On Line CPP Review – Physical Security

Slide 1 Introduction
Before a facility can be protected, the professional security practitioner should
apply a logical process in evaluating the risk and applying countermeasures. The
process requires the development of a plan that starts with an analysis of the
needs for security and ends with the implementation of effective and applicable
solutions. The practitioner will need to understand the general concepts of
protection that can be used to mitigate the vulnerabilities identified.

Slide 2 Phases in the Development of a Security Plan

Like any business activity, a security program should be developed according to
a coherent plan consisting of four distinct phases:
 Vulnerability Assessment: The identification of assets, threats, risk, and
vulnerabilities as well as constraints such as operational issues, culture,
and cost.
 Security Program Design: The selection of countermeasures to mitigate
vulnerabilities.
 Implementation: Implementation of approved solutions.
 Maintenance: Ongoing process to ensuring effectiveness of solutions

Slide 3 The Security Survey

The basic instrument for determining security vulnerability. Most descriptions of
security surveys refer to checklists, audits or inventories of security conditions.
Process begins with a ‘‘needs assessment” to identify the people, things or
processes that are necessary to the continuation of the business.

Slide 4 The Security Survey (cont.)

The security survey is an on-site examination and analysis to:
 Determine existing security;
 Identify deficiencies;
 Establish the protection needed; and
 Recommend measures to enhance overall security.

Slide 5 Assessing Risk

The next step in establishing a physical security program is assessing the risk, or
identifying the potential threats that may affect the organization and the likelihood
or frequency rate of their occurrence. A basic precept of assets protection is that
an effective security plan or program must be based on a clear
understanding of the actual risks it faces. First understand the problem; then
consider solutions.
Slide 6 Defining the Problem
Involves an accurate assessment of three factors:
[Link] kinds of threats or risks affecting the assets to be safeguarded;
[Link] probability of those threats becoming actual loss events; and
[Link] effect on the assets or business if the loss occurs.
The first is called loss event profile, the second loss event probability or
frequency, and the third loss event criticality.

Slide 7 Loss Event Profile

Recognizing individual loss events that might occur is the first step in dealing with
asset vulnerability. It requires clear ideas about the kinds of loss events or risks
as well as about the conditions, circumstances, objects, activities and
relationships, which can produce the loss events. A security countermeasure
should be planned if the loss event has the following characteristics:

 The event will produce an actual loss, measurable in some standard

medium such as dollars; and
 The loss is not speculative in the sense that nonoccurrence of the
event would result in a gain.

Slide 8 Types of Risk

Two types of risk are:
 Dynamic Risks. Event, which may produce either a loss or a gain, is
often called a business or conventional risk. Example: Stock purchases,
gambling.
 Pure Risks. The kinds of events that are loss-only oriented. Example:
Crime or natural disaster.

Slide 9 Loss Event Probability or Frequency

Basic concept: The more ways a particular event can occur in given
circumstances, the greater the probability that it will occur.
Increased probability for a repeatable event means increased frequency.
For effective assessment of probability, as many as possible of those
circumstances that could produce the loss must be known and recognized.

Slide 10 Probability Factors

The conditions and sets of conditions that will worsen or increase asset exposure
to risk of loss can be divided into five major categories as follows:
 Physical environment, i.e. climate, location
 Social environment, i.e. unemployment, neighborhood types
 Political environment, i.e. government type, political attitudes
 Historical experience, i. e. crime index reports
 Criminal state-of-art, i.e. professional vs. amateur
Slide 11 Loss Event Criticality
Loss impact can be measured in a variety of ways. One is effect on employee
morale; another is effect on community relations. But the most important
measure overall is in dollars. Security and assets protection programs must be
cost justified. Cost justification means not spending more than the benefits
derived are worth. Costs of security losses are both direct and indirect. They
are measured in terms of lost assets and lost income. Frequently, a single loss
will result in both kinds of costs.

Slide 12 Criticality Ratings

When the cost data have been collected, a decision can be made as to the
proper criticality rating to be applied to the loss under consideration as follows:
 Fatal: The loss would result in total recapitalization or abandonment or
long-term discontinuance of the enterprise.
 Very Serious: The loss would require a major change in investment
policy and would have a major impact on the balance sheet assets.
 Moderately serious: The loss would have a noticeable impact on
earnings as reflected in the operating statement and would require
attention from the senior executive management.
 Relatively unimportant: Loss covered by normal contingency reserves.
 Seriousness unknown: Before priorities are established, this provisional
rating is to be replaced by a firm rating from one of the first four classes.

Slide 13 Developing Countermeasures

After all of the assessments have been completed, security objectives have been
developed, and the role of physical security in achieving those objectives
identified, the final step is to develop countermeasures. The cost of
countermeasures should relate to the level of risk. A comprehensive security
program will cover personnel issues and the protection of intellectual assets in
addition to the physical security of an organization.

Slide 14 Developing Countermeasures (cont.)

Physical security is a system of tangible countermeasures, designed to protect
the organization ’s physical and operational assets from identified threats. The
physical security component of a comprehensive security program is usually
comprised of:
 Policies and Procedures. Statements of security goals and the required
means of achieving them.
 Personnel. People to monitor, administer and implement the system.
 Barriers. Access control devices or structures.
 Equipment. Detection, alarm, communication and control systems. (This
element includes both hardware and software.)
 Records. Past and incident reports, access records, and transaction logs.
Slide 15 Physical Security Concepts
Most common concepts that are applied as part of a physical security program:
 Deter. Visual evidence of a comprehensive security program will induce
some perpetrators to look for other facilities where access would be less
risky.
 Detect and Annunciate. Security’s primary function is to prevent losses.
The first step is to detect unauthorized intrusion and inform security that a
penetration has occurred.
 Delay. Once an intrusion has been detected, the perpetrator must be
delayed for sufficient time to allow a response force to prevent a loss.
 Deny Access. Provide physical barriers to prevent access to assets at
risk.
 Apprehend. If possible the perpetrator should be apprehended in time to
prevent malfeasance or recovery of assets, and to deter future
perpetrators.

Slide 16 Security in Depth

The primary goal of a physical security program is to control access. The concept
of barriers has evolved to deal with this objective. Barriers are typically arranged
in concentric layers, with the level of security growing progressively higher as
one approaches the center. Each layer will delay an attacker as much as
possible. If properly planned, the accumulation of delay should either discourage
an attempted penetration or assist in controlling it. Therefore, physical controls
should be made an essential part of the facility layout and be integrated into the
overall plan to obtain maximum benefit from them. This is referred to as
‘‘protection in depth”.

Slide 17 Layers of Security

An outer protective layer can be established at any natural or man-made
barrier enclosing the facility or at the facility property line.
A middle layer is set up at the exterior of the structures.
Inner layers in the interior of the buildings.
Also referred to as the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd lines of defense

Slide 18 Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED)

Concept based on the belief that ‘‘...the physical environment can be
manipulated to produce behavioral effects that will reduce the incidence and fear
of crime.’’ CPTED contemplates barriers and takes into consideration natural
access control, natural surveillance and territorial reinforcement.

Slide 19 Protecting Continuing Operations

In addition to controlling access, a physical security program is designed to
prevent the interruption of operations. Interruptions can occur as a result of
natural catastrophes like hurricanes and floods, environmental disasters like
nuclear meltdown or toxic pollutant release, industrial accidents like fires or
explosions, and intentional acts of sabotage, vandalism or malicious mischief.
Slide 20 Personnel: The Principal Resource
The most valuable resource of any organization is its employees. And the
most sensitive aspect of security is striking a balance between providing
adequate security for those employees and ensuring that work progresses
smoothly. Too little security may cause personnel to feel vulnerable or to try to
take advantage of the organization. Too much security may become an
impediment to smooth functioning. The personal safety of employees is an
aspect of the overall security program —this requires ensuring that employees
are reasonably free from preventable security risks to life or person.

Slide 21 Barriers as Elements of Physical Security

Two general categories – natural and structural
Natural barriers are, simply, one that is not manmade. Rivers, creeks, woods,
cliffs or knolls are examples.
Structural barriers are those arranged in a definite pattern of organization to
control access. They include: berms, walls, fences, doors, and locks.
Two additional categories of barriers include:
Human barriers - The systematic use of people to limit access and control
movement. Includes police, security officers, receptionists.
Animal barriers: With their superior sensing capabilities, are used in
conjunction with personnel to search and locate but they can also be used to
control access and movement.

Slide 22 Compartmentation
Compartmentation is another term that describes the use of barriers to
segregate and physically protect valuable material or information. Besides
preventing physical penetration, barriers may be used to prevent visual access or
the introduction of clandestine listening devices. In this day and age, access to
the most vital corporate assets — information —does not even require gaining
access to a company. Web site intruders can now gain access to a company ’s
computer system from a site anywhere in the world.

Slide 23 Clear Zones

When barriers are installed outdoors, clear zones should be established on both
sides to provide an unobstructed view of the barrier and adjacent terrain. Clear
zones should be kept free of weeds, rubbish or other material capable of offering
concealment or assistance to an intruder attempting to breach the barrier. A
clear zone of 20 feet or more should separate a perimeter barrier from exterior
structures, parking areas and natural features. A clear zone of 50 feet or more
should separate a perimeter barrier from structures within the protected area,
except when a building wall constitutes part of a perimeter barrier.
Slide 24 Building Openings
Openings in buildings provide means of entrance and exit, access for utilities and
delivery, and permit use of natural illumination and ventilation. But the gaps in the
barriers provided by the building surfaces may constitute security hazards. As
building openings are designed to provide some type of access, potential
intruders can be expected to attempt to locate one that will allow them to gain
entry. Any openings less than 18 feet above the ground or 96 square inches or
larger invite penetration and must be addressed in any comprehensive security
plan.

Slide 25 The Fence as a Barrier

The material in most general use as a perimeter barrier is fencing. It can be low
cost, takes many forms and utilizes a variety of materials, including wire,
masonry, wood and metal in cast, extruded, expanded, rolled and other formed
shapes. Fence design characteristics are notably different depending upon
design objective. Fences will only delay, not permanently prevent an entry
attempt. All fencing must be supplemented or enhanced by other
countermeasures such as surveillance, alarms or patrol. Nevertheless, a fence
can be a valuable element in an integrated protection scheme.

The major contributing factor of such barriers is that they clearly mark the
perimeter of the property to be protected. It can not be over emphasized
that tests have clearly demonstrated that standard fencing can be
circumvented in minutes, and alone, provides no real deterrent.

Slide 26 Chain Link Fencing

Chain link is the most popular and durable, and the cheapest. It can be put in
place quickly, can be effective against vehicles, persons and animals if properly
installed, and has the advantage of allowing the area on either side of the fence
to remain visible from the other.

Slide 27 Chain Link Fence Installation

 Terminal posts are placed at the ends and corners and to support gates.
 Line posts should be spaced at equidistant intervals not to exceed 10 feet
[3.05 m] The depth of the post hole should be a minimum of 24 inches
(609.6 mm), plus an additional three inches (76.2 mm) for each 1 foot (305
mm) increase in fence height over 4 feet (1.22 mm).
 Fabric should be No.9 A.W.G. or heavier, and the mesh openings should
not be larger than two inches (50 mm).
Slide 28 The Top Guard
A top guard is an overhang of barbed wire, along the top of the fence, usually at
a 45-degree angle. Whether the barb arm of the top guard should face inward or
outward is dependent upon whether the threat is from individuals attempting to
enter of leave the fenced area. The top guard extended outward hampers the
attempt to circumvent the fence from the outside of the protected area. The top
guard extended inward makes it more difficult to exit the fenced area by climbing
over the fence. Three strands of barbed wire are generally used, spaced six
inches apart. Increases the vertical height of the total fence by one foot.

