Research Briefing

29 November 2024

By Library specialists
Israel and the Occupied
Palestinian Territories: UK
response to the conflict since
July 2024

Summary
1 The situation in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories
in 2024
2 UK Government and opposition statements
3 UK Government actions

commonslibrary.parliament.uk
Number 10085 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Contents

1 The situation in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in

2024 10

1.1 Hamas’s attack on Israel and Israel’s response 10

1.2 Humanitarian situation in Gaza and access 16

1.3 Situation in the West Bank and Jerusalem 20

1.4 Negotiations on hostages and ceasefire 23

1.5 Israeli statements on the post-conflict Occupied Palestinian

Territories 28

1.6 Palestinian Authority statements and actions in 2023/24 31

2 UK Government and opposition statements 36

2.1 Government priorities and ceasefire demand 36

2.2 UK arms sales to Israel 39

2.3 Post-conflict Gaza and the two-state solution 41

2.4 Role of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 43

2.5 Role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 47

2.6 Israeli settler violence and sanctions 49

2.7 Reports of sexual violence and mistreatment 50

2.8 Terrorist threat to the UK 54

3 UK Government actions 55

3.1 UK diplomatic activity 55

3.2 Deployment of UK military forces 56

3.3 UK humanitarian aid 58

3.4 New UK sanctions and visa restrictions 59

3.5 Debate on sanctioning the IRGC 60

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

3.6 How has the UK voted at the UN? 62

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Summary

On 7 October 2023, the Palestinian group Hamas, officially designated a

terrorist group by many countries including Israel, the United States, the
European Union, and the United Kingdom, commenced an armed assault
against Israel. It launched several thousand rockets into Israel and conducted
attacks in border areas, killing around 1,200 civilians and taking 254
hostages, as part of what it called “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood”.

In response, in October 2023 Israel conducted air strikes against Hamas in

Gaza and launched a ground attack to “destroy Hamas’ governing and
military capabilities and to bring the hostages home”. Hamas continued to
fire rockets into Israel after 7 October. Fighting is ongoing.

This briefing provides information on the situation in Israel and the Occupied
Palestinian Territories and the UK response, including actions at the UN and
government and opposition party statements from 5 July 2024.

The Commons Library collection, Middle East tensions in 2023/24 has more on
the international response to the conflict and the conflicts in the Red Sea,
Lebanon and between Israel and Iran. It also has information on activity at
the UN Security Council, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), International
Criminal Court (ICC) and the position and role of the UN Relief and Works
Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA).

Ongoing hostilities and casualties

Fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza continues. In May 2024, the Israel
Defence Forces (IDF) captured the Rafah crossing in Egypt, which had been
the main aid crossing into Gaza since October 2023. The crossing remains
closed. In October 2024 the IDF launched new operations in northern Gaza.
The UN, US and UK have raised concerns about the low level of aid entering
Gaza since early October 2024. Around 90% of Palestinians in Gaza are
displaced.

In September 2024 the then Israeli Defence Minister, Yoav Gallant, said that
Hamas “no longer exists” as a “military unit” and was instead engaged in
guerrilla warfare. He also said that it is no longer an effective proxy of Iran.
Several Hamas leaders have been killed, including the head of Hamas, Yahya
Sinwar, in October 2024.

Citing Israeli authorities, the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health and

Palestinian Civil Defence, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNOCHA) says that since 7 October over 1,200 Israelis and foreign
nationals have been reported killed and around 5,400 injured. At least 44,249

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Palestinians have been reported killed, a further 10,000 are missing or under
rubble and 104,746 injured across Gaza and Israel (as of 26 November 2024).

There is ongoing violence in the occupied West Bank. Other Iran-supported

groups such as the Houthis in Yemen and Shia militias in Iraq and Syria have
been launching attacks on civilian shipping and against US and Israeli
targets. A ceasefire between Israel and Iran-aligned Hezbollah (a proscribed
terrorist group in the UK) in Lebanon and northern Israel was agreed in
November 2024. Iran directly attacked Israel in April and October 2024.

Pauses in fighting and ceasefire proposals

From 24 November to 1 December 2023, fighting paused to enable the release
of hostages. Before it began, Israel said it would last no longer than 10 days
and that fighting would then resume. The pause enabled the release of
110 hostages from Gaza and 240 Palestinian prisoners from Israel.

On 10 June, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed a resolution introduced by

the US for a three-stage plan to end the conflict, backed by Israel. Its first
stage includes the release of many hostages in exchange for Palestinian
prisoners in Israel, an increase in aid and withdrawal of Israeli forces from
populated areas of Gaza. The UNSC called on Hamas and Israel to implement
the agreement. Israel said it remains committed to destroying Hamas.

Following the killing of Yahya Sinwar in October 2024, several countries,

including the United States and UK, called for renewed negotiations and said
it was time to end the conflict. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said
the “war is not over yet” and other cabinet ministers called for Israeli
operations to continue until Hamas is destroyed and the hostages released.

UK actions and response (from 5 July 2024)

Government advice for British nationals

• The government advises against travel to most of Israel and the
Occupied Palestinian Territories and all of Lebanon.

• UK visa holders in Gaza can contact the UK for assistance to leave if they
hold valid permission to enter or remain in the UK for more than six
months and have a spouse/partner or a child aged 17 or under in the UK.

• There are no exit routes for foreign nationals to leave Gaza due to
fighting around the Rafah crossing. The UK is looking for alternatives.

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Military, diplomatic and humanitarian actions

• The UK Government has deployed military assets to promote de-
escalation and conduct surveillance activities. The government has not
provided “lethal or military equipment” to Israel since 7 October 2023.

• UK military assets supported the defence of Israel against Iran in April

and October 2024 (though only intercepted Iranian drones in April). The
UK is also participating in Operation Prosperity Guardian to protect Red
Sea shipping from Houthi attacks and conducted five air strikes against
the Houthis from January to May 2024.

• In 2023/24, the UK provided over £100 million in aid to the Occupied

Palestinian Territories. None is directed via Hamas. In July 2024 the
government announced new funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency
for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA). New UK funding had been paused in
January following allegations some of its staff were involved in the
7 October assault. The government said the new funding followed
UNRWA commitments to reform to ensure its neutrality. The Library
briefing, West Bank and Gaza Strip: UK aid and UNRWA: FAQs has more.

Government and opposition statements on the

conflict (from 5 July 2024)

Immediate ceasefire and release of hostages

The UK Government supports the Biden-proposed three stage ceasefire
agreement (see above), as did the Conservatives when in government. The
Liberal Democrats and the SNP support a ceasefire.

Suspending some arms exports to Israel

In September 2024 the UK Government said it would suspend around 30 of the
350 arms export licences to Israel, following a review.

Foreign Secretary David Lammy said that the UK continues to support Israel’s
right to self-defence in line with international humanitarian law, but he had
concluded that “for certain UK arms exports to Israel there does exist a clear
risk that they might be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of
international humanitarian law”. A statement sets out the government’s
reasoning. The Commons Library research briefing, UK arms exports to Israel,
has more on the process and decision.

The Conservatives criticised the announcement’s timing and questioned how

it would support the release of hostages. The Liberal Democrats and SNP
welcomed the decision but called for UK restrictions to go further.

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Support for a two-state solution

Labour says it will recognise a Palestinian state alongside a “safe and secure
Israel” when it judges this will best support the peace process.

The Conservatives also support a two-state solution. The Liberal Democrats

intend to introduce a bill for the immediate recognition of a Palestinian state.
The SNP intend to bring a vote to the Commons on recognition.

UK sanctions in response to Israeli settler violence

The UK has announced three sets of sanctions against Israeli settlers and
some outposts in the occupied West Bank, in February, May, and October
2024. Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, has condemned the
settler violence.

International Criminal Court (ICC) warrants

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an international court (PDF)
dedicated to prosecuting individuals for “the most serious crimes of
international concern”. It is a court of last resort, complementing, but not
replacing, local criminal courts. It is not part of the UN or ICJ.

In May 2024 the ICC prosecutor applied to the court’s judges for warrants
against three Hamas leaders and two Israeli leaders (Mr Netanyahu and Mr
Gallant). In November 2024 it said it would issue the warrants. The full press
releases for the Israeli leaders and one Hamas leader (the other Hamas
leaders have been confirmed to have been killed) detail the specific
allegations. Israel says it will challenge the decision.

When in government, the Conservatives questioned whether the ICC had

jurisdiction, as Israel is not a member of the court. It intended to submit
observations to the ICC on the topic. The Labour government did not submit
any observations by the ICC’s 26 July deadline, “in line with its position that
this is a matter for the Court to decide on”.

Following the ICC decision in November 2024 the Minister for the Middle East,
Hamish Falconer, said the government would adhere to international law and
the enforcement of any warrants in the UK would be a decision for UK courts,
not the government. The Shadow Foreign Secretary, Dame Priti Patel, said the
government should challenge the ICC decision. The Liberal Democrats and
SNP say the UK Government should adhere to the ICC decision.

International Court of Justice (ICJ) case

The ICJ is one of the principal organs of the UN. It settles disputes between
UN member countries and provides advisory opinions on legal questions that
have been referred to it by other authorized UN organs.

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South Africa has brought a case against Israel at the ICJ. The ICJ has issued
three preliminary orders that call for Israel to increase aid and to minimise
civilian casualties (among other measures). In January 2024, Mr Lammy said
Israel should comply “in full”. The Liberal Democrats say that the UK should
comply with the ICC (see above) and the ICJ. The SNP has also said this.

In a separate case begun in 2022, in July 2024 the ICJ issued an advisory
opinion on Israeli occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPTs).
The UK Government said it “does not disagree with the central findings of the
ICJ’s advisory opinion” and Israel should bring its presence in the OPTs to an
end “as rapidly as possible” but “we are clear that every effort must be made
to create the conditions for negotiations towards a two-state solution”.

Governing post-conflict Gaza

Both Labour and Conservative governments said Hamas cannot be allowed to
remain in Gaza and threaten Israel. Mr Lammy has also said that the Israeli
Defence Forces cannot remain in Gaza. He has suggested “trusted” Arab
states may take a security role there.

Suggestions that Israel establish settlements in Gaza

The UK has criticised comments by Israeli ministers Bezalel Smotrich and
Itamar Ben-Gvir suggesting Israel establish settlements in Gaza (the Israeli
Government has not endorsed this). Mr Netanyahu told the US Congress that
Israel does not want to resettle Gaza.

