COMMENTARY HEZBOLLAH’S SHORTSIGHTED STRATEGY FOR THE WAR IN GAZA

Hezbollah’s Shortsighted Strategy

for the War in Gaza
HILAL KHASHAN
American University of Beirut, Lebanon
ORCID No: 0009-0000-9865-6777

ABSTRACT This commentary argues that Hezbollah felt duty-bound to

open a front in Southern Lebanon to ease Israel’s military pressure
on Hamas. Hezbollah indicated that its participation in the war will
continue until reaching a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, appar-
ently expecting the hostilities to last only for a few weeks. However,
the war dragged on for months as Israel pledged to keep it going until
destroying Hamas and, contrary to what Hezbollah expected, push-
ing it away from the border area to ensure the safety of its residents
in the upper Galilee settlements. The fighting in Southern Lebanon
turned into a war of attrition against Hezbollah as Israel eliminated
most of its field commanders by drone attacks. Should Israel succeed
in evicting Hezbollah from the border area, it would lose its claim to
resistance to liberate Lebanese territory still occupied by Israel, in-
creasing the pressure on it to disarm like all other Lebanese factions
when the civil war ended in 1989.

Keywords: Hezbollah, Unity of the Fronts, Iran, Lebanon, Israel, Hamas

Insight Turkey 2024

Vol. 26 / No. 2 / pp. 35-44

Received Date: 29/4/2024 • Accepted Date: 2/6/2024 • DOI: 10.25253/99.2024262.3

2024 Sprıng 35
COMMENTARY HILAL KHASHAN

H
amas’ decision to launch Op- and that his party’s measures aimed
eration al-Aqsa Flood on Is- at lending support to Gaza mainly by
rael last October took Hezbol- forcing one-third of the Israeli mili-
lah by surprise since all indicators at tary to deploy near the border with
the time suggested that Hamas ought Lebanon. He warned that Israel’s war
pacification with Israel and focused, on Gaza would blow up the entire
instead, on managing Gaza and con- region and that he would not go into
solidating its rule over the besieged details about the battlefield decisions
sector, the world’s most congested that Hezbollah intended to take, pre-
territory. Hezbollah was in no way ferring to leave Israel confused.
interested in fighting Israel, despite
its pompous claims to the contrary. Hezbollah has been using the claim
Hezbollah’s anti-Israel role ended in of resistance to Israeli occupation and
2000 when it pulled out unilaterally its purported claim of achieving a de-
from Southern Lebanon without even terrent military capability vis-à-vis
reaching an agreement with Lebanon. the Jewish state to camouflage its sta-
Since then, the occasional minor at- tus as Iran’s premier regional proxy.
tacks it launched on Northern Israel Its decision to open a secondary front
aimed at swapping Lebanese prison- of solidarity with Hamas turned out
ers with Israelis to justify the useful- to be a miscalculated gambit, and it
ness of its military wing for Lebanese fell into Israel’s trap. Its ideological
factions that resented its failure to dis- affinity with Iran did not shield it
arm like all other local militias. While against Israeli retaliation, revealing
Hezbollah continued to express its ul- Iran’s military weakness and aversion
timate objective of driving Israel from to military confrontation. Stuck in its
still-occupied Lebanese territory in conflict with Israel, Hezbollah now
the South, it practically served as faces severe domestic challenges to
Iran’s leading regional proxy in serv- disarm like all other Lebanese fac-
ing the interests of the Islamic Repub- tions that gave up their arms at the
lic, mainly in Syria and Iraq.1 end of the civil war in 1989.

