Iran in the Face of Regional Developments:

Challenges, Responses and Possible

Courses of Action
January 23 ,2025

Highlights1
The dramatic developments in the Middle East in recent months, mainly Israel’s military
May 26, 2024 achievements vis-à-vis Hamas and Hezbollah and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria,
have significantly weakened Iran and the “resistance front” that it leads and pose significant
challenges to it, first and foremost the damage to Tehran’s ability to influence the region.
These challenges join a series of other challenges facing the Islamic Republic, mainly the
deepening of the economic crisis, the consequences of the Israeli attack at the end of October
2024, and the return of Donald Trump to the White House.
In light of the recent regional developments, Iran is trying to downplay the seriousness of
the situation, emphasizing its capabilities and the capabilities of the “resistance front”
to overcome the challenges and continue to act in light of the new circumstances, thanks
in part to the ability of Iran’s regional proxies to produce weapons themselves; Highlighting
Israel’s failure to realize its goals in the war, both in the Gaza Strip and in Lebanon, and
presenting the ceasefire in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip as a victory for the “resistance front”
and a strategic failure for Israel; Emphasizing Iran’s continued support for the
“resistance,” as it is a central pillar of the Islamic Republic’s policy.
In the ITIC’s assessment, Iran has no intention of backing down from its efforts to
maintain its regional status and continue its support for the “resistance front.” At the
same time, it appears that Iran will examine how to make the necessary adjustments and
find possible solutions to the limitations and constraints it faces in the main arenas in
which it operates.
In the Palestinian arena: Iran is expected to accelerate its efforts to establish a
terrorist infrastructure in Judea and Samaria and to increase its terrorist activity inside
Israeli territory.

1
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In the Lebanese arena: There is an Iranian effort to find alternative ways to overcome
the loss of the strategic path in Syria to support Hezbollah, rehabilitate its military
capabilities damaged in the war, and take part in the reconstruction efforts of the
Lebanese state to preserve some of its influence.
In the Syrian arena: Iran is working to establish channels of communication with the
new regime, reopen its diplomatic missions in Damascus, and maintain its foothold in
Syria by reinforcing trends of destabilization in the country over time. In addition, it
continues its attempts to smuggle weapons through Syria to Lebanon and may take
advantage of Israel’s military presence in Syria to encourage the establishment of
“resistance” cells in the south of the country.
In the Iraqi arena: Iran opposes the disarming of the Shiite militias. However, under
certain circumstances, Iran may accept the integration of the militias into the Iraqi
armed forces and try to maintain its political, military, and economic influence through
the institutions of the Iraqi state, while striving to maintain and increase its control over
the pro-Iranian militias.
In Yemen: Iran can maintain its limited influence through the Houthis and may also
exploit the Horn of Africa, especially the ongoing civil war in Sudan, to re-establish
influence and facilitate weapons transfers.

The impact of regional developments on Iran and

the “resistance front”
The dramatic events in the Middle East in recent months constitute a shock for Iran and the
pro-Iranian axis in the region. Israel’s military achievements vis-à-vis Hamas and Hezbollah
and the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria have significantly weakened Iran and the
“resistance front” it leads.

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“The axis of resistance” ([Link], December 17, 2024)

The Palestinian arena

The war in the Gaza Strip severely damaged the military capabilities of Hamas, which is an
important (though not the central) component of the “resistance front.” Iran saw the
strengthening of its ties with Hamas as an opportunity to gain a foothold in the Gaza Strip,
increase its influence in the Palestinian arena, and strengthen the cohesion of the “resistance
front.” Hamas, for its part, saw Iran as a strategic, financial, and operational support, which
helped it build up militarily to continue its armed struggle against Israel and to consolidate its
rule in the Gaza Strip. Iran’s support for Hamas included military aid (means and training) and
financial aid of hundreds of millions of dollars to the movement’s leadership and its military
wing.2 Although Hamas remains the dominant factor in the Gaza Strip, it has suffered
unprecedented losses since the outbreak of the war, and Iran’s ability to continue to use it to
consolidate its influence in the Gaza Strip has been severely limited.

The Lebanese arena

The war between Israel and Hezbollah has severely damaged the organization, which is
considered Iran’s preferred strategic arm in the region. The elimination of most of the
organization’s leadership, headed by secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, and the severe
damage to its military and strategic capabilities posed a significant threat to the most
important regional project that Iran has fostered for decades. The severe blow to Hezbollah
has also largely deprived Iran of its ability to deter Israel and respond to it in the event of an
attack on its nuclear facilities. Political developments in Lebanon also pose a growing
challenge to Iran in its efforts to maintain its influence and rehabilitate Hezbollah after the
war. The election of Joseph Aoun as president of Lebanon and Nawaf Salam as prime minister

2
For further information, see the ITIC study, “Captured Documents Show Iranian Support for Hamas
in the Gaza Strip” (November 18, 2024).

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of Lebanon is a significant achievement for Hezbollah’s opponents, reflecting the weakness

of the organization, which has lost its ability to impose its candidates and has been forced to
accept the election of Aoun and Salam.