The UK government says it considers “all Israeli settlements as illegal under

international law” and presenting a “threat to peace, and threaten[ing] the
physical viability of a two-state solution”. This has been the position of
successive UK Governments.

Suggestions that Israel annexes the West Bank

Ministers Smotrich and Ben-Gvir have also suggested Israel annex
settlements in the occupied West Bank. The UK Government condemned the
suggestion and said annexation would be illegal under international law and
hinder a two-state solution. The Israeli Cabinet reportedly considered
whether to return to the issue in November 2024.

Potential UK sanctions against Israeli ministers Bezalel

Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir
In October 2024 former Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron said the Conservative
Government had been working on plans to sanction the two ministers. The
Labour Government says it keeps its sanctions policy under review. The
Liberal Democrats have called for sanctions. In response, the two Israeli
ministers said any sanctions would not lead to a change in their positions.

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

1 The situation in Israel and the Occupied

Palestinian Territories in 2024

Events since 7 October and in the wider Middle East

Section 1 of this briefing provides an overview of events since 7 October 2023.
It focuses primarily on the period since early July 2024 (when a new UK
Parliament was elected and a new government formed).
It is not intended to provide detailed information on fast-moving events.
During active conflicts, statistics and reports on specific events can be
difficult to verify. This is because journalists, researchers and civil society
organisations face challenges accessing conflict zones.
The Commons Library research briefing 2023/24 Israel-Hamas conflict: UK
response to July 2024 provides more information on events in Israel and the
Occupied Palestinian Territories from 7 October 2023 to early July 2024.
Section 1 of the briefing includes links to further reading, fact-checking
resources, and statements issued by the Israeli Government, Palestinian
Authority and UK Government.
The Commons Library collection, Middle East instability in 2023/24 has further
research briefings on the UK, UN and international response to the conflicts
between Israel and Hamas, Israel and Hezbollah, Israel and Iran, and Houthi
attacks on Red Sea shipping. It also includes a briefing on the position and
funding of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA).

1.1 Hamas’s attack on Israel and Israel’s response

Hamas assault on 7 October 2023

On 7 October 2023, the Palestinian group Hamas, officially designated a
terrorist organisation by the Israeli, US, and UK governments, commenced an
armed assault against Israel. 1

Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups (including Palestinian Islamic

Jihad, also a designated terrorist organisation in the UK) launched several

1
Home Office, Proscribed terrorist groups or organisations, updated 26 April 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

thousand rockets into Israel and conducted attacks in border areas. They
killed around 1,200 civilians and taking 254 hostages. 2

The UK Government has confirmed a total of two British nationals were taken
hostage during the assault, Emily Damari and Nadav Popplewell. Nadav
Popplewell was held in captivity and declared deceased in June 2024. The
government says there are three other hostages with strong British links. 34
In September 2024 it was estimated 101 hostages remain in Gaza, including
four taken hostage in 2014 and 2015. Israeli authorities believe “about 35” of
the hostages have died. 5

In an interview in November 2024, one senior Hamas leader said the group
did not regret its assault of 7 October. 6 Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
reiterated in October 2024 that he believed it “legitimate” and “logical”. 7

Hamas continued to fire rockets and projectiles into Israel after 7 October,
including from Lebanon. The number of rockets being fired has fallen in 2024.
Hezbollah (a proscribed terrorist group in the UK) has also been firing rockets
from Lebanon since October 2023, as have other Iran-backed groups in Syria
and Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen. Israeli military forces entered Lebanon in
October 2024. A ceasefire in Lebanon was agreed in November. 8

Israeli ground offensive in Gaza from October 2023

Israel’s aims in Gaza
In July 2024 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said “total victory” in
the conflict against Hamas has four elements:

when we eliminate the military and governing capabilities of Hamas, bring all
of our hostages back home, ensure that Gaza will never again constitute a
threat to Israel, and return our residents in the south [of Israel] and the north
[of Israel] securely to their homes [...] 9

He has also set out an aim to “deradicalize” Palestinian society (referring to a

change in Palestinian leadership and the curriculum taught in schools). 10

2
US State Department (US DoS), Anniversary of October 7th attack, 7 October 2024
3
British-Israeli hostage among four who died in Hamas captivity, Sky News, 3 June 2024
4
PQ 13812 [Hamas: hostage taking], 21 November 2024; Hamas hostages: Stories of the people taken
from Israel, BBC News, 7 October 2024
5
Dozens of hostages remain in Gaza: what we know, New York Times, 3 September 2024
6
Hamas says ready to forge ceasefire […], BBC Monitoring, 15 November 2024
7
Khameni.IR, Palestinian and Lebanese resistance pushed by Zionist regime [Israeli Government] to
70 years ago, 4 October 2024
8
Armed Conflict Location Event Data (ACLED), One year of war in numbers, 10 October 2024 and
Commons Library Israel-Hezbollah conflict 2023/24: UK and international response
9
Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, Statement by PM Netanyahu, 13 July 2024
10
Benjamin Netanyahu: our three prerequisites for peace, Wall Street Journal, 25 December 2023

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Following the killing of Hamas leader Muhammad Deif in July 2024,

Mr Netanyahu also said that “we will reach the entire Hamas leadership”. 11

In November 2024, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that “we are eliminating its
[Hamas’s] military capabilities in very impressive fashion and [are] moving on
to its governing capabilities, with more to come”. 12

Commencement of action in October 2023

In response to the assault, on 8 October Israel’s security cabinet declared war
on Hamas and said it would launch “significant military activities” against it. 13

On 28 October 2023, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) commenced a ground

offensive in Gaza.14 This has continued, aside from the pause between 24
November and 1 December 2023 (see section 1.4).

The Israeli Government says it is committed to conducting its operations in

line with international law, increasing aid, and avoiding civilian casualties. 15

Fighting in northern Gaza

On 15 January 2024, the then Israeli Defence Minister, Yoav Gallant, said that
the “intensive phase” of the IDF action in northern Gaza had ended.16 The IDF
also said that it had completed the “dismantling” of Hamas in north Gaza.
However, in May it resumed its actions in the area, saying Hamas was aiming
to “reassemble”. 17

On 6 October 2024, the IDF began a new operation in northern Gaza around
Jabalia which it said would involve “systematic strikes and the radical
destruction of terrorist structures”. Israel issued evacuation orders for
northern Gaza. 18 On 18 October Israeli minister Amichai Chikli said “we
allowed the civilian population to escape into the safe zone, and we
prevented supplies to enter the blockade region”. 19

On 5 November the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

(UNOCHA) reported that “for almost a month, all attempts by humanitarian
organisations to deliver food” to besieged areas in the north had been
blocked by Israeli authorities. UNOCHA reported that subsequent supplies
have “only been allowed to reach Gaza city” and not other areas of the
northern Gaza governorate. 20 On 23 October the UN Secretary General’s

11
Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, Statement by PM Netanyahu, 13 July 2024
12
Netanyahu, Israeli media foresee continued Gaza campaign, BBC Monitoring, 20 November 2024
13
Security Council confirms Israel at war […], Times of Israel, 8 October 2023
14
Oct. 28: Israel expands ground offensive inside Gaza, Times of Israel, 28 October 2023
15
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hamas-Israel conflict 2023: FAQs (PDF), 6 December 2023
16
Gallant: Intense fighting is over in northern Gaza, Times of Israel, 15 January 2024
17
Israel’s return to areas of Gaza it said were clear of Hamas […], CNN, 13 May 2024
18
Heavy fighting in Gaza’s Jabalia, BBC News, 8 October 2024
19
At least 33 killed in Israeli strikes in northern Gaza […], BBC News, 18 October 2024
20
UNOCHA, Humanitarian situation update 235: Gaza Strip, 5 November 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

spokesperson said that Palestinian civilians in northern Gaza were “rapidly

exhausting all available means for their survival”. 21

The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) said the
IDF’s evacuation orders in early October covered 400,000 people in northern
Gaza. 22 On 12 November UNOCHA estimated that around 50,000 to 75,000
Palestinian civilians remained in north Gaza. 23

Foreign governments have raised concerns with that of Israel on the nature of
Israeli operations in northern Gaza, including on aid access. 24 Rights group
Human Rights Watch has also accused Israel of forcibly displacing
Palestinian civilians from the north. 25

A proposed plan by former IDF General Giora Eiland to evacuate all civilians
and reduce aid as a means to encourage Hamas to release all the remaining
hostages has been the subject of international criticism. 26 The IDF states it
has not received “a plan like that” proposed by General Eiland.27 Prime
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has reportedly considered the plan in a session
with the Israeli Parliament but has not issued any public statements on it. 28

The Israeli Government also says the Human Rights Watch report is “false and
detached from reality”. 29 A November 2024 letter from the Israeli Defence
Minister to the US Administration, published by news-site Axios, states there
has not been, and will not be, any forced displacement from Gaza and Israel
is not limiting humanitarian aid.30 The US State Department says any forced
displacement would be a “red line” and it had not seen such displacement. 31

Section 1.2, below, has more on the humanitarian situation and aid access.

