LABOR LAW & LEGISLATION (HR 192) - 9th SATURDAY

1. G.R. No. 188385

G.R. No. 188385 October 2, 2013

BENITO E. LORENZO, Petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION (DepEd), Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the
24 February 2009 Decision1 and 11 June 2009 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 104853, Affirming the 23 June 2008 Decision3 of the Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC), denying the petitioner's claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree (P.O.) No. 626, as
amended, otherwise known as the Employees' Compensation Law.

The facts

This case emanates from a simple claim for Employees’ Compensation death benefits filed by the
petitioner, surviving spouse of Rosario D. Lorenzo (Rosario), a Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) member with GSIS Policy No. CM-56244, who during her lifetime served as
Elementary Teacher I at the Department of Education (DepEd) for a period covering 2 October 1984
to 27 December 2001.

The records of the benefit claim which was docketed as ECC Case No. GM-18068-0307-08, show
that on 1 October 2001, Rosario was admitted at the Medical City Hospital due to Hematoma on the
Tongue, Left Inner Lip and Right Cheek with Associated Gingival Bleeding.4

It appears that prior to her hospitalization, she was previously diagnosed by the same hospital for
Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia and was in fact confined therein on 31 July 2001 because of
Pneumonia which was a result of immuno-compromise secondary to leukemia. Rosario’s health
condition was confirmed by means of a bone marrow examination which showed "hypercellular
aspirate with marked myeloid hyperplasia."

There was no other document on record indicating any past medical, family and personal or social
history of Rosario. On 27 December 2001,Rosario died of Cardio-Respiratory Arrest due to Terminal
Leukemia.5

Petitioner, being the surviving spouse, claimed for Employees Compensation death benefits from the
GSIS. It was denied on the ground that the GSIS Medical Evaluation and Underwriting Department
(MEUD) found Rosario’s ailments and cause of death, Cardio-respiratory Arrest Secondary to
Terminal Leukemia, a non-occupational diseases contemplated under P.D. No. 626, as amended.

Unconvinced, petitioner elevated his Employee’s Compensation claim to the ECC for review and
reconsideration under the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation provided in P.D. No. 626.
Upon review, the ECC found the denial of petitioner’s claim to be in order, stating that:

Leukemia is listed as an occupational disease under P.D. 626, as amended. Under, Annex "A," Item
No. 15 of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation, Leukemia is considered compensable
among operating room personnel due to exposure to anesthetics.

Considering the above-stated medical facts and the conditions for compensability under P.D. 626, as
amended, the denial by the System of appellant’s claim for EC Death Benefits is proper.

This Commission believes that the deceased’s Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia is a result of a
defective genetic expression in expanding hematopoietic stem cells (or blood cell precursors)
resulting in the uncontrolled production of abnormal blood cells. "The diagnosis of Chronic
Myelogenous Leukemia is established by reciprocal translocation between chromosomes 9 and 12.
This translocation results in the head-to-tail fusion of the breakpoint cluster region (BCR) gene on
chromosome 22q11 with the ABL gene located on chromosome [Link], the disease is
characterized by the inevitable transition from a chronic phase to an accelerated phase and on to
blastic crisis." (Harrison’s Principles of Internal medicine, 16th Ed., Vol. I, pp. 637).

The nature of the deceased’s occupation does not increase the risk of developing Chronic
Myelogenous Leukemia because the work does not show frequent and sufficient exposure to
substances established as occupational risk factors of the disease. Further, several non-occupational
factors can also increase the risk of this disease. "There is a marked increase in the incidence of
leukemia with age, and there is also a childhood peak which occurs around two to four years of age.
Certain immulogic conditions, some of which are hereditary, appear to predispose to leukemia.
Ionizing radiation and benzene exposure are established environment and occupational causes of
leukemia." (Encyclopedia of Occupational Health and Safety: International Labor Organization,
Geneva, 4th Ed., pp. 1, 4).6

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review of the decision of the ECC with the CA.

In a Decision promulgated on February 24, 2009, the CA affirmed the decision of ECC. The fallo of
the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DISMISSED. The
assailed decision is AFFIRMED.7

The CA ruled that under the present law, leukemia, while listed as an occupational disease, is
compensable only among operating room personnel due to exposure to anesthetics.8 Being a school
teacher who is not exposed to anesthetics, Rosario’s disease, though listed under Annex "A" may not
be compensable, unless, petitioner could prove that his wife’s risk of contracting the disease was
increased by the latter’s working conditions, which the petitioner failed to do.

The CA went on to state that petitioner has not presented any medical information on the cause of his
wife’s illness, which could help in determining the causal connection between Rosario’s ailment and
her alleged exposure to muriatic acid, floor wax and paint - hardly considered as radiation exposure
which may cause chronic myeloid leukemia.

Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court via a petition for review on certiorari insisting, inter alia, on
the error allegedly committed by the CA in failing to appreciate that P.D. No 626, as amended, is a
social legislation whose primordial purpose is to provide meaningful protection to the working class
against the hazards of disability, illness and other contingencies resulting in the loss of income. Such
that, the ECC, SSS and GSIS as the official agents charged by law to implement social justice
guaranteed by the Constitution, should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding
claims for compensability.

We are called to decide whether or not the ailment of the late Rosario Lorenzo is compensable under
the present law on employees’ compensation.

This Court’s Ruling

We find the Petition unmeritorious.

Sickness, as defined under Article 1679 (1) Chapter I, Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code of the
Philippines refers to "any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the
Employees’ Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment, subject to proof that
the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.

In cases of death, such as in this case, Section 1(b), Rule III of the Rules Implementing P.D. No. 626,
as amended, requires that for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
claimant must show: (1) that it is the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the
Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied; or (2) that the
risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.

Section 2(a), Rule III of the said Implementing Rules, on the other hand, defines occupational
diseases as those listed in Annex "A" when the nature of employment is as described therein. The
listed diseases are therefore qualified by the conditions as set forth in the said Annex "A," hereto
quoted:

OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the
following conditions must be satisfied:

(1) The employee’s work must involve the risks described herein;

(2) The disease was contracted as a result of the employee’s exposure to the described risks;

(3) The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to
contract it;

(4) There was no notorious negligence on the part of the employee.

xxxx

Occupational Disease Nature of Employment

xxx

15. Leukemia and Lymphoma Among operating room personnel due to anesthetics
Gauging from the above, the ECC was correct in stating that, contrary to the earlier finding of the
MEUD of the GSIS, Rosario’s disease is occupational, which fact, however, does not thereby result
in compensability in view of the fact that petitioner’s wife was not an operating room personnel.

