Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 15, no.
1, 2019
BOOK REVIEW
UNVEILING THOMAS MOYNIHAN'S SPINAL
CATASTROPHISM:
THE SPINE CONSIDERED AS A
CHRONOGENETIC MEDIA ARTIFACT
Ekin Erkan
Book under review: Thomas Moynihan, Spinal Catastrophism: A Secret History (MIT
Press, 2019)
Despite the comparative impulse to posit Thomas Moynihan within the lineage
of Reza Negarestani’s “theory fiction,” all such compulsions ought to be curbed.
Moynihan, a young philosopher hailing from the UK, is a fine example of what
has recently been termed “post-continental philosophy”, i.e. philosophy that
makes no distinction between analytic and continental divisions. Moynihan, a
thinker who collectively parses through the philosophy of science and history
with adroit ease, situates his discourse on cosmology and spinal trauma within
the hyper-genealogical tradition of Friedrich Nietzsche, Georges Canguilhem,
and Michel Foucault. However, to reduce Moynihan to the terms of archeological
historiography would be folly—indeed, Spinal Catastrophism (2019) unfolds as an
intellectual “cabinet of curiosities,” its thoroughly researched medical acumen
matched by the haunted echoes bridling the book’s ghostly pages (which feature
detached crooning skulls and inflected serpentine spines galore). Demonstrating
how every cognitive prosthesis creates its own neurosis while simultaneously
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EKIN ERKAN 565
wedding philosophers written out of history with esoteric biogeochemists and
curious medics, Moynihan’s inaugural book is at once erudite and ominous—a
challenging, albeit most rewarding, read.
At the heart of Moynihan’s project are occult synergies that produce a kind of
deep horrorism, fascinated with alternate catastrophic forecasts. Despite what
one may assume, however, this book does not simply produce a kind of
enchantment properly reducible to fanciful philosophical indulgences but,
instead, is a markedly political endeavor. Make no mistake, behind Moynihan’s
cheeky fatalism—the book resounds with a final crescendo of omnicide qua
dynamite-induced implosion—is a philosopher well aware of the Anthropocene
and the operant existential planetary risks that threaten the Earth’s ecosystem,
which creep closer with every carbon emission. Rather than participate in the
perhaps overwrought literary prognostic of prediction and posthumous
caretaking, however, Moynihan's altogether unique mode of “theory fiction”
invigorates speculative geoengineering, terraforming, and macro-strategy 1
through the interplay of reason and intellectual magnetism. In addition, the
prudent reader will notice a thread of subtle Hegelianism interwoven within
Spinal Catastrophism’s plexus, perhaps best abridged by the apothegm that “animal
makes itself ”.
How, exactly, does animal make itself, then? Where media studies would
rejoinder that “animal makes itself ” through reticulated and intermedial agential
artifacts, political science might pose cultural cleavages and striated ethnic lines
manipulated by political entrepreneurs. Rather than committing to an inquiry
on technology and new media, Moynihan examines the spinal cord as a properly
archeological media object and, consulting André Leroi-Gourhan’s Speech and
Gesture (1964), considers how "[t]he freeing of the areas of the motor cortex of the
brain, definitely accomplished with erect posture [...] will be complete when we
succeed in exteriorizing the human motor brain".2 Drawing from the German
tradition of philosophical anthropology (a genealogy that runs from Ernst Kapp
to Arnold Gehlen), Leroi-Gourhan examined the human, woefully and radically
underdetermined, as the animal that necessarily externalizes itself through the
implementation of “artificial organs”. (p.19) Moynihan reverses Leroi-Gourhan's
1
Thomas Moynihan, Spinal Catastrophism: A Secret History (MIT Press, 2019), p. 34.
2
André Leroi-Gourhan, Gesture and Speech (MIT Press, 1993), p. 248.
COSMOS AND HISTORY 566
dictum that the “standards of natural organs should be applied to such artificial
organs” (p. 111) by imbuing the spine with a kind of accented sociotechnical and
electronic intelligence.
Thus, both following and modernizing Leroi-Gourhan’s seminal study of
mechanical reproducibility and externalization, Moynihan’s book complicates a
particular contemporary trend within posthumanism festering in popular science
and cultural studies. 3 If we parse the posthuman trajectory along Moynihan’s
intellectual framework, diachronization is revealed to be relative to technization
and organology, rather than bondaged to any specific or discrete technology or
politically socialized technological dispositif. If the spinal cord is a media object,
then its erect positioning indexes its actuarial operative use. Playfully engaging in
German philosopher of technology Ernst Kapp’s dictum that humanity
externalizes itself, Moynihan carves a world whereby the biological human is
erased while materially producing consciousness in itself (that is, externalization
as an inflected process). Coupling Leroi-Gourhan’s description of programmed
standardization with Kapp's writing on "organ projection", 4 Moynihan examines
"planetary autonoesis", (p. 177) whereby a kind of accidental bio-mimicry is
realized in the ways that we externalize ourselves through autonomic feedback
loops, bypassing the brain. (The guileful reader will notice myriad parallels
between second order cybernetics and Moynihan’s description of
environmentally and allometrically scaled evolution.)