21
UN, Daily press briefing by the Office for the spokesperson for the Secretary General, 22 October
2024
22
UNRWA, Situation report 143 on Gaza Strip, West Bank including East Jerusalem, 13 October 2024
23
UNOCHA, Humanitarian situation update 237, 12 November 2024
24
See below, section 2.1, for UK statements on northern Gaza; Top US diplomat issues warning to
Israel over Gaza aid, BBC News, 23 October 2024
25
Human Rights Watch, Israel’s forced displacement of Palestinians in Gaza, 14 November 2024
26
Giora Eiland, In Defence of the “Generals’ Plan” [...], Haaretz, 1 November 2024; Senior ministers
call for new settlements in Gaza at ultranationalist conference, Times of Israel, 21 October 2024
27
Netanyahu mulls plan to empty northern Gaza of civilians and cut off aid [...], AP, 14 October 2024
28
Knesset, Maj. Gen. (res.) Eiland: “It can change the reality”, 18 September 2024 (site currently down
for maintenance); Netanyahu considering plan to force all Palestinian civilians […], CNN, 22
September 2024; Is Israel deploying a “surrender or starve” strategy in Gaza?, Washington Post, 14
October 2024; Israeli siege plan under scrutiny as US demands change, Washington Post, 16
October 2024, October 2024
29
Israel says HRW “crimes against humanity” allegations are “completely false”, Times of Israel, 14
November 2024
30
Israel vows not to forcibly displaced Palestinians from northern Gaza, Axios, 20 November 2024
31
US DoS, Department press briefing, 14 November 2024

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May 2024 offensive in Rafah

Following the reduction in IDF operations in northern Gaza, in February 2024
the Israeli Government said it intended to extend its offensive to southern
Gaza and the Rafah governorate if the hostages were not released. 32

Israel’s government estimated between 5,000 and 8,000 Hamas fighters

were in Rafah, along with the hostages taken on 7 October 2023. The majority
of Palestinians in Gaza, around 1.5 million, had been displaced to Rafah by
earlier action. 33

Israel said it would arrange for the evacuation of civilians before it

commenced its Rafah action. 34 The US, UK and other states said they would
not support a “major” offensive in Rafah without a plan to protect civilians. 35

On 6 May 2024, the IDF action commenced and on 7 May it took control of the
Rafah crossing. The Rafah crossing, closed since then, was the main corridor
for the delivery of aid since October 2023 (though other points are being
used). Rafah was also the only point for civilians to leave Gaza. Limited
medical evacuations have taken place since May via other routes. 36

On 12 September 2024 the IDF said it had “defeated” Hamas forces in Rafah
and it had “operational control” over the area. 37

Deaths of Hamas leaders

Broadly, Hamas has two leadership structures: a political one, based outside
Gaza (such as in Qatar and Turkey), and a military one, based in Gaza. 38

Several killings of Hamas leaders have been attributed to Israel in recent

decades. This included Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who founded Hamas, in an
Israeli missile strike in 2004. In June 2024 the head of the military wing,
Mohammed Dief, was killed by an Israeli strike in Gaza and in October 2024
Yahya Sinwar, who was appointed overall political leader of Hamas in August,
was killed in an IDF operation in Gaza. 39 Israeli intelligence identified him as
the primary planner of the 7 October assault against Israel. 40

On 31 July, the Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh, and predecessor to

Yahya Sinwar, was killed in Iran. Israel has not confirmed or denied it was

32
Israeli minister says ground offensive in Rafah will begin by Ramadan […], CNN, 19 February 2024
33
Israel’s troops take control of Rafah border crossing in Gaza, Bloomberg, 7 May 2024
34
Netanyahu orders military to plan evacuations from Rafah, BBC News, 10 February 2024
35
UN, Speakers in Security Council urge Israel to stop military incursions into Rafah, 20 May 2024;
Israel’s operation in Rafah doesn’t cross US red lines—White House, BBC News, 29 May 2024
36
World Health Organization, WHO and UAE evacuate 85 patients from Gaza, 30 July 2024
37
IDF declares Hamas’s Rafah brigade defeated, Times of Israel, 12 September 2024
38
European Council on Foreign Relations, Mapping Palestinian politics: Hamas
39
Which Hamas leaders have been targeted in assassination attempts?, Reuters, 31 July 2024;
Hamas: What has happened to its prominent leaders?, BBC News, 18 October 2024
40
Hamas names Yahya Sinwar as new overall leader, BBC News, 6 August 2024

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responsible for Ismail Haniyeh’s death. 41 Iran, Hezbollah and other Iran-
backed groups said they would retaliate. 42

Hamas reportedly will keep the identity of its new leader confidential. 43

Several countries, including the United States, UK and the European Union
called for renewed negotiations following Yahya Sinwar’s death in October
2024 and said it was time to end the conflict (see below, section 1.4). 44 Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said “the war […] is not over yet”. 45

Military strength of Hamas

In September Prime Minister Netanyahu said that between 17,000 and 18,000
“Hamas operatives” had been killed from 7 October 2023 to September
2024. 46 He also said that “23 out of 24” Hamas battalions has been destroyed
and the IDF was now “taking out terrorist commanders and destroying
remaining terrorist infrastructure”. The then Israeli Defence Minister Yoav
Gallant also said Hamas was now engaged “in guerilla warfare” and it was
“no longer an effective tool” or regular military force to be used by Iran. 47

Analysis by the Armed Conflict Location Event Data Project (ACLED) in

October 2024 judged that Hamas is primarily conducting guerrilla warfare.
But it also said Hamas may still retain up to nearly half its pre-October 2023
fighters and may have been involved in a greater number of violent acts in the
occupied West Bank in 2023/24 than in the previous year. 48

Hamas continues to engage diplomatically abroad with delegations to Russia

and China. Polling suggests some continuing support for Hamas in the West
Bank and Gaza in 2024. 49

41
US Institute for Peace, Israeli assassination of Hamas leaders, 1 August 2024
42
See Commons Library 2023/24 Israel-Hezbollah conflict and Israel-Iran October 2024
43
Hamas intends to keep its new leader’s identity confidential, BBC News, 21 October 2024; Who will
lead Hamas after killing of Sinwar?, BBC News, 21 October 2024
44
US Department of State, Charting a path to peace and security, 25 October 2024; Prime Minister’s
Office, PM speech in Berlin, 18 October 2024; European Union External Action, It’s time to give peace
a chance, 18 October 2024
45
Netanyahu says war is “not over yet” after death of Hamas leader, The Hill, 17 October 2024
46
Netanyahu lashes out at foreign press for “false” reporting, Times of Israel, 4 September 2024
47
UN, Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu remarks at the 79th session, 27 September 2024; Hamas,
Hezbollah no longer effective proxies for Iran: Defence minister, Al Arabiya, 27 October 2024; Israel
defence minister says Gaza truce deal a ‘strategic opportunity’, France 24, 10 September 2024;
48
Armed Conflict Location Event Data Project, Hamas is military weakened, 6 October 2024
49
What is left of Hamas?, FT, 4 November 2024; Palestinian Center for Policy and survey Research,
Public opinion poll 93, 17 September 2024; Tony Blair Institute, New polling by Zogby research, 23
September 2024

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

1.2 Humanitarian situation in Gaza and access

Statements on casualty numbers

Citing Israeli authorities and the Hamas-controlled Ministry of Health and
Palestinian Civil Defense, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (UNOCHA) says that since 7 October, over 1,200 Israelis and foreign
nationals have been reported killed and around 5,400 injured. At least 44,249
Palestinians have been reported killed, a further 10,000 missing or under
rubble, and 104,746 injured across Gaza and Israel (as of 26 November
2024). 50 These figures are in the process of being verified by UNOCHA.

Data on Palestinian casualties is not restricted to civilian deaths and injuries.

In November 2024 the UN Human Rights Office said that, of the 8,119
Palestinian deaths that have been verified to 2 September, 44% were children
and 26% were women. The process of verification is ongoing. Around 88% of
those deaths verified to date occurred in residential buildings. 51

More information on how these figures are reported and the challenges
involved is provided in BBC Verify articles, How the dead are counted in Gaza
(16 November 2023) and Why is the UN citing lower death toll for women and
children? (16 May 2024) and a Reuters article, How many Palestinians have
died in Gaza? Death toll explained (9 December 2023).

The Israeli Government contests the casualty figures cited by UNOCHA. In

September Mr Netanyahu said that the ratio of civilian to combatant deaths
was “1 to 1” and said 17,000 to 18,000 Hamas fighters had been killed.52

Israeli authorities have said 728 soldiers, reservists and local security officers
have been killed and 4,576 wounded from 7 October 2023 to 1 September
2024. This includes 403 killed in ground operations in Gaza. The majority of
the 1,200 people killed on 7 October 2024 were civilians.53

Food insecurity
In October 2024 the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) said
that “the risk of famine persists across the whole Gaza Strip”. It reported that
around 1.8 million people are experiencing “high levels of acute food
insecurity” (“crisis” level) or above, including 664,000 in “emergency” levels
and 133,000 “catastrophic food insecurity” (the two highest levels of food
insecurity). The report said that the whole of Gaza faces the risk of famine

50
UNOCHA, Reported impact snapshot: Gaza Strip, 26 November 2024
51
UN Human Rights Office, Six month update report on human rights situation in Gaza, 8 November
2024, para 12
52
Netanyahu lashes out at foreign press for “false” reporting, Times of Israel, 4 September 2024
53
A year of war: IDF data shows 728 troops killed […], Times of Israel, 1 September 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

from November 2024 to April 2025 “under a worst-case scenario that has a
reasonable chance of occurring”. 54

In a statement of 8 November, the IPC said that there is a “strong likelihood

that famine is imminent in areas within the northern Gaza Strip” and
immediate action, “within days”, was required to avert this. 55

Israeli officials argue the IPC has “consistently predicted deterioration and
then reporting improvement” and it relies on “partial” data.56 Israel has said
it places no limits on the amount of aid, including food, that can enter Gaza. 57

Disease and polio vaccinations

The World Health Organization (WHO) has warned of the threat of disease.
The first case of polio in Gaza in 25 years was confirmed in August 2024. The
WHO has launched a vaccination campaign but said pauses in the fighting
are necessary to vaccinate children and allow sustained access for health
workers (the UN Secretary General has made a similar request). In 2023, polio
vaccination coverage in Gaza stood at 89%, down from 99% in 2022. 58

Pauses to allow for vaccination against polio began on 1 September 2024. 59 In

November, the WHO confirmed that a second round of vaccinations had been
completed. It said around 94% of the target population of 592,000 children
under the age of 10 had been reached. It said coverage was lower in northern
Gaza (88%) compared with 103% in central Gaza and 91% in southern Gaza.
It said around 7,000 to 10,000 children were inaccessible in some areas,
including Jabalia. 60

Humanitarian aid access

Gaza is heavily dependent on Israeli energy and water. 61 On 9 October 2023
the then Defence Minister Yoav Gallant said there would be a “total siege” of
Gaza with no electricity, water, food or fuel, though these goods have
subsequently been allowed to enter. 62 Since November 2023, Israel has
allowed limited amounts of fuel to enter Gaza to support the UN Relief and
Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA). 63

54
Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, Gaza Strip: IPC acute food insecurity and acute
malnutrition snapshot, September 2024 to April 2025 (PDF), October 2024
55
IPC Famine Review Committee, Alert Gaza, 8 November 2024
56
COGAT, Humanitarian information centre: IPC (PDF), 8 November 2024
57
Israeli Government, Swords of Iron: humanitarian efforts, updated 7 May 2024
58
WHO, Gaza: first polio case confirmed, 23 August 2024; UN, Gaza remains at “high risk” of polio
virus spread, 14 August 2024; UN, Guterres appeals for “polio pause” in Gaza, 16 August 2024
59
UN, Gaza: Polio vaccination campaign moves to southern areas, 5 September 2024
60
WHO, Second round of polio campaign in Gaza completed […], 6 November 2024
61
Unicef, The Gaza Strip. The humanitarian impact of 15 years of blockade, June 2022
62
Defence Minister announces ‘complete siege’ of Gaza […], Times of Israel, 9 October 2023; UN says
fuel shortages will halt Gaza aid operations within a day, CNN, 26 October 2023
63
Israel to allow some fuel into Gaza after US push-officials, Reuters, 18 November 2023

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In 2024, the Israeli Parliament passed legislation which will ban Israeli
officials from working with UNRWA (see below).

