3RepnbHr of t{Je l~IJiHt1pine%

~uprcutr ([:ourt
J]lflnnHn

.EN BANC

PAULI:NE S. MOYA, A.C. No. 13082

Cornplainant,
Members:

GESMUNDO, CJ,
-versus- PERLAS-BERNABE,*
LEONEN,
CAGUIOA,
HERNANDO,
CARANDANG,
ATTY. ROY ANTHONY S. ORETA, LAZARO-JAVIER,
Respondent. INTING,
ZALAl\llEDA,
LOPEZ, M.**
GAERLAN,
ROSARIO,
LOPEZ, J.
DlMAAMPAO, JJ.

Promulgated:

November 16, 2021

DECISION

PERCUR[AM:

Complainant Pauline S. r. toya sought the disbarment of respondent

Atty. Roy Anthony Salarneda Oreta for immorality, gross misconduct, and
acts of violence. She essentially alleged:

• On official leave.
** On official leave.
Decision 6 A.C. No. 13082

paramours whom she discreetly called "HB." But he found out she never let
go of her other lovers. He got hurt but chose to just let her be since he
unconditionally loved her. 13

Then they decided to live.. together. Complainant made it a point to

make his presence felt by her children who at first called him "Tito" till
eventually, they grew fond of him and started calling him "Daddy Roy." He
gladly assumed the responsibilities of a good husband to complainant and a
good father to her chil<lren. 14

It was not true that he never shared in the expenses at home. In fact, he
defrayed the expenses for electricity, water, telephone, and internet. It was his
idea to have a phone line and internet installed in their house for a monthly
bill of'Pl,349.00 which he regularly paid. He also purchased two (2) brand
new cars for the family - a Nissan Livina and a Nissan Sentra. He contributed
to the grocery expenses which ran from P20,000.00 to P40,000.00 a month.
Though his parents taught him to save for rainy days, he set aside his
thriftiness for complainant and her children because he considered them his
own family. He paid for the children's tuition fees and other educational
needs. He bought the appliances they were using in the house. 15

During their cohabitation, complainant exhibited the so-called

"Youngest Child Syndrome" characterized by being spoiled, obnoxious,
attention-seeking, demanding, sensitive, dependent, absent-minded, and
flaky. The eldest among siblings like him typically falls in love with people
of such character traits. 16

During their arguments, he never verbally abused complainant. He

tenderly loved her and would often give in to her whims just to end a fight
with her. Once, following a fight, she deleted all the female contacts listed on
his cellphone, but again, he just let lt pass because she was his boss. 17

During those times he could not readily accommodate her demands, she
would threaten to leave him to find another man: "Iwanan mo lang ako at
marami papalit sa iyo, ang daminR offers dyan. lwanan mo lang ako at
magkakaroon na ako ng bagong bahay, condo pa, at bagong kotse, may
kasama pang driver. Jvfay monthly allowance pa ako!" His consistently
bruised ego left him emotionally and psychologically scarred. Lest it be
forgotten, "Men have feelings too!" 18

13
Id. at 272.
14 Id.
15
Id. at 276-280.
16
Id. at 270.
17
Id. at 274.
is Id.
'
',
, '
'
'.·,'', '
\ ,.

Decision 7
A.C. No. 13082

Among her sweethearts was Police Officer 1 Emmanuel Lugartos (PO I

Lugartos ). This man would message and call her even during late hours of the
day. One evening, he blurted out "Maawa ka naman. Tigilan mo na yang
pagtetext. Gabi na. Madaling araw na nga eh. Matulog na tayo, please!
Feeling ko tatlo tayo dito sa kama eh." After her breakup with POI Lugartos,
she also charged the latter with violation of the VA WC Law. She indeed had
the propensity to file VA WC cases against her former boyfriends to exact
revenge or win them back. 19

He never raped her. It was he who refused to have sexual congress with
her after she admitted to him that she was sleeping with different men
including POl Lugartos. He could have his cellphone inspected to prove he
did not take nude photos of her nor took videos of their love making. 20

He also never laid a hand on her; in truth, it was he who would tum
black and blue whenever they had a fight. She would hit him with a metal
decor, a pan, or anything she would get her hands on. He never laid a hand on
her children either since he considered them his own. Toward the end of their
relationship, her father even thanked him for being a father to her children. 21

Before he finally bade her goodbye, he asked her for one last serious
talk but all she uttered was "P***** i** m*! Wala kang kwenta! Wala ka sa
mga kakilala kong lalaki!" Then she proudly broadcast how she had rough
sex with a hot man the night before. To this, he unabashedly wailed like a
baby, then drove miles and miles away, and just completely got lost. 22

Complainant's accusations against him are intended solely to spite and

take revenge on him because he bade her goodbye for good in April 2010. 23
She later wanted to reconcile with him, but it will never happen. Not now, not
ever. 24

He is filled with remorse for his indiscretion and apologizes for his
moral weakness and momentary lapse of judgment. He promises to be more
circumspect in his future private dealings. 25

On August 1, 2014, respondent manifested that the Office of the City

Prosecutor - Quezon City dismissed the criminal complaint against him.

