Game Theory Notes
Game Theory Notes
GAME THEORY
ANSWER ANY 4 QUESTIONS
TOTAL MARKS=20 MARKS
1. Players: Strategic games involve at least two players, but they can
include many more.
2. Strategies: Each player has a set of possible strategies or actions they can
choose from. These strategies determine how a player will behave in the
game.
1. Prisoner's Dilemma: In this classic example, two suspects are arrested for
a crime, and each has the option to cooperate with the other by remaining
silent or betray the other by confessing. The payoffs depend on the choices
made by both suspects, and it illustrates a situation where both players have
a dominant strategy to confess, leading to a suboptimal outcome for both.
2. Cournot Competition: In this game, two firms decide how much output to
produce in a market with limited demand. Each firm chooses its output level
to maximize its profit, taking into account the expected response of the other
firm. This game is used to model oligopolistic competition.
3. Bertrand Competition: In this scenario, two firms set prices for identical
products. Consumers will buy from the firm with the lowest price. Firms
choose their prices strategically, considering how the other firm will price its
product.
Strategies: Each suspect can choose one of two strategies: "Cooperate" (C)
by remaining silent or "Betray" (B) by confessing to the crime.
Payoff Matrix:
```
| A Cooperates (C) | A Betrays (B) |
-------------------------------------------------
B Cooperates | A gets 2, B gets 2 | A gets 0, B gets 3 |
-------------------------------------------------
B Betrays | A gets 3, B gets 0 | A gets 1, B gets 1 |
```
- The first element in each cell represents the payoff for Player A.
- The second element represents the payoff for Player B.
2. If both suspects betray (B-B), they both receive a harsh sentence, and
each gets a lower utility of 1.
3. If one suspect cooperates (C) while the other betrays (B), the one who
betrays gets a significantly reduced sentence (3), while the one who
cooperates receives a very harsh sentence (0).
Analysis:
In the Prisoner's Dilemma, the dilemma arises because each player's rational
choice (maximizing their own utility) leads to a suboptimal outcome for
both when considered together.
As a result, both players often end up betraying each other, leading to the
outcome (B-B), which is worse for both in terms of their combined utility
compared to the outcome (C-C).
Certainly, here are suitable examples of classical game theory scenarios for
both "Conflict of Sales" and "Advertising War":
Game theory can be used to analyse this situation and predict how the
companies will strategically choose their prices and what the resulting
market outcomes will be.
4. Illustrate the concept of Arm’s race with Pay-off Matrix and utility
preference in the context of strategic games. (5 MARKS)
Payoff Matrix:
```
| Country A Arms (A) | Country A Disarms (D) |
---------------------------------------------------------
Country B Arms (A) | 3, 3 | 0, 4 |
---------------------------------------------------------
Country B Disarms (D) | 4, 0 | 1, 1 |
```
- The first element in each cell represents the utility (or benefit) to Country
A.
- The second element represents the utility to Country B.
1. If both countries choose to "Arm" (A-A), they both invest heavily in their
military capabilities. However, they also bear the costs of military spending,
resulting in a moderate utility of 3 for each country.
3. If both countries choose to "Disarm" (D-D), they avoid the costs and
tensions associated with military buildup, resulting in moderate utility (1)
for each country.
Analysis:
In this arms race scenario, both countries face a dilemma similar to the
Prisoner's Dilemma. Their dominant strategies, from an individual
standpoint, may be to "Arm" because it results in the highest utility for each
country. However, when both countries pursue this strategy (A-A), they both
end up with moderate utility and face the financial and security burdens of
an escalating arms race.
On the other hand, if both countries choose to "Disarm" (D-D), they avoid
the costly arms race and enjoy moderate utility, but they may worry about
being vulnerable to potential aggression from each other or other nations.
The arms race illustrates how countries can find themselves in a situation
where pursuing their own interests can lead to suboptimal outcomes for both
when considered collectively. Game theory helps analyse such situations and
explore strategies that may lead to cooperation and disarmament, ultimately
benefiting both countries in terms of stability and reduced military
expenditures.
