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POSREPHERST ar
Conti 95 ie American Pc
Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes
Anthony G. Greenwald
University of Washington
Mahzarin R. Banaji
Yale University
Social behavior is ordinarily weated as being under conscious (if not always thoughtful) contro.
However, considerable evidence now supports the view that social behavior often operates in an
{implicit or unconscious fashion. The identifying feature of implicit cognition i that past experience
influences judgment in a fashion not introspectively known by the acto. The present conclusion —
‘that attitudes, selestem, and stereotypes have important implicit modes of operation—~extends
‘bot the consruct validity and predictive usefulness ofthese major theoretical constructs of social
psychology. Methodological, this review calls for increased use of indirect measures—which are
imperative in studies of implicit cognition. The theorized ordinariness of implicit stereotyping is
consistent with recent findings of discrimination by people who explicitly disvow prejudice. The
finding that implicit cognitive effects are often reduced by focusing judges" attention on ther jude
rent task provides a basis for evaluating applications (suchas afirmative action) aimed at reducing
such unintended discrimination.
Long before they became central to other areas of psycholog-
ical theory, concepts of cognitive mediation dominated the anal-
ysis of social behavior. The constructs on which this article fo-
couses achieved early prominence in social psychological theory
with formulations that were partly (attitude) or entirely (stereo
type) cognitive. By the 1930s, Allport (1935) had declared atti-
tude to be social psychology’s “most distinctive and indispens-
able concept” (p. 798), Thurstone (1931; Thurstone & Chave,
1929) had developed quantitatively sophisticated methods for
attitude measurement, and Katz and Braly (1933, 1935) had
{introduced a method that is sil in use to investigate stereo-
types. Self-esteem, an attitudinal construct to which this article
gives Separate treatment because of its prominence in recent
‘Anthony G. Greenwald, Department of Psychology, University of
Washington: Mabzarin R Banaji, Department of Psychology. Yale
Universi
reparation of his report as wells conduct of some ofthe research
reported in it were supported by National Science Foundation Grants
‘DBC-9205890 and DBC-9120987 and by National Insitute of Mental
Health Grant MH-#1328, We thank Ieek Ajzen, John Bargh, R.
Bhaskar, Irene Blai, Robert Bornstein, Marilynn Brewer, Robert
Crowder, Leonard Doob, Russel Fazio, Klaus Fiedler, Deborrah
ble, Daniel Gilbert, Jack Glaser, Richard Hackman, Curtis Hardin,
Roger Hughes Jon Jost, Lary Jacoby, John Kihistrom, Mark Klinger,
David Myers, Delroy Pauthus, Richard Petty, Alex Rothman, Pete Sa-
lovey, Erie Schuh, Norbert Schwarz, Constantine Sedikides, Jerzy
Tresbinski, James Uleman, Wendi Walsh, Timothy Wilson, Joanne
‘Wood, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on a draft of this
article, and we thank Mitzi Johnson both for comments and for permis-
sion 1 use the data presented in Figure 1
“This article is dedicated to the memory of Tom Ostrom, a dear col
league who continues to have a profound influence on both of the
authors.
‘Correspondence concerning this article should be addresed to An-
thon G. Greenwald, Department of Psychology, NI2S, University of
‘Washington, Seattle, Washington 9819 Eletronic mail may besent 10
aaegu vashington ed
research, also has a long-established history (e.g, James, 1890;
see overview in Wylie, 1974, 1979),
TThrough much ofthe period since the 1930s, most social psy
cchologists have assumed that attitudes, and to a lesser extent
stereotypes, operate in a conscious mode. This widespread as-
sumption of conscious operation is most evident in the near.
universal practice of operationalizing attitudes (including self-
esteem) and stereotypes with direct (instructed self-report)
‘measures. The pervasiveness of direct measurement for atti-
tudes and stereotypes was documented by Greenwald (1990)
and by Banaji and Greenwald (1994) and is further reviewed
below: In contrast, this article describes an indirect, uncon-
scious, or implicit mode of operation for attitudes and
stereotypes."
Implicit Social Cognition: Introduction and Overview
Implicit social cognition is offered as a broad theoretical cat-
‘egory that integrates and reinterprets established research find-
‘ngs, guides searches for new empirical phenomena, prompts,
attention to presently underdeveloped research methods, and
suggests applications in various practical settings. This section
summarizes the goals ofthe review, starting from a definition of
implicit social cognition.