19
Id. at 275-276.
20 Id. at 284.
21 Id.
22
Id. at 282.
23 Jd. at 222.
24
Id. at 270.
25
Id. at 221.
 '
,',,'
' .,
,'

8 A.C. No. 13082

Decision

Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines -

Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)

By its Report and Recommendation26 dated December 12, 2014, the

IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months.

It held that complainant and respondent openly admitted their

cohabitation as husband and wife while they were still legally married to their
respective spouses. The fact that both of them were then separated de facto
from their respective spouses was inconsequential.

As for the charges of sexual, physical, psychological, economic abuse,

and unconsented taking of her nude pictures and videos of their lovemaking,
the IBP-CBD found that complainant failed to substantiate the same.

Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines -

Board of Governors (IBP-BOG)

By Resolution27 dated April 19, 2015, the IBP-BOG recommended the

penalty of disbarment.

In respondent's subsequent motion for reconsideration, he prayed to

reduce the penalty to reprimand or fine. He posited that although his
indiscretion was something he would regret forever, it was he who ended the
adulterous relationship in 2010. Since then, he had returned to the fold of
decency and had been living a moral and upright life completely remorseful
for his past indiscretion. Thus, rather than blame him, he should be praised for
taking the first big step towards moral rehabilitation. He again signified his
apologies to his brethren for his moral weakness and momentary lapse in
judgment. He already has a new family whom he dearly loves. 28

Under Resolution29 dated October 28, 20 l 7, the IBP-BOG resolved to

reduce the recommended penalty from disbarment to suspension from the
practice of law for three (3) years.

It opined that while respondent's cohabitation with complainant was

immoral, it did not amount to gross immorality considering that he already
ended the relationship and expressed remorse and apologies for his
indiscretion.

26
id. at 842-847.
27
Id. at 841.
28
Id. at 859-861.
29
Id. at 873.

,,J
~
'' '.
,,

Decision 9 A.C. No. 13082

Per verification with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC), no motion
for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party as of May
28, 2021. The IBP, nevertheless, elevated the entire case records to the Court
since the IBP Resolution is merely recommendatory.

Our Ruling

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a

privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar
may be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyer's lack of
essential qualifications30 including good moral character.

Indeed, good moral character is not only a condition precedent for

admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact to maintain
one's standing in this exclusive and honored society. There is perhaps no
profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is
more imperative than that oflaw. 31

A high sense of morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and

required of members of the Bar. They must conduct themselves with great
propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all
times. 32 The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which respondent
vowed to uphold, clearly affirms this kind of conduct, 33 viz.:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scanda!ous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

It is~ thus, expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court,
must not only be of good moral character, but must also be seen to be leading
lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. 34
Unfortunately, respondent failed to live up to these standards.

30
See Garrido v. Garrido, 625 Phil. 347, 366 (20 IO).
31
See Tapucar v. Tapucar, 355 Phil. 66, 72 (J 998).
32
Mendoza v. Deciembre, 599 Phil. 182, i 91 (2009)
33
See Villarente v. Viflarente, Jr., A.C. No. 8866, September 15, 2020.
34
SeeAdvinculav.Advincula, 787Pbii. l0!, ll2(2Gl6).
 - ' ,
..
I

., ·,

10 A.C. No. 13082

Decision

Complainant sufficiently proved her

claim ofphysical abuse.

In disbarment cases, the complainant bears the burden of proof to

satisfactorily prove the allegations in his or her complaint through substantial
evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. 35

Here, the Court does not agree with the finding of the IBP-CBD that
complainant failed to prove her accusation of physical abuse against
respondent.

In her Reply-Affidavit, complainant recalled the harrowing incidents

she suffered in the abusive hands of respondent:

68. [On] March 14,2010[,] me and Roy had an argument that ended
up to our very first physical fight then. I incurred bruises in this fight, and
it was my very first physical abuse in my entire life. My parents never hit
me or slap me, nor did Jun. I was never traumatized until this eaiih-
shattering day with Roy. We already had some misunderstanding[s] those
days because of the tremendous throwing of foul words of Roy with me in
front of my kids and friends. Then, we started to argue more because Roy
wanted to leave the house with his mother without telling me that he will
leave, nor tell me where they will proceed on that day. So, I went to my
room and tried to change my clothes. Plain and simple. Roy followed me
and locked the door and pulled the pants I was half wearing already. Making
me f[a]ll [to] the floor, with my hands, then became reddish and painful. I
picked up my pants again and tried to wear it for several times, but Roy kept
on pulling my pants, thus making me fla]ll to the floor so many times. I
decided to get a new pants or shorts or anything that I can wear so that I can
leave my room instantly. But, [sic] Roy started to throw me against my bed
and bed frame for several times. I asked Roy to stop hurting me and let me
leave my room at once. I also asked Roy to stop throwing me or else I will
start fighting back too.