5. Explain the battle of Sexes WITH Pay-off Matrix and explain its relevance
in the context of game theory. (5 MARKS)
The "Battle of the Sexes" is a classic game theory scenario that explores
coordination and conflict in decision-making. It is often used to illustrate
situations where individuals have different preferences but still need to
coordinate their actions to achieve a desirable outcome. This scenario is
particularly relevant in understanding human behavior in relationships,
negotiations, and other cooperative contexts.
Scenario Description:
Imagine a couple, Alice and Bob, who want to spend an evening together.
However, they have different preferences for how they would like to spend
their time. Alice prefers going to a ballet, while Bob prefers attending a
football game. They both agree that spending time together is more
important than going alone, but they need to coordinate their choice to have
an enjoyable evening.
Strategies: Each player can choose either "Ballet" (B) or "Football" (F) as
their preferred activity for the evening.
Payoff Matrix:
```
| Alice chooses Ballet (B) | Alice chooses Football (F) |
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Bob chooses Ballet (B) | 2, 1 | 0, 0 |
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Bob chooses Football (F) | 0, 0 | 1, 2 |
```
1. If both Alice and Bob choose "Ballet" (B-B), they get a payoff of 2 and 1,
respectively. This outcome is preferable to both, but Alice gets her preferred
activity, resulting in a slightly higher payoff.
2. If Alice chooses "Ballet" (B) while Bob chooses "Football" (F), Alice's
payoff is 0, as she doesn't enjoy football. Bob, however, gets his preferred
activity and receives a payoff of 2.
4. If both Alice and Bob choose "Football" (F-F), they get a payoff of 1
each, which is better than their least preferred outcome (0-0).
The Battle of the Sexes scenario is relevant in game theory for several
reasons:
2. Nash Equilibrium: In this scenario, there are two Nash equilibria (B-B
and F-F), which are stable outcomes where neither player has an incentive to
unilaterally change their strategy. However, one outcome may be more
preferred by both players, leading to the question of how to reach it.
Here's how the concept of dominant strategy works in the context of the
Prisoner's Dilemma:
Payoff Matrix:
```
| A Cooperates (C) | A Betrays (B) |
-------------------------------------------------
B Cooperates | A gets 2, B gets 2 | A gets 0, B gets 3 |
-------------------------------------------------
B Betrays | A gets 3, B gets 0 | A gets 1, B gets 1 |
```
- The first element in each cell represents the payoff for Player A.
- The second element represents the payoff for Player B.
1. Utility Maximization: At the core of rational choice theory is the idea that
individuals are rational actors who seek to maximize their utility. Utility is a
measure of satisfaction or well-being, and rational individuals make choices
that lead to the highest possible utility given their preferences and
constraints.
1. Pure Strategy:
- A pure strategy in game theory refers to a specific, deterministic choice
that a player makes in a game. It involves selecting one action or option with
certainty. Players using pure strategies do not randomize their decisions.
2. Mixed Strategy:
- A mixed strategy involves a player randomizing their choices among
multiple pure strategies with specific probabilities assigned to each strategy.
Players using mixed strategies introduce an element of randomness into
their decision-making.
3. Optimal Strategy:
- An optimal strategy is a strategy that maximizes a player's expected
utility or minimizes their expected cost given their beliefs about the actions
of other players. It is the best strategy for a player to adopt in a given game.
5. Saddle Point:
- In a two-player zero-sum game, a saddle point is a specific cell in the
payoff matrix where the value of the game is achieved. It is a situation
where the Min-Max and Max-Min strategies coincide, leading to a stable
outcome. The values in this cell represent the optimal payoff for both
players.
6. Fair Game:
- A game is considered fair when, in equilibrium, the expected payoffs for
all players are zero. In other words, no player has an advantage, and the
game does not Favor any particular player. Fair games can be used as a basis
for decision-making in situations where fairness or equity is important.
Nash Equilibrium is a game theory concept that determines the optimal solution in
a non-cooperative game in which each player lacks any incentive to change his/her
initial strategy. Under the Nash equilibrium, a player does not gain anything from
deviating from their initially chosen strategy, assuming the other players also keep
their strategies unchanged. A game may include multiple Nash equilibria or none
of them.
