Final Project Submission.
Final Project Submission.
BY
AUGUST, 2017
DECLARATION.
This is my original work and has not been presented for examination in any of the study
programs in any university.
This project has been presented for examination with my approval as the university supervisor.
Lecturer,
University of Nairobi.
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.
First and foremost, I would like to thank the almighty Allah for giving me the strength that I
needed to undertake the entire course as well as the rigours of this study. I would also like to pass
my gratitude to my project supervisor, Dr. Emmanuel Kisiangani, for his valuable time, guidance
and direction in all the stages of writing and compiling this report.
I thank my family led by my spouse Amina Osman, whose support and encouragement
necessitated my desire to undertake and conclude this project, and my children, Nawaal,
Nusaibah, Noordiin and Najla, for the endurance they had during the course of conducting this
study. Finally, I thank all the course lecturers and fellow students without whom the course
would not have been as smooth as it turned out to be.
iii
DEDICATION.
I dedicate this work affectionately to my family, led by my spouse, Amina Osman, and my
children, Nawaal, Nusaibah, Noordiin and Najla.
iv
Abstract
There are quite a number of definitions for the word terrorism since different researchers define
it in their own different terms. This difference in definition has been attributed to the fact that the
process of defining terrorism depends on the definer’s view, a person can view an individual as a
terrorist, but the same individual be viewed as by another person as a freedom fighter. However,
in general, terrorism refers to a deliberate use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear.
The fear is usually intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies into submitting to
something, usually in pursuit of goals that are usually political, religious or ideological in nature.
The subject has been a major concern in Kenya and the north eastern region of Kenya lately, due
to the emergence of a new terrorist group in the region, Al – Shabaab. Terrorist activities have
drastically changed the situation in the area, though not much of it has been documented. This
study therefore aimed to determine the socio economic effects of terrorism in the north eastern
region. The study was conducted in north eastern region of Kenya using mixed methodology
design. Mainly secondary data was collected using print media reports about the various
terrorism activities, newspapers and minimal discussion with people in the regions. The study
found that terrorism activities have had major effects on the economic and social activities with a
number of people closing their activities and transfer to other safer regions. A number of
professionals have fled the area, leaving some of the basic activities almost deserted. The
education and health sector have been the most affected as teachers and medical practitioners
fled the region and left public schools and hospitals without professionals in the fields. The study
recommends that local residents of the area should be encouraged to sensitize their children to
study in the two professions so that in case professionals from other parts of Kenya flee the area,
the locally trained professionals can effectively handle the matters.
v
Table of content
Declaration ………………………………………………………………….………ii
Acknowledgement………………………………………………………….………iii
Dedication ………………………………………………………………….……….iv
Abstract …………………………………………………………………….……… v
List of Figures…………………………………………………………………….viii
1.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………….………..1
1.6 Hypothesis………………………………………………………………………..4
1.7 Significance of the Study………………………………………………………...5
vi
CHAPTER TWO: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF TERRORISM………………………...…………………………………………11
2.1 Introduction…………………………………………..…….………………………………...11
2.2 Background……………………………………………….……….…………………………11
EASTERN REGION……………...………………………………………………………...….29
3.1 Introduction……………………....…………………………………………………………..29
3.5 Terrorism and the Political Spheres in North Eastern Region of Kenya……...……………..35
3.7 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………..………….38
vii
4.2.4 Initiate Nyumba Kumi Initiative in the Region……………………………………41
5.4 Recommendations…………………………………………………………………………..46
References …………………………………………………………….………………………48
viii
List of Figures
ix
1.0 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.
1.1 Introduction
The word terrorism has no universally agreed definition. This is partly because a number
of countries and agencies define terrorism in different ways. For example, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence
against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population,
or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives 1 . The American
Department of Defence defines terrorism as the calculated use of unlawful violence or
threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or
ideological objectives 2 . There are therefore quite a number of definitions since different
researchers define terrorism in their own different terms. These differences in definition
arise from the fact that the process of defining terrorism depends on the general view of
the person defining it. Besides, while a person may be defined as a terrorist by one
individual, he may be considered as a freedom fighter by a different individual 3 .
Although researchers have not agreed on the definition of terrorism, there has been a
move towards a consensus about its substantial meaning 4 . There has been consensus
regarding the means that terrorists use and their fundamental nature of activities.
Terrorists use violence or the threat of violence that is usually aimed at the general
unarmed population. Through the violence means, terrorists create a psychological effect
of fear on the people in the environment where activities are performed, others apart from
their victims terrorist activities aim at creating unrest among groups of people. In effect,
terrorism is not about, terrorism does not have to do with the immediate victims it claims,
but about the horror effect it creates on the rest of the people. According to Kegley,
1
Giddens, A. (2006), Sociology (5th edition), Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, p. 879-888.
2
Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside Terrorism (New York: Colu mbia Un iversity Press, 1998), 2.
3
Ganor, B. (2002), Defin ing Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?, in:
Police Practice and Research (3), p. 287-304.
4
Bjørgo, T. (2005), Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths reality and ways forward. New Yo rk: Routledge.
terrorism is not directed to the victims of its activities, but to the people who eventually
get information about their effects, and those who see the results. 5
Kenya has had a fair share of terrorist attacks before the current Al S habaab attributed
terrorist attacks in the past. The first bombs to strike independent Kenya took place in
early 1975. In that year, a bomb was blasted inside Starlight nightclub while another hit a
travel bureau next to Hilton hotel in February. A more serious blast then followed, hitting
Nairobi bus terminal on March 1st , killing up to 30 people. No one was arrested in both
occasions. There was imminent fear for several days within the city as a number of phone
call hoaxes were made by unknown people. 6 . The second bomb attacks took place in
1980 when the Nairobi Norfolk hotel was attacked on the New Year’s Eve, killing 20
people and leaving over 80 injured. On August 7, 1998, the US embassy in Nairobi was
bombed, an even that remained greatest terrorism incident in Kenya prior to the recent
Westgate and Garissa university attacks. The US embassy attack claimed 200 people,
most of whom were Kenyans, while thousands others were injured. Al Qaeda claimed
responsibility for this attack 7 .
In recent times, there have been sporadic grenade attacks by the Al Shabaab across the
country following the military operation involving the Kenyan military jointly with the
Federal Government of Somalia military against the Al-Shabaab insurgents in southern
Somalia. Since then, and especially since 2012, there have been a number of attacks by A
Shabaab, many of which have concentrated in north eastern region, though others took
place in Nairobi and Mombasa.
The recurrent attacks have had many socio-economic effects on the region. A number of
professionals have fled the region in fear of being attacked, leaving their jobs without
replacement. Education has been greatly paralysed as most teachers left the region en
5
Kegley, C.W. (2003). The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls, Upper Saddle
River: Prentice Hall.
Aronson, S.L. (2013). 'Kenya and the Global War on Terror: Neglecting History and Geopolitics in
Approaches to Counterterroris m', African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies : AJCJS 7(1/ 2): 24
7
Pillar, P. (2001). Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press
2
mass, leaving great gaps in the education system. The health sector was also paralysed
long before as professionals left the sector. In similar fashion, many traders closed their
businesses and took off, greatly affecting the economy of the region. While these are the
general visible effects, the study seeks to determine and document the socio-economic
impacts of terrorism to the socio-economic development of the region as a whole.
3
1.3 The Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to investigate the impact of terrorism on socio-economic
development in north eastern region of Kenya. The specific counties in the region studied
included Mandera, Wajir and Garissa.
1.6 Hypothesis
The study was guided by the following hypotheses:
H01 : Terrorism has great negative effects on the health sector in north eastern region
H02: Terrorism has negative effects on the education sector in north eastern region
H03 : Terrorism has negative impacts to the business sector in north eastern region
4
H04 : Several strategies can be put in place to counter terrorism in north eastern region
5
them to collect data on his behalf as research assistants. The researcher personally
concentrated on data collection in Garissa Township and its environs.
Idealists, on the other hand, centre their contention on the disordered nature of the
international system, based on antagonism among various players, instead of the human
nature, as the structure of international politics. Idealists believe that the international
8
Rourke, T.John.7th Ed. (1992). International Politics on the World Stage. Dushkin/McGraw-Hill, USA.
6
system is made up of autonomous actors (state and non-state) acting on their own impulse
and follow their own objectives and welfare in different ways by any possible methods
that can help them reach their end. To them, the use of brutality is the most suitable since
the stronger will always win, and the end justifies the means. Idealists believe that the
superior actors are answerable to no one since the international system lawless, without
an overall authority providing security and order. Due to this, the international players
usually resort to war to meet their ends 9 . In the context of terrorism, the terrorists use
violence as the best means of having their way and are answerable to no one. Thus, this is
the best way through which they can achieve their objectives.
