Spring 2023
POL 575 T-TH
Formal Theory I: Game Theory 9:00-10:20am
Corwin 127
Prof. Kristopher Ramsay
303 Fisher Hall
Office Hours: TH 10:30-11:30.
(Please use [Link] link on landing page and sign up on Calendly)
kramsay@[Link]
258-2960
TA Roel Bos
rbos@[Link]
PURPOSE: This course is designed as a rigorous introduction to the concepts and models used
to analyze political behavior in strategic contexts. We will begin with a brief introduction to the
theory of choice. As will material throughout the course, this discussion will be pitched at students
whom have taken POL 502. The course then focuses on game theory covering normal and extensive
form games, games of incomplete information, repeated games, and bargaining.
COURSE REQUIREMENTS: Grades will be determined as follows: 40% problem sets, 30%
midterm, 30% final. Late work will be penalized severely. Also, no early final exams will be given.
READINGS:
Required Texts:
1. Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. (FT.)
2. Robert Gibbons. Game Theory for Applied Economists. (G.)
Recommended Texts: If you do not like the text assigned, there are many others. They range from
the very rigorous to those that present intuitions with very little analysis. Most are at the library
if you wish to take a look. Below are a few suggestions.
• Martin J. Osborne. 2004. An Introduction to Game Theory
• Dixit and Nalebuff. 1991. Thinking Strategically
• Roger Myerson. Game Theory. A high quality text.
• David Kreps. Game Theory and Economic Modelling. A more intuitive treatment.
• Dixit and Skeath. Games of Strategy. Another undergraduate text.
• William Poundstone. Prisoner’s Dilemma. A popular biography of John von Neumann and
a history of the role of game theory in the Cold War.
• Sylvia Nasar. A Beautiful Mind. The well know biography of the founder of non-cooperative
game theory (still to be found in Fine Hall).
• McCarty and Meirowitz. 2007. Political Game Theory. The first real game theory text writ-
ten for political science.
COURSE SCHEDULE:
Below is a list of topics and the scheduled readings for the course. Naturally, this schedule may
change as the semester unfolds.
1. Utility Theory and GS Theorem
• PDF on Canvas
2. Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
• FT. Chapter 1
• G. 1.1C, 1.3
3. Extensive Form Games
• FT. 3
• G. 2.1, 2.2, 2.4
4. Repeated Games
• FT. 4.1-4.3, 5.1, 4.4
• G. 2.3
5. Dynamic Bargaining
• FT. 4.4
6. Static Games of Incomplete Information
• FT. 6
• G. ch 3.
7. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
• FT. 8.1-8.3
• G. 4.1, 4.2, 4.3A
8. Payoff Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium
• FT 13.1-13.2
