DIGESTED BY: CHARDANE P.

LABISTE

FRANCISCO V. GONZALES, G.R. NO. 177667, SEPT. 17, 2008

FACTS:
The marriage of Cleodualdo M. Francisco and Michele Uriarte Francisco had been
declared null and void ab initio in October 2001. A Compromise Agreement was signed
by the ex-spouses providing for the transfer of ownership of a house and lot located in
Taal Street, Ayala Alabang by Deed of Donation to their children Cleodia and
Ceamantha, upon reaching the age of 19 and 18, respectively.

In May 2001, a case of Unlawful Detainer was filed against Michele and her partner
George Zoltan Matrai (Matrai), by Jorge and Purificacion Gonzales, because of the
former’s failure to pay the rents in the leased property in Lanka Drive, Ayala Alabang. A
writ of execution was levied upon the Taal Street property on November 2001.

Dra. Maida Uriarte, guardian-in-fact of the Francisco children filed a motion to stop the
auction sale of the property. The claims are as follows:
1. The Francisco children are already the rightful owners of the Taal Street
property;
2. Cleodualdo and Michele have already waived their rights to the property;
3. The obligation incurred by Michele did not benefit her familywith Cleodualdo;
4. The unlawful detainer case entails obligations of Matrai and Michelle, not joint
and solidary with Cleodualdo and their family

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Taal Street property, may be held liable for the obligation incurred by
Michele Uriarte

RULING:
NO, the Taal Street property may not be held liable for the obligation incurred by
Michele Uriarte.

Article 121, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Family Code provide that:

The debt incurred by Michele in the form of unpaid rentals and telephone bills in the
Lanka Drive property did not benefit the conjugal partnership with Cleodualdo or their
family including the two children. It was an obligation she incurred with her new partner
Matrai. Thus, the property in Taal Street, now owned by the children, cannot be made
the subject of a writ of execution in order to settle her obligation in Lanka Drive.
DIGESTED BY: CHARDANE P. LABISTE

VELOSO V. MARTINEZ, 28 PHIL 255

FACTS:
Maiano Veloso commenced an action to recover of Lucia Martinez the possession of a
certain parcel of land together with the sum of P125 per month. Lucia Martinez
answered and filed a counterclaim for services rendered by the deceased to Veloso and
recovery of certain jewelry alleged to be in the possession in Veloso. The jewels in
question before the possession of the same was given to Veloso belonged to Lucia
Martinez personally and she had inherited the same from her mother. Martinez Lucia is
the widow of Domingo Franco and after the death of her husband she was appointed as
the administratrix. A short time before the death of Domingo he borrowed from the
Veloso money and gave as security the jewelry.

ISSUE:
WON the jewelry in question a paraphernal property of Lucia.

RULING:
Yes, the record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife,
acquired from her mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that
they constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property, she
exercised dominion over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive
control and management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her
husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it
properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.)

There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in
any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not be deprived of the same
by any act of her husband, without her consent, and without compliance with the
provisions of the Civil Code above cited.
DIGESTED BY: CHARDANE P. LABISTE

BUADO V. BUADO, G.R. NO. 145222, APRIL 24, 2009

FACTS:
Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado filed a complaint against Erlinda Nicol for slander.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay the damages. The decision
reached the Supreme Court but was affirmed, and it became final and executory on
March 5, 1992.

In October 1992, the trial court issued a writ of execution against the personal
properties of Erlinda Nicol, stating that if the properties are insufficient to cover the civil
liability, the Deputy Sheriff shall issue a notice of levy on real property against a
property. Finding Erlinda’s personal property to be insufficient, the notice of levy was
annotated on the Transfer Certificate Title No. T-125322. A public auction followed,
wherein the spouses Buado were the highest bidders. A certificate of sale was issued in
favor of the Buados.

Almost a year later, Erlinda’s husband, Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of
certificate of sale and damages with a preliminary injunction. The Buados contend that
Romulo is not the third party contemplated in Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
and that the obligation of Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the family. According to the
law, a third-party claimant may also resort to an independent separate action, the object
of which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the
sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the property.

ISSUES:
1. Did Erlinda’s obligation redound to the benefit of the family?