Following Moynihan’s recounted archive of occult medical annals,
bipedalism, the nexus of hominization, is the root of all trauma. Accordingly,
Moynihan queries:
“[c]ould all observable structure, then, be some astronomically distributed and
rarefied ‘neurosystem’, some Dysonian Organprojektion? physics itself the externalized
‘nervous array’ of computational behemoths and their ongoing interaction?” (p. 67)
3
Simply consider the wide media coverage of Elon Musk’s NeuraLink and the transhumanist
technofetishization colouring Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek's branch of accelerationism, which advocates
for full automation whereby “the tendencies towards automation and the replacement of human labor
should be enthusiastically accelerated”. See: Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, "#Accelerate Manifesto for
an Accelerationist Politics", in Robin Mackay and Armen Avanessian (eds), #Accelerate: The Accelerationist
Reader (Urbanomic, 2014), p. 109.
4
For further reading, see: Ernst Kapp, Elements of a Philosophy of Technology: On the Evolutionary History of
Culture (University of Minnesota Press, 2018).
EKIN ERKAN 567
This is the collective closure between astronomer Fred Hoyle's theory of
“morphological evolution” 5 as an emancipation from anthropocentricism and
philosopher of science Milan M. Ćirković's “indistinguishability thesis”. As such,
Moynihan writes that “intellect tends towards environmental manipulation”,
wherefore any “sufficiently advanced intelligence becomes entirely
indistinguishable from its own environment”. (p. 67) Within this belated
cosmogony of the spinal cord-cum-megalith, environment and thought are
enraptured in a kind of mutualist dance. Scoliosis-impacted floating spines and
encephalized skulls litter Spinal Catastrophism’s cosmic mythos, at ends with the
spinal-radial axis that grounds the reader along the Earth’s mold. An index for
the unencumbered human, the floating spine serves as an answer to fatalist
doom.
Another bridge soon appears (such ephemeral bricolage dazzles Spinal
Catastorphism) via the Fermi Paradox, the term given to the enigma troubling
theoretical arguments that indicate that there ought to be countless other
intelligent species in the universe, despite all observational and empirical
evidence that suggests otherwise. In contrast to the Baudrillardian hyperreal,
Moynihan’s writing is much closer to Cirkovoc’s “simulation hypothesis”, which
describes "a simulation created by Programmers of an underlying, true reality
and run on the advanced computers of that underlying reality". 6 Moynihan’s
“simulation”, while unaffixed to traditional computational devices (and,
consequentially, freed from rationalist responsibility), is run through a
permutation of Schopenhauer’s notion of reality as a nervous simulation—if the
Central Nervous System is a parasite, then “reality is itself the symptomology of
viral invasion”. (p. 254)
Fermi’s paradox brings us to the Polish science fiction author and philosopher
Stanisław Lem, 7 whose mythic fabricated scientist, Aristides Acheropoulos, offers
a “New Cosmogony” that breaks with metaphysical systems and natural science,
offering a purely preflexive idea of the material world. Acheropoulos booms,
“Tertium non datur, the world was created by No One, though it was created
5
For further reading, see: Fred Hoyle, The Origin of the Universe and the Origin of Religion (Moyer Bell, 1993).
6
Milan M. Ćirković, The Great Silence: Science and Philosophy of Fermi's Paradox (Oxford University Press,
2018), 122.
7
It was Lem who originally coined the phrase “Fermi’s Paradox”. For further reading, see: Stanisław
Lem, Solaris, tr. Joanna Kilmartin (Mariner, 2002).
COSMOS AND HISTORY 568
nonetheless”. Consequently, Acheropoulos cosmologizes ludics and Moynihan,
following suite, surreptitiously marries instincts with drives.