69. xx x He held my hands so tightly so that I cannot fight him back

after I showed Roy the reddish hands I had and the bruises I got from the
throwing he did to me. I would try to get my hands freed from his hard grip
on my hands and arms. x x x Contrary to what he claims that he never hit
me nor slap me, there was a second time on April 22, 2010 which 1 will
recap later on.

70. xx x My kids saw my bruises, my friends Daisy, Jay[,] and Susie

came over and saw themselves the bruises too. My father and brother saw
the bruises too on that very agonizing and upsetting day for us. The next
day, even our batchmates saw the said bruises. Three days after, Roy came
back and begged for my kids to leave me in my bedroom so he can talk to
me. At first, my kids[,] specially AA.A and BBB were hesitant to leave my
room for Roy might be hitting me again. x x x

35
See Domingo-Agaton v. Cruz, A.C. No. ! 1(}23. tv\;;_v ·1, 2021.

rl
L../
Decision 11 A.C. No. 13082

xxxx

73. [On] April 22, 2010[,] Roy left early this day [while] I stayed in
the house for I will be having a meeting nearby. I had a meeting with some
of our batchrnates regarding our past activities and since I was an officer[,]
I needed to attend this meeting. And this was the reason why I wanted Roy
to just tell the so-called no partner party that he cannot attend, for we will
have a meeting, or we can only stay for a while in that party.xx x Anyway,
as expected[,] Roy went to that party without me x x x When I went home,
I slept at the living room initially, but he pulled my cell phone from me to
the extent that it fell into pieces. He just want to read my cell phone that
time, so I left him with my phone and went to my kids['] room because I
could already smell that he would be violent again.

74. xx x We argued and I reiterated why he can afford to still attend

the party I was doubting so much and even attended without me. He
attended this party without even prioritizing our relationship that was in a
bad condition at that time. On the other hand, I attended our own meeting
wherein Roy was also supposed to be present, as part of the team. He said
that, why am I angry for attending the party'. I reiterated that it was not
because he attended the party but I was mad because of the maimer the
message was sent to him. It is as if I was the only one not invited, because
both the parts of the women cannot really attend and that the wife of the
other man was out of town. x x x. In addition, the text message contained
that Roy has to pick up the other woman and bring her home too. Such a
surprising lines [sic] that I know any partner or wife would ask why that
kind of text message.

75. xx x Then to my shock, Roy slapped me on my face. I was

astonished. I cried and tried to leave the room due to fear that he might do
hit me again. He pulled me and threw me on the bed again but I stood up
and then he slapped me again. I stood up once more and went to the door.
He blocked the doorway, so I tried to pull his left hand by my left hand
while my right hand tried to push his elbow too. Unfortunately, since we
were both perspiring due to our fight, I slipped my right hand and
accidentally scratched his left arms[ sic] by my right finger nails. I
apologized and said that he knew my hand only slipped and I did not mean
to scratch him. Besides, I was never physical with him at all. I was shocked
again that Roy got his cellphone beside the drawer and took a photo shot on
his left arms. I asked what was his purpose and why the shot? [H]e never
replied but instead he slapped and threw me again for the third time. 36

xxxx

To prevent respondent from further laying his hand on her and her
children, she applied for and after due proceedings before the barangay, was
issued a BPO. Notably, the issuance of a BPO is not ministerial in nature. It
is issued only after the punong barangay is convinced that an imminent danger
of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur. 37

36
Rollo, pp. 251-254.
37
See Garcia v. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44, 69 (2013).
 12 A.C. No. 13082
Decision

She, too, initiated before the Regional Trial Court-Branch 94, Quezon
City a petition for issuance of a PPO via Civil Case No. Q-10-67984. We refer
to the factual findings of the trial court, as borne in its Decision dated January
5, 2012, thus:

The facts are undisputed. Respondent inflicted physical harm not

only to petitioner but also to the latter's youngest child as well.

The incidents that transpired on March 14, 2010 and April 23, 2010
cannot be discounted. Respondent slapped petitioner for no reason at all.
She was thrown against the wall and into her bed by respondent. The
arguments that ensued on those dates led to physical abuse as petitioner
incurred bruises. The bruises were seen by Susan Salumbides and
petitioner's daughter, BBB.

Also, not only did respondent commit violence against petitioner in

contemplation of RA 9262, but likewise commit the same to petitioner's
children. BBB experienced [firsthand] the temerity ofrespondent to unleash
verbal abuses. She likewise witnessed how respondent inflicted "harm" on
her youngest sibling, DDD.

The Barangay Protection Order dated August 8, 2010 issued by

Barangay Sangandaan, Quezon City bolstered petitioner's contention that
she suffered abuses in the hands of respondent. Petitioner narrated in full
the abuses she experienced in the hands of respondent for the last seven (7)
years, culminating [i]n the physical abuses inflicted to her on April 23,
2010.

