Policy Brief

Emerging Technologies and Military Capability

Dr Andrew D. James
November 2013
Emerging Technologies and Military Capability
Dr Andrew D. James

Abstract
“Emerging technologies” are the subject of considerable New technologies can make existing defence systems
interest to academics and practitioners not only in the obsolete or provide new and more effective military
field of military capability and international security but capability. By and large, attention has tended to focus on
also in the fields of economics and business. Emerging new-to-the-world technologies yet novel combinations of
technologies are said to have the potential to change “the existing and mature technologies can also have profound
rules of the game” whether that “game” is the balance of military implications.
military power between security actors or the balance of
competitive advantage in a market between incumbent At the heart of the paper is a consideration of the link
companies and new entrants. between emerging technologies and military capabilities
and the importance of institutional factors and the
Consequently, visions of the military future almost always acquisition system in determining the speed of adoption
have a strong technological element. This paper examines of emerging technologies. It is argued that technological
the nature of emerging technologies, their implications and economic change means that this is an increasingly
for military capability and the challenges that they pose important issue. Defence is playing a declining role as
to the acquisition system. The paper emphasises that a sponsor of advanced technologies and will become
their emergent nature means that emerging technologies a follower rather than a leader in many (most) areas of
are characterised by considerable uncertainty: will their technology. Consequently, most emerging technologies
apparent technological promise be fulfilled? How long will will arise from scientific, technological and innovative
it take to develop them to a sufficient state of maturity activity taking place in civilian sectors, small firms
that they have practical application (and how much will and universities world-wide. In the future, the defence
that cost?) How might they be most effectively utilised (if innovation process will need to place more emphasis
at all)? At its core, the paper stresses that it is a potentially on the timely identification and effective exploitation of
long and uncertain journey from the emergence of a new emerging technological knowledge wherever it resides.
technology to its use in a fielded weapons system. The future of defence technology policy is likely to be in
building absorptive capacity and agility by (i) developing
Such issues are important because new technologies effective search mechanisms to identify potentially
have the potential to change the environment in which important emerging technologies and their sources, (ii)
militaries operate and a radical new technology can building effective partnerships with (potentially) non-
change the balance of power or create new forms of traditional suppliers of such technological capabilities,
insecurity. New technologies can change military and(iii) finding means for the agile exploitation of those
doctrine and the way that war fighting is conducted. emerging technologies to military advantage.

1
Introduction provides some examples of emerging technologies that
“Emerging technologies” is the subject of considerable have been identified as having potential implications for
interest to academics and practitioners not only in the military capability in the future. This section also discusses
field of international security but also in the fields of why emerging technologies are of concern in the military
economics and business. Emerging technologies are said context and the threats and opportunities that they can
to have the potential to change “the rules of the game” pose. Section 3 defines “emerging technologies” and
whether that “game” is the balance of military power makes the distinction between technologies, weapon
between security actors or the balance of competitive systems and, technologies and innovation. Section 4
advantage in a market between incumbent companies introduces the notion of the “technology life cycle” to
and new entrants. explain the nature of emerging technologies. Section 5
discusses a key feature of emerging technologies, namely
By “emerging technologies”, this paper will mean uncertainty, and the reasons why it is difficult to make
new technologies that are at an early stage in their accurate ex ante assessments of the rate and timing
development. Their emergent nature means that they of a technology’s development. Section 6 considers
are characterised by considerable uncertainty: will their the link between emerging technologies and military
apparent technological promise be fulfilled? How long capabilities and the importance of institutional factors
will it take to develop them to reach a sufficient state of and the acquisition system in determining the speed of
maturity that they have practical application (and how adoption of emerging technologies. Section 7 considers
much will that cost?). How might they be most profitability the sources of emerging technologies of military relevance
utilised? Examples of the effects of the emergence of new in a global technological environment characterised by
technologies on business are many and varied. Take the “Joy’s Law” (i.e.“No matter who you are, the smart people
dramatic fall of Eastman Kodak. The dominant company always work for someone else”). Section 8 seeks to identify
in the photographic industry for a century was swept some implications for the Asia Pacific. Section 9 provides
away in a matter of a decade by the emergence of digital a conclusion.
imaging technology and the capacity of new entrants
to exploit that technology in new products. Emerging Emerging Technologies and the Military
technologies have had similar impacts on military power. Visions of the military future almost always have a
During the Second World War, the emergence of radar strong technological element. A review of futures
had a dramatic impact not least in the defence of the studies conducted by the likes of the UK MOD Defence
U.K. during the Battle of Britain and the conduct of anti- Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC)’s Strategic Trends
submarine warfare in the North Atlantic. During the 1
Programme, the U.S. National Intelligence Council Global
Cold War, emerging computer technologies, electronic Trends Program, the French Ministry of Defence and
component technologies (not least semiconductors) and the European Defence Agency shows that emerging
propulsion technologies – all sponsored at the time by the technologies feature prominently. 3 They identify
military – each had significant impacts on the performance emerging technologies such as: (i) autonomous systems
of Cold War weapons systems and perceptions of the Cold and robotics, (ii) swarming autonomous micro aerial
War balance of military power. 2
vehicles, (iii) developments in nanotechnology sensors,
(iv) cyberspace, (v) directed energy weapons, among
The aim of this paper is to examine the nature of emerging many others. Advances in microsystems, nanotechnology,
technologies and their potential impact upon military unmanned systems, communications and sensors, digital
capability. The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 technology, bio and material sciences, energy and power

