ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS Vol. 16, No.

2/2023

Disinformation - The Scourge of Contemporary

Society

Valeriu Baeșu1

Abstract: In recent years, the term “disinformation” has become a focal point in the attention of the
media and public discussions. Fabricated news, which doesn’t reflect reality, has the potential to
deeply affect the political, economic, and social lives of individuals, as they are often created with the
intention to deceive the public. To understand this issue, it’s necessary to clarify the concept of
disinformation. Only then, by deeply comprehending this complex phenomenon, can we develop
strategies to limit them. In this article, we focus on three categories that reveal the consequences and
disinformation of news. These are flawed information, disinformation, and unintentional
misinformation. These categories are closely related, yet they also present essential differences
leading to distinct interpretations for each.

Keywords: communication media; information pollution; disinformation; media falseness; flawed

information and unintentional disinformation
JEL Classification: K10; K19; K30

1. Introduction
Disinformation is one of the biggest challenges that people are facing globally
today, and social media is at the heart of it. The research findings suggest that fake
news spreads faster on social media than reliable information. A report issued by
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology states that 70% of individuals are more

1
Associate professor, PhD of law, Free International University of Moldova, Republic of Moldova,
Address: Vlaicu Pârcălab Street 52, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova, Corresponding author:
baesuvaleriu@[Link].
AUDRI Vol. 16, No. 2/2023, pp. 48-58
48
ISSN: 2065-0272 RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES

likely to share fake news on social media than real news, reaching the public six
times harder.
By any terminology - whether it is disinformation, fake news or propaganda - it is a
violation of human rights and one of the biggest challenges facing societies around
the world, not just in a particular country or region. The spread of disinformation
can cause multiple damage to human rights - whether we are talking about civil and
political rights or social, economic and cultural rights. The impact can be
devastating in various circumstances. As a concrete example and to avoid general
discussion, disinformation or fake news can be practically damaging to specific
rights, including civil and political rights, or can be guilty of violating specific
social, economic and cultural rights.
The definition of disinformation
In order to determine the viability of disinformation, we need to start by developing
a definition and then, guided by this definition, identify the prerequisites for
disinformation to occur in order to assess whether these conditions can be met.
Disinformation is usually defined as the dissemination or transmission of false
information. From this perspective, we could define disinformation as an act of
communication in which false information is disseminated, where we could add,
but not necessarily, that it would be an act of public communication. Such a
definition is not correct because the definition contains metaphorical terms
(Bernecker, Flowerree & Grundmann, 2021).
When defining “information” in the aforementioned definition, it is used
metaphorically because information has no factual values, therefore there can be no
false information. “Information” is a theoretical term, having the role of explaining
the reduction of non-determinism. The realization of a contrary among several
complementary contraries is explained by invoking information, and information is
greater or lesser as the number of complementary contraries is greater or lesser. For
example, if someone flips a coin, it would fall on one of two sides. To explain why
the coin falls on a particular side, we invoke the information which in this case,
under certain conditions, is 1 bit. We note that information cannot be characterized
by truth values. Information or misinformation can cause a reduction in variety, for
example, it can cause a decision to be made about one’s behavior, i.e. we are
dealing with an informational process, but nothing follows from this about any

49
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS Vol. 16, No. 2/2023

truth value of the information involved in such an occurrence, since there can be
decisions based on both truth and falsehood (Green & Donahue, 2018).