This commentary argues that Hez-

bollah’s involvement in the fighting Hezbollah as Iran’s Premier
seemed perfunctory since fighting Regional Proxy
Israel was not a priority and it was
entirely preoccupied with domestic Hezbollah cannot admit that it is
and regional issues utterly unrelated no longer an anti-Israel resistance
to conflict with Israel or liberating movement for reasons of popular le-
Lebanese territory still occupied by it. gitimacy and justification for its sur-
In his first speech a month after the vival as a military group. Hezbollah is
start of the war in Gaza, Hezbollah more than just an ordinary party with
Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah an armed component; instead, it is a
clarified that Hamas’ operation was faction in the Iranian Revolutionary
a 100 percent Palestinian decision Guard Corps. It is faithful to the di-

36 Insight Turkey
 HEZBOLLAH’S SHORTSIGHTED STRATEGY FOR THE WAR IN GAZA

rectives of Iran’s Supreme Leader, an

integral part of his regional project, Hezbollah has been using the
and a vital component of the Islamic
Republic’s strategic depth strategy.2 claim of resistance to Israeli
Nasrallah admits that Hezbollah’s occupation and its purported
weapons, funding, and food come
from Iran and proudly says that he
claim of achieving a deterrent
is a soldier in the army of Ayatollah military capability vis-à-vis
Khamenei.3 the Jewish state to camouflage
The war in Gaza put Hezbollah in its status as Iran’s premier
a dangerous dilemma. Its failure regional proxy
to support Hamas by opening the
Southern Lebanon front would have
led to the elimination of what Iran
called the Unity of Fronts, i.e., simul- lah could watch Hamas fight alone
taneously opening the Gaza, Leba- against a disproportionately more
non, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen fronts powerful adversary. Hezbollah linked
against Israel. Failure to act would the cessation of attacks against Israel
have exposed Iran’s slogans before its to ending the fighting in Gaza. It got
popular base in the region. On the into trouble because Israel insisted on
other hand, Hezbollah’s joining the destroying Hamas and demanding
war would invite an Israeli response that Hezbollah abandon the border
beyond Hezbollah’s ability to with- demarcation line. Israel has been es-
stand, leading to terminating the ex- calating its attacks on Hezbollah and
isting rules of engagement between has made it clear that it is determined
Israel and Hezbollah. Furthermore, to establish a buffer zone on the Leb-
hostilities in the South would reignite anese side of the border.
the internal debate in Lebanon about
the necessity of disarming Hezbollah The Unity of Fronts, which includes
due to the threat it poses to the coun- the Iranian-led Axis of Resistance,
try’s security and safety. goes back to the Battle of Saif al-
Quds, which Hamas launched in
Iran views Hezbollah as its most val- May 2021 in response to the Israeli
ued strategic regional asset. It rea- violations of the al-Aqsa Mosque.
soned against fully involving it in The Unity of the Fronts has gained
the war between Hamas and Israel, momentum since the Hamas attack
choosing to “exercise restraint.”4 In- last October. The concept includes
stead, it authorized involving it in political-military groups whose in-
launching low-intensity attacks on terests intersect in hostility toward
Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory Israel, preventing it from achieving
in Shebaa Farms and Kfar Shuba its goals in the Palestinian Territories
Hills as a gesture of solidarity with and elsewhere in the region. These
Hamas. Neither Iran nor Hezbol- groups, which spread across Gaza,