1
On radar and the air defence of the UK see the excellent PhD thesis by Phillip Judkins (2007) Making Vision into Power: Britain’s Acquisition of the
World’s First Radar-based Integrated Air Defence System 1935-1941, PhD thesis, Defence College of Management and Technology, Cranfield University.
2
For more details, see Andrew D James (2007) “Science and technology policy and international security”, in Brian Rappert (ed) (2007) Technology
and Security: Governing Threats in the New Millennium, Palgrave MacMillan: New York and Houndsmill.
3
James, A.D and Teichler, T. (forthcoming) “Defence and security: new issues and impacts”, Foresight.

2
technologies and neuro-technologies are all identified advantage along dimensions not traditionally valued or
as likely to have important applications in the defence poorly understood by the military that tend to be the
sector. Cyber security and cyber warfare will grow ever focus of attention and concern.
more significant. The UK MOD DCDC’s analysis is typical:
Fundamentally, these types of new technologies can
“Trend analysis indicates that the most substantial change the environment in which military forces operate. A
technological developments are likely to be in radical new technology can change the balance of power
the areas of: (i) ICT, (ii) sensor/network technology, or create new forms of insecurity. The most dramatic
(iii) behavioural and cognitive science, (iv) illustration of the impact of new technology was the Allied
biotechnology, (v) materials,(vi) and the production, development of the atomic and hydrogen bombs during
(vii) storage and (viii) distribution of energy. the Second World War and the subsequent development
Advances in nanotechnologies will underpin many of similar capability by the Soviet Union. In turn, the
breakthroughs. Developments in individual areas development of inertial navigation technologies added
are likely to be evolutionary, but where disciplines the prospect of accuracy to devastating lethality.
interact, such as in the combination of cognitive
science and ICT to produce advanced decision- New technologies can redefine the way that warfare is
support tools, developments may be revolutionary, conducted or create new types of warfare. Technology and
resulting in the greatest opportunities for a novel military doctrine are closely coupled and interdependent.4
or breakthrough application….[S]ome [emerging Blitzkrieg, the Air-Land Battle and Carrier Strike are but
technologies] may have catastrophic effects or the examples of how new technologies combined with
present potential threats, perhaps through perverse organisational change led to new ways of warfare. 5 The
applications, such as the use of genetic engineering internet and its widespread application has created the
to produce designer bio-weapons” (pp.135-136). possibility of a new form of warfare – cyber warfare – that
was hardly imaginable 20 years ago.
Emerging technologies matter to the military because new
technologies can present a threat or opportunity and yet Equally, the significance of an emerging technology also
they are veiled in uncertainty. The military understands the depends in part on whether it is competence enhancing
potential of new technologies but – like its counterparts or competence destroying. An emerging technology that
in civilian business strategy – the uncertainty that undermines existing training, equipment, doctrine and
characterises emerging technologies mean that they so forth will have a more dramatic impact on the military
cannot know which emerging technologies mature to than one that complements or enhances existing military
have profound impacts, how long that maturation will competencies. New technologies can render existing
take nor the technological trajectory. Most emerging defence systems obsolete. Cavalry on the Western Front
technologies represent incremental improvements to is but one example (although it was only the carnage of
what went before and enhance the competencies of the battle that brought this home to military planners).
military along dimensions that they have traditionally
valued. This kind of technological development presents At the same time, a new technology can provide new and
relatively few challenges to the military, although their more effective military capability. Precision munitions,
insertion into existing platforms can be difficult (as we not least the use of GPS technology, is a good example.
shall see). In contrast, it is new technologies that are radical, Increased accuracy has led to a reduction in the number
competence destroying and create new sources of military of aircraft required to attack targets and the substitution
of heavy bomber for lighter fighter bombers. 6

4
Alic, J.A. (2007) Trillions for Military Technology: How the Pentagon Innovates and Why it Costs So Much, Palgrave MacMillan: New York and Houndsmill.
5
See Williamson, W. and Murray, A.R. (eds.) (1996) Military Innovation in the Inter-War Period, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge
6
Alic (2007) op cit.

