Milan Ristović

The Resistance in Yugoslavia: Causes, Forms, Divisions, Results

(A short Overview)*

History of Yugoslavia during the WWII could be on the complexity scale

categorized as the most complicated and dramatic one.1 One of most important factors
with far-reaching implications on the general situation was great fragmentation of the
territory after the short April war 1941.2 Half of dozen of occupation regimes including
establishment under the German and Italian sponsorship of fascist marionette Ustasha
Independent State of Croatia, with their extremely brutal policy toward civilian
population (central place was “reserved” on almost all occupied and annexed territories
for the Serbs and Jews), soon created unbearable conditions for the life with uncertain
chances for the barren survival. What concerns Serbia, important role for the organizing
armed resistance played collective experience and vivid memories on the bitter years of
Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian occupation during the First World War, but also
tradition which marked resurrection of modern Serbian state with uprisings and liberation
wars. To made this “sharp soup” sharper as a very strong ingredient the ideological
moment was added.
Hitler’s immediate reaction on the military coup in Belgrade on 27th march 1941.
and overthrowing of unpopular government Cvetkovic-Maček and Regent Paul, who,
after months of Germany’s pressure, accepted joining to tripartite pact two days earlier,
was the decision to start immediate military action with the goal to eradicate Yugoslav
state. Hitler’s point of view was, that political overturn in Belgrade was “one proof
more” of “Serbian insincerity”. He compared events in Belgrade with the assassination of
Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo 1914, accusing the Serbs and “Serbian military clique”
for starting both World Wars.3 He decided there and then to ensure “that Belgrade, the

 Published in Polish translation in ; RISTOVIĆ, Milan, „Ruch oporu w Jugoslawii: przyczyny,

formy, podzialy, rezultaty“, OBOZ. Wolnosć i bezpieczenstwo narodow Europy Srodkowo-
Wschodniej w XIX-XX wieku, pod redakcja Elžbiety Znamierowskiej-Rakk, tom II,
Warszawa, 2010, 137-160.
1
See: Branko Petranović, Srbija u Drugom svetskom ratu, 1939-1945, Beograd, 1992.
2
Ferdo Čulinović, Okupatorska podjela Jugoslavije, Beograd, 1970, pp 49-85; Klaus Olshausen,
Zwischenspiel auf dem Balkan, Stuttgart, 1973, pp 97-110.
3
F. Čulinović: Okupatorska podjela, p. 46, 387-394; Hermann Neubacher: Sonderauftrag Südost 1940-1945.
Göttingen/Berlin/Frankfurt am Main 1957, p 127ff

1
center of conspiracy, should never become important”.4 Hermann Neubacher, the German
plenipotentiary for the Southeast, said that, at that time, the German leaders thought it will
be best if “Serbia completely disappeared from all maps”. Failing that, this “eternal
carrier” of unrest, “should be made as small as possible”.5
Hitler’s hatred and intolerance expressed toward the Serbs could be directly
connected with his reminiscence on - again aroused - old Austro-Hungarian propaganda
stereotypes with whom public in Habsburg Monarchy was “fed” before and especially
during the WWI. These stereotypes, almost unchanged have had shown its poisonous
usability in the April war 1941.6 Few months later, when armed resistance in Serbia
started, German military commander in Serbia, general Franc Bohme expressed his
opinion that German soldiers are at the same duty as their fathers and grandfathers at the
same space in WWI.7 Serbs were to be punished, as the nucleus of Yugoslav state, the
“artificial creation of Versailles”.8
I
The Axis Powers started an undeclared war against Yugoslavia on the night
between 5 and 6 April, 1941. The German troops penetrated the Yugoslav borders from
the territory of Austria, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria.9 Italian troops take part it the
military operations and (from April the 10th) Hungarian army. Bulgaria and Rumania put
their territories and airfields at German ground troops and Luftwaffe disposal.10
German minister for foreign affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop justified this criminal
action as “act of defense” caused by the “Serbia” which endangered German interests and

4
Staatsmänner und Diplomaten bei Hitler. Vertrauliche Aufzeichnungen über Unterredungen mit
Vertretern des Auslandes, Bd. I, hg. von A. Hillgruber. Frankfurt am Main 1967, p 531.
5
Arhiv Vojnoistorijskog institute (AVII), Nemačka arhiva, dosije Hermann Nojbahera, September
1947.
6
See: F. Čulinović, Okupatorska podjela, p. 387-396; Milan Ristović, Crni Petar i balkanski
razbojnici. Balkan i Srbija u nemačkim satiričnim časopisima 1903-1918: Black Peter and Balkan
Brigands. The Balkans and Serbia in German Satirical Journals 1903-1918, Beograd-Belgrade, 2003,
pp 47-79.
7
F. Čulinović, Okupatorska podjela, 392. Pressed by their own strategical needs the Italians improved
later with the Serbian population thet were living in the Independent State of Croatia.
8
Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels. Sämtliche Fragmente. Teil I: Aufzeichnungen 1924-1941, Bd.
4. München/New York/London/Paris 1987, S. 574; Willy. A. Boelcke; Kriegspropaganda 1939-1941,
Stuttgart 1966, p 653.
9
The codename of this action was: Strafgericht- the Punishment.
10
K. Olshausen: Zwischenspiel, p 97-110; Velimir Terzić, Slom Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1941.
Beograd/Ljubljana/Titograd 1983. The attack was based on a hastily improvised plan (‘Weisung Nr.
25“). In April 1941, 870.000 soldiers of the Axis states were engaged in the operations against
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, organized into 52 divisions, with 2,232 aircraft, against 600,000 Yugoslav
soldiers. The Second Armored Group, with three German divisions and 600 tanks invaded Yugoslavia
from Bulgaria, while Italian naval forces took part in sea operations; see more in: V. Terzić, Slom
Kraljevine Jugoslavije.