The Syrian arena

The overthrow of the Assad regime in December 2024 placed Iran and the pro-Iranian axis
in unprecedented weakness. Iran saw Syria (along with Iraq) as its strategic depth. Therefore,
it has supported the Assad regime since the beginning of the Syrian civil war in March 2011,
providing various forms of assistance, including deploying thousands of IRGC and Hezbollah
fighters, extending tens of billions of dollars in direct financial aid and credit, and recruiting
foreign Shiite fighters to help regain control. The collapse of the Assad regime deprived Iran
of its front line of defense against Israel and, to a large extent, its ability to rehabilitate
Hezbollah’s military capabilities by transferring weapons through Syria, which served as a
major smuggling route for the organization.3
The statements of Syria’s de facto leader, Ahmad al-Shara (Abu Mohammad al-Julani),
provide Iran with great cause for concern. Thus, for example, al-Shara accused Iran of turning
Syria into a Captagon factory and said that the export of the Islamic Revolution affected the
entire region, causing sectarian conflicts, wars, and corruption. He stressed that Iran must
respect Syria’s internal affairs and recalculate its involvement in the region (Al-Hadath,
December 29, 2024). In a meeting with Lebanese interim Prime Minister Najib Mikati, al-Shara
said that Iran had harmed Syria, and stressed that Syria would no longer serve as a conduit
for the flow of Iranian weapons to Hezbollah (Al-Hadath, January 12, 2025).

“The Umayyad army in Syria” [the Umayyad dynasty in Syria is considered the enemy of the
Shiites] (Fars, December 18, 2024)

3
For further information on the smuggling routes used by Iran to smuggle weapons into Syria, Lebanon,
and Judea and Samaria, see the ITIC study, “Captured documents reveal how Iran smuggles weapons
via Syria and Jordan” (December 22, 2024).[Link]
documents-reveal-how-iran-smuggles-weapons-via-syria-and-jordan/

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The Iraqi arena

Iran faces the possibility of dismantling the Popular Mobilization Forces (the umbrella
organization to which the pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Iraq belong) and integrating the militias
into the Iraqi armed forces. Since the occupation of Iraq in 2003, the IRGC’s Qods Force has
led Iran’s cooperation with these militias to deepen Iranian influence in the country. The
militias’ involvement in the multi-front campaign, including their activity against American
forces in the region and the launching of missiles and drones at Israel, increased pressure to
disarm them in order to reduce Iran’s influence in the region. Senior American officials even
threatened the Iraqi government with the use of force if it did not act to dismantle the pro-
Iranian militias (BBC, December 26, 2024). Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein said that Iraq
was trying to persuade militias in the country that had acted against American and Israeli
forces to lay down their arms or join the country’s security forces (Reuters, January 16, 2025).
In addition, “Iraqi sources” reported that in a meeting between the commander of the IRGC’s
Qods Force, Esmail Qaani, and the commanders of the pro-Iranian militias in light of the
developments in Syria, the militia leaders stressed to him that Iraq is committed to neutrality
in light of the situation and that they do not want to enter into war on other fronts (Al-Araby
Al-Jadeed, December 12, 2024).
The challenges facing Iran in the various arenas join a series of other challenges (which
will not be detailed in this document), chief among them the worsening domestic
economic crisis, the consequences of the Israeli attack on October 26, 2024, and the
return of Donald Trump to the White House, which is expected to lead to the renewal of
the policy of “maximum pressure” against the Islamic Republic.

Senior Iranian officials address the situation of the

“resistance front” in the wake of regional
developments
Comments by senior Iranian figures about the status of the “resistance front” considering
the recent regional developments convey several key messages:

An attempt to downplay the severity of the situation

Emphasizing the ability of Iran and the “resistance front” to overcome the challenges and
continue to act vis-à-vis the new circumstances. Senior Iranian regime figures admitted that
the recent developments in the region had harmed the “resistance front,” but stressed

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that Iran’s proxies, led by Hezbollah, are capable of producing their own weapons and are not
dependent on Iran. The following are prominent statements:
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said at a meeting in Tehran that the “enemies”
imagined that the issue of the “resistance” had come to an end through the operation
carried out in Syria and the “crimes of the Zionist regime” and the United States with the
support of others, but they were wrong. He added that the spirit of Hassan Nasrallah and
Yahya al-Sinwar is alive, and their path continues, and that the Gaza Strip faces daily
attacks from the “Zionists” but continues to stand firm and resist, as does Lebanon
(Supreme Leader’s website, December 17, 2024).
In a meeting with religious preachers, Khamenei said that there is no basis for the
claim that Iran has lost its proxies in the region. He noted that Iran does not have “proxy”
forces and that Yemen, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) are
fighting on their own right and the strength of their beliefs, and not on behalf of Iran. He
added that the “resistance” in the region is still alive, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and
the PIJ, and that the peoples of the region will uproot the “Zionist regime” (Supreme
Leader’s website, December 22, 2024).

The Supreme Leader of Iran (Supreme Leader’s website, January 1, 2025)

IRGC commander Hossein Salami said at a conference in Bandar Abbas that Iran
supports the “resistance front,” but that it produces weapons on its own (Tasnim,
December 23, 2024).
Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh said at a memorial ceremony for the head of
the Qods Force’s support office in Damascus, Seyyed Razi Mousavi, that those who claim
that the “resistance” has weakened do not understand its significance (Mehr, December
27, 2024).

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IRGC spokesman Ali Mohammad Naeini said that the Iranian attack against Israel and
the actions of Hezbollah and the Houthis proved the strength of the “resistance front.”
He noted that Hezbollah’s actions proved that the “Zionist regime’s” calculations
regarding the organization’s strength were completely wrong, and that Israel had “gone
crazy” because of the killing of Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah commanders, but that
the organization quickly recovered despite the damage it had suffered. Naeini added
that the enemy does not understand the nature of the “resistance” and that it cannot be
weakened by bombing and physical confrontations (Tasnim, December 29, 2024).
The representative of Iran’s Supreme Leader in the Qods Force, Ali Mohammadi Sirat,
said that the strength of the “resistance front” has not weakened and that the more the
enemies continue their crimes, the more the power of the “resistance front” will only
increase. He noted that throughout Muslim history there had been ups and downs, as
well as during the Islamic Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War. However, in the end, the
Muslim nation wins, and the “resistance front” will realize its goals and achieve its final
victory through a combination of diplomatic and political planning and military
measures (Jamaran, January 4, 2025).