Until the last moment, petitioner considered talking things over with
respondent. However, the incident that transpired in respondent's office,
wherein he shouted for no reason at all towards petitioner upon seeing her,
and eventually blaming her for his performance at work, broke the camel's
back. Petitioner was humiliated by respondent in front of other people. Not
knowing what to do, petitioner just cried and left.

These instances, to say the least, added emotional and psychological

stress not only to petitioner but to her children as well. The acts of violence
employed by respondent to petitioner caused the latter physical,
emotional[,] and psychological distress that made her and her family
paranoid and wary upon the sight of respondent. These cannot be
countenanced for the same violate the basic precepts enshrined in Section
[2] of RA 9262, that is, guaranteeing full respect to human rights and
valuing the dignity of women and children.

Respondent was given the chance to refute the allegations imputed

against him. His counsel thoroughly examined every witness and piece of
evidence presented by petitioner. However, when the time to present his
evidence came, he opted not to. This actuation ofrespondent prevented the
court from hearing his side of the story.
' .
"'

Decision 13 A.C. No. 13082

WHEREFORE, tll.e Temporary Protection Order issued on

September 23, 2010, under Republic Act 9262, otherwise known as "Anti
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004" is hereby made
PERMANENT with some modifications, x x x

xxxx

SO ORDERED. 38

Verily, respondent slapped complainant, repeatedly slammed her

against the wall and on the bed, and threw her to the floor. Complainant
suffered bruises which were seen by her friends and children who could only
feel sorry for her. Respondent, too, would call complainant ''puta" or
''pokpok" and brazenly declare "nanlalake kasi mommy mo" in front of her
children. These are established facts.

There is no cogent reason why the Court should depart from these
factual findings which are matters ofjudicial record. The same speak volumes
of respondent's repeated physical abuse not only toward complainant but her
children, as well. Notably, the trial court heard the parties' respective
positions and had the opportunity to observe their demeanor and determine
their credibility up close. We also note that respondent chose not to refute the
damning inculpatory evidence of his physical and verbal abuse toward
complainant and her family despite ample opportunity given him. At any rate,
the decision in the civil case already attained finality, a fact which respondent
does not deny.

To be sure, the issuance of a protection order requires preponderance

of evidence39 or that evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing
than that Vl{hich is offered in opposition to it. 40 Preponderance of evidence in
civil case~ is greater than substantial evidence required in disbarment
proceedings such as the case at bar. 41 Thus, the judicial truths established by
the trial coprt should also be deemed established here.
II

The : principle remains true despite the dismissal of the criminal

complaint for violation of RA 9262. 42 Indeed, administrative cases against
lawyers ar~ distinct from and proceed independently of civil and criminal
I
I

I
38
Rollo, pp. 549-551. ·
39
Section 34.1 When petition may proceed separately from or be deemed instituted with the civil action.for
1
damages. (a) An offended party may file a petition for protection order ahead of a civil action for
damages arising from the same act. The same shall proceed separately from the civil action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the petitioner, the court may consolidate the
petition with the civil action. (Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, AM. No. 04-10-
11-SC, October 19, 2004).
40
See Rivera~- Court ofAppeals, 348 Phil. 734, 742 (1998).
41
In the hierflrchy of evidentiary values, We find proof beyond reasonable doubt at the highest level,
followed by clear and convincing evidence, preponderance of evidence, and substantial evidence, in that
order, See $pauses Manalo v. Roldan-Co11fesor, 290 Phil. 311, 323 ( 1992).
42
Anti-Violehce Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, Republic Act No. 9262, March 8, 2004.
 )'

14 A.C. No. 13082

Decision

cases. 43 In other words, there need not be a predicate crime for the Court to
impose its disciplinary action on erring lawyers. The rationale is clear:

x x x disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.

Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an
action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct
of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no
sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, it also involves neither a plaintiff
nor a prosecutor. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges
as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of
the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there
can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. 44

xxxx

To repeat, the dismissal of the criminal complaint for violation of RA

9262 should not therefore preclude the imposition of disbarment on
respondent for violation of Rules 1.0 l 45 and 7 .03 46 of the CPR. Disbarment
on ground of final conviction of crime involving moral turpitude is one thing;
disbarment on ground of violation of CPR is another. They are separate
grounds for disbarment which the Court may deal with separately.

If at all, the dismissal of the criminal complaint against respondent only

meant that complainant failed to muster the required quantum of proof in that
particular case alone. But the dismissal of the criminal complaint did not
automatically mean complainant could not prove, by substantial evidence,
respondent's abusive behavior toward her and her children. For administrative
cases only require substantial evidence to prove a claim. \Ve emphasize the
well-settled rule that a criminal case is different from an administrative case
and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to
each case. 47

43
See Gonzalez v. Alcaraz, 534 Phil. 471, 481-482 (2006).
44
See Rico v. Sa/utan, 827 Phil. I, 6-7 (2018).
45
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Code of
Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
46
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
47
Office of the Court Administrator v. Lopez, 654 Phil. 602, 607 (2011 ).
 ..
'
\
.