9
Rourke, T.John.7th Ed. (1992). International Politics on the World Stage.Dushkin/McGraw-Hill, USA.
7
Health service
- Health facilities
- Health personnel
Education services
- Education Facilities
- Teachers
- Supervision
SOCIO-ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT
Business sector
- Movement of Goods
- Prices of Goods
- Inflation
Countering methods
- Sporadic curfew
8
1.12 Research Methodology.
This study adopted a mixed methodology design due to its capacity on real- life
understandings, multi- level viewpoints and cultural influences 10 . The design also utilizes
multiple methods such as intervention, trials and in-depth interviews and frames the
investigation within philosophical and theoretical positions. It was carried out in the three
major towns of north eastern region – Garissa, Wajir and Mandera county headquarters.
The areas are prone to terrorist attacks, which has resulted in devastating effects as many
professionals have deserted the towns in fear of their lives. The terrorists target people
from other parts of the country who, in most cases, are sent to these areas to offer
professional service to the local population. By being the targets of terrorists, the
professionals have deserted the places and left the places with major shortage of
professional services such as health, education and other public service duties. These
have had effects on the economic development of the areas, and the study is interested in
finding out these effects. Mainly secondary sources that included published books,
journals, and newspapers were used to collect data for this study. These sources were
complimented to a small extent by primary data collection through discussion with
members of the public and knowledge experience of the researcher, who hails from the
region and understands the region well. The data collected in this method was analysed
through discussion of terrorism activities and events that occurred at various places in the
major towns of Garissa, Wajir and Mandera.
10
Brown, 2001
9
Chapter Three of this study contains a discussion on the state of terrorism in north
eastern region. Specifically, the chapter contains the introductory part of the chapter then
discusses the impact of terrorism on the health sector in north eastern region. It then
discusses the impact of terrorism on the education sector in the region, the impact of
terrorism to the business sector in the region before discussing other factors related to
terrorism activities. The chapter eventually provides a conclusion.
Chapter Four provides a critical analysis of mechanisms for mitigating the impact of
terrorism in north eastern Kenya. Specifically, the chapter an introductory part then
discusses the modalities of countering terrorism and its impacts in north eastern region of
Kenya. It then discusses the improvement of cooperation between police and the public,
boarder security management system, improvement of security institutions to eliminate
corruption and the initiation of nyumba kumi initiative in the region as a means of
combating terrorism. The chapter also discusses the need for improvement of harmony
between local community and other immigrants, and finally the encouragement of locals
to train in specific professions. The chapter winds up by with a conclusion about the
chapter.
Chapter Five provides a review of literature on socio-economic impact of terrorism. The
chapter contains the introductory part then gives a summary of discussion findings. It
then provides the conclusion and winds up by giving the recommendations of the study.
10
2.0 CHAPTER TWO: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON THE SOCIO-
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM.
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews literature on the socio-economic impact of terrorism broadly. The
chapter begins by discussing an overview of terrorism before reviewing litera ture on
economic effects of terrorism. It then looks at the social impact of terrorism and winds up
by examining literature on terrorism activities in Kenya.
2.2 Background
Many definitions have been fronted for the term terrorism, but none has been accepted as
constituting terrorism. According to Nancy et al. terrorism is to perpetrate an offence
that puts the life of another person in danger, or that is brutal with a broader intent to
coerce, influence or change strategy or view. 11 According to Sandler, terrorism is “the
premeditated use or threat of use of violence by individuals or sub- national groups to
obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience, beyond
that of the immediate victim” 12 . Terrorism is a form of asymmetric warfare that should be
recognized that way to effectively combat it. Worldwide, terrorism has evolved despite
opposition, just like conventional warfare. The evolution of terrorism has plagued around
the world, and is currently viewed as the most dangerous and immediate security threat to
the world at large.
A Jewish sect known as the Zealots is said to have committed the earliest recorded act of
terrorism in the 1st century. They are said to have resisted the Roman rule through a
campaign consisting of assassinations. Their fighters attacked their enemies in public
when there were people to witness the incidences. They used these actions as a message
to the rest of the public. An Islamic group – the Assassins, used similar methods between
1090 and 1272 in their struggle against Christian campaigners. They used similar
methods of suicide and sacrifice that are used by present day terrorists. They viewed acts
11
Nancy G., Massimo C., Bobby G., M ichael S., Mark T, Michael W., and Hilary H.(2009). “Terrified or
Terrorist?” Time 174, no. 20 (2009).
12
Sandler, T. and Enders, W. (2005). Econo mic Consequences of Terrorism in Developed and Developing
countries
11
of violence as sacred, and the architects are assured of ascending to glory in heaven if
they died on the act. 13
Terrorism was linked more to the oppressive practices used by tyrannical regimes of the
Nazi in Germany, Fascists in Italy and Communists in the Union of the So viet Socialist
Republic (USSR) in the 1920s and 1930s. in the Middle East, terrorism can be traced to
the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the battle in Palestine pitting the Irgun
and the British, terrorism waged against colonialism by the British empire in Cyprus and
Aden and against the French in Algeria 14
After the Second World War, terrorism relapsed to its revolutionary nature. The wars of
independence in the 1940s and 1950s instigated by nationalist groups throughout Asia,
Africa, and the Middle East, that followed the end of the Second World War were
described as terrorism. Several countries including Israel, Kenya, Cyprus, and Algeria
gained independence through such wars instigated by nationalist and employing, to
certain extent, levels of terrorism. The bombing of Jerusalem's King David Hotel by a
Jewish subversive group in 1946 is considered one of the most momentous terrorist
episodes. However, terrorism began to take its current radical nature after the Second
World War 15 .
Since 1960s, international acts of terrorism have been recurring frequently enough to
have made it to rise steadily on the global agenda. The beginning of the current era of
international terrorism can be attributed to a Palestinian group – Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestin (PFLP), hijacked an Israeli commercial jet – El Al, on its way from
Rome, Italy to Tel Aviv, Israel on 22nd July, 1968. The incident was followed by an even
more daring international incident when the same group hijacked three commercial
13
Aksoy, E. (2012). International Terroris m in the age of globalization. M.A. Thesis (Unpublished).
Bilkent Un iversity
14
Aksoy, E. (2012). International Terroris m in the age of globalization. M.A. Thesis (Unpublished).
Bilkent Un iversity.
15
Aksoy, E. (2012). International Terroris m in the age of globalization. M.A. Thesis (Unpublished).
Bilkent Un iversity
12
airliners —two American and one Swiss. The hijackers flew the planes to a remote
airstrip in Jordan, evacuated the passengers and blown up in the presence of television
cameras. This attack had similarities with that of 11 th September 2001 due to its
international characteristics, in which the interests of the terrorists were well served by
globalization as the events and news were beamed almost immediately.
Terrorism has become a global problem since the US attacks of 11 th September 2011. the
war on terror was launched soon after and, together with terrorist attacks in Europe and
asia in more recent times, terrorism has acquired a global dimension. The Afghanistan
and iraq wars have been understood along global terrorism dimension. Regional and local
conflicts that were previously not given much attention have of late acquired more
significance and are now considered to be linked to the Al-Qaeda and/or other terrorist
groups in various parts of the world. 16
The spread of terrorist attacks and their coverage in the media has made terrorism to
become a commonly used word. The September 11, 2001 incident and the terrorist
activities of the last two decades prove that there are people ready to instigate violence to
achieve their objectives. According to Wilkinson (2001), a number of terrorist groups use
violence as terror campaign as a warhead of intimidation to threaten recognized
establishments and regimes to succumb to their demands. 17 The events of September 11,
2011 show that terrorism is a covert warfare that has advanced over the years with the
advancement of technology.
Although Al-Qaeda has been blamed for most terrorist activities for many years, there are
other smaller terrorist groups with less organizational structure. These organizations may
be small and relatively unorganized but their enthusiasm to use terror and advance strong
relationships with other terrorist groups allows them to improve their capacity and
therefore makes them very troubling. Working together allows different organizations to
16
Rohan G. (2002). Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (London: Hurst, 2002), 222.
17
Wilkinson, P. (2001). Terrorism versus Democracy, the Liberal State Response (London: Cass, 2001),12.
13
build up their technical capacity in terms of bomb making as well as information warfare.