As correctly pointed out by the ECC, the coverage of leukemia as an occupational disease relates to
one’s employment as an operating room personnel ordinarily exposed to anesthetics. In the case of
petitioner’s wife, the nature of her occupation does not indicate exposure to anesthetics nor does it
increase the risk of developing Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia. There was no showing that her
work involved frequent and sufficient exposure to substances established as occupational risk factors
of the disease.10 Thus, the need for the petitioner to sufficiently establish that his wife’s job as a
teacher exposed her to substances similar to anesthetics in an environment similar to an "operating
room."11 This leans on the precept that the awards for compensation cannot rest on speculations and
presumptions.12

Indeed, following the specific mandate of P.D. No. 626, as amended, and its Implementing Rules, the
petitioner must have at least provided sufficient basis, if not medical information which could help
determine the causal connection between Rosario’s ailment and her exposure to muriatic acid, floor
wax and paint as well as the rigors of her work. Instead, petitioner merely insists on the supposition
that the disease might have been brought about by the harmful chemicals of floor wax and paint
aggravated by the fact that the Manggahan Elementary School is just along the highway which
exposed Rosario to smoke belched by vehicles, all contributing to her acquisition of the disease.

We find such factors insufficient to demonstrate the probability that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions of Rosario as a public school teacher; enough to
support the claim of petitioner that his wife is entitled to employees compensation. Petitioner failed
to show that the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions in Rosario’s
work. Not even a medical history or records was presented to support petitioner’s claim.

In Sante v. Employees’ Compensation Commission,13 we held that "x x x x a claimant must submit
such proof as would constitute a Reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of
employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working conditions had aggravated the
risk of contracting that ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate
basis for a reasonable man x x x to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be determined
only on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely
apparent, for the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real x
x x not merely apparent."

At most, petitioner solely relies on a possibility that the demands and rigors of Rosario’s job coupled
with exposure to chemicals in paint or floor wax could result or contribute to contracting leukemia.
This is but a bare allegation no different from a mere speculation. As we held in Raro v. Employees
Compensation Commission:14

The law, as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – the illness was caused by
employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. To say
that since the proof is not available, therefore, the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to
the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof
cannot be presumed.

It is well to stress that the principles of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" found in
the old Workmen’s Compensation Act is expressly discarded under the present compensation
scheme. As illustrated in the said Raro case, the new principle being applied is a system based on
social security principle; thus, the introduction of "proof of increased risk." As further declared
therein:

The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies – the Government Service
Insurance System and Social Security System – under the Employees Compensation Commission.
The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer’s obligation to pay workmen’s
compensation and the employee’s right to receive reparation for work-connected death or
disability.15

The case of Sarmiento v. Employees’ Compensation Commission,16 cited in Raro case, elaborates,
thus:

xxxx

The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on
the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation.
No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The
sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees’ Compensation Commission which
then determines on the basis of the employee’s supporting papers and medical evidence whether or
not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration
is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.

On the other hand, the employer’s duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It
does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up
its own fund to meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously
documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen’s compensation. The
Commission administers and settles claims from a fired under its exclusive control. The employer
does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of
benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered
claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption
of compensability and controversion cease to have importance.

The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through
the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent. (Emphasis supplied).

All told, this is not to say, however, that this Court is unmindful of the claimant’s predicament.
While we sympathize with the petitioner, it is important to note that such sympathy must be balanced
by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for compensation.17

Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater
concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families look to for
compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur.18

In light of the foregoing, we are constrained to declare the non-compensability of petitioner’s claim,
applying the provisions of the law and jurisprudence on the purpose of the law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The 24 February 2009 Decision and 11 June 2009
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C A- G.R. SP No. 104853 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

2. G.R. No. 232888

G.R. No. 232888, August 14, 2019

JULIETA T. VERZONILLA, PETITIONER, v. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION

COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

CAGUIOA, J.:*

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision2 dated October 28, 2016 (Assailed Decision) and Resolution3 dated July 6, 2017
(Assailed Resolution) of the Court of Appeals (CA) Special Tenth Division and Former Special
Tenth Division, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 134846.

Facts

Reynaldo I. Verzonilla (Reynaldo) was employed as a Special Operations Officer (SOO) III in the
Quezon City Department of Public Order and Safety since June 1, 1999 until his death on July 5,
2012: As such, he performed the following functions:
1. Assist the Special Operations Officer V in conducting seminars, training and [dry
runs] on disaster preparedness and first aid techniques relative to rescue and relief
operations.

2. Assist the immediate supervisor in enhancing public awareness on disaster

preparedness through tri-media information campaign.

3. Conduct hazard, vulnerability, and risk assessment within the city.

4. Attend meetings, seminars, and trainings on disaster prevention and preparedness.

5. Render fieldwork in times of urgent need and coordinate with other government
agencies/offices.4
Pursuant to a Memorandum dated June 29, 2012, Reynaldo attended the training "on the use of the
Rapid Earthquake Damage Assessment System (REDAS) software" on July 1-6, 2012 in Tagaytay
City. Prior to this, he attended several other seminars.5

On July 5, 2012, Reynaldo died due to "cardio pulmonary arrest, etiology undetermined" at
UniHealth-Tagaytay Hospital and Medical Center, Inc. (UTHMCI). His Discharge
Summary/Clinical Abstract6 shows that he complained of abdominal pain and chest pain. Records
show that Reynaldo was previously diagnosed with hypertension in 2002.7

Thereafter, petitioner Julieta Verzonilla (Julieta), the surviving spouse of Reynaldo, filed a claim for
compensation benefits before the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) under Presidential
Decree (PD) 626.8 In a letter dated April 26, 2013,9 the GSIS denied the claim of Julieta, stating that
based on the documents submitted, the ailment of Reynaldo was not connected to his work and that
no evidence was found that his duties as SOO III increased the risk of contracting said
ailment.10 Julieta moved for a reconsideration of the denial but the same was denied in the GSIS
decision dated May 24, 2013.11

Julieta elevated her claims to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC). In a decision dated
August 7, 2013,12 the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS, noting that while cardiovascular
disease is listed as an occupational disease under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation (EC), it is still subject to the conditions therein set. According to the ECC, Julieta
failed to satisfy these conditions. Further, the ECC held that Julieta failed to provide substantial
evidence to show reasonable connection between the cause of death of Reynaldo and his work and
working conditions.13

Hence, Julieta filed a Petition for Review with the CA. In the Assailed Decision, the CA agreed with
the ECC that Julieta failed to prove, by substantial evidence, that the conditions for compensability
of cardiovascular diseases were met14 or that Reynaldo's risk of contracting the disease was increased
by his working conditions.15 The CA noted that while Reynaldo was diagnosed to be hypertensive,
no evidence was submitted to show that this hypertension was controlled or that his heart disease
worsened by the nature of his work.16 The CA held as well that there was no showing that Reynaldo
was performing strenuous activities prior to his death.17 The CA, thus, disposed of the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DENIED. The
appealed Decision dated August 7, 2013 by the Employees' Compensation
Commission in ECC Case No. GM-19162-0705-13 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.18
Julieta filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in the Assailed Resolution. Hence,
the present recourse.

In assailing the findings of the CA, Julieta avers that: 1) there is a reasonable work connection
between Reynaldo's hypertension, cardiac arrest and abdominal pain, on the one hand, and the
pressures of his work, on the other;19 2) PD 626 is a social legislation, the purpose of which is to
provide meaningful protection to the working class,20 hence, doubts on compensability must be
resolved in favor of labor;21 and 3) Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on EC requires the
concurrence of only one of the conditions set forth and that paragraphs (a) and (b) of said conditions
were satisfied in the present case.22

Issue

Whether the CA erred in affirming the ECC's denial of Julieta's claim for EC benefits in connection
with the death of her late husband Reynaldo.