Decision 15 A.C. No. 13082

Thus, in Tucay v. Tucay, 48 the Court resolved to disbar Atty. Manuel

Tucay for carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman despite the
pendency of a separate bigamy charge against him. According to the Court,
complainant sufficiently proved in the disbarment proceeding that respondent
had been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, though the trial
court has yet to render a verdict of conviction or acquittal in the criminal case.

In any event, Resolution dated March 12, 2013 of the Office of the City
Prosecutor's Office - Quezon City left much to be desired. We quote:

After analysis of the allegations and the evidence adduced by the

complainant and the respondent in relation to the provisions material to this
complaint, it appears that there is no sufficient basis to indict respondent for
sexual, physical, psychological[,] and economic abuse under Republic Act
No. 9262. Respondent could not be charged for economic abuse since the
evidence proves that he gave financial support to the complainant and her
children while they were living together.xx x Neither could respondent be
charged for psychological and physical abuse as the complainant's
allegations relative thereto appear to be not in accordance with common
experience and observations of mankind that is probable under the
circumstance[s]. x x x The same is true with the alleged sexual abuses - x
x x. Even if complainant has secured a Barangay Protection Order, it does
not necessarily prove that the respondent is a violent person since the
alleged threat on her life could either be imagined or real considering that
the Barangay issues the Order summarily and ex-parte or merely on the
basis of the application.

xxxx

As can be gleaned, the investigating prosecutor did not show how he

was supposed to have logically and reasonably processed the case in
consideration of the applicable law and the evidence on record.

The investigating prosecutor simply concluded that the issuance of the

BPO, without more, did not prove respondent's abusive behavior. He in fact
reduced the evidentiary value of the BPO as a mere scrap of document not
worthy of credence. To emphasize though, complainant was under oath when
she applied for the issuance of the BPO. More, to side with the prosecutor's
disregard of the BPO is anathema to the very State policy49 of RA 9262 - the
protection of the dignity of women and children and guaranteed respect for
human rights. If the very mechanism and refuge accorded by law to women
and children are reduced to a mere scrap of paper, the following questions
linger- are we really instruments for the protection of women and children's

48
See Tucay v. Tucay, 376 Phil. 336,340 (1999).
49
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared that the State vaiues the dignity of women and
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the
family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.xx xx (Anti-Violence Against Women and their Chiidren Act of 2004, Republic
Act No. 9262, March 8, 2004).
 I
;"',
. ·,.'

Decision 16 A.C. No. 13082

rights? Or did we just devise a fonnal mechanism to provide a picture of

protection on paper?

In any case, it cannot be said that the dismissal of the criminal

complaint against respondent precludes the refiling thereof based on whatever
additional evidence may later on be mustered and presented by the
complainant against him. The dismissal of the criminal complaint cannot
therefore be regarded as an accurate measure of the state of the relationship
between complainant and respondent.

On the contrary, the fact that respondent repeatedly abused her and her
children which~ as shown, had already been established with finality by
preponderance of evidence, more than the required quantum of substantial
evidence in administrative cases against members of the bar. Hence, in
accordance with the trial court's ruling in Civil Case No. Q-10-67984, we find
respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 50 and 7.03 51 of the CPR for
repeatedly abusing complainant and her children.

As for respondent's own claim of physical abuse he suffered in the

hands of complainant, suffice it to state that mere allegation, without more,
cannot be given credence. At any rate, respondent's claim of physical abuse,
even if true, does not grant him the license to become abusive of complainant
and her children.

Complainant failed to substantiate her

claim of sexual and economic abuse.

The Court nevertheless adopts the recommendation of the IBP to

dismiss complainant's accusation of sexual and economic abuse for lack of
substantiating evidence. 52 The trial court's Decision dated January 5, 2012,
does not bear any finding of sexual or economic abuse against respondent
either.

At any rate, the receipts for groceries, prov1s10ns, utility bills,

transportation, and tuition fees submitted by respondent show that he did share
in the living expenses and gave :financial support to complainant's family
during their cohabitation.

50
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Code of
Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
51
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Code of Professional Responsibility. June 21, 1988).
52
See Vitug v. Rongcal, 532 Phil. 615, 631 (2006).
Decision 17 A.C. No. 13082

But being financially supportive of complainant's family does not give

respondent the right to lay a hand on complainant and her children. Violence
is never a normal occurrence in any family set up. To justify the same is
egregious and goes against the very essence of a civilized society. 53 The Court
will never tolerate this kind of attitude or practice.

Respondent's illicit relationship with

complainant eroded the sanctity of marriage

As a member of the Bar and officer of the Court, respondent is required

not only to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses, but
also to conduct himself in such a way as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of
law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever
is a member of its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles, but
must also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. 54

Here, both complainant and respondent openly admitted to cohabiting

as husband and wife from November 2003 until April 2010. At the start of
their cohabitation, they were still legally married to their respective spouses.
In fact, the nullity of respondent's marriage became final only in July 2004
while complainant's marriage to Carlos has not been dissolved at all.