Acheropoulos’ enraptured battle with Professor D.C. Barker 8 is deeply knitted
within the fabric of Spinal Catastrophism, mirroring Moynihan’s epic clamor
between the Central Nervous System and the Autonomic Nervous System. This
nested antagonism, once again, reflects Moynihan’s implied Hegelianism, where
an ontological paradox of dialectical historicity is premised on an open Whole
that is irremediably ruptured by its own absolute negativity. Professor Barker, the
renegade cryptographer, is silently plucked from Nick Land/CCRU’s universe
(although Moynihan, devilish “theory fiction” trickster that he is, uses “in world”
citations, requiring that the reader be privy to their own research)—one may
recall this is a scientist who “has spent his life decoding ancient scripts, quasibiotic
residues, and anomalous mineral patterns”.9
For Barker, it is trauma that externalizes itself, rather than self-consciousness
or technics. As Barker once quipped, “trauma is a body”. 10 Professor Barker,
following the lineage of JG Ballard (himself a non-conformist Kantian), maps
“spinal catastrophism” 11 along trans-organic lines, drawing topological and
geometrical similarities between the human cranial vault and the Boötes void,
alongside “the mammal’s swollen calvarium and the concavity of the Chicxulub
crater”. (pp. 72) Such terrestrial parallels inform the system Moynihan slyly
carves, decorated idiosyncratic and forgotten “parascience” curiosities coupled
alongside genuine scientific axioms. For instance, describing a latent desire for
cosmological symmetry, Moynihan lists secret morphisms and tectologies—a
personal favorite is paleontologists' once-popularized idea of dinosaurs owning a
posterior "second brain". (p. 76)
An excavator of hermetic mystique, Moynihan recovers German philosopher
of the unconscious, Eduard von Hartmann (whom Nietzsche unabashedly
censured, effectively writing out of history), so as to divulge a disquisitive
8
Professor Barker, himself, a descendent of Deleuze and Guattari’s Professor Challenger, an inhabitant
of A Thousand Plateaus (though appropriated, in turn, from Conan Doyle’s oevre).
9
Nick Land, Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987–2007 (Urbanomic, 2011), p. 506
10
Ibid., 498.
11
The term “spinal catastrophism” was originally coined in one of Professor Barker's publications, as
noted in in Fanged Noumena (p. 505). In Moynihan’s book, this fictitious paper is surreptitiously cited as
follows: 'Spinal Catastrophism', Plutonics, vol. X, No. 10, Spring 1992.
EKIN ERKAN 569
physiophilosophy. By culling Hartmann, Moynihan professes the possibility of
"Alien Spine Syndrome", whereby a nested assemblage of praxial junctures in
the spine autonomously correlates to instinctual behavior sans brain-arbitage or
any cerebral passthrough. Uncovering how the Central Nervous System could
operatively profess a kind of "spinal soul", Moynihan marries Hartmann's
philosophy of the unconscious with physiologist Marshall Hall's "reflex theory",
providing a cartography of integrative sensory-motor responses that require no
functional participation from the brain. Thus, one stumbles upon somnabulent
subjects “thinking within their trunks” (p. 198), who haunt and lumber across the
pages of Spinal Catastrophism. It is no wonder that these littered gyrating spinal
chords are so eager to lift themselves off the page.
Moynihan's disarticulated horology is central to his notion of "Spinal
Catastrophism", for these parasiting spinal artifacts are the bearers of time and
lost temporality, calcified heterochronic signifiers. Moynihan echoes 17th-century
Danish geologist Nicolaus Steno's laws of stratigraphy, which describe the
patterns in which rock layers are deposited through a tripartite mold: 1) original
horizontality, 2) cross-cutting relationships, and 3) lateral continuity. Moynihan
extends Steno’s Law onto vertebral levels. Consequently, not only are bodies
mystified, reduced to “glaciated temporality,” (p. 89) but, accordingly, spinal
chords are valorized as regionalized memory, indices of (a collective) neural saga.
Such is Spinal Catastrophism’s trajectory: we begin with Kant’s musing on the
earth, veer towards externalizing and inflected bodies, vivisect a few cadavers,
and harvest their spines. Not only do these phantom spines suggest collapse but
their stratigraphic layering reminisces of the earth and its plutonic depths.
Consequently, it is only appropriate that Moynihan eventually guides us, once
again, back to the Earth (although not before circuiting us through a
psychoanalytic lagoon, bubbling with Sándor Ferenczi’s writing on archaeo-
evolutionary geological inscription).
"How gentle and soothing, if death were really nothing but ceasing to be, but
is there such a thing as 'mere death'?" 12 Recall that the “post-Kantian School’s”
point of contact with theology qua eschatology almost always produced
cosmogenic traces. In this tradition, neurosis, musing over death, unfailingly
12
Nick Land, The Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille and Virulent Nihilism (Routledge, 1991), p. 128.