3
By and large, attention has tended to focus on radical service at least with the United States military8). Sometimes
new-to-the-world technologies yet novel combinations of analysts conflate the far future and the soon to be fielded
existing and mature technologies can also have profound as “emerging technologies” giving the impression to
military implications. Schumpeterian thinking emphasises the unwary that (true) emerging technologies on the
that innovation can be new combinations of existing technological far horizon are as certain to be fielded as
technologies and stresses the potential significance of those in late stage development. This raises important
combining existing technologies in a new use. The DCDC questions about timing that are critical to discussions
Strategic Trends study identifies the rapid asymmetric about emerging technologies. It also raises issues about
insertion and exploitation of commercial technologies uncertainty. Both issues will be discussed later in this paper.
as a significant concern. Indeed, the experience of Iraq
and Afghanistan provides graphic illustrations of how A further source of ambiguity in discussions about
such tactics can have devastating effects. The contrast emerging technologies is what is meant by “technologies”.
between the rates of combinatorial innovation of this Technologies can be defined as “The ensemble of
kind has posed challenges to the traditional defence theoretical and practical knowledge, know-how, skills and
acquisition process. In the future, such developments artefacts that are used... to develop, produce and deliver...
may present ever greater challenges to the traditional, products and services”9). This definition is concerned with
long-term requirement and acquisition cycles. 7 technology and business but it holds equally for military
technology. Military technology combines “theoretical and
Defining Emerging Technologies practical knowledge” – some may be science based but
Before going any further, it is important to define what much will be engineering knowledge, including “know-
is – and what is not – meant by “emerging technologies”. how and skills” – individual and collective knowledge that
The U.K.’s Defence Technology Plan defines emerging arises within defence through “learning by doing”, team
technologies as follows: “Emerging technologies can be working, culture and so forth and “artefacts” – tangible
characterised as: immature technologies in the early proof- assets such as capital equipment, manufacturing facilities
of-principle stages; more mature technologies but where and so forth. It is worth noting that following this definition
a novel defence application has been identified”. While much of the core “technology” that underpins defence is
this definition appears clear and straightforward (and intangible and human.
this paper will use it), it is the case that a feature of much
of the discussion of emerging technologies is a lack of There is an important distinction here that is sometimes
clarity as to the subject of analysis. missed by military analysts of emerging technologies
(business analysts miss this too). The distinction is between
“Emerging” is used variously to examine technologies technologies and products/services (in the case of the
that analysts regard as potentially emerging in the military, we mean weapons, their delivery systems and
far future (e.g. the latest U.K. MOD DCDC programme the infrastructure that supports military capability).
report looks out to 2040 and consciously examines what Technologies underpin weapon systems but are distinct
technological developments may occur). In contrast, from them. Militaries want “capability”, not technologies per
“emerging” is sometimes used to describe technologies se. Consequently, how emerging technologies and other
that have reached a stage that we know that they will factors are combined into military capability should be
find application in a weapon system in the near future the critical consideration not the emerging technologies
(e.g. many of the “emerging” IT technologies discussed themselves (this is an important point that we shall return
by Bruce Berkowitz in his 2003 book are now in military to later).

7
Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) [UK], Global Strategic Trends: Out to 2040, Fourth Edition, Ministry of Defence: London.
8
Bruce Berkowitz (2003) The New Face of War: How War will be Fought in the 21st Century, The Free Press: New York.
9
Burgelman, R.A. and Rosenbloom, R.S. (1989) “Technology strategy: an evolutionary process perspective” Research on Technological Innovation,
Management and Policy, vol.4.