Slide 29 Barbed Wire Fencing

Barbed wire is the principal or auxiliary security enhancement on many types of
barriers. Fences, including gates, constructed entirely of barbed wire intended to
discourage human trespassing should not be less than seven feet in height, plus
a top guard. The strands should be tightly stretched and attached firmly to posts
spaced less than six feet apart. The vertical distance between strands should not
exceed six inches.

Slide 30 Barbed Wire Concertina

The coils are made of spring steel wire and may be used for top guards on
barriers, or may be utilized alone as fencing by laying them on the ground, one
coil placed on top of another until the fence is of the desired height. Because of
the coiled configuration, concertina does not require barb arms for support, but
can be attached directly to the top of a barrier with wire ties and clamps.
Temporary or tactical barriers can be laid very quickly using concertina.

Slide 31 Barbed Tape

Barbed tape and barbed tape concertina are utilized for the same applications as
barbed wire and concertina wire. Because barbed tape is wider and flatter than
barbed wire, it must be attached to posts and barb arms with wire ties or clamps.
In addition to use on the tops of fences, barbed tape concertina can be attached
vertically to the chain-link fabric with wire ties. It can also be installed horizontally
on the ground behind a fence or between fences in a double fence installation.
When used on the ground, it should be anchored with stakes every few feet to
prevent movement or lifting.
Slide 32 Expanded Metal
Expanded metal and welded wire fabric are less expensive metal available for
security barrier construction. It offers some general advantages as a security
barrier, including the following:
 Its presence discourages break-in attempts.
 It won’t unravel.
 It’s tough and extremely difficult to cut.
 It’s easy to fabricate and install.
 Suitable for both new construction and modifications of existing structures.
 Available in a variety of sizes, styles and weights.

Slide 33 Glazing Material

The term glazing refers to the installation of transparent or translucent glass or
plastic in construction. For security applications, glazing materials must be
evaluated for their resistivity to: 1) impact, 2) fire, 3) explosion and 4) other
hazards, which may threaten a facility.

Slide 34 Three Basic Types of Glass

There are varieties of flat glass products for construction, automotive and
industrial use that appear to be different in their finished form all of which
originate from three basic types of glass: sheet, plate and float. All three types
are manufactured in a variety of thicknesses to resist wind pressures and
breakage. By adding chemicals and through processing during manufacture,
these basic glass types can be changed to meet modern requirements for
comfort, security, safety and architectural needs.

Slide 35 Tempered Glass

Tempered glass is treated to resist breakage and can be utilized for both safety
and security purposes. Tempered glass is a logical choice for installation along
passageways, in entrance doors and adjacent panels.

Slide 36 Wired Glass

Wired glass may be utilized for both interior and exterior installations required by
fire and safety codes. It provides resistance to the impact of large objects, but
with the risk of injury from the shattered glass. In addition, this type of glass
generally has limited acceptability because of aesthetic reasons. It does not offer
penetration resistance to bullets or high-impact energy missiles.

Slide 37 Laminated Glass

Laminated glass is well suited for installation in street-level windows or displays,
doorways and other access areas where security is necessary. It is composed of
two sheets of ordinary glass bonded to a middle layer or layers of resilient plastic
material, typically PVB (polyvinylbutyral). Laminated glass is useful in areas
vulnerable to explosions because it is highly shatter resistant.
Slide 38 Laminated Security Glass
This type of glass has been designed to protect against the ‘‘smash and grab’’
attack. A criminal who encounters this glass and cannot make a quick
penetration will usually break off the attack of a typical burglary. This glass is
usually 5/16 inch thick. The interlayer is a special high-resistance plastic.

Slide 39 Plastic Glazing

Plastic glazing material can be divided into two general categories: acrylic and
polycarbonate. A sheet of acrylic material (Plexiglas) is less than half the weight
of glass. It is available in varying thicknesses and has much more impact
resistance than double-strength window glass. Polycarbonate sheets, like acrylic
sheets, weigh 50 to 60 percent less than glass Polycarbonate, has 300 times the
impact resistance of glass and 20 to 30 times the impact strength of acrylic.
This tough plastic material is used as one of the core materials in laminated
glass.

Slide 40 Bullet Resistive Glazing

Bullet-resisting (BR) glass is laminated and consists of multiple piles of glass,
polycarbonate and other plastic films to provide many levels of ballistic
resistance.

Slide 41 Security and Protective Lighting

From a security perspective, two major purposes of security lighting are:
 To create a psychological deterrent to intrusion and criminal activity, and
 To enable detection once a breach of security has occurred.

Slide 42 Lighting Definitions

Lumens: The quantity, or flow of light emitted by a lamp is measured in lumens.
For example, a typical household bulb rated at 100 watts may output about 1700
lumens.
Illuminance: The concentration of light over a particular area. Illuminance is
measured in lux, representing the number of lumens per square meter or foot-
candles (fc), the number of lumens per square foot. One foot-candle is equal to
10.76 lux (often approximated to a ratio of 1:10). Note: When evaluating the
amount of light needed by a particular CCTV camera (or the eye) to
perceive a scene, it is the amount of light shining over the area of the lens
iris (camera or eye), or its illuminance, that is critical.
Slide 43 Lighting Definitions (cont.)
Reflectance: When we see an object our eyes are sensing the light
reflected from that object. If there is no light reflected from the object, we do not
see it —unless as a silhouette in contrast to its background. If the object is
illuminated by other than white light we will see the object in colors that are not
true colors. The color of the surface also has an impact on reflectance; a light
surface, such as a parking lot paved in concrete, will have higher reflectance
than a dark surface (a parking lot paved in asphalt or black-top). The measure of
reflectance of an object is the ratio of the quantity of light (measured in
lumens) falling on it to the light being reflected from it, expressed as a
percentage.

Slide 44 Lighting Definitions (cont.)

Color Rendition Index (CRI): Ability of a lamp to faithfully reproduce the colors
seen in an object. Security personnel need the ability to accurately describe
color. It is an important aspect in the apprehension and prosecution of criminals
who are caught on CCTV displays and recordings. CRI is measured on a scale of
0 to 100. A CRI of 70 to 80 is considered good, above 80 is considered excellent,
and 100 percent is considered daylight.
Corrected Color Temperature (CCT): A measure of the warmth or coolness of
a light. CCT has a considerable impact on mood and ambiance of the
surroundings.

Slide 45 Lighting System

A lighting system consists of a number of components, all of which are important
to the effectiveness of a lighting application. Below is a list of the major
components and their function.
 Lamp (also known as a light bulb) is the manufactured light source that
includes the filament or an arc tube, its glass casing and its electrical
connectors. Types of lamps are incandescent, mercury vapor, etc., which
describe the type of technologies used to create the light.
 Luminaire (also known as fixture) is the complete lighting unit consisting
of the lamp, its holder and the reflectors and diffusers used to distribute
and focus the light.
 Mounting Hardware such as a wall bracket or a light pole is used to fix
the luminaire at the correct height and location.
 Electrical Power operates the lamp, ballasts and photocells. Some lamp
technologies are sensitive to reduced voltages, in particular the high
intensity discharge (HID) family of lamps (metal halide, mercury vapor and
high-pressure sodium).
Slide 46 Lamps
Incandescent lamps are commonly found at residences. They are the least
efficient and most expensive to operate, and have a short lifetime. Excellent color
rendition
Halogen and quartz halogen lamps are incandescent bulbs filled with halogen
gas and provide about 25% better efficiency and life than ordinary incandescent
bulbs.
Fluorescent lamps create twice the light and less than half the heat of an
incandescent bulb of equal wattage and cost 5-10 times as much. Do no provide
high levels of light output. Lifetime is 10,000-15,000 hours. They are not used
extensively outdoors, except for signs. Excellent color rendition.
Mercury vapor lamps also pass electricity through a gas. They provide good
color rendition but are heavy on the blue.
Metal halide lamps are also a gaseous type. Often used at sports stadiums
because they imitate daylight conditions and colors appear natural. These lamps
complement CCTV systems (excellent color rendition) but they are the most
expensive light to install and maintain.
High-pressure sodium lamps are gaseous and have a very long life and are
energy efficient. These lamps are often applied on street and parking lots, and in
fog conditions are designed to allow the eyes to see more detail at greater
distance. Provide poor color rendition, making things look yellow.
Low-pressure sodium lamps are gaseous and are even more efficient than
high-pressure sodium. These lamps are expensive to maintain. These lamps
make color unrecognizable and produce a yellow-gray color on objects

Slide 47 Starting and Re-strike

Some lamps require time to re-light if they are switched off intentionally or due to
either a full power failure or a brownout. The extended re-lighting time is typical
of high-intensity discharge (HID) types of lamps since they rely on an arc to
produce light. The lamp tube must cool sufficiently before the arc can be re-
struck. In addition, HID lamps (and to a much lesser extent fluorescent lamps)
take time on starting from cold to reach their designed light output levels. These
functional limitations of lamps are of concern to the security practitioner. Although
lamp switch-on times can be scheduled to allow for their start-up time, full or
partial power failure, however brief, can mean a loss of lighting for a considerable
period.
Slide 48 Security Lighting Applications
The security professional needs to consider lighting in a number of different
areas of the facility being secured. The following list provides a sample of such
areas together with lighting recommendations. A useful rule of thumb to use
when considering lighting levels is: for pedestrians or normal cameras, the
minimum level of reflected light for Detection is 0.5 fc, for Recognition 1.0 fc, and
for Identification 2.0 fc.4
Perimeter Fencing: Lighting, as well as physical barriers, act as a deterrent to
unauthorized intrusion. If perimeter intrusion detection systems are used, the
lighting also aids in the use of CCTV systems for alarm assessment and the
effectiveness of the response force to delay and/or apprehend the perpetrators.
Regulations specify 0.2fc of illumination at perimeter and in the clear area
between the two fences. Since the perimeter fence may border on the property of
neighbors, light trespass needs to be considered in the design solution.
Site Landscape & Perimeter Approaches: Roadways and pedestrian walkways
are lit for both safety and security reasons. Vertical lighting, shining onto the
horizontal walkway or roadway, is ideal to identity potholes or objects that may
cause tripping. However, when installing lights so that pedestrians can clearly
see another, or for the most effective use of CCTV cameras, some component of
the light must be horizontal so as to illuminate vertical surfaces. Site landscapes
are particularly difficult and expensive to light, especially if there are trees and
shrubs that provide cover to would-be intruders. Ground lighting
focused up into the trees and shrubs is most effective in deterring their use as
hiding places. Such lighting also provides a high contrast background to detect
movement. Typical lighting levels for walkways: 1-4 fc for walkways, 0.5-2 fc for
roadways, 10 fc for entrances and 2 fc for open yards.

Slide 49 Security Lighting Applications (cont.)

Building Facade: Where individual exterior objects cannot be adequately lit,
providing a high contrast will give good identification of shape and movement.
The floodlighting of a building facade achieves this goal. If the facade has good
reflectance, there will also be a measure of horizontal light for a viewer (person
or camera) located between the facade and the object to identify the object.
Typical lighting levels for security are 0.5-2 fc.
Parking Structures: These areas are difficult to light since there are few vertical
elements to reflect light or provide contrast to moving objects. In some
municipalities, building codes require a bright white horizontal stripe on walls, at
waist height, to improve contrast. The lack of ceiling clearance restricts the height
of luminaires and requires the fixtures to spread the light horizontally. This is
excellent for lighting vertical surfaces; however if CCTV cameras are used, the
luminaire design should be selected to reduce glare at the camera lens. A
horizontal illuminance level of 5 fc with a uniformity ratio of 4:1 provides an
adequate level of security.
Open Parking: The height of luminaires is less restricted in open than in covered
parking unless local codes and light trespass become factors. The higher light
sources tend to provide horizontal illumination. Recommended light levels range
from a minimum of 0.2 fc in low-activity general parking and pedestrian areas to
2 fc in high-activity vehicle areas. Cash collection and vehicular access control
areas should be maintained at a minimum of 5 fc.