2
acted as exponent of British policy.11 Directives for the German propaganda in
Yugoslavia underlined, that war was waged at the first place against the Serbs for the
liberation of other Yugoslav nations from the “Great Serbian Slavery” and “Serbian
Hegemony”, insisting on the difference between “friendly nations” (Croats, Macedonians-
actually accepted as Bulgarians, and members of Albanian and Hungarian minority), from
the “enemy nations” (Serbs and in less grade Slovenians).12 This was a constant of their
policy, but later was subjected to some “corrections”, mostly on the Italian side, what was
caused by the “pragmatic approach” on the terrain and deterioration of relations between
Rome and Zagreb.
Air forces of the Third Reich and Italy struck the first blow. They attacked the
airfields as well as naval basis. One of main targets was Yugoslav and Serbian capital,
Belgrade, even though it had been proclaimed an open city on 3 April. Some 500
Luftwaffe bombers attacked systematically Belgrade, on several occasions, on 6 an 7
April. The number of citizens killed exceeded 2,271 and may have been as high as
13
4,000.
Unorganized Yugoslav resistance, general disarray, panic, as well as massive
desertion and rebellion of non-Serb officers and soldiers, revival of separatist movements
in almost all parts of the Kingdom were a prelude to four-year long war agony. On 10
April, German troops entered Zagreb and members of fascist Ustasha movement
proclaimed Independent State of Croatia. The German entry into Belgrade on 13 April
symbolized the total disintegration of the Yugoslav state. On 15 April, German troops
reached Sarajevo and forced the Second Yugoslav Army to surrender. The Wehrmaht
units reached the Adriatic Cast on 17 April.14 About 400,000 Yugoslav soldiers became
prisoners of war, while predominantly Serbs (about 200,000), some Slovenians and Jews
were kept in prison camps in Germany and Italy. King Petar II with members of the
Government went into exile and so did several thousand officers and soldiers, who
managed to reach Palestine via Greece.15
Yugoslav territories were already being partitioned while military operations were still
going on. On 27 March Hitler himself laid the basic guidelines for dismemberment (“the General
plan for organization of subsequent government in the Yugoslav region” of 6 April and the
11
F. Čulinović: Okupatorska podjela, p 47.
12
F. Čulinović: Okupatorska podjela, p 80.
13
Branko Petranović, Srbija u drugom svetskom ratu 1939-1945. Beograd 1991, p. 101-103.
14
K. Olshausen, Zwischenspiel p., 113-120.
15
B. Petranović, Srbija, p. 107-110.

3
“Temporary directives for the division of Yugoslavia” from 12 April). 16 The “directives” were
implemented at the conference held in Vienna on 21 and 22 April 1941. There Germany
distributed the “war plunder” among her allies. Serbia with Banat was placed under direct
German occupation administration. Bačka, Baranja and certain smaller frontier territories have
been annexed by Hungary.17 In addition to the major part of Vardar Macedonia, Bulgaria also
occupied parts of eastern and southeastern Serbia. Most of Kosovo and Metohija, as well as
western Vardar Macedonia, were annexed to “Greater Albania”. Italians have occupied
Montenegro, Dalmatia and a part of Slovenia.18 Germany annexed the remaining parts of
Slovenia. The Quisling Independent State of Croatia consisted from the territories of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Croatia.19 On the majority of occupied and annexed territories, reprisals,
massive persecution and killing primarily targeted Serbian population, stigmatized as the main
“culprit”. In Slovenia, German authorities were planning massive germanization of Slovenians
and massive relocation to Serbia or Croatia.20 In addition, Yugoslav Jews, particularly those in
Croatia and Serbia, bore the brunt of anti-Semitic legislation, “Aryanization” measures and
massive liquidations.21 Over 400,000 Serb refugees fled to Serbia from the persecution of
Ustasha, Bulgarian, Albanian and Hungarian occupied authorities.22

II

The German Supreme Command (OKW) installed on 22 April 1941 military commander
of Serbia, a supreme political and military position with wide authority. A special command
headquarters was formed, headed by Dr. Harald Turner who was in charge of military

16
F. Čulinović: Okupatorska podjela, p. 52, 53; K. H. Schlarp: Wirtschaft und Besetzung in Serbien
1941-1944. Stuttgart 1986, pp. 73-90.
17
F. Čulinović: Okupatorska podjela, p 54-78; Jovan Marjanović: „The German Occupation System in
Serbia in 1941“. In: Les systèmes d’occupation en Yougoslavie 1941-1945. Belgrade 1963, pp 272 ff.
18
On Italian occupation system in Yugoslavia see: Sala Teodoro, “1939/1943. Jugoslavia “neutrale” e
Jugoslavia occupata”. In: Italia contemporanea, Milano, marzo 1980; ibid., “Guerra e amministrazione
in Jugoslavia 1941/1943: un’ipotesi coloniale”. In: L’Itala in guerra 1940-1943. Annali della
Fondazione Luigi Micheletti, 5/1990-1991; Dragan S. Nenezić, Jugoslovenske oblasti pod Italijom
1941-1943, Beograd 1999.
19
On ISC and Ustasha see: Ladislav Hory- Martin Broszat, Der kroatische Ustascha Staat 1941-
1945, Stuttgart, 1964; Fikreta Jelić-Butić, NDH i ustaše 1941-1945, Zagreb, 1977; Bogdan Krizman,
Ante Pavelić i ustaše, Zagreb, 1978; ibid., Pavelić između Hitlera i Mussolinija, Zagreb, 1980.
20
Milan Ristović, “Zwangsmigrationenen in den Territorien Jugoslawiens im Zweiten Weltkrieg:
Pläne, Realisierung, Improvisation, Folgen“. In: Zwangsmigrationen im mittleren und östlichen
Europa. Völkerrecht-Konzeptionen-Praxis (1938-1950), Herausgegeben von R. Melville, J. Pešek und
K. Scharf, Mainz, 2007, pp 309-330.
21
Zločini fašističkih okupatora i njihovih pomagača protiv Jevreja u Jugoslaviji, Beograd 1952.
22
See: Slobodan D. Milošević, Izbeglice i preseljenici na teritoriji okupirane Jugoslavije 1941-1945,
Beograd, 1981.

