TAMIL NADU NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, TIRUCHIRAPPALLI.

SEVENTH SEMESTER

PROJECT TOPIC: “RULE OF EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS”

SUBMITTED TO; [Link] PRASAD

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF LAW,

TAMIL NADU NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL,

TIRUCHIRAPPALLI.

DONE BY;

AJAYSHARMA .STR

BC0170006

[Link].B(HONS.)
 RULE OF EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS

BRIEF NOTE OF THE CONCEPT

“It is a Latin phrase that says ‘Express Mention and Implied Exclusion’ that means
express mention of one thing excludes all other things. Here it is considered that the
items which are not on the list are not covered by the statute. When something is
expressly mentioned in the statute it leads to the presumption that the things which are
not specified in the statute are excluded. 

General words in a statute must receive a general construction unless the statute is
specifying any special meaning to the general words. Whenever something is added in
the statute it is added with the due consciousness. It is assumed that if something is not
added in the statute there is a reason behind it, which is to exclude that from the
particular statute.”

HYPOTHESIS

The Researcher Believes Latin Phrase That Says ‘Express Mention And Implied Exclusion’
Is Not Ambiguous, Is Not Subject To Change In Environment, Does Not Have Any
Complexities, And The Phrase Is Perfect.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. What Is The Use Of Rule Of Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius?

2. What Are The Criticisms And Defences Of Rule Of Expressio Unius Est Exclusio
Alterius?

3. What is the Use Of Expressio Unius In Income Tax Cases?

 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this research paper, the researcher has opted for doctrinal research methodology and
the sources are collected through secondary data by means of referring books, journals
and articles.

TENTATIVE CHAPERTISTATION

1. Brief note of the concept.

2. Hypothesis

3. Research question

4. Research methodology

5. Maxims of interpretation

6. Principle of implied prohibition

7. Construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius

IMPORTANCE OF INTERPRETATION

“The word interpretation is derived from a Latin Term called "Interpari", the word
interpretation means to translate explain or understand. in order to know the true intention
of any law or correct intention of any law it is necessary for a person to know
interpretation. “

As the organisation of justice is directed by the adjudicators as per the arrangements of

law, in this way it requires that there are sure guidelines of understanding the
interpretation rules so that just and uniform judgements are conveyed by them. The main
target that is accomplished by interpretation is that it guarantees that the courts work in
accordance to the legislatures intent.

The main functionof judeges is deemed to be interpretation . the government has three
wing they are as follows the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. It is the legislature
which sets out the laws however it is legal executive which places the law into activity or
being used. There emerges requirement for the judges to learn the right significance of
the law laid by the governing body.

 TYPES OF INTERPRETATION

[Link] INTERPRETATION OR LITERAL INTERPRETATION

“As per this RULE, the words are given their customary and regular importance and if the
significance of such words is clear they should be offered effect to whatever is their
outcome. Thus, the customary, normal mainstream or exacting significance of the words
must be mulled over. It is the overall standard of understanding that judges are not at
freedom to add to or to detract from the letters of law. They need to restricted to the
language of the law. Courts can't add anything to legal arrangement which is plain and
unambiguous.1

In the case of  Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh2The primary question was
about the translation of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court held
that utilization of word "shall" leaves no permission to cop to hold the enquiry prior to
recording a FIR. Utilization of the articulation "data" with no capability likewise means that
police needs to record data notwithstanding he being unsatisfied by its sensibility. So
here, the court deciphered the strict significance of the words utilized.

In Keshavnanda Bharti v. State of Kerela,3 it was held that a word gets its 'colour' in the
setting wherein it is utilized. The word assembles its importance with respect to its
meaning not just in the setting that it has been utilized however from the words utilized in
comparative conditions.

THE RULE OF MISCHIEF

This rule with respect to interpretation was set down on account of Heydon's Case,4 in
which it was held four things are to be thought of:-

• What was the precedent-based law before the creation of the Act.

• What was the mischief for which the precedent-based law didn't give.