By living together as husband and wife despite the subsistence of their

respective marriages, both complainant and respondent openly gave the
impression that a married man or woman may very well cohabit with
individuals beside their lawful spouses. And although the decree of nullity of
respondent's marriage became final in July 2004, his continuous cohabitation
with complainant until April 2010 did not diminish his liability. For he knew
full well that complainant's marriage with Carlos has not been severed at all.

Nor did his covetous desires for complainant, nay, his so-called
unconditional love for her justify his flagrant violation of our penal laws on
adultery and concubinage. His illicit relationship with complainant
undeniably eroded the sanctity of man-iage and the protection accorded to
such vital institution by the Constitution itself

Respondent attempts to throw all the blame on complainant by painting

her as a gold digger and woman of ill-repute. But complainant's moral fitness
is simply not what is at stake here; it is respondent's fitness to continue as a
member of the Bar which hangs in the balance.

53
Cristobal v. Cristobal, A.C. Ne. 12702, November 08, 2020.
54
Supra note 33.
 18 A.C. No. 13082
Decision

In Samaniego v. Ferrer, 55 respondent claimed he was not entirely to

blame because complainant knew he was married, yet, she chose to continue
their illicit affair. The Court ruled, however, that complainant's complicity in
the immoral act could not mitigate, let alone, negate respondent's liability.
Whether complainant was in pari delicto with respondent is wholly
immaterial to the issue of respondent's liability here.

For cohabiting with a married woman for almost seven (7) years,
respondent violated Rule 1.01,56 Canon 7, 57 and Rule 7.03 58 of the CPR. His
liability, therefore, is not diminished just because during their first year of
cohabitation, his own marriage got annulled. He may have become single
again but complainant with whom he cohabited remained married to her
husband all throughout their cohabitation.

Respondent must be sanctioned for using

offensive language and insolence.

Lastly, we remind respondent that lawyers must refrain from using

offensive language not only in writing pleadings but also in their public and
private dealings. 59 Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the CPR decrees:

CANON 8-A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.

RULE 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

Here, respondent described complainant as a woman of ill-repute who

lent him a hand to hold and shoulder to lean on. Given his vulnerable state at
that time though, he could not resist complainant as "even a saint would [have
been] tempted at the sight of an open door."

Respondent's use of double entendre does not escape us, and we are
offended. Such distasteful language is not welcome. True, a lawyer's language
may be forceful and emphatic, but it should always be dignified and
respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. 60

55
578 Phil I, 5 (2008).
56
Rule 1.0 I A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitfal conduct. (Code of
Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
57
Canon 7 -A lawyer shall at all times upho!d the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the integrated bar. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, I 988).
58
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in publ;c or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
59
See Dimaculangan v. Jurado, A.C. No. 12359, Apdl 8,2019, [Unsigned Resolution].
60
See Spouses Nuezca v. Villagarcia, 792 Phil. 535, 540 (2016).
'< \
:

Decision 19 A.C. No. 13082

The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in

the dignity of judicial forum. Language abounds with countless possibilities
for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and
illuminating but not offensive. To emphasize, lawyers are licensed officers of
the court who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession,
hence, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly at all times, in all
places. 61

The use of intemperate and highly derogatory language in pleadings is

punishable by direct contempt. In fact, offensive and disrespectful observation
is an act of direct contempt or contempt in facie curiae which could be
summarily punished without hearing. 62

The power to punish for contempt, however, should be exercised on the

preservative and not the vindictive principle and on the corrective rather than
retaliatory idea of punishment. 63 The Court, therefore, resolves to admonish
respondent to deter him from using uncalled for derogatory remarks.

In the same vein, respondent must also be held accountable for

displaying insolence in his pleadings. Although he signified his remorse for
his indiscretion, he continues to exude a high degree of arrogance just the
same. In fact, we find his so-called apology to the legal profession to be less
than sincere. He even had the temerity to claim that he is worthy of
commendation and praise for ending his illicit relationship with complainant.
But the Court does not give medals to philanderers, abusers, and cheats. Nor
do we exalt those who gaslight and manipulate their respective partners. Quite
the reverse, we have consistently upheld the high moral standard required of
all members of the bar. For a lawyer's moral fiber is a thread that tethers him
or her to the legal profession.

In Washington v. Dicen, (Washington) 64 the Court found Atty. Dicen

guilty of violating Rule 8.01, Canon 8 of the CPR for his use of language
which not only maligned complainant's character, but also imputed a crime
on her, i.e., that she was committing adultery against her husband who was,
at the time, living in the United States. In his pleadings before the IBP, Atty.
Dicen referred to complainant as a ,clunatic" who was on a "crazy quest for
revenge" against him. In the same pleading, Atty. Dicen also called
complainant "a puppet and a milking cow" of her paramour Maiiin.