4
Equally, new or improved classes of weapon rarely (if ever) change and that technology is necessary and sufficient
comprise only new (“emerging”) technologies but instead to drive innovation in military capability has been widely
combine new technologies with mature technologies. discredited by those who study innovation. The study
Schumpeterian thinking emphasises that innovation can of military innovation emphasises the critical role of
be new combinations of existing technologies – existing political and bureaucratic politics among both military
technologies in a new use. Innovation that produces and civilian actors in selecting (or not selecting) particular
modern weapons systems is increasingly based on the technologies. 11 Equally, it emphasises the relationship
dynamic recombination of generic technologies which between technology and doctrine.12 Grissom summarises
are often information technologies.10 the literature on Social Shaping of Technology and its
emphasis on the nature of technologies as:
The decision to invest in an emerging technology in
the hope of military capability advantage depends on “ultimately ideas that are shaped by discourse and
very many factors not least the perception of the threat competition with different views on the potential
environment. The Cold War was different to today. World of a given technology… these interest groups (such
Wars are different to regional conflicts. The military needs as research teams, policymakers and investors) vie
of forces in Iraq and now Afghanistan have brought home to superimpose their own vision on a developing
the fact that emerging technologies are only of military technology by building a coalition around their
significance if they can be matured and fielded quickly vision, engaging in bureaucratic manoeuvres to
enough to make a difference to current combat operations. exclude other groups, and ensuring that important
Investments in emerging technologies that may only have design and engineering choices reflect their vision
application in 30 years time and are characterised by for the technology”.13
uncertainty have always had lower priority. Constrained
defence budgets in the U.K., Europe and the United In short, an emerging technology, its funding, trajectory
States mean that this is likely to be even more the case and adoption in use is shaped by a variety of actors.
in the future. Indeed, this speaks to the need for greater There is nothing “inevitable” about the trajectory of a new
agility in the defence acquisition process. The military technology or how it will (or will not) be used. This insight is
technological innovation timescale that emerged during important as we turn to consider the technology life cycle.
the Cold War means that development times of 20 years
for major weapon systems became the norm. New designs Emerging Technologies and the Technology
of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) seem to appear Life Cycle
in Afghanistan on a monthly basis. Changes in cyber A clear understanding of what we mean by “emerging
threats can occur just as quickly. This requires reform of technologies” matters since there is a danger that those
the defence innovation process to promote greater agility discussing the military implications of such technologies
and reduce time-to-fielding of new equipment. may find that they are talking at cross-purposes about
different objects of analysis, over different timescales and
Another important point needs to be made and that is the so forth. Those who study technological change think in
danger of analysis of emerging technologies degenerating terms of the technology life cycle (TLC). 14 This S-curve
into some form of technological determinism. The idea is illustrated in Figure 1.15 Note that the TLC is divided
that emergence of a new technology leads inevitably to into three stages distinguishing between emerging,

10
Hasik, J. (2008) Arms and Innovation: Entrepreneurship and Alliances in the twenty First Century Defense Industry, University of Chicago Press: Chicago.
11
Grissom, A. (2006) “The future of military innovation studies”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 29 (5): 905-934.
12
Alic op cit.
13
Grissom (2006) op cit.
14
The analogy of biological life is popular in the academic business and innovation community and the technology life cycle (and product life cycle
which I will also mention) should not be confused with the R&D lifecycle, product life cycle management and so forth.
15
Technology life cycle and product life cycle are both presented as logistic (S) curves

5
 transitional and mature technologies and is mapped The issues of what we mean by “performance” and
along two dimensions: time and performance. In many “time” are worthy of further examination. The TLC has
respects, this is covering similar ground to the idea of time as its X-axis and it is clear that the timescale for
Technology Readiness Levels used by NASA, the European a new technology can vary greatly depending on its
Space Agency and in defence. 16
technical characteristics, complexity, the state of scientific
and engineering knowledge as well as level of funding
Figure 1: Emerging technologies and the technology life cycle available for that technology and the priority it is given
within the defence acquisition community of an individual
country. Equally, it is clear that many of those technologies
labeled by analysts and advocates as “emerging” may –
Performance

using the TLC – actually be transitional or even mature.

The Y-axis of the TLC is performance. This should also be

examined carefully although the unit of performance
is frequently left unexplained by academics using the
Emerging Transitional Mature
Time TLC approach. In computing, performance may be
memory size or clock speed. In the military context,
The TLC begins with the emerging phase. An emerging performance may be speed, lethality or precision or
technology is characterised by its relatively poor perhaps some combination of performance measures.
and uncertain performance. The technology is at the In the modern security environment, what constitutes
proof of concept stage, characterised by high levels of the key performance measure is increasingly open to
technological uncertainty and uncertainty as to the debate and no longer straightforward. Performance is
feasibility of its application in military systems. The no longer about only technological trajectories but also
emerging stage may involve the transition from scientific about whether technologically possible weapons are
research to applied research and the observation of the suitable on political and ethical grounds.
essential characteristics of the technology. Analysis and
experimentation will likely take place to ensure proof of Uncertainty and Emerging Technologies
concept. At the emerging stage, the technology is a long The uncertainty that surrounds emerging technologies
way from providing military capability in a fielded system has been mentioned at various points in this paper
(TRL 1-3). During the transitional stage, (roughly TRL 4-5) and deserves further discussion. Uncertainty is a key
the technology is subject to testing through prototyping characteristic of technological change and stems from the
and other activities. At this stage, the technology will difficulties of ex ante assessment of the rate and timing
likely be tested in a relevant and realistic environment of a technology’s development. Failed predictions about
to judge its potential performance. At the mature stage, technological developments are legion. Bill Gates is said
the technology’s performance characteristics are well to have said about computer memory that “640k ought
understood. The technical uncertainties that characterised to be enough for anybody”. 17 A British Training manual
the earlier stages have been reduced and efforts focus on in 1907 stated: “It must be accepted as a principle that the
questions of design and integration into military systems rifle, effective as it is, cannot replace the effect produced
prior to the production phase for a new military system by the speed of the horse, the magnetism of the charge
or the insertion of the new technology into an upgrade and the terror of cold steel”. Marshal Ferdinand Foch was
of an existing system. reported as saying in 1911:“Airplanes are interesting toys
but of no military value”.18