2. Results and Discussions

Consequently, defining disinformation by the term “false information” leads to the
situation where disinformation is not possible because, as we have seen,
information cannot be false. This error has even made its way into the Criminal
Law of the Republic of Moldova, where ‘spreading false information’, under
certain circumstances, is punishable by imprisonment of between one and five
years, even though such an offense is impossible, because, as we have seen,
information cannot be false. This is how we can be punished for acts we cannot
commit!
For the purposes of defining disinformation, it is important to recognize that it is an
intentional action intended for a specific purpose. Therefore, in order to identify
acts of disinformation, we need to consider the purpose pursued by the disinformer.
We can assume that the objective of disinformation is to influence the behavior of
the receiver. By sending an insincere message, the sender aims to generate certain
behavioral reactions on the part of the potential receiver of the message.
Instruments of communication aimed at influencing the behavior of a receiver fall
into the category of manipulation. Disinformation is therefore a species of
manipulation or a form of manipulation. In order to introduce a specific difference
between these two, we consider the means or methods used in disinformation. The
sender, through manipulation, using communication techniques, cannot induce a
certain behavior on the part of the receiver. The only thing it can do is to influence
the receiver to adopt a certain emotional state and, based on this state, to take
certain decisions (Legg, 2018, p. 43).
Emotional states can be either correct or incorrect. For example, one may be
correctly afraid that a burglar has broken into one’s home, but it is not impossible
that one’s fear may be incorrect and that one may be mistaken either about the
burglar’s break-in or about the burglar’s intentions. We define disinformation as a
form of manipulation in which the sender seeks to influence the receivers of the
message to adopt incorrect emotional states, presumably in view of a certain
behavior (Cao, Sheng, Yang, Guo & Li, 2020, p. 147).

50
ISSN: 2065-0272 RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES

Emotions can be understood in terms of opinions and attitudes. For example, fear
can be expressed by developing an individual’s opinion or belief about an event in
which the individual manifests a negative response. For example, when asking
someone why they feel fearful, that person might respond that they are fearful
because they believe that the Earth will be hit by a giant meteorite and that this
would be a catastrophe. We see that, in such a situation, fear is the result of a
positive belief about a particular event (such as the belief that the event will happen
or is already happening) and a negative attitude towards it.
The opinion is the assignment of a truth or alethic value to a sentence. For
example, one may believe that the Earth is flat if one believes that the sentence
“The Earth is flat” is true and, in contrast, one may not believe this statement if one
believes it to be false. Thus, opinions can vary between being positive or negative.
Attitude, conversely, reflects the ethical evaluation, right or wrong, of a statement.
Thus, for instance, one might think it is okay for the Earth to be flat, hence
expressing a favorable attitude towards this view. Attitudes, in turn, can be
favorable or unfavorable. The attitudes can finally be reduced to opinions about the
appropriate ethical statements. For example, it is equivalent to regard the fact that
the Earth is flat as positive or to believe that the statement “It is beneficial that the
Earth is flat” is true.
Conclusively, we see that emotional states derive from relationships between the
subject and statements or facts. A statement considered true is accepted in an
alethic sense, while one considered false is rejected. Similarly, a statement
involving a fact perceived as good is accepted in an ethical sense, while one that is
the opposite is rejected. On the basis of statements accepted or rejected alethically
or ethically, the subject is in various emotional states.
An emotional state is correct when both the opinion and the associated attitude are
considered correct. An opinion is considered correct when the sentence it
represents is considered true, and an attitude is considered correct when the fact or
situation being evaluated receives an appropriate ethical value from the subject.
Accordingly, an emotional state becomes incorrect if the opinion or attitude that
comprise it is considered incorrect.
The sender may induce disinformation by conveying messages that incite the
interlocutor to adopt incorrect opinions or attitudes. This indicates that
disinformation is not exclusively about factual accuracy. A sender could