The asymmetric conflict/war between the Soviets and the Afghans laid the groundwork
for terrorist organizations and allowed terrorists from all over the world to train in
asymmetric warfare. 18
The nature of battle and conflict since the cold war ended. Through asymmetric warfare,
weaker fighters are using innovative tools to deal major blows to more powerful
opponents. Religious extremism makes recruitment, fundraising, and communication to
mass audiences easy to do and more difficult for governments to track. Most terrorist
organizations are defined by religion, as the terrorists acquire followers by invoking
religion and pretending to fight on behalf of the religion. This is one reason why
terrorism has become more and more lethal as gro ups easily acquire followers confessing
to the same religion.
18
Aksoy, E. (2012). International Terrorism in The Age Of Globalization. M .A. Thesis (Unpublished).
Bilkent Un iversity
19
Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside Terrorism (New York: Colu mbia Un iversity Press, 1998),
20
Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside Terrorism (New York: Colu mbia Un iversity Press, 1998),
14
Juergensmeyer states that terrorist attacks around the world are perpetrated with religion
as a driving factor and it cannot be pinpointed to a specific country of origin. He gives
examples of the Jewish assassins of Israel, the Buddhist terrorist sect in Japan, radical
Hindus and Sikhs in India and the Christian militants in the United States. 21 Researchers
have long believed that certain religious organizations give incentives to those ready to
surrender their lives for the sake of their religion. For instance, Ghorayeb inferred that
that the eradication of discrimination and degradation led to the core of sacrificial victim
in Shi’a Islam 22 . The idea of martyrdom is used to demonstrate high esteem and
prominence within society at large. Those who are ready to forfeit their lives for religious
purposes are viiewed as iconic within their culture. Ghorayeb claims that they are
worshipped by family and friends for their willingness to continue the fight for their
belief and complete selfless disregard for their personal life 23
A number of researchers have suggested that religious terrorism is of far greater threat
than political terrorism. Caleb Carr claims that religiously motivated terrorists believe
they are fighting in a cosmic battle that defines the battle of good versus evil. The
outcome of this type of war is greater than the individual and therefore justifies the
sacrifice of lives. 24 Those individuals that perpetrate religiously affiliated terrorism acts
are more willing to kill themselves and those around them as opposed to the political
terrorists who want their message to be known but without massive fatalities. Hoffman
claims that the politically motivated terrorist wants their message to be heard and the y
view killing as a sad necessity while the religiously motivated terrorist believe that killing
is a sacramental act. Religion is a far more dangerous motivator for conflict when
compared to just acquiring land. 25
21
.Juergensmeyer, M . (2000). “Understanding the New Terrorism,” Current History 99 (2000)
22
Ghorayeb, A. (2002). Hizbullah: Politics and Religion (London: Pluto, 2002)
23
Ghorayeb, A. (2002). Hizbullah: Politics and Religion (London: Pluto, 2002)
24
Carr, C. (2002). The Lessons of Terror: A History of Warfare against Civ ilians: Why It Has Always
Failed and Why It Will Fail Again (New Yo rk: Rando m House, 2002), 78.
25
Hoffman, B. (1998). Inside Terrorism (New York: Colu mbia Un iversity Press, 1998),
15
The objectives of Religious fighters go beyond the world we live in today and look to the
afterlife. Religious fighters develop a “will to win” mentality because the consequence
for giving up in a battle is falling out of good graces with God and therefore eternal
damnation. The idea of damnation moves the religious fighter past the point of self-
preservation and allows them to overcome the fear of death. Suicide terrorists are ten
times more likely to come from Muslim countries where the American military is present,
or, in the case of Palestine, where an active Israeli occupation remains. 26
Terrorism can have different impacts depending on the economic situation of a country.
They can reduce the economic activities, or the terrorism can be reduced by creating
more employment opportunities where the economy is more developed. This creation of
more employment opportunities can reduce the incentive to indulge in terrorist activities
by the youth. According to Bloomberg et al., the impact of terrorism on economic growth
is negative 28 . It may result in the shifting of resources from investment spending to
government spending, thereby reducing economic growth due to reduced investment.
Sandler and Enders alludes to this view by arguing that developed countries have vast
economy and any terrorist activity may result in reallocating of resources amo ng various
26
Pape, R. (1995). Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. New Yo rk: Random House.
27
Sandler, T. and Enders, W. (2005). Econo mic Consequences of Terrorism in Developed and Developing
countries
28
Bloo mberg, Brock, Gregory Hess and Athanasios Orpanides (2004).The Macroeconomic Consequences
of Terro ris m’ downloaded on 3rd January 2014.
16
sectors of the economy29 . However, developing countries do not have this sort of
flexibility and any major terrorist act may drastically jeopardize the economic growth of
developing countries. Sandler and Enders 30 further argues that developing countries are
more dependent on other countries compared to developed ones, hence any economic
shock due to terrorism in other countries can affect the economic growth of a developing
country that has not been directly attacked.
The impact of war of terrorism on global economy is quite monumental 31 . This includes
the pulling out of private research and development expenditure from research activities
to the military to counter terrorism, thereby reducing economic growth. Measures taken
to counter terrorism increases expenditure on security which then reduces expenditure on
research and development. International corporations with investment in terrorism prone
countries evaluate the risk associated with terrorism in those countries and spend higher
on security, thereby acting as a barrier to the flow of investment in those countries.
A study by Gaibulloev and Sandler 32 found that there is significant growth limiting
impact of terrorism33 . The study found that there is greater impact of terrorism in
developing countries than in developed ones have greater flexibility to terrorism due to
their strong economies. The study also found that terrorist activities coming from internal
conflicts have double negative effects of minimizing economic growth relative to
international terrorism. The reason for higher negative impact on the economy is due to
cramming together of government expenses and a loss capital outlay due to increased
terrorist activities.
29
Sandler, T. and Enders, W. (2005). Econo mic Consequences of Terrorism in Developed and Developing
countries
30
Sandler, T. and Enders, W. (2005). Econo mic Consequences of Terrorism in Developed and Developing
countries
31
Koh, Winston T.H. (2007). “Terroris m and its Impact on Economic Growth and Technological
Innovation”. Technological Forecasting and Social Change.
32
Gaibulloev, Khusrav and Sandler, Todd (2008). “The Impact of Terroris m and Conflicts on Growth in
Asia”, ADB Institute Discussion Paper No. 113
33
Gaibulloev, Khusrav and Sandler, Todd (2008). “The Impact of Terroris m and Conflicts on Growth in
Asia”, ADB Institute Discussion Paper No. 113
17
Terrorist activities are not confined to the economies of the country in which the
activities take place. Their effects are felt far and wide. A study by Murdoch and Sandler
found that the effect of growth reduction is to the neighbouring countries as well 34 .
Further, the impacts that limit growth have short and long te rm effects on the economy of
the affected country as well as that of other countries in the neighbourhood. Accordingly,
civil war can decrease the economic growth by as much as 85 percent in the economy of
the affected country in the short run. But this effect reduces to 30 percent in the long run.
In the case of neighbouring countries, the short run reduction in growth has a 24 percent
impact, but moves to 30 percent in the long run 35 .
The effect of terrorism on economic growth originates from low performance of the
economy discernible in low opportunity costs of terrorism which in turn increase the
violence and thus terrorism 36 . Whereas terrorism may cause low economic growth by
negatively affect resource allocation, significant fiscal and political events also have
intense effects on the kind of terrorism as well as on fiscal development. In many
countries, terrorism is a product of economic growth. On the other hand, the economies
of developed countries are sufficiently robust to endure the impacts of terrorist attacks.
Gries et al. concludes that although economic performance make terrorism opportunity
costs high enough to thwart such incidents, economic performance is not the only criteria
to counter terrorism 37 . As such, political and social consideration must be taken into
account by policymakers to counter terrorism.
34
Murdoch, J. and Sandlers, T. (2004). “Civil Wars and Economic Growth: Spatial Dispersion”, American
Journal of Political Science, 48 (1)
35
Murdoch, J. and Sandlers, T. (2004). “Civil Wars and Economic Growth: Spatial Dispersion”, American
Journal of Political Science, 48 (1)
36
Gries, T, Tim K. and Meierrieks, D. (2009). “Causal Linkages between Do mestic Terro ris m and
Economic Gro wth”. Working Papers Series No. 2009-02, Center for International Economics, USA
37
Gries, T, Tim K. and Meierrieks, D. (2009). “Causal Linkages between Do mestic Terro ris m and
Economic Gro wth”. Working Papers Series No. 2009-02, Center for International Economics, USA
18
In a nutshell, the economic growth of any country can be greatly affected via a number of
avenues by terrorism in the short run. The attacks can drastically amplify ambiguity,
which in effect restricts developments and deflect foreign direct investment (FDI)38 .