• What cure the parliament had settled and delegated to fix the sickness of federation

1 Union of India v. Braj Nandan Singh, AIR 2005 SC 4403

2 AIR 2014 SC 184
3 (1973)  4 SCC 225
4 (1854) EWHC Exch J36
• The genuine explanation of the cure.

This rule is utilized by the courts to decipher the expectation of the lawmakers. This
targets finding the wickedness and imperfection in the rule and afterward accommodating
solution for the equivalent. The principle preferred position of this standard is that it shuts
the escape clauses in the law and assists with building up the law. This standard permits
the appointed authorities to change the significance of the law with the view to guarantee
justice administration. This standard gives most tact to the appointed authorities and is fit
to the vague cases.

On account of Bengal Immunity Company v. Territory of Bihar,5 the mischief rule was
applied to the development of Article 286 of the Constitution of India, seeing that it was to
fix the mischief of different tax collection and to protect the free progression of the
between state exchange or trade in the Union of India viewed as one economical unit with
no common boundary that the Constitution creators received Article 286 in the
Constitution.

The courts are required not to act subjectively and thusly they are to adhere to the
principles of Interpretation. It is fundamentally discovering the genuine meaning of any
type of words that is the sense the creator proposed to pass on, and of empowering
others to get from them a similar thought which the creator expected to pass on.

According to Salmond interpretation is defined as “Interpretation or construction is the

process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of legislation through the
medium of the authoritative form in which it is expressed.”

GOLDEN RULE

“This rule is the alteration of the rule of gramatical interpretation. As indicated by this rule,
conventionally the words utilized in the rule should be given their characteristic
significance however on the off chance that it prompts bother, difficulty or treachery, the

5  AIR 1995 SC 661

courts must adjust the importance so much to eliminate such burden or bad form. So as
this rule tackles all issues this is known as Golden Rule. This standard depends on the
suspicion that the legislature doesn't expect certain articles and any development
prompting any of such items has the right to be dismissed.”

In the case Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Samiti v. Brij Kishore,6 the high court held that
the articulation "landless individual'' utilized in segment 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Brij Kishore,
the high court held that the articulation "landless individual'' utilized in Section 14 of U.P.
Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953 which made arrangement for award of land to people, was
restricted to "landless workers''. A landless work is he who is occupied with horticulture
yet having no rural land. The Court additionally said that "any landless individual" did
exclude a landless business person living in a city. The object of the Act was to execute
the Bhoodan development, which focused on dissemination of land to landless works
who were skirted in horticulture. A businessman however landless can't utilise the
advantage of the Act.”

HARMONIOUS CONSTRUCTION

“This rule is adopted in those situations where emerges a contention between at least two
statues or between the two arrangements of a similar provisions. The principle followed is
that each provison has some reason for which it is instituted, so it should be perused all
in all. So the institution which makes the authorization should be the aim of the courts too
and a construction which dodges irregularity ought to be followed.”

In T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. Territory of Karnataka , while deciphering Articles 29 and 30 of

the Constitution the Supreme court saw that when provisions of the constitutions are
deciphered, it must be borne as a main priority that the understanding ought to be, for
example, to facilitate in corporation. They can't be perused in segregation and must be
perused agreeably to give importance and reason. They can't be deciphered in a way that
delivers another provision repetitive. In the event that important, a harmonious and
purposive translation should be given.

6 AIR 1981 SC 1656

“The Supreme Court set down adhering to rules of agreeable development on account of
CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers7

1. he courts must evade a head on conflict of apparently negating different provisions

and they should interpret the opposing proviosn harmoniously in order to fit them .

2. The arrangement of one section can't be utilized to overcome the arrangement

contained in another except if the court, regardless of every one of its endeavors,
can't figure out how to accommodate their disparities. At the point when it is difficult
to totally accommodate the distinctions in conflicting arrangements, the courts must
decipher them in, for example, way so that impacts is given to both the arrangements
however much as could be expected.