2024 Sprıng 37
COMMENTARY HILAL KHASHAN

Israel’s enemies not to miscalculate,

The Hamas’ operation warned that “Nasrallah, 17 years after
the sin he committed in 2006, is very
resulted in significant shifts close to committing a sin that could
in the balance of the conflict lead the region to a major war.”7
between Hezbollah and Israel,
going beyond breaking the Hezbollah’s Miscalculated Gambit
rules of engagement that
Nasrallah stressed that the attack
existed since the 2006 war launched by Hamas on Israel on Oc-
tober 7 was 100 percent Palestinian
and that it revealed the weakness
Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq, and frailty of Israel, describing it as
seek to strike Israel militarily and tar- weaker than a spider’s web. He also
get its interests to weaken it materi- stressed that Hezbollah’s front against
ally and morally. The concept of the Israel was only one of solidarity with
Unity of the Fronts also aims to form Hamas because the decisive battle
an acceptable level of deterrence on with it had not yet come.8 By open-
Israel to prevent it from singling out ing the Southern front, Hezbollah
any of Iran’s regional allies, as well as wanted to preoccupy Israel without
to put pressure on the U.S., Israel’s triggering a comprehensive war and
main ally, to moderate its regional compromising Iran’s regional inter-
policies. The alliance, sometimes ests.9 When it opened the Southern
dubbed the mini-Iranian NATO, front, Hezbollah estimated that Leba-
avoids escalating military confronta- non was not Gaza and that a compre-
tions into a general regional war that hensive Israeli war on Lebanon would
favors Israel. Iran’s involvement in meet much more significant inter-
the coalition stops at assigning roles national opposition than its war on
to its allies in a way that keeps it away Gaza. As a state with institutions and
from confrontation with Israel.5 foreign relations, Lebanon is not iso-
lated like Gaza. Some countries will
On the 23rd anniversary of Israel’s move quickly to save Lebanon and
withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, prevent its collapse, such as France,
which it describes as a war of libera- with its distinguished ties with Leb-
tion, Hezbollah conducted a military anon, and even the U.S., which has
exercise for 200 elite troops simulating strategic allies such as the Lebanese
the storming of an Israeli army site army. In addition, Israel has never
under the title “No One Can Defeat raised the possibility of eliminating
You,” in which it displayed its growing Hezbollah, and therefore, Hezbol-
military capabilities, threatening Israel lah will be able to rebuild its forces
with another defeat.6 However, the quickly and with Iranian support. Is-
head of the Israeli army’s intelligence rael realizes that there is no point in
service, Aharon Haliva, who advised going to a full-scale war against an

38 Insight Turkey
 HEZBOLLAH’S SHORTSIGHTED STRATEGY FOR THE WAR IN GAZA

Hezbollah
attacked Israel’s
Amad military
enemy that you are unable to destroy gering an all-out war, he still had base in the Ain
and force to recognize its existence.10 doubts about Israel’s intentions. He Zeitim and Upper
declared that if the war broke out, it Galilee region
Hezbollah took Israel’s threats of with Katyusha
would be because Israel wanted it to
missiles, on July
massive escalation lightly. Right after happen. He admitted, however, that 12, 2024.
Hamas’ operation last October, Israeli Hezbollah expected Israel’s war on SAMIR ABDALHADE /
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Gaza to be brief, as in previous en- AA
said he would “change the Middle counters over the past 15 years: “We
East.”11 His statement implied that didn’t expect the war would last this
the situation on the Northern front long because we didn’t think that
would not return to the pre-attack Netanyahu was that foolish.”12 Israel
period. Hezbollah did not take Net- insists that Hezbollah’s withdrawal
anyahu’s warning seriously and chose from the border area, i.e., 10 kilome-
to escalate militarily, although in a ters, means losing 70 percent of its
carefully calculated manner, to avoid ability to strike Israeli targets and de-
massive Israeli retaliation. Still, Israel priving its strikes of their importance.
deemed Hezbollah’s military restraint The geographical nature of Lebanon
irrelevant given the unprecedented in the border region gives the party’s
shock of Hamas’ attack, which it had fighters the advantage of operating in
completely ruled out as irrational and primarily high-forested areas. Topog-
suicidal. raphy enables them to use direct and
uncurved missiles fired at targets in
Even though Hezbollah’s Deputy Israeli settlements located below Leb-
Chief, Naeem Qassem, made it clear anese territory, creating a dilemma
that his party had no interest in trig- for Hezbollah. If the party’s fighters