The Supreme Leader’s representative in the Qods Force (Jamaran, January 4, 2025)

Highlighting Israel’s failure to realize its goals in the war

Senior Iranian officials stressed that Israel has failed to achieve its goals vis-à-vis
Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon, despite its military successes. The
following are prominent statements:
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that although the “resistance” had
recently been hit, the “enemy” had not been able to achieve its goals. It did not succeed
in destroying Hamas in the Gaza Strip or Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the “resistance” will
continue on its path and compensate for the blows it suffered (Tasnim, January 1, 2025).

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According to Iranian Defense Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, the “resistance” in the Gaza
Strip is so strong that the “Zionist regime” has not been able to achieve its goals in the
war (Mehr, December 27, 2024).

The Iranian Defense Minister (Mehr, December 27, 2024)

Mohammad Bagheri, chief of staff of the Iranian armed forces, said at a meeting of
the commanders of the armed forces that despite the “crimes” Israel committed against
civilians in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, and despite the military and political support of
the United States, it had not been able to achieve any of its goals in the war. He added
that Israel had hoped to establish security in the north of the country and return the
residents of the north to their homes; this goal was not only not achieved, but the
insecurity also spread to large Israeli cities such as Haifa and Tel Aviv (ISNA, November
26, 2024).
IRGC commander Hossein Salami said in a maneuver by the IRGC’s Basij militia in the
southern Iranian province of Khuzestan that Israel is being defeated in the Gaza Strip
and southern Lebanon, the “Zionists” are fleeing the battlefield, the “Zionist” authorities
are helpless, their army is tired, and the “resistance” is growing stronger by the day
(Tasnim, November 22, 2024).
According to an IRGC statement issued following the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza
Strip, the “Zionist regime” has not succeeded in realizing its goals of releasing the
hostages through military action and eliminating Hamas; It surrendered to the
steadfastness and “resistance” of the residents of the Gaza Strip. According to the IRGC,
this “great victory” will go down in history; Months of crimes brought no achievement
for the “Zionist regime;” and the “resistance” remains alive and steadfast and will make
strong progress toward the liberation of Al-Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem (Fars, January
16, 2025).

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Emphasizing Iran’s continued support for the “resistance”

The Iranians made it clear that they would continue to support the “resistance front”
because it is a central pillar of the Islamic Republic’s policy. The following are prominent
statements:
Iranian Supreme Leader Khamenei declared that Iran would continue to stand by “the
Palestinian fighters and Hezbollah fighters” and support them (Supreme Leader’s
website, December 17, 2024). Khamenei also said that Iran would continue to support
“resistance in the West Bank, Lebanon, Yemen” and anywhere where there is
“resistance” to the actions of the “Zionist regime” (Supreme Leader’s website, January
8, 2025).
Speaking with Khalil al-Hayya, head of Hamas’ political bureau in the Gaza Strip,
following the ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi
said that Iran would continue its support for the Palestinian cause and the “legitimate
resistance” (Iranian Foreign Ministry website, January 16, 2025).
In a speech marking the death of Hassan Nasrallah, Ali Fadavi, deputy commander of
the IRGC, made it clear that Iran would continue to support Hezbollah and the “axis of
resistance” stronger and faster than in the past (Tasnim, November 14, 2024).

Senior Iranian officials’ comments on

developments in Lebanon
After the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon, senior Iranian officials presented the end of
the fighting as a “great victory” for Hezbollah and the “resistance,” and as a strategic failure
and defeat for Israel, which, they claimed, was forced to agree to the ceasefire after failing to
defeat Hezbollah and realize its goals in the war. The officials stressed that the blows suffered
by Hezbollah in recent weeks would not stop the activity of the “resistance” and that the
organization would be able to recover from the blows it had suffered and rehabilitate. The
senior Iranian officials also stressed Iran’s determination to continue supporting Hezbollah.
Following the election of Joseph Aoun as president of Lebanon, senior officials in Tehran
claimed that his election was made possible thanks to Hezbollah’s support and does not pose
a threat to the interests of Iran or Hezbollah. The following are prominent statements:
Foreign Minister Araghchi declared that Hezbollah once again shattered the myth
that Israel is invincible. He claimed that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had
been forced to “beg” for a ceasefire after Israel suffered heavy losses in southern

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Lebanon, despite full military and political support from the United States (Abbas
Araghchi’s X account, November 27, 2024).
In a letter to Hezbollah secretary-general Naim Qassem, IRGC commander Hossein
Salami wrote that the ceasefire in Lebanon was “a strategic and humiliating defeat for
the Zionist regime,” which had not succeeded in achieving any of its goals and
aspirations in the war against Hezbollah (Tasnim, November 28, 2024). In a speech at a
conference in Esfahan, Salami declared that Israel planned to eliminate the “resistance
front” and defeat Hezbollah by eliminating its leaders, but the martyrdom of the
organization’s commanders resurrected it. He claimed that Hezbollah forced Israel to
accept a ceasefire after its extensive attacks on Tel Aviv (Tasnim, November 28, 2024).
Mohammad-Jafar Asadi, deputy commander of the Khatam al-Anbiya Central
Headquarters, said that Israel wanted to compensate for its defeat on the battlefield by
setting conditions for a ceasefire, but Hezbollah did not accept these conditions and
imposed its conditions on Israel. Asadi added that although the ceasefire was not 100%
preferred by Iran, it welcomed it overall, because it was a victory for the “resistance
front” in Lebanon and a major defeat for the “Zionist regime” (Tasnim, November 27,
2024).