Crossing points
There are six main crossing points into Gaza. Four of these crossings – Rafah,
“Gate 96”, West Erez, and Erez crossings – are primarily used for people. The
fifth main crossing, Kerem Shalom, is used to transmit goods between Israel
and Gaza. A new crossing at Kissufim was opened in November 2024.

Currently, five crossings are open but not Rafah, which has been closed since
the Israeli offensive in the Rafah governorate in May 2024. 64

Humanitarian aid trucks arriving into Gaza

The UN, US and UK, among others, have called for an increase in the amount
of aid entering Gaza to meet the aim of 500 trucks a day set by Israel. 65

According to the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

(UNOCHA), October 2024 had the lowest number of humanitarian aid trucks
enter Gaza since October 2023, at 37 a day (1,160 in total). 66

Separate data released by the Israeli Coordinator of Government Activities in

the Territories (COGAT) states that around 33,800 tonnes of aid entered Gaza
in October 2024, down from a peak of 137,000 tonnes in April 2024 (the
highest total recorded in 2024). It said that 1,789 trucks entered Gaza in
October, down from a peak of 6,773 in April. 67

In November 2024 the leaders of 15 UN and humanitarian organisations

described the situation in northern Gaza as “apocalyptic” and the civilian
population there as being “denied basic aid and life-saving supplies”. Those
signing the statement included the Director General of the World Health
Organization, the Executive Director of the UN Children’s Fund, Unicef, and
the UNOCHA Acting Emergency Relief Coordinator and Under-Secretary
General. 68

On 26 November UNOCHA said that of its 41 aid missions planned to northern

Gaza from 1 to 26 November, all were either denied by the IDF or impeded by
events on the ground. 69

In October 2024 the US Secretaries of State and Defense wrote to the Israeli
Government saying they had 30 days in which to improve the level of aid
arriving into Gaza, or risk a loss of US military support. Among the requests

64
Aid to Gaza choked off as border crossings closed, VOA, 7 May 2024; US DoS, Department press
briefing, 7 November 2024
65
UNOCHA, Reported impact snapshot: Gaza Strip, 4 September 2024
66
UNOCHA, Reported impact snapshot: Gaza Strip, 12 November 2024
67
Humanitarian Efforts Israel, Gaza: humanitarian aid data
68
World Health Organization, Statement by principles of the inter-agency standing committee, 1
November 2024
69
UNOCHA, Humanitarian situation update: Gaza Strip, update 242, 20 November 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

were enabling a minimum of 350 lorries a day to enter Gaza and ensuring
northern Gaza is not isolated from aid. 70

In November the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that “Israel has
taken action either in implementing or being in the process of implementing
12 of the 15 steps” that the US requested, and he said more needed to be done
for pauses in fighting and allowing more trucks in. 71

Israel has previously committed to “flood” Gaza with aid and said in October
2024 that there are no limits on the level of aid allowed into Gaza. 72 It has said
one “problem is Hamas, which hijacks the aid”. 73

Looting of aid convoys

On 16 November 2024 UNRWA reported that a convoy from Kerem Shalom to
southern Gaza of 109 UN aid lorries was violently looted, with a loss of
97 lorries. The Commissioner General of UNRWA, Phillippe Lazzarini, said that
“until four or five months ago, we still had local capacity, people who were
escorting the convoy. This has not completely gone”. 74

Both Hamas, alongside other groups, and the IDF say they are combatting
looters. 75 UN officials have reportedly requested additional security around
crossings from the IDF. 76 The US says there is an “imperative” to address
“lawlessness and looting inside of Gaza” and says the lack of a replacement
governing authority to Hamas “is ultimately the key culprit for the lack of
security”. 77

Israeli legislation on UNRWA

On 13 October 2024 the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) passed legislation which
will ban Israeli officials from engaging with the UN Relief and Works Agency
for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) and ban UNRWA from working in Israeli
territory. UNRWA supports around 5.9 million Palestinian refugees across the
Occupied Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. The Israeli
legislation follows allegations that some UNRWA staff are Hamas members
and UN investigations that have led to sacking of some of its staff. 78

Section 1.3 of the Commons Library briefing, UK aid to the West Bank and
Gaza Strip, provides information on the UK assessment on access for aid and

70
US gives Israel 30 days to boost Gaza aid or risk cut to military support, BBC News, 16 October 2024
71
US DoS, Secretary Antony Blinken remarks to the press, 13 November 2024
72
Gallant says Israel plans to “flood Gaza with aid”, Times of Israel, 10 April 2024; UN says critical aid
routes to northern Gaza cut off […], Times of Israel, 13 October 2024
73
Israel must show no “policy of starvation” in Gaza, US says, Jerusalem Post, 16 October 2024
74
Almost 100 Gaza food aid lorries violently looted […], BBC News, 18 November 2024
75
Hamas says group raids killed 20 ‘aid convoy looters’, BBC Monitoring, 19 November 2024; Hamas-
led force targets gangs looting Gaza aid convoys, Reuters, 20 November 2024
76
Gangs looting Gaza aid operate in areas [...], Washington Post, 19 November 2024
77
US DoS, Secretary Antony Blinken remarks to the press, 13 November 2024; US DoS, Press briefing, 19
November 2024
78
See Commons Library, West Bank and Gaza Strip: UK aid and UNRWA, FAQs, section 5

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

the changes it wants Israel to implement to increase the delivery of aid, and
on the position and role of UNRWA in 2024.

1.3 Situation in the West Bank and Jerusalem

Humanitarian and economic situation

The International Labour Organization (ILO), a UN agency, reports that the
short-term poverty rate in the West Bank has risen from 12% in 2023 to 28%
by mid-2024 (this compares to nearly 100% in Gaza). It says that
unemployment had increased to 35% in the West Bank, which largely
reflected the loss of employment for 150,000 people formerly employed in
Israel. 79

Levels of violence in 2023

Violence is ongoing in the West Bank. UNOCHA reports that 2023 was the
“deadliest year” for Palestinians and Israelis in the West Bank since it began
recording casualties in 2005 (with 36 Israeli and 506 Palestinian deaths). 80

UNOCHA also states that in 2023 there were 1,229 incidents involving Israeli
settlers in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, that resulted in damage
or Palestinian casualties. This was the highest total since it began collecting
incident data in 2006. 81

Levels of violence in 2024

In November 2024, UNOCHA reported that from 7 October 2023 to 31 October
2024, 736 Palestinians were killed in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.
These included 719 killed by Israeli forces, 12 by Israeli settlers and seven
where it remains unknown if they were killed by the IDF or settlers. 82

During the same period, 23 Israelis, including 16 members of the IDF and six
settlers, were killed by Palestinians in the West Bank, including East
Jerusalem. In Israel, attacks by Palestinians from the West Bank resulted in
the deaths of 16 Israelis and eight Palestinian perpetrators. 83

Over the same period, UNOCHA recorded nearly 1,600 attacks by Israeli
settlers against Palestinians. 84

79
ILO, A year of war in Gaza: impacts on employment and livelihoods, October 2024
80
UNOCHA, Hostilities in Gaza Strip and Israel, flash update 80, 30 December 2023
81
UNOCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel, flash update 94, 16 January 2024
82
UNOCHA, Humanitarian situation update 234, West Bank, 31 October 2024
83
As above
84
As above

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

IDF operations
In 2024, UNOCHA has reported ongoing search-and-arrest operations by the
IDF and confrontations and demonstrations, resulting in deaths and injuries. 85
In November 2024 the then Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant said that
Iran was attempting to increase its support for terrorist groups in the West
Bank. 86 The IDF has also been conducting operations against smugglers of
arms and drugs into the West Bank. 87

BBC Monitoring analysis reports a rising use of air and drone strikes by the IDF
in the West Bank. The number of Israeli drone and air strikes totalled 47 from
the summer of 2023 to 28 August 2024. Before this, the last reported air strike
was in 2006. Israel has said the use of aircraft is to address the “mounting
terrorism” and armed activity in the West Bank. 88

Israeli settler violence

In November 2024 the US State Department said it was “deeply concerned” by
reports of “increasing extremist settler violence in the West Bank”, saying it
caused “intense human suffering for Palestinians, they threaten Israel’s
security, [and] make the realization of a two-state solution more difficult”. 89
In July 2024 the UK said that “settler violence [has] reached record levels”
and that it would act against those who “undermine a two-state solution”. 90
Both have announced sanctions against some involved in the violence (see
section 3.4 for the UK).