4
administration and acted in the first phase of occupation as a state government. Later he assumed
the control of local collaborationist government.23 On 1 May 1941 Turner appointed first
collaborationist administration in Serbia (“the Council of Commissars”), headed by Milan
Aćimović, a former Minister of the Interior. Aćimović’s administration with total submissiveness
to the occupation authorities was restricted in its powers and in consequence, inefficient,
especially in restoring the economy. The main task that the Germans gave to the “Council of
Commissars” was to destroy any resistance to the occupation. After the uprising in the summer
of 1941, the Council’s police and gendarmerie took part, with German forces, in carrying out
punitive raids against civilian population. The “Commissariat” collapsed fairly quickly and failed
in one of its principle tasks: pacifying the population and keeping of order.24 The Commissariat
was discharged and German military commander appointed on 29 August General Milan Nedić
to lead new domestic puppet administration, known as the “Government of National
Salvation”.25 Nedic asked the population to be passive and loyal to the occupation authorities and
his “Government”.26 He thought every resistance to be unnecessary, harmful and suicidal,
condemned the “adventurism” of the communists and the royalist units of colonel Mihailović.
Military defeat, capitulation and dismemberment of the Yugoslav state which followed,
did not mean “pacification” of Yugoslav territory in long terms. The Balkan “Blitzkrieg” was
only introduction in to four year bloody war. Occupation and division of territories with all their
consequences inevitably caused after shorter period of dejection and hopelessness arising of
spontaneous and organized resistance. German occupation authorities were from the same
beginning calculating with this development. Representatives of occupation authorities have
been aware of this possibility from the very beginning and documentary evidence testifies of
conflicts between German units and armed groups, which brought about the first German losses
in Serbia, in the area between Belgrade and Šabac as early as in the second half of April. At the
end of April 1941, “…due to increased number of perfidious attacks on German soldiers”

23
The first military commander in Serbia was Air Force General Helmut Foerster. He was replaced in
June 1941 by General Ludwig von Scheoeder who died in the end of the summer and the new
commander became Air Force General Danckelmann. His failure to end the armed resistance resulted
his dismissal, and General Boehme replaced him in the second half of September. In late autumn 1941
Bohme left for Finland and General Paul Bader replaced him. In February 1942 he was commanding
general in Serbia responsible to the commander of the German forces for the Southeast; Jovan
Marjanović: “The German Occupation”, p. 270, ff; Schlarp, Wirtschaft und Besatzung, pp. 73-90.
24
On Commissariats activities, see: Branislav Božović, Beograd pod komesarskom upravom 1941,
Beograd, 1998.
25
Milan Nedić (1877-1945) was on three occasions Minister of War of Yugoslavia; Milan Borković,
Kontrarevolucija u Srbiji. Kvislinška uprava 1941-1942, I, pp. 87, ff.
26
On Nedić’s ideology see: M. Ristović, “Rural ‘anti-utopia’ in the ideology of Serbian
collaborationists in the Second World War”. In: European Review of History-Revue europeenne
d’histoire, Vol. 15, Nr. 2, April 2008, p 179-192.

5
Maximilian von Weichs, commander of the German Second Army, issued an order to introduce
“harsher countermeasures” to prevent the creation of “bands”.27
In the of summer 1941, the rebellion started spreading rapidly in Serbia. The German
forces applied draconic measures in relation to domestic population. In middle of September
1941, Hitler issued a command to execute hostages in proportion 1:100 for each killed, and 1:50
for each wounded German soldier in Serbia. The new chief commander in Serbia, Franz
Boehme, was especially decisive: he ordered consistently fulfillment of the “quotas”. In camp
near town of Šabac (North West Serbia), firing squads executed 1,226 out of 22,000 prisoners. 28
Of an armed attack on Topola, in which 21 German soldiers died, firing squads executed 2,100
hostages, especially Jews and communists. In his order of 10 October 1941, which was based on
the order OKW of 28 September, Boehme emphasized that “…in Serbia, because of the ’
Balkan mentality’ and rapid spread of communist and nationalist rebellion, it is necessary to
carry out the orders of the German Supreme Command in the sharpest form possible”.
Implementation of these measures took place in the second half of October 1941. On 7 October
firing squads of the 717th German Infantry Division massacred 1,800 civilian inhabitants of
Kraljevo. In the city of Kragujevac, firing squads killed 2,300 persons.29
As for the phenomenon of active resistance movement in the Yugoslav territory, local
specifics which should be taken into account caused significant differences in the onset, course,
development and intensity of fight. From the beginning, the uprising and resistance in Serbia and
other parts of Yugoslavia, had more than one political, ideological and military source. The first
resistance groups in Serbia were established in May 1941 in Western Serbia that would become
the mainstay of uprising, and had two “command centers”. This polycentrism, in addition to
irreconcilable political and ideological differences and differences regarding the tactics of
struggle, soon became a fertile soil for emerging internal civil conflict that turned into a civil
war.
The first, nationalistic movement, consisted of Yugoslav officers (by the great majority
Serbs) and civilian politicians who stayed loyal to the Yugoslav Government in exile and the
King. 30 The other, was headed by the members of Yugoslav Communist Party. They saw a war
as national liberation, but also as a chance to realize their ideological goals.

27
From 19 May 1941; Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o Narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije
(Zbornik NOR), I/ 1, p. 324; Schlarp, ibid., p 154.
28
M. Messerschmidt: „Rassistische Motivation bei der Bekämpfung des Widerstandes in Serbien?“ In:
Faschismus und Rassismus. Kontroversen um Ideologien und Opfer. Hrsg. von W. Röhr u.a. Berlin 1992, p 322-
329; Schlarp, ibid., p 154.
29
Ibid.
30
On this problem see: Jozo Tomasevich: The Chetniks. War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945. Stanford
(Cal.) 1975; Jovan Marjanović: Draža Mihailović između Britanaca i Nemaca. Zagreb/Belgrad 1979; Kosta

6
 The center of Serbian monarchist, loyalist and anti-Axis forces was created in mid-May
1941 in Western Serbia around the Chief-of-Staff Colonel Dragoljub – Draža Mihailović,
(known under various names: the Ravna Gora movement, Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland or
the Chetnik Movement). One of his close associates (Z. Vučković) testifies that Mihailović’s
initial intentions were to create guerilla units throughout the country, organize and carry out
sabotages and intelligence work with the support of the Allies until the time suitable for uprising,
while engaging in armed clashes with the enemy only in extreme emergency.31 Those gathering
around Mihailović mainly encompassed active Yugoslav officers of junior ranks, primarily those
originating from Serbia and Montenegro, with considerably less members of other nationalities.
One may say that the Chetnik movement was formally Yugoslav but actually it was solely a
Serbian nationalist movement. Mihailović succeeded in spreading his organization through
Yugoslav territories, assigning commanders and representatives to specific areas. His
headquarters gradually drew various civilian politicians, who influenced Mihailović and his
movement in return.32
Until the German attack at the USSR, Yugoslav communists followed the Comintern’s
“general line” about the character of World War II. To them, the rapid collapse and dissolution
of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia merely confirmed their assertions that it was both unstable and
correctly denoted as being “against the interests of the people”.33 The organizational structure of
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, with its strong internal discipline and significant number of
members with experience from the Spanish Civil War on the top leading positions, an existing
underground communications and propaganda network – this all made communists more
adaptable to the new situations compared with bourgeois political parties that were seized by
disarray.34 Division and occupation of the country encouraged separatist tendencies and
nationalism in the CPY, particularly in Macedonia and Croatia. In Macedonia, the local

Nikolić, Istorija ravnogorskog pokreta, I-III, Beograd, 1999. Bibliography about Chetnik Movement see at
Tomasevich, ibid, and Marc C. Wheeler: Britain an the War for Yugoslavia 1940-1943. New York 1980, p 333-
342, and K. Nikolić, ibid.

