MANUEL V. BALA v. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ et al.

G.R. No. 67301, 29 January, 1990, SECOND DIVISION, (Sarmiento, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must be first issued by

the court of an order of final discharge based on the report and recommendation

of the probation officer. Only from such can the case of the probationer be

deemed terminated.

FACTS

Petitioner has been convicted of falsifying public or official document as

penalized under Article 172 of the RPC. The respondent judge who gave the decision

granted the application for probation of the petitioner. The expiration of the probation

was set on August 10, 1983, one year from the promulgation of judgement allowing

probation. After the lapse of the period, however, the final discharge of the petitioner

was not granted since the probation officer has not submitted its final report on the

conduct of his discharge.

Respondent People filed a petition to revoke the probation of petitioner on the

grounds that he has violated the conditions of his probation. Petitioner then argued he

was no longer in probation since the 1 year had already lapsed. Moreover, petitioner

filed a motion to dismiss against respondent’s petition since the trial court who granted

probation had no jurisdiction, since he transferred his residence to Las Pinas.

Respondent judge denied the petition. Hence, the present petition under Rule 65
ISSUE

WON petitioner’s probation can be revoked?

RULING

YES. Section 16 of PD 968 states that expiration of the probation period does not

automatically terminate probation. In order for the final discharge to be granted, it must

be based on the report and recommendation of the probation officer. In the absence of

the final order of discharge the probations still subsists unless otherwise revoked.

In the case at bar, the court revokes petitioner’s probation since, he has not

subjected himself to the principles and objectives of probation. He has not been

rehabilitated. Petitioner, in 1984 committed the same crime of falsifying government

documents which is sufficient grounds that he has not yet reformed. Therefore, it was

proper for the Court to revoke his probation and impose upon him the original sentence.

As to the question of jurisdiction, the Court did not grant the petition. Pursuant to

BP 129 the Courts in Makati and in Manila are co-equal and coordinate courts, the

totality of which is one Regional Trial Court. Hence, despite the change of venue of

petitioner’s residence, it does not hamper the Trial Court from revoking his probation.
 URBANO M. MORENO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTION et al.

G.R. No. 168550, 10 August, 2006, EN BANC, (TINGA, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

During the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified

from running a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from

public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.

FACTS

A case was filed against petitioner to disqualify him from running as Punong

Barangay on the grounds of conviction by final judgement from the crime of Arbitrary

Detention punished under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner Moreno

argued that the petition has no cause of action since he was already granted probation.

He cites the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, where imposition of penalties and accessory

penalties shall be suspended pursuant to granting probation. Furthermore, petitioner

cites Section 16 of the Probation Law, where the final discharge of probation shall

operate as to restore to him all civil rights.

In the decisions of the Investigation Officer up to the First Division of the

COMELEC, petitioner is disqualified. Pursuant to Article of the Local Government Code,

respondent argues that the grant of probation to petitioner merely suspended the

execution of his sentence, but did not affect his disqualification from running into office.

Before the Supreme Court, petitioner argues that Section 40 of the LGC does not apply

to him since he did not serve his sentence, and since he is a probationer, no sentence
or imposition of penalties was rendered. Because of this, he further argues that the

Probation Law is an exception to Section 40 of the LGC.

ISSUE

WON Section 40 of the LGC applies to petitioner?

RULING

NO. The phrase “within two years after service of sentence” in Article 40 of the

LGC, should be interpreted and understood to apply to both those who have been

sentenced by final judgement for an offense involving moral turpitude, and to those who

have been sentenced by final judgement for an offense punishable by 1 year or more.

Likewise, the phrase “service of sentence” from the same provision, should be

understood as confinement of a convicted person in a penal facility for a certain period.

The COMELEC, however, has extended the meaning of the same phrase to include

those who were granted probation. During probation, probationer is not disqualified from

running public officer because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is

not yet imposed. Clearly, the period which a person has undergone, under probation

cannot be equated with service of sentence.

