The “Rebirth” of Hizbollah:

Analyzing the 2009 Manifesto

Benedetta Berti

Hizbollah’s secretary general Hassan Nasrallah surprised many people

when, during a live press conference in Beirut on November 30, 2009,
he personally announced and read the organization’s new “Manifesto.”
Significantly, the Manifesto is only the second ideological platform
published by Hizbollah and was issued twenty-four years after the
original “Open Letter,” which was the main tool to present the group’s
weltanschauung to the world over the previous decades. Composed of an
introduction and three chapters – on the state of the world (“Domination
and Hegemony”), the group’s domestic policy (“Lebanon”), and its view
on the Arab-Israeli conflict (“Palestine and Compromise Negotiations”)
– the Manifesto reflects the political and military evolution of the
organization since the 1985 Letter and explains the group’s strategic
vision for the future.
The Manifesto, which was presented during the seventh political
conference of the organization,1 generated a wide spectrum of reactions
both within Lebanon and worldwide. While many observers interpreted
the document as an incontrovertible sign of Hizbollah’s process of
“moderation” and full political integration in the Lebanese system, others
countered that the platform did not include any substantial changes, either
ideological or strategic. The essay below focuses on the political context
that prompted Hizbollah to release its new declaration of principles as
well as the contents of the document, and draws conclusions on whether
the Manifesto marks a true organizational “rebirth.”

Benedetta Berti, Neubauer research fellow at INSS

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Understanding the Timing: Hizbollah and the Lebanese Arena
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The release of Hizbollah’s new ideological platform should be seen in

the context of the group’s post-electoral efforts to reposition itself within
Lebanon. Despite the fact that the Hizbollah-led opposition forces
lost the June 2009 parliamentary elections to the incumbent March 14
coalition, the elections still awarded Hizbollah thirteen parliamentary
seats and reconfirmed the political importance and popular support of
the Lebanese-Shia armed organization. Indeed, on the basis of votes cast,
Hizbollah was the clear winner at the polls, earning almost 55 percent
of the ballots. In the aftermath of the elections, the opposition forces
were able to leverage this political power to insist on greater political
participation and block the formation of the new executive cabinet for
months by demanding at least eleven of the thirty available cabinet seats
– which in the Lebanese political system amounts to effective veto power.
In the end, the elected government agreed to form a “unity cabinet”
composed of fifteen members of the March 14 coalition, ten members
from the Hizbollah-led opposition, and five independent candidates
appointed by President Michel Suleiman.2 As a
Hizbollah did not release result, Hizbollah obtained three seats in the new
its renewed ideological cabinet: the ministry of agriculture, the ministry
of administrative reforms, and the ministry of
platform during a
youth and sports.3 This agreement is acceptable
phase of weakness or
to Hizbollah, which can now count on the support
as an “accommodation of the “independent” candidates to prevent the
tool.” Even though the elected government from implementing reforms
group lost the elections, that would hurt the organization’s strategic
Hizbollah’s political interests.
In other words, despite the electoral defeat,
role within Lebanon is
Hizbollah’s current position in the Lebanese
now more entrenched political arena is still solid and strong: the group
than ever before. In this and its political allies forced the elected majority
sense, the declaration of to agree to rule under the banner of “national
principles was formulated unity,” thus applying their political power and
leverage well beyond that of a typical opposition
from a position of power.
party. In this sense, an additional important sign
of Hizbollah’s current political status in the post-electoral phase is
the recent adoption by the new executive cabinet of a joint statement
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supporting Hizbollah’s “resistance.” On December 1, 2009, Information

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Minister Tareq Mitri announced that the cabinet had approved a
statement affirming “the right of Lebanon, its people, its army, and its
resistance to liberate the occupied Lebanese territory in Shab’a and Kfar
Shouba hills.”4
Understanding Hizbollah’s current status and political role is a
crucial first step in assessing the strategy and potential impact of the
new Manifesto. In fact, Hizbollah did not – contrary to what several
commentators have suggested – release its renewed ideological platform
during a phase of weakness, as an “accommodation tool.” Even though
the group lost the elections, Hizbollah’s political role within Lebanon
is now more entrenched than ever before, both through the national
unity agenda and the executive cabinet, and through the government’s
guarantee that it would not (and cannot) actively pursue Hizbollah’s
disarmament. In this sense, the declaration of principles was formulated
from a position of power, and it reflects this reality.