Foreign direct investment is an important source of savings for funding investment for
the economies of developing countries. But where there are terrorism activities, the
government is forced to spend more on its defences in order to secure possible targets,
and develop programs to arrests terrorists and any assets they may have acquired. The
increase in expenditure on defence tends to reduce expenditure on areas that can enhance
economic growth both in the public as well as in the private investments 39 . Finally,
terrorism can negatively affect important sectors of the economy such as airlines,
tourism, and the export sector. The negative effects on these industries have the potential
of reducing the gross domestic product (GDP) and development in general40 .
38
Abadie, A. and Gardeazabal, J. (2008). Terrorism and the world economy. European Econo mic Review
39
Gaibu lloev, K. and Sandler, T. (2008). The Impact ofTerrorism and Conflicts on Growth in Asia. ADB
Institute Discussion Paper No. 113.
40
Enders, W. and Sandler, T. (2006). The Polit ical Economy of Terroris m. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
41
Richardson H., and Go rdon, P. (2008). The Economic Costs and Consequences of Terroris m. Ed ward
Elgar Inc. New York.
42
Jackson, P. (2011). Terroris m: A Critical Introduction. Palgrave Macmillan
19
workers and traders regularly. This negatively affects the economic development of the
economies of the affected countries.
When terrorists attack a place, the immediate impact is the loss of life and property. It
therefore disrupts the social fabric of the society by depriving children of their
dependants, maiming others while depriving some of the survivors of their source of
livelihoods. These have major social effects on those left behind that may have depended
on the support of the maimed and the dead. However, to a certain extent, Richardson and
Gordon argue that terrorism activities create jobs as affected countries increase defe nce
spending to prevent future acts of terrorism43 . As such, more personnel are recruited into
the various forces as a means of preparation against terrorist attacks. They argue that like
natural disasters, things are destroyed which are eventually replaced. The process of
replacing destroyed things increase gross domestic product (GDP). Further, increased
spending on security measures creates a boom in the security sector of the economy. The
costs incurred are transferred to the consumer as increased fixed overheads that are
shared by all within an industry.
Acts of terrorism makes people stay indoors to avoid travelling as terrorists target means
of transport like buses, trains and planes. According to Sloan, the countries that
neighbour Afghanistan like India and Nepal recorded a enormous fall in tourism
following the 2001 September 11 attacks on America in 2001 and the subsequent war that
followed the attacks 44 .
Writing on the effect of Boko Haram insurgency in southern Nigeria, Mohamed stated
that Boko Haram had led to the fleeing of people states occupied by Boko Haram, and
reduced the consumption of goods from the northern region of Nigeria due to rumours
that emerged, claiming that Boko Haram members would were planning to transmit
poisonous products from their region to other parts of Nigeria. The group had also led to
43
Richardson H., and Gordon, P. (2008). The Economic Costs and Consequences of Terrorism. Ed ward
Elgar Inc. New York.
44
Sloan, S. (2006).Terrorism: The Present Threat in Context. Berg Publishers, Netherlands.
20
the closure and desertion of people’s business activities in the regions that they
occupied. 45 . This had a multiplier effect on the people of the area since it is not only
difficult to do business in the region controlled by the group, but almost impossible to sell
in southern regions due to the rumours. Speaking of the activities of the same group,
Mohammed noted that
Commercial banks had to review their hours of operational so as to operate from 9.00
a.m. to 12.00 noon, whereas they normally operated between 8.00am to 4.00pm46 . within
this new hours of operation, it had become quite difficult for patrons, especially traders,
to transact business in the banks since the banks closed when they were still deep in their
usual businesses and not yet ready to deposit their incomes in banks. The situation had
forced a number of them to keep their earnings in their shops or other places of work.
This in effect had given rise to frequent burglaries as the thieves targeted the cash stashed
into the business premises and homes.
Places with frequent terrorist attacks are usually deprived of public services other than
security. Many professionals either flee the area or refuse altogether to be posted to work
in such places. Social services like education, health and other public services come to a
stand still as professionals in the areas flee to safer regions. As Mohammed reports, many
government services are no longer available in northern Nigeria due to the terrorist
activities of the Boko Haram group 47 . He further adds that people who do not profess
Islamic religion and have not mingled with Muslims have been made to believe that
Muslims are fundamentalists due to the activities of Boko Haram. Similarly, who do not
originate from regions with terrorist activities evade any issue that may require their
going to places rife with terrorist activities. This situation applies to Nigerian graduates
45
Mohammed, D. (2014). The Effect of Boko Haram Crisis on Socioeconomic Activities in Yobe State.
The International Journal of Social Sciences and Hu manities Invention Volu me 1 issue 4
46
Mohamed M.H. (2015). The Underlying Dynamics of Al-Shabaab’s Recruit ment of Muslim Youth: A
Case of Mo mbasa County in Kenya. M.A. Thesis. The Hague, the Netherlands
47
Mohammed, D. (2014). The Effect of Boko Haram Crisis on Socioeconomic Activities in Yobe State.
The International Journal of Social Sciences and Hu manities Invention Volu me 1 issue 4
21
drafted in the Nigerian National Youth Service Corp (NYSC), who out rightly reject
posting to parts of northern Nigeria that are rife with terrorist attacks. 48
In order for terrorists to continue in their operation, they need to continuously recruit
followers. This is done either forcefully or through financial inducement. The insurgents
may attack villages and kidnap youths in the area, or use monetary incentives to lure the
youth to join them. If they recruit through kidnapping, they will leave pain and agony in
their wake since the kidnapping must be forceful and violent, leaving death in their trail.
On the other hand, if recruits are lured into the group, family members left behind
agonise for ages as they look for their missing member 49 .
48
Mohammed, D. (2014). The Effect of Boko Haram Crisis on Socioeconomic Activities in Yobe State.
The International Journal of Social Sciences and Hu manities Invention Volu me 1 issue 4
49
Olukorede Y. (2012). What Nigeria need to tackle Bo ko Haram (indexphp/ news/45036) (cited 2017
May12):
50
Thordsen, S.N. (2009). New Muslim Activism in Kenya. Institute for Statskundskab
51
Chande, A.N. (2000). 'Radicalis m and Reform in East Africa'.
52
Møller, B. (2006). Political Islam in Kenya. DIIS Working Paper
22
youths to join the ‘jihad’ in Somalia. 53 These events have ensured that religious
extremism gains a foot hold in Kenya.
During the 1990s, Wahhabism developed gradually in Kenya. This followed the
development of the same in Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates, Libyan, Oman, Iraq and
Kuwait. There were also a number of charities in Arab countries that were funded by Iran
in the 1970’s and 1980’s. 54 Money from the oil boom in Saudi Arabia was invested in
scholarships for Kenyans pursuing Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia. There were also other
initiatives to financially support Muslim communities in north eastern and coast regions
of Kenya. The formation of the Muslim world league, opposed to communism and
secular nationalism encouraged the growth of Wahhabism, thereby expanding the
narrative of ‘jihad’. 55
Al-shabaab first emerged in somalia following the dethronement of the Islamic courts
union that had initially taken control of Somalia. Al-Shabaab or ‘Harakat-al-Shabaab al-
mujahidin’ or ‘the youth’ developed as a Somali based religion-political group and
affiliated of Al-Qaida. The group was connected to the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) of
Somalia which was preceded by ‘Al-Itihad al-Islamiyah’ in the 1980’s. 56 According to
Wise, Al-Shabaab is a terrorist group that thrived on forced taxation and extortion. The
group took over Somalia following the demise of the Islamic courts union, and is credited
with bringing some semblance of law and order to Somalia. The group streamlined
policing, judicial and decision making, and brought about social welfare and other
services 57 a number of other groups that took over Somalia from time to time, including
the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and severa l United Nations (UN) led peace
53
Lind, J., P. Mutahi and Oosterom, M. (2015). Tangled Ties: A l-Shabaab and Political Vo latility in
Kenya
54
Oded, A. (2000). Islam and Politics in Kenya: Arye Oded. Boulder, CO [etc.]: Lynne Rienner
55
Haynes, J. (2005). 'Islamic M ilitancy in East Africa', Third World Quarterly 26(8): 1321-1339.
56
Hansen, S.J. (2013). A l Shabaab in So malia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group,
2005-2012. Oxford University Press.