Slide 50 Security Lighting Application (cont.)

Loading Docks: Nighttime lighting will depend on off-hours activity. To maintain
an adequate level of security for the exterior area without truck parking, 1 fc at
the building facade (roll-up doors, stairs, ramps, etc.) and 0.2 fc in open yards is
recommended. For nighttime shipping and receiving operations, the illuminance
should be increased to 5 fc. Interior dock areas, such as loading bays, should be
lit to 15 fc and unpacking and sorting areas to 20 fc. Packing and dispatch areas
are recommended at 30 fc.
Security Control &Monitoring Rooms: Most activities in this area are computer
based and should be illuminated to 30-50 fc with task areas, such as a console
desk, at 50 to 70 fc. Glare from computer and video monitoring screens can be a
problem. The positioning of luminaires and the angle of screens are critical in
minimizing glare. The type of screens used is also important: Flat screens and
ones with anti-glare coatings or covers will help to reduce or eliminate glare. If
screen monitoring, e.g., alarm and CCTV, is the predominant function, monitoring
staff may want to reduce the ambient light levels considerably to minimize glare
and increased the contrast of the screens. The security manager should discuss
the use of dimmers with the lighting designer.
Guard and Gate Houses: The area surrounding a gate or guardhouse should be
well lit, 2-5 fc, on the exterior at night. Task lighting on the interior should be high,
30 fc, during daytime operations, but should be reduced at night to below exterior
levels to permit good visibility of the surroundings and approaching pedestrian
and vehicular traffic.

Slide 51 Security Lighting & CCTV

Where CCTV cameras are used to augment security, there are some additional
considerations to be taken in the selection and application of lighting, including:
 Color Rendering Index for accurate reproduction and identification of
colors;
 Illuminance is critical because it relates to the amount of light needed by
a particular CCTV camera to perceive a scene is the amount of light
shining over the area of the lens;
 Reflectance of materials since this is what both the human eye and the
camera lens sees; and
 Directionality of the reflected lighting in the direction that the camera is
aimed.

Note that the high-and low-pressure sodium and mercury vapor light sources
have very low CRI values and should not be used in conjunction with color
camera applications or where color identification is critical. For example, under
low-pressure sodium light, a green shirt will have a blue hue.
Slide 52 Locking Concepts
The lock is the most widely used method of controlling physical access.
Locks are among the oldest of security devices. Locks can be divided into two
general classes:
 Those that operate on purely mechanical principles; and
 Those that are electrical and combine electrical energy with mechanical
operations and are commonly associated with automated access control
systems.

Slide 53 Mechanical Locks

A mechanical lock utilizes some barrier arrangement of physical parts to prevent
the opening of the bolt or latch. In such a lock the functional assemblies of
components are:
 The bolt or latch that holds the movable part (door, window, etc.) to the
immovable part (jamb, frame, etc.);
 The keeper or strike into which the bolt or latch fits. The keeper is not an
integral part of the lock mechanism but provides a secure housing for the
bolt when in a locked position;
 The tumbler array that constitutes the barrier or labyrinth that must be
passed to move the bolt; and
 The key or unlocking device, which is specifically designed to pass the
barrier and operate the bolt.

Slide 54 The Warded Lock

The mechanical lock longest in use and first developed is the warded lock. The
lock is exemplified by the open, see-through keyway. The greatest weaknesses
of this type of lock are its vulnerability to spring manipulation by
any key that is not stopped by the wards and corrosion due to weathering and
age. A well-planned, modern locking program does not include warded locks.

Slide 55 The Lever Lock

A significant lock improvement after the warded lock came in the 18th century.
The lever lock offers more security than the warded lock. The lever lock finds
continued application today in such varying situations as desk, cabinet
and locker installations, bank safe deposit boxes and U.S. mail boxes. Although
the lever lock is inherently susceptible to picking, it can be designed to provide a
high degree of lock security through resistance to picking.

Slide 56 The Pin Tumbler Lock

The most important development in the history of mechanical locks to date has
been the invention of the pin tumbler lock. The pin tumbler is probably the most
widely used lock in the United States for applications such as exterior and interior
building doors. A pin tumbler actually consists of at least three elements: 1) the
pin; 2) a driver or separate metal cylinder; and 3) a spring. The spring provides
tension against the driver, which in turn pushes against the pin, forcing it down
When a key is inserted into the keyway, each pin is raised so that the line at
which the pin and driver meet is brought exactly even with the edge of the plug.
When this is done for each pin tumbler, a shear line is created between the plug
and the shell and the plug is free to turn. The wafer tumbler lock
uses flat tumblers fashioned of metal or other material to bind the plug to the
shell.

Slide 57 Dial Type Combination Locks

Dial type combination locks, while not employing a key, resemble the lever
tumbler lock in many respects. The number of wheels or tumblers in a
combination lock determines the number of elements in the combination.
Most important in the use of combination locks are procedures for the selection
and maintenance of the numerical combination. Procedures should be in place
also for changing the combination, usually whenever a person who knows it is
terminated or no longer requires access, or if there has been some form of
compromise. In any event the code should be changed at least once every one
to two years.

Slide 58 Master Keying Mechanical Locks

The principle of master keying is that a single lock may be operated by more than
one key by designing various different keys to engage or work upon different
tumblers or different aspects of the same tumblers. Master keying is utilized to
provide a hierarchy of access to groups of locks, from access to only one lock
through access to increasingly larger groups of locks, and, finally, to access to all
locks in the population.

Slide 59 Master Keying Concerns

Three major security difficulties are presented by master keying and they must
be balanced against the alleged need for the master key convenience.
 First, effective master key accountability must be maintained. The loss,
compromise, or unauthorized use of such a key exposes all the locks in
that group
 Second, in any manipulation of the lock, additional positions or
possibilities are presented for surreptitious unlocking by the creation of
multiple shear lines or gate openings.
 Third, for cylinder locks the additional parts required in the lock core
create the need for additional maintenance.

Slide 60 Master Keying Caution

The use of a single grand Master combination for any
mechanical locking system is not a sound security
practice.
Slide 61 Security Vulnerabilities of Mechanical Locks
Mechanical locks are subject to a variety of attacks that can result in their failure
or compromise.
 Attack by Force: Force to separate the door from the jamb without a
direct attack on the lock. Force used to remove the lock from its housing
and expose the bolt to manual manipulation. Force used on pin tumbler
cylinders to snap the pin tumblers and turn the plug freely.
 Surreptitious Attack: Picking or manipulating the tumblers through the
keyway
 Attack by Impression Making and ‘‘Try ’’Keys: If a blank designed for
the particular keyway can be introduced into the lock before any bitting
cuts are made, it may be possible, by applying turning pressure, to make
faint marks on the key blank. “Try keys ’’or ‘‘jingle keys ’’ are key blanks
correctly milled to fit the particular keyway and contain random bitting.
Insertion in the keyway and combined turning/raking movements may
cause the lock to open.

Slide 62 Fail Safe & Fail Secure

Electrified locking mechanisms allow doors to be locked and unlocked by a
remote device. Before describing the different types of electrified locking
mechanisms, it is useful to define two important terms clearly —fail safe and fail
secure. These terms are usually applied in reference to fire/life safety codes and
relate to doors in the path of egress from an occupied space that are required to
be unlocked either at all times of occupancy or only during a detected fire
emergency. A fail safe locking mechanism is one that will unlock under any
failure condition. The failure mode most commonly considered is loss of power.
A fail secure lock is one that will remain locked when power is lost or an
other failure occurs.

Slide 63 Electric Deadbolt

The electric deadbolt is the oldest and simplest of all electrical locking devices. A
solenoid (electro-magnet) moves a deadbolt, typically mounted on a doorframe,
either into or out of a strike plate on a door. The mechanism can be either fail
safe, automatically unlocking on the removal of power, or fail secure, remaining
locked on the removal of power. The electric deadbolt is not normally
recommended for application to doors required to be unlocked automatically in
response to a fire alarm signal because the bolt may bind in the strike plate if
pressure is on the door when power is removed.

Slide 64 Electric Latch

Somewhat similar to an electric deadbolt is the electric latch it is also solenoid
activated, mounts on the doorframe and uses a strike plate in the door. Instead of
a deadbolt, a beveled latch is used. It has an advantage over the deadbolt
because the latch does not need to be withdrawn for the door to close since it is
pushed into the lock mechanism against spring pressure as it rides up and over
the strike plate.
Slide 65 Electric Strike
The electric strike operates as an adjunct to any standard mechanical lock. The
operating principle is simple: electrical energy is delivered to a solenoid that
either opens or closes a mechanical latch keeper or strike plate. (Note that the
electric strike is not a lock but operates with a lock to hold the door closed
or to permit it to be opened.) A typical application of the electric strike is to
control passage in one or both directions. The lockset handle is fixed (i.e., will not
turn) on the side(s) from which passage is controlled. The only means of access
becomes remote, unlocking the electric strike by a button or switch within the
secure space, or by an automated access control device, such as a card reader
or digital keypad.

Slide 66 Electric Lockset

The electric lockset is simply a regular mortise lockset that has been electrified to
control the ability to turn the handle. As the lock is contained within the door, the
door must be drilled to allow power wiring to be fed to the hinge side. The cabling
must then be fed either through or around the door hinge. This type of electric
lock is becoming increasingly popular for automated access control applications.

Slide 67 Electromagnetic Lock

The electromagnetic lock, also known simply as a magnetic lock, utilizes an
electromagnet and a metal armature or strike plate. When energized, the magnet
exerts an attractive force upon the armature and thus holds the door closed.
Magnetic locks are rated by the pounds of force required to separate the
armature or strike plate from the electromagnet. An adaptation of the
electromagnetic lock is called the shear lock .The electromagnet is
concealed in the header of the door frame and the armature is mounted in a
channel in the top of the door.

Slide 68 Designing Secure Locking Systems

Despite the sophistication of modern access control systems, such as card and
biometric readers authorizing access via computer software, the traditional
mechanical lock and key remain the most commonly used system for restricting
access to corporate or institutional facilities and assets. The justifications for this
choice include, low cost, simplicity of operation and reliability. However, all of
these benefits will be negated if the locking systems are not professionally
planned and administered.
Slide 69 The Lock Design Plan
Locking systems are coordinated arrays of mutually supportive and
complementary locking elements. They are based upon design plans that
consider:
 The need for different, concurrent levels of security control for locked
spaces;
 The likelihood that such levels will change with time;
 The probability that some (or many) users will require common access in
some spaces and exclusive access in others;
 The possibility that access devices (keys, cards or tokens) may be lost,
compromised or damaged; and
 The requirement that there be effective means for adapting the system to
planned, as well as unanticipated changes.

Slide 70 Lock System Planning Considerations

The following are common design or planning criteria and require systematic
study before either the locking hardware or the scheme is finally decided upon:
 Total number of locks.
 Major categories of sectors of the system.
 Security objectives.
 Size and turnover of population.
 Related or supportive security subsystems.
 Intelligence or information requirements.
 Criticality of asset exposure.

Slide 71 Locking Policy

As with all major security functions, the lock program should be based upon a
written policy. The locking policy should do the following things:
 Require a systematic approach to the use of locks for security purposes;
 Assign specific responsibility for the development of the lock program;
 Make all persons who will use or have access to keys, locks or access
devices, or combination information, responsible for compliance with the
program requirements.