51
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS Vol. 16, No. 2/2023

disseminate correct information that nevertheless implies an incorrect ethical

assessment.
For instance, during a campaign aimed at promoting tobacco consumption, the
public was given the message C = “Most doctors prefer Camel cigarettes”. Under
the circumstances, message C was true, as several surveys showed that doctors who
smoked mostly preferred Camel cigarettes. However, this was an act of
disinformation, as the purpose of the message was to provoke a favorable attitude
towards tobacco consumption, although such an attitude would not have been
correct. The sender thus sought to induce an incorrect emotional state in the
recipients, even if the message was true (Glaeser & Ujhelyi, 2006, p. 4).
Taking a sender’s perspective, the issue of the possibility of disinformation, or
more precisely, under what conditions it becomes possible, is raised. Simplistically
speaking, in what situations can we cause people to adopt incorrect emotional
states? We note that emotional states can be divided into opinions and attitudes,
which are essentially a type of opinion. Therefore, the question of possible
disinformation narrows down to the question under what conditions we can
influence the formation of incorrect opinions.
The possibility of disinformation
Defining disinformation as causing or influencing opinions makes it impossible.
The disseminator of disinformation has no means of inducing someone to adopt a
particular opinion, whether correct or not. The development of opinions is subject
to the principle of doxastic freedom, which states that opinions are created freely
and there are no external factors that determine their formation; the individual
freely assigns truth value to a particular sentence. Disinformation would appear not
to be possible under this light, as the subject adopts an opinion without external
influence.
Nevertheless, disinformation is possible in a weaker form, as influencing the
subject to adopt certain opinions. The disinformer cannot produce a particular
opinion to the subject, but can influence him to adopt the desired opinion, which
may be wrong. Disinformation as persuasion is possible because of the principle of
opinion determination, according to which an unbiased opinion is always incorrect.
When we talk about an undifferentiated opinion, we mean the absence of
attribution of a certain truth value to a sentence. However, in any context,
sentences have a specific truth value. Therefore, if in a given context, the

52
ISSN: 2065-0272 RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES

individual does not assign a particular truth value to a sentence, he will be in a state
of uncertainty. Realizing that he would like to avoid mistakes, the individual will
establish the truth value of sentences, especially those that are relevant to his
domain of interest.
Through the principle of opinion determination, the disinformer can send messages
that present the acceptance or rejection of a statement as correct or, conversely, as
erroneous, and thus influence the subject to accept or reject the statement. For
instance, in order to influence the acceptance of a sentence, P, the sender may
convey a message presenting a sentence accepted by the subject as a sufficient
condition of sentence P. In this case, if the subject were to reject P, then its system
of opinions would become inconsequential, it would contain erroneously accepted
or rejected sentences. The sender can use the subject’s belief system to influence
the subject to accept or reject any sentence (Marsh & Yang, 2018, p. 22).
Disinformation, however, does not guarantee that its objectives will be achieved,
and the person affected may not accept the false information. Regardless of the
techniques used, the disseminator of disinformation cannot be sure of success, due
to the principle of doxastic freedom. Even when the disseminator argues for a
particular statement P, based on the subject’s system of opinions, the subject
remains free to accept or reject the statement P, even if this could lead to an
inconsistency or reconfiguration of his or her system of opinions.
Rationale for disinformation
Due to doxastic freedom, the receiver of a message can accept it or not, but due to
the principle of opinion determination, he cannot avoid the peril of error.
Therefore, for the receiver of a message, the crucial issue is whether acceptance or
rejection of the message is justified. A message is justified if it does not introduce
errors into the receiver’s system of opinions. The receiver is faced with the
question whether there is any criterion by which to decide whether a message is
justified or not (Legg, 2018, p. 48).
The receiver, faced with a received message, is free to decide whether to accept or
reject that message. By choosing to accept the message, he will adjust his system of
opinions according to the information received. In addition, he will use the
message to make decisions and guide his actions, adapting his behavior
accordingly. There is however a possibility that, when the message is the result of
disinformation, the receiver may adopt views that do not serve his own interests. In