Israeli Prime Benjamin Netanyahu has condemned settler violence but said
“accusations against the settlement movement [are] baseless” and those
involved in the violence are not representative. 91 In response to a settler
attack on one village in August 2024, Israeli President Isaac Herzog said a
“small, radical minority…is harming the law-abiding settler public and
Israel’s status”. 92

The head of Shin Bet (the Israel Security Agency), Ronen Bar, argued in an
August 2024 letter to the Israeli Government (later released by the Israeli
press) that settler violence was causing “indescribable” damage to Israel and
some acts constituted “terror”. 93

Statements on Al-Aqsa/Temple Mount

The comments and actions of Israeli National Security Minister Itamar Ben-
Gvir, who is responsible for Israel’s police force, have been criticised by some

85
UNOCHA, Humanitarian situation update 198, West Bank, 31 July 2024
86
With Hezbollah and Hamas weakened, Gallant says Iran […], Times of Israel, 3 November 2024
87
Washington Institute, Hamas and Iran are trying to ignite Israel’s eastern fronts, 20 June 2024
88
Israel increases West Bank air strikes, BBC Monitoring, 29 August 2024
89
US Dos, Department press briefing, 4 November 2024
90
HC Deb, 19 July 2024, c300
91
PM pans West Bank attacks by “handful of extremists”, Times of Israel, 9 November 2023
92
Jewish settlers descend on West Bank village, Haaretz, 16 August 2024
93
Shin Bet chief warns PM and ministers, Haaretz, 22 August 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Israeli leaders. In August 2024 Mr Ben-Gvir said he was open to putting a

synagogue at Al-Aqsa/Temple Mount. He also prayed at the site. The site is
sacred to both Jews and Muslims. Under an informal 1967 Israeli arrangement
(often referred to as the “status quo”) only Muslims are allowed to pray at the
site. 94

In response to Mr Ben-Gvir’s comments, Mr Netanyahu said there is no

change in the “status quo”. Then Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant
accused Ben-Gvir of “endanger[ing] national security” and Interior Minister
Moshe Arbel said he should be removed from office and was endangering
Israel’s relationship with Arab states. Mr Ben-Gvir rejected the criticism. 95 The
UK Government “strongly” condemned Mr Ben-Gvir’s comments. 96

Israeli settlement expansion

The US says Israeli settlements in the West Bank are “inconsistent” with
international law.97 The UK Government also considers settlements to be
“illegal under international law” and that their expansion should be halted.98

In July 2024 the Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, said expansion was at
“record levels [and] the Israeli Government have seized more of the West
Bank in 2024 than in the past 20 years”. He said this was “unacceptable”. 99

In March 2024, the Israeli Government approved plans for new settlements in
the West Bank, the first since June 2023. 100 In August 2024, it published one of
the plans. It said this was in response to four European states choosing to
recognise a Palestinian state (see paragraph below) and the backing of the
Palestinian Authority for a case brought by South Africa against Israel at the
International Court of Justice (ICJ).101

In response to the decisions of Norway, Spain, Ireland and Slovenia to

recognise a Palestinian state in June 2024, the Israeli Government said it
would take steps to “strengthen settlement” in the West Bank. 102 On 28 June
the Israeli security cabinet legalised five outposts (settlements) in the West
Bank and cancelled some exit visas for Palestinian Authority officials (among
other measures). 103

94
Backlash in Israel as far-right minister’s statement on holy site, BBC Monitoring, 27 August 2024;
Cabinet ministers warn Ben Gvir endangering Israel, Times of Israel, 26 August 2024
95
As above
96
FCDO, UK statement in response to IDF military operation [...], 30 August 2024
97
Blinken reverses Trump-era policy on Israeli settlements, Axios, 23 February 2024
98
PQ 527 [Israeli settlements] , 23 July 2024; FCDO, Five outposts to be legalised […], 30 June 2024
99
HC Deb, 19 July 2024, c300
100
Israel approves plans for 3,400 new homes […], BBC News, 6 March 2024, Israel unveils big West
Bank land seizure […], France 24, 22 March 2024
101
Israel publishes plan for new West Bank settlement, Reuters, 14 August 2024
102
Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, Announcement, 17 June 2024
103
Security cabinet okay legalising 5 outposts, Times of Israel, 28 June 2024

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

The Palestinian Authority criticised the settlement legalisation as a

“deliberate sabotage” of a potential two-state solution. 104

Statements on potential West Bank annexation

In 2020, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government had plans to apply
Israeli sovereignty over parts of the West Bank which contained Israeli
settlements. It said this was distinct from annexation. 105

The move was intended to be coordinated with the Middle East Peace Plan of
the first Trump administration, and was not implemented. 106 Agreements to
normalise diplomatic ties between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
in 2020 reportedly included commitments to halt the Israeli move.107

In July 2024 Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said that Israel should “apply
sovereignty to the territories of the homeland” as did National Security
Minster Itamar Ben-Gvir. 108 Both have long called for annexation. 109

Following the election of Donald Trump in November 2024 Mr Smotrich said

2025 would “be the year of sovereignty in the West Bank” and he had
instructed officials to begin preparations on the issue. 110

The Israeli Cabinet reportedly considered whether to return to the issue in

November 2024. 111 The UK Government has condemned Mr Smotrich’s
comments and annexation as illegal under international law. 112

1.4 Negotiations on hostages and ceasefire

“Tactical, local” pauses

In November 2023 and June 2024, the IDF announced daily “tactical pauses”
in its military operations to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid.113

104
Palestinians condemn Israel’s plan to legalise West Bank settlements, BBC Monitoring, 29 June
2024
105
Explainer: Israel, annexation and the West Bank, BBC News, 25 June 2020
106
Netanyahu said to tell Likud MKs: West Bank annex on for July, Times of Israel, 25 May 2020
107
US assured UAE it won’t back Israel annexation before 2024 […], Times of Israel, 13 September 2020;
UAE ambassador: “Abraham Accords were about preventing annexation”, Times of Israel, 2
February 2021
108
Smotrich calls on Netanyahu to annex West Bank […], Times of Israel, 15 July 2024; Top UN court
says Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories is illegal, Reuters, 19 July 2024
109
Atlantic Council, Netanyahu’s fifth term, 15 April 2019, Israel swears in most right-wing government
in its history, Axios, 29 December 2022
110
Israel’s Smotrich calls for annexation of occupied West Bank, Al-Monitor, 1 November 2024
111
Israeli leaders discuss West Bank annexation, BBC Monitoring, 12 November 2024
112
Hamish Falconer MP Twitter/X, “I condemn Minister Smotrich’s comments […],” 14 November 2024
113
Israeli army says allowing “humanitarian pauses” in Gaza, BBC Monitoring, 9 November 2023;
Israel’s plan for ‘tactical pause’ for aid raises questions […], CNN, 17 June 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

In September 2024, pauses in fighting have also been held to allow the
vaccination of children against polio. 114 This was completed in November. 115

2023 pause
Following mediation by Qatar and Egypt, a pause in fighting took place from
24 November to 1 December 2023 to allow for the release of hostages in
exchange for Palestinian prisoners in Israel. Hamas released 105 hostages
from Gaza and Israel released 240 Palestinians from Israeli prisons. 116

2024 proposal for a three-stage cessation of hostilities

On 31 May, US President Joe Biden announced a three-phase agreement,
which he said Israel had proposed and Qatar had passed to Hamas:

• Stage 1: the release of some hostages in exchange for Palestinian

prisoners, a full ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from
populated areas of Gaza.

• Stage 2: the exchange of all remaining hostages, complete Israeli

withdrawal from Gaza, and the “cessation of hostilities permanently”.

• Stage 3: a plan for the reconstruction of Gaza. 117

The plan was supported in a resolution of the UN Security Council (including

the UK) in June, which called on Israel and Hamas to implement it. 118

Speaking on 31 May, President Biden said that “Hamas no longer is capable of

carrying out another October 7th” and Israel can therefore “make this offer
without any further risk to their own security”. 119

On 2 September, President Biden argued that Mr Netanyahu was not doing

enough to secure an agreement. 120 In early September, the Washington Post
reported that the United States was planning to present Israel and Hamas
with a “final”, “take it or leave it” hostage release and ceasefire proposal. 121
US State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said he would not give a
timetable on the development of any new proposal or its contents. 122

114
Israeli army approves Gaza humanitarian pauses for polio vaccination, 30 August 2024
115
WHO, Second round of polio campaign in Gaza completed, 6 November 2024
116
Gaza truce extension faltered […], New York Times, 1 December 2023
117
White House, Remarks by President Biden on the Middle East, 31 May 2024
118
UN, Gaza: Security Council adopts US resolution […], 10 June 2024
119
White House, Remarks by President Biden, 31 May 2024
120
Netanyahu not doing enough to free Gaza hostages, says Biden, BBC News, 3 September 2024
121
US plans to present ‘take it or leave it’ […] deal […], Washington Post, 1 September 2024
122
US DoS, Press briefing, 4 September 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

The US has also argued that a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas will help
to address the tensions in Lebanon, the Red Sea and elsewhere. 123

The Palestinian Authority was not participating in the talks. 124

Section 2 of the Commons Library research briefing, Israel and the Occupied
Palestinian Territories in 2023/24: UN, ICC and ICJ statements and actions,
has further information on the UN resolution and international positions on a
ceasefire.

August 2024 call for renewed talks

In August the United States said that only the details for the “implementation”
of the framework agreement remained to be agreed. 125 The EU, the UK,
France, and Germany endorsed the calls for further negotiations. 126

In an official briefing to the press on 4 September 2024, a senior US

administration official said that “90%” of the deal had been agreed:
The deal has 18 total paragraphs. Fourteen of those paragraphs are finished
and, I have to say, are identical [to that in July] […] One paragraph has a very
technical fix, and the other three paragraphs have to do with the exchange of
prisoners to hostages […] So, basically, 90% of this deal has been agreed. 127

The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has made similar remarks and said
that “pretty much everything” other than issues including the
Philadelphi corridor (see below) and “how hostages and prisoners are
exchanged” is agreed. 128 On 5 September, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu rejected the “90%” statement as “exactly inaccurate”. 129

Hamas has argued that the Israeli Government wants to add demands to
prolong the talks. Reported proposals include Israeli control of the Rafah
border crossing, the Philadelphi Corridor (citing a desire to prevent weapons
smuggling into Gaza) and the Netzarim Corridor in the centre of Gaza (to
screen Palestinians moving between north and south Gaza). Israel denies it
has tried to add new conditions and that these were “clarifications” to the
framework. 130

The then Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant has argued that Israel should
compromise on the Philadelphi Corridor so it can reach an agreement with

123
US DoS, Press briefing, 29 July 2024; US DoS, Secretary Blinken at a conversation on US foreign
policy, 1 July 2024
124
White House, Press gaggle by national security communications advisor, 15 August 2024
125
US embassy in Israel, Joint statement from the leaders of the US, Egypt and Qatar, 9 August 2024
126
Prime Minister’s Office, Joint statement on the Middle East, 12 August 2024; Council on the European
Union, Israel/Palestine: statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU, 9 August 2024
127
White House, Background press call on efforts to secure the release of hostages, 4 September 2024
128
US DoS, Secretary Blinken at a press availability, 5 September 2024
129
Netanyahu is unequivocal about ceasefire and hostage agreement, CNN, 5 September 2024
130
A top Hamas official says the group is losing faith in the US, AP, 15 August 2024; Israel was less
flexible in recent Gaza ceasefire talks, New York Times, 13 August 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Hamas. 131 He said that agreeing a deal and a six-week pause is a “strategic
opportunity” for Israel that “gives us a high chance to change the security
situation on all fronts”. 132 On 4 September, Mr Netanyahu said that Israel
cannot leave the corridor, as there is a risk that not all hostages will be
returned (for stages 1 and 2 of the proposed agreement) and “you can enable
the rearmament of Gaza [Hamas] through the Philadelphi Corridor”. 133

Other members of the Israeli coalition government have said they will resign if
the conflict ends without the defeat of Hamas. 134