Mohammad-Jafar Asadi (Tasnim, November 27, 2024)

Ali Larijani, advisor to the Iranian Supreme Leader, said that Hezbollah had become
a missile manufacturer itself, and that, contrary to Israel’s claims, it continues to
maintain extensive weapons capabilities. He noted that Hezbollah plays a central role
in Lebanon and that removing the organization from the political equation in the
country is out of the question (Tasnim, November 24, 2024).
Following Aoun’s election as president of Lebanon, Iranian President Masoud
Pezeshkian issued a letter of congratulations, in which he noted that strengthening
stability and unity would defeat the ambitions of the “Zionist enemy” against Lebanon.

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He stressed Iran’s willingness to expand cooperation between the countries in various

fields (ISNA, January 9, 2025).
Iran’s Ambassador to Lebanon Mojtaba Amani said in an interview with Lebanese
television that Aoun would not have been elected president of Lebanon without the
“resistance.” He noted that the United States and Israel wanted to appoint Samir
Geagea, who is completely connected to Israel, as president, but when they were unable
to force his appointment, they had to make do with Aoun. Amani stressed that Aoun is
not anti-Iranian and that he respected Hezbollah when he served as army commander
and even allowed the transfer of weapons to the organization. He added that Hezbollah,
the Amal movement, and some of the Sunni and Christian representatives in Lebanon
see the resistance as a necessary condition for Lebanon’s existence, especially in light
of the recent events in Syria. The ambassador stressed that the “resistance” in Lebanon
cannot be eliminated (IRNA, January 10, 2025).

Iranian comments on developments in Syria

Senior Iranian officials presented the fall of the Assad regime as a “joint American-Zionist
plan” and expressed concern about future developments in Syria. The officials admitted that
the revolution in Syria had undermined Tehran’s ability to support the members of the “axis
of resistance.” However, they claimed that the fall of the Assad regime would not have a
significant negative impact on them because they were capable of producing the weapons
themselves and were not dependent on Iran. The following are prominent statements:
Supreme Leader Khamenei declared that there is no doubt that what happened in
Syria is the result of a “joint American-Zionist plan.” He said that the more pressure was
exerted on the “resistance” and the more it was fought against, the more it would
expand and become stronger (ISNA, December 11, 2024).
At a ceremony marking the fifth anniversary of the death of former Qods Force
commander Qassem Soleimani, Khamenei said that Syria belongs to the Syrian people
and that there is no doubt that anyone who attacks this land will be forced to retreat in
the face of the strength of the Syrian youth, and the American bases will be crushed
under their feet (Supreme Leader’s website, January 1, 2025).
IRGC commander Salami acknowledged that all the roads (that could have been used
to transfer Iranian forces to Syria) had been closed but claimed that the “resistance
front” has become independent and is not dependent on Iran (ISNA, December 12,

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2024). Speaking at an IRGC conference, Salami stressed that there are still ways to
support the “resistance front” that are independent of Syria, and that things may change
in Syria as well (ISNA, December 12, 2024).

The IRGC commander (ISNA, December 12, 2024)

Hossein Taeb, former head of the IRGC intelligence Organization and advisor to the
IRGC commander, said that it was undeniable that with the fall of Assad, the “resistance
front” had suffered a loss and lost one of its allies. However, the incident not only failed
to create opportunities for the Americans but also posed a new threat to the United
States and Israel ([Link], December 18, 2024).
Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi expressed concern that Israel would take
advantage of the situation in Syria, adding that it was natural for the “axis of resistance”
to be affected by the events in Syria. However, he stressed that Hezbollah and the “axis”
had already overcome greater challenges and that the “axis” would continue on its path.
He said Syria had played an important role in the “resistance,” but that does not mean
that the “resistance” will cease without Syria. Regarding Iran’s ability to continue
supporting Hezbollah in view of the severance of the supply routes for weapons through
Syria, Araghchi said that Hezbollah can provide its own needs, as is the case in the Gaza
Strip and Yemen, and that it can find new ways to meet its needs (Iranian TV, December
8, 2024).
Ali-Akbar Ahmadian, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, admitted
that support for the “resistance” had become more difficult following the fall of the
Assad regime, but stressed that Hezbollah, Hamas, and the PIJ are no longer dependent
on Iran and have achieved the ability to produce weapons on their own. He added that
Iran also has no direct land connection with the Gaza Strip and Yemen, but the
Palestinians and Yemenis have the ability to develop advanced missiles. He stressed

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that in any case, Iran’s connection with the “resistance” and Hezbollah would not be
severed (Supreme Leader’s website, December 20, 2024).

Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council

(Supreme Leader’s website, December 20, 2024)

In contrast to the official Iranian line, which tries to downplay the importance of
developments in the region on Iran and the pro-Iranian axis in the region, in recent weeks,
other voices have been heard in Iran acknowledging the severe blow suffered by Iran and
the “resistance front.” The following are prominent statements:
Behrouz Esbati, a former senior IRGC officer in Syria, admitted that Iran had suffered
a severe defeat in Syria. He noted that in the three months preceding the collapse of the
Assad regime, the Syrian government exerted increasing pressure on the Iranians, and
Iranian planes could not land in Syria. He added that Assad’s definition of “resistance”
was different from that of Iran and that his commitment to it was limited (Didehban,
January 9, 2025).