Ruling
There is merit in the petition.

Article 165 (1) of Title II, Book IV on Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund of the
Labor Code, as amended by Section 1, PD 626, as amended, defines "sickness" as "any illness
definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused
by employment, subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working
conditions."

This is reiterated in the Amended Rules on EC, which implements PD 626 and which requires that,
"for the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the
result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of [the] Rules with the conditions set
therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased
by the working conditions."23

In plainer terms, to be entitled to compensation, a claimant must show that the sickness is either: (1)
a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on EC under the
conditions Annex A sets forth; or (2) if not so listed, that the risk of contracting the disease is
increased by the working conditions.24

Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on EC lists cardiovascular disease as an "Occupational and Work-
Related Disease" subject to certain conditions, thus:
18. CARDIO-VASCULAR DISEASES. Any of the following conditions:
a. If the heart disease was known to have been present during
employment, there must be proof that an acute exacerbation was
clearly precipitated by the unusual strain by reasons of the nature
of his/her work.

b. The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of

sufficient severity and must be followed within 24 hours by the
clinical signs of a cardiac insult to constitute causal relationship.

c. If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before being

subjected to strain at work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac
impairment during the performance of his/her work and such
symptoms and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal
relationship subject to the following conditions:
1. If a person is a known hypertensive, it must be
proven that his hypertension was controlled and that he
was compliant with treatment.

2. If a person is not known to be hypertensive during his

employment, his previous health examinations must
show normal results in all of the following, but not
limited to: blood pressure, chest X-ray,
electrocardiogram (ECG)/treadmill exam, CBC and
urynalysis.
d. A history of substance abuse must be totally ruled out. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is well to recall that the first law on workmen's compensation, Act No. 3428, worked upon the
presumption of compensability which means that if the injury or disease arose out of and in the
course of employment, it was presumed that the claim for compensation fell within the provisions of
the law. PD 626 abandoned this presumption.25 Hence, for the sickness and resulting disability or
death to be compensable, the claimant has the burden of proof to show, by substantial evidence, that
the conditions for compensability is met.26

Hence, in the present case, the fact that cardiovascular disease is listed as an occupational disease
does not mean automatic compensability. Julieta must show, by substantial evidence, that any of the
conditions in item number 18 of the Amended Rules on EC was satisfied or that the risk of Reynaldo
in contracting his disease was increased by his working conditions.

Julieta hinges her claim on paragraphs (a) and (b) of item number 18 of the ECC Board Resolution.
She does not dispute that Reynaldo had a pre�-existing hypertension, having been diagnosed with
such in 2002. However, she claims that this illness, as well as the abdominal pain that Reynaldo
suffered, was aggravated by the strenuous conditions of his work as SOO III, which ultimately led to
his death.27

To support her claim, Julieta lays down the series of alleged strenuous work Reynaldo was subjected
to, quoting thus:
x x x Mr. Verzonilla comes (sic) from Manila as his death certificate would show. He
therefore had to travel in perhaps about two (2) hours or more including traffic, to get
to Tagaytay. Starting July 1, he started attending that day-long seminar. It cannot be
denied that seminars, especially one for earthquake assessment, would also involve
some physical activities. Then on the 4th day, Mr. Verzonilla and company went to at
least five (5) different places in Tagaytay for the use of the [Global Positioning
System (GPS)] system. Inclusive of travel, this activity lasted for at least two and a
half hours (2 1/2 hours). Thereafter, he continued on with attending the lectures for
that day until 7:30 p.m. [a]nd then this was followed by a program which lasted at
least until 10:00 [p.m.] Not long after, he suffered a cardiac arrest and at 1:25 a.m. of
July 5, 2012, he died. His death occurred in less than x x x 24 hours since his last
strenuous activities in that seminar.

And prior to this particular seminar, Mr. Verzonilla was also made to attend a
Seminar on Partnership Build for Disaster, Risk Reduction and Management Climate
Change also in Tagaytay City which lasted from June 18-20, 2012.28
The CA, in affirming the ECC decision denying the claim of Julieta, ruled out paragraph (c), item 18
of the ECC Board Resolution, thus:
Here, though it was shown that Reynaldo was diagnosed to be hypertensive, it also
appears that his last consultation with Dr. Alonso was on December 22, 2003. There
was no evidence adduced to show that his hypertension was controlled and that he
was compliant with the treatment given, if any.29
Moreover, the CA pronounced that "although cardiovascular disease is a listed occupational disease,
its compensability, nonetheless, requires compliance with all [the] conditions set forth in the
rules,"30 giving the impression that Julieta is bound to prove the concurrence of ALL of the
conditions in item number 18. This is mistaken. A simple reading of the law shows that a claimant is
required to prove merely the existence of "any" of the conditions mentioned in the subject item,
hence, only at least one thereof.

Indeed, it appears that the CA failed to appreciate whether Reynaldo's case falls under the paragraphs
of Item 18 other than paragraph (c) thereof. Of particular importance is paragraph (b) which speaks
of a situation wherein the strain of work of the employee which caused an attack was severe and was
followed within 24 hours by signs of a cardiac insult. To the Court's mind, if the CA considered the
foregoing, it would have not been so precipitate in dismissing Julieta's claim.

Julieta makes a valid point that from the evidence presented, substantial proof was shown that
Reynaldo's cardiac arrest falls under, at least, paragraph (b) of item 18. This merely requires that: 1)
the strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and 2) it must be
followed within 24 hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac insult. The series of strenuous activities
Reynaldo underwent prior to his heart attack is undisputed. Likewise, that the cardiac arrest and the
resulting death happened within 24 hours from such strain of work is clearly shown.

There is likewise substantial proof to support that Reynaldo's pre�-existing heart disease was
exacerbated by the stresses of his work. Part of Reynaldo's job was to conduct and attend trainings
and seminars and conduct hazard, vulnerability and risk assessments.31 His job required him to
render several hours of field work and, hence, spend stressful and long hours travelling. Barely two
weeks prior to his death, he attended a two-day out-of�-town seminar. He, in fact, died while in
Tagaytay City, on the last day of a five-day seminar. He spent his last living hours going to five
different places and enduring hours of travel time. Upon his return to the hotel, he had to conduct
another lecture and attend a program which ended at about 10:00 p.m. About three hours thereafter,
he suffered the cardiac arrest which took his life.32 Hence, up to his death, Reynaldo was
continuously exposed to stresses of his work which, at least, contributed to his death.