3. Courts should likewise remember that interpretation that lessens one provision to a
pointless number or dead isn't harmonious development.

the petitioner In M.S.M. Sharma v. Krishna Sinha8, a newspaper editor, was asked to
show cause for what good reason should he not be punished for breach or advantage of
the House ensured by Article 194 (3) of the Constitution for distributing a discourse made
in the state Legislative Assembly without canceling certain comments as coordinated by
the Speaker.”

In an appeal under Article 32 of the Constitution, he contended that the proposed activity
against him would be in opposition to the right to speak freely and expression ensured by
Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that practicality requested
that Articles 19(1) (a) and 194 (3) must be interpreted harmoniously. To offer impact to
both these provisions, it was important to hold that major right of the right to speak freely
of discourse and expression under Article 19(1) (a) was dependent upon the advantages
of houses ensured by Article 194(3). The appeal was, along these lines, dismissed.

7 AIR 2002 SC 3491

8 AIR 1959 SC 395
 MAXIMS OF INTERPRETATION

“In the field of interpretation of statutes many maxims have been used from time to time
by the Courts. Many of the general principles of interpretation have been expressed in the
form of maxims, like ex visceribus actus (the statute should be read as a whole), ut res
magis valeat quam pereat (it may rather become operative than null), noscitur a sociis
(know from the association), ejusdem generis (of the same kind), expressio unius est
exclusio alterius (express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another) and
contemporanea expositio est fortissima in lege (contemporaneous exposition is the best
and strongest in the law).”

PRINCIPLE OF IMPLIED PROHIBITION

“The well known principle of interpretation that express mention of one thing impulsive
the exclusion of another expressed in the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius has
given birth to the principle of implied prohibition which is the antithesis of the principle of
implied powers. In the Constitutions of some countries9 the Union or the Central
Legislature has been given power to legislate on certain subjects enumerated in the form
of a list and for the subjects left out of the list the State legislatures have been conferred
power to make laws. On the other hand, in the Constitutions of some other countries10
Central and State legislatures have been empowered to legislate in distinct fields
designated by more than one list In the former class of cases, the specific mention of
subject to be legislated upon by the Centre means implied prohibition on the Centre to
legislate on the residuary areas. In other words, the Centre is impliedly prohibited from
encroaching upon the residuary powers of the State in such cases, however, the ban
must not be necessarily incidental to the execution of the express powers granted by the
Constitution to the Centre.

9 Australia and The United States of America, for instance.

10 Indian and Canada, for instance.
in the latter cases of canes, the principle of implied prohibition does not exist at all11, even
though that of incidental and ancillary powers does.”

CONSTRUCTION OF EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS

“The maxim “means that express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. If
one or more things of a particular class are expressly mentioned in an enactment that
means that other things belonging to the same particular dass are excluded from the
domain of the enactment. Again, where two expressions have been used in a statute one
of which generally includes the other, the more general expression excludes the less
general. The rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius is often a valuable servant but a
dangerous master to follow in the construction of statutes or documents. The exclusio is
often the result of inadvertence or accident, and the maxim ought not to be applied when
tis application, having regard to the subject matter to which it is to be applied, leads to
inconsistency or injustice12. This principle is a general rule with regard to the effect of an
enabling statute and means express enactment shuts the door to further implication”.

In Parbhani Transport v. Road Transport Authority,13 permits to ply buses having been
given to the State of Bombay under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the petitioner argued
that since the Act entitled the government to ply buses under a scheme, buses could not
be run by it otherwise The maxim expressive wus est exclusio alterius was quoted in
support The Supreme Court has allowed this maxim on the basis of the language of
Section 42 (3) (a) is unambiguous to the effect that the government has to apply, for
permits under Section 42 (1) for plying buses.