53
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS Vol. 16, No. 2/2023

such cases, their actions may do more harm than good, because in situations of
disinformation, the messages conveyed are usually in the interests of the sender
rather than the receiver.
In the case of a public communication, there is no general interest of the receivers
of the message because the audience is on the one hand diverse and on the other
hand unorganized. Because of the diversity, the interests of audience members are
different and, due to the lack of an organized structure, no common or public
interest can be identified. In practice, when the idea of public interest or public
interest is invoked in a public communication context, it can be seen that it serves
particular interests rather than a common general interest.
Under these circumstances, in order to be in conformity with its own interests, the
rational receiver should accept only those messages that are justified, i.e. are in
conformity with its interests. Of course, truth is always in accordance with the
interests of the receiver, but only that truth which corresponds to the receiver’s own
states. Therefore, messages that are justified for a given receiver are those that are
true, but we have in mind the truth corresponding to the context in which the
evaluator finds himself at the time (Trevors, 2019, p. 59).
Once disinformation uses acts of communication, it would seem that a primary
justifying factor is the sender or source of the message. For a message to be validly
accepted on the basis of the source, the sender should have the truth conditions of
the message and not intend to disinform. The receiver cannot verify either of these
conditions, so the thesis that we could justify accepting or rejecting a message on
the basis of the source or sender of the message cannot be sustained. No matter
how “reputable” such a source may be, or how knowledgeable the sender may be,
it does not constitute an argument to justify messages coming from it, because the
conditions of justification cannot be verified (Fuller, 2018, p. 19).
The only aspect to which the receiver can relate to the source of the message is its
interests, since the interests can be identified by an outside observer. The receiver
can assume, depending on the interests of the source, whether he is the victim of
disinformation and, if so, reject the message (Grundman, 2021, p. 136.).
The receiver comes into contact only with the message, therefore, in order to
justify their opinions, the receiver is able to analyze the message. First, the message
must be interpreted or understood, i.e. the receiver establishes its truth conditions
(Bernecker, 2021, p. 20). The receiver will then apply the criteria of truthfulness to

54
ISSN: 2065-0272 RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES

the message in its various contexts of interest to determine in which of these

contexts the conditions are met, and thus the message can be considered true.
Through this process, the receiver can determine in which circumstances it is
justified to accept the message.
The conditions of veracity of a message may be sufficient or necessary. If a
sufficient condition occurs, the message is true, and if a necessary condition does
not occur, the message must be rejected as false. For example, in December 1989,
the radio station Europa Liberă broadcast the message that there were 60 000
victims during the repression of the Timisoara Revolution. Even a cursory analysis
of such a message reveals its falsity, because for almost a quarter of Timișoara’s
population to have disappeared would have required a major disaster. However,
such a necessary condition for the truth of the message did not occur. The
message’s broadcasters only sought to influence, incorrectly, the emotional states
of the listeners (Narita, 2022, p. 20).
The subsequent arguments put forward by the management of the radio station,
which stated that the news was based on messages from Romanian officials, are not
supported, because, as we have noted, we cannot validate a message solely on the
basis of its source. The radio station could have carried out a simple analysis of the
message and found that it could not be considered true, and thus refrained from
broadcasting it.
The relationship between media ownership concentration and disinformation is
significant because the public is manipulated and misled according to the interests
of those who control the media. In these circumstances, misinformation has the
power to influence the public’s choices and perspectives and can alter a citizen’s
opinion on certain topics.
In the Republic of Moldova, it is essential to distinguish between external and
internal sources of propaganda and disinformation.
Disinformation from external sources focuses mainly on anti-Western messages,
targeting institutions such as the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the United States. Typically, in the run-up to elections
in Moldova, a common disinformation narrative supports the idea that the West is
interfering in and influencing Moldova’s electoral processes. The spread of
external propaganda increased significantly with the outbreak of the conflict in
Ukraine. After the Russian army invaded Ukraine in February 2022, disinformation

55
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS Vol. 16, No. 2/2023

about Ukrainian refugees spread rapidly; it manifested itself in the dissemination of

false information and the promotion of speeches inciting inter-ethnic hatred.
During this difficult period, the level of internal disinformation has increased
significantly. Dissemination of internal propaganda is carried out by various
entities, including politicians, media sources linked to certain political orientations,
pro-Kremlin oriented organizations and/or individuals with Eurosceptic attitudes.
This year, the main medium for spreading disinformation has been the messaging
application Telegram, which connects users in Moldova with other Internet users in
the region and in other countries. Through these and similar platforms, politically
affiliated media representatives, politicians or their supporters frequently pick up
chat conversations and spread false information. Disinformation from these sources
often reflects narratives specific to Kremlin propaganda, including ideas that
NATO and the US are responsible for the war in Ukraine, that the Americans are
funding biological weapons labs in neighboring countries, and that deny
documented incidents of pregnant women being treated in hospitals hit by Russian
troops in Mariupol.
Disinformation shockwaves in 2022 have had a significant impact on the
population of Moldova. Over the twenty months since the conflict in Ukraine
began, Promo-LEX has monitored and analyzed online media, television, social
networks and public statements by political actors and opinion leaders. Their
findings are alarming: ‘Hate speech and incitement to discrimination’ were the
most frequent topics encountered in hate speech rhetoric, with a focus on
nationality. “In the context of the war in Ukraine and the influx of refugees, hate
speech and incitement to discrimination or other forms of intolerance have been
directed at the group represented by Ukrainians, including Ukrainian politicians
and military personnel, refugees of various ethnicities - and by extension at citizens
of the United States and Romania.” During the monitoring period, the primary
platform for spreading hate speech was Telegram, and disinformation directed
against Ukrainian refugees was also disseminated via TikTok.