16
For a definition of Technology Readiness Levels see http://esto.nasa.gov/files/trl_definitions.pdf
17
He says he never said this.
18
Adam Simons, “The art of being wrong: failed predictions” http://urbantimes.co/2012/02/being-wrong-failed-predictions/ (last downloaded 23
January 2013)

6
 Why are emerging technologies characterised by impossible to forecast the eventual outcomes of emerging
uncertainty? Figure 2 describes three S-curves for the technologies, and since few (if any) countries have the
life cycles of three technologies. They illustrate that resources to pursue all emerging technologies, this raises
uncertainty may arise because the technology is radical; important strategic questions: should a country seek to
the technology is early in its life cycle but also because of pick a winner? Should it lag behind and hope that an ally
the increasingly amorphous nature of security threats. 19
invests in the technology, and is subsequently willing
to transfer that technology, or does a country seek to
Figure 2: Emerging technologies and the nature of follow all of them but develop processes that allow it
technological innovation to know when to stop when initial expectations prove
unfounded? A small country may choose to lag behind and
C simply invest in adsorptive capacity (to access commercial
technologies) and/or a limited range of distinctive
Performance

capabilities that allows it to enter into cooperative

B arrangements with other countries. This suggests that
investments should be in scanning the environment and
A in absorptive capacity rather than seeking to sponsor
new technology development which speaks to an “open
Emerging Transitional Mature innovation strategy” (we will discuss this later).
Time

The S-curve labelled (A) emphasises that some S-curve (C) emphasises that only some technologies
technologies may fail to deliver on the early performance will reach the stage that they are deemed sufficiently
claims of their advocates. They may fail to deliver because mature that they may be considered for transition into
engineering and technological challenges arise that are new military capability. The design dilemma faced by the
difficult to overcome without excessive time or other defence acquisition community is the trade-off between
resources. Equally, they may reflect a “conspiracy of the costs of designing in emerging technologies against
optimism” in which those who have a vested interest in the benefits. Advocates of the emerging technologies
a particular technology over-sell its military potential. understandably focus on their benefits but the costs
Academic grant holders and researchers in government are non-trivial. Those costs include those related to the
defence research laboratories may boost the technology uncertainties surrounding any emerging technology
to ensure their own funding. Entrepreneurs may claim (will it work, at what cost and when?); the disruption to
military relevance to access “free” defence funding for established military ways of operating (including doctrine);
early stage technology development. Experts in think and the costs of substituting the new weapons for existing
tanks may over-sell the potential of a technology to sell weapons. The fielding of new technologies in weapons
books or access funding for workshops. Failure is normal, systems is a function of the weapons development process
natural and desirable. This may be an uncomfortable and the procurement process of individual governments.
truth for officials in a resource-constrained environment. An emerging technology may move along a development
DARPA’s “success” was its ability to allow space for “failure” trajectory but never be translated into a fielded weapon.
– a number of significant DARPA programmes (including
UAVs) were the outcome of returning to a “failed” project. Emerging Technologies and Military
Capability
The S-curve labelled (B) illustrates a situation where a There is an understandable tendency for those who
technology is superseded by other technologies that analyse emerging technologies to focus on those
are better or cheaper or faster to develop. Since it is technologies. However, military innovation is about more