If both companies start advertising, each company will attract 100 new customers.
If only one company decides to advertise, it will attract 200 new customers, while
the other company will not attract any new customers. If both companies decide
not to advertise, neither company will engage new customers. The payoff table is
below:
Company A should advertise its products because the strategy provides a better
payoff than the option of not advertising. The same situation exists for Company
B. Thus, the scenario when both companies advertise their products is a Nash
equilibrium.
Example of Multiple Nash Equilibrium
John and Sam are registering for the new semester. They both have the option to
choose either a finance course or a psychology course. They only have 30 seconds
before the registration deadline, so they do not have time to communicate with
each other.
If John and Sam register for the same class, they will benefit from the opportunity
to study for the exams together. However, if they choose different classes, neither
of them will get any benefit.
In the example, there are multiple Nash equilibria. If John and Sam both
register for the same course, they will benefit from studying together for the
exams. Thus, the outcomes finance/finance and psychology/psychology are
Nash equilibria in this scenario.
Q1) Discuss the Cournot model. How is it diff from Bertrand model? Provide example.\
Ans.: The Cournot model and the Bertrand model are two fundamental models in the field of
industrial organization and game theory, used to analyze competition between firms in an
oligopoly (a market with a small number of large firms). Here's a discussion of each model
along with their key differences and an example:
Cournot Model:
The Cournot model was developed by French economist Augustin Cournot in 1838. In this
model, firms compete by choosing the quantity of a homogeneous product they will produce.
The key assumptions of the Cournot model are:
1. Number of Firms: There are two or more firms in the market.
2. Homogeneous Product: The product produced by all the firms is identical.
3. Simultaneous Decision-Making: Firms choose their quantities simultaneously, without
knowing the quantities chosen by their rivals.
4. Profit Maximization: Firms aim to maximize their profits.
5. Constant Marginal Cost: Each firm has a constant marginal cost of production.
The equilibrium of the Cournot model is found by solving for the Nash equilibrium, where
each firm's quantity choice is optimal given the quantity choices of its competitors.
Bertrand Model:
The Bertrand model, named after French economist Joseph Bertrand, assumes that firms
compete by setting prices for their products rather than quantities. The key assumptions of the
Bertrand model are:
1. Number of Firms: There are two or more firms in the market.
2. Homogeneous Product: The product produced by all the firms is identical.
3. Simultaneous Decision-Making: Firms set their prices simultaneously, without knowing
the prices set by their rivals.
4. Perfect Information: Consumers have perfect information about prices.
5. Profit Maximization: Firms aim to maximize their profits.
The equilibrium of the Bertrand model is found by solving for the Nash equilibrium, where
each firm's price choice is optimal given the price choices of its competitors.
Key Difference:
The key difference between the Cournot and Bertrand models lies in the choice of strategic
variable - quantity in Cournot and price in Bertrand. This difference has significant
implications for market outcomes and competition.
Example:
Let's consider a simplified example with two firms, Firm A and Firm B, in a duopoly market.
Cournot Model Example:
- Both firms simultaneously choose quantities (qA and qB) to produce.
- Total market demand is given by P = 100 - (qA + qB), where P is the price.
- Assume both firms have the same constant marginal cost of production, MC = 10.
Bertrand Model Example:
- Both firms simultaneously choose prices (PA and PB).
- Total market demand is given by Q = 200 - (PA + PB), where Q is the quantity demanded.
- Assume both firms have zero marginal cost of production, MC = 0.
Solving for the Nash equilibrium in each model will provide the optimal quantities/prices for
both firms, and you can compare the outcomes. Keep in mind that these are simplified
examples and real-world situations may involve more complex considerations.
Q2) Discuss the Stackleberg model in GT. How is it diff from the Cournot model? Provide
examples w relevant applications
Ans: The Stackelberg model is another important concept in game theory, particularly in the
context of strategic interactions between firms. It is named after the German economist
Heinrich von Stackelberg.