Israel says that Hamas should release the hostages immediately and accused
it of trying to add 29 amendments to the framework (Hamas denies this).135 Mr
Netanyahu has also said other issues included the ratio of hostages to
Palestinian prisoners and Israel’s demand to veto the release of some
prisoners. 136 He has also questioned how committed Hamas is to an
agreement, following the recovery of the bodies of six hostages by the IDF
that Israel said were killed by Hamas on 1 September 2024. 137

Hamas has also called for a permanent ceasefire, while Israel supports only a
temporary pause for the release of hostages.138

On 1 September, Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid called for nationwide

strikes to pressurise the Israeli Government to come to an agreement with
Hamas to secure the release of hostages held in Gaza, arguing the
government is not doing so for “political reasons”. 139 The call for a strike
followed the death of six hostages, which the IDF said occurred shortly before
they were able to recover them from Hamas captivity. Protesters in Israel and
some relatives of those taken hostage by Hamas have called for a deal for
their release to be secured quickly. 140

Mr Netanyahu said Israel would “settle accounts” with Hamas in Gaza and
that efforts to reach an agreement for their release continue. 141

Further calls for talks from October 2024

Following the killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in October, who the US
Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said was the “biggest obstacle” to an
agreement, the US, UK, and others called for renewed negotiations. 142 Israel’s

131
Israeli defence minister calls for deal to bring hostages home, Reuters, 1 September 2024
132
Israel defence minister says Gaza truce deal a ‘strategic opportunity’, 10 September 2024
133
Netanyahu says his April claim was not intended literally, Times of Israel, 5 September 2024
134
Israeli ministers threaten to quit […], BBC News, 2 June 2024
135
Netanyahu denies claims he changed conditions […], Jerusalem Post, 13 August 2024
136
Netanyahu says his April claim was not intended literally, Times of Israel, 5 September 2024; Gaza
talks stall over details of hostages-for-prisoners swap, New York Times, 5 September 2024
137
As above
138
Hamas has offered a ceasefire deal […], CNN, 8 May 2024
139
Lapid calls on Histadrut, employers to strike, Jerusalem Post, 1 September 2024
140
Tens of thousands rally in Israel calling for hostage release deal, BBC News, 1 September 2024
141
Instigated after hostages killed, Netanyahu blames Hamas […], Times of Israel, 1 September 2024
142
US DoS, Secretary Antony Blinken and Qatari Prime Minister, 24 October 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

President, Isaac Herzgog, said Yahya Sinwar’s death had “created an

opportunity that we must not miss”. 143

Some talks did take place in October 2024, in which Israel said new proposals
were made that “integrate previous proposals and take into account the main
issues and developments in the region”. 144 Egypt proposed a two-day
ceasefire.145 One Hamas official said the group would continue to oppose any
temporary ceasefires and only support an agreement that led to a
“permanent end to war”. 146

On 5 November Antony Blinken said Hamas had “again refused to release

even a limited number of hostages to secure a ceasefire and relief for the
people of Gaza”. 147

On 9 November 2024 Qatar, which alongside Egypt has acted as the primary
mediator to the conflict, said it would “stall its efforts to mediate between
Israel and Hamas if an agreement was not reached” in the negotiations. The
Qatari Foreign Office said it would resume work “when the parties show their
willingness and seriousness” to end the conflict and return the hostages. 148

Following the US election in November, Secretary Blinken said that the Biden
administration would continue to work for a ceasefire, the release of
hostages, and getting more aid into Gaza, before it leaves office in January. 149

In November Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly told the Israeli Knesset

Foreign Affairs Committee that he would not allow the IDF to leave Gaza if it
meant Hamas would return to power, “under any circumstance”. 150 Finance
Minister Bezalel Smotrich suggested Israel could occupy “the entire northern
Gaza strip” and tell Hamas that unless the hostages are returned, “we will
apply Israeli sovereignty there and remain forever”. 151

143
At Oct.7 memorial, Herzog says Israel must exploit Sinwar’s killing […], Times of Israel, 27 October
2024
144
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister’s Office announcement, 28 October 2024
145
Egyptian State Information Service, President El-Sisi reveals a new two-day ceasefire […], 27
October 2024
146
Netanyahu offers Hamas $1m for each hostage and amnesty […], Telegraph, 5 November 2024
147
US DoS, Secretary Blinken’s call with Egyptian Foreign Minister, 4 November 2024
148
Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 November 2024
149
US DoS, Secretary Antony Blinken remarks to the press, 13 November 2024
150
PM says he won’t back deal that ends war with IDF leaving Gaza […], Times of Israel, 18 November
2024
151
Smotrich: Israel must vow to stay in northern Gaza […], Times of Israel, 18 November 2024

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

1.5 Israeli statements on the post-conflict

Occupied Palestinian Territories

Post-conflict plans discussed by Israeli Government

No role for Hamas in Gaza
The Israeli Government, alongside governments such as those of the United
States and UK, has stated that Hamas cannot play any role in the government
of post-conflict Gaza. 152

February 2024 discussion plan of Israeli Government

In February 2024, Mr Netanyahu proposed a discussion plan to the Israeli
security cabinet on post-conflict Gaza. Reports suggest it included:

• Civilian management of Gaza by “local representatives” not affiliated

with Hamas. The Palestinian Authority is not mentioned in the plan.

• The closure of UNRWA and its replacement by other aid groups. In

October 2024 Israel passed legislation that will ban the agency from
engaging with Israel officials, but aid through other UN bodies would
continue.

• The demilitarisation of Gaza, save for weapons “necessary to maintain

public order”, after which reconstruction will be carried out by countries
“acceptable to Israel”.

• An Israeli presence on the Gaza–Egypt border to prevent smuggling and

the creation of a border security zone on Israel’s border with Gaza. 153

Dismissal of Israel Defence Minister, November 2024

Yoav Gallant served as Minister for Defence from 2022 to 2024. A member of
Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud Party, Mr Gallant was dismissed by Prime
Minister Netanyahu and replaced by the then Israeli Foreign Secretary, Israel
Katz, in November 2024.
Prime Minister Netanyahu said he lacked “full trust” in his defence minister. 154

152
Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, Statement by PM Netanyahu, 21 January 2024
153
No reconstruction in Gaza without demilitarisation, Axios, 22 February 2024; US Institute for Peace,
Plan for Gaza’s future highlights the challenges that lie ahead, 29 February 2024; Netanyahu
presents plan for post-war Gaza, BBC Monitoring, 23 February 2024
154
Full text of Netanyahu speech: I fired Gallant, Times of Israel, 6 November 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Following the announcement, Mr Gallant said he was dismissed because of

disagreements on three issues in the seven-party coalition government in
Israel. These were:
1. proposed legislation on requiring all those of conscription age to serve in
the IDF (there had been exemptions for some ultra-Orthodox citizens; Mr
Gallant supported the change but others do not in the coalition
government),

2. his view that some “painful compromises” were needed to secure a

hostage agreement, and

3. his call for a state commission of inquiry into the events of 7 October. 155

Mr Netanyahu previously attempted to fire Mr Gallant in 2023, when he

opposed the government’s reforms to the judicial system. 156
Opposition party leaders including Benny Gantz and Yair Lapid criticised the
dismissal of Mr Gallant and called for protests. 157

Netanyahu address to US Congress in July 2024

In an address to the US Congress on 25 July 2024, Mr Netanyahu reiterated his
position on the governing of post-conflict Gaza and that Israel would
maintain responsibility for security. He did not explicitly mention a role for the
Palestinian Authority:

My vision for that day is of a demilitarized and deradicalized Gaza. Israel does
not seek to resettle Gaza. But for the foreseeable future, we must retain
overriding security control there to prevent the resurgence of terror, to ensure
that Gaza never again poses a threat to Israel.

Gaza should have a civilian administration run by Palestinians who do not seek
to destroy Israel […]

A new generation of Palestinians must no longer be taught to hate Jews but

rather to live in peace with us […]

Following our victory, with the help of regional partners, the demilitarization
and deradicalization of Gaza can also lead to a future of security, prosperity
and peace […] 158

155
Full text of Gallant speech, Times of Israel, 5 November 2024
156
Netanyahu reverses firing of Israeli defence minister, New York Times, 10 April 2023
157
“Act of insanity”: Opposition chiefs declare Netanyahu unfit to be PM […], Times of Israel, 6
November 2024
158
“We’re protecting you: Full text of Netanyahu’s address to Congress, Times of Israel, 25 July 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

On 26 July, the Chair of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General CQ Brown, said
that for the US there had not been “a lot of detail” from the Israeli
Government on post-conflict plans, though discussions were continuing. 159

Position on recognising a Palestinian state

In July 2024, the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) voted for a motion opposing a
Palestinian state.160 The motion was passed by 68 votes to 9 (out of a total
membership of 120). The motion followed the decisions of Spain, Norway,
Slovenia and Ireland to recognise a Palestinian state. The motion said:

The Knesset of Israel firmly opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state

west of Jordan. The establishment of a Palestinian state in the heart of the
Land of Israel would pose an existential danger to the State of Israel and its
citizens, perpetuate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and destabilize the region.

It will only be a matter of a short time until Hamas takes over the Palestinian
state and turns it into a radical Islamic terror base that operates in
coordination with the Iranian-led axis to eliminate the State of Israel.
Promoting the idea of a Palestinian state at this time would be a reward for
terrorism […] 161

The Palestinian Authority and Arab governments criticised the resolution. 162
Foreign Secretary David Lammy said the vote was “hugely disappointing”. 163

Mr Netanyahu was not present for the vote. In February 2024 the cabinet
approved a resolution rejecting international recognition of a Palestinian
state without direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians.164

Statements on establishing settlements in Gaza

Israeli settlements in Gaza were removed when Israel disengaged from the
Strip in 2005.