61
Id.
62
See Calo, Jr. v. Tapucar, 177 Phil. 72, 78 (1979).
63
See Yangson v. Salandanan, 160-A. Phli. 691, 693 (1975).
64
835 Phil. 837, 842-843 (2018).
 ' ~·
' ,·

20 A.C. No. 13082

Decision

Similarly, we find respondent guilty of violating Canon 865 and Rule

8.01 66 of the CPR for his insolence and use of offensive language in his
pleadings.

Penalties

a. Violation of Rules 1.01 67 and 7.03 68 of the CPR - Physical Abuse

In recent years, domestic violence has begun to emerge from behind

closed doors and drawn shades which have traditionally hidden it from public
scrutiny. With its severity and pervasiveness now known, all elements of
government must play its role to eradicate this social ill. 69 For its part,
Congress has enacted the VAWC law to guarantee protection to women and
children who are among the most vulnerable sectors of society. But we, too,
have a role to play in this lofty campaign. We are uniquely positioned to mold
behavior and culture through the cases we resolve. With the prompt and
proper resolution of domestic abuse cases, we send a strong message that acts
of abuse against women and children will not be tolerated but condemned.

No person should be subjected to physical abuse. The VA WC law,

nonetheless, gives special protection to women and children who are the
"usual victims" of violence ai1d abuse which flows from the unequal power
relationship between women and men and the widespread gender bias and
prejudice against women. 70 The State's policy of affording special protection
to women and children who are victims of violence and child abuse is
unequivocal and is a policy that the Court fully supports. 71

The most protection, though, goes to children as their growth and

development may be negatively affected by such trauma brought about by
physical abuse on their person. But bearing witness to abuse carries the same
risk of harm to children's mental health and have the same serious and life-
changing effects as being abused directly. 72 The abuses suffered by
complainant are therefore comparable to the psychological trauma inflicted
on her children who bore witness thereto. For nothing could be more painful

65
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
66
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
67
Rule l.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Code of
Professional Responsibility, June 21, l 988).
68
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
69
Lawyers and Domestic Violence: Raising the Standard of Practice, John M. Burman, University of
Wyoming College of Law; Michigan Journal of Gender and Law, Volume 9, Issue 2, 2003.
70
Supra note 37 at 91.
71
Re: Recommendation of Victoria, A.M. No. l 2.-7- l.5-SC, September 4, 2012.
72
https://www.usatoday.com/storyinews/health/2019/01 /29/ domestic-violence-research-children-abuse-
mental-health-leaming-aces/2227218002/.
-. '
'

Decision 21 A.C. No. 13082

than seeing one's beloved mother being subjected to physical abuse and verbal
degradation by none other than the man whom she considered as her partner
in life.

Indeed, the risk of post-traumatic stress disorder from domestic

violence is high because it is a betrayal by someone who is supposed to be a
protector; it happens in a place which is supposed to be safe; and is usually
done at a time when children are totally dependent on their parental figures,
hence, powerless. 73 This type of trauma is a double-edged sword that cuts
deep. Aside from scarring the impressionable minds of children, it also
imprints the idea that violence is a normal set up in families. Then such abuse
breeds a new generation of abusers, ad infinitum. This should not be the case.

The Court's full support to the protection of women and children

extends to the cleansing of its ranks of officers with audacity to lay their hands
on women and children. Even without a conviction for violation of the VAWC
Law, the Court can make the hammer fall, and heavily74 when, as in this case,
complainant sufficiently established by substantial evidence, her claim of
abuse not only on her person, but also on her children.

Indeed, lawyers and judges alike should be at the forefront in

combatting domestic abuse and mitigating its effects. But rather than become
a vanguard against violence on women and children, respondent chose to be
the perpetrator thereof. The Court, therefore, deems it proper to impose the
supreme penalty of disbarment on respondent for violating Rules 1.01 and
7.03 of the CPR, for repeatedly laying his hand not only on complainant but
on her children, too - an act which the Court abhors the most.

The noble legal profession is simply no place for abusers. We do not

coddle violators of the VAWC law, nor do we allow them to tarnish our
collective dignity. We have all vowed to uphold the protection of women and
children when we took our sacred oath. This involves the imposition of
administrative penalties, including the supreme penalty of disbarment, when
our own officers of the Court violate this sworn duty.

b. Violation of Rule 1.01, 75 Canon 7, 76 and Rule 7.03 77 of the CPR

- Immoral Conduct

73 Id.
74
See Sunville Timber Products, Inc. v. Abad. 283 Phil. 400,410 ( 1992).
75
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (Code of
Professional Responsibility, June 2 l, 1988).
76
Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at ail times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support
the activities of the integrated bar. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988)
77
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession. (Code of Professional Responsibility, June 21, 1988).
 I

Decision 22 A.C. No. 13082

Maintaining an illicit relationship is an immoral conduct punishable by

either suspension or disbarment depending on the circumstances of the case.
For a lawyer to be disbarred on ground of immorality, the conduct complained
of must be grossly immoral or so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency. 78

In Ceniza v. Atty. Ceniza, 79 respondent got disbarred for violating Rules

1.01 and 7.03 of the CPR for abandoning his legitimate family in order to live
with another married woman. His children pleaded with him to avoid
displaying his paramour in public but their pleas went unheeded. This caused
one of his children to suffer depression and attempt suicide. Despite the pain
he had caused his family, respondent showed no remorse for his actions.