Stackelberg Model:
In the Stackelberg model, there are two or more firms, but unlike in the Cournot model where
firms make decisions simultaneously, in the Stackelberg model, one firm (the leader) makes
its decision first, and then the other firm(s) (the followers) make their decisions, knowing the
leader's decision. The leader anticipates the reactions of the followers when making its
choice.
Key Assumptions:
1. Number of Firms: There are two or more firms in the market.
2. Homogeneous Product: The product produced by all the firms is identical.
3. Sequential Decision-Making: The leader makes its decision first, followed by the
followers.
4. Perfect Information: All firms have perfect information about costs, demand, and the
strategies of other firms.
Stackelberg vs. Cournot:
The main difference between the Stackelberg and Cournot models lies in the timing of
decisions. In the Stackelberg model, the leader chooses its quantity (or price) first, and then
the followers react, while in the Cournot model, both firms choose quantities simultaneously.
Example with Relevant Applications:
Example: Duopoly with Differentiated Products
Let's consider a simplified example with two firms, Firm A and Firm B, in a duopoly market
producing slightly different products.
Stackelberg Model:
- Firm A, as the leader, chooses its quantity first (qA).
- Firm B observes qA and then chooses its quantity (qB).
Cournot Model:
- Both firms simultaneously choose quantities (qA and qB) to produce.
Relevant Applications:
1. Automobile Industry: In the automobile industry, one company may introduce a new model
or technology, setting the pace for the rest of the industry. For example, Tesla's introduction
of electric cars disrupted the market and prompted other companies to invest in electric
vehicle technology.
2. Video Game Consoles: When a new video game console is released, it often becomes the
leader in the market, influencing the strategies of other console manufacturers.
3. Airline Industry: Airlines may adjust their flight schedules and routes based on the actions
of competitors. For example, if one airline starts offering a new route, other airlines might
respond by adjusting their own routes and schedules.
4. Pharmaceutical Industry: A pharmaceutical company that develops and patents a new drug
becomes the leader in the market. Other companies must then decide how to respond,
whether by developing a competing drug or seeking a different market niche.
These examples illustrate how the Stackelberg model can be applied in various industries
where firms make sequential decisions based on the actions of their competitors. The leader's
advantage in setting the initial strategy can have significant implications for market outcomes
and competition.
Q3) Discuss the concept of mixed Nash equilibrium. Provide suitable examples with
appropriate application.
Ans.: A mixed Nash equilibrium is a concept in game theory that extends the notion of a Nash
equilibrium to games where players may not have a pure strategy that is a best response to the
strategies of the other players. Instead, players choose their strategies probabilistically,
leading to a distribution of possible strategies.
Definition:
In a mixed Nash equilibrium, each player assigns a probability distribution over their set of
possible pure strategies. These probabilities represent the likelihood of choosing each
strategy. No player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from their chosen strategy, given
the strategies chosen by the other players.
Example: Matching Pennies Game
A classic example to illustrate the concept of a mixed Nash equilibrium is the "Matching
Pennies" game. In this game, two players simultaneously choose either "Heads" or "Tails" by
placing a penny face up or face down.
- Player 1's payoff matrix:
Heads Tails
Heads 1 -1
Tails -1 1
Analysis:
In this game, there is no dominant strategy for either player. That is, regardless of what the
other player does, neither player has a pure strategy that is always better than the other.
To find a mixed Nash equilibrium, we assume that each player chooses each strategy with a
certain probability. Let's denote the probability that Player 1 plays Rock as p, Paper as q, and
Scissors as 1-p-q. Similarly, for Player 2, let's denote the probabilities as r, s, and 1-r-s.
Now, the expected payoff for Player 1 when playing Rock is:
E1(Rock) = p*(-1) + q*1 + (1-p-q)*(-1)
The expected payoff for Player 1 when playing Paper is:
E1(Paper) = p*1 + q*(-1) + (1-p-q)*1
Setting up similar equations for Player 2, we can solve for the probabilities p, q, r, and s that
make both players indifferent between their strategies.