In July 2024 Prime Minister Netanyahu told a joint session of the US Congress
that “Israel does not wish to resettle Gaza” but wants “for the foreseeable
future […] overriding security control” to “prevent the resurgence of terror”. 165
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken also said in October 2024 that it was, “to

159
US not seen a detailed post-war plan from Israel, Gen. Brown says, Reuters, 26 July 2024
160
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PM Netanyahu’s remarks at the start of a government meeting, 18
February 2024 and Israel opposes ‘unilateral’ imposition, Reuters, 18 February 2024; Knesset votes
resoundingly […], Times of Israel, 22 February 2024
161
Knesset, Knesset Plenum votes in favour of declaration that parliament opposes the establishment
of a Palestinian state, 18 July 2024
162
Israeli resolution opposing Palestinian state draws Arab condemnation, BBC Monitoring, 19 July
2024
163
HC Deb, 19 July 2024, c310
164
Israel rejects international recognition of a Palestinian state, BBC Monitoring, 18 February 2024
165
Israeli Prime Minister’s Office, PM Netanya’s address to joint meeting of US congress, 24 July 2024

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

the best of my understanding, the policy of the Israeli government” not to

“reoccupy” Gaza. 166

In 2024 Israeli ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and May Golan have called for
Palestinians to be encouraged to leave Gaza, while Bezalel Smotrich has said
establishing Israeli settlements in Gaza will be a means of ensuring security. 167
These statements have been condemned by the US and UK governments,
among others. 168

1.6 Palestinian Authority statements and actions

in 2023/24

Palestinian Authority statements on the conflict

The Palestinian Authority has had limited authority over Gaza following the
2006 victory by Hamas in parliamentary elections. In 2007, fighting between
Hamas and Fatah (the majority party of the Palestinian Authority) resulted in
Hamas taking control of Gaza. 169

Fatah, as the largest group in the Palestine Liberation Organisation,

renounced terrorism in 1988 and was removed from the US terrorist list the
same year. It is supportive of a two-state solution between Israel. 170

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has called for an immediate

ceasefire, more humanitarian aid, and the withdrawal of the IDF from Gaza. 171

The Palestinian Authority rejected the discussion plan put forward to the
Israeli security cabinet in February 2024 (see above, section 1.5) as
“continuing Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories and preventing
the establishment of a Palestinian state”. 172

The Authority has also said it is willing to govern in Gaza but not without a
“political solution for the West Bank”. 173

Talks with Hamas

In July 2024, China hosted talks in which Hamas and Fatah signed a
declaration to end their division (this is not the first time such an agreement
has been reached). China said it hoped it would lead to reconciliation and the

166
US DoS, Secretary Antony Blinken remarks to the press, 23 October 2024
167
Senior ministers call for new settlements in Gaza […], Times of Israel, 21 October 2024
168
US, UK, France blast Israeli conference on Gaza resettlement, Times of Israel, 30 January 2024
169
A guide to Palestinian and other anti-Israeli factions, Foreign Policy, 10 October 2023
170
European Council on Foreign Relations, Mapping Palestinian politics: Fatah
171
Palestinian leadership reiterates call for immediate end […], WAFA, 1 June 2024
172
Palestinians reject Netanyahu’s plan for post-war Gaza, BBC Monitoring, 24 February 2024
173
Palestinian PM: We will not run Gaza without solution for West Bank, The Guardian, 29 October 2023

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

“realisa[tion] of independent statehood at an early date”. In response, Israel,

the UK and the US reiterated that Hamas should not retain control of Gaza.
These states have a no-contact policy with Hamas. 174

Talks between Hamas and Fatah on governing Gaza have continued in later
2024 but no agreement has been reached.175

Activity at the UN and International Court of Justice

In December 2023, South Africa began proceedings against Israel at the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) alleging Israel is breaching its obligations
under the Genocide Convention. 176 Palestinian officials applied to join the case
against Israel in June 2024. 177

In April 2024, the UN Security Council voted on a resolution recommending

that the “State of Palestine be admitted to membership in the United
Nations”. The US vetoed the resolution, meaning it did not pass. 178 The UK
abstained on the resolution, arguing “we must keep our focus on securing an
immediate pause in order to get aid in and hostages out” and work towards a
sustainable ceasefire. 179

In May 2024 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution to upgrade the

status of the Palestinian observer mission at the UN and to recommend that
the Security Council “reconsider the matter” of granting full Palestinian
membership “favourably”. 180 Seven changes were made to the status of the
Palestinian observer at the UN from September 2024. This included having the
right to co-sponsor proposals and amendments and to introduce them, and
to be seated among member states in alphabetical order. 181

For more, see the Commons Library research briefing, Israel and the
Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2023/24: UN, ICC and ICJ statements and
actions.

174
Hamas and Fatah sign a declaration [...], AP, 23 July 2024; PRO Foreign Affairs Ministry, Palestinian
factions sign […] declaration, 23 July 2024; PQ 3016 [Palestinian Authority], 9 September 2024;
Written evidence from Foreign and Commonwealth Office, MEP0055
175
Row over Hamas-Fatah “proposed committee” to govern Gaza, BBC Monitoring, 5 November 2024;
Hamas, Fatah meet in Cairo for post-war Gaza talks, BBC Monitoring, 9 October 2024; Senior
Palestinian official Jibril Rajoub […], Al Monitor, 13 November 2024
176
ICJ, Case Overview 192 South Africa v. Israel
177
Palestinian officials apply to join South Africa’s case at top UN court […], AP News, 3 June 2024
178
UN, Security Council fails to recommend full UN membership for State of Palestine, 18 April 2024
179
FCDO, We must start by fixing the immediate crisis in Gaza, 19 April 2024
180
This section sourced from UN, UN General Assembly presses Security Council to give ‘favourable
consideration’ to full Palestinian membership, 10 May 2024
181
FCDO, “Setting out a horizon for a Palestinian state should be one of the vital conditions for moving
from a pause […]”, 10 May 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Changes to Palestinian Authority government

In March 2024, the Palestinian Authority’s President Abbas appointed a new
Prime Minister, Mohammed Mustafa, and cabinet.182

The US and the UK welcomed the Prime Minister’s appointment and called for
“credible and far-reaching reforms”. 183 Both governments support a role for
the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, subject to it making reforms. Hamas
criticised Mr Mustafa’s appointment. 184

In November 2024, President Abbas also designated an interim successor if

he were to leave post. The interim president would serve for 90 days before
elections are held. The last elections to the Presidency were held in 2005. 185

Palestinian Authority revenue

Israel collects revenue on the Palestinian Authority’s behalf. The Palestinian
Authority reports it has lost around two-thirds of its tax revenues since
October 2023 (though some funds were transferred later). This, together with
a decline in foreign aid over several years, has weakened the Palestinian
Authority’s ability to pay public sector salaries and provide services. 186

In May 2024, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said that some revenue
would be held to protest the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor
applying for arrest warrants against the Israeli Prime Minister and Defence
Minister and the Palestinian Authority pursuing “unilateral” efforts for
international recognition of a state. 187 He withheld further revenues following
the decisions of Spain, Ireland and Norway to recognise a Palestinian state in
May. 188 The G7 has called on Israel to release these funds. 189 The first transfer
since October 2023 occurred in July 2024.190

The Israeli Government must also endorse correspondence agreements

between Palestinian and Israeli banks, which allows them to transact
between each other. In October and November 2024, the UK, France,
Germany, and the United States called on Israel to “urgently” renew these
agreements “to prevent economic collapse” in the Occupied Palestinian

182
Palestinian Authority announces a new cabinet […], AP, 28 March 2024
183
Palestinian president appoints long-time adviser as prime minister, BBC News, 15 March 2024; HC
Deb, 26 March 2024, c1394; HC Deb, 12 March 2024, c139
184
Hamas criticises new Palestinian appointment, BBC Monitoring, 19 March 2024
185
Palestinian President names interim successor […], Reuters, 28 November 2024
186
Gaza war drives Palestinian budget deficit up by 172%, Reuters, 23 July 2024. See also World Bank,
New update on the Palestinian economy, 23 May 2024
187
Smotrich holding NIS 170 million in PA tax revenue […], Times of Israel, 10 May 2024
188
Smotrich signs off partial transfer of tax revenues […], Times of Israel, 8 August 2024; Washington
Institute, West Bank economies are key to stabilising Palestinian Authority […], 31 May 2024
189
FCDO, Israeli settlements in the West Bank: G7 statements, 11 July 2024
190
Israel transfer $116 million of withheld tax revenue to Palestinians, Reuters, 3 July 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Territories. 191 In November, the Israeli cabinet extended the agreements for
one month. 192 The UK and US called on Israel to extend them for a year. 193

Role of Arab states in post-conflict Gaza

The Israeli Government has suggested that Arab states such as Saudi Arabia
and the UAE should fund Gaza’s reconstruction after the conflict. The UAE and
Qatar have said they will not fund reconstruction without Israeli action on a
two-state solution. 194 Arab states have similarly said committing troops to an
international peace keeping force in Gaza, if such a force was established,
would first require steps to be taken towards Palestinian statehood.195

Separately, the UAE has reportedly signalled that it is willing to form part of a
multinational coalition to maintain security in Gaza after the conflict if invited
to do so by a reformed Palestinian Authority and there is a path to Palestinian
statehood. No formal statements or agreements have been made.196

Further resources and reading

• Foreign Affairs, Axis of resilience: Israel is underestimating Iran and it
allies, 13 November 2024
• International Crisis Group, In Gaza, the time of greatest peril, 18 October
2024
• Chatham House, Sinwar’s death does make Hamas-Fatah reconciliation
more likely, whoever his successor may be, 23 October 2024
• International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Israel-Hamas war one
year on, 7 October 2024
• US Institute for Peace, A year after October 7, 10 October 2024
• Italian Institute for International Political Studies , October 7: a year that
changed the Middle East, 7 October 2024

191
FCDO, E3 foreign ministries call for urgent renewal of Israeli-Palestinian respondent banking
services, 30 October 2024; Israeli-Palestinian correspondent banking services, 28 November 2024
192
Smotrich extends deal reviving Israel-PA bank ties, only for one month, Times of Israel, 31 October
2024
193
Hamish Falconer MP on Twitter/X, “Israel’s decision to extend vital banking […]”, 1 November 2024;
US DoS, US Government’s response to Israel’s cabinet decision, 31 October 2024
194
Netanyahu said to tell MKs that Saudis, UAE will foot bill of Gaza reconstruction, Times of Israel, 11
December 2023; Gulf states press for two-state solution roadmap after UN vote on Israel-Gaza war,
The Guardian, 13 December 2023
195
Arab states reticent as US pushes postwar plan for Gaza, Washington Post, 30 April 2024; Arab
nations warm to Gaza peacekeeping force, Financial Times, 7 May 2024; Egypt, UAE prepared to
participate in postwar Gaza security force […], Times of Israel, 27 June 2024
196
UAE willing to join multinational force for Gaza, FT, 18 July 2024; US, Israel and UAE held a secret
meeting on Gaza war “day after” plan, Axios, 23 July 2024; UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah
bin Zayed denounces statements by Israel Prime Minister, 11 May 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

• Middle East Institute, A year of shocks since Oct.7, 7 October 2024

• Ehud Olmert and Nassar al-Kidwar [former Israeli Prime Minister and
Palestinian Authority Foreign Minister], Israelis and Palestinians alike
need hope—and a plan, Financial times, 4 October 2024
• Chatham House, Palestinians must given the space to reorganise their
political agency, 3 October 2024
• US Institute for Peace, Wither ceasefire talks after Hamas kills six Israeli
hostages?, 4 September 2024
• International Crisis Group, Stemming Israeli settler violence at its root, 6
September 2024
• Jonathan Lincoln in Foreign Affairs, How to keep the peace in [post
conflict] Gaza, 4 September 2024
• Washington Institute, Prioritising the West Bank amid escalation and
deterioration, 30 August 2024
• Chatham House, The real schism in the Israel-Hamas ceasefire talks is
about who decides Gaza’s future, 23 August 2024

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

2 UK Government and opposition

statements

Further reading on UK Government position

For information on UK aid to Gaza and the role and position of the UN Relief
and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA), see the Commons
Library’s Gaza Strip and West Bank: UK aid and UNRWA.
For information on the statements of the UK Government and opposition
parties before 5 July 2024 (under the Conservative government), see the
Commons Library briefing, Israel-Hamas conflict: UK actions and response,
October 2023 to July 2024. A full list of parliamentary and government
statements in this period is provided in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian
Territories: A parliamentary reading list, 2020-July 2024, 25 July 2024.