Behrouz Esbati (Didehban, January 9, 2025)

Hossein Marashi, former vice president of Iran and secretary-general of the Servants
of Reconstruction party, which is affiliated with the pragmatic camp in Iran, recently
admitted that Iran has lost several important cards in its hands, including Syria,
Lebanon, and even Iraq, and that it cannot rely on the Houthis, who are under heavy

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pressure. He compared Iran’s current situation to that of Iraq after Iraq succeeded in
recapturing the al-Faw Peninsula on the Persian Gulf coast in 1988 in a war between the
two countries (Khabar Online, January 13, 2025).
The daily Jomhouri Eslami also expressed a sober view of the recent developments
in the region and called for recognition of the bitter reality in the region so that the
consequences of the events could be successfully dealt with. A commentary article said
that there is no denying the fact that the “Zionist regime,” the United States, the “Takfiri
terrorist groups” and their supporters have realized a significant part of their goals.
According to the newspaper, the answer to the question of whether this is a temporary
or permanent victory depends on the willingness of decision-makers on the “resistance
front” to reexamine their policy. If the mistakes that led to the defeat in Lebanon and
Syria are acknowledged, there is a possibility that the current successes of the “Zionist-
American-regional triangle” will be temporary, but denying reality in light of the
negative developments in Syria and Lebanon will not make it possible to resolve the
situation (Jomhouri Eslami, January 11, 2025).

Possible courses of action for Iran in the region

An examination of Iran’s statements and conduct in recent weeks shows that Iran has no
intention of withdrawing from its efforts to try to maintain its regional status and continue its
support for the “resistance front.” Over the past two decades, Iran has invested considerable
efforts to consolidate its regional influence and strengthen its regional proxies, and it is not
expected to abandon this policy, which is a central pillar of Iran’s security doctrine despite the
weakening of the regional axis it leads. However, it can be assumed that it will examine how
to make the necessary adjustments and find possible solutions to the limitations and
constraints it faces in the main arenas in which it operates.

The Palestinian arena

Iran is expected to accelerate its efforts to establish and operate terrorist infrastructure in
Judea and Samaria (as a possible partial replacement for the Gaza Strip) and to increase its
terrorist activity inside Israeli territory. Since 2007, and especially in the past decade, Hamas
has enjoyed massive Iranian military support, which is reflected in the supply of Iranian
weapons, the training of its operatives in Iran, and the transfer of Iranian know-how and
capabilities through various routes to the Gaza Strip and Judea and Samaria, as well as
extensive financial support. In addition to supporting Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Iran has

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intensified its efforts to smuggle weapons to terrorist operatives in Judea and Samaria. The
Iranian instruction was made public when Supreme Leader Khamenei gave a speech marking
World Jerusalem Day on June 23, 2014, calling for the arming of the “resistance” in Judea and
Samaria. Since then, senior Iranian figures have stressed their duty to help the Palestinians in
Judea and Samaria.4
Since the beginning of the Swords of Iron War, Iranian efforts have intensified, especially
with the aim of helping terrorist operatives in Judea and Samaria escalate their activities and
open another arena of the “axis of resistance,” which will be closest to Israel’s population
centers. Among other things, Iran attempted to smuggle “game-changing” weaponry, which,
if it had reached its destination, could have improved the capabilities of the terrorist
operatives to harm the security forces and carry out attacks, such as claymore mines
(explosive charges), mortar shells, anti-tank mines, plastic explosives, and rockets, as
discovered in shipments seized by the IDF in March and November 2024 (IDF Spokesperson,
March 25, 2024 and November 27, 2024).
In a document seized by the IDF in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank was defined as of great
strategic importance for Iran and Hamas, since it is an arena designed to exert pressure on
Israel. Accordingly, Iran is making intensive efforts to transfer weapons and money to this
arena through all available means at its disposal. In these efforts, Jordan’s role stands out, as
Hamas and Iran have used it to transfer weapons to Judea and Samaria. In the wake of the
war in the Gaza Strip and Iranian attempts to spark a new front in Judea and Samaria,
smuggling attempts have become more violent, especially on Jordan’s northern border. In
the past year, Jordan has thwarted several attempts to smuggle weapons and drugs through
the Syrian border, carried out by Iranian-backed militias.5
An expression of the increasing efforts since the beginning of the war in the Gaza Strip to
increase the transfer of weapons to Judea and Samaria can be found in an interview given by
Qais al-Saadi, a commander in the armed factions in Jenin, in which he admitted that they
receive support from Iran, although he claimed that they do not belong to Tehran or any other
external party (CNN, December 23, 2024). On the other hand, Anwar Rajab, the spokesperson

4
For further information, see the ITIC study, “Declarations of Senior Iranian Officials Concerning the
West Bank Point to Intensifying Iranian Effort to Expand Its Influence in this Arena” (February 13, 2023).
5
For further information on the smuggling routes used by Iran to smuggle weapons into Judea and
Samaria, see the ITIC study, “Captured documents reveal how Iran smuggles weapons via Syria and
Jordan” (December 22, 2024).

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for the PA’s security services, accused Iran of trying to spread “chaos and corruption” and
weaken the PA by funding militants to promote its interests in the region (CNN, December 23,
2024). On December 19, 2024, the Israeli security forces eliminated four terrorist operatives in
an airstrike in Tulkarm, among them Tareq al-Dosh, one of the heads of the local terrorist
network who operated with Iranian funding and was in contact with terrorist operatives in
Lebanon (Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Telegram channel, December 20, 2024).