57
Wise, R. (2011). Al Shabaab. Center for Strategic and International Studies
23
missions failed to achieve these. Due to their capacity to bring semblance of law and
order, the Al-Shabaab gained support of most of the clans in Somalia and the population
in general. They gained further legitimacy when they retaliated against the Ethiopian
invasion forces of 2017. During the Ethiopian war, the Al-Shabaab extremely recruited
youth in Somalia, Kenya and the rest of the world. 58 Following this recruitment, they
changed their agenda from local to international. They thus changed their agenda from
local to global. This strategy enabled them to acquire international allies like the Al-
Qaida. This alliance increased their legitimacy in the international ‘jihad,’ a factor that
enabled them to attract foreign financial support and man power. 59 Thus, they were able
to outstrip nationality differences using the narrative of ‘jihad’.
The current wave of Al-Shabaab attacks took place in the backdrop of the rise of the
group in 2009. the group performed intermittent abductions on the Kenyan side of the
boarder, after which they demanded ransoms from the family of the victims. The
situation worsened in 2011 when the Kenyan military crossed over to Somalia with the
aim of flushing out the perpetrators of atrocities on the Kenyan side of the boarder. The
Kenyan military was later absorbed into the African Union Mission to Somalia
(AMISOM). Al-Shabaab has been justifying their attacks on Kenya on the basis of
revenge for atrocities committed to their fellow Muslims in Kenya by the Kenyan
government. 60 However, the attacks tend to surpass a common religious identity with
Muslims in Kenya. It is explained that the attacks are also have more to do with their
disapproval of the Kenyan forces in Somalia, which has hindered their control of
Somalia. Since 2009 Al-Shabaab has launched large scale attacks in Kenya such as the
Westgate shopping mall attack in 2013, Mpeketoni attacks in 2014 and most recently the
Garissa University College attack in April 2015. 61
58
Aynte, A. (2010).. "The Anatomy of al-Shabaab." Unpublished: Doha (2010).
59
Wise, R. (2011). Al Shabaab. Center for Strategic and International Studies
60
Mwakimako, H. and J. Willis (2014). 'Observatoire Des Enjeu x Po lit iques Et Sécuritaires Dans La Corne
De l’Afrique'
61
Amb le, John C. “Co mbating Terroris m in the New Media Env iron ment.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
35, no. 5
24
Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya have increased at almost the same rate as the increase in
youth radicalization and recruitment into the group. 62 The complex dynamics of ethnicity,
religion, poverty and nativism have been capitalized on for maximum effect as a tool for
youth recruitment. It has also been argued that selective government’s counter-terrorism
strategies such as ‘Operation Usalama watch’ have constructed the Somali and Muslim
identity as a threat to Kenya’s stability. 63 A large number of the Muslim youth have
become susceptible to recruitment into the group due to implicit discrimination and
enacting security discourses that are unfavourable to the Muslim youth.
The first of the Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya are thought to have occurred just a few days
following the entry of the Kenyan military into Somalia. These first attacks involved the
use of hand grenades and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The IED blasts
first occurred in Garissa, at police posts and checkpoints Mandera and in Dadaab refugee
camp 64 . The number of explosions gradually increased and there have been over 80 Al-
Shabaab attacks in kenya since 2011. 65 since the Al_Shabaab is essentially a muslim
organization, the attacks have been blamed on the Muslims and the Somalis and Muslim
in general are generally viewed as terrorists in Kenya. These labels have been reinforced
by the security forces in their security practices.
Kenya has been faced with a number of terrorist attacks since independence. However,
the Al-Shabaab terrorist phenomena is a rather new occurrence that started following the
Kenya Armed Forces entering Somalia to flush out the terrorist groups in October 2011.
Since then, there have been sporadic attacks by the Al-Shabaab in Mandera, Wajir,
62
Amb le, John C. “Co mbating Terrorism in the New Med ia Environment.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
35, no. 5
63
Blanchard, L.P. (2013). 'Kenya: Current Issues and u.s. Policy', Current Politics and Economics of Africa
6(1): 71.
64
Anderson, D.M. and J. McKnight (2015). 'Kenya at War: Al-Shabaab and its Enemies in Eastern Africa',
African Affairs 114(454): 1-27.
65
Anderson, D.M. and J. McKnight (2015). 'Kenya at War: Al-Shabaab and its Enemies in Eastern Africa',
African Affairs 114(454): 1-27.
25
Garissa, Mombasa and Nairobi66 . Al-Shabaab is said to have emerged in Somalia from
the remnants of Al-Itihad al Islamiya (AIAI), a Wahabi Islamic terrorist organiza tion
which started in Somali in 1980s with the purpose of overthrowing the then government
and replacing it with a government ruled by Shariah Laws. 67
On July 1 st 2012, there was a twin attack on two churches in Garissa that left 17 people
dead and about 50 were injured 68 . There was a major attack in Westgate shopping Mall
in Nairobi in 2013 and an attack at Garissa University College in March 2015 that killed
over 60 people, mainly students. A number of sporadic attacks have continued to take
place mainly in north eastern region, with various effects on the residents.
A number of factors have contributed to its being a good target of attack by the terrorists.
Some of these factors include the country‘s coastal geographic situation and strategic
location relative to Europe, Asia, and neighbouring African countries, porous borders,
unstable neighbouring countries especially Somalia and Sudan, relatively open and
multicultural society, relatively good transport and communications infrastructure and
relatively advanced regional economy69 . Kenya’s close links with U.S.A., Europe, Israel
and other western capitalist interests, together with substantial presence of western
interests, investments, installations, diplomatic corps, and the headquarters of
international agencies such as the UN puts Kenya at risk of attack.
Of late, a number of terrorist attacks have been performed by Kenyans who are not of
Somali origin. However, all of them have been recent converts to Islam. By 2012, the
number of attackers that were Kenyan natives other than of Somali origin were estimated
66
Kipkembo i, R. A. (2013). An Assessment of the Socio-Economic Impacts of Terrorism In East Africa: A
Case of Al Shabaab in Kenya. Unpublished thesis. University of Nairob i
67
Khayat, M. (2012). Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen and Kenyan Muslim Youth Center strengthen ties, Middle
East Media Research Institute, Inquiry and Analysis Series Report no. 870, 12 August 2012, p.28
68
Campbell, Kurt M., and Michele A. Flournoy. (2001). To Prevail: An America Strategy for the
Campaign against Terrorism. Washington, DC: Center for Africa Strategic tudies.
69
Kipkemboi, R. A. (2013). An Assessment of the Socio-Economic Impacts of Terroris m In East Africa:
A Case Of Al Shabaab In Kenya. Unpublished thesis. University of Nairobi
26
to be about 10% of the total force of the Al – Shabaab. This group is referred to as the
Kenyan Mujahideen by the Al- Shabaab core members. The recent converts are typically
young and overzealous, whose situation of poverty have made them easy targets for the
outfit's recruitment activities 70 .
In recent times, there have been sporadic grenade attacks by the Al-Shabaab across the
country following the coordinated operation between the Somali military and the Kenyan
military against the Al-Shabaab group of insurgents in southern Somalia. Since then, and
especially since 2012, there have been a number of attacks by A Shabaab, many of which
have concentrated in north eastern region, though others took p lace in Nairobi and
Mombasa.
Police vehicles and stations, nightclubs, bars, religious groupings, churches, a bus station
and downtown building of small shops have been the major targets of Al-Shabaab attacks
in recent past. On July 1st 2012, there was a twin attack on two churches in Garissa that
left 17 people dead and about 50 were injured 71 . There was a major attack in a shopping
Mall in Nairobi in 2013 and an attack at Garissa University College in March 2014 that
killed over 60 people, mainly students. A number of sporadic attacks have continued to
take place mainly in north eastern region, with various effects on the residents.
70
Kipkemboi, R. A. (2013). An Assessment of the Socio-Economic Impacts of Terroris m In East Africa:
A Case Of Al Shabaab In Kenya. Unpublished thesis. University of Nairob i
27
the economy. The review also shows that methods of combating terrorism themselves
also negatively affect the economy. But it does not provide any better ways of combating
terrorism that have little effect on the economy. The review also showed t hat terrorism
causes social disharmony and illegal money into the economy, thereby creating inflation.
But the review does not state how to deal with these effects nor how to reverse them. The
review reveals that the return of young muslim elites from Islamic education in Saudi
Arabia and Pakistan in the 1970s marked the beginning of radicalization in KenyaBut the
current terrorism acts have nothing to do with Muslim returnees as it seem to be home
grown. The review also shows some of the youths were recruited following preaching by
some controversial preachers like Aboud Rogo and Makaburi, who urged Muslim youths
to join jihad in Somalia and fight against the infidels, yet no action was taken against
them but were instead killed by unknown assassins. It is not clear why no action, apart
from death by assassination, could be taken against known preachers who incite the youth
to violence before the youth actually joined militant groups to perpetrate violence. All
these factor form gaps that this study expects to fill.