31
Zvonimir Vučković: „Ustanak u zapadnoj Srbiji“. In: Ravnogorska istorija. Beograd 1992, p 91; J.
Marjanović: Draža, p 71.
32
In August 1941 they founded the Central National Commitee, a political and avisory body headed
by civlians-royalist politicians; Tomasevich, The Chetniks, p 124 -126; Marjanović, Draža, p 76; B.
Petranović, Srbija, p. 168.
33
B. Petranović, Srbija, p. 71-77; 166; Tomasevich, The Chetniks, p 174.

34
In the beginning of 1941 the CPY had 8,000 members; by summer it was 12,000 and, according to
the CPY’s later assertions, 40,000 members of SKOJ, a Party Youth Organisation; B. Petranović,
Srbija, p 77.

7
communists were asked to join in with the Bulgarian Party, while in Croatia many preferred the
separate status and an independent Croatian Communist Party.35
In response to the Comintern directives from June 22 and July 1, and Stalin’s broadcast
from 3 July, Central Committee of CPY decided on 4 July 1941 to start armed actions against
occupation forces and collaborators, posting its representatives through the country to organize
detachments and assign political commissars in them. During the summer 1941 a larger Partisan
detachments were formed in Serbia. At the end of June the CPY Military Committee grew into
Supreme Staff of the People’s Liberation and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia, with Josip
Broz-Tito as the commander.36 Since the beginning of July 1941 they became the military and
ideological core of the Partisan Movement (People’s Liberation Army – NOV) in Serbia and in
other parts of Yugoslavia, while the General Secretary of the CPY, Josip Broz- Tito assumed the
role of the chief commander of the movement. As soon as the Ustasha Independent State of
Croatia was formed, the CPY Secretary General, Josip Broz -Tito moved from Zagreb to
Belgrade, counting upon the strategic importance of Serbia, its tradition of insurrection,
conscious nationalism and readiness of the people to take arms.37 This tactics proved it
politically fruitful for the CPY and had far reaching consequences for relations between military
and political factions of the Serb, and Yugoslav, resistance movement.
Thinking along the same lines as did Mihailović, or, perhaps, walking in his footsteps,
western Serbia was chosen as the most favorable region for the movement, as it was toed to
eastern Bosnia, Sadzak and Montenegro. The communists didn’t entirely approve of Mihailović
and his endeavors, but were obliged to accept him as disagreeable ant “temporary companion”.38
During the summer, the network of armed Chetnik and Partisan units spread from
western Serbia to central Serbia (Šumadija), and to eastern and southern Serbia, with partisan
strongholds in Banat and Srem. For a while, German occupation authorities hoped that reprisals
and the local police would solve the problem. But, soon OKW suggested introducing severe
measures and direct German intervention to suppress the uprising.39 These two movements,
differing in terms of tactics and political opinions, experienced in the summer and autumn 1941 a
short phase of military collaboration in the uprising in Serbia and Montenegro. The main success

35
Jill A. Irvine: The Croat Question. Partisan Politics in the Formation of the Yugoslav Socialist State. Boulder/
San Fransisco/Oxford 1993, p 107-114; M. Wheeler, “ Pariahs to Partisans to Power: The Communists Party of
Yugoslavia”. In: Tony Judt (Hg.): Resistance and Revolution in Mediterranean Europe 1939-1948. London/New
York 1989, p 126
36
B. Petranović: Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji 1941-45. Bd. I. Belgrad 1983, p 173 ff
37
Wheeler: Pariahs, p 129
38
Zbornik NOR, I,1, p. 36-39, 63-67; Kosta Nikolić, „ Prilog proučavanju karaktera ustanka u Srbiji
1941. godine“. Istorija 20. veka. 1-2/1991, p 102f
39
Venceslav Glišić, Užička republika. Beograd 1986, p 39.

8
of the joint struggle was creation of a large liberated territory in Western Serbia (cities of Užice,
Požega, Čačak, Gornji Milanovac).40
Mihailović’s Chetniks stressed that they fought for the liberation of the country and
restoration of the pre-war political and social status quo, along with the “punishment for
treason”, particularly of Croats, Muslims and of minorities (Germans, Hungarians, and
Albanians). In a program document of December 1941 they demanded the creation of “Greater
Homogenous Serbia” within the restored Yugoslav state. 41 Only at the beginning of 1944 the top
leadership of this movement accepted the option of “trialistic”, federal order.42
On the other hand, Tito and his fellow combatants regarded the war for liberation of
Yugoslavia as a unique chance to also work toward the achievement of their ideological and
political goals through a form of a national liberation war against the occupiers. During the
summer of 1941 Partisan units assumed distinct ideological characteristics (red star, the name
“partisan” taken from the Soviet political practice, political commissaries, etc.). Certain actions
of Partisan authorities in liberated territories of the “Užice Republic” in the fall of 1941
(revolutionary courts, expropriation of property, etc.), heralded the introduction of “revolutionary
measures” that will be implemented in full extent toward the end of war and after it.43
Sporadic conflicts between the Partisans and Chetniks over the control of territories and
war spoils, in addition to failed negotiations about collaboration between Tito and Mihailović,
turned into an open civil war in November 1941. Mihailović’s anti-communism, belief that open
fight with the Germans should be avoided because of reprisals and waiting for a better situation
on the fronts (what in August was advised by General D. Simović, the Yugoslav Prime Minister
and by his British advisors),44 on the one hand, and Partisans’ insistence on the fight regardless
of casualties and accusations of Chetniks for collaboration (which was compounded by certain
Mihailović’s actions, such as failed negotiations with the Germans on 11 November), resulted in
tragic consequences for the uprising in Serbia.
The split led to inconclusive diplomatic action in London and Moscow in November
1941, aimed at uniting all Partisan and Chetnik units under one, namely, Mihailović’s command.
In mid-November the Yugoslav Government assigned Mihailovic the post of “commander of all
Yugoslav armed forces in the country”, while the first allied mission already visited his