In Narag v. Atty. 1Varag,80 Dantes v. Atry. Dantes, 81 Bustamante-

Alejandro v. Atry. Alejandro, 82 and Guevarra v. Atty. Eala, 83 the Court
resolved to disbar respondents for abandoning their legitimate spouses and
maintaining illicit affairs.

Another. In Tucay v. At(y. Tucay, 84 Villatuya v. Atry. Tabalingcos, 85

Bunagan-Bansig v. Atry. Celera, 86 and Dr. Perez v. Atry. Catindig, 87 the
Court has invariably imposed the penalty of disbannent against lawyers who
entered into bigamous marriages.

Yet in F erancullo v. F erancullo, Jr., (F erancullo )88 the Court merely

suspended Atty. Sancho M. Ferancullo, Jr. from the practice of law for two
(2) years for his intimate relationship with a woman other than his wife. We
held that in the absence of any exacerbating circumstance such as
abandonment of the lawful spouse, the ultimate penalty of disbarment would
not be imposed.

Ferancullo applies here. Notably, when complainant and respondent

started living together in November 2003, respondent was already separated
from his wife, so was complainant from her husband. There is, therefore, no
issue of abandonment or bigamous relationship here. As in F erancullo, we
also find that in the absence of any of these exacerbating circumstances,
respondent's two (2) year suspension from the practice of law would suffice.

n See Panagsagan v. Panagsagan, A.C. No. 7733, October l, 2019.

79
A.C. No. 8335, April 10, 2019.
80
353 Phil. 643,648 (1998).
81
482 Phil. 64, 71 (2004).
82
467 Phil. 139, 145 (2004).
83
555 Phil. 713, 719 (2007).
84
Supra note 48.
85
690 Phil. 381, 388-389 (2012).
86
724 Phil. 141, 152 (2014).
87
755 Phii. 297,304 (2015).
88
538 Phil. 501, 517 (2006).
Decision 23 A.C. No. 13082

In view of the earlier imposition of the supreme penalty of disbarment,

however, the penalty of suspension here is rendered nugatory. A disbarred
lawyer may no longer be suspended from the practice of law.

c. Violation of Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the CPR - Insolence and

Use of Derogatory Language

In accordance with Washington, 89 respondent is admonished for his

insolence and use of derogatory remarks against complainant and use of
indecent language in his pleadings in the present case.

Let this be a reminder to all lawyers to resist the temptation brought

about by the sight of an open door no matter how vulnerable they are, lest they
live a life of regret like herein respondent. Indeed, lawyers are bound to
maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
including honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. They are at all times subject to
the watchful public eye and community approbation. Needless to state, those
whose conduct - both public and private - fail this scrutiny like respondent
have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized. 90

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds Atty. Roy Anthony S. Oreta liable

for:

l) Physical abuse in violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
DISBARRED from the practice of law effective upon receipt of
this Decision, and his name ORDERED stricken off in the Roll
of Attorneys;

2) Gross immorality in violation of Rule l.01, Canon 7,

and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, hence,
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years.
Considering, however, that respondent has already been
disbarred, this penalty may no longer be imposed;

3) Violation of Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility for his derogatory and indecent
remarks in his pleadings for which he is ADMONISHED; and

4) Violation of Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility for displaying insolence and
arrogance in his pleadings for vvhich he is ADMONISHED.

89
Supra note 64 at 841.
90
Supra note 30 at 362.
 Decision 24 A.C. No. 13082

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's personal record

in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Furnish a copy of this Decision to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

for its information and guidance; and the Office of the Court Administrator
for dissemination to all comis of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

·;;,;,f,,,, , ~
-~~
R G. GESMUNDO

(On official leave)

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

A ~NDO
Associate Justice

"-.MJ/4f,;;ru RID. CARANDANii2-

ASSOCiate Justice
AMY /2£LJ~VIER
Associate Justice

~
!rrl!l//';tff /
HENRI !JEAN PAU1r&_( INTING
Associate Justice

~r~
SAMUE~GA
Associate Justice
( On official leave)
Decision 25 A.C. No. 13082

RICARD~OSARJO JHOS~OPEZ
Assoc\ate Justice Associate Justice

\ P RB. DIMAA
Associate Justice

~~;~;~~
ANNA-LI R.PAPA-GO:'JlBIO
Deputy Clerk of Court En Banc
OCC En Banc,Supreme Court