Hizbollah and the World: Foreign Policy in 1985 and 2009

There is undoubtedly deep continuity in both content, and to a lesser
extent language, in Hizbollah’s view of the world and its adversaries as
expressed in the 2009 Manifesto and the original document, the 1985
Letter.
The first declaration of principles, which many consider to be
Hizbollah’s ideological foundation, was published on February 16,
1985, following the creation of the group in the early 1980s. Formulated
in the midst of both the Lebanese civil war and the Israeli intervention
in the country, the group’s document reflected a Manichean view of the
world, divided between the forces of evil, namely the West and its local
allies, and the Party of God. More specifically, the 1985 Letter rejected
all foreign presence and interference within Lebanon and the Muslim
umma in general, and maintained the need both to repel the presence and
corrupting influence of the West on the Islamic world and to fight until
the final destruction of the State of Israel.5
The 2009 Manifesto adopts and develops these same concepts,
showing, however, a greater degree of political sophistication. For
instance, while in the 1985 Letter Hizbollah refers to the United States
and the West as an evil and oppressive force on the Muslim world, the
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2009 declaration of principles describes the US world plan in terms
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of seeking global “hegemony” and emphasizes the negative impact

of globalization on the Muslim and Arab identity.6 In other words,
although strikingly similar in content, the 2009 document reflects the
organization’s growing understanding of international politics and
its attempt to employ terminology and notions that are commonly
associated with the “anti-globalization” and “leftist” movements, in an
effort to transcend its national and regional boundaries and identify as
an international movement.
To support this endeavor to be increasingly “global,” for example,
Hizbollah clearly associates itself with the “independent and free
endeavor that opposes hegemony in Latin American states,” and
notes the common contribution to “building a more balanced and just
international system.”7 Similarly, the organization now adopts a more
nuanced approach towards Europe, and instead of as in 1985 openly
attacking it, it chooses to criticize Europeans for their “subjugation to US
policies,” while reminding them of their “special responsibility pursuant
to the colonial heritage” inflicted on the region, and recalling Europe’s
“long history with resisting the occupier.”8
In the 2009 platform, Hizbollah also openly acknowledges its regional
allies – another important political element that was absent in the 1985
Letter and that signals the group’s self-perception as part of the regional
resistance axis. First, it declares that “Syria has recorded a firm distinctive
attitude in the struggle with the Israeli enemy, supported the resistance
movements in the region, and stood beside us in the most difficult
circumstances,” adding “the need to adhere to the distinguished relations
between Lebanon and Syria.”9 While continuing to push Lebanon towards
Syria, Hizbollah also reiterates its political and ideological alliance with
Iran. Yet apart from this open acknowledgment of the crucial regional
role of Iran and its core contribution to the “resistance,” the Manifesto
remains silent with respect to the role that the Islamic Republic has
played in supporting Hizbollah and its political-military development.
The absence of reference to the strategic partnership between Iran
and Hizbollah stems from the organization’s need to assert itself as a
Lebanese national movement, and to downplay those who describe
the group as an Iranian puppet. Directed at the national audience, the
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Manifesto balances the need to cite the existing links with Iran with the