40
See: Jovan Marjanović, Ustanak u Srbiji I Narodnooslobodilački pokret, Beograd, 1963.
41
Tomislav Dulić, Utopias of Nation. Local Mass Killing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1941-1942,
Stockholm, 2005, pp 109-115.
42
K. Nikolić, Istorija, II, pp 425-436.
43
V. Glišić, Užička republika.
44
Wheeler: Britain, p. 68; Detlef Brandes, Großbritannien und seine osteuropäischen Alliierten 1939-
43. München 1988, pp 205-209; J. Marjanović: Draža, p 89.

9
headquarters. At the same time, he was widely popularized in the British and American public as
“Europe’s first guerrilla warrior”. The conflict opened the way for German forces to more easily
break their resistance in the late autumn of 1941. The majority of Partisan units, with great
losses, retreated to the German occupation zone at the border between Serbia, Montenegro and
Bosnia.45
The remaining small Partisan units in Serbia fought for survival until the autumn of 1944,
when Partisans launched a large-scale campaign for the liberation of Serbia. Avoiding greater
conflicts with German and collaborationist’s forces, Mihailović decided at the end of November
1941 to infiltrate (“legalize”) the forces under Nedic’s command, and so preserve the manpower.
On 7 December 1941 Germans encircled Mihailović’s headquarter and he himself barely
managed to escape.46.
Chetnik units operated in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia in very
different local conditions and often without contacts with the formal command center, entering
into provisional arrangements with Italians against the Partisans, and sometimes with the Ustasha
against Partisans. Muslim rural population perished in particular in their actions to “revenge” the
Ustasha crimes against the Serbs, particularly in Eastern Bosnia and Sandžak.47
In Montenegro, over 30,000 rebels led by communists and officers of the Yugoslav Army
started attacking the Italian garrisons on 13 July 1941. Great losses (about 5,000 soldiers and
officers) caused counteroffensive of Italian troops, with the help of local Muslim and Albanian
militias, which resulted in temporary suppression of rebels.48 This initial failure caused the crisis
in the loose coalition of communists and their allies (tribal leaders, nationalists, politicians of
Serbian orientation and officers) who subsequently joined Mihailović’s movement. The new
partisans’ defeat in the siege of the city of Pljevlja in December resulted in attrition of Partisan
ranks and proved to have long-term negative consequences for the Partisans and for the balance
of power in general and their retreat to Bosnia. Armed conflict in full scale between Partisans
and Chetniks erupted in January 1942. Elsewere, the Italians used these domestic quarrels to
their advantage, in this case by tolerating and aiding the Chetniks. Along with Chetnik
anticommunism and actions against Partisan supporters, there were many other reasons for open
armed clashes in Montenegro, including Partisans’ practice of “revolutionary radicalism” in their

45
Wheeler: Britain, pp 107-116; B. Petranović: Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1988, II,
Narodnooslobodilački rat i revolucija 1941-1945, Beograd, 1988, p 186 ff.
46
Tomasevich, The Chetniks, p 155; B. Petranović, Srbija, p 270 ff.
47
A. Miletić-V. Dedijer, Genocid nad Muslimanima, 1941-1945: Zbornik dokumenata i svedočenja,
Sarajevo, 1990; T. Dulić, Utopias , pp 180-215.
48
B. Petranović, Srbija, p 189, 192.

10
fight against “class enemies” what made the other side of the bloody balance.49 In the hope of
eliminating their main opponent in this civil war, the Chetniks accepted this “tactical
collaboration” with occupiers.50 This territory was relinquished to the Chetniks, who started to
rely on Italian help in their fight against the Partisans. In the spring of 1943, in the territory of
Herzegovina, Partisan forces managed to defeat the major part of Montenegro Chetnik units.
While anti-Axis uprising in Serbia and Montenegro was organized for the most part, the
main reason that drove Serbian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia to
resistance was provided by the genocide policy of the authorities in the Quisling Independent
State of Croatia.51 Already in May 1941 Ustasha massacres triggered the defense mechanism of
the Serbian population in Herzegovina, Bosnian Krajina, and Dalmatia. Massive resistance
against Ustasha terror broke out in the in eastern Herzegovina at the end of June 1941, although
there was some earlier sporadic armed resistance.52 The resistance spread rapidly toward
Western Bosnia, causing a chain reaction in the parts of Croatia with the Serbian population
(Lika, Kordun, Banija, and Kninska Krajina). German general in Zagreb, Gleise von Horstenau,
has warned that the Serbian uprising was a reaction to Ustasha’s “bloody and inhuman
annihilation measures”, without which the Serbs could not be, even with the best propaganda,
encouraged to “…life-and-death struggle for communist goals”.53
In the beginning, the uprising in Herzegovina was not influenced by Communists nor and
others. It was a general peasant uprising, a fight for survival. The unabridged rebellion was full