In arriving at this conclusion, the Court stresses that in determining the compensability of an illness,
it is not necessary that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development, or acceleration
of a claimant's illness to entitle him to compensation benefits.33It is enough that his employment
contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease.34 Moreover, the degree of
proof in establishing at least a small work-connection is merely substantial evidence. The Court has
pronounced in GSIS v. Capacite:35
x x x the case of GSIS v. Vicencio x x x particularly states:

It is well-settled that the degree of proof required under P.D. No. 626 is merely
substantial evidence, which means, such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. What the law requires is a
reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. It is enough that the
hypothesis on which the workman's claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the
contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for
inferring a work� connection. Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. It is
not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development
or acceleration of a claimant's illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for.
It is enough that his employment contributed, even if to a small degree, to the
development of the disease.36 (Emphasis supplied)
In sum, the Court is convinced that Julieta was able to adduce substantial evidence to support her
claims for compensation benefits in relation to her late husband's death.

On a final note, it is well to recall that the constitutional guarantee of social justice towards labor
demands a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability.37 This
holds true despite PD 626's abandonment of the presumption of compensability under the previous
Workmen's Compensation Act. The Court has ruled, thus:
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the presumption
of compensability and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmens
Compensation Act. Despite such abandonment, however, the present law has not
 ceased to be an employees' compensation law or a social legislation; hence, the
liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still prevails, and
the official agency charged by law to implement the constitutional guarantee of social
justice should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for
compensability, especially in light of the compassionate policy towards labor which
the 1987 Constitution vivifies and enhances.38 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Assailed Decision dated
October 28, 2016 and Resolution dated July 6, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
134846 are REVERSED. The respondent Employees' Compensation Commission is hereby ordered
to award death benefits due petitioner in relation to the death of Reynaldo I. Verzonilla. The award
of death benefits shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of extrajudicial
demand until finality of this Decision and the total amount thereof as of the finality of this Decision
shall earn 6% interest per annum from such date until full payment.

SO ORDERED.

J. Reyes, Jr., Lazaro-Javier, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.

Carpio, (Chairperson), J., on official leave.

3. G.R. No. 144449

G.R. No. 144449 March 23, 2006

FRANCISCO T. JIMENEZ, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION, SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM AND HACIENDA LUISITA, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Francisco T. Jimenez (petitioner) assailing
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 56865 dated February 21,
20001 which dismissed his petition for review, for his failure to attach pertinent pleadings, and the
Resolution dated August 7, 20002 which denied his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Francisco Jimenez worked as clerk in the Administration and Records Department of the
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (Hacienda) in Tarlac from September 5, 1959 to October 15, 1997. On
February 2, 1982, he was found to be suffering from "non-insulin diabetes mellitus" and on October
3, 1989, he was diagnosed with "cataract senile, mature OD." He underwent cataract extraction and
was confined at the Ramos General Hospital in Tarlac from January 29, 1995 to February 5, 1995.
He was also advised to have regular medical examinations for "diabetes mellitus, mature cataract,
and bullous keratopathy."3

In 1999, petitioner filed a claim for compensation benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 (P.D.
No. 626), before the Social Security System (SSS) which denied his claim on the ground that there
was no direct relationship between his illness and his work at the Hacienda.4 He appealed to the
Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) but the latter also denied his appeal stating that:

(Petitioner’s) occupation did not, by its nature, lead to the development of his diabetes mellitus and
its complication, cataract, considering that the etiology of diabetes mellitus points to factors not in
any manner related to his work. The absence of a causal link between his occupation and his ailment
gives us no other alternative but to deny the instant claim.5

On February 7, 2000, petitioner, with the aid of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), particularly
Attys. Arceli A. Rubin, Amelia C. Garchitorena and Eden B. Chavez, filed before the CA a petition
for review alleging that petitioner’s claim for compensation was denied by the SSS, as well as his
subsequent motion for reconsideration thereof; and that his appeal to the ECC was also denied, thus
his petition before the CA. 6

On February 21, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying Jimenez’s petition thus:

Upon examination of the present Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, this Court finds that the herein petition lacks some pertinent pleadings that would support
the allegations in his petition, such as but not limited to the following: the certified true copy of the
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration which he filed with the Social Security System (SSS); and
the medical records to prove that his alleged illness is work-related.

xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSED for
non-compliance with said rule.

SO ORDERED.7

Petitioner’s counsel, the PAO, through Atty. Chavez, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Leave
of Court and Compliance, explaining that she inadvertently assumed and stated in the petition before
the CA that Jimenez filed a motion for reconsideration of the SSS decision denying his claim; that
upon perusal of the records however, she found out that petitioner did not file a motion for
reconsideration and instead immediately appealed to the ECC. Atty. Chavez begged indulgence from
the CA and attached the medical records of petitioner.8

On August 7, 2000, the CA denied the motion, as follows:

xxx

We find the Motion for Reconsideration to be frivolous and malicious, considering that the
petitioner’s counsel tried to deceive this Court for the decision of public respondent ECC clearly
states that:

"In the early part of 1999, appellant filed with the respondent System a claim for income benefits
under P.D. No. 626, as amended, but was disapproved. According to the System, there is no direct
relationship of his job to his illness, hence, it is not work-related. He then requested
reconsideration but was likewise disapproved for similar reason prompting him to appeal the case to
this Commission."
xxx

If it is true that petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration before the SSS, as certified by a
certain Mr. JONATHAN GO CUNETA, a Stenographer I, from the ECC, how could the aforesaid
decision mention such a motion? "Factual findings of administrative agencies are generally held to
be binding and even final so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record of the
case." Besides, what is the authority of Mr. Cuneta to issue the said certification?

Hence, the Motion is denied.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Petitioner is hereby DENIED, and the
Motion and Manifestation filed by the OSG is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.9

Petitioner now comes before this Court, again through the PAO, except that Atty. Chavez is replaced
by Atty. Ralph P. Tua, raising the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO ATTACH TO THE PETITION A

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND
HIS MEDICAL RECORDS IS A GROUND FOR THE OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF THE
CASE.10

Petitioner alleges that upon receiving the CA February 21, 2000 Resolution, which denied his
petition outright for non-compliance with Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, his
former counsel filed a motion for reconsideration attaching therewith pertinent documents and a
certified true copy of the SSS’ Resolution together with an explanation why the annexes required
were not attached to the petition for review when first filed; that the CA rejected petitioner’s plea to
have the case decided on the merits; that the dismissal of the petition on the ground of technicality is
unwarranted since this Court frowns upon dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds; that the
rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense since it is designed to
help secure and not override substantial justice; that what should guide judicial action is the principle
that a party litigant must be given fullest opportunity to establish the merit of his case rather than for
him to lose liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities; and that in the interest of justice,
petitioner who is now totally blind by reason of a work-related illness, should be afforded his right to
prove his case.11

On October 16, 2000, the Court denied the petition for lack of proof of service pursuant to Sec. 5(d),
Rule 56 and Sec. 13, Rule 13.12

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Compliance dated November 10, 2000, which this
Court granted through its Resolution dated December 4, 2000, reinstating the petition and requiring
respondents to comment thereon.13