2024 Sprıng 39
COMMENTARY HILAL KHASHAN

evacuate the border area, they will dismantling Hamas in the South, it
lose the ability to launch guided mis- did not face a significant escalation
siles, forcing them to use ineffective from Hezbollah. Encouraged by Hez-
curved and unguided projectiles.13 bollah’s trepidation, Israel started
attacking its forces across Lebanon
The Hamas’ operation resulted in sig- in December. By December, Hez-
nificant shifts in the balance of the bollah appeared to be implementing
conflict between Hezbollah and Is- a tactical retreat, as most of its Rad-
rael, going beyond breaking the rules wan’s elite forces withdrew to avoid
of engagement that existed since the precision raids by Israel. Hezbollah
2006 war. The attack brought about avoided responding forcefully to the
radical changes in the nature and con- Israeli attacks, fearing it could trig-
cept of the war between the two sides, ger an all-out war, fully aware that it
negatively impacting the settlements would lose.15 Israeli Defense Minister
in Northern Israel and Southern Leb- Yoav Galant said during a visit to the
anese villages; it turned into a battle- headquarters of the Northern Com-
field that led to the displacement of mand that his forces killed about half
more than 90 thousand citizens, the of Hezbollah’s field commanders in
destruction of thousands of homes, Southern Lebanon and that the com-
the burning of agricultural lands, and ing period will be decisive.16 Usually,
the death of hundreds of thousands killing the enemy’s field command-
of livestock. Nasrallah did not hide ers suggests the presence of plans to
his fear about the chances for the mil- launch a sizeable ground operation.
itary situation to slide into a full-scale
war after he realized that the rules of The chairperson of the Israeli parlia-
engagement that existed before Octo- ment’s Foreign Affairs and Defense
ber 7 had expired due to Israel’s esca- Committee reiterated Israel’s deter-
latory strikes. He realized that Israel, mination to end Hezbollah’s presence
which possesses enormous firepower, on the border with Israel, diplomati-
mandated that Hezbollah introduce cally or militarily. Western diplomats
new, unconventional weapons to the frequently visit Beirut to sway the
battlefield to restore a semblance of Lebanese government to pull out of
deterrent capability. Nasrallah ac- the border area to avert a significant
knowledged heavy human and ma- Israeli military campaign. Hezbollah
terial losses attributable to his forces’ has adamantly rejected the propos-
carefully calculated fighting, which als of evacuating the South or even
refrained from expanding the scope considering accepting a ceasefire
of confrontations. However, Nasral- while Israel’s war on Gaza continued.
lah stressed that if Israel imposed a Hezbollah’s Chief, Hasan Nasral-
war, there would be no controls on lah, said he would not listen to such
Hezbollah’s use of its full firepower.14 proposals.17

After the Israeli army took control Hezbollah says it will end its military
of most of Northern Gaza and began operations against Israel once a cease-

40 Insight Turkey
 HEZBOLLAH’S SHORTSIGHTED STRATEGY FOR THE WAR IN GAZA

fire takes hold in Gaza. However, the

Israelis say it is not up to them to de- Iran is doing everything in its
cide when to start or end hostilities,
given the growing public pressure power to avoid the expansion
in Israel to mount a comprehensive of the war in Gaza beyond the
campaign to flush Hezbollah from
the border area.18 Some Israelis do
involvement of its proxies in
not think it is sufficient to push Hez- Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. It
bollah a few kilometers from the bor- is careful to avoid a situation
der. They insist that the argument of
“Hezbollah withdrawing to the Litani where the U.S. and Israel
River is outdated and naive, offering might target Iranian territory
no long-term solution; Hezbollah
would still possess approximately
200,000 missiles and rockets, a fleet
of UAVs, and advanced surveillance consulate in Damascus, it launched
capabilities.”19 hundreds of drones and long-range
missiles against Israel that inflicted
no casualties. Iran keeps rationalizing
Iran’s Paper Tiger its avoidance of responding to Israeli
lethal attacks on the grounds of its
Iran and Hezbollah are aware of the strategic patience.22
serious risks that could result from a
broader war in Lebanon, including Revolutionary Guard Commander
strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, Ismail Qaani told Hassan Nasral-
so Tehran wants to avoid any war lah when he met with him in Beirut
between Israel and Hezbollah.20 The last March that Hezbollah’s response
Israel-Hamas war has demonstrated to Israeli strikes should be carefully
Iran’s power deficiency, limited to considered, even if they exceeded the
verbal bellicosity and condemnation rules of engagement, because Iran
of Israel. Its empty rhetoric has ex- had no intention of expanding Ga-
posed it to Shiite allies. Hezbollah’s za’s war and had no interest in con-
Lebanese base of Shiite support un- fronting the U.S. and Israel because it
derstands that Iran will not rescue wanted to protect its regional assets.
them in the event of war with Israel.21 Qaani addressed Nasrallah, saying
For more than a decade, the Israeli that if a war occurred between Israel
air force hammered Iranian mili- and Hezbollah, Iran would not join
tary sites in Syria, killing scores of it. When Hezbollah coordination
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps official Wafiq Safa visited the United
advisors, to which Iran did not an- Arab Emirates shortly after Qaani’s
swer, stating that it would choose the visit, he informed the officials he
time and place to settle scores with met there of the party’s readiness to
Israel. When Iran finally decided to stop fighting on the Southern Leba-
retaliate against the destruction of its non front and declare the border area