Slide 72 Basic Access Control Objectives

Access control programs are instituted to:
 Permit or deny entry to or presence in a given place;
 Increase or reduce the rate or density of movement to, from, or within a
defined place;
 Protect persons, materials, or information against unauthorized
observation or removal; and
 Prevent injury to people or damage to material.
Slide 73 Authorized Access Control
There are three basic types of identification verification and access control:
 Guards —to make a personal recognition or inspect identification —such
as a badge — of the employee or visitor, and then formulate a judgment of
that person’s validity.
 Card reader systems —to compare the coded card with the computer
records for authorized personnel verification.
 Biometric readers —use of a person’s physical property —such as retinal
pattern, hand geometry or fingerprint —to gain entry.

Slide 74 Large Systems

The larger access control systems that include operator’s terminals, perform the
following functions:
 Admit or reject cards for entry;
 Alarm if an unauthorized entry or exit attempt is made;
 Alarm when penetration is made without using a card;
 Make a permanent transaction record; and
 Print real-time events and historical logs.

Slide 75 Performance Factors

The following performance requirements define what a modern card reader
system should embody:
 Validity: The system must establish the identity of the individual person.
 Reliability: The system must correctly identify an individual each time the
individual is presented. This proves the system is consistently valid.
 Ease of Use: System should be as simple and uncomplicated as
possible.
 Tamper-Resistant: The possibility of surreptitious substitution or
counterfeiting must be defeated if possible.
 Longevity: Once set up, the system should remain functional over
appreciable periods of time. This requirement applies both to identification
cards and card readers.

Slide 76 Coded Card Technology

Coded cards search the identification medium used for key information, encoded
in a way that is readable by the processor. The most popular card readers today
read magnetic coding, sometimes in combination with a PIN number from a
keypad. A summary description of the different types of technology will illuminate
their distinctive differences.
Slide 77 Types of Cards
 Magnetic Stripe Cards: By far, the most popular coded card in use. The
readers sense the magnetic energy present in, or absent from, a minute
field within a medium capable of receiving magnetic energy. Magnetic
tape is the most common example.
 Watermark Magnetics: Differs from magnetic stripe card in that it has
enhancements that make it extremely difficult to defeat. Cards cannot be
duplicated because the Watermark code number is different for every
card.
 Barium Ferrite: It positions magnetic fields throughout the card. Not in
wide use today, due in part to its vulnerability to sabotage.
 Wiegend: More secure than magnetic strip cards. Bits of ferro-magnetic
wire positioned on strips of plastic in specific patterns are embedded in the
cards. Not effected by magnetic fields.
 Proximity: Proximity readers are compatible for people who have
disabilities that prohibit them from being able to use an insertion or swipe
reader.

Slide 78 Types of Cards (cont.)

 Resonant Circuits: Access control functions are used for electronic
surveillance of merchandise and stock control.
 Radio Frequency Readers: Radio frequency (RF) readers are long-
range proximity readers. The most common applications are: electronic
article surveillance, push-button transmitter that locks/unlocks a car.
 Biometric: Devices take unique physical data about the person, convert
them to an electronic information format, and then compare critical
parameters of the viewed information with previously stored information.
 Hollerith: Often referred to as punch cards. A major security vulnerability
is it can be easily duplicated and an unauthorized or substitute device
produced. This can be solved by including other critical requirements in
the reading process.
 Smart Cards: Personal identification device. Contains an integrated
circuit that stores all the information needed to identify and permit access
in its chip memory.

Slide 79 Special Access Features and Applications

Anti-Passback: The following example is used to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the anti-passback feature: A large business complex has a high-value area,
such as a research laboratory. Employees authorized to enter the high-value
area must pass through a door that has an anti-passback feature in addition to
the normal card reading access control measures. Once inside the restricted
area, the card can be used only on other readers within the area, or to exit. When
using a card to exit, the anti-passback feature automatically returns the system to
the general facilities mode and immediately blocks further use inside the area,
unless the card is first used for re-entry. This prevents unauthorized personnel
from entering a restricted area if one of the cards were passed out.
Two Man Rule: To control entry, two employees with valid coded cards must use
their cards in sequence —within 45 seconds of each other —to unlock the door
for entry or exit.
Mantrap: A mantrap is used where a high degree of access control is required
and egress is low. It is typically a vestibule with card reader controlled doors on
both ends, so that when one door is open the other automatically locks.
Sally Port: A sally port is similar to a mantrap except it is large enough for a
truck to drive into. At military posts, they are built of heavy reinforced chain link
fencing or masonry. At a federal reserve bank, they are interior and are built to
withstand a bomb. There are two operational requirements for a sally port:
 It should provide a safe and isolated location to inspect the vehicle.
 It should provide a sheltered access to a nearby safe room in which the
driver is interviewed.

Slide 80 Safes
Safes can make an important contribution in any security program, but it does not
necessarily follow that it will properly protect everything that is stored in it. The
characteristics and limitations of various types of safes must be understood. A
safe designed for fire protection would not be effective in preventing a forced
entry. Materials used to dissipate heat may do little to resist the blow of a
hammer. A safe designed to protect money will give little protection against fire
because its thick, solid steel walls transfer heat rapidly to the interior. Paper will
be destroyed quickly by a fire in this type of container. Safes of the type included
in this discussion can generally be classed as portable. The Underwriters
Laboratories Inc. (U/L) standards require that a safe weighing less than 750
pounds be anchored.

Slide 81 Fire-Resistant Safes

There are three general types of safes designed for record protection.
 Fire-resistive safes and insulated record containers,
 Insulated filing devices, and
 Containers to protect magnetic media records.
All must pass three tests —fire endurance, explosion and impact. During the
fire endurance test, the inside temperature within the safe cannot exceed
350 ° F. One element in the construction of a record safe is the incorporation of
moisture into the insulation to help dissipate the heat developed during a fire.
During the impact test, a heated safe is dropped 30 feet to see if it can withstand
the force. Fire resistant safes may be found U/L labeled as to their protection
capabilities as follows:
 Class 350 - 4hours (Former U/L Class A)
 Class 350 - 2 hours (Former U/L Class B)
 Class 350 – 1 hour (Former U/L Class C)
Slide 82 Insulated Filing Devices
Insulated filing devices, designated Class 350-1hour (formerly Class D) and
Class 350-1/2 hour (formerly Class E) afford considerably less protection for
records than the three levels of fire-resistive containers already discussed. An
insulated filing device may be expected to give protection only against burnout in
fire-resistive buildings where the area in the vicinity of the container has a small
quantity of combustible material. Also, valuable records should not be stored in
this type of container on a floor that might collapse during a fire because if either
class of container should be dropped it might break open, allowing the contents
to be damaged or destroyed.

Slide 83 Electronic Data Processing (EDP) Record Protection

Electronic data storage media such as tapes and disks pose a new records
protection problem. Magnetic media begins to deteriorate at 150 °F or lower, and
at humidity levels of more than 80 percent. Consequently, a need was created
for specially insulated record storage equipment, which could withstand high
humidity levels as well as the extreme heat that might be expected at the time of
a fire. Early solutions for meeting this requirement consisted of what has been
described as ‘‘a safe within a safe’’, vis-à-vis, a sealed inner insulated repository
in which the magnetic media are stored, and an outer safe protected by a heavy
wall of insulation. This type of container has been designed to protect EDP
records against 125 °F and 150 °F temperatures and 80 percent humidity for 4,
3, 2, or 1 hour periods. Later models provide the same protection by themselves,
without utilizing the safe within a safe approach.

Slide 84 Burglary Resistive Safes

Burglary-resistive equipment will resist an attack by tools, torch, or explosives in
accordance with their construction specifications. Safes undergo severe testing
before receiving ratings from Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. The meanings of
the various label designations resulting from UL tests are described as follows:
 TL-15 or TL- 30 indicates that the container offers 15 or 30-minute
protection against an attack using common electrical and mechanical
tools.
 TRTL 15 X 6, TRTL- 30, or TRTL- 60 indicates that the safe has been
designed to give protection against 15, 30 or 60 minutes of attack with
common electrical and mechanical tools and cutting torches. The “ X 6”
addition means that all six surfaces of the safe give the rated protection.
 TXTL- 60 indicates the container offers 60 minutes of protection against
an expert burglary attack using common hand tools, cutting torches, high
explosives and any combination of these techniques.
Slide 85 Method of Safe Attack
Any security device constructed by man can be defeated by man. Safes are no
exception, and some of the more common methods used to attack them are:
Punch: The use of a punch is one of the most popular methods of attacking
safes designed for fire protection.
Peel: The container is attacked with a chisel and sledgehammer, to make a
penetration so that an edge of metal is exposed.
Rip: Another method is to cut through the metal plating with a chisel and
hammer. As with the peel, this method is usually used only on fire-protection
Drill: A drill, either high torque or core, is usually employed by professionals.
Most newer safes designed for fire protection and all burglary-resistant chests
are constructed of drill- resistant metal.
Burn: An oxygen-acetylene torch is used to burn an opening in a container.
Burning Bar or Thermal Lance: Bar packed with aluminum and magnesium
wire, or welding rods connected by a hose to an oxygen source.
Explosives: An explosive, usually nitroglycerine, may be placed in the space between the door and
the jamb. A shaped charge might also be utilized.
Manipulation: An individual manipulating a safe depends on sound and touch to
align the tumblers in a lock so that the door of a safe can be opened.

Slide 86 Vaults
Vaults are defined as specially constructed rooms or areas intended to limit
access and provide protection to the assets to be secured in this space.
Generally a vault is utilized to preclude forced entry, theft or removal of the asset.
The term vault is also applied to specially constructed rooms or areas that are
designed to protect the contents from fire and not necessarily theft. Vaults
designed to protect assets from damage caused by fire are generally less
expensive, and are built using very different construction standards and do not
provide much protection from theft. When making the decision which standards
to be followed (fire or security), the owner must consider the asset being
protected and its vulnerability.

Slide 87 Alarm Sensors

Sensors are the basic ingredients to an alarm system. They detect the condition
or event indicating a security or fire problem. All logical discrimination,
transmission, processing, display and recording activities that occur subsequent
to initial detection have meaning because of what sensors see, hear, feel or
otherwise sense with optical, electronic, electromechanical or mechanical
capabilities. If the sensor is inappropriate or inadequate to the task,
the output of the entire system is severely limited, becoming a greater burden
than benefit. Designed to report the presence of persons attempting to enter or
move about in protected areas, intrusion detectors can be divided into three
general classes, based on what they are intended to detect and the location of
the installation:
 Perimeter or point of entry;
 General area; and
 Object
Slide 88 Categories of Sensors
Sensors of all types should be designed to initiate alarms under any of the
following conditions:
 Occurrence of the event or condition being monitored (penetration of
protected area, rise in temperature, presence of smoke)
 Loss of electrical power
 Opening, shorting or grounding of the device circuitry
 Failure of the sensor itself
 Tampering with the sensor ’s enclosure or distributed control panels
(transponders).
Units for indoor use should be capable of operating in a temperature range of
32 °F to120 °F. Units to be installed outdoors or in unheated structures should
be capable of operating in temperatures ranging from minus 30 °F to 150 °F. All
units should be capable of operating at 90 °F and 95 percent relative humidity.

Slide 89 Passive Infrared (PIR) Sensors

Passive infrared sensors, commonly referred to simply as PIR’s, are the most
widely used intrusion detectors today and are highly versatile. PIR’s ‘‘see ’’the
invisible, bold colors of thermal or infrared (IR) energy. Because there is no
beam, they are called passive. Like heat from the sun, this energy has no visible
color or light. A PIR sees warm, infrared images against a cooler background.
PIR’s are actually able to detect objects that are either warmer or cooler against
background temperature. Effectiveness diminishes as background temperature
approaches that of the intruder. Since human intruders in temperate climates are
usually warmer than the background, the requirement here is for a PIR to detect
warmer objects. This perspective changes in warmer climates, where room
temperatures may be hotter than intruders. The cooler temperature of a human
(98.6 °F) is what the PIR should see here. In environments where temperatures
are not artificially regulated —such as unheated, non-air conditioned warehouses
or vacant vacation homes —or where the ability of the PIR to discern
temperature variations is particularly critical, automatic temperature
compensation is an essential feature. A unit is needed that expands the
temperature range at which it can see an intruder. Design and installation of
PIR’s are key to avoiding sources of false alarms.