Upon separate manifestations and motions of the OSG,14 ECC,15 and the Hacienda16 stating that the
only party which should file its comment in this case is the SSS, pursuant to Sec. 4, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the Court in its Resolutions dated March 7, 2001,17 October 1, 2001,18 and February
6, 2002,19 dispensed with their comments.
In its Comment and/or Opposition to the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated February 1, 2001,
the SSS averred that: the petition has no basis in fact and in law; petitioner should adhere to the strict
procedural requirements under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as non-compliance thereof would
defeat the purpose of the law; strict compliance

with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless delay and for the orderly and
expeditious dispatch of judicial business; and good faith cannot substitute strict compliance.20

On May 9, 2003, petitioner filed a Reply alleging that no arguments or issues were raised by the SSS
against the petition itself as a perusal of the contents of said Comment reveals that what it was
arguing for was the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration dated November 10, 2000 which
was already granted by this Court in its Resolution dated December 4, 2000. Petitioner then
reiterated that based upon the provisions of P.D. No. 626 and the case of Flores v. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission (89 SCRA 89, March 14, 1979), the working conditions and his
numerous duties and responsibilities as Senior Clerk in the Administration and Records Department
of Hacienda increased the risk of contracting his ailment, diabetes mellitus. He then prayed that the
Court decide his claim based on the social justice precepts of P.D. No. 626 as amended and to take
liberal attitude in favor of employees like him.21

On May 25, 2005, the Court required the parties to file their respective memoranda.22

Petitioner in his Memorandum reiterated the arguments in his petition.23

SSS in its Memorandum, argued that: the CA acted in accordance with law in outrightly dismissing
the Petition for Review for lack of certified true copy of the Motion for Reconsideration which
petitioner filed with the SSS and the medical records to prove that his alleged illness is work-related;
Sec. 6, Rule 43 on which the CA based its resolution is mandatory and failure to comply or observe
the said rule warrants dismissal of the petition as provided in Sec. 7 thereof; the CA is empowered to
require the parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary in the interest of substantial
justice; the plaintiff could have easily cured the defect by attaching the needed documents in his
Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court and Compliance, however he only attached copies
of medical records and in lieu of the copy of the Motion for Reconsideration filed with the SSS, he
submitted a certification issued by a clerk of the ECC certifying that petitioner did not file such
motion; in Atillo v. Bombay (351 SCRA 362, February 7, 2001), the Court explained that the
necessity of attaching pertinent documents is to enable the CA to determine at the earliest possible
time the existence of prima facie merit in the petition; in this case, the insufficiency of the documents
combined with the unjustified refusal of petitioner to substantially comply with the attachment
requirement justified the dismissal of the petition.24

The Court agrees with petitioner that the CA erred in denying his petition for review on the ground
of failure to attach pertinent pleadings.

It is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities.25

After a closer examination of the records of the case, the Court finds that no motion for
reconsideration was actually filed before the SSS. Except for the statement of the ECC that petitioner
requested for a reconsideration in the SSS, no motion for reconsideration is found in the records.
Absent any allegation or showing that the records were tampered with, it is just and reasonable to
conclude that the ECC, just like petitioner’s counsel, also assumed that a reconsideration was asked
for, when in fact none was made.
In any case, petitioner submitted medical records with his motion for reconsideration, together with
an explanation that no resolution by the SSS on a motion for reconsideration could be produced,
which the CA should have considered as sufficient as the medical records so submitted can already
aid the court in evaluating whether petitioner’s claim for disability has merit.

As held in Mendoza v. David:26

Instead of denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the Court of Appeals should have ruled on the
merits of the case considering that Mendoza already submitted the pleadings and documents required
by the Court of Appeals. The rules of procedure are designed to ensure a fair, orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases. As much as possible, appeals should not be dismissed on a mere
technicality in order to afford the litigants the maximum opportunity for the adjudication of their
cases on the merits.27

While it is petitioner’s prayer that the CA resolutions be reversed and set aside and that the CA be
ordered to give due course to his petition,28 because of the lapse of time and in order to avoid further
delay, however, the Court will resolve the petition on the merits instead of remanding the case to the
CA.29

After evaluating the merits, the Court finds that petitioner’s illness, diabetes and its complications
cataract and bullous keratopathy, are not occupational diseases recognized by law, neither has
petitioner shown that the risk of contracting the same was increased by his working conditions.

To be entitled to disability benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Law,30 there must be loss or
impairment of a physical or mental function which resulted from an injury arising out of or in the
course of employment, or from any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by
the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting
the same is increased by working conditions.31

As clearly stated by Sec. 1 Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation:

SECTION I. Grounds --- (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of
the following conditions:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to
be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an
order for the employer.

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of
these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be
shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working
conditions.
 (c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting
disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules. (Emphasis supplied)

Since diabetes mellitus, senile and mature cataract, and bullous keratopathy, are not listed in the
Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees’ Compensation,
petitioner is required to present proof that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by his
working conditions. This petitioner failed to do as he merely alleged that his work as clerk in the
Administration and Records Department of the Hacienda increased his risk of contracting his
illnesses.32

It is his claim that when he started working at the Hacienda, he was in perfect health and was not
suffering from any illness. It was only in 1982 or 23 years after his employment as clerk in the
Administration and Records Department of the Hacienda that he was diagnosed with diabetes.
Having incurred his illness in the course of his employment, it is his theory that his diabetes mellitus
could be attributed to his working conditions.33 Petitioner cites Flores v. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission to support his position.

The Court is not swayed.

It is true that in the case of Flores v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission34 which is being
invoked by petitioner, diabetes mellitus was deemed compensable. In said case, the Court did not
give weight to the expert opinion that petitioner’s illness of diabetes mellitus is one inherent in the
individual and cannot be caused or aggravated by the nature of his employment, as the Court
reasoned that the opinion of doctors cannot prevail over the presumption established by law.35

Under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act No. 3428), on the basis of which the Flores case was
decided, the presumption is that if the injury or disease arose out of and in the course of employment,
the claim for compensation falls within the provisions of the law and the employee need not present
any proof of causation since it is the employer who should prove that the illness or injury did not
arise out of or in the course of employment.36

It must be emphasized, however, that said ruling may not be applied to the present case. As
thoroughly explained in Orate v. Court of Appeals37

The first law on workmen’s compensation in the Philippines is Act No. 3428, otherwise known as
the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which took effect on June 10, 1928. This Act works upon the
presumption of compensability which means that if the injury or disease arose out of and in the
course of employment, it is presumed that the claim for compensation falls within the provisions of
the law. Simply put, the employee need not present any proof of causation. It is the employer who
should prove that the illness or injury did not arise out of or in the course of employment.

On November 1, 1974, the Workmen’s Compensation Act was repealed by the Labor Code
(Presidential Decree No. 442). On December 27, 1974, Presidential Decree No. 626 (which took
effect on January 1, 1975) was issued. It extensively amended the provisions of Title II, Book IV of
the Labor Code on Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance Fund. The law as it now stands
requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – that the illness was caused by employment and the
risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. It discarded, among others, the
concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" and substituted a system based on
social security principles. The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies – the
Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System – under the Employees’
Compensation Commission. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer’s
obligation to pay workmen’s compensation and the employee’s right to receive reparation for work-
connected death or disability.