49
B. Petranović, Srbija, p 298; Ibid., Revolucija i kontrarevolucija u Jugoslaviji 1941-1945. Bd. I, Beograd
1983, pp 313-340
50
Matteo Milazzo, The Chetnik Movement and Yugoslav Resistance. Baltimore and London, 1975, p
90ff.
51
On Ustasha crimes see: L. Hory, M. Broszat, Der kroatische, p. 120, 146f; F. Jelić-Butić, NDH, p 106; F. F.
Čulinović, Okupatorska podjela, p 77 ff; Anton Miletić, Koncentracioni logor Jasenovac, 1-3, Beograd 1986-
1987; Viktor. Novak: Magnum Crimen. Pola vijeka klerikalizma u Hrvatskoj. Zagreb/Belgrad 1986; V.
Kazimirović: Nezavisna Država Hrvatska u svetlu nemačkih dokumenata i dnevnika Gleza fon Horstenau 1941-
1945. Beograd 1987, p 144; Zločini Nezavisne Države Hrvatske, 1941-1945. Ed. by S. Vukčević, Vol. 1, Zločini
na jugoslovenskim prostorima u I i II svetskom ratu, Beograd, 1993; Zločini u logoru Jasenovac. Ed. By N.
Novaković, Banja Luka 2000; T. Dulić, Utopias of Nation.
In one GESTAP-o report, prepared for Himmler in mid-February 1942, it was emphesized that „…the number of
Ortodox (i.e. Serbs-M.R.), that the Croats masscred and who died as a reslut of sadistic mistreatment, is about
300,000“. In March 1943 General A. Lohr quoted in in a memorandum to Hiler that Ustasha claim to have killed
some 400,000 Serbs by then; V. Kazimirovic,. pp 128f, 245; L. Hory, M. Broszat, Der kroatische, p 120, 146f.
The first Ustasha concentration camp for Serbs and Jews was “Danica” near the town of Koprivnica. Near the
railway Zagreb-Belgrade, a system of concentration and death camps was founded in 1941, known collectively as
Jasenovac, consisting of five camps (Krapja, Ciglana, Stara Gradiska, Kozara and Bracica). The numbers of
victims killed there has never been precisely established. Estimates vary (from 40, 000 by some Croat authors to
800,000 by some Serb authors) and were never kept systematicaly. According to the data from the Croatian
National Committee the actual number who perished is 550,000-600,000, while examinations of massive
graveyards of an area of 57,000 m2 indicated more than 360,000 burred; F. Čulinović, pp. 316-324; F. Jelić-Butić:
pp 185f. On the problem, see: Bogoljub Kočović: Žrtve drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji. Sarajevo 1990

52
B. Petranović, Srbija, p 178f
53
Zbornik NOR, XII,1, S. 288; Dušan Lukač, Treći Rajh i zemlje Jugoistočne Evrope, II, 1941-1945.
Beograd 1987, p 88

11
of revenge directed against the neighbors, Croats and Muslims who were now joining the
Ustasha and killing the Serbs. The blood that was shed posed a major problem both for the
Communists who were trying to persuade the Serb population to swallow the slogan
“brotherhood and unity: in order to attract the Muslims for the Partisan units. The Chetniks were
trying to show that reconciliation between Serbs and Muslims was impossible, and that revenge
and retribution was legitimate way of fighting.54
With attack of “guerrilla detachments” on Drvar on 27 July 1941 the uprising started in
Bosnia as well and in early August the Serb rebels advanced to the outskirts of Sarajevo. The
actions in Bosnia provoked a chain reaction in neighboring regions of Croatia with their Serb
population, engulfing Lika, Kordun, Banija and Kninska Krajina by the end of July 1941. The
Italians intervened, repulsing the ustasha terror and endeavoring to minimize the influence of the
Ustasha state within Italian zone. Certain domestic nationalist Serbian politicians and dignitaries
saw Italian control of these territories as the only real chance for survival of the Serb population.
As the result the uprising in Lika and Kninska Krajina lost momentum. The Communists wanted
the opposite: to continue the struggle against ustashe and Italian army, as well as against their
opponents, namely Chetniks.
The Chetnik movement had its strongholds in Lika and Dalmatian hinterland, while it had
almost no supporters in Banija, Kordun, Gorski Kotar, where communists had decisive influence.
Communists soon joined the process of “political differentiation” among the rebels and gradually
assumed control over the part of rebel forces, which was accompanied by mutual conflicts and
liquidations of competitors, thus creating the atmosphere of increasingly profound cleavage. 55
“Special ties” with the Italian occupying autgorities had a price attached cooperative
actions against Partisans: Chetnik and Italian units together carried out a “cleansing” of Dalmatia
in autumn 1942 and spring 1943, leaving behind many civilian victims in Croat villages on
Mount Biokovo and around Dalmatinska Zagora.56
Great initial disproportion in favor of the Serbs (who accounted for about 20% of the
population) in Partisan units in Croatia also represented a political problem for the Croatian
communists. Partisan leader Tito (himself a Croat by nationality) asked the leadership of the
Communist Party of Croatia to attract more Croats into the Partisans. At the end of 1941 he
wrote: “The weakness of the Partisan movement in Croatia is that it includes the Serb

54
Enver Redžić, Naconalni odnosi u Bosni I Hercegovini 1941-1945 u analizama jugoslovenske
istoriografije, Sarajevo, 1980, pp 86f and the chapter about the Serbs in ISC.
55
On Cetnik Movement in Croatia, see: F. Jelić-Butić, Četnici u Hrvatskoj 1941-1945. Zagreb 1986;
Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp 158, 213-220, 354-358; Milazzo: The Chetnik, p. 57ff.
56
Zbornik NOR, XIV,1, p 614f; Tomasevich, The Chetniks, p 259; F. Jelić-Butić, Četnici, p 162f

12
population…but very few Croat peasants” In another message of spring 1942, he predicted that
the Partisan movement in Croatia would not succeeded until the majority in them were not
Croats, that is, until they as majority, accepted the political platform and the kind of warfare the
Partisans followed.57 Unlike in other parts of Croatia, Croats in Dalmatia, occupied by the
Italians, where strong pro -Yugoslav inclination existed, joined Partisan units in large numbers
since the beginning of the war. Croats from the continental part started to join Partisan units
more massively after the capitulation of Italy and since mid-1944, following Tito’s agreement on
cooperation with the Prime Minister of the Yugoslav Royal Government Ivan Šubašić (former
“ban” of Croatia) and one of the leaders of Croat Peasant Party.
The Partisan movement in Slovenia, divided between Italy and Germany, also had its
specifics. It was well organized in cities and besides communists it also included representatives
of some left-oriented civil political parties and associations (Sokoli-Falkons). The Chetnik
movement also had its foothold in Slovenia in a group of monarchist officers. Smaller partisan
units in Slovenia operated in difficult conditions in the province, continuously threatened by the
pursuit of Axis and collaborationist units. Characteristic of Slovenian Partisans – unlike those
from other Yugoslav regions – was that they through all four years of the war almost exclusively
operating in the Slovenian territory. 58
The conflict between the Yugoslav and Bulgarian communists in (Yugoslav) Vardar
Macedonia over the competencies after the annexation of these territories resulted in the delay in
organizing the Partisan movement. It strengthened in the areas bordering on Serbia and Greece,
particularly in 1943 and 1944, when cooperation with the Greek ELAS was also established.59
III
In the first half of 1942 large anti-Partisan operations were also organized in western
Bosnia, Montenegro, Herzegovina and mid-Croatia. Partisans attacked main lines of
communication, especially the Zagreb- Belgrade, Zagreb-Split and Zagreb-Rijeka railroads.
Partisan centers were established in the liberated city of Jajce and Mrkonjic-Grad. German
estimates in the fall of 1942 indicated that there were 60,000 partisans in the territory of Bosnia
only. New fighters were also recruited into the newly-formed units.60
Stressing “brotherhood and unity” and “ethnic equality” of all Yugoslav peoples as some
of the central program items of their Yugoslav policy, the Partisan leaders in Bosnia tried to
57
J. Irvine, The Croat Question, p 114 - 116; M. Wheeler, Pariahs, p 143.
58
B. Petranović, Revolucija i kontrarevolucija, 2, p 46- 48.
59
Ibid, p 191, 192; Svetozar Vukmanović-Tempo, Revolucija koja teče. Memoari, 1, Beograd 1971, pp
291-383.
60
B. Petranović, Istorija, pp 212- 216f; Wheeler: Pariahs, p 144 ff.