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need to portray Hizbollah as an independent Lebanese actor.
The other main theme that Hizbollah has retained unaltered in content
since 1985 is its view of the State of Israel. Israel was the organization’s
primary enemy and its raison d’être since its foundation in the early
1980s, and it is identified with the West’s attempts to take over the Muslim
world. Capitalizing on traditional Shia themes such as martyrdom and
oppression, Hizbollah defines its struggle against Israel in existential-
defensive terms: “Israel represents an eternal threat to Lebanon. The
role of the resistance is a national necessity as long as Israeli threats and
ambitions to seize our lands and water continue.”10 On this subject, it is
clear that there has not been any significant change, both in content and
form, and that Hizbollah’s prime organizational duty to this day remains
“resistance.” Similarly, twenty-four years of organizational development
and political integration have not led to any shift in Hizbollah’s fervent
opposition to any negotiated agreement between Israel and the Arab
world. The group continues in its “absolute refusal to [accept] the very
principle of the choice of settlement with the
Zionist entity, which is based on recognizing the Hizbollah in 2009 is a
legitimacy and existence of this entity and giving more politically savvy,
up to it the lands it usurped from Arab and Islamic integrated, and powerful
Palestine.”11 Predictably, Palestinian groups
party and a greater
reacted positively to these statements, with Islamic
military force than
Jihad representatives declaring their support for
Hizbollah and asking people in the Arab world in 1985. At the same
to rally behind the document. Similarly, Hamas time, there is a basic
spokesperson Fawzi Barhum declared: “This organizational continuity
shows that we can strengthen the Arab and in content and strategic
Islamic resistance front to face all challenges….It
priorities, and it seems
also shows that we can reinforce the Palestinian
people’s right to resist the Zionist enemy.”12 excessive to assert that
In sum, Hizbollah’s foreign policy has not it has undergone a
changed in its substance between 1985 and 2009, “strategic rebirth.”
and countries that deal with the organization –
including Israel – should be mindful of this strategic continuity. At the
same time, some of the terminology now employed by the organization
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shows a growing internal push to transcend its exclusive regional identity
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and be recognized at the international level.

Hizbollah in Lebanon: Domestic Policy in 1985 and 2009

In contrast to Hizbollah’s foreign policy, which shows remarkable
continuity throughout its development, the organization’s view of its
role within Lebanon has shifted quite considerably since its original 1985
formulation.
In the Open Letter, Hizbollah stated its desire to establish an Islamic
state within Lebanon, and rejected the possibility of participating in
what it saw as the inherently corrupt existing political system.13 In the
organization’s weltanschauung, the creation of this Lebanese Islamic
state, to be modeled after Iran, would be only the first step towards the
establishment of a larger pan-Islamic state that would unite all Muslims
in the region under the same government.14 Significantly, the 2009
Manifesto omits the call to create an Islamic state, and recognizes that the
Lebanese political system is the most suitable environment for Hizbollah
to operate in.
In truth, however, this shift in domestic priorities does not come as a
surprise to those who have observed Hizbollah’s political evolution over
the past decades. In fact, as early as 1992, when the organization first
decided to join the political system and participate in the parliamentary
elections, it had started to underplay the goal of creating an Islamic state,
describing it as a long term desideratum more than a practical, political
objective and in effect recognizing that the political reality of Lebanon
did not allow for the realization of an Islamic republic.15 Moreover, even
though the 1985 program was very specific as to what constituted the
final political goal for the organization in Lebanon, the Letter was not
as precise in describing Hizbollah’s means to achieve the creation of the
model Islamic state. Furthermore, it clearly stated that the leaders called
“for the implementation of the Islamic system based on a direct and
free choice of the people, and not through forceful imposition as may be
assumed by some.”16 This assertion, together with Hizbollah’s numerous
references to the importance of the principle of non-compulsion in
Islam (whereby no one should be forcibly converted to Islam),17 had
already allowed the organization a great degree of ideological flexibility
in adapting its original agenda to changing strategic priorities. In this
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sense, publically evading the goal of creating an Islamic state is more a