19
Hasik, op cit.

7
than emerging technologies and there is a load road from innovative and emerging “uses” for existing technologies
the emergence of a technology to its having an impact (it will be recalled that this point is made in the U.K. MOD’s
on military capability. Defence Technology Plan). Recent insurgencies prove that
a 100 year old rifle is as effective as a modern equivalent
An important point here is that the knowledge that when used effectively and IED designs do not need to
underpinned these emerging technologies rarely resided evolve that much to remain devastatingly effective.21
in the military of a single country. The United Kingdom
was not the only country to possess the knowledge that The procurement process can also have an important
underpinned the emergence of radar. The United States part to play in the adoption of an emerging technology.
was not the only country during the Cold War to possess The responsive of the procurement process to new
semiconductor technologies. The military-scientific- technologies has always been an important concern
industrial establishments of each country made decisions and is becoming more in the face of the twin forces of
to prioritise the development of certain technologies budget constraints (at least in Europe and the United
for certain applications. The pace of application varied States) and rapid technological change. The defence
in part as a consequence of the ability of the military acquisition process has always faced the challenge that
procurement process to pull the technologies through it generates more ideas and potential new technologies
into fielded weapons. than it can possibly transfer into new weapons and other
military equipment. This raises the matter of the so-called
In short, military innovation is about more than an “Valley of Death” – the situation where R&D supports the
emerging technology. We have already noted that while development of an emerging technology only for that new
technologies may underpin weapons systems, they are technology not to transition into fielded equipment due
distinct from them.The distinction is between technologies a lack of procurement funding. This has always been an
and products/services (in the case of the military, we mean issue for the military and is likely to become more so in an
weapons, their delivery systems and the infrastructure that era (for the West at least) of austerity and defence budget
supports military capability). Militaries want “capability”, cuts. Even where defence spending is growing as it is in the
not technologies per se. Consequently, how emerging Asia Pacific, it will likely remain the case that the number
technologies and other factors are combined into military of potential technological ideas will exceed opportunities
capability should be the critical consideration not the to transition those into equipment programmes.
emerging technologies themselves.
Rapid technological change also poses challenge for
However, the idea that military capability can be reduced to the procurement process. Technology cycles in the
the fielding of weapon systems with superior technology civilian economy are shortening (witness the rate of
is plainly wrong (although in the eyes of much of the change in Integrated Circuits) but weapons systems take
world this Cold War mindset has characterised aspects longer to develop. This makes it increasingly difficult
of U.S. thinking with disastrous consequences, not least to take advantage of commercial innovations. “New”
in Afghanistan). History shows that improving military weapons are introduced that include technologies that
effectiveness may require complementary organisational are already obsolete. This raises huge questions for the
and doctrinal innovation. 20
For example, German defence acquisition process. How to make the defence
Blitzkrieg was a military innovation that combined these acquisition process more agile and responsive to emerging
with organisational and doctrinal innovations. Indeed, technologies? How to insert the new technology when it is
it has been argued that the whole issue of emerging “good enough”? Various responses have been adopted or
technologies would be better thought of in terms of the proposed including open system architectures and “spiral

20
Murray and Millett (1996) op cit.
21
I want to acknowledge with thanks the thoughts of Andrew Burton on this point.

8
development” and yet the divergence of the technology civilian sectors, small firms and universities world-wide.
life cycles between civilian and defence equipment At the same time, discussion of “military” technologies
remains a profound challenge for the military acquisition will become increasingly redundant. There may be a very
process. few technologies (e.g. those related to low observables)
that have strictly military application. However, most
Critically, the adoption of a new technology is dependent technologies will arise out of the dynamics of global non-
on the response of the military. In the civilian economy, defence innovative activities: the technologies may have
competition stimulates innovation and determines military relevance but they are unlikely to be “military”
which new technologies are adopted. In the military technologies per se. To emphasise a point made earlier in
innovation system, which new technologies are adopted this paper, too often advanced technologies are discussed
is determined by bureaucratic and political decisions. In in the abstract but it is the combination of technologies
peacetime, the military is characterised by conservatism into military systems and the development of doctrine,
towards innovation. Military innovation arises out of training and organisation to exploit them to best effect
inter- and intra-service rivalries as well as interactions and that is the key issue for military capability.
negotiations between the military and civilian “champions”
of innovation.22 The changing dynamics of technology mean that Defence
in the United States and Europe will have to accept Joy’s
Joy’s Law, “Military” Technologies and Law. As Bill Joy, Co-Founder of Sun Microsystems, said:“No
Open Innovation matter who you are, most of the smartest people work
A further point needs to be appreciated if we are to for someone else”. For most countries, it is increasingly
understand the nature of emerging technologies. We no apparent that most smart people work somewhere else.
longer live in the 1960s where U.S.’ defence R&D spending Joy’s Law represents a profound shock for the defence
accounted for something like half of all defence and non- innovation systems of many countries, not least the
defence R&D spending in the world. At that time, U.S.’ United States (where, for a long time, many of the smartest
defence R&D and procurement was able to stimulate people did work in U.S. defence). In the future, the defence
whole new technologies (like semiconductors). However, innovation process will need to place more emphasis
this state of affairs did not last. Defence R&D remains on the timely identification and effective exploitation of
important for the development of certain defence-specific emerging technological knowledge wherever it resides.
technologies and knowledge but, more broadly, the The future of defence technology policy is likely to be in
defence innovation system has grown isolated from civil building absorptive capacity and agility by developing
technology developments as a consequence of economic effective search mechanisms to identify potentially
and technological change. important emerging technologies and their sources,
building effective partnerships with (potentially) non-
Defence is playing a declining role as a sponsor of traditional suppliers of such technological capabilities,
advanced technologies and will become a follower and finding means for the agile exploitation of those
rather than a leader in many (most) areas of technology. emerging technologies to military advantage.
“Emerging technologies” are more likely to emerge from
non-defence than defence sources.23 Consequently, Such an approach is already commonplace in many sectors
most emerging technologies will arise from scientific, of the civilian economy where companies increasingly
technological and innovative activity taking place in practice what has become known as “open innovation”.24