2024 Sprıng 41
COMMENTARY HILAL KHASHAN

lahian confirmed that the Iranian re-

No matter how this conflict sponse to the Israeli attack on its con-
sulate in Damascus had ended the
ends, it would be unlikely to escalation on its part and that the is-
decimate Hezbollah, which sue was closed.25 The massive Iranian
cruise and ballistic missile attack on
has succeeded over the past April 13, codenamed Operation True
four decades in becoming Promise, inflicted minor damage
a grassroots movement. at an Israeli air base that remained
operational, while Israel, backed
Nevertheless, presenting itself mainly by the U.S., intercepted and
as a resistance movement destroyed 99 percent of the missiles
before reaching the Israeli airspace.
and the defender of Lebanon Six days later, the Israeli air force at-
would become a spurious tacked an Iranian air base near Isfa-
claim since it failed to defend han, inflicting minor damage, clearly
in a bid to avoid further escalation
itself against Israel with Iran. U.S. diplomacy succeeded
in averting a military confrontation
between Iran and Israel that neither
along the Blue Line a demilitarized one of them wanted.
zone with a military presence limited
to UNIFIL and the Lebanese army.
Then, after the ceasefire, an agree- Hezbollah’s Fate
ment would be reached to demarcate
the land borders, as happened with When Hezbollah chose to open a sec-
the maritime borders. Israel rejected ondary front to ease the military pres-
the proposal, saying that it would not sure on Gaza, it expected the war to
accept any agreement with Hezbollah end within weeks, the same way pre-
before it fully surrenders its weapons vious wars between Hamas and Israel
to the Lebanese army.23 had ended. However, by June 2024, the
war had entered its ninth month with
Iran is doing everything in its power no apparent end. Hezbollah’s involve-
to avoid the expansion of the war in ment in the armed conflict turned
Gaza beyond the involvement of its into an attrition war, inflicting heavy
proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. human losses on Hezbollah, includ-
It is careful to avoid a situation where ing most of its field commanders, in
the U.S. and Israel might target Ira- addition to destroying its infrastruc-
nian territory.24 The late Iranian For- ture in Southern Lebanon. The war
eign Minister Hossein Amir Abdolla- revealed the vulnerability of Hezbol-
hian who recently died in a helicopter lah and the unbridgeable technolog-
crashsent several letters to the U.S. to ical gap with Israel. Israel insists that
stress that his country did not seek to Hezbollah must withdraw voluntarily
expand tensions with Israel. Abdol- from the South Litani area, about 30