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confirmation of an ongoing trend and recognition of Lebanon’s political
reality than a strategic change.
Similarly, the new ideological platform lends prominence to a series
of political themes that Hizbollah developed in the past two decades,
such as the importance of administrative decentralization and the open
objection to both federalism and the current sectarian system.18 The
document in fact affirms: “The main problem in the Lebanese political
system which prevents its reform, development, and constant updating is
political sectarianism.”19 While ranking the abolition of confessionalism
among its key priorities, Hizbollah also claims that until the achievement
of this goal, “the consensual democracy will remain the fundamental
basis for governance in Lebanon.”20 This point is particularly important,
as one can detect here an expression of Hizbollah’s new understanding
of its political power and subsequent status in Lebanon. By stressing
the need for a consensual democracy and a national unity government,
the document’s message is that Hizbollah sees itself as a major political
player and that regardless of the electoral results, the government must
take this reality into consideration and rule by agreement with Hizbollah.
This is exactly the result produced by the 2009 elections, where the
majority coalition cannot actually govern without a larger alliance with
the Hizbollah-led opposition forces.21
Lebanese reactions to these claims varied widely, from praising and
appreciating Hizbollah’s “soft-spoken” tone and its numerous references
to the importance of “democracy,”22 to openly recognizing Hizbollah’s
growing interest in political power. In this context, a statement of the
March 14 forces sharply criticized the group’s demands, by charging that
they “suspended the constitution itself under the headline of consensual
democracy instead of the parliamentary democracy.”23
Another important point that emerges in the Manifesto is Hizbollah’s
vision of its military role in Lebanon. On this front, the group is extremely
clear about its intention to continue to maintain its armed structure and its
refusal to even discuss disarmament. For instance, the document reads:
“The continuous Israeli threats oblige Lebanon to endorse a defensive
strategy that couples between a popular resistance that participates in
defending the country and an army that preserves the security of the
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country and safeguards its security and stability in a complementary
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process that has proved in the previous phase to be successful.”24

This statement is extremely interesting for a number of reasons. First,
it shows that since 1985, Hizbollah has moved from considering the
Lebanese army as an enemy to treating it as a de facto auxiliary force. In
this sense, the expectation that the armed forces will have the capacity
or interest to turn this cooperative relationship into a confrontational
one in order to pursue an eventual disarmament of the Lebanese-Shia
organization seems unrealistic at best. Second, this paragraph downplays
the efforts of the National Dialogue Council, created to investigate issues
such as finding national solutions to Hizbollah’s weapons, or any project
calling for the group’s dissolution into the armed forces. Here Hizbollah is
clear in affirming that it agrees to carry out its “resistance” in cooperation
with the army, but that it intends to remain a separate and autonomous
entity. This point was also criticized in a statement by the majority
March 14 forces: “On the issue of defending the homeland against the
occupation and foreign attacks, the document of Hizbollah has entrusted
this mission with the Islamic resistance in Lebanon and made the state,
the army, and the people as backers to it….As for the national army, the
only mission it has is to protect the rear lines of the resistance under the
headline of maintaining internal stability….On this issue, the document
of Hizbollah contradicts the Ta’if agreement, which entrusts the state
with the mission of liberation.”25

Hizbollah in 2009: New Trends and Old Themes

By closely analyzing the content of the 2009 ideological and political
platform and comparing it to the 1985 Open Letter, it is clear that the
Manifesto is not a mere replacement of the older document in different
terms. Hizbollah has changed and adapted to its new political and
security environment; as Secretary General Nasrallah admitted: “We
have no problem or any complex about describing what happened – be it
development or transformation. This is natural. People develop. Indeed,
the entire world has changed in the past twenty-four years.”26 Hizbollah
in 2009 is a more politically savvy, integrated, and powerful party and
a greater military force than in 1985. At the same time, there is a basic
organizational continuity in content and strategic priorities, as well as
in the main ideological references. In this sense, the group maintains
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its strong Islamic identity throughout the text, and it seems excessive to