22
See Grissom, (2006) op cit for a review of the work of Posen; Rosen; Murray and Millet; Pierce and others.
23
See Alic, J.A., Branscomb, L.M., Brooks, H., Carter, A.B. and Epstein, G.L. (1992) Beyond Spin-Off: Military and Commercial Technologies
in a Changing World. Boston: Harvard Business School Press; Cowan, R. and Foray, D. (1995) Quandries in the economics of dual
technologies and spillovers from military to civilian research and development. Research Policy 24 851–868; Molas-Gallart, J.
(1997) Which way to go? Defence technology and the diversity of ‘dual-use’ technology transfer. Research Policy 26 367–385.
24
Huston, L. and Sakkab, N. (2006) “Connect and Develop: Inside Procter & Gamble’s New Model for Innovation”, Harvard Business Review (March): 58-66.

9
Open innovation is the idea that organisations should will mean the ability to (i) develop effective search
seek, engage and exploit knowledge wherever it resides. 25
mechanisms to identify potentially important external
Open innovation is already common practice in many technologies outside Defence and their sources, (ii) build
other sectors.Under open innovation the ability to engage effective partnerships with (potentially) non-traditional
effectively with external suppliers of technological suppliers of such technological capabilities, and (iii) find
knowledge becomes a key competence. The challenge means to exploit those capabilities to military advantage.
for Defence – both government and industry – is to
develop those skills and competencies necessary to Policy Implications
engage with non-traditional suppliers who will most A number of policy implications arise from this discussion.
likely be from outside the traditional boundaries of the
defence innovation system. The closed innovation has First, emerging technologies can have significant
been struggling to accommodate dual-use technological implications for military capability but the path from
change and budget constraints for years. Recent technological emergence to military capability is a long
developments, however, mean that the closed innovation and uncertain one. Many immature technologies fail to live
model is finally broken. Importantly, technologies critical up to the promises of their advocates. Hype is common;
to defence are increasingly civilian in origin and global failure even more so. The nature of the acquisition process
in nature and this explains why governments across the not least its agility and responsiveness to new technologies
world are seeking to access non-traditional sources of is critically important. Equally so is the recognition that the
technology for defence. combination of mature technologies in use can also have
profound implications for military capability. The shock
Many – most – of the emerging technologies identified of the old can be just as great as the shock of the new.
as potentially important to defence are not of defence
origin but are emerging from commercial R&D activity This raises a second point, namely whether we should
taking place in civilian sectors, SMEs and start-ups and in use an absolute or relative measure in judging whether
universities throughout the world. The defence innovation a technology is “emerging”. What is a mature technology
process will need to place more emphasis on the efficient in one country may be an “emerging” technology for
exploitation of technological knowledge wherever it another country or region (in our case the Asia Pacific).
resides and take advantage of the significantly greater This raises important issues about the diffusion of military
investments made in markets outside of its control or technologies and innovation that were the subject of
influence. The emphasis will have to be on exploiting an excellent collection edited by Emily Goldman and
technologies rather than large investment in new cutting Leslie Eliason.27 Arms transfers and cooperation play an
edge technologies in all but a few defence critical areas. important role in this process and will grow as European,
U.S. and other governments and companies seek to
Accordingly, one of the key competencies that Defence gain a share of growing defence procurement budgets
will need to develop in an era of open innovation is that in the Asia Pacific. Equally, the relative capabilities of
of absorptive capacity. The idea of absorptive capacity is national innovation systems are likely to be an important
clearly understood by many non-defence technology consideration. Most of the true emerging technologies
companies, namely that the ability of a firm to recognise identified in futures studies are emerging globally, and
the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and defence is likely to play only a minor role as sponsor and
apply it to commercial ends is critical to its innovative user. The strength of national innovation systems (rather
capabilities. Absorptive capacity in the Defence context
26
than just defence innovation systems) will be important.

25
Chesbrough, H. (2003) Open Innovation, Harvard Business School Press: Boston.
26
Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A. (1990) “Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and Innovation”, Administrative Science Quarterly , 35
(1): 128-152.
27
Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason (eds) (2003) The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas.