In Sarmiento v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, et al., we explained the nature of the new
employees’ compensation scheme and the State Insurance Fund, as follows –

The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on
the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation.
No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The
sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees’ Compensation Commission which
then determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or
not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration
is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.

On the other hand, the employer’s duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It
does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up
its own funds to meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously
documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen’s compensation. The
Commission administers and settles claims from a fund under its exclusive control. The employer
does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of
benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered
claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption
of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an
employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts
favoring the claimant, is now absent. . . .

In workmen’s compensation cases, the governing law is determined by the date when the claimant
contracted the disease. An injury or illness which intervened prior to January 1, 1975, the effectivity
date of P.D. No. 626, shall be governed by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
while those contracted on or after January 1, 1975 shall be governed by the Labor Code, as amended
by P.D. No. 626.38 x x x

In this case, petitioner was diagnosed with diabetes in 1982 and with cataract in 1989. Clearly,
therefore, petitioner’s case falls under the present law where the burden is on him, as claimant, to
prove that the risk of contracting his illnesses was increased by his working conditions.39 Petitioner
must prove, by substantial evidence, reasonable work-connection, if not direct causal relationship
between his ailment and his working conditions;40 and by substantial evidence, we mean, such
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.41 The
fact that he was employed with the Hacienda for many years and that he was employed thereat when
he was diagnosed with diabetes and its complications, cannot be considered as evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion that it was his working
conditions which caused his diabetes and its complications.

In a similar case, De Guia v. Employees’ Compensation Commission,42 where the claimant, who was
employed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue from 1956 to 1988 as storekeeper to Supervising
Revenue Enforcement Officer, sought compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 after suffering loss
of vision secondary to diabetes mellitus, the Court held:

Inasmuch as petitioner’s "diabetic retinopathy" and its underlying ailment, "diabetes mellitus," are
not listed in the Table of Occupational Diseases embodied in Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees’
Compensation, petitioner is required to prove a positive proposition, which is, that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by working conditions. x x x That burden of proof, petitioner has
failed to discharge.

Petitioner’s "diabetic retinopathy" is a complication linked with his diabetic condition, from which
he was suffering for twenty-five (25) years. The very medical terminology emphasizes that
complication. In other words, petitioner’s eye condition was not contracted by reason of his
employment but came about as a complication of an underlying disease. Neither can it be said,
therefore, that the risk of contracting the eye ailment was increased by his working conditions for
irrespective of those conditions, the complication could have set in.

The underlying ailment, "diabetes mellitus" is neither work-connected. It is a metabolic and a

familial disease to which one is pre-disposed by reason of heredity, obesity "or" old age. While
petitioner states that no one in his family is suffering from the illness, genetic susceptibility is a
factor that stretches from generation to generation. And even assuming that petitioner has
satisfactorily proven that he is not predisposed to the disease due to heredity, he has not shown that
he is not predisposed thereto due to old age or obesity. Stated otherwise, irrespective of the type of
work that petitioner had been engaged in, he could have contracted diabetes.

We thus find no causal relation between petitioner’s basic illness, "diabetes mellitus" and its
complication "diabetic retinopathy" with his employment and working conditions nor can we say
that the nature of his work had increased the risk of his contracting either ailment.43

While the Court is saddened by the plight of petitioner, we are constrained to deny his claim for
compensation benefits absent proof establishing causal relationship between his illnesses and his
occupation or the risk of contracting his illnesses was increased by his working conditions. Indeed,
awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations and presumptions as the claimant must prove a
positive proposition.44

Again, as well explained in Orate v. Court of Appeals45

Much as we commiserate with (petitioner), our sympathy cannot justify an award not authorized by
law. It is well to remember that if diseases not intended by the law to be compensated are
inadvertently or recklessly included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered.
Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by law ignores the need to show a greater
concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families look to for
compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and deaths occur. This stems from the
development in the law that no longer is the poor employee still arrayed against the might and power
of his rich corporate employer, hence the necessity of affording all kinds of favorable presumptions
to the employee. This reasoning is no longer good policy. It is now the trust fund and not the
employer which suffers if benefits are paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law.46

One last point. Petitioner’s counsel failed to state accurate narrations in their pleadings. Not only did
counsel erroneously state that a motion for reconsideration was filed with the SSS in their petition
before the CA when there was actually none, the Petition and Memorandum filed with this Court
also stated that a resolution issued by the SSS was attached to the motion for reconsideration filed
with the CA when no such resolution was attached.

Much confusion was caused by the erroneous statements of counsel of petitioner, and this Court
cannot just gloss over such mistakes. Petitioner’s counsel is therefore admonished to adhere closely
and faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rules
10.01 and 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that:

Rule 10.01. --- A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 --- A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly
cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact
which has not been proved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated February
21, 2000 and August 7, 2000 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. However, petitioner’s claim for
compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

4. G.R. No. L-55233

[G.R. No. L-55233. November 29, 1988.]

CRISPULO GAROL, Petitioner, v. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION and

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Health), Respondents.

Florando Umali for Petitioner.

The Solicitor General for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION; SICKNESS;

DEFINED. — Article 167 (1) of the Labor Code, as amended, defines "sickness" for purposes of the
Code’s Title on "Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance Fund" in the following manner:"
‘Sickness’ means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission,
or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the
same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is empowered to
determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be considered
compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. ID.; ID.; ID. RULE FOR COMPENSABILITY THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — Under Rule III,
Section 1 (b) and (c) of the Amended Rules and Regulations on Employees’ Compensation, in order
that an illness and the resulting death may be compensable, the employee’s illness must be among
those listed in Annex "A" of the above Amended Rules or, alternatively, the claimant is able to prove
that the risk of contracting such illness was increased by the conditions of the employment of the
deceased employee. In the instant case, as aforestated, petitioner’s wife died of cirrhosis of the liver.
It is not disputed that cirrhosis of the liver is not listed in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules.
Petitioner’s claim, therefore, may be granted only upon a showing that the conditions of employment
of petitioner’s wife increased the risk of contracting cirrhosis of the liver. Petitioner claims, firstly,
that his wife contracted liver cirrhosis during her employment by the Ministry of Health and that
while so employed, she succumbed to that illness. This is not disputed by respondents. Petitioner
suggests that the fact that Emeteria Garol contracted liver cirrhosis during employment indicated
"presumptively, if not conclusively, that the said illness was directly caused by her employment." As
has been pointed out by this Court, however, the presumption of compensability (in effect a
presumption of work-relatedness) under the old Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act No. 3428, as
amended) was discarded in the Labor Code. This Code established a scheme of compensation which,
among other things, placed upon the employee the burden of proving a relationship of causation (or
heightened risk) between the conditions of employment and the illness for which compensation is
sought. Thus, the simple fact that the deceased Emeteria Garol first manifested symptoms of
cirrhosis of the liver during employment, does not give rise to any presumption that such
employment, or the conditions thereof, caused or increased the risk of contracting such ailment.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RE-LOCATING THE BURDEN OF PROOF OF THE WORK-RELATED
CHARACTER OF A PARTICULAR ILLNESS; EXPLAINED. — In De Jesus v. Employees’
Compensation Commission, [142 SCRA 92 (1986)] the Court speaking through Mr. Justice
Gutierrez explained at some length the structural assumptions underlying the relocating of the burden
of proving the work-related character of a particular illness: "In this case, however, there is no
dispute that the governing law is the New Labor Code, which according to settled jurisprudence
(Sulit v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483; Armena v. Employees’
Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851; Felipe U. Erese v. Employees’ Compensation
Commission, GSIS, Metro Manila, G.R. L-45662, August 20, 1985), discarded the aforesaid
concepts to ‘restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer’s obligation to pay workmen’s
compensation and the employee’s rights to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.’
The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on
the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation.
No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The
sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees’ Compensation Commission which
then determines on the basis of the employee’s supporting papers and medical evidence whether or
not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration
is low. The amount of death benefits has also then doubled. On the other hand, the employer’s duty
is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies
to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these
contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims. The
new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen’s compensation. The
Commission administers and settles claims from a fund under its exclusive control. The employer
does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of
benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered
claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits. Since there is no
employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability
and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one
employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant,
is now absent. The Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund was established after
actuarial studies and on the basis of the new provisions of the new law. I commiserate with the
claimant but compassion should be for all beneficiaries and not specific claimants. If we endanger
the stability and liquidity of the Fund through orders compelling payment of benefits where the law
never intended such benefits to be paid, we are not compassionate. We endanger the scheme."cralaw
virtua1aw library