2.6 Conclusion
The chapter reviewed information regarding terrorism activities in the world and in
Kenya. It started by an overview of terrorism throughout the world, then reviewed
information about the economic effects of terrorism. The chapter then looked at the social
impacts of terrorism before zeroing down to terrorism activities in Kenya. It then
provided the theoretical and conceptual framework for the study. Finally, the chapter
discussed the gaps identified in the study.
28
3.0 CHAPTER THREE: A CASE STUDY OF KENYA’S NORTH EASTERN
REGION.
3.1 Introduction
This chapter looks at the impact of terrorism on the social, economic as well as political
spheres of north eastern region. Specifically, the chapter discusses the impact of terroris m
on the health sector, education sector, business and the political sectors in the region.
Medical specialists in the health sector consist of people from all parts of Kenya,
including a few from the local population. However, unlike the security sector where
most people from the locality working in other parts of Kenya were transferred to work
29
within the counties, the health sector has professionals from all parts of Kenya. Given
that the highest numbers of peoples of Kenya are not Somalis, the same proportion
applies in the health sector in the three counties. This implies that majority of health
specialists are not part of the local population. Following the advent of terrorism, many of
the non- Somali specialists in the sector either secured transfers to other parts of Kenya,
or just took off, not minding the repercussions of deserting duty. According to the fleeing
specialists, life is more precious than anything else since all others can be found provided
that one is alive 72 .
Besides the public hospitals in the major towns in the three counties, there are a number
of private health facilities in the major towns. The private health facilities are manned by
the specialists sourced from the public hospitals. The officers work part time when they
are not on duty. But with the departure of the health specialists from the public health
sector, the private sector has also been left with very few specialists. Most of the health
specialists still manning the health sector, whether public or private, are people from the
local population. However, compared the rest of Kenyans combined, the specialists from
the local population are so minimal that they cannot handle the many duties that need to
be handled in the health facilities. The end result is that there are very few specialists in
the health sector.
In general, the advent of Al – Shabaab terrorism in Kenya since 2011 has nearly
paralysed the health sector in the north eastern region. Health specialists from the county
referral hospitals have virtually fled the area to go and practice in other parts of Kenya,
possibly where they call their homes. The only specialists remaining are those who are
natives of the area - the Somalis. But these are quite few compared to the various areas of
specialization that require handling. In effect, there are very few health service providers
in the area and patients have to go for specialized treatme nt in other parts of Kenya, like
in Mwingi County that neighbours Garissa and north eastern in general, and Nairobi.
72
Daily Nation Newspapers, 7th June, 2017
30
3.3 Terrorism and the Education Sector in North Eastern Kenya
Education is divided into various levels in Kenya. These are the early childhood
education and development (ECED) sector, primary schools sector, secondary school
sector and the higher education sector that consists of colleges and universities. There are
three colleges in the region, all based in Garissa. These are Garissa Teac hers College,
Medical Training College and North Eastern National Polytechnic. Recently, a
constituent college of Moi University – Garissa University College, was started in
Garissa. The rest of the sectors in education - secondary, primary and ECED sectors are
distributed all over the three counties.
When terrorism started in Kenya in 2011, all people who were not from the Somali
community were targeted. The first few attacks concentrated on places where the so –
called Christians (actually non-Muslims, whether Christians or not) could be found in
bulk. There were attacks in churches, hotels owned by non- Somalis, bars normally
frequented by non-Somalis and virtually every business area frequented by large numbers
of non-Somalis and therefore where there were huge gatherings. For quite some time, the
education sector was not affected much. Any teacher who was ever affected by terrorism
activities was found among different groups rather than in educational institution. As
such, the education sector remained kind of immune to terrorism and learning proceeded
as normal.
However, the situation changed drastically when in November 2014, a passenger bus
from Mandera to Nairobi was attacked and most non – Somalis inside were murdered by
the Al Shabaab terrorists. It turned out that the attack occurred on the dawn of Saturday
when most schools had just closed the previous Friday, implying that most teachers were
in the attacked bus. Majority of the people who were killed by the terrorists were
therefore non- local teachers who had been teaching in the local primary schools, both
public and private. The teaching fraternity was dealt a major blow as most of the
passengers on board the bus were teachers. There was a huge outcry from the teaching
fraternity with all teachers from the north eastern region asking to be transferred
unconditionally in view of the attack on their members. A lull ensued throughout the
31
December holidays, possibly because there were no activities in the education sector
during the holiday. However, from January 2015, majority of teachers from other parts of
Kenya who previously taught in north eastern Kenya camped at the Teachers service
Commission Headquarters in Nairobi, demanding their immediate transfer from the
region as, on the basis that their lives were in danger. The camping took quite some time
as the employer did not bulge to the demands of the teachers, but camping eventually
fizzled out, with majority of the teachers opting instead to stay away from school rather
than go back to their work stations in north eastern region. However, a few of them
returned to their schools.
Education sector in north eastern region was dealt another fatal blow in early April 2015
when Al-Shabaab terrorists attacked Garissa university College, the then newly
established constituent college of Moi University. A number of students were killed,
mainly from other parts of Kenya, while almost no student from the region was killed.
This incident affected not just the teaching fraternity, but students as well. W hile the
initial departure of teachers following the Mandera bus attack mainly affected teachers in
Mandera and Wajir Counties, the Garissa University attack not only affected teachers, but
the learners as well, together with lecturers in higher learning institutions working in the
region. Virtually all learners in boarding schools or colleges in the region disserted their
institutions. Specifically, all students from the affected university were transferred to
their parent university - Moi University in Eldoret. Non – local students from the other
institutions of higher learning – Medical Training College, NEP Technical Training
Institute (currently North Eastern National Polytechnic) and Garissa Teachers College
virtually took off. Since majority of learners in these institutions were from other parts of
the country, their departure from these institutions left the institutions with less than 20%
of their original population. In fact, the colleges were officially closed from May when
they were supposed to re-open, to as late as September as the institutions instituted
security measures. The colleges are yet to recover the student population they had before
the university attack. The University of Nairobi, which had opened a satellite campus in
Garissa and even bought land for expansion, shifted its base to Mwingi and all students
asked to report to Mwingi for any official issues.
32
Similarly, non – local students in the national schools in Garissa – NEP Girls and Garissa
High school, transferred to other schools in their areas of birth. Another set of mass
departure of teachers began, whether official or otherwise. The three colleges, initially
not affected much by the teacher departure after the Mandera bus attack, now faced the
same problem of teacher departure. The colleges lost nearly half their earlier teacher
population, and about 80% of their student population 73 . Coupled with refusal by teachers
to seek teaching positions in the affected areas despite TSC advertisements for the same,
north eastern region has remained without the requisite number of teachers in all sectors
of education since May 2015. Considering that the area had been under staffed even
before the two terrorist incidences, the situation is now almost out of hand.
The scenario in education sector has led to very poor educational outcomes in the region.
Most schools do not have qualified teachers, with some schools employing the services of
untrained teachers, some of who did not even perform well in their form four
examinations. The end result is that pupil performance in the north eastern region, which
had been dismal even before the advent of terrorism, has worsened. Attempts to employ
teachers through advertisement of vacancies in the local press has not yielded much as
only a few places are filled by locally born trained teachers as others from the rest of the
country no longer consider taking jobs in the area. Furthermore, the two indecencies – the
Mandera bus attack and the Garissa university college attack were not the last attacks on
teachers in the region. The insurgents have continued to attack schools and other
installations, resulting in deaths of teachers from other parts of Kenya. Recently, the
terrorists killed a teacher who had just been in the area for about five months. This has
greatly discouraged other job seekers from ever seeking employment in the region.
While the advent of terrorism has affected nearly all sector of the economy, the effect on
the education sector is bound to be long term since majority of the current generation is
missing out on very important milestone in their life – acquisition of education. The
learners are not able to acquire the knowledge and skills expected of them at various
73
Daily Nation Newspapers, Jun 10, 2013
33
stages due to lack teachers. This implies that the region will lag far behind the rest of the
country as the students from the region can no longer attempt to compete with others
from other parts of the country. In general, the advent of terrorism has negatively
affected the education sector so much so that the effects will be felt long after.