42 Insight Turkey
 HEZBOLLAH’S SHORTSIGHTED STRATEGY FOR THE WAR IN GAZA

kilometers from the border, or face an The consequences would be detri-

all-out war. Neither option bodes well mental to Hezbollah’s self-image as a
for Hezbollah’s future as the dominant resistance movement, further increas-
actor in Lebanese politics. ing the pressure on it to disarm. The
post-war domestic situation is likely
The barrier of fear of Hezbollah’s in- to lead to civil strife in Lebanon, even-
fluence over Lebanon is eroding day tually paving the way for the national
after day, and instances of restless- army with international backing to
ness against its policies are increasing take steps to bring about law and or-
even within the Shiite community, der in the country. No matter how this
especially since the economy col- conflict ends, it would be unlikely to
lapsed five years ago. The Lebanese decimate Hezbollah, which has suc-
public is increasingly realizing that ceeded over the past four decades in
the country has become an arena of becoming a grassroots movement.
regional contestation. The notion of Nevertheless, presenting itself as a re-
a widespread embrace of Hezbollah sistance movement and the defender
has severely waned, even before it of Lebanon would become a spurious
opened a front in support of Hamas. claim since it failed to defend itself
Most Lebanese no longer see Hezbol- against Israel.
lah’s weapons as primarily directed
against Israel but rather to serve Iran’s
regional interests. In August 2021, Endnotes
residents of a Druze village in the 1. For a detailed account of Hezbollah’s policy ori-
South confiscated a Hezbollah rocket entation after 2000, see: Hilal Khashan, Hizbullah:
launcher after firing a salvo at North- A Mission to Nowhere, (Lanham: Lexington, 2019).

ern Israel, embarrassing the party 2. Iran has had a tumultuous history for the past
two centuries with Russian and British intrusion
and forcing it to take responsibility on its territory. Also, the U.S. manipulated its do-
for the incident.26 mestic affairs, notably the 1953 Operation Ajax
that overthrew the government of the democrat-
Hezbollah faces an inhospitable Leb- ically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosad-
degh and restored the reign of Mohammad Reza
anese environment that rejects its Pahlavi. The 1979 Islamic Revolution introduced
involvement in the armed conflict, the Arab Policy, which sought to spread the rev-
which is getting worse due to the diffi- olution into Arab countries to increase Iran’s for-
eign policy leverage and shield it against Western
culty in reaching a ceasefire that Hez- schemes.
bollah wants today and not tomorrow.
3. Rafiq Khoury, “Dawr Hezbollah al-Iqlimi Yu’atil
However, the fighting is likely to con- Dawr Lubnan [Hezbollah’s Regional Role Hinders
tinue because Israel has set condi- Lebanon’s Role],” Independent Arabia, (December
tions, such as the party’s withdrawal 24, 2022).
from the border region. It rejected 4. Mat Nashed, “Can Lebanon’s Hezbollah Afford
Hezbollah’s demands to withdraw to Go to War with Israel?” Al Jazeera, (October 16,
2024), retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/
from occupied Lebanese territories in news/2023/10/16/can-lebanons-hezbollah-af-
Shebaa Farms and Kfar Shuba Hills. It ford-to-go-to-war-with-israel.
is unlikely that when the war ends, it 5. “Mafhum Wahdat al-Sahaat: Hilf NATO Musagh-
will be according to Hezbollah’s terms. har li_Iran wa Jama’atiha [The Concept of Unity

2024 Sprıng 43
COMMENTARY HILAL KHASHAN

of Fronts: A Mini-NATO for Iran and Its Groups],” 16. “Galant: Nisf Qadat Hezbollah al-Maydaniyin
Radio Sawa, (May 22, 2023). Tamat Tasfiyatuhum wa al-Fatra al-Qadima Ha-
6. “Nasrallah: Muawarat Hezbollah Ja’at li Tu’ak- sima [Galant: Half of Hezbollah’s Field Command-
kid ‘ala Jahiziyat al-Muqawama wa Israel Taraja’at ers Have Been Eliminated, and the Coming Period
‘an Tahdidatiha [Nasrallah: Hezbollah’s Maneu- Will Be Decisive],” RT Arabic, (April 24, 2024).
vers Came to Confirm the Readiness of the Resis- 17. Dan Williams and Tom Perry, “Israel Wants
tance, and Israel Backed Down from Its Threats],” Hezbollah Away from Border, Lawmaker Says,” Re-
Al Jazeera, (May 25, 2023). uters, (December 13, 2023), retrieved from https://
7. “Israel Tuhaddir min Mukhatataat Hezbollah www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israel-
[Israel Warns of Hezbollah’s Plans],” Al Hurra, (May wants-hezbollah-away-border-lawmaker-says-
22, 2023). 2023-12-13/.

