Modal logic is a collection of formal systems developed to represent statements about necessity
and possibility. It plays a major role in philosophy of language, epistemology, metaphysics,
and natural language semantics. Modal logics extend other systems by adding unary operators
and , representing possibility and necessity respectively. For instance the modal
formula can be read as "possibly " while can be read as "necessarily
". Modal logics can be used to represent different phenomena depending on what kind of
necessity and possibility is under consideration. When is used to represent epistemic
necessity, states that is epistemically necessary, or in other words that it is
known. When is used to represent deontic necessity, states that is a
moral or legal obligation.[1]
In the standard relational semantics for modal logic, formulas are assigned truth values relative to
a possible world. A formula's truth value at one possible world can depend on the truth values of
other formulas at other accessible possible worlds. In particular, is true at a world if
is true at some accessible possible world, while is true at a world if is
true at every accessible possible world. A variety of proof systems exist which are sound and
complete with respect to the semantics one gets by restricting the accessibility relation. For instance,
the deontic modal logic D is sound and complete if one requires the accessibility relation to be serial.
While the intuition behind modal logic dates back to antiquity, the first modal axiomatic systems were
developed by C. I. Lewis in 1912. The now-standard relational semantics emerged in the mid
twentieth century from work by Arthur Prior, Jaakko Hintikka, and Saul Kripke. Recent developments
include alternative topological semantics such as neighborhood semantics as well as applications of
the relational semantics beyond its original philosophical motivation.[2] Such applications
include game theory,[3] moral and legal theory,[3] web design,[3] multiverse-based set theory,
[4]
and social epistemology.[5]
Syntax of modal operators[edit]
Modal logic differs from other kinds of logic in that it uses modal operators such as and
. The former is conventionally read aloud as "necessarily", and can be used to represent
notions such as moral or legal obligation, knowledge, historical inevitability, among others. The latter
is typically read as "possibly" and can be used to represent notions including permission, ability,
compatibility with evidence. While well formed formulas of modal logic include non-modal formulas
such as , it also contains modal ones such as , , , and so on.
Thus, the language of basic propositional logic can be defined recursively as follows.
1. If is an atomic formula, then is a formula of .
2. If is a formula of , then is too.
3. If and are formulas of , then is too.
4. If is a formula of , then is too.
5. If is a formula of , then is too.
Modal operators can be added to other kinds of logic by introducing rules analogous to #4 and #5
above. Modal predicate logic is one widely used variant which includes formulas such as .
In systems of modal logic where and are duals, can be taken as an
abbreviation for , thus eliminating the need for a separate syntactic rule to introduce it.
However, separate syntactic rules are necessary in systems where the two operators are not
interdefinable.
Common notational variants include symbols such as and in systems of modal
logic used to represent knowledge and and in those used to represent belief.
These notations are particularly common in systems which use multiple modal operators
simultaneously. For instance, a combined epistemic-deontic logic could use the formula
read as "I know P is permitted". Systems of modal logic can include infinitely many modal operators
distinguished by indices, i.e. , , , and so on.