3.4 Terrorism and the Business Sector in North Eastern Region of Kenya
The business sector, like the other parts of the economy in north eastern region, has also
been affected negatively by terrorism. Besides the attack on churches, business premises
owned by non – Somalis in the region were among the initial targets by terrorists. Since
these businesses were patronized by non – locals, the terrorists targeted them when a
large number of patrons were available. Such attacks targeted hotels and any other
businesses that attracted a multitude, such as makeshift shades for selling chips, bars,
shops and butcheries. A number of people got killed during such attacks, some of whom
included the proprietors themselves. As a result, many traders closed their businesses and
relocated other parts of the country.
Apart from individual traders shifting from north eastern region, some companies also
closed shop and moved to other parts of the country or just redistributed their employees
to relatively safer areas. A number of companies and non-governmental organizations
and even educational institutions shifted bases from north eastern to other parts of the
country. Examples of these include the AA driving school that operated in Garissa that
had to distribute its employees to other parts of the country. A number of NGOs closed
shop and moved out of north eastern region, rendering many employees jobless. Many
transporters who used to ferry goods to and from major towns in north eastern region
relocated their businesses to other parts of Kenya. This has had a net effect of increasing
the prices of basic food commodities as most of the food items are not grown in the
region, but are transported from other parts of Kenya.
In general, the advent of terrorism has greatly affected the business sector as a number of
businesses have had to be closed as their proprietors fear for their lives. Some of the
proprietors have also been killed in the raids. The business environment has therefore
34
generally worsened as some businesses are closed. The local population have therefore
faced shortage of employment as the few initially employed lose their jobs.
3.5 Terrorism and the Political Spheres in North Eastern Region of Kenya
Like the other sectors, the political field has not been spared by acts of terrorism in north
eastern region. One conspicuous case is the attempts on the life of the governor of
Mandera County, Governor Ali Roba 74 . The governor’s convoy has been attacked by
terrorists three times, a situation that has compelled him to boost his security. This
implies that a large portion of the county funds are used in beefing up the governor’s
security.
Besides the attack on the Mandera governor, it has become rather difficult to organize
political rallies especially during this time of electioneering. There have been sporadic
hand grenade attacks in various places and it is not clear where the grenades come from,
nor how many are still around. As such, it is feared that if a rally is not well secured, the
terrorists can explode a grenade for maximum effect. As such, to organize a political
gathering has become a rather expensive affair as a large number of security officers have
to be involved.
It has been claimed that a number of politicians have been claimed to be sponsoring the
activities of terrorist groups in the region. Sometimes, these allegations are raised in order
to make would be voters to rebel against the said politician. Such allegations may in fact
form a death knell for the politician’s political career. Currently, some politicians even
use the presence of terrorism activities in the region to undermine incumbents by blaming
them (incumbent leadership) for abetting the vice. In general the advent of terrorism has
made the political environment to be rather volatile as the politicians do not have means
of eradicating the vice.
74
Daily Nation Newspapers, 24th May, 2017
35
3.6 Other Sectors Affected by Terrorism in North Eastern, Kenya
Besides health, education and business sectors, terrorism has also affected other areas of
existence in the north eastern region. These include the social structure, communication
systems as well as the security infrastructure in the region. To begin with, terrorism has
affected the way security apparatus operates in the region. According to the Kenyan
constitution, national security forces should be nationalised, implying that the bodies
should have the face of Kenya. This implies that there should be a mixture of security
personnel from all communities in Kenya. In this sense, a security force like the Kenya
police should be a mix of officers from all parts of the country. This means that in a
security team of any given town like, say, Mombasa, no specific group should dominate
that force. It should contain people from any part of the country. The fact that Mombasa
is dominated by the coastal communities does not imply that security forces should be
sourced from the place. There can be a proportion from the coast, others from eastern,
western, central, Turkana and so on without necessarily considering the actual proportion
of ethnicity. The force becomes nationalized in the sense that no particular ethnic group
dominates it. But the activities of terrorists have changed this situation for the case of
north eastern region.
After a series of sporadic attacks in which no leads could be used to forestall terrorist
attacks, it was found that there were some security personnel who were compromised not
to provide intelligence information that could lead to the forestalling of impending attack.
After a series of investigations, it was recommended that majority of the security
personnel be members of the local community who have vast knowledge of the local
context, who would then get intelligence information right from the village. As such, it
was decided that members of the Somali community working as security officers in other
parts of the country be transferred to work in north eastern region to help restore security.
This was done and currently, majority of members of the police force in north eastern
region are Somalis. It is the same thinking that led to the appointment of Mr. Mohamed
Saleh, a Somali, to become the north eastern regional commissioner. In effect, terrorism
has had the impact of transforming the security apparatus in north eastern region from the
36
national outlook to a local outlook. To some extent, this arrangement has contributed to
some semblance of security in the region.
One of the key areas that terrorists target for attack has been police stations, especially
those in remote areas that are manned b y a handful of officers like, say, ten officers 75 .
Such stations have been prone to attack as the terrorists seek to increase their weaponry.
Very many police stations, especially those close to the Kenya-Somali boarder, have been
attacked and officers killed or injured. As such, a number of remote police stations have
had to be closed down and officers moved to more secure places. This has left the places
that initially had the police stations with virtually no security personnel. In effect,
residents in these environments have also had to where their security can be more
assured.
Another area in which terrorism has had drastic effect is on communication. Currently,
most people in the region use mobile telephone for most communications. To achieve
this, mobile telephone companies have installed infrastructure to effect communication
for calls, messaging as well as cash transfer. However, one of the main targets of
terrorists is the telecommunication systems. As such, whenever terrorists strike, one of
the installations that they target first is the telecommunication masts. In many cases, the
terrorists destroy the masts to prevent any communication for reinforcement from other
nearby security officers. Due to frequent attacks, some of the communication equip ments
have stalled completely for some time as engineers cannot easily access them to repair
them as they also fear for their lives. In essence, the terrorist menace has stalled
communication in some areas
Finally, incidences of terrorism have affected the social setup of people living in north
eastern region. Terrorists target places where there is a high concentration of non-Somali
population. One such place is the church where only Christians go for prayers, yet
Somalis are all Muslims. Since churches are major targets of attack, a large number of
Christians no longer attend church on Sunday or any other day in fear of terrorist attacks
75
Daily Nation Newspapers. 25th September, 2016
37
there. Although all churches are usually provided with security every time they have
prayers or other church functions, a large number of people do not believe that the
officers can provide enough security and therefore still just avoid going to church.
Other areas where non- local populations are likely to be found in large numbers are
social places like in social halls, bars and hotels. The effect is that many people have
opted not to attend such places, or attend but leave the places by six in the evening, just
before dusk. Proprietors of social places like bars have had to spend substantial amount
of money to hire security personnel so as to assure patrons that their security is
guaranteed while inside the bars. Similarly, people no longer go to eat in hotels after 6
p.m. this is the time that terrorists attack and since one cannot tell when the next attack
would take place and where, the only way of ensuring ones security is to avoid places
that attract a large number of people, specifically non- local people.
3.7 Conclusion
From the discussion, it is clear that terrorism has had a lot of negative effect on the
livelihood of people residing in north eastern region. Despite the acts of terrorism
targeting people originating from other parts of Kenya – people who are not Somalis, the
net effect is felt more by the local people themselves. While non-Somalis have places to
migrate to, the local Somali people have no other home but where they live and where
terrorism takes place. In most cases, professionals employed by the government get
transferred or simply shift to go and work in other more secure parts of the country, but
members of the local population remain in the same place. Therefore, as much as
terrorism activities are directed at the non- locals, it is the locals who eventually suffer
most. Currently, the education sector is on its knees while the health sector is s imply
crawling. Specialists in various fields are lacking as they shift to either their home
environments, or just other more secure parts of Kenya. As much as many of those killed
by terrorist attacks are non – Somalis, the remaining Somali population suffers as they
cannot access vital services. Therefore, terrorism is a vice that affects the intended as well
as the unintended in almost the same measure. There is need to bring it to rest.
38
4.0 CHAPTER FOUR: MITIGATING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM IN
NORTH EASTERN KENYA – A CRITICAL ANALYSIS.
4.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on strategies to counter terrorism and its impacts in north eastern
region of Kenya. The chapter discusses how to mitigate the impacts in the health sector,
education sector, business sector and in other aspects in which the impact of terrorism are
felt.