Lebanon
There is an evident Iranian effort to look for alternative ways to overcome the loss of the
strategic path in Syria and to rehabilitate Hezbollah’s capabilities that were damaged in the
war. It can be assumed that in light of the lessons of the multi-front campaign and Hezbollah’s
failure in the war, Iran will strive to increase its involvement and control in the organization,
while rehabilitating its governmental, military, and organizational capabilities.
Recently, it was reported that Iran is considering smuggling weapons and money to
Hezbollah via flights to Lebanon. It was reported that Iran could turn Beirut into a new
shipping center following the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the disruption of the land
routes through which weapons were transferred to Hezbollah. It was also reported that other
options under consideration are the land transfer of weapons from Iran through Iraq, and
from there to Jordan and Judea and Samaria, as well as maritime transfers (The Times,
December 22, 2024).
“Western intelligence sources” revealed that Iranian diplomats are using foreign airlines to
transfer money to Hezbollah, in light of Israel’s surveillance of Iranian airlines. According to
the report, the diplomats fly from Iran to countries in the region with suitcases “full of cash,”
and from there continue to Beirut with foreign companies. Additionally, the “sources”
confirmed that Hezbollah is in desperate need of Iranian funding following the severing of the
funding route through Syria (Sky News in Arabic, January 22, 2025).
According to flight tracking systems, the Iranian airline Mahan Air, which is linked to Iranian
arms transfer by the IRGC, conducted 11 flights to Beirut Airport via Turkish airspace in the
second half of December 2024. These flights continued during January as well (JNS, January
7, 2025). It therefore appears that Iran is considering alternative air routes through Turkey
(despite the tension between Tehran and Ankara, especially after the fall of the regime in
Syria) as a substitute for the land corridor from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon.

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On January 2, 2025, “Lebanese security sources” reported that an Iranian Mahan Air aircraft
was inspected at Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut on suspicion of carrying funds
intended for Hezbollah. According to the report, the Iranian delegation on the plane
attempted to prevent a search of their luggage, claiming they were a diplomatic mission.
Airport security services were called to conduct the search, during which nothing was found.
In an update from the Iranian embassy in Beirut to the Lebanese Foreign Ministry, it was
reported that two small diplomatic pouches carried by an Iranian diplomat on the flight
contained documents and banknotes for covering the embassy’s operational expenses.
Following this clarification, the two pouches were allowed entry (An-Nahar, January 2, 2025).
Iranian Ambassador to Beirut Mojtaba Amani clarified that the airport authorities’ activity
stemmed from a lack of knowledge, which was resolved following the intervention of the
Lebanese Foreign Ministry, and that Iran protested the incident (Tasnim, January 3, 2025).
In parallel with Hezbollah’s rehabilitation efforts, Iran is also striving to take part in the
reconstruction efforts of the Lebanese state to maintain its influence in the country. Iran
reportedly informed senior Hezbollah officials that it was committed to rebuilding southern
Lebanon after the war, the Dahiyeh in southern Beirut, and the ruins in Baalbek and Hermel
in the Bekaa Valley, near the border with Syria. The announcement was made after the Iranian
Majles speaker, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, who was visiting Beirut, pledged that Iran would
reconstruct only the Dahiyeh (Al-Anbaa, November 13, 2024). Sheikh Ali Damoush, deputy
chairman of Hezbollah’s Executive Council, said that the funding needed for the
reconstruction process in Lebanon would come from Iran. He thanked Supreme Leader
Khamenei for his interest in Lebanon, noting that the process was being carried out thanks to
the Iranian people, who agreed to support the cause and helped fund it (Al-Nashra, December
30, 2024).

Syria
Following the collapse of the Assad regime, Iran is working to establish channels of
communication with the new regime and to reopen its diplomatic missions in Damascus to
re-ensure its ability to operate there. According to a “senior Iranian official,” even before the
fall of the regime in Syria, Tehran had established direct channels of communication with
several groups led by the Syrian opposition. He noted that Iran is open to direct dialogue with
the new leadership in Syria to prevent a hostile path between the two countries, stabilize
relations between them, and prevent further tension in the region (Reuters, December 9,

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2024). At the end of December 2024, Iranian government spokeswoman Fatemeh Mohajerani
said that Iran was holding diplomatic consultations aimed at bringing about the reopening of
the Iranian embassy in Damascus ([Link], December 24, 2024).
In January 2025, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi appointed his special envoy to the
Middle East, Mohammad-Reza Sheibani, as his special representative for Syria. The
announcement of the appointment stated that Syria is an important country in the region and
that Iran recognizes the importance of stability in this country and the need to preserve its
territorial integrity and respect the will of the Syrian people to determine its fate without
foreign interference and presence. In the announcement of the appointment, Araghchi
stressed that decision-making regarding the future of Syria is up to the Syrian people and that
Iran will regulate its relations with any governmental system based on the will of the Syrian
people, mutual interests, and international law (ISNA, January 12, 2025).
At the same time, Iran is trying to maintain its foothold in Syria by strengthening and
encouraging trends of destabilization in the country over time. Iran may act through various
elements in Syria, especially the Alawites, Shiites, Kurds, and Palestinians in the refugee
camps in southern Syria, to maintain channels of influence in the country and to try to
smuggle weapons into Syria and Lebanon. Bakhshayesh Ardestani, a member of the Majles
National Security and Foreign Policy Committee, estimated that the armed conflicts in Syria
would continue and even intensify because the new government in Syria is not committed to
democracy and the rights of minorities, and because the various groups operating in Syria,
including the Kurds, Druze, Alawites, secular groups, and even Sunni Salafi groups, would not
easily surrender their weapons. He added that there are still 130,000 Syrians, most of them
Shiites and Alawites, who fought alongside the Assad regime as part of the “resistance” during
the civil war and they can take action against the new government if it acts against them by
force or discriminates against them. He stressed that the new Syrian government cannot deal
with the many challenges it faces and that it will face significant security and economic
problems in the future, which will lead to young Syrians acting on their own and establishing
organizations to fight against the new government (Didehban, January 5, 2025).
A possible expression of Iran’s intentions to destabilize Syria is evident in reports published
in the Iranian media in recent weeks, which emphasized the instability in Syria and the clashes
between the new regime in Damascus and the country’s religious minorities. For example, a
conservative daily reported on clashes in Syria over the central government’s demand to