Definition
The signature of implicit cognition is that traces of past ex-
perience affect some performance, even though the influential
"The terms impliitexpict capture ase of overlapping distinctions
that are sometimes labeled as unaware-aware. unconscious-conscows
Iuitne-analytic, direct-indiect, procedural-delaratbe, an auto-
‘matic-contrlled. These dichotomies vary i the amount and nature of
implied theoretical interpretation. Thisartcl usesthe impliiiexplicit
pair because of that dichotomy's prominence in recent memory re
Search, coupled with the present intention to connect research on ati-
tudes, selfesteem, and stereotypes to memory research, IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION 3
earlier experience is not remembered in the usual sense—that
fs, itis unavailable to self-report or introspection (cf. Graf &
‘Schacter, 1985; Greenwald, 1990; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Ja-
‘cobs, Lindsay, & Toth, 1992; Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982;
Kihistrom, 1990; Roediger, Weldon, & Challis, 1989; Schacter,
1987), As an illustration of implicit cognition, consider a result
that is readily obtained with the task of generating complete
‘words in response to incomplete letter strings (word stems or
‘word fragments), The completion responses are more likely to
’be words from a list to which subjects were casually exposed
cearlier in the experiment than (o be equally likcly words that
‘were not presented. This effect of prior exposure occurs despite
subjects’ poor ability to recall or recognize words from the ear-
lier list, The word-completion task providesan indirect measure
of the effect of the prior experience, That is, even though the
subject is not instructed to retrieve the earlier presented mate-
rial and is presumably not trying to do so (and may well be
incapable of such retrieval), the subject's responses indicate a
residual effect. (For further reviews of indirect measurement in
memory research, sce Richardson-Klavehn & Bjork, 1988;
Roediger, 1990; Roediger & Blaxton, 1987; Tulving,& Schacter,
1990, For further discussion of direct and indirect measures in
‘other contexts that involve unconscious cognition, see Jacoby,
Lindsay, & Toth, 1992; Reingold & Merikle, 1988.)
‘A template for definitions of specific categories of implicit
‘cognition is: An implicit C is the introspectively unidentified (or
inaccurately identified) trace of past experience that mediates
R. In this template, Cis the label for a construct (such as atti-
tude), and R names the category of responses (such as object-
‘evaluative judgments) assumed to be influenced by that
construct.
To the extent that implicit cognition differs from self-repor-
table conscious or explicit) cognition, direct measures—that is,
‘measures that presume accurate introspection—are necessarily
‘inadequate for its study. Rather, investigations of implicit cog-
nition require indirect measures, which neither inform the sub-
{ect of what is being assessed nor request self-report concerning
it. The usual justification for indirect measures in social psy
chological research is the empirical one of minimizing reactiv-
ity of research situations to avoid demand characteristics (Orne,
1962) and sources of sef-presentational artifacts such as evalu-
ation apprehension (Rosenberg, 1969). When used in this way
to minimize reactivity, indirect measures are empirically desir-
able but not theoretically essential. By contrast in studying im-
plicit cognition, indirect measures are theoretically essential,
Theory: Relation to Other Treatments of Unconscious
Aspects of Social Cognition
Mach of the present review concerns unconscious cognitive
involvement in (and especially interference with) deliberate
judgments, This focus is till infrequent in social cognition lit-
‘erature, perhaps because the range of deliberate judgments that
are affected by unconscious cognition has only recently become
apparent, as a consequence of the explosion of interest in im
plicit memory. The existing work to which the present treat-
‘ment is closest is that of Jacoby and colleagues (cg, Jacoby &
Dallas, 1981; Jacoby, Toth, Lindsay, & Debner, 1992; Iacoby &
‘Witherspoon, 1982). Jacoby’s group has pioneered theory and
‘methods 10 identify implicit memory influences and has
effectively established an important role of unconscious cogni-
tion in deliberate judgments. The phenomena investigated by
Jacoby have often been ones in which the research subject mis-
‘akenly attributes case of perception on reexposure to a stimu-
Jus (perceptual fluency) to some characteristic of the stimulus
other than an unremembered recent encounter. The present
analysis of implicit social cognition uses the same basic misat
tribution principle, while focusing on the social domain to lo-
cate influential prior experiences and affected target judgments,
The following paragraphs review the various ways in which
unconscious cognition has already been integrated into social
psychological theory. After considering the three categories that
are focal to this review—attitudes, self-esteem, and stereo-
types—the focus shifts to some related topics.