In Gilmore (Valuation Officer) vs. Baker Carr,14 the question was whether a broiler house
was an ‘agricultural land’ or an ‘agricultural building Both these expressions are defined
under Section 2 (2) of the Rating and Valuation (Appointment) Act, 1928 and land
exceeding one quarter of an any used for the purpose of poultry farming has been
included with in the definition of agricultural land. The court held that a broiler house

11The Burhanpur Tapti Mills Ltd. vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1962 MP 225, and
Durgeshwar Dayal v. Secretary, Bar Councils Allahabad AIR 1954 All.728
12 Per Lopes L.J. Colquhoun V. Brooks, (1888) 21 QBD 52 at p.63
13 AIR 1960 SC 801
14 (1962) 1 WLR 1165.
cannot be a agricultural land because ‘building’ and ‘land’ have been clearly
distinguished in the Act as mutually exclusive, and it is a building.”

“In Khemka and Company v. State of Maharashtra,15 interpretation of Section 9 (2) of the
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 was involved. The first part the provision vested powers in
the State officials to act on behalf of the Central Government for assessing, re-assessing
and enforcing payment of tax while the latter part of the provision says that this will be as
if the tax or penalty payable under the General Act is a tax or penalty under the general
Sales Tax law of the State. The Supreme Court said that penalty provisions in the Central
and the State legislations were special provisions in each Act and are not part of the
general sales tax law of the Centre or the State. Therefore, the rule expressio unius est
exclusio alterius is applicable in the present case and so interpreted the reference to
penalties in the latter part of Section 9 (2) must apply only to special penalty provisions in
the Central Act.”

“In Nandini Satpathi v. [Link],16 interpretation of the term ‘confession’ used in Section
26 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 was in question. It was argued that confession is a
kind of admission and hence the ‘Miranda exclusionary rule’ or the American law of
evidence is applicable jn India. The said rule means that to statement made by a person
in police custody shall be relevant. Rejecting the argument the Supreme Court ruled that
the legislature has intentionally incorporated the word ‘confession’ in Section 26 of the
Act and hence it is applicable only to the confessional statements made by the accused
and the other statements are expressly excluded. Thus, if an accused makes an
admission in police custody, it becomes relevant because it 15 not attracted by the
provisions of Section 26 of the said Act.”

“The fundamental rights under Articles 15, 16 and 19 are available to the citizens of India
and hence other persons, i.e., non-citizens are expressly excluded In Bennett Coleman v,
Union of India17 and [Link] v. Union of India,18 the Supreme Court interpreted the
term ‘citizen’ and clearly lad down that the freedoms under Article 19 cannot be claimed

15 AIR 1975 SC 1549

16 AIR 1978 SC 1025
17 AIR 1973 SC 106
18 AIR 1970 SC 564
by non-citizens nor, by the legal persons as they are not citizens. However, Indian citizens
may claim these freedoms through their legal persons because the relief ultimately goes
to the citizens and not to the legal persons.”

“In Union of India vs. Alok Kumar, questions relating to disciplinary inquiry under Rule 9
(2) of the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1962 and Public Servants
(Inquiries) Act, 1850 were to be decided. The Supreme Court ruled that the Rules and the
Act are neither inter dependent nor do they convey the legislative intent that departmental
inquiry has to be held under both collectively or at the discretion of the disciplinary
authority. The expression ‘other authority’ in Rule 9 (2) is intended to cover a vast field
and there is no indication of the mind of the framers that the expression must be given a
restricted or narrow meaning. The framers of the Rules have not excluded appointment of
former employees of the railway department as other authority. It is a settled principle of
interpretation that exclusion must either be specifically provided or the language of the
rule should be such that it definitely follows by necessary implication. The language of
Rule 9 (2) shows that words are disjunctive and so the principle of ejusdem generis is not
applicable. Therefore, the expression ‘other authority’ in Rule 9 (2) does not have to be
only a person in service.”

CONCLUSION

“Regular working of the courts includes interpretation of rules and statutes since it is the
obligation of the judiciary act as indicated by the genuine aim of the legislature. So
provisions are to be deciphered to implement the law and furthermore to stay away from
unnatural birth cycle of equity which means miscarriage of justice. Be that as it may, if any
interpretation brings about bad form, difficulty, bother it should be kept away from and
the one which underpins the equity ought to be received. Various guidelines have been
created to give the structure to the understanding and it is the duty of the appointed
judges to apply the best fitting principle for the situation.”