Slide 90 PIR Design

A working understanding of modern PIR design can be gained from knowing how
two essential components work together. First is the fresnel lens .The lens
focuses IR images onto a pyroelectric sensor. Much like a magnifying glass
focuses the sun ’s heat, the fresnel lens creates a sharper image.
The second thing to know is that the pyroelectric sensor (simply, pyro)
produces an electrical output when subjected to a change in IR energy. If
the sensed changes are typical of a human signature in terms of mass, shape
and intensity, a signal-processing unit in the PIR alarms.
Proper installation is a primary consideration in avoiding false alarms. Ideally, a
PIR should be mounted in a location where an intruder would pass across its
field of view. Electrically connected peripheral devices —CCTV cameras, video
recorders, lights, heating and ventilation controls, door openers and local alarms
—can all be activated when a PIR is triggered. Drafts and insects are common
sources of false alarms. Air from vents and other sources of drafts should not
flow directly on the unit. Direct sunlight can cause false alarms, so it ’s important
to avoid mounting a PIR where it will see a bright window or direct sunlight in its
field of view.

Slide 91 Glass Break Sensors

Glass break sensors have largely replaced foil in most applications. They offer
the advantage of sounding an alarm while an intruder is still outside. Breaking
glass produces unique sound wave frequencies (3 to 5 kHz), that glass break
sensors ‘‘hear,’’ and seismic shock frequencies (200 Hz) that they ‘‘feel.’’ Built-in
microprocessors enable the devices to react to these sounds and ignore others
that cause false alarms.

Slide 92 Acoustic Sensors

Several designs of acoustic sensors are available. Acoustic sensors may have
the capability of sensing one or both of the acoustic and seismic frequency
ranges. Those that simultaneously listen and feel are more reliable and less
susceptible to false alarms. Microprocessors make it possible to differentiate
between the sound of breaking glass and other sounds that cause false alarms.
Acoustic Glass Break Sensors: Can be installed on walls or ceilings. Detection
is best when installed on a wall opposite protected glass, since sound waves
need not then reflect off an opposing wall before reaching the detector.
Susceptible to false alarms from radio frequency interference.
Shock Sensors: Glass break shock sensors ‘‘feel ’’the shock wave generated by
breaking glass and signal an alarm. Attached directly to a protected pane of
glass or adjoining window frame, they are an appropriate choice for protecting
glass in loud, occupied rooms where acoustic sensors may be prone to false
alarms.

Slide 93 Dual Technology Sensors

Dual technology PIR/Microwave detectors initiate an alarm upon simultaneous
activation of two alarm technologies working in concert (communicating) with one
another. Both technologies must process and signal to initiate an alarm. Units
with supervised circuitry provide continuing protection from the PIR alone if the
microwave fails. Devices are available that combine PIR with glass break
technology. This innovation has solved the problem of arming glass break
sensors in occupied buildings. Because glass break sensors are prone to false
alarms caused by noises other than breaking glass, such as banging
mop buckets and noisy janitorial crews, it was often impractical to arm glass
break sensors until buildings were totally vacant. By combining technologies, the
glass break sensors can be relied upon to ignore noise that might otherwise
generate an alarm whenever the PIR sensor ‘‘sees ’’someone (like a janitor)
inside the room.

Slide 94 Electromechanical Sensors

Electromechanical devices are relatively simple and provide stable, reliable
service.
Foil: Formerly widely used on glass windows. Breaking the glass cause foil to
be severed, interrupting the electrical current and initiating an alarm. Foil is a
thin, current-carrying metallic tape typically applied with adhesive to the secure
side of the surface being protected. Use of foil is considered obsolete by most
installers and it has been replaced by glass break sensors.
Magnetic and Mechanical Switches: Accessible openings such as doors,
windows and skylights may be protected with either mechanical or magnetic
intrusion switches. This type of sensor is composed of a two-part electrical
contact. One is installed on the opening surface, the other installed on the fixed
surface. When the opening surface (typically a door), is in a closed position, the
two contacts provide a closed circuit. When the opening surface is moved,
separating the contacts, the circuit is broken and the interruption in current
activates an alarm. The switches may be either mechanical or magnetic,
recessed or surface mounted, wired or wireless. They should always be installed
on the protected or secure side.
Wire and Screen Detectors: Fine, hard-drawn breakwire may be utilized in
various configurations to fabricate window screens, grids and lacing for
installation on openings and barriers to detect forcible penetration. This method
of protecting building openings is not as widely used today as other technologies.
Wire ‘‘strain gauges ’’may also be used on fencing.
Pressure Mats: This type of intrusion detection device is virtually obsolete, and
has been replaced by other technologies —principally PIR’s. Mats were typically
installed under carpeting near doors, on stair treads or in other strategic
locations.

Slide 95 Ultrasonic Sensors

Based on the Doppler effect, microwaves or sound waves are disturbed when
movement changes signal frequency between transmission and receipt. As long
as the return pattern being received is the same as that being transmitted, a
stable condition exists. When a distortion of the wave pattern caused by
movement is detected, an alarm is initiated. Like PIR’s, the range of an ultrasonic
detector is limited. An ultrasonic sensor is not influenced by exterior audio noise.
Because it reacts only to movement within a protected area, movement beyond
walls of the protected area will not cause an alarm. Air currents, such as those
from air conditioning, may cause false alarms. As with a PIR, an ultrasonic
detector would detect a ‘‘lock in ’’or concealed intruder by that person ’s
movement. It does not alarm if cabinets or containers placed flush against a wall
are penetrated through the wall because there is no movement in the path of the
sound waves. This type of sensor is usually limited to indoor application where
types of movements are less varied than those found in typical exterior
environments

Slide 96 Microwave Sensors

The microwave sensor operates on generally the same principle as the ultrasonic
sensor. The difference lies in the type of wave or signal used. The ultrasonic
sensor uses a high frequency sound wave, whereas the microwave sensor
utilizes much higher frequency electromagnetic energy. The microwave
transmitter sends a signal that is reflected back to an antenna. A comparison
circuit compares the transmitted and reflected signals. If there is no movement in
the area, the wave form remains constant. When the signal is reflected from a
moving object, the waveform changes, initiating an alarm. Microwave sensors
may be utilized in outdoor applications as well as indoors because they are not
generally affected by heavy fog, rain, snow, sleet, air turbulence, drafts, noise,
temperature extremes or atmospheric disturbances. When utilized for area
protection, the wave pattern is designed to flood a room or area being protected.
When used for perimeter protection a narrow beam is directed around the area or
zone to be protected. An interruption of this beam causes an alarm. A
microwave beam can be blocked or diverted by metal objects, so any movement
behind metal objects in a room or area will not be detected. The waves penetrate
common nonmetallic construction material, such as plaster walls, and detect
movement outside the protected area. False alarms may result if this factor is not
considered in planning a microwave installation.

Slide 97 Capacitance Sensors

A capacitance sensor is a large electrical condenser that radiates energy and
detects change in the capacitive coupling between an antenna and the ground. In
a typical installation, a capacitance sensor wire is connected to an object to be
protected, such as a safe or file cabinet. An intruder who touches the object
absorbs some of the electrical energy, disturbing the circuit and causing an
alarm. Newer technologies, such as PIR’s, detect an intruder long before he or
she reaches a protected object and have replaced many capacitance type
devices. However, if it is critical to limit the field of detection just to the protected
object (safe or file cabinet for example), the capacitance device may still be the
preferred protection.

Slide 98 Shock and Vibration Sensors

Utilizing the same technology as glass break shock sensors for object protection,
these alarms detect vibrations caused by an intruder ’s attempt to penetrate the
wall of a room, enclosure, vault, control panel, safe or filing cabinet. An alarm
discriminator may be included in the sensor and adjusted so that vibration
outside the protected space or surface is disregarded.
Slide 99 Audio Sensors
Microphones capable of receiving sound in the audible range (from 20 to about
20,000 Hz) are inconspicuously installed inside the protected area. An amplifier
is also part of the installation so that intrusion sounds can be transmitted and
activate an alarm. As audio sensors have become more sophisticated their use
has increased in specialized applications. A typical use may be inside a specialty
retail store in a busy shopping mall. Central station operators monitoring sensor
output can actually listen in on the protected space, recording sounds and voices
of intruders, later to be used as evidence. Fences may also be protected by
audio sensors that ‘‘listen ’’to the sound of cutting or climbing as it travels through
fencing material. Audio sensors may allow for greater discrimination between
genuine forced entry or climbing attempts and false alarm sources such as wind
or accidental impact.

Slide 100 Photoelectric Sensors

Photoelectric sensors operate based on modification of a light level or
interruption of a light beam protecting an area. If the light beam is visible, it can
be avoided. For this reason, infrared filters are usually placed over the light
source so only invisible light is transmitted. Over distances longer than 500 to
1000 feet operating ranges, light sources or receiver strength may need to be
amplified. To counteract the possibility of circumventing the device by introducing
an outside light source such as a flashlight, receiver frequencies may be
designed to modulate, thereby being unpredictable. Photoelectric detection
devices may be used both indoors and outdoors. Exterior units are designed with
protection against the elements. Some are equipped with self-contained heaters
to maintain a reasonably constant operating temperature. Extremes of weather
involving snow or heavy fog can affect or even disable exterior photoelectric
devices. In a typical application protecting multiple doors such as at a loading
dock, a single straight beam of light may be zigzagged using mirrors or multiple
beams may be tiered, making avoidance difficult. Each mirror shortens the
effective range by about 1/3.

Slide 101 Closed Circuit TV Sensors

Closed circuit television use as a motion alarm sensor has grown in recent years.
Measurement of a change in the scene under CCTV surveillance is the basis for
this technology. The scene is stored and compared to the real-time signal during
the next frame. Such systems are capable of detecting and comparing motion on
multiple video signals, generating hardware or software alarms. Parameters of
motion detection algorithms —such as for the sensitivity of detection —are under
user control. While these devices prove useful in many applications,
the generation of a video alarm alone cannot determine whether the intruder
appearing in the image is a good guy or a bad guy. With digitized imagery it is
possible to develop TV motion detection even further in that any number of
screen bits can be selected for change (movement) monitoring. Irregular patterns
of a screen display can thus be studied without being effected by status changes
elsewhere in the scene being viewed.
Slide 102 Balanced Pressure Sensor
A balanced pressure sensor has been developed for outdoor applications. This
sensor consists of liquid-filled hoses spaced about four feet apart. A differential
pressure sensor is connected at one end of each hose or tube. Intruders are
detected by sensing slight changes in differential pressure on soil as intruders
walk or crawl over ground where hoses are buried. The hoses can be buried
to conform to the contour of the ground along fence lines or across open spaces.
Hoses are buried about 12 to 15 inches deep and depend on the elasticity of soil
around lines to transmit detection pressure. Anything reducing this elasticity,
such as rock or frozen soil, reduces device sensitivity. Extraneous vibration
caused by nearby heavy traffic or by trees bending in the wind can cause the
sensor to activate a false alarm. A better buried detector utilizes coaxial cable
whose shielding has been stripped or perforated at measured intervals. This
‘‘leaky coax ’’radiates an electronic signal that creates a standing pattern through
the soil and to a height of several feet above the surface. Movement through the
signal causes an alarm.