‘Attitudes. Recent work has established that attitudes are ac-
tivated outside of conscious attention, by showing both that ac-
tivation occurs more rapidly than can be mediated by conscious.
activity (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Fazio, San-
>bonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) and that activation is initi-
ated by (subliminal) stimuli, the presence of which is unrepor-
table (Greenwald, Klinger, & Liu, 1989). The present analysis
of implicit attitudes extends work on automatic activation to
explain how the atitude activated by one object can be (mis)at-
tributed o another. An implicit attitude can be thought of as an
existing attitude projected onto a novel object. The interpreta-
tion of several important existing findings as implicit attitude
effects substantially expands the predictive and construct valid-
ity of social psychology's attitude construct. It also prompts the
‘empirical search for further members of the potentially large
‘lass of implicit attitude effects. In the domain of attitude
change, 1wo recent theorctical analyses (Chaiken, 1987; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986) have distinguished relatively thoughtful (cen-
tral or systematic) from relatively thoughtless (peripheral or
heuristic) roles of cognition in persuasion. The implicit pro-
cesses conceived in the present analysis are, in part, subsumed
by the notions of peripheral or heuristic processing, but also,
involve processes operating even further from the range of con-
scious thought than conceived in these analyses.
Self-esteem. The broad importance of self-esteem has been
recognized in many works over the past century (e.g., Allport,
1937; Cooley, 1902/1964; Epstein, 1973; James, 1890; Rogers,
1951; Rosenberg, 1979; Sherif & Cantril, 1947). Recent reviews,
have further expanded the case for importance of the self-ati-
tude (e.,, Beck, 1979; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Seligman,
1991; Steele, 1988; S. E, Taylor & Brown, 1988; Tesser, 1988).
In the course of examining available evidence for the implicit
‘operation of attitudes, evidence for implicit operation spect
cally ofthe attitude toward self was so prominent as to prompt
‘treatment of implicit self-esteem as.a distinct topic. The present
review of implicit self-esteem phenomena demonstrates the per-
‘vasiveness of projections ofthe self attitude onto other objects,
‘while also indicating the need for a class of measures that pres-
cently does not exist—measures of individual differences in im:
plicit selfesteem.
Stereotypes. Recent reviewers have very effectively docu-
‘mented the unconscious or automatic operation of stereotypes
(Banaji & Greenwald, in press, Bargh, 1994; Devine, 1989;
Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986; Fiske, 1989; Geis, 1993; Gilbert 6 ANTHONY G. GREENWALD AND MAHZARIN R, BANAJI
& Hixon, 1991; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Perdue & Gurt-
‘man, 1990), This article's use of the “implicit” label for stereo
types serves primarily to emphasize the connection of the exist-
ing body of social cognition research on stereotypes to recent
cognitive psychological research on implicit memory (ef. E. R.
Smith & Branscombe, 1988). The present treatment of stereo-
types also includes new findings that demonstrate this connec-
tion, using the methods of implicit memory research to reveal
‘implicit gender stereotypes.
Effortless or automatic social cognition. Single words have
been shown to result in effortless activation of attitudes (dis-
cussed in the next paragraph), and behavior describing sen
fences produce spontaneous trait inferences (Uleman, 1987:
Winter & Uleman, 1984). These and other effortless activation
effects often contribute importantly to, but are not synonymous
with, implicit social cognition. As will be seen below, an implicit
effect can occur when an actor (a) notices some aspect of an
Automatic effect caused by one stimulus and (b) mislabels it in
‘away that that influences the judgment of either that stimulus
‘oF some other stimulus. Discussions of effortless aspects of so-
cial cognition can be found in Bargh (1989), Brewer (1988), Ep-
stein (1991), Gilbert (1989), and Lewicki (1986)
Priming and context effects. In common with implicit so-
cial cognition, priming and context effects involve the effect of
prior events on the response to a current stimulus. However,
‘whereas priming and context function as designations for oper-
tionally defined categories of effects, implicit cognition desig-
nates a theory-defined category of effects. Some established
priming and context effects fall well within the boundaries of
implicit social cognition. Others should not be grouped with
implicit effects because of the subject's likely awareness of the
effect of prior experience on behavior or judgments. Because
the existing literatures on priming and context effects are very
large, analysis to sort implicit effects from other effects within
those literatures is beyond the scope of this article. Recent the-
‘retical discussions of priming and context effects can be found
in Higgins (1989), Schwarz (1990), Strack (1992), Martin and
Tesser (1992), and Petty and Wegener (1993)
Introspective access. Nisbett and Wilson (1977a) argued
persuasively that psychology’s reliance on verbal self-report
‘measures was unwarranted in the face of evidence showing the
poverty of introspective access to the causes of behavior. Wegner
and Vallacher (1977, 1981) also drew attention to influences on,
social behavior that escape introspective notice. They presented.