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assert that it has undergone a “strategic rebirth.”
First, in terms of foreign policy, Hizbollah shows complete continuity
both regarding its worldview and its strategic goals; however, the group
has learned how to convey these ideas in a more politically savvy way.
By relating its struggle to other non-Islamic movements (for instance by
mentioning a continuity of goals with Latin American anti-US policies)
and by employing “anti-globalization” terminology, the organization
attempts to gain an even more international identity and support. At
the same time, Hizbollah’s goals with respect to Israel have remained
unaltered, and so has its complete opposition to any negotiated solution
to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The international community, including
Israel, should expect the organization to attempt to block any progress in
this direction, acting as spoiler whenever possible.
Second, the group showed a certain degree of change in terms of its
domestic policy. Hizbollah finally recognized that the Lebanese political
system is the best arena for the organization to develop in, and has thereby
forfeited its goal to create an Islamic state. However, this statement
reflects Hizbollah’s increased political power and status within Lebanon,
and should not be interpreted as a sign of weakness or retreat. The group
has in fact become so entrenched in the political system that it now
demands increased decision making power, for example by insisting
on a “consensual democracy formula.” Finally, the group maintains a
“business as usual” posture with respect to its armed wing: specifying in
the Manifesto its intention to remain a separate and autonomous armed
group, and to retain its weapons and resistance. Again, the document
shows the growing power of the organization and dismisses any internal
talks about military integration, let alone disarmament.

Notes
1 “Nasrallah Announces Today the ‘Rebirth’ of Hizbollah,” As-Safir, Novem-
ber 30, 2009 (translation by MidEast Wire).
2 “Without National Consensus New Cabinet Will Achieve Nothing,” Agence
France Presse, November 11, 2009.
3 “Lebanon’s New Government,” International Foundation for Electoral Systems,
November 9, 2009, http://www.ifes.org/publication/38e87b372599cdff387c7
6fd022fb123/Lebanons_new_government.pdf.
4 “Hizbollah Has Right To Keep Arms: Government,” al-Arabiya.net, Decem-
ber 1, 2009.
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5 Hizbollah, Open Letter, February 16, 1985. Cited in Jerusalem Quarterly 48,
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Fall 1988, http://www.standwithus.com/pdfs/flyers/hezbollah_program.

pdf .
6 “Lebanese Hizbollah Leader Outlines Party’s Foreign, Domestic Policy,” al-
Manar TV, December 1, 2009, (provided by BBC Worldwide Monitoring).
7 The Political Document (Manifesto) of Hizbollah 2009 AC /1430 H,” Novem-
ber 30, 2009, Syrian News Station, http://sns.sy/sns/?path=news/read/7187.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 “Palestinian Factions Back Lebanese Hizbollah’s Political Document,” al-
Manar TV, December 1, 2009, (provided by BBC Worldwide Monitoring).
13 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2007), pp. 37-40.
14 Amal Saad-Gorayeb, Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion (London: Pluto Press,
2002), pp. 34-36.
15 Mona Harb and Reinoud Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah ‘Terror-
ism’ and the Polities of Perception,” Third World Quarterly 6, no. 1 (2005):
179.
16 Hizbollah, Open Letter, 1985, p. 20.
17 Saad-Gorayeb, Hizbu’llah: Politics and Religion, p. 49.
18 Franklin Lamb, “Hezbollah’s New Manifesto: The ‘Rebirth,’” The Palestine
Chronicle, December 2, 2009.
19 The Political Document (Manifesto) of Hizbollah 2009.
20 Ibid.
21 Hassan Haidar, “Hizbollah’s New System,” Dar Al Hayat-International Edi-
tion, December 3, 2009.
22 Jean Aziz, “On Hizbollah’s document,” Al-Akhbar, December 1, 2009,
http://www.al-akhbar.com/ar/node/167443.
23 “14 March Forces Criticize Hizbollah Political Document,” Lebanese Na-
tional News Agency, December 3, 2009, emphasis added.
24 The Political Document (Manifesto) of Hizbollah 2009.
25 “14 March Forces Criticize Hizbollah Political Document.”
26 “Nasrallah Press Conference after Reading of Manifesto,” MidEast Wire,
November 30, 2009.