13
recruit both the Croatian and Muslim population, which was until then under Ustasha influence,
attempted to draw them into their ranks by political activity, with slogans about national and
religious equality, and social revolution. The ethnic issue was one of the key points of the
Partisans’ (Yugoslav) policy in the country where a brutal civil war was waged in addition to
occupation, in which ethnic and confessional affiliation played a major role. Partisans’ pragmatic
policy about this issue, compared with extreme nationalisms, which constituted the key of
political programs and genocide practice of competitive movements, was indeed appealing.
Slogans on equality of all Yugoslav peoples, combined with those on radical social revolution
had much greater attraction than promises of return to the pre -1941 situation, particularly for the
majority of the rural population (about 78% in 1941), who were the main victims of war and the
main source of recruitment for all domestic armies.
In November 1942, in Bihać, the Central Committee and the Supreme Staff began
creating a parallel state organization, which was the opposite what the Yugoslav Government in
exile stood for. This organization, following directives from the Comintern, was intended as
cover for the Western Ally, being multi-national and multi-party in character. Thus on the
political scene emerged a body that at least had the appearance of a parallel, Partisan,
“parliament”- the Antifascist Council of People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ). In spring
1943 the Partisan defeated Chetniks on Neretva, and the Germans used this reversal to finish
them off. In operation “Schwarz” the Germans imprisoned and disarmed Chetnik units in
Montenegro and Herzegovina.61 At the end of spring 1943, 129,000 German, Italian, Bulgarian
and ustasha soldiers performed a massive operation against some 20,000 Partisans, in the border
area of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina. In spite of losing one third of their forces, the
Partisan units and the Supreme Staff managed to escape to eastern Bosnia.62
During 1943 the Allies, particularly the British, started to change their positions in
relation to resistance movements in Yugoslavia. They shifted their aid from Mihailović to Tito,
justifying this with the former’s “procrastination” tactic, insufficient military efficiency and
allegations that some of his commanders were collaborating with the occupation forces In
September 1943 arrival to the Partisan Supreme Staff of General Brigadier Fitzroy MacLean, a
man of Churchill’s trust, gave the stamp of formal recognition to the Partisan movement. This

61
Tomasevich, The Cetniks, pp 252-256
62
B. Petranović, Istorija, p 267ff

14
gave to the Partisan leadership a strong political weapon-one that they used with great efficiency
and without hesitation against Mihailović’s Chetnik movement.63
In the second half of 1943, the worst was over for the Partisans. They survived the
military crisis from the first half of 1943 and have managed to suppress and isolate the Chetniks.
In consequence, the international position of the Partisans became stronger than ever before.
Thus Partisan leadership felt free to initiate the second session of AVNOJ, in the Bosnian city of
Jajce, on 29 and 30 November 1943. This move put both the Allies and Yugoslav politicians in
exile before an accomplished act. AVNOJ proclaimed National Committee for Liberation of
Yugoslavia (NKOJ) as temporary government, with Tito as its first president. Also proclaimed
equality of “peoples and nationalities”, the federalist principle, the right of self-determination,
insisted that Montenegrins and Macedonians be recognized as separate nations. Moslems were
recognized as separate group, but not a nation in their own right just yet. AVNOJ suspended the
monarchy simply by forbidding the King to return to the country till end of the war. The British
considered the AVNOJ a temporary and transitional arrangement. The Soviets were more
positive about Jajce decisions, but formally without jeopardizing relations with the Yugoslav
Royal Government. The Americans stated that they would continue to recognize the King and
his government and not NKOJ.64
After the Teheran Conference, Churchill asked the Yugoslav King and Prime Minster to
abandon Mihailović, threatening to send aid only to the Partisans. In 1944 Mihailović was also
left without the position of the minister of war and without the support of Royal Government and
the King (who was forced to such a move by the British) and was left to his fate. 65
Having been evacuated to Italy before the German pursuit in the spring of 1944, where he
met with Churchill in Caserta, and then was transferred to the island of Vis in the Adriatic, Tito
was forced in the summer of 1944 by the pressure from the Allies side to temporarily accept a
compromise solution and make an agreement with the royalist government.66
In his letter of 5 July 1944 to Stalin and Molotov, Tito invited Soviet troops to Serbia and
so help resolve the problem in Serbia, and eliminate British and American support to the Serbian
monarchists and nationalists.67 On the night of 18/19 September 1944, via Romania, Tito flew to

63
Lukač, pp 442; Tomasevich, The Chetniks, pp 289-298; B. Petranović: Srbija, p 571, 579ff; B.
Petranović, Srbija, pp 283-285; E. Barker, Britanska politika prema jugoistočnoj Evropi u drugom
svjetskom ratu, Zagreb, 1978, pp 323-346. MackLean’s report is published in: Dušan Biber (ed.): Tito-
Churchill, strogo tajno. Beograd-Zagreb, 1981.
64
D. Brandes, Großbritannien, pp 534-543; B. Petranović, Srbija, p 527-530ff; ibid., Istorija, p 288.
65
B. Petranović, Srbija, 580-596.
66
B. Petranović, AVNOJ. Revolucionarna smena vlasti, Beograd, 1980, pp 266-312.
67
B. Petranović, Istorija, p 324; Lukač, p 716.