aan “implicit psychology.” drawing on and extending Bruner and,
Tagiuri’s (1954) concept of implicit personality theory. How-
ever, because their work preceded the past decade's wave of re-
search on implicit memory, Wegner and Vallacher did not share
the present articles focus on empirical studies that use indirect
‘measures. More recently, in several works, E. R, Smith (€..,
1984, 1990, 1994) has emphasized the importance to social
cognition of nonverbalized procedural knowledge. The present
‘work shares Smith's emphasis on examining the introspectively
inaccessible underpinnings of social cognition. In related work,
Smith (see E. R. Smith & Branscombe, 1988) has also noted the
relevance of implicit memory to social cognition. The research
reviewed here sheds new light on the nature of causes that are
hhidden from introspection and provides some methods for ob-
serving them. In this respect, research in social cognition now
appears to be taking an important further step along the path
that was laid out by Nisbett and Wilson (1977.
Empirical Assessment
Falsifability. Ofany newly offered theoretical construct, it
should be asked: How does the new construct differ from exist-
ing ones (or is it only a new label for an existing construct)?
The preceding paragraphs show that implicit social cognition,
although strongly rooted in existing constructs, offers a theoret-
ical reorganization of phenomena that have previously been de-
scribed in other ways and, in some cases, not previously identi-
fied as having an unconscious component. The relations to prior
theorization are emphasized in this article by using established
construct terms—attitude and stereotype—as labels for two
major categories of implicit social cognition,
When a new construct indeed differs from existing ones, the
‘new construct should provide a basis for either (a) predicting
previously unobserved empirical phenomena or (b) guiding re=
search to show a gain in the efficiency with which existing phe-
‘nomena can be explained. Importantly, the construct should be
well enough linked to research operations that its predictions,
especially its predictions that differ from those afforded by ex.
isting constructs, can be disconfirmed.
This article's strategy is to identify parallels of method and
findings between the domains of social cognition and implicit,
‘memory. The ease with which such parallels are discovered is,
‘the main evidence for value of the implicit social cognition con-
structs. This convergence-sceking strategy provides little oppor-
tunity for falsification of the general thesis that social cognition,
‘operates in implicit fashion. Rather, results that appear not 10
fit the thesis can be set aside as possibly involving inappropriate
operationalizations. However, as parallels between the two do-
‘mains of phenomena are increasingly established, there should
be increased confidence in interpretations of research opera-
tions for social cognition constructs, and, consequently, results
that fail to fit with theory will increasingly call theory into
question.
Challenge to measurement method, The present account
supposes that individual differences in manifestations of im-
plicit cognitive effects should be predicted by individual differ
ences in the strength of theorized representations that underlie
those effects. Measurement of those individual differences is be-
yond the means of present assessment technology; conse-
‘quently, a large subset of the empirical implications ofthe pres-
ent analysis are currently untestable. The need for new mea:
surement methods and these methods’ relation to available
methods are discussed later inthis article
Application potential. The empirical phenomena of im-
plicit social cognition involve introspectively inaccessible
effects of current stimulus or prior experience variations on
Judgments and decisions. As will be shown, these effects often
result in subjects making judgments that they would regard as
rnonoptimal if made aware of the source of influence. Further-
more, these effects are likely to occur in situations that involve
‘economically and socially important decisions, such as hiring,
educational admissions, and personnel evaluations. Conse
quently, a strong test of the empirical value of the analysis of
{implicit social cognition will be its ability to generate applica- IMPLICIT SOCIAL COGNITION 7
tions that can minimize these unwanted intrusions on judg-
ment. This important application topic is considered briefly
near the end of this article.
Generalizability: I will be obvious that the great majority
of evidence reviewed in this article comes from experimental
studies done in late-20th-century North America. As a result,
it is very likely that some of the specific properties of implicit
attitudes, implicit self-esteem, and implicit stereotypes in-
cluded in this review are culture bound and time bound. At the
same time, there is no reason to believe that, as a general class
(of phenomena, implicit social cognition should be confined to,
modern North American culture, Furthermore, although the
present treatment focuses on just the three categories of implicit
attitudes, implicit self-esteem, and implicit stereotypes, implicit,
cognition is also expected to be involved broadly in other social
phenomena,
‘The next three sections consider phenomena of implicit so-
cial cognition in the categories represented by construct desi
‘nations of attitude, self-esteem, and stereotype. Following those.