COSMOS AND HISTORY 570
leaves a script, a last vestige of fractured idealism. In Schopenhauer's thought, for
instance, we see that a philosophy of redemption relies upon our pure extinction,
although there is a caveat: how can we be certain that this process won’t simply
repeat itself? Thus, following Schopenhaur, von Hartmann13 claimed that the
cyclic world process is doomed to sputter out yet another humanoid species and
therefore, we must break the cycle by creating an absolute universal negation of
the world (thus begins his arcane metaphysics). It is, therefore, our duty to die.
Moynihan writes that, in order to ensure a universal annihilation, "[w]e must
remove the potential for any other future nervous systems—anywhere”. (p.267)
This is where Moynihan’s final chapter places us, virtuously planted within
superlative extinction, a Stygian universal negation where we must all become
what Jean Paul Richter contemporaneously called the coming “Dead Christ”.14
This is the most sublime of all omnicide: supernovae's heliotrope plasma-clouds
besmirch the sky and fractured spines finally falter in unison, pattering like hail
while betraying their once-remarkable erect verticality. Following Moynihan’s
hyperstitious hysteria, the spine becomes an aesthetic media object; much like
art, the spine traps the jouissance of fragmentary “time in a pure state”, 15 the
chronogenetic artifact par excellence. Riffing on HG Wells’ pitch-black
pessimism, Moynihan concludes that “[m]ind may well be at the end of its bony
tether”. (p. 267) Ergo, it is the duty of the autonomous spine, the clandestine
recorder, keeper of all grammatization and humanity’s tragic chronicler, to
destroy the universe—or, conversely, the spine is the universe's articulation of the
ethical duty to self-destruct. (p. 268)
While Spinal Catastrophism’s disquietude is steeped in the protracted heritage
of “theory fiction”, Moynihan's appropriation of Leroi-Gourhan’s externalization
also recalls Bernard Stiegler's recent work on technics and the exosomatized
body, through which the transdividuated subject “becomes intrinsically fetishistic
and whose instincts become drives”. 16 Furthermore, both Moynihan and Stiegler
complicate zoological accounts of noetic cerebral organs that are veritably
13
Notably, von Hartmann considered the spine to be “the seat of the unconscious”; see Thomas
Moynihan, Spinal Catastrophism, p. 88.
14
J.P. Richter, “Speech of the Dead Christ from the Universe that There is No God’, in Jean Paul: A
Reader, tr. E. Casey (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. 179-83.
15
Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, tr. C.K. Scott Moncrieff (Marcel Proust, 2012), p. 2621.
16
Bernard Stiegler, The Age of Disruption (Polity Press, 2019), p. 274.
EKIN ERKAN 571
immersed in a libidinal economy of différance vis-à-vis the brain and the brain,
alone. 17 Where we, once upon a time, had Galls' phrenology, in which "spirit is a
bone", today we see the unabashed dominance of a new kind of “soft
phrenology”, whereby spirit is blithely cofounded with thought and reduced to
gelatinous cognition as a synonym for causality. In response to this proof of
plasticity as the epigenesis of reason, both Stiegler and Moynihan propose an
organological condition, albeit most distinctly. While Stiegler focuses on digital
protentions as pharmakon, parsing automation and algorithmic govenmentality
for how they incur proletarianization, Moynihan’s hypergenealogy recounts an
imperative of naught, where the subtraction of responsibility becomes self-
reflecting. Nonetheless, Spinal Catastrophism basks in a kind of restrained sanguine
buoyancy, which the Postscript so acutely reveals, recounting a narrative of
nature's history outstripping the human so as, quite possibly, to frame “entropy’s
dark laughter” 18 as our epochal moment, whereby the full scale of planetary risk
and ruination is near impossible to fully imagine.
ee2447@[Link]
17
This is, in fact, why Stiegler admonishes Catherine Malabou’s work on (neuro)plasticity as erroneous,
remarking that “this noetic organ is constituted through identification, idealization, sublimation and the
super-ego, which are not, properly speaking, cerebral even though they pass through the brain. This is what
Catherine Malabou fails to understand…” See: Bernard Stiegler, The Age of Disruption, p. 257. Similarly,
Moynihan instrumentalizes psychoanalysis to bridge neuronic antagonism with topographical scales, the
stratigraphic earth and its plutonic depths refracting the weighty brain’s incumbrance, which the spinal
cord is forced to buttress (once again, it is no wonder that these spinal cords seek to wrest themselves free).
Both Stiegler and Moynihan engage with autonomic processing and its environmental feedback so as to
move beyond accounts of artifactual externalization/media as “organ projection”, recognizing how these
artifacts are readily engaged in reorganizing Umwelt (tying operative media as that which is both
libidinal/drive-based and insensate/espoused to instinctual relay).
18
Moynihan, Spinal Catastrophism, p. 276.