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disarm the armed groups in the south of the country. According to the report, the ethnic
diversity and the existence of armed groups in Syria will not allow Syria to return to normal
(Vatan Emrooz, January 13, 2025). Another report referred to the increase in attacks and
executions by the groups ruling Syria against civilians in Damascus, Homs, and Hama since
the fall of the Assad regime and deliberate attacks against Alawites and Shiites, including
arrests and executions (Al-Alam, January 11, 2025). Another report claimed that the Syrian
regime was taking over Alawite mosques to spread extremist Sunni Islamic ideas. According
to this report, the new regime’s activity is causing growing concern among the various
religious minorities in Syria (Mehr, January 12, 2025). Strategic affairs analyst Mehdi Kharatian
estimated that the new regime’s policy in Syria would arouse growing discontent among the
Alawites, Shiites, and even some Sunnis and tribes. He raised the possibility of the formation
of “resistance cells” by some of President al-Assad’s former supporters (Tabnak, January 13,
2025).
The Syrian regime has already accused Iran of involvement in the sectarian conflicts in the
country. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan al-Shibani warned Iran against spreading
chaos in Syria (Al-Shibani’s X account, December 25, 2024). In response, Iranian Foreign
Minister Araghchi stressed in an appeal to the Arab League that Iran wants to achieve stability
and quiet and prevent chaos and unrest in Syria. He noted that Iran aspires to preserve the
unity of Syrian territory and the integrity of its territory (Abbas Araghchi’s X account,
December 27, 2024). Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei also denied the
allegations of Iranian involvement in the incitement and encouragement of sectarian riots in
Syria. He stressed that Iran supports Syria’s territorial integrity and national unity and the
establishment of a political system with the participation of all political, ethnic, and religious
groups in the country. He added that the spread of insecurity and violence against various
parts of Syrian society must be prevented, and the security of civilians must be ensured
(Iranian Foreign Ministry website, December 26, 2024).
On the ground, there is still evidence of Iran’s efforts to continue smuggling weapons
through Syria to Lebanon. According to the Tartus Internal Security Directorate, after
coordination with the intelligence service in the province and through continuous
surveillance and monitoring, an operation to smuggle weapons that made its way into
Lebanon through illegal crossings was thwarted, and the weapons were confiscated before
entering Lebanese territory. Photos published by the Syrian Ministry of the Interior showed

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Iranian-made Shahed-101 drones as well as small arms (Syrian Ministry of the Interior
Telegram channel, January 17, 2025).

Weapons seized in Syria (SANA, January 16, 2025)

According to a report in Turkey, Iran has agreed with the Kurdish People’s Protection Units
(YPG), which belongs to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), to supply 1,500 suicide drones to
destabilize Syria and deal with Turkey’s military activity in the region. According to the report,
the reliability of which is unclear, Iranian representatives held a secret meeting in Iraq with
representatives of the Kurds, who asked for 2,000 drones. The Iranian representatives made
it clear that Iran would only be able to supply 1,500 drones, but the delivery of the drones has
been delayed due to close supervision by Turkey in the Syrian-Iraqi border area and its
intention to intercept any attempt to transfer drones into Syrian territory (Yeni Şafaq, January
12, 2025). Farhad Shami, head of the media department of the SDF, denied the publication
and accused the media close to the Turkish government of fabricating news. He said that the
purpose of the publications was to harm the Kurdish forces and arouse a hostile atmosphere
against the residents of northern and eastern Syria in world public opinion. He stressed that
the SDF developed independent military capabilities, including drones (Farhad Shami’s X
account, January 14, 2025)
Additionally, it is evident that Iran is seeking to take advantage of Israel’s military presence
in Syria to encourage “resistance” cells in the south of the country. At the end of December
2024, Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei declared that the advance of the “Zionists” in Syria
and the occupation of parts of it were made possible by the fact that no soldiers stood up to
them. He said there was no doubt that the brave young Syrians would get them out of Syria
(Supreme Leader’s website, December 22, 2024). IRGC commander Salami said that the
situation in which the “Zionists” could look into the houses of Damascus with the naked eye

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was intolerable and that they would pay a heavy price and be buried on Syrian soil (Tasnim,
December 15, 2024). In a meeting with Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi, the secretary
of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Ali-Akbar Ahmadian, said that with the
occupation of Syrian territory by the “Zionist regime,” a new “resistance” has been born,
which will manifest itself in the coming years (ISNA, December 30, 2024).