‘comes a section that considers principles underlying potential
applications that seek to reduce unintended implicit cognitive
intrusions on judgment. Last, problems associated with mea-
surement of implicit social cognition are discussed before gen-
eral conclusions are sated.
Implicit Attitudes
Attitudes are favorable or unfavorable dispositions toward
social objects, such as people, places, and policies. Attempts to
establish the validity of the attitude construct have most often,
sought to demonstrate positive correlations between measured
attitudes and the favorable-unfavorable aspect of observed be-
havior toward their objects. The frequently weak correlations
“observed in these attempts define the predictive validity prob-
lem for attitudes (documented especially by Wicker, 1969; see
also Festinger, 1964, and LaPiere, 1934). A notable accomplish-
‘ment of modern research on attitudes has been the solution of
this predictive validity problem. That is, conditions under
which attitudes strongly correlate with behavior have now been
well identified (especially by Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fazio,
1986, 1990b; Fazio & Zana, 1981; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974;
Zanna & Fazio, 1982). In particular, this research has estab-
lished that attitudes have predictive validity in situations in
which they are strongly activated and/or when the actor clearly,
perceives a link between attitude and behavior. Myers (1990)
‘summarized these and related programs of research as showing,
that “our attitudes predict our actions . . «if, as we act, we are
‘conscious of our attitudes” (Myers, 1990, p. 40, emphasis
‘added), Similarly, in the description of attitude-behavior re-
lations in their recent treatise on the attitude construct, Eagly
and Chaiken (1993, pp. 208-211) referred to the importance of
attitudes “[coming] to mind” and the “perceived relevance” of
attitude to action,
‘Although the modern synthesis achieved by the Fishbein~Aj-
zen (1974) and Fazio-Zanna (1981) research programs is now
well established, itis dificult to avoid concluding that the atti-
tude construct lost scope in the process. For those who can re-
‘member it, there might be justifiable nostalgia for an era in
which Allport (1935) was able to proclaim that attitude was so-
cial psychology’s “most indispensable concept.” In an undis-
‘uised effort to restore this prominence, the present article
seeks to preserve the modern synthesis while asserting that its
opposite is also valid (cf. MeGuire’s [1973] Koan 7: “The op-
posite ofa great truth is also true”); that i, attitudes of which
the actor is not conscious at the moment of action (implicit at-
titudes) are also strongly predictive of behavior.
Ignored Consciousness in Conceptual Definitions
of Attitude
‘The following list gives several definitions that have been in-
fluential in guiding scholarly and empirical treatments of atti-
‘tudes, as indicated by their frequent citation in other works. Al-
though the list may appear dated (the most recent entry is from
1962), it nevertheless remains current. Recent works (c..,
Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fazio, 1986; McGuire, 1985; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1981; Zanna & Rempel, 1988) continue to draw on
them and remain within their boundaries.
‘Atitud i the affect for or aginst a psychological object. (Thur-
stone, 1931, p.261)
‘An attitude is a mental nd neural state of readines, organized
through experience, exerting a directive or dynamic influence
‘upon the individuals esponse to all objects and situations with
‘which itis related. (Allport, 1935, p. 810)
Aside is... an implicit, drive-producing response considered
‘Socalysigniicant in the individual's society (Do0b, 1947, p. 136)
Aan attitude is predisposition to experience, to be motivated by,
land to act toward, alas of objecsin a predictable manner (M.B.
‘Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956, p. 33)
[Attitudes] are predispositions to respond, but are distinguished
from other suc states of readiness in that they predispose toward
an evaluative response. (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957, p.
189)
[An attitudes] a disposition to react fivorably or unfavorably toa
cass of objets (Sarno, 1960, p. 261).
Attitudes {are} enduring systems of positive or negative evalua
tions, emotional feelings, and pro or cn action tendencies with
Tespect to socal objects. (Krech, Crutchfield, & Ballachey, 1962
‘The lack of mention of consciousness in this collection of at
titude definitions accurately reflects. long scholarly tradition of
ronconcern with the distinction between conscious and uncon-
scious operation of attitudes. At the Same time, nothing in this
scholarly tradition actively opposes either the possibility or the
importance of unconscious operation of attitudes.