Slide 103 Sensors for Fire Protection

As with alarm sensors for security applications, fire alarm systems have also
become more intelligent and addressable. Modern sensors are intelligent
detection devices that provide two-way communication and sophisticated,
graphic user interfaces. Communication software employs protocols that contain
both digital and analog signals, allowing each sensor to communicate its
individual address, sensor type and an analog value. System controllers
analyze the analog signal to measure the sensitivity of each sensor and to
communicate its status. Normal, pre-alarm, alarm and trouble conditions are
differentiated. Operators can observe changing conditions of the sensor and
environment at an alarm ’s point of origin. Sensors that detect fire or fire
precursors as early as possible should be selected because:
 An early alarm permits safe evacuation of a building or facility;
 The fire can be extinguished while small; and
 Destruction of facilities and material can be prevented.

Slide 104 Stages of Fire

The four stages of fire are:
 Incipient stage —invisible products of combustion are given off, and no
visible smoke, flame or appreciable heat is yet present;
 Smoldering stage —combustion products are now visible as smoke, but
flame or appreciable heat is still not present;
 Flame stage —the actual flames of a fire now exist, and while appreciable
heat is still not present it follows almost instantaneously; and
 Heat stage —uncontrolled heat and rapidly expanding air are
characteristic of a fully involved fire.
Slide 105 Fire Sensor Types
Types of fire sensors include thermal (heat), smoke (photoelectric), flame
(ultraviolet), products-of-combustion or ionization, fusible element devices
and water flow indicators. Two types of thermal detectors are available. A fixed
temperature type responds when detection elements reach a predetermined
temperature, and a rate-of-rise type that responds to an increase in heat at a rate
greater than some predetermined value. Some sensors combine both the fixed
temperature and rate-of-rise principle. Still others integrate smoke and thermal
detection capabilities. Smoke sensors are designed to activate an alarm when
obscuration in a test chamber is caused by smoke accumulation in the air. Flame
detectors activate an alarm when the spectral field reaches the predetermined
color, usually in the ultraviolet range. Invisible products-of- combustion detectors
respond to the very early change in ionization (electrical charge in the
air) typical of early combustion. Fusible element devices involve frangible
materials or those with very low melting temperatures. When the ambient
temperature causes the frangible element (often liquid inside glass) to break, or
the low melting point link to melt, a contact is opened or closed and an alarm is
transmitted. Water flow indicators are installed in sprinkler system risers and
mains and when water flows in the system at a faster than preset rate
(typically 10 gallons per minute or more), electrical contacts are closed and an
alarm is initiated.

Slide 106 Alarm Transmission and Control Panels

Methods for transmitting alarm signals, like the technology of devices
themselves, are advancing rapidly. No longer must alarm and control points be
wired together. RF, microwave, laser, cellular telephones and satellites are a few
of the alternatives now available. Cellular telephone transmission has vastly
improved flexibility because the availability of telephone lines is no
longer an issue. Cellular transmission also makes redundancy possible in the
event phone lines are cut or fail. Digitized cellular transmission can be even more
effective because the transmissions are not subject to degradation or garble from
atmospheric interference like random RFI or EMI.

Control modules are intended for collecting, processing and reporting data from
various detection devices that are part of an intrusion system. System controllers
do not detect anything themselves; rather, they collect and process intelligence
from the actual sensors. Choosing a controller that offers features you will
need and use is critical to overall functionality of an alarm system.
Slide 107 Security Communications
A major task for the assets protection professional is addressing relevant
concerns when considering a communications application. The task is
complicated by the expanding range of available communications technology. In
every communication, security professionals are concerned with:
 Integrity of the communications medium (availability of the message path
is available);
 Integrity of the message (complete and errorless transmission of the
data);
 Timeliness of the transmission (data communication within an appropriate
time frame); and
 Message security (accessibility of the communication to authorized
persons only).

Slide 108 Wire Transmission of Alarm and Audio Signals

Alarm signals may be transmitted on an unshielded pair of direct current (DC)
conductors. The size of the wire and its resistance must be considered because
resistance varies directly with the length of the line and inversely with the
diameter of the wire. The wire resistance limits the effective length of a line.
Audio transmissions require the use of shielded twisted pairs of alternating
current (AC) type wires, referred to in telephone parlance as voice-grade lines.
Alarm signals and audio transmissions both may be transmitted on the same pair
of twisted, shielded wires. Signals also may be transmitted on lines installed to
carry electric power.

Slide 109 Optical Fiber

The capability of optical fiber to transmit extremely large volumes of information
at the speed of light has revolutionized the communications industry. This signal
carrying capacity makes it possible to transport more sophisticated signals than
could ever be handled by a like amount of copper. Optical fibers can be used to
carry voice-grade signals, video signals and digital or ‘‘data grade ’’signals.
Optical fibers differ from conventional metal wire in that they:
 Are not affected by electromagnetic interference (EMI) or radio frequency
interference (RFI);
 Do not carry any electrical current and do not ‘‘radiate ’’signals;
 Carry many more different multiplexed messages than conventional wires;
 Are much smaller and lighter than conventional wires;
 Are flexible and can take an irregular course from point to point; and
 Are not vulnerable to interception by acoustical or inductive coupling.
Slide 110 Video Transmissions
Video signals cannot be transmitted directly on DC lines. However, video can be
transmitted on coaxial and optical fiber cable, on standard telephone line or on
balanced twisted wire pairs. For coaxial cable transmission, the video signal does
not require further processing between the camera and the monitor if the
transmission distance is short enough, typically 1,000 feet. Longer transmissions
can be achieved if the signal is amplified along the way. If the transmission path
is via optical fiber and the telephone signal is in digital format, real-time
transmission is possible because the optical fiber can transmit more data faster
than standard telephone copper wire pairs.

Slide 111 Status and Alarm Transmission

Three types of line transmission installations usually are used in electronic
protection systems: loop, point-to-point and multiplex .The three types may be
used with proprietary wire networks or leased telephone lines. With any alarm
system configuration, access to the control unit would permit disabling the entire
system; thus, physical security of the control unit or console.

Slide 112 Loop

In a loop system, devices are installed on a pair of wires that have been looped
throughout an area, a building or a facility, and connected to a control center. A
signal at the control center indicates when an abnormal situation occurs on the
loop. This system may be adequate for a small space or a single facility;
however, the better method is to code the signal from each detector so that the
source of each signal can be defined at the central point. A short circuit or broken
connection on the loop may interrupt all signals on the far side of the break. This
problem can be partially corrected by using a McCulloh circuit. In this circuit,
when an open occurs, the circuit is switched to send current from the control unit
over both sides of the circuit wires out to the break point. The circuit integrity is
thus restored to all devices on either side of the open. If two circuit breaks occur,
any devices between the two breaks will be lost, as there will not be any circuit
path between the breaks.

Slide 113 Point-to-points

Each sensor in a point-to-point installation is connected directly to a control
center by a pair of wires. This ‘‘hard wired ’’type of installation is more expensive
than the loop system because more wire is required; however, only one detector
is influenced in case of an individual line fault. An attacker attempting to disable
the system would have to define each wire controlling each sensor in the area to
be penetrated, and each alarm line would have to be disabled. With the loop
system, all the detectors in an area could be disabled by interrupting the loop
at the proper location.
Slide 114 Multiplexing
Multiplexing is a technique to transmit several messages simultaneously on the
same medium. The transmission medium can be wire, radio frequency (RF),
microwave or optical fiber. A multiplex installation can be more cost effective than
a loop or point-to-point installation, as multiple signals are transmitted over longer
distances to a control center. The two methods generally used are: 1) time
separation or time division multiplexing (TDM); and 2) frequency separation or
frequency division multiplexing (FDM). With TDM, each sensor or data source
is assigned a time segment and each may transmit only during its assigned
segment. In FDM, signals from a number of sensors on a common transmission
line occupy different portions of the frequency spectrum. Even though transmitted
simultaneously, their different frequencies keep them individually identifiable at
the receiver.

Slide 115 Communications Security

Line Protection: The switched telephone network, dedicated telephone lines or
proprietary circuits may be utilized in a protection system. To protect the
communications, outside wiring should be installed underground and inside
wiring should be installed in conduits. The telecommunications service provider
should be requested to provide an underground service connection. In
particularly vulnerable situations, the underground service should not be taken
from the nearest utility pole, but from a more distant one to further obscure the
actual wire path to an attacker.
Line Supervision: A wire alarm system should be designed with line
supervision to check the circuits automatically and immediately signal line faults.
The simplest line supervision is an end-of-line resistor installed to introduce a
constant, measurable electrical current. A variance from the normal
level beyond a determined threshold will be detected and generate an alarm.
This simple type of line supervision normally detects an open circuit (broken
connection), a ground or a wire-to-wire short.

Slide 116 Wireless Communications

Wireless communications can include voice radio, wireless alarm signals, cellular
telephones, local digital fixed wireless systems, satellite, microwave, and laser.
Any unscrambled or unencrypted communication transmitted by wireless
technology should be considered available for interception. Microwave and laser
technologies rely on line of sight. Microwave penetrates rain, fog and snow and is
not affected by man-made noise. Laser is affected by weather conditions.

Wireless interference: Proper signal reception depends on the ability of the

equipment to discriminate wanted signals from unwanted signals and noise.
Unwanted signals (interference) may be encountered in any radio communication
system. Some of the most common causes of interference are signals from other
transmitters and industrial and atmospheric noise. Noise interference can be
man-made or natural.
Slide 117 SYSTEMS CONSIDERATIONS
Individual sensors do not provide security protection unless they are integrated
into a system that transmits the individual signals to one or more monitoring
locations. When sensors are configured into a meaningful and functional array,
it’s called sensor integration and is the basic task of security system design.
Systems that maximize the common control of a variety of sensors and field
devices are called integrated systems. Sensors and their array are one part of
a protection system. Two other elements, software and personnel, are necessary
to complete it.

Slide 118 Alarm Termination

Proper termination of alarms ensures response to signals. There are four
methods of alarm terminations:
 Local;
 Central station;
 Direct connection (to police or fire); and
 Proprietary termination in a business or industrial facility.

These methods can be used individually or in combination.

Slide 119 Local Alarm Termination

Local alarm termination utilizes a sound-generating device —usually a bell, or
horn on the exterior wall of the protected area —to call attention to a violation.
The installation can be designed so that lights are turned on both inside and
outside the protected area, and other presumed deterrents are activated. In this
type of installation, it is anticipated that the police hear an alarm, or that a
passerby, hearing the alarm, alerts the police. This type of termination is
inexpensive to install, but is relatively easy to defeat because of its simplicity.
Some local sounders rely on battery power that requires frequent testing and
increases maintenance costs. It is recommended that all such devices be
connected to a power supply supported by both main power and short-term
battery back up to cover main power blackouts and brownouts. One positive
feature to an alarm is that an intruder knows his entry has been detected, and
therefore he might leave immediately without causing any damage.
Slide 120 Central Station Termination
Alarm termination at a commercial central alarm station is sometimes referred to
as a silent alarm installation because there is usually no signal at the protected
location. The central station may receive signals from protected premises by one
of four methods:
 Direct wire: a dedicated enunciation device or switchboard at the station
for that single subscriber;
 Common transmitter: serves multiple subscribers but involves a higher
level of vulnerability because failure or compromise of the common
transmitter imperils all users and may leave all of them without alarm
protection, at least temporarily;
 Multiplex circuits: transmit simultaneous or sequential signals over a
common communication channel with a means for positively identifying
each signal; or
 Digital communicator: provides for the connection of protected premises
to the central station via the telephone-switched network

Direct wire, common transmitters and multiplexed systems may utilize leased
telephone lines, microwave or radio frequencies, or a combination.

