeline. The methane line was
Finally, a comparison of the previous study with underground and the others were above
the new version was done in some segments. This ground. This study was done for the
comparison is presented as a case study. methane line. After completing the new
study, a comparison between the two
RESULT projects was made. The team discussed the
The core element of the present study was similarities, overlaps, and differences
based on creating a new sort of deviations from the between the two studies. The newly
generally accepted guide source that would be detected deviations, regarded as the novelty
suitable for the HAZOP of pipelines. All of the p-HAZOP, were marked for further
components of Index Sum were disintegrated and studies. Fig. 3 depicts the case study. Table
the relevant parameters and deviations were 2 compares some of the new deviations
detected. Table 1 shows some of the new with the previously identified deviations.
deviations selected for the Index Sum. Finally, the new complementary findings
The overall assessment revealed that the new were added to the primary study.
deviations could be categorized in three groups:
1. The deviations that were the same as the DISCUSSION
previous deviations In response to the constraint of the
2. The new deviations with some degree of HAZOP for the use in risk assessment of pipelines,
overlaps with the previous ones, and a new extension of HAZOP was developed in this
3. Quite new deviations study to overcome the existing limits. To this end,
The team was looking for those deviations, which the classic HAZOP was integrated with Kent’s
were new, exclusive, and supplementary for the method. This integration generated considerable
primary deviations. Therefore, group 1 (overlapped new guidewords that reveal the need to improve the
deviations) was excluded. Most of the approved current HAZOP to cover the scope of pipeline risk
deviations belonged to the category of the novel management. In addition, the overlapped
deviations. The overlapped deviations were the guidewords generated more knowledge about
clues that are expressed indirectly in the classic pipeline risks. The results demonstrated that

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employing this new extension of the classic HAZOP would improve the traditional version. The new
modifications revealed poor applicability of the necessity of modifying the classic HAZOP to cover
commonly used classic HAZOP for the use in the new applications, including pipeline risk management
domain of pipeline studies [19]. An outstanding [5, 17, and 20]. This study highlights the need for the
feature of the new extension is its ability to enlist improvement of the current HAZOP for using in the
more details as deviations. In other words, this method scope of pipeline risk management. Using an
can convert many failures of control systems or lack integrated approach could enhance the capabilities of
of control over the new deviations. This extension each technique and resolve the drawbacks of the
provides more (1) detailed checklist for the analysis to techniques. However, it is recommended to study the
find the probable deviations in designs. Such a feature integration of other pipeline risk assessment
is especially important for those analysts with a lower techniques in order to develop new methods more
level of experience. It could be said that P-HAZOP suitable for pipeline risk identification or improve the
brought the publicity and comprehensiveness of the existing classic procedures by integrating with more
two approaches in one method. Many studies have comprehensive methods, such as Kent’s method. It
emphasized the importance of pipeline risk should be noted that these new extensions only
management [19]. Selecting the right tools for improve the classic methods and are not alternatives
controlling pipeline risks is crucially required. This for them because some classic deviations are
research confirmed the previous studies on the exclusive and do not have substitutions.

Table 1. Extracted deviations from Kent’s method

Parameter Guide-word Deviation Meaning
Depth of soil cover Inadequate Inadequate depth of cover Inadequate depth of cover is a deviation from the
normal design.
Activity level High High activity level around High level of activities around pipelines would rise
pipelines the total risk e.g. excavation
Above ground facilities Susceptible Susceptible above ground Existence of above-ground facilities reflects a higher
facilities risk (pump stations, compressors, etc.).
Line location Ambiguous Ambiguous line location Ambiguous line location is a deviation from the
intended design.
Public education Low/ Inadequate Low public education More awareness of the third parties around pipelines
reduces the risks.
Right of way condition Lack of right of Lack of right of way Lack of right of way is a deviation from the normal
way operation.
Patrolling No /Less No /less patrolling Normal operation of pipelines depends on the routine
patrolling.
Environment Harsh Harsh environmental The impact of the surrounding environment on
conditions pipelines
Coating quality Poor Poor coating quality Poor coating quality is a deviation from the intended
design.
Design thickness Less Less thickness It is an obvious deviation from the designing
specifications.
Fatigue Unacceptable Unacceptable fatigue Unacceptable Fatigue is located outside of the
intended design.
Maximum operating Exceed MOP Exceeding observing MOP increase integrity and safety
pressure (MOP)
Surge potential High High surge potential Surge effect is a sudden conversion of kinetic energy
to potential energy, which is destructive.
Landslide Destructive Landslide beyond the accepted design
Safety system No No safety system The control system that prevents the pipeline from
being over- pressurized.
Supervisory control and Lack Lack of SCADA ‫أ‬normal transmission of information is a part of the
data acquisition intended design.

Fig. 2. Classification of the new deviations

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.
Fig. 3. Classified pipeline deviations

Table 2. Comparison of the classic and new deviations

New deviation Overlaps with the classic deviations Preference
High activity level Pointed as a cause, not as a deviation, which can Unacceptable activity around pipelines is a
lead to some impacts deviation from the normal state.
Less depth of soil cover No Exclusive
High above ground Pointed as location of impact, not as a deviation High above ground facilities endanger the
facilities transportation system.
Ambiguous line location No Exclusive
Poor public education No It could be a deviation from the desired status.
No / poor observation right No Exclusive
of way
No / less patrolling In some cases patrolling had been mentioned as a Lack of patrolling is a deviation from the normal
control measure procedures.
Harsh environment Pointed as seasonal variations and hot or cold Repetitive
environment
Poor coating quality Pointed as a cause for poor insulation It could be a deviation
Less thickness Pointed as a cause for line rupture Considering less thickness as a deviation gives a
better focus for finding its causes
Exceeded MOP Pointed as more pressure Considering “Exceeded MOP” clarifies which
extent of pressure is allowable
Land movement Pointed as a cause for line rupture Applying it as a cause might lead to the
ignorance of line deformation
No / poor safety system Pointed as control measures Considering it as a deviation would help to
determine the cause of poor safety systems
No SCADA No SCADA was considered as a control measure not
a root cause of the deviation.
No / poor documentation No Exclusive

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Published online: May 24, 2018