‘Standing starkly in the above list as suggesting unconscious
operation is Doob’s (1947) definition, which labels attitude as,
‘an “implicit, drive-producing response." In spite of Doob’s as-
sociation with a behaviorist theory (Hull, 1943) that had no use
for conceptions of either conscious or unconscious cognition, it,
is clear that Doob did conceive attitude as operating uncon-
sciously (May & Doob, 1937, p. 13). na recent communication
to the present authors (October 27, 1992), Doob commented,
“before World War II we all were impressed by psychoanalysis,
inaddition to behaviorism,” suggesting that, even though it may
hhave gone unmentioned in many published treatments, the idea 8 ANTHONY G. GREENWALD AND MAHZARIN R, BANAII
that attitudes operated unconsciously was quite acceptable in
the 1940s nd earlier. That conclusion is supported also by sev-
eral passing references to the possibly unconscious nature of
attitudes in Allport’s (1935) review chapter
Implied Consciousness in Operational Definitions of
Attitude
‘The present authors conducted a census of studies published
in all issues of European Journal of Social Psychology, Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology; Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology, and Personality and Social Psychology Bul-
{erin for a single year (1989). The aim of this census was to com-
pare the levels of use of direct and indirect measures of attitudes
in published research literature. Studies that included attitude
_measures were categorized in terms of whether they measured
attitude directly or indirectly, Direct measures included self-re-
Port procedures such as multi-item Thurstone, Likert, o se
‘antic differential scales of the sort that are described in texts
‘on attitude measurement (e.g. A. L. Edwards, 1957; Fishbein,
1967), as well as more informal single-item and mult-item self
report procedures. Indirect measures are identifiable chiefly by
their lack of the defining feature of direct measures, that is, by
their not alerting the subject to the identity ofthe object of the
attitude being measured. Discussions and illustrations of indi-
rect measures can be found in Hammond (1948), Campbell
(1930), Jahoda, Deutsch, and Cook (1951), Sherif and Hovland
(1961, p.934f), Dawes and Smith (1985), Pratkanis 1988), and
Dovidio and Fazio (1992),
The authors’ 1989 census included not only studies that ob-
viously dealt with attiudes (as indicated by title or abstract),
‘but also ones that more incidentally included measures of eval-
uuation toward the self, others, or social objects, for example in
studies of person perception and in-group bias. Each of the 47
studies found to include an attitude measure was judged for
presence of both direct and indirect attitude measures. All 47
(100%) used at least one direct measure of attitude, and only 6
(13%) used some form of indirect measure. An important class
of attitudes discussed in this article is self-esteem, It is not nec-
essary 10 conduct a census of publications to assert with confi
dence that Self-esteem is generally assessed with direct measures,
(see Wslic, 1974, 1979). In summary, the observed high level of
reliance on direct measures of attitudes indicates a widespread
(even if not widely stated) assumption that atitudes operate pri-
‘marily in a conscious mode.
Definition of Implicit Attitude
Evidence concerning the strength of attitude-behavior re-
lations has generally been regarded as the primary evidence
bearing on predictive validity of the attitude construct. How-
ever, there are other categories of studies in which strong pre-
dictive effects that involve attitudes are routinely obtained. Ex-
amination of these now will indicate that some strong effects of
attitude can and do occur when the actor is not attentionally
focused on the attitude. These findings play a central role in
justifying the concept of implicit attitude.
“Implicit atnudes are imeospectively unidentified (or inaccurately
identified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable or un
favorable fecling, thought, or action toward social objects
Relation 10 stimulus-response theory: To those familiar
with behavior theory of 30-50 years ago, the debt of this def-
nition both to Doob’s (1947) analysis of atitude as an implicit
response and to subsequent mediationist stimulus-response
theories wll be obvious. The earliest mediationiststimulus-re-
sponse formulations (mature statements of which appear in
Hull, 1952; Spence, 1956) had proposed the existence of covert
stimulus-producing responses (called “fractional anticipatory
goal responses”) as a means of explaining findings achieved
within Tolman’s e-g., 1959) cognitive approach to learning the-
ory. Dollard and Miller (1950), Osgood (e... 1957), and Mo-
rer (1960) most fully adapted these mediationist principles 10
the analysis of human social behavior. Campbell’s (1963) trea-
tise on the attitude construct preserved some of the implicit,
‘mediationist character of the later behaviorist treatments, de-