10
Cold War thinking about the dominant global position technologies combined in new ways. This paper examines
of the United States through its home-grown defence the nature of emerging technologies, their implications
technologies is declining in relevance by the day. The 28
for military capability and the challenges that they pose
further growth of the already considerable scientific and to the acquisition system. The paper has emphasised that
technological capabilities of the Asia Pacific region is likely their emergent nature means that they are characterised
to have significant implications in the field of emerging by considerable uncertainty: at its core, the paper stresses
technologies. that it is a potentially long and uncertain journey from
the emergence of a new technology to its use in a fielded
The gulf between the most advanced technologies weapons system.
being applied for military use by the United States and
those of much of the Asia Pacific region is considerable. Such issues are important because new technologies
The difficulties (and cost) of trying to close the gap have the potential to change the environment in which
are enormous and beyond the scope (and ambition) militaries operate and a radical new technology can change
of regional actors. Since it is impossible to forecast the the balance of power or create new forms of insecurity.
eventual outcomes of emerging technologies, and since New technologies can change military doctrine and the
few (if any) countries have the resources to pursue all way that war fighting is conducted. New technologies
emerging technologies, this raises important strategic can make existing defence systems obsolete or provide
questions: should a country seek to pick a winner? Should it new and more effective military capability. By and large,
lag behind and hope that an ally invests in the technology, attention has tended to focus on new-to-the-world
and is subsequently willing to transfer that technology, technologies yet – as this paper has emphasised - novel
or does a country seek to follow all of them but develop combinations of existing and mature technologies can
processes that allow it to know when to stop when initial also have profound military implications.
expectations prove unfounded? A small country may
choose to lag behind and simply invest in adsorptive How emerging technologies of military importance
capacity (to access commercial technologies) and/or a are identified and integrated into weapons systems
limited range of distinctive capabilities that allows it to through the acquisition process is a critical issue. The
enter into cooperative arrangements with other countries. rate of technological change – driven by technological
This suggests that investments should be in scanning and economic factors mainly from the civil sector – places
the environment and in absorptive capacity rather than a premium on agility and responsiveness of the defence
seeking to sponsor new technology development which acquisition system. At the same time, it suggests the need
speaks to an “open innovation strategy”. This suggests that for a profound shift from a closed towards an open model
the use of more mature technologies in new ways is a more of defence innovation.
likely direction of development for Asia Pacific militaries.
We are already seeing such developments, not least in Acknowledgements
the development of military capabilities in cyberspace. I wish to thank Hugh Cameron (University of Manchester)
and Andrew Burton (Imperial College London) for their
Conclusion helpful discussions on this topic. I also wish to acknowledge
The aim of this paper has been to examine the nature the very useful comments and discussion at the MacArthur
of emerging technologies and their potential impact Foundation funded workshop on Emerging military
upon military capability. This paper has defined “emerging technologies and their impact on the Asia Pacific at the
technologies” as new technologies that are at an S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang
early stage in their development or relatively mature Technological University, Singapore, January 2013.

28
This is recognised if not always by some within the defence-industrial-scientific complex. For example, see the National Academies (2009) report,
Beyond “Fortress America”: National Security Controls on Science and Technology in a Globalized World.

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Author’s Biography
Dr Andrew D. James is a Senior Lecturer at Manchester reports and his research focuses on the application of core
Business School and Senior Research Fellow at the frameworks from the academic literature on technology
Manchester Institute of Innovation Research. Andrew strategy and innovation management to the particular
is the author or co-author of more than fifty academic challenges and particularities of the security and defence
journal publications, book chapters and public domain sectors.

About the Project on Strategic Stability in the 21st Century Asia

Since June 2012, this project by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS is a constituent unit of RSIS) has
been engaged in identifying and analysing the key sources of strategic stability and instability in contemporary Asia.
We sought to augment the prevailing understanding of how forces that stabilise Asia can be strengthened, and how
forces that destabilise Asia (or have the potential for doing so) can be managed, and their adverse effects mitigated
or contained.

The project addresses three key research concerns: First, examine major power relations in Asia. Second, analyse interstate
dynamics within the maritime domain. And finally evaluate the impact of new and emerging military technologies in
Asia. To that end, we organised three workshops during January-February 2013. We also commissioned a number of
policy briefs, research papers, monographs, and edited volumes on critical security issues that have the potential to
affect the security order in Asia over this decade.

The project is funded through a grant from the Chicago-based John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

About the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies

The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) is a professional graduate school of international affairs at the
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. RSIS’ mission is to develop a community of scholars and policy analysts
at the forefront of security studies and international affairs. Its core functions are research, graduate education and
networking. It produces cutting-edge research on Asia Pacific Security, Multilateralism and Regionalism, Conflict Studies,
Non-Traditional Security, International Political Economy, and Country and Region Studies. RSIS’ activities are aimed at
assisting policymakers to develop comprehensive approaches to strategic thinking on issues related to security and
stability in the Asia Pacific.

For more information about RSIS, please visit www.rsis.edu.sg.

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 S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University
Block S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798
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