“Syria’s oil for Washington and Syria’s water for Tel Aviv” (Fars, January 15, 2025)

The Iraqi arena

At this stage, the Iranian leadership is publicly opposing the disarming of the pro-Iranian
Iraqi Shiite militias and their integration into the Iraqi armed forces. In a meeting with Iraqi
Prime Minister Mohammad Shia’ al-Sudani in Tehran, Khamenei stressed that the Popular
Mobilization Forces are one of the most important components of the government in Iraq and
must be preserved and strengthened even more. He also warned against US efforts to
establish and expand its presence in the country (Supreme Leader’s website, January 8, 2025).
According to an “Iranian source,” al-Sudani has not been able to receive Iranian support for
the initiative to dismantle the Popular Mobilization and hand over its weapons to the Iraqi
security forces ([Link], January 9, 2025). On the other hand, a “source close to the
Iranian presidency” reported that during the talks with the Iraqi prime minister in Tehran,
senior Iranian officials claimed that the issue of the Popular Mobilization concerned the Iraqis
themselves and that they would be the ones to decide on the issue ([Link],
January 9, 2025).

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The Iraqi prime minister meets with the Supreme Leader and the Iranian president
(Supreme Leader’s website, January 8, 2025)

Prior to al-Sudani’s visit to Tehran, Qods Force commander Esmail Qaani paid a secret visit
to Baghdad, during which he met with senior Iraqi government officials and several Iraqi
militia commanders and discussed with them the reorganization of the Shiite militias and the
possibility of disarming some of them in accordance with US demands (Shafaq News, January
5, 2025). “Iraqi political sources” noted that Qaani arrived in Iraq with a plan to assess the
situation of the Shiite militias in light of international pressure on Iraq to solve the problem.
According to the report, Iran is striving to implement a preliminary plan to resolve the issue of
the future of the Shiite militias before the Iraqi army is forced to resolve this issue under
pressure. Qaani’s plan is based on the Iraqi prime minister’s decision to merge the Popular
Mobilization Forces into the Iraqi armed forces while subordinating the organization to the
Iraqi forces in terms of management and command. The presentation of the plan is intended
to reduce the American pressure on the Iraqi government regarding the pro-Iranian Shiite
militias (Al-Arab, January 7, 2025). These reports may indicate that under certain
circumstances, Iran will be willing to accept the integration of pro-Iranian militias (or some of
them) into the Iraqi armed forces and try to maintain its political, military, and economic
influence in Iraq through Iraqi state institutions.
Given the preservation of the current status of the Shiite militias, Iran will strive to increase
its control over the militias as much as possible. This is a lesson learned from the multi-front
campaign, during which the militias sometimes adopted an independent line that threatened
to drag Iran into an unwanted military confrontation with the United States or Israel, for
example in the incident of the death of three American soldiers in Jordan as a result of an
attack by an Iraqi Shiite militia at the end of January 2024.

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Yemen and the Horn of Africa

In Yemen, Iran can continue to maintain its influence through the Houthis, who in recent
months have remained the main element in the “resistance front” that continued to act
against Israel even after the ceasefire in Lebanon, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria,
and the cessation of attacks by pro-Iranian militias in Iraq. Since the beginning of December
2024, the Houthis have claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks against Israel using drones
and ballistic missiles, despite Israeli and US attacks on civilian infrastructure, command and
control facilities, and underground missile depots in Yemen. The Houthis have also escalated
attacks on US military and civilian vessels in the Red Sea, while attacks on non-US vessels
have decreased.6
The Iranian Diplomacy website recently suggested that Iran would use the Houthis to
threaten Israel and continue to exact a price from it in light of the difficulties in operating
through Hezbollah and the Shiite militias in Iraq. The website stressed that the collapse of the
Assad regime and the loss of the land corridor in Syria limit Iran’s ability to support Hezbollah,
and that the “resistance” in Iraq is also subject to internal and external pressure to disarm and
has been forced to stop launching missiles and drones at Israel. In contrast, the Houthis in
Yemen remain the exception and continue to attack Israel in support of the Palestinians in the
Gaza Strip. Therefore, in the event of a renewal of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah,
they could be used to act against Israel (Iranian Diplomacy, January 14, 2025).
In recent weeks, Iran has on several occasions condemned the attacks by Israel and the
United States in Yemen. At the same time, senior Iranian officials expressed support and
appreciation for the Houthis’ continued activity against Israel. For example, Iranian Foreign
Minister Araghchi spoke with his Yemeni counterpart, Jamal Ahmed Ali Amer, and expressed
his appreciation for Yemen’s support for the Palestinian people (Tasnim, December 22, 2024).
However, it should be emphasized that the Houthis apparently carry out their activities
independently and without the intervention of other parties. In addition, it appears that Iran’s
influence over the Houthis is relatively limited, and they retain a great deal of autonomy in
managing their territory, priorities, and strategic goals.

6
For further information, see the following ITIC studies: “The Houthi Movement and the War in Yemen:
Development and Significance” (March 14, 2023); “The Houthis and Operation Iron Swords” (November
3, 2023); and “Houthi-Israel-United States Escalation, December 2024” (December 26, 2024).

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Iran may also use the Horn of Africa, especially Sudan, to consolidate its influence and to
smuggle weapons. “Senior intelligence officials and diplomats” recently reported that Iran is
transferring shipments of weapons, including drones, along with intelligence information to
the Sudanese army to help it in the civil war against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia.
According to the report, Tehran wants the aid to provide them with access to the strategic
port of Port Sudan in the Red Sea (Bloomberg, December 18, 2024). The continuation of the
civil war and the instability in Sudan provide Iran with an opportunity to re-establish its
influence in the Horn of Africa and exploit it for arms transfers to its proxies in the region.

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