8. “Nasrallah: Inkharatna fi al-Harb min al-Bidaya 18. Justin Salhani, “Is Israel Hoping to Escalate
wa Mustamirrun Fiha [Nasrallah: We Were In- Hostilities with Hezbollah in Lebanon?” Al Jazeera,
volved in the War from the Beginning, and We Are (March 12, 2024), retrieved from https://www.alja-
Continuing It],” Al Jazeera, (November 3, 2023). zeera.com/news/2024/3/12/is-israel-hoping-to-
escalate-hostilities-with-hezbollah-in-lebanon.
9. Jana Dhaybi, “Ma’alat Nusf ‘Aam min Harb
Musagghara bayn Israel wa Hezbollah [The Con- 19. Omer Dostri, “To Provide Security for Its Citi-
sequences of Half a Year of a Minin-War between zens, Israel Must Go to War with Hezbollah,” Yedi-
Israel and Hezbollah],” Al Jazeera, (April 4, 2024). oth Ahronoth, (February 26, 2024), retrieved from
https://www.ynetnews.com/article/r149ynknp.
10. Nidal Kanaana, “Al-I’tibaraat al-Isralilia Qabl
Fath Harb ‘ala Hezbollah [Israeli Considerations 20. “Hezbollah Tam’ana Iran: lan Najurrakum ila
before Opening a War on Hezbollah],” Sky News Harb Ghaza wa Sanuqatil Wahdana [Hezbollah
Arabia, (January 24, 2024). Reassured Iran: We Will Not Drag You into the
Gaza War, and We Will Fight Alone],” Al-Arabiya,
11. “Netanyahu Says Israel’s Response to Gaza (March 15, 2024).
Attack Will Change the Middle East,” Reuters,
(October 9, 2023), retrieved from https://www. 21. Hilal Khashan, “Hezbollah’s Last Stand,” Geo-
reuters.com/world/middle-east/netanyahu-says- political Futures, (December 13, 2023), retrieved
israels-response-gaza-attack-will-change-mid- from https://geopoliticalfutures.com/hezbol-
dle-east-2023-10-09/. lahs-last-stand/.

12. “Qassem Stresses Hezbollah’s Determination 22. Hilal Khashan, “Iran’s Strategic Dilemma,” Geo-
to Avoid Full-Scale War,” L’Orient-Le Jour, (April 19, political Futures, (April 10, 2024).
2024), retrieved from https://today.lorientlejour. 23. Huda Husseini, “Sallimu al-Silah Yaslam al-
com/article/1410972/qassem-stresses-hezbol- Janub [Hand over the Weapons, the South Will Be
lahs-determination-to-avoid-full-scale-war.html. Safe],” Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, (March 28, 2024).
13. Nadhir Rida, “Hezbollah Yatamassak bi al-Baqa’ 24. “Iran la Tuman’ fi Qasqasat Ajnihat Hezbollah li
‘ala Hudud Janub Lubnan Tajannuban li Khisarat Mana’ Tawassu’ al-Harb [Iran Does Not Mind Clip-
al-Ta’thir al-‘Askari [Hezbollah Insists on Remaining ping Hezbollah’s Wings to Prevent the Expansion
on the Borders of Southern Lebanon to Avoid Los- of the War],” Al-Arab, (March 16, 2024).
ing Military Influence],” Aawsat, (January 18, 2024).
25. “Iran Tu’akkid li Washington Annaha la Tu-
14. “Al-Sayyid Nasrallah: Musta’iddun li Harb min rid Tawsi’ al-Tawatturat maa’ Israel [Iran Assures
Dun Dawabitwa min Dun Saqf [Sayyid Nasrallah: Washington That It Does Not Want to Expand
We Are Ready for War without Controls and with- Tensions with Israel],” Ash-Sharq al-Awsat, (April
out Ceilings],” Al-‘Ahd News, (January 4, 2024). 18, 2024).
15. Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Why Israel Yet Has to 26. Jonny Fakhry, “Tamalmul wa Ghadab fi Bi’at
Launch a Full-Blown War on Hezbollah?” Jerusa- Hezbollah [Restlessness and Anger in Hezbollah’s
lem Post, (March 13, 2024). Environment],” Al-Arabiya, (December 1, 2021).

44 Insight Turkey
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