RULING:
1. No. Erlinda’s obligation clearly did not redound to the benefit of the family. It is an
obligation arising from criminal liability. In this case, the court needed to determine the
character of the property as well as if the obligation would be redounded to the benefit
of the family. It has been ruled in previous cases that the husband of the judgment
debtor cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his
wife for an obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

The contested property is conjugal in nature and therefore could not be made liable for
the personal debts contracted by the husband or wife before or during the marriage if it
did not redound to the benefit of the family. The conjugal partnership of gains is unlike
the absolute community of property where the community may be held liable for the
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of crime or quasi-delict if the exclusive
property of the debtor-spouse is insufficient. Unless some benefit redounded to the
family, the conjugal partnership shall not be liable.
DIGESTED BY: CHARDANE P. LABISTE

PARTOSA-JO V. CA, 216 SCRA 693 [G.R. NO. 82606, DEC. 18, 1992]

FACTS:
Jose Jo is a Chinese national, and Prima Partosa is his legal wife. Jose Jo admitted that
he had cohabited with three other women and fathered 15 children. The two agreed that
Prima would temporarily leave their conjugal home in Dumaguete City to stay with her
parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for Jose to visit and support her.
They never agreed to separate permanently. In 1942, Prima went back to Dumaguete,
but she was not accepted by her husband.

In 1980, Prima filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property as well as for
support. The trial court judge rendered the decision granting Prima a monthly support of
Php500, Php40,000 for the construction of a house where she may live separately,
Php19,200 by way of support in-arrears, and Php3,000 for attorney’s fees. However, the
complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property was dismissed for lack of a cause
for action and on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article
178 of the Civil Code.

“It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are considered properties
of Jose Jo, the defendant in this case, subject to separation of property under Article
178, third paragraph of the Civil Code, which is subject to separate proceedings as
enunciated herein.”

ISSUES:
Is Prima Partosa-Jo entitled to a judicial separation of conjugal property?

RULING:
Yes. Article 178 (3) provides that the separation in fact between husband and wife
without judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that: (3) If the
husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may
petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership
property or separation of property.

The above-quoted provision has been superseded by Article 128 of the Family Code,
which states: Art. 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to
comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the
court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, for authority to be the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary
conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the
preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental, or property relations. A spouse is
deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling
without any intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a
period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to
his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning
to the conjugal dwelling.

For abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital relations,

VILLANUEVA V. CA, 427 SCRA 439

FACTS:
Orlando filed with the trial court a petition for annulment of his marriage with Lilia
alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into marrying her who was
already pregnant. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and
well-grounded fear of imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the
harassing phone calls from Lilia and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three
men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes thereat, and the
threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New People’s
Army whom Orlando claimed to have been hired by Lilia and who accompanied him in
going to her home province of Palawan to marry her. Orlando also alleged that he never
cohabited with Lilia after the marriage.

Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing that Orlando freely and voluntarily
married her; that Orlando stayed with her in Palawan for almost a month after their
marriage; that Orlando wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during which
private respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress
of her pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely.

ISSUES:
Should the marriage be annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between the
parties?

RULING:
No. Orlando cannot claim that his marriage should be annulled due to the absence of
cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation is, per se, not a ground to
annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend upon the will of the
spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate. The failure to
cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any of the
grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit
with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.
DIGESTED BY: CHARDANE P. LABISTE

PATRICIO V. DARIO, G.R. NO. 170829, NOVEMBER 20, 2006

FACTS:
Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla G.
Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G.
Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and
a pre-school building built thereon.

On August 10, 1987, Patricio, Marcelino Marc and Dario III, extrajudicially settled the
estate of Marcelino V. Dario. Thereafter, Patricio and Marcelino Marc formally advised
Dario III of their intention to partition the subject property and terminate the co-
ownership. Dario III refused to partition the property claiming that the subject property,
which is the family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario, cannot
be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein namely, his 12-year-old son,
who is the grandson of the decedent.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of Dario III, can be
considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code

RULING:
No, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV can’t be considered as a beneficiary.

Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art.
159: (1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the
family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.

In this case, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his
grandmother, but from his father.

Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V.
Dario, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated
under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his
grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom he is dependent on legal support,
and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his
parents, being of legal age.