56
ISSN: 2065-0272 RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES

3. Conclusions
Concern about the phenomenon of misinformation is growing both nationally and
internationally, and it represents a significant challenge for authorities, civil
society, researchers and journalists. In open democratic societies, public debate and
accurate information allow well-informed citizens to express their will in free and
fair political processes. Quality media play a crucial role in providing citizens with
the information they need to form opinions and actively engage in democratic
society. In the European Union, democracy is based on free and independent
media. Easy access to diverse and reliable information can stimulate participation
in democratic processes, providing opportunities for all citizens to get involved.
The Internet has profoundly changed the way people access and manage news,
increasing the volume and diversity of information available. The article examined
the European approach to disinformation, highlighting research by European
authorities and recent studies in the Republic of Moldova on the subject.
The phenomenon of disinformation can be mitigated with the support and
collaboration of government institutions, academia, the media and civil society. To
this regard, we propose some recommendations: Implement effective national and
international algorithm-based security information systems to counter this
phenomenon. Professional standards for ethical and responsible journalistic
practices are an important shield against strategic disinformation and the
distribution of incorrect information. Thus, media outlets, in their desire to attract
audiences, should be more vigilant about information sources and image
manipulation. For consumers, it is essential to access information from multiple
credible media sources and to adopt a critical attitude towards any information.

References
Bernecker, S. (2021). An Epistemic Defence of News Abstinence. In Bernecker, S.; Flowerree, A. K.
& Grundmann, T. The Epistemology of Fake News, p. 20. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bernecker, S.; Flowerree, A. K. & Grundmann, T. (2021). „Introduction”. The Epistemology of Fake
News. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cao Juan, S. P.; Sheng, Q.; Yang, T.; Guo, J. & Li, J. (2020). Exploring the Role of Visual Content in
Fake News Detection. Disinformation, Misinformation, and Fake News in Social Media.
Fuller, S. (2018). How Can Philosophy Teach Us about the Post-Truth Condition. Post-Truth, Fake
News, 19.

57
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS Vol. 16, No. 2/2023

Glaeser, E. L. & Ujhelyi, G. (2006). Regulating Misinformation. NBER Working Paper Series, 4.
Green, M. C. & Donahue, J. K. (2018). The effects of false information in news stories. In Southwell,
B.; Thorson, E. & Sheble, L. Misinformation and Mass Audiences, p. 116. Austin: University of
Texas Press.
Grundman, T. (2021). Facing Epistemic Authorities. In Bernecker, S.; Flowerree, A. K. &
Grundmann, T. The Epistemology of Fake News, p. 136. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Legg, C. (2018). The Solution to Poor Opinion is More Opinions: Peircean Pragmatist Tactics for the
Epistemic Long Game. In Peters, M.; Rider, S.; Besley, T. & Hyvonen, M. Post-Truth, Fake News:
Viral Modernity & Higher Education, p. 43. Singapore: Springer.
Marsh, E. J., & Yang, B. W. (2018). Believing Things that are not True. Misinformation and Mass
Audiences, 22.
Narita, I. (2022). The Epistemology of Misinformation. International Scientific Conference European
Union Security Strategy in the context of the Metamorphoses of International Relations, p. 20.
Chisinau.
Trevors, G. T. (2019). Psychological Tribes and Processes: Understanding why and how
Misinformation Persists. Misinformation and Fake News in Education, 59.

58