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CLAIMANT MUST ADDUCED SUFFICIENT CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THEREOF. — Petitioner also argues that the work of a public health midwife was both
physically exhausting and emotionally taxing; that Emeteria Garol was subject to the call of duty at
any time of day or night; that she was often aroused from sleep to go out in all kinds of weather to
attend to women about to give birth; and that she was exposed to diverse kinds of microorganisms
while attending to such women. Petitioner further argues that the position of a midwife commanded
only a meager salary, barely of subsistence level, such that malnutrition was an inevitable result.
Petitioner invokes a passage in the decision of the respondent ECC to the effect that "malnutrition is
believed to be a predisposing factor if not [a] primary etiologic factor [of cirrhosis of the liver]." We
do not believe that petitioner has discharged the burden of proof which the Labor Code has placed
upon him. He has not submitted any support for his above allegations and although the strict rules on
evidence are not applicable in claims for Workmen’s Compensation, the basic rule that mere
allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded. Physical hardwork, occasional or periodic exposure
to sun and rain, emotional and physical privations accompanying modest salaries are conditions
shared by the great majority of public employees, indeed of the bulk of the population of the country.
None of the general conditions of Emeteria’s employment asserted by the petitioner (and we assume
the truth of these assertions for present purposes) has been shown to bear any specific relation to
cirrhosis of the liver or to the risk of contracting cirrhosis of the liver. It thus appears clear that
petitioner has not adduced sufficient credible evidence showing that the conditions of employment of
the deceased Emeteria Garol had substantially increased the risk of her contracting cirrhosis of the
liver. Upon the other hand, the decision of the ECC points out that there is evidence of Emeteria
Garol’s having been an "alcoholic" (which evidence, per the record, has not been controverted by
petitioner) and that alcoholism plays a "major role in the development of the cirrhosis of the liver."
These circumstances give rise to the inference that decedent’s "alcoholism" was at least a
contributory factor in her ailment.

DECISION

FELICIANO, J.:

In this Petition, Mr. Garol asks the Court to review a Decision of the Employee’s Compensation
Commission (ECC) affirming a Decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) which
had denied his claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as [Link]:cralaw:red

Petitioner’s wife, Emeteria Garol was for about twenty-nine (29) years employed as a midwife by the
Ministry (now Department) of Health. Her last assignment was in Bondoc Peninsula, San Narciso,
Quezon Province, a remote area and apparently beset by difficulties of transportation.

Sometime in October 1978, Emeteria Garol started to exhibit a "yellowish discoloration of the sclera
[eyes]." 1 On 1 January 1979, she was admitted to the Andaman Maternity and Surgical Clinic in
Lucena City and there her illness was diagnosed as liver cirrhosis. Despite medication, her ailment
persisted. There was a noticeable enlargement of her abdomen, accompanied by jaundice and
anorexia. She was discharged from the Andaman Maternity and Surgical Clinic and transferred to the
UST Hospital in Manila. She died twelve (12) days after admission to the UST Hospital. The cause
of her death was stated as "hepatic failure due to liver cirrhosis." 2

Petitioner, as the surviving spouse of Emeteria, filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS, upon
the ground that his wife’s illness which culminated in her death was caused by the conditions of her
employment. The GSIS denied the claim, holding that her death was not attributable to the nature
and conditions of her employment. The GSIS stressed that cirrhosis of the liver is not an
occupational disease, the same not being characteristic of or peculiar to Emeteria Garol’s
employment as a midwife.

Petitioner appealed to respondent ECC which, as abovementioned, affirmed the decision of the GSIS
denying petitioner’s claim.

The sole issue raised in this Petition is whether or not the death of Emeteria Garol, caused by liver
cirrhosis, is legally compensable under P.D. No. 626, as amended.

We are compelled to resolve this issue in the negative.

The record shows that the earliest date of the decedent’s hospitalization and treatment for liver
cirrhosis was 1 January 1979. Dr. Potenciano A. Andaman, her physician, certified, however, that
her illness had started about three (3) months earlier. 3 The decedent’s illness, having supervened
after 1 January 1975, must be governed by the provisions of the Labor Code. 4

Article 167 (1) of the Labor Code, as amended, defines "sickness" for purposes of the Code’s Title
on "Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance Fund" in the following
manner:jgc:[Link]

"‘Sickness’ means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the
Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by working conditions. For this purpose, the Commission is
empowered to determine and approve occupational diseases and work-related illnesses that may be
considered compensable based on peculiar hazards of employment." (Emphasis supplied).

The above provision is clarified to some degree by Rule III, Section 1 (b) and (c) of the Amended
Rules and Regulations on Employees’ Compensation, as follows:jgc:[Link]

"RULE III. COMPENSABILITY

Section 1. Grounds. - . . .
x x x

(b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the
result of an occupational disease listed under Annex ‘A’ of these rules with the conditions set therein
satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the
working conditions.

(c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or
death shall be compensable under these Rules." (Emphasis supplied).
Under the above provisions, in order that an illness and the resulting death may be compensable, the
employee’s illness must be among those listed in Annex "A" of the above Amended Rules or,
alternatively, the claimant is able to prove that the risk of contracting such illness was increased by
the conditions of the employment of the deceased employee. In the instant case, as aforestated,
petitioner’s wife died of cirrhosis of the liver. It is not disputed that cirrhosis of the liver is not listed
in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules. Petitioner’s claim, therefore, may be granted only upon a
showing that the conditions of employment of petitioner’s wife increased the risk of contracting
cirrhosis of the liver.