Slide 121 Direct Police or Fire Department Termination

Some jurisdictions allow alarms to be terminated at police or fire headquarters. In
these cases, the municipal dispatcher or another individual monitors alarm
signals received and initiates a response. As with the central station termination,
a leased telephone line is usually used to transmit signals between the protected
area and the facility receiving the alarm. Although reputable manufacturers offer
automatic dialers, dedicated lines are more reliable for a number of reasons —in
addition to the attack vulnerability. First, if it is not possible to provide line security
because dialers use the regular telephone switch network. Second, if the number
being dialed (to signal a penetration) is busy; the signal may not get through,
although later models will redial for a set period or number of tries.

Slide 122 Proprietary Termination

A proprietary alarm termination is designed so that all alarm signals in a facility
terminate at a central point within the protected enterprise. This type of
installation is similar to the central station but instead of a commercial central
station monitoring alarms, personnel in the protected facility, or otherwise under
control of the owner of the facility, performs that task. An adequate number of
security officers must be employed to monitor the console where the alarms
terminate and to respond to alarm conditions. Many disadvantages listed for the
other type of alarm terminations are eliminated when an enterprise is of sufficient
size to justify installation and operation of a proprietary alarm system.
Slide 123 System Design - Advantages
The integration of all sensors and devices utilized in a modern protection system
is a complex design task. Before systems can be designed, it’s necessary to
analyze both security needs and operating constraints. The use of electronic
systems and components can result in two advantages —cost reduction and
improvement of protection. Major cost reduction is often possible because
electronic techniques and equipment can be substituted for personnel. Past
experience indicates possible reductions of as much as 50 percent of pre-system
personnel costs. The cost of the installed system would be amortized over its
estimated useful life and the net expense decrease would be the achievable
saving. Better protection usually results when reliable sensors are properly
installed and maintained. Some patrol inspection can be eliminated or reduced
with electronically supervised sensors. This reduces the total number of
personnel needed and results in lower personnel costs. Electronic techniques
can also enhance supervision of such personnel. The combination of checkpoints
and mobile communication makes it possible for the control center operator to
know where the patrolling personnel are located at all times. In the event of patrol
tour delinquency, injury or other exceptions, other nearby stations can respond.
In general, the more effective the personnel, the fewer personnel needed.

Slide 124 System Design and Specification

System in the security context is defined as a combination of equipment,
personnel and procedures, coordinated in such a way as to assure optimum
achievement of the system’s stated security objectives. Note that a system
includes more than hardware components and, although much of the following
discussion is related to security technology, the process is also applicable to the
design, procurement and deployment of security staff. More important, the
technology element of a system is totally ineffective in a vacuum without the
staffing and procedural elements to support it. Integration is the logical and
symbiotic combination of these elements into a system. The definition refers to
the stated security objectives; the planning phase assists in determining those
objectives.
A security system implementation project includes:
 Determining security requirements;
 Developing solutions for resolving vulnerabilities;
 Preparing security systems construction documents;
 Soliciting pricing; and
 Installing, commissioning and testing the security system.
Slide 125 Planning Phase
The planning phase consists of gathering all the information needed to make
informed decisions when selecting solutions to security problems. It is a formal
process of identifying the problems and of developing objectives, criteria,
concepts and methods that will be used in the design phase. The time spent in
the planning phase gets returned, so to speak, in the form of reduced costs and
fewer meetings, and in system ’s overall longevity The outcome of planning is a
set of security requirements, or objectives, that will be used as a reality check
throughout the design (and implementation) process. Another important outcome
of the planning phase: the development of the business and economic
justification for the new or upgraded security system.

Slide 126 REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION

While the vulnerability assessment task is used to define and understand the
security problems, the requirements definition task is used to develop
countermeasure solutions to those problems. Before looking at specific
requirements, it is useful to formulate a statement of the overall objectives or
mission of the integrated security system (ISS). The objectives must reflect and
support the overall corporate mission if the ISS is to be funded and supported by
executive management. The overall objectives should be checked as each
requirements definition is being developed. Developing security requirements
means examining each vulnerability and defining what functions are required to
mitigate, reduce, limit or erase that vulnerability. It is useful to add a level of
confidence factor to each requirements definition. The requirements definition
should focus on preventing, delaying or modifying the consequences. Solutions
to different vulnerabilities may be the same or similar. Likewise, not every
solution (or prevention technique) will solve (or prevent) every problem. A
planning process must evaluate all vulnerabilities and cannot be bypassed for
assuming one thing will take care of other things.

Slide 127 DESIGN CRITERIA

Design criteria are the ground rules for the design and selection of subsystems
and components; they are also known as functional requirements .The criteria fall
into a number of categories:
 Codes &Standards: Design and implementation will probably be required
to follow both national and local building, and fire/life safety codes.
 Quality: Ultimate quality is achieved only at ultimate cost. A sensible level
needs to be designated to ensure that costs are kept in check. Quality
also needs to be applied on a consistent basis.
 Capacity: Capacity, size and space requirements will affect the design of
solutions.
 Performance: Performance of individual components is usually detailed in
the system specification. Includes reliability and maintainability criteria.
 Features: Major system features should be defined.
 Cost: The most common constraint is implementation cost.
  Operations: Security programs need to have minimum negative impact
on productivity.
 Culture and Image: Corporate culture greatly factors into the
implementation of security programs.
 Monitoring and Response: An essential component in any security
program is security staff to monitor alarm systems and to respond to alarm
conditions.

Slide 128 Preliminary Estimate of Probable Cost

The last task in the planning phase is to develop budgets for both capital and
recurring costs associated with the proposed system. Since no detailed design
work has been performed nor have component quantities been finalized, the
budgets must be preliminary estimates, at best. Although the estimate is
preliminary, its accuracy is important to the project. If the estimate is too low,
discovering the real cost could lead to abandoning the project. If the cost
estimate is too high, the budget may not be approved.

Slide 129 Security Manager’s Role

The security manager ’s role is primary to the successful design and
implementation of the system. The security manager must understands three
important concepts:
 The security manager lives with the consequences of system failure and
therefore must assume accountability and ownership of the system.
Ownership is achieved by understanding the process of design and
implementation and by maintaining direct involvement throughout the
project.
 One person cannot be a specialist in all the aspects of design and
construction. The security manager needs to be able to identify where
expertise is lacking and be prepared to hire specialists —either full-time
staff or independent consultants —to maintain the level of involvement
required to achieve ‘‘ownership.’’
 The system solutions must reflect the organization ’s mission, must be
responsive to the organization ’s culture and business operations, and, to
be successful, must have the executive management ’s ‘‘fingerprints ’’on
the plan.

Slide 130 Design & Documentation Phase

Once the planning phase has been completed and reviewed, and the design
concepts and budgetary cost estimates have been approved, the project moves
into the design and documentation phase. The objective of this phase is to
complete the design and to document the process to the level of detail necessary
for the chosen method of procurement —by the sole source of a trusted supplier,
by competitive requests for proposals from a list of suppliers or by competitive
invitation for bids openly advertised.
Slide 131 Contractual Details
This section of the construction documents describes the form of contract to be
used when a supplier of goods and/or services has been chosen. It covers items
such as insurance and bonding requirements, site regulations, labor rules,
delivery and payment terms, methods of measuring work progress for partial
payment, owner recourse in the event of nonperformance, termination conditions,
application of unit pricing to additions and deletions, instructions to bidders, etc.
For a large construction project, the architect or the construction manager
develops this document to cover all trades including security.

Slide 132 Design Specifications

The design specifications provide the means to define accurately and completely
the system requirements in such detail that:
 The final implementation reflects what was intended; and
 All bidders get the same, complete understanding of the requirements.
Incomplete or inaccurate specifications can lead to wildly different bids
and an inability of the procurer to compare and select among them.

Slide 133 Minimum Security Specifications

A minimum security system specification should include the following:
 Instructions to bidders with a list of all documents included in the
contract documents;
 A functional description of the complete systems, their intended
operation and the installation schedule;
 A list of products and services to be included in this contract;
 A list of products and services that are required as part of the security
system but are included in other contracts. Such split responsibilities
require careful coordination among contractors. An example is electrical
door hardware provided and installed under the door hardware contract
but which the security contractor must connect to the security system;
 A list of applicable codes and standards
 Support services such as drawing, sample and documentation
submittals, commissioning, testing, training, warranty, maintenance and
spare parts;
 Technical descriptions of all major subsystems and their components
including capacity, capability, expandability, performance and operational
parameters, environmental operating parameters, installation and
integration details, appearance and finish, and acceptable makes and
models; and
 General site conditions, installation standards and quality control
standards.
 Slide 134 Design Coordination
Just as security does not exist in a vacuum within an organization, security
design on a construction project is affected by many other design disciplines.
Careful coordination between the security system designer and other design
team members is essential to avoid missing elements of the design or procuring
things twice. Some elements of the security system will be procured and
described in specification sections that are prepared by other design disciplines.

Slide 135 Procurement Phase

There are three major forms of procurement: sole source, request for proposal
and invitation for bid, with many variations among them. Each has its own
benefits but choosing the form of procurement for a project should be done
before the start of the design phase because the type of procurement will affect
the level of detail required in the construction documents.
Sole Source: For small projects, this may be the most appropriate method of
procurement. The organization pre-qualifies a security system contractor, works
with the contractor to design the system and negotiates the cost of equipment
supply and installation.
Request for Proposal: Commonly used by non-government organizations. A
full set of construction documents is prepared but the specifications can be
generic and performance based —that is, without the need to list specific
component manufacturers and model numbers.
Invitation for Bid: Is commonly used by government and other organizations
whose procurement procedures require that projects be competitively bid and
that the award be given to the lowest qualified, responsive bidder.

Slide 136 Testing, Warranty & Maintenance

Before the owner or owner ’s representative is requested to witness acceptance
testing, preliminary testing should be performed by the contractor to ensure that
all systems, subsystems and components are working as specified.
Warranty specifications should include the warranty start date and duration;
maintenance performed during warranty; and required response protocol to
system problems. Maintenance requirements should be described even if
maintenance is not contracted for until after the warranty period and should
include the frequency of periodic maintenance —monthly or quarterly —and
specific tasks performed. After warranty frequent tests of the security system and
all of its components are essential in the implementation of the assets protection
program. Tests should result in the following:
 Risks or hazards still existing are identified and system deficiencies are
revealed.
 System changes required to accommodate facility or organization
revisions become apparent.

End of Slide presentation for Physical Security module

 Practice Questions for Physical Security Module

1.) The optimum approach to the formulation of an organizational

assets protection plan is to:
a. Respond to each loss or potential loss as the hazard occurs and
build an overall plan over time.
b. Formulate and implement a comprehensive prevention plan to
include all types of hazards.
c. Develop an assets protection plan based on the results of
investigations and prosecutions of losses as the cases are closed.
d. Formulate a protection plan based on the advice of the crime
prevention specialist in the local law enforcement agency.

ANSWER: b

2.) Implementing the systems approach in security

involves:
a. Vulnerability analysis, countermeasures choice and program test.
b. Vulnerability analysis, program test and cost control.
c. Countermeasures choice, management approval and testing.
d. Vulnerability analysis, cost control and management approval.

ANSWER: a

3.) The three types of countermeasures are:

 a. Hardware, software and firmware.
b. People, hardware and software.
c. Hardware, software and investigations.
d. People, hardware and prosecution.

ANSWER: b

4.) A policy statement covering an organization’s security

program should be issued by:
a. The assets protection manager at each facility.
b. Top management of the enterprise.
c. The security director of the enterprise.
d. The corporate counsel.

ANSWER: b

5.) The most important and generally the most expensive type of
countermeasure is:
 a. Hardware.
b. Software.
c. People.
d. Competitive Intelligence

ANSWER: c

6.) The Underwriters Laboratories is a standards organization to which:

a. Access control and intrusion detection components must be submitted for performance
testing.
b. Information systems components must be submitted for performance certification.
c. A wide variety of products are submitted on a voluntary basis to be tested for conformance
with Underwriters Laboratories standards.
d. Any component manufactures for a U.S. government department must be submitted to be
tested for conformance with U.S. government standards.