Also, since petitioner obtained a final discharge order, the supposed to be

penalty to be imposed is extinguished, pursuant to Section 16 of the Probation Law. The

Probation Law should be construed then as an exception to the LGC.

G.R. No. 182748, 13 December, 2011, EN BANC, (Abad, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to

probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one

of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and

stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions

FACTS

Public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged and accused petitioner with

frustrated homicide. Based on testimony of private respondent and victim Rufino that

petitioner snuck behind him and struck him with a stone on the hand. Based on the

Medico Legal Certificate, Rufino suffered two lacerations on the forehead. Petitioner in

his defense claimed self-defense against Rufino and two other mean. He stated that

private respondents along with two other men were drunk and when he asked them on

the whereabouts of the Mayor of Tigaon, Rufino pushed him and the other men boxed

him which led him to hit them back with a stone.

The RTC rendered a judgement convicting Arnel guilty of frustrated homicide.

Upon appeal of the decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and decision of

the RTC. In addition, the CA did not grant petitioner’s prayer for a lesser penalty. Before

the Supreme Court, petitioner argues that he is entitled to apply for probation in case

the Court metes out a lesser penalty to him. On the other hand, the Solicitor General
argues that the Probation Law will not apply to him since he already perfected an

appeal in the CA which disqualifies him to apply for probation.

ISSUE

WON petitioner is entitled to probation?

RULING

YES. Citing Palaganas v. People, the prosecution must establish with certainty

the nature, extent, depth and severity of the victim’s wound. In the case at bar, the

Medico Legal failed to show that Rufino’s head injuries were severe as to cause danger

to his life. With the lack of evidence to support the prosecution’s claim, the decision

erred in it decision to convict petitioner with frustrated homicide. What petition is guilty is

only attempted homicide, which is a probationable. With the new penalty, Arnel is can

now apply for probation.

However, the present ruling runs against the established jurisprudence in

Fransisco v. CA where the perfection of an appeal is a disqualification to apply for

probation. This Court clears out the dilution by stating that petitioner did no appeal from

a judgement that would allow him to apply for probation. He did not have a choice

between appeal and probation. Had the RTC imposed the correct penalty, then a

different situation would have happened since, petitioner is confronted with either

appeal or probation.
 ARTEMIO VILLAREAL v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 1512578, 1 December, 2013, SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION, (Sereno, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

An application for probation must be filed with the trial court that convicted

and sentenced the defendant, or the court of origin.

FACTS

Petitioner filed before the Supreme Court a petition for Reconsideration and

Clarification concerning its decision modifying the judgement of the Court of Appeals,

finding Tecson and Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence

punishable by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners seek clarification as to

the imposed penalty upon them by the Supreme Court. Since, they already filed for

probation and have been discharged, hence, the case is already disposed. The OSG

questions the jurisdiction of the Trial Court where the petitioners filed for petitioner since

it was not the court that rendered the judgement in the criminal case against them

ISSUE

WON the probation granted by the Regional Trial Court of 130

RULING

NO. Pursuant to Section 4 of the Probation Law, the probation granted by RTC

Branch No. 130 will not be accepted as it is not the same court who rendered the
conviction against petitioner. Petitioners are not at liberty to choose the forum in which

they seek.

DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., v. COMMISSION ON ELECTION

G.R. No. 193237, 9 October, 2012, EN BANC, (Carpio, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

A sentence for prision mayor by final judgement is ground for

disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government Code, and under

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.

FACTS

Jalosjos and Cardino filed separate special civil actions against the resolution of

the COMELEC. Cardino asserts that Jalosjos is disqualified from running for Mayor of

Zamboanga Del Norte, since he is convicted of committing robbery, and yet he states in

his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run. Jalosjos countered that he had

already been granted probation.

ISSUE

WON Jalosjos is eligible to run for Mayor

RULING

NO. Based from the facts of the case, the probation argued by Jalosjos was

fraudulently issued, therefore concluding that he has not yet served his sentence, which

implies that he is still serving the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, which
entails that he is prohibited from running or holding any office, pursuant to Article 40 of

the LGC.