39
4.2.2 Improve Boarde r Security Management System
Most of the Al – Shabaab attacks are planned from outside Kenya, specifically in
Somalia. The implementers of the plans only cross over to the country when the planning
has already been done. Although there is always cooperation from the local population,
as long as cross boarder activities can be curtailed the frequency of attacks can be
curtailed. At the moment, the boarder security system is not quite detailed, manned
mainly by security officers on patrol. But there have been reports of the same officers
being compromised by being offered bribes by would be attackers. The officers operate
in remote places with little supervision and being alone and far, are prone to
compromising activities. To curb the menace, there is need to improve the boarder
security management system such that no individuals cross to Kenya without proper
identification documents and reasons for entry. Further, transportation of weapons should
be checked as much as possible. There have been plans by politicians to build a wall
between Kenya and Somali, but the progress of this plan is not quite clear. Meanwhile,
the security at the boarder need to be full proof to ensure that Al-Shabaab elements do not
cross over to cause atrocities in the country. Above all, the taking of bribes by security
officers should be checked as this greatly compromises the security surveillance at
boarder points.
40
possible, officers should not be left to work alone as it is quite easy to compromise a
single officer on duty compared to a number of them.
41
groups of people. There should be clear interaction between the local population and
other immigrants, who are usually the target of attacks. This would greatly improve
information flow and hence thwart any planned attacks before they actually occur.
To ensure that the north eastern region also has local secondary school teachers, the local
leaders should start a fund to be used to pay college fees for any person wishing to study
as a teacher in diploma or degree level. The fund should therefore cater for any person
wishing to become a teacher at any level above ECED. Some of them can be sponsored
in the locally based Garissa university college for degree course in education, while
others can be supported to attend diploma courses elsewhere. This can help fill the
teaching gap left by fleeing teachers from other parts of the country.
42
In the same way, to fill the gap left by fleeing health personnel, north eastern region
leaders can create a fund to train their own health workers. Luckily, there is already a
Medical Training College in Garissa where health personnel can be created. Although the
college currently offers training to certificate level only, it can be upgraded to offer
diploma level training. Further training of personnel to the level of degree can be done in
other colleges in other parts of Kenya, provided that there are funds to cater for the same.
When the funded students qualify, there should be a mechanism to ensure that they go
back to work in their local health centres to fill the void left by fleeing health personnel.
4.2.7 Conclusion
It is clear that the entire north eastern region has been drastically a ffected by the frequent
attacks by Al-Shabaab militants. Terrorism activities have affected various sectors of the
economy in the region, as well as the social setup of the region as a whole. The Kenyan
government has reacted to the activities by deployment of forces, who are equally
attacked by the dissidents. However, as much as it may be necessary to use military
intervention to deter further attacks on Kenyans, other non-violent means may be
necessary to ensure that information regarding pending attacks are known in advance.
This implies that the security officers need to cooperate with the public so that the public
informs relevant authorities of any impending attacks. When these tactics are used jointly
together with other deterrent activities such as increasing boarder surveillance, it will be
possible to reduce the frequency of terrorist attacks. Besides, the recent idea of
neighbours spying on any new arrival in the neighbourhood (the nyumba kumi initiative)
has not been made operational in north eastern region. this idea can help identify any
foreign people in an area and thereby help in thwarting any plans by the militants. A
combination of these factors can actually reduce and possibly eliminate the Al Shabaab
menace in the area in the long run.
43
5.0 CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
5.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a summary of the study’s discussions and findings regarding the
impacts of terrorism in north eastern region. It also provides concluding remarks and
recommendations.
It was found that many health professionals have deserted the region, leaving only locally
born health officers. The net effect is that the health care system in North Eastern region
lacks professionals and residents have to spend a lot of money to seek treatment in
hospitals located in other regions mainly Mwingi, Thika and Nairobi. Further, some units
in major referral hospitals in North Eastern region have been virtually closed due to lack
of professionals with the right skills to operate there. One example is the renal unit in
Garissa county referral hospital that has remained closed for over two years now due to
lack of professionals in the area after the previous ones left.
With regard to the education sector, it was found that majority of teachers who have been
teaching in North Eastern region but originating from other parts of Kenya deserted their
work and took off to work in friendly areas, specifically their home area. This has caused
a huge teacher shortage in the region. In effect, education standards in the region, which
has been below the national average throughout the years since independence, has
reached its all time low as majority of schools lack teachers, and are at times taught by
untrained individuals. In fact, public school managements have resorted to contracting
44
untrained personnel to work as teachers in both primary and secondary schools in the
region.
Besides education and the health sector, terrorism has also drastically affected the
business sector. Businesses in North Eastern region are no longer as vibrant as they used
to be before the advent of terrorism. A number of businesses have closed shop and
relocated to relatively safer areas of Kenya. Similarly, a number of NGOs have closed
and relocated from North Eastern region. This has greatly escalated the level of
unemployment in the region rendering much youthful population jobless.
Mobile telecommunication companies have not been spared either since they spend quite
a lot of money in repairing their communication masts. The se masts are major terrorist
targets who believe in disabling communication first before attacking the targeted places.
This renders the attacked places out of communication for quite some time hampering
security’s immediate response and rescue efforts.
Terrorism has also led to a general increase in levels of insecurity in North Eastern region
as police stations in remote places and those close to the Somali boarder for instance
Liboi, Amuma, Elwak and Mandera Police stations have been continually attacked,
leading to closure of most of them. The net result is that boarder patrol has reduced,
thereby escalating infiltration into the country by the Somali terrorists. On the social
front, the terrorism menace has created social apathy against people of Somali origin in
other parts of Kenya. The Somalis are usually viewed suspiciously by the other Kenyans
as people tend to feel that they are up to something fishy, usually terror related activities.
5.3 Conclusion
It is clear that terrorism has had drastic negative economic and social impact on the
residents of North Eastern region as a whole. While majority of the residents are not
responsible for the menace, the perception in Kenya has been that terrorism is mainly
carried out by people of Somali decent who are natives of these regions. The
consequence has been that people of North Eastern region have often faced prejudice and
45
been associated with negative effects of terrorism. However, terrorism is no longer a
preserve of people of Somali origin as a number of arrested members of the Al – Shabaab
have been found to originate from other tribes in Kenya and beyond (Tanzania, Ethiopia,
Uganda and even Sudan).
In conclusion, acts of terrorism in the North Eastern part of Kenya have affected locals
more than anyone else. The locals are the ones who suffer most when professionals leave
the region. While the rest of the population can virtually shift to go and leave in other
parts of the country, usually their places of origin, the natives of North Eastern Kenya
have nowhere else to go but to continue suffering in the hands of terrorists. Terrorism has
therefore retarded nearly all their important sectors of life and almost paralyzed
especially their economic activities. It is therefore important that whatever is possible
should be done to eliminate terrorism and its associated activities so as to revive the
economy of North Eastern region as a whole.
5.4 Recommendations
In view of the findings by the study, the following recommendations are made:
i. There is need to identify reasons that make individuals or persons join terrorist
groups in order to revere the conditions that give rise to terrorism. While the first
incidences of terrorism emanated from Somalia, it has become a trend for Kenyan
nationals, not only of Somali decent, but from other tribes as well, to cross the
boarder to Somalia for terrorism training and then come back to unleash terror on
Kenyans. Reasons for such cross boarder movements should be investigated in
order to eradicate them and thereby reduce the possibility of homegrown
terrorists.
ii. Members of the local community living in North Eastern region should be
encouraged to train in some of the professions that are occupied by people from
other parts of Kenya. This will help cushion the local community from the effects
of desertion by professionals from other parts of the country. Key professions
include medical and teacher education courses.
46
iii. There is need to initiate unbiased and stringent security laws by the legislative
arm of government in order to hinder, curb or draw heavy penalty on anyone from
participating, encouraging or sympathizing with terrorist groups or organizations.
iv. Learning institutions should be provided with adequate security so as to ensure
that the institutions can receive and ensure security of students. This can
encourage students to continue learning in these institutions whether the Al-
Shabaab menace has been wiped out or not.
v. Mobile telecommunication companies should come up with means of covering
places located along the Somali boarder without necessarily erecting
communication masts in the places. They can use masts located in more secure
places, or use satellites for transmission in such remote places. This is because the
terrorist groups target communication installations before attacking other areas,
ensuring that no immediate response and rescue can take place as there would be
no communication. Communication is key for deployment of security officers,
reinforcement and accelerate security’s response mechanism in saving the lives of
those been attacked by the terrorist from time to time.
vi. The government should deploy an efficient and effective border security
management system for surveillance and coordination necessary in keeping at bay
all elements of terrorism and terror related activities along the border. These will
help compliment the already existing security facilities in place.
vii. The rest of the Kenyan population should be encouraged not to view Kenyans of
Somali origin as members of Al – Shabaab or potential Al – Shabaab recruits
since the organization is not necessarily tribal based, nor does it belong to the
Somalis.
47
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