ANSWER: c

7.) When evaluating the probability of the occurrence of a loss event we

note that the number of ways that a particular event can occur in
given circumstances:
a. Has no effect on the probability that it will occur.
b. The greater the probability that it will occur.
c. The lesser the probability that it will occur.
d. Renders it impossible to determine the probability that it will occur.

ANSWER: a

8.) A list of the kinds of threats or risks affecting the assets to be

safeguarded is known as:
a. A loss event profile.
 The loss event criticality list.
b. The insurance rate calculation table.
c. A law enforcement watch list.

ANSWER: a

9.) The term “security in depth” refers to:

a. The distance between a barrier and the nearest building.
b. A series of barriers in a protection program.
c. The depth of a water barrier at the closest point to the protected area.
d. The minimum distance between any two barriers in a protection system.

ANSWER: b

10.) The most popular fence type is

a. Expanded metal.
b. Slatted wood.
 c. Chain link.
d. Decorative aluminum.

ANSWER: c

11.) In the construction of a chain link fence the posts at the ends and
corners of the fence and those used to support gates are known as:
a. Command posts.
b. Lead posts.
c. Terminal Posts.
d. Pull posts.

ANSWER: c

12.) The top guard of a chain link fence is:

a. The senior security officer in charge of the perimeter fence security
operation.
b. A horizontal rail to which the fabric of the fence is attached with
ties or clips at intervals not exceeding two feet (61cm).
c. A horizontal tension wire which is intertwined with the top of the
fence fabric.
d. An overhang of barbed wire along the top of the fence usually at a
45-degree angle.

ANSWER: d

13.) Sheets of expanded metal:

a. Will unravel on the vertical edges.
b. Are available only in galvanized steel and stainless steel.
c. Are suitable in new construction rather than in modification of existing structures.
d. Are extremely difficult to cut.

ANSWER: d

14.) Master keying the conventional pin tumbler lock:

a. Makes the lock more vulnerable to surreptitious entry.
b. Increases the theoretical number of keys that can be cut to totally
different combinations.
c. Enhances the possible control over master keys.
d. Facilitates maintenance in that a smaller number of pins are
required in the lock.

ANSWER: a

15.) With electrified locks, the term “fail safe” means

that when commercial electric power is lost:
a. The device will remain locked.
 b. A battery backup is available to insure that the device remains
locked.
c. The device will revert to an unlocked condition.
e. The device is connected to the emergency power circuit.

ANSWER: c

16.) A good locking plan should consider which of the

following?
a. The need for different, concurrent locking levels.
b. The likelihood that such levels will change over time.
c. The possibility that keys and access devices will be lost.
e. All of the above.

ANSWER: d

17.) The responsibility for compliance with locking system

requirements should be assigned to:
a. The assets protection manager.
b. Each department or division manager.
c. First line supervisors.
d. Each person who will use or have access to keys, locks or access
devices.

ANSWER: d

18.) Compliance with locking system program requirements is enforced

through:
a. The regular line organization so that each employee may be
evaluated on performance under the policy.
b. Disciplinary action determined by and meted out through the
Security Department.
c. Civil action in a court of proper jurisdiction.
d. Immediate referral of the offending employee to the Human
Relations Department.

ANSWER: a

19.) Intrusion detectors can generally be grouped in

which of the following three classes?
a. Perimeter, area and object.
b. Inclusive, exclusive and intermediate.
c. Continuous, intermittent and cycled.
e. Physical, virtual and logical.

ANSWER: a
20.) In reviewing the applications for ultrasonic intrusion detectors we note
that:
a. A large room furnished with heavy furniture, rugs and drapes would
be ideal.
b. Coverage of two adjacent rooms divided by plaster walls can be
accomplished.
c. This type of sensor is usually limited to indoor applications where
types of movements are less varied than those found in typical
exterior applications.
e. The ideal application would be a fence line of less than 50 feet in
length.

ANSWER: c

21.) Ideally, a passive infra-red sensor should be

mounted in such a location that an intruder would
pass:
a. At less than a 45-degree angle into the field of view of the sensor.
b. At less than a 30-degree angle into the field of view of the sensor.
c. Directly into the field of view of the sensor.
d. Across the field of view of the sensor.

ANSWER: d

22.) An ionization fire detector senses a change in the:

a. Volume of smoke molecules in a closed space.
b. Ambient temperature in a given area.
c. Ionization of air near a source of combustion.
d. Volume of air that passes through an ionization chamber.

ANSWER: c

23.) Dual technology detectors initiate an alarm upon:

a. Simultaneous activation of the two alarm technologies working in
concert (communicating) with one another.
b. Activation of either of the two alarm technologies.
c. Activation of the alarm technology that the installer had switched
to the "on" position.
 d. Activation of the two alarm technologies within an adjustable
span of time that is predetermined by the installer or the user.

ANSWER: a

24.) An integrated system

a. Maximizes the common control of a number of sensors.
b. Is generally more economical than other systems.
c. Will easily meet code requirements.
d. Requires coaxial cable or optical fiber for trunk lines.

ANSWER: a

25.) The three phases of integrated security system development are:

a. Planning, design and implementation.
b. Budgeting, approval and implementation.
c. Estimating, detailing and design.
d. Conception, review and approval.

ANSWER: a

26.) In an integrated security system the design criteria, or functional

requirements, are the:
a. Ground rules for the design and selection of subsystems and
components.
b. Potential loss events that the security system is to be designed to
preclude.
c. Levels of risk associated with the potential loss events that have
been identified.
d. "Level of confidence" factors that are included in each risk
evaluation.

ANSWER: a

27.) Development of budgets for capital and recurring costs associated

with a proposed security system is:
a. The last task in the planning phase.
b. Accomplished after the proposals are received from potential
supply and installation firms.
c. Done immediately after the potential loss events are identified.
d. Accomplished immediately after the design criteria are identified.

ANSWER: a
28.) In frequency division multiplexing, the transmitted
signals are
a. Sent at different time intervals.
b. Sent on different transmission media.
c. Sent on different portions of the spectrum.
d. Sent simultaneously on the same frequency.

ANSWER: c

29.) In considering the security of wireless communications we note that:

a. Digital cellular communications are secure from interception.
b. Cordless telephones with multiple frequency settings offer secure
communications.
c. Radio communications transmitted on frequencies above 400
megahertz offer secure communications.
e. A communication transmitted by wireless technology should be
considered
available to interception.

ANSWER: d

30.) Microwave transmissions:

a. Penetrate rain, fog and snow and are not affected by man-made
noise.
b. Penetrate rain, fog and snow but are affected by man-made noise.
c. Are affected by rain, fog and man-made noise.
d. Penetrate rain, fog, snow and steel.

ANSWER: a

31.) In access control the term “personal recognition”

means a:
a. Signal from a member of a surveillance team that the subject is
present.
b. Security officer recognizes another person from memory.
c. Security officer recognizes a person to be identical with a
photograph.
d. Proximity card presented at an access control card reader is
validated by the access control system.

ANSWER: b

32.) Which of the following is not an access control

objective?
a. Permit or deny entry.
b. Change density of movement.
c. Account for revenue in the collection of non-negotiable checks..
d. Protect people, material or information.
 ANSWER: c

33.) In a high security area in which the "two man rule" has been
implemented:
a. Any disciplinary action to be taken against a security officer must be approved by
two levels of management.
b. Two security officers must attest to any security infraction for which disciplinary
action that may be taken against any employee authorized to be in the area.
c. Two security officers must approve access to the restricted area.
d. Two employees with valid coded cards must use their cards in sequence, within
45 seconds of each other, for entry or exit.

ANSWER: d
34.) Protection in depth implies:
a. Multiple layers of approximately equal protection.
b. Alternating layers of heavy and light protection.
c. Multiple layers of progressively increasing protection.
d. Electronic devices coupled with site hardening measures.

ANSWER: c

35.) The physical controls at the outer protective layer

are generally designed to:
a. Provide a strong physical barricade against vehicular entry.
b. Define the property line and channel people and vehicles through
designated access points.
c. Delay an intruder until the security force can respond.
d. Prevent unauthorized access by all persons but the skilled and
determined intruder.

ANSWER: b

36.) In physical security planning, the location of inner protective layers,

if properly planned would cause an intruder who had penetrated both
the outer and middle protective layers to:
a. Immediately activate an alarm condition that would result in a law
enforcement response.
b. Be trapped in a maze of corridors and barriers.
c. Immediately activate an alarm condition, which would result in a
security response.
d. Fail to find anything of value easily accessible.

ANSWER: d

37.) After the required security equipment and its likely configuration have
been determined a technical specification of either the “prescriptive” or
“performance” type is prepared. A “performance” specification:
 a. Specifically identifies the actual equipment required including the
brand name or manufacturer and model number.
b. Gives suppliers latitude to propose items which may not have been
considered by the specifying organization but which will accomplish
the required function.
c. Sets out the number and qualifications of technical personnel that
will be required to make the equipment functional.
d. Requires the supplier to post a bond to insure that the work will be
accomplished within a given period of time after a contract is let.

ANSWER: b

38.) A “prescriptive” technical specification for security equipment:

a. Sets out the number and qualifications of technical personnel that
will be required to make the equipment functional.
b. Gives suppliers latitude to propose items which may not have been
considered by the specifying organization but which will accomplish
the required function.
c. Identifies specifically with the actual equipment required.
d. Requests that prospective suppliers suggest items of equipment
that will fulfill the security operating requirements.

ANSWER: c
39.) Burglary-resistant safes should be anchored if they
weigh less than
a. 1,000 pounds.
b. 750 pounds.
c. 500 pounds.
e. 250 pounds.

ANSWER: b

40.) In the course of testing, a fire resistive safe designed for the
protection of paper documents must maintain an interior
temperature at not more than:
a. 1000 degrees.
b. 750 degrees.
c. 500 degrees.
d. 350 degrees.

ANSWER: d

41.) The term "corrected color temperature" (CCT) is a measurement of

the:
a. Heat emitted from each type of lamp per hour of illumination.
b. Warmth or coolness of a light.
c. Heat generated by a color CCD camera.
d. Maximum allowable operating temperature of each type of digital video recorder.
 ANSWER: b

42.) Illuminance is a measurement of:

a. The concentration of light over a particular area.
b. The light that is reflected off an object.
c. The light that is absorbed by an object.
e. The output of a specific type of lamp.

ANSWER: a

43.) The “defensible space” theory suggests that:

a. The security force can more readily protect a facility when a “defensible space” of at least 50
feet is maintained between a perimeter fence and the buildings.
b. A range of mechanisms, real and symbolic barriers, strongly defined areas of influence and
improved opportunities for surveillance can combine to bring the environment under the
control of its residents.
c. A series of concentric barriers with appropriately placed surveillance ports can allow the
residents to defend their environment pending the arrival of law enforcement officers.
e. A range of mechanisms, real and symbolic barriers, strongly defined areas of influence and
improved opportunities for surveillance can combine to bring the environment under the
control of law enforcement or security officers.

ANSWER: b

44.) Dynamic risk is defined as a situation in which there is:

a. The possibility for both benefit and cost or loss.
b. No possibility for any benefit, only for cost or loss.
c. The possibility of benefit, but only with significant investment of
resources.
e. The possibility of benefit and no possibility of cost or loss.

ANSWER: a

45.) Landscaping considerations in CPTED include maintaining tree

canopies at least:
a. Five feet above ground level.
b. Six feet above ground level.
c. Seven feet above ground level.
d. Eight feet above ground level.

ANSWE: d

END OF QUESTIONS