15
Moscow. He had several talks with the Soviet dictator, discussing international recognition,
military aid and the entry of the Red Army into Yugoslavia from Romania.68
In the beginning of September 1944 sixteen Partisan divisions were concentrated on the
territory of Serbia. The Partisans fought with German forces stationed in Serbia as a part of a
wide Allie’s offensive from Normandy to Italy to European East, The fight against Chetniks,
however, was a struggle of two competing and opposing ideological and political factions. After
defeats in Serbia Mihailovic with some 17,000 men left Serbia to Bosnia continuing the
withdrawal to the west during the winter 1944/45. On the September 11 1944 King Peter II
Karageorgevic, gave in to the demand of the British Government, a call “to all the Serbs, Croats
and Slovenes” to put themselves under Tito’s command. At the end of 1944 and beginning of
1945, Partisan troops (now under new name: the Yugoslav Army) crushed remaining Mihailovi’s
units in south-eastern Bosnia. 69
The main military operation in Serbia in autumn 1944 was the liberation of Belgrade, the
capital of Yugoslavia and Serbia. After forcing the Danube and conquering the region of Baranja
with Partisan forces, the Soviet troops left Yugoslav territory and passed to Hungary. The center
of fighting in the following six moths, during the autumn and winter 1944-45, was Srem, the area
between the rivers Sava and the Danube. The Wehrmacht, Ustasha, and the Albanian SS-division
Skenderbeg prevented Yugoslav Army penetrating further, in order to protect the German forces
in Hungary and also to facilitate the withdrawal of the German Balkan Army. The fighting as
genuine hand to hand trench warfare, a totally new experience for the Yugoslav Army, which
were skilled in the Partisan way of fighting. Weakness in command, the untrained new recruits
from Serbia and Vojvodina a difficult plains terrain and unfavorable climatic conditions caused
in extremely heavy losses of men (estimations ranged between from 10,000 to 30,000).
The war operations on Yugoslav soil did not end until 15 May 1945. Some of the last
strongholds of German army and its most faithful allies in the South-East, the Ustasha, were
crushed or abandoned some ten days after the fall of Berlin.70 The end of the war marked the end
of four-year long agony of the peoples of Yugoslavia.71
During the war and immediately after its end the Yugoslav communists have politically
and also largely physically eliminated all their domestic political and ideological opponents, so
that they remained alone on the political scene. Chetniks have been defeated in Serbia in the fall

68
B. Petranović, Srbija, p 619ff
69
B. Petranović, Srbija, p 638, 639.
70
Zagreb, for instance, fell on 8 May 1945 in Partisan hands.
71
Official estimation of number of killed during World War II in Yugoslavia is 1,7. On the problem
see: B. Kočović, Žrtve drugog svetskog rata.

16
1944, while Mihailović hid in the country until 1946, when he was captured and sentenced to
72
death for “treason and collaboration” in a spectacular political trial. After the referendum
organized and controlled by the new, communist authorities, monarchy was abolished and the
Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia proclaimed on 29 November 1945, which marked the
beginning of several decades of absolute power of Josip Broz Tito and Yugoslav Communist
Party.
***
In socialist Yugoslavia, ideologically “purged image” of Partisan resistance “in the
liberation war and revolution” as well as their “fight against domestic traitors” was the basis for
historical and political legitimacy of the regime. In the Manichean historiography and
propaganda treatment of armed resistance there was no room for nuances or doubts, particularly
not for interpretations that communists – notably in the final stage – have eliminated all domestic
ideological competitors (monarchists, rests of bourgeois parties and remaining nationalistic
military formations).
The People’s Liberation War, as its official name and definition was, became the basis
for the “myth on foundations” of the new Yugoslavia in which, in turn, the cult of Josip Broz-
Tito, commander of Partisan forces and General Secretary of the CPY, had a central place. In the
construction of the identity of new Yugoslavia, equally for internal and foreign-policy purposes,
it was inevitable continuously to stress the authenticity, massive participation, losses, and
military contribution of the Yugoslav Partisan movement to the course of war in Southeastern
Europe, which became a “commonplace“of official historiography.
“Dismounting” of this simplified picture of an extremely complex phenomenon, which
started after Tito’s death, was the main task of “revision” of history in all former Yugoslav
republics. This process was associated with the change of political climate, revival of democratic
tendencies and pluralism, among other things, including the need to approach the analysis of
recent history without ideological prejudices. In practice it focused much more on the search of
material for new legitimization of different national (-istic) policies (which ultimately led to the
destruction of Yugoslavia). This implied rejection of everything that was associated with the
Yugoslav heritage, particularly of the socialist period – as a product of Partisan movement – with
sole insistence on its “communist attributes”. Instead of a critical review, this resulted in the
opposite extreme. Anti-fascist character of the partisan movement, its real significance in the

72
Đ. Tripković, Prilike u Jugoslaviji i Velika Britanija 1945-1948. Beograd 1990, pp 136-140; B.
Miljuš, Revolucija u Jugoslaviji. Lausanne/Belgrad/Sarajevo 1991, pp 243-245; Tomasevich, The
Chetniks, pp 461-463

17
history of the European resistance movement, its effects as integrating, Yugoslav alternative to
the policy of exterminating nationalisms, etc. – was also thrown out as the proverbial “baby”
with the “bath water” of what used to be the official historiography until recently.
Relativization of the role played in World War II by collaboration (open, ideological or
“tactical”), including mass crimes against the civilian population of the “other” ethnic,
confessional or political background, offered new, black-and-white images, and now with
inverted perspective. Former heroes became “bad guys” and traitors and vice versa. With rare
exceptions, historiography production about WWII experiences in the former Yugoslav
Republics, at least to the extent that we were able to observe, follows these “new trends”. One
can only speculate what position will now divided national historiographies, after the situation
calms down, take toward the experiences of the resistance movement and will so much needed
rationalization of this issue occur, primarily as a historiography and scientific rather than a
political or national issue. 73

73
See ctitics of the revisionist tendencies in Croatian in Goldstein Iva and Goldsten Slavcko,
„Revisionism in Croatia: The Case of Franjo Tu]man“, in: Eastern European Jewish Affairs 32, No. 1,
2002, 52-64, and the article written by this author: „Kolaboracija u Srbiji u Drugom svetskom ratu:
Istoriografski i (ili) politički problem“. In: Religija, društvo i politika. Kontraverzna tumačenja i
približavanja. Thomas Bremer (ed.), Bonn, 2002, 10-25.

18