Petitioner claims, firstly, that his wife contracted liver cirrhosis during her employment by the
Ministry of Health and that while so employed, she succumbed to that illness. This is not disputed by
respondents. Petitioner suggests that the fact that Emeteria Garol contracted liver cirrhosis during
employment indicated "presumptively, if not conclusively, that the said illness was directly caused
by her employment." 5 As has been pointed out by this Court, however, the presumption of
compensability (in effect a presumption of work-relatedness) 6 under the old Workmen’s
Compensation Act (Act No. 3428, as amended) was discarded in the Labor Code. This Code
established a scheme of compensation which, among other things, placed upon the employee the
burden of proving a relationship of causation (or heightened risk) between the conditions of
employment and the illness for which compensation is sought. 7 Thus, the simple fact that the
deceased Emeteria Garol first manifested symptoms of cirrhosis of the liver during employment,
does not give rise to any presumption that such employment, or the conditions thereof, caused or
increased the risk of contracting such [Link] virtual lawlibrary

In De Jesus v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 8 the Court speaking through Mr. Justice
Gutierrez explained at some length the structural assumptions underlying the relocating of the burden
of proving the work-related character of a particular illness:jgc:[Link]

"In this case, however, there is no dispute that the governing law is the New Labor Code, which
according to settled jurisprudence (Sulit v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483;
Armena v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851; Felipe U. Erese v. Employees’
Compensation Commission, GSIS, Metro Manila, G.R. L-45662, August 20, 1985), discarded the
aforesaid concepts to ‘restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer’s obligation to pay
workmen’s compensation and the employee’s rights to receive reparation for work-connected death
or disability.’

The new law establishes a state insurance fund built up by the contributions of employers based on
the salaries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation.
No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The
sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees’ Compensation Commission which
then determines on the basis of the employee’s supporting papers and medical evidence whether or
not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration
is low. The amount of death benefits has also then doubled.

On the other hand, the employer’s duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It
does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up
its own funds to meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously
documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen’s compensation. The
Commission administers and settles claims from a fund under its exclusive control. The employer
does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of
benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered
claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption
of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an
employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts
favoring the claimant, is now absent.

The Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund was established after actuarial studies and
on the basis of the new provisions of the new law. I commiserate with the claimant but compassion
should be for all beneficiaries and not specific claimants. If we endanger the stability and liquidity of
the Fund through orders compelling payment of benefits where the law never intended such benefits
to be paid, we are not compassionate. We endanger the scheme." 9

Petitioner also argues that the work of a public health midwife was both physically exhausting and
emotionally taxing; that Emeteria Garol was subject to the call of duty at any time of day or night;
that she was often aroused from sleep to go out in all kinds of weather to attend to women about to
give birth; and that she was exposed to diverse kinds of microorganisms while attending to such
women. Petitioner further argues that the position of a midwife commanded only a meager salary,
barely of subsistence level, such that malnutrition was an inevitable result. Petitioner invokes a
passage in the decision of the respondent ECC to the effect that "malnutrition is believed to be a
predisposing factor if not [a] primary etiologic factor [of cirrhosis of the liver]." 10

We do not believe that petitioner has discharged the burden of proof which the Labor Code has
placed upon him. He has not submitted any support for his above allegations and although the strict
rules on evidence are not applicable in claims for Workmen’s Compensation, the basic rule that mere
allegation is not evidence cannot be disregarded. 11 Physical hardwork, occasional or periodic
exposure to sun and rain, emotional and physical privations accompanying modest salaries are
conditions shared by the great majority of public employees, indeed of the bulk of the population of
the country. None of the general conditions of Emeteria’s employment asserted by the petitioner (and
we assume the truth of these assertions for present purposes) has been shown to bear any specific
relation to cirrhosis of the liver or to the risk of contracting cirrhosis of the [Link]

In its decision dated 4 September 1980, respondent ECC said, among other things:

"Basing its findings on generally accepted medical principles, the System, thru its Medical and
Underwriting Group, pointed out that ‘Cirrhosis of the liver is any diffuse fibrosis that destroys the
normal architecture of the liver. The most common type is Laennec’s or alcoholic cirrhosis which is
the consequence of a specific type of malnutrition usually related to chronic alcoholism and/or faulty
dietary habits. It is generally believed that alcohol reduces food intake and thus, leads to a deficiency
of lipotrophic substances that affect the lipid content of the liver. As a result, the liver becomes fatty
and ultimately undergoes fibrosis.’" (Emphasis supplied).

The Decision of the ECC continued —

"Medical evaluation revealed that liver cirrhosis is a chronic disease characterized by increased
connective tissue that spreads from the portal spaces, distorting liver architecture and impairing liver
functions. Portal cirrhosis occurs chiefly in males in late middle life. Malnutrition is believed to be a
predisposing factor if not a primary etiologic factor. The role of alcohol is not clearly established.
Alcohol probably exerts a direct toxic effect on the liver, and also increases malnutrition by
providing calories without essential nutrients. Cirrhosis has been produced in animals by diets low in
protein and specifically low in choline. The addition of choline to these diets prevents cirrhosis.
Chronic poisoning with carbon tetrachloride or phosphorus produces changes similar to those from
portal cirrhosis. Hepatic insufficiency and hyperproteinemia is an end result of liver cirrhosis.
(Reference: Lyght, C.E.: The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy; M.S.D.; M.J.; 11th edition,
pp. 928)

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the predisposing factors responsible for the development
of the fatal ailment are manifestly not inherent in or peculiar to the deceased’s employment. Hence, it
is without basis to trace the disease to the employment itself. We have also scrutinized the record and
we find no evidence whatsoever that could suggest, much less substantively provide, that the
deceased’s employment increased the risk of contracting the fatal ailment. Dr. Luis Mayo Lao of the
UST Hospital certified that the deceased had a past history of being an ‘alcoholic,’ and gives no
specific answer as to whether the illness was directly caused by the decedent’s duties. (See Attending
Physician’s Certification, Part III, GSIS Form). Since medical evaluation earlier revealed that
alcoholism plays a major role in the development of cirrhosis of the liver, we can only conclude that
the decedent’s alcoholism was the decisive cause of her ailment which led to death . . ." 12
(Emphasis supplied)

It thus appears clear that petitioner has not adduced sufficient credible evidence showing that the
conditions of employment of the deceased Emeteria Garol had substantially increased the risk of her
contracting cirrhosis of the liver. Upon the other hand, the decision of the ECC points out that there
is evidence of Emeteria Garol’s having been an "alcoholic" (which evidence, per the record, has not
been controverted by petitioner) and that alcoholism plays a "major role in the development of the
cirrhosis of the liver." These circumstances give rise to the inference that decedent’s "alcoholism"
was at least a contributory factor in her ailment.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED and the Decision dated 4 September 1980 of
the Employees’ Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 1417 is hereby AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to [Link] : virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, J., on leave.

Paras, J., I dissent. The disease here is actually cancer whose cause is really unknown. Petitioner
cannot be blamed for failing to prove the impossible.