Mixed Nash Equilibrium Outcome:
In the Rock-Paper-Scissors game, a mixed Nash equilibrium is achieved when both players
choose their strategies with equal probabilities (p=q=r=s=1/3). This leads to a situation where
neither player can gain an advantage by unilaterally changing their strategy.
Application:
The concept of mixed Nash equilibrium is widely applicable in various real-world situations
where decision-makers have uncertainty or incomplete information:
1. Pricing Strategies in Oligopoly: Firms might choose to set prices with probabilities to
introduce unpredictability and avoid price wars.
2. Political Campaign Strategies: Candidates may use mixed strategies for campaign
messaging to appeal to different segments of the electorate.
3. Game Theory in Sports: Athletes or teams might use mixed strategies in competitive sports
to introduce unpredictability in their tactics.
4. Military Strategies: Commanders might use mixed strategies to introduce unpredictability
in their tactics, making it harder for the opponent to anticipate their moves.
In all these scenarios, players use mixed strategies to introduce an element of unpredictability
or to account for uncertainty in the actions of their opponents. The concept of mixed Nash
equilibrium provides a framework for analyzing and understanding strategic interactions in
these complex situations.
Q7) Differentiate between Cournot, Stackleberg, Bertrand with applications and examples.
Ans.: Certainly! Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand are three different models used in game
theory to analyze competition between firms in oligopolistic markets. They each have distinct
assumptions and strategic elements. Here's a comparison along with relevant applications and
examples:
1. Cournot Model:
- Assumptions:
- Firms simultaneously choose quantities to produce.
- Products are homogenous (identical).
- Each firm believes the output of the other firms to be fixed.
- Example:
- Consider two firms, A and B, producing a homogenous product. If A produces \(q_A\)
units and B produces \(q_B\) units, total output in the market is \(Q = q_A + q_B\). Firms
maximize profits given this total output.
- Application:
- Oil Production: OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) often operates
under Cournot-style competition where member countries collectively set production levels.
2. Stackelberg Model:
- Assumptions:
- One firm (the leader) makes a decision first, and then the other firm(s) (the followers)
make their decisions, knowing the leader's choice.
- Products are homogenous.
- Perfect information.
- Example:
- Consider a market with two firms, Firm A and Firm B. If Firm A acts as the leader, it
chooses its quantity first. Then, Firm B observes A's choice and selects its own quantity.
- Application:
- Game Consoles: When a new video game console is released, the company introducing it
effectively becomes the leader, influencing the strategies of other console manufacturers.
3. Bertrand Model:
- Assumptions:
- Firms compete by setting prices, not quantities.
- Products are homogenous.
- Perfect information.
- Example:
- Consider two firms, A and B, competing by setting prices for their products. If A sets a
price \(P_A\) and B sets a price \(P_B\), consumers will buy from the firm with the lower
price.
- Application:
- Airline Ticket Pricing: Airlines compete by setting ticket prices. If two airlines offer the
same route, consumers are likely to choose the cheaper option.
Comparisons:
1. Strategic Variable:
- Cournot: Firms choose quantities.
- Stackelberg: One firm chooses quantity first, others respond.
- Bertrand: Firms set prices.
2. Information Assumptions:
- Cournot: Firms have imperfect information about rivals' quantities.
- Stackelberg: Perfect information.
- Bertrand: Perfect information.
3. Timing of Decisions:
- Cournot: Simultaneous quantity choice.
- Stackelberg: Leader makes decision first, followers respond.
- Bertrand: Simultaneous price setting.
Applications:
- Cournot Model:
- Oil Industry: OPEC members choosing production levels.
- Telecom Industry: Companies determining network capacity.
- Stackelberg Model:
- Automobile Industry: One company may lead with a new technology, influencing rivals.
- Retail Industry: A dominant retailer may set prices, with others following suit.
- Bertrand Model:
- Airline Industry: Airlines compete by setting ticket prices.
- Fast Food Industry: Fast food chains often compete based on pricing.
Remember, real-world situations may involve a combination of elements from these models,
and firms' strategies can be influenced by various factors beyond the scope of these models.
These models serve as useful simplifications to understand and analyze strategic interactions
in different types of markets.