Other resources and commentary on UK policy

• The Commons Foreign Affairs Committee has an ongoing inquiry into the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
• The Conversation/Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), UK suspends 30
arms export licences to Israel—but it won’t change much in the war in
Gaza, 3 September 2024
• RUSI, Foreign Secretary Lammy’s “balanced position” on Israel-Palestine,
19 July 2024
• Chatham House, The next UK government should make conflict resolution
the centrepiece of its Middle East and North Africa policy, 7 June 2024

2.1 Government priorities and ceasefire demand

Support for Israel’s self-defence

Speaking in the Commons in October 2023, shortly after the 7 October 2023
Hamas assault, the then Leader of the Opposition, Keir Starmer, spoke in
“condemnation of terror [and] in support of Israel”. He said Israel had the

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

right to recover those taken hostage by Hamas and to defend itself, in

accordance with international humanitarian law.197

Mr Starmer also said that there could be “no safety” for Israel while Hamas
has the capability to carry out attacks in Israel. 198

Three priorities and backing for ceasefire

In a statement to the Commons on 19 July 2024, after taking office, Foreign
Secretary, David Lammy, said that the government supported:

• An “immediate ceasefire” and the immediate release of hostages.

• More aid entering Gaza. Mr Lammy referenced Israel’s commitment in

April 2024 to “flood Gaza with aid”, but said “more aid must enter Gaza”.
He argued Israel “imposes impossible and unacceptable restrictions” on
aid entering Gaza and said the Rafah crossing, closed since early May
2024, should reopen to aid. The crossing remains closed.

• Ending Israeli settler violence in the West Bank and halting the expansion
of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. He said the settlement expansion
was “unacceptable”. 199

Mr Lammy said that the Biden-proposed three-stage ceasefire plan, agreed

by Israel and endorsed by the UN Security Council in June 2024, should be
agreed and implemented. The first stage of the ceasefire would include the
release of most of the hostages held by Hamas (see section 1.4 for more). 200

He has also said agreeing a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas would “help
to prevent an escalatory cycle” in Lebanon”. 201

On 7 October 2024, the Prime Minister, Keir Starmer, reiterated the

government’s calls for an “immediate ceasefire in Gaza”. 202 Following the
death of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar the same month, Keir Starmer said:

[…] we must make the most of this moment. What is needed now is a ceasefire
in Gaza. The immediate and unconditional release of all hostages. Immediate
access for humanitarian aid. And a return to the path towards the two-state
solution. 203

197
HC Deb, 16 October 2023, c25
198
HC Deb, 16 October 2023, c25
199
HC Deb, 19 July 2024, c300-302
200
HC Deb, 19 July 2024, c306
201
HC Deb, 30 July 2024, cc1201-2
202
HC Deb, 7 October 2024, c23
203
PMO, PM speech in Berlin, 18 October 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Opposition parties also back a ceasefire

The UK, then led by Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, voted in favour of the Biden
ceasefire proposal at the UN Security Council in June 2024. 204

In July 2024, then Shadow Foreign Secretary Andrew Mitchell confirmed that
the Conservative Party still supported this plan being implemented.205 The
then Liberal Democrat Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, Layla Moran, also called
for an immediate ceasefire, as did the SNP. 206

Situation in northern Gaza and aid access

In October 2024 the UK Government raised concerns about the level of aid
arriving into northern Gaza. It has also said that Palestinians displaced from
the north should be allowed to return to their homes. On 15 October 2024
International Development Minister Anneliese Dodds said:

We are gravely concerned by the situation in northern Gaza in particular. Very

little aid has entered northern Gaza since 1 October [2024]. Evacuation orders
continue to be issued across northern Gaza but civilians are struggling to move
to safety and we are worried that the IDF-designated humanitarian zone is
overcrowded and unsafe. Israel must comply with international
humanitarian law and allow unfettered aid access. The message from this
Government is clear: Israel could and must do more to ensure that aid reaches
civilians in Gaza. 207

International Development Committee Chair Sarah Champion has also asked

what the government is “doing to make sure that the retired generals’
‘surrender or starve’ strategy is not being implemented”. UK International
Minister Anneliese Dodds told her that “there has been serious engagement
at every level” with the Israeli Government. 208

The question is a reference to a plan proposed by retired IDF general, Giora

Eiland, involving the evacuation of civilians from northern Gaza and to treat
the area as a military zone where no aid supplies can enter it (see above,
section 1.1). 209 The Israeli Government has said there will be no forced
displacement in Gaza and the IDF says it has not received a plan like it. 210

At the UN Security Council in October, the UK ambassador, Dame Barbara

Woodward said:

204
FCDO, UNSC adopts resolution on proposed ceasefire and hostage deal, 10 June 2024
205
HC Deb, 18 July 2024, c221
206
HC Deb, 18 July 2024, c227 and HC Deb, 21 February 2024, c724
207
HC Deb, 15 October 2024, c700
208
HC Deb, 15 October 2024, c704
209
Netanyahu tells lawmakers considering “Generals” plan to lay siege to northern Gaza, Times of
Israel, 22 September 2024. See also Knesset, Maj. Gen. (res.) Eiland: “It can change the reality”, 18
September 2024 (site currently down for maintenance)
210
Netanyahu mulls plan to empty northern Gaza of civilians […], AP, 14 October 2024; Israeli siege
plans for Gaza under scrutiny […], Washington Post, 16 October 2024; Israel vows not to forcibly
displaced Palestinians from northern Gaza, Axios, 20 November 2024

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Northern Gaza must not be cut off from the south. Palestinian civilians,
including those evacuated from northern Gaza, must be allowed to return to
their homes […] there must be no forcible transfer of Gazans from or within
Gaza, nor any reduction in the territory of the Gaza Strip […] 211

2.2 UK arms sales to Israel

Information on UK policy on arms sales

The Commons Library research briefing, UK arms exports to Israel sets out UK
arms policy on arms sales towards Israel, the arms export criteria, and the
September 2024 decision by the UK Government to suspend some sales.

The value of UK arms sales

In May 2024, the then Minister for Industry and Economic Security, Alan Mak,
told the Commons Business and Trade Committee that in 2022 the UK granted
licences for defence exports worth £42 million to Israel. This was 0.15% of the
UK’s total export licenses in 2022 and less than 1% of Israel’s defence imports.
He said the figures remained similar in the 12 months to June 2023
(£41 million) and that this was the “ballpark [yearly] average” since 2008. 212

UK arms licencing criteria

All arms exports are assessed against the UK’s strategic export licensing
criteria. 213 There are eight criteria, detailed in sections 2 to 10 of the Commons
Library research briefing, UK amends its criteria for arms exports. These
include respecting human rights, determining if the provision of arms would
undermine peace and security, and whether provision would undermine UK
national security or that of allied countries.

Data released in June 2024 covering licences between 7 October 2023 and
31 May 2024 states that 108 licences were issued for exports to Israel in this
period. A total of 345 licences to sell arms to Israel exist (including those
issued before 7 October 2023). No licences were rejected or revoked in this
period.214

211
FCDO, North Gaza must not be cut off from the south, 16 October 2024
212
Business and Trade Committee, Oral evidence: UK arms exports to Israel, HC 690, 21 May 2024, Q46
213
PQ 1408 [Arms trade: Israel], 26 July 2024
214
Department for Business and Trade, Export control licencing data: 31 May 2024, 11 June 2024

39 Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 November 2024

Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Government review and actions, September 2024

On 2 September 2024, Mr Lammy told the House of Commons that following a
review he had concluded that:

for certain UK arms exports to Israel, there exists a clear risk that they might
be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international
humanitarian law.

Mr Lammy also said that it had not been possible to make a “determinative
conclusion” on allegations regarding Israel’s conduct of hostilities:

in part because there is insufficient information either from Israel or other

reliable sources to verify such claims. Nevertheless, it is the assessment of His
Majesty’s Government that Israel could reasonably do more to ensure that
lifesaving food and medical supplies reach civilians in Gaza […]

The Foreign Secretary also said that there “can be no doubt” that Hamas
does not adhere to international law and embeds itself in the civilian
population and infrastructure in Gaza. Mr Lammy said that the UK continues
to support Israel’s right to self-defence, in line with international law, and
that the “point of the [arms licencing] process” is “in no way to punish Israel,
but to make sure that our export licensing regime remains among the most
robust in the world”.

He said the UK’s action was not a “blanket ban or an arms embargo” because
Israel must have the right to defend itself against Hezbollah, the Houthis and
Hamas. He said that the action “will not have a material impact on Israel’s
security” or affect the F-35 strike fighter programme that supplies aircraft to
more than 20 countries (except where components go directly to Israel, which
are included in the restrictions). 215

The Israeli Government criticised the announcement on the suspension of 30

arms licences. Mr Netanyahu said it was “shameful” and the Foreign Minister,
Israel Katz, said Israel “operates in accordance with international law […]
and expect[s] ally nations like Britain to recognise that”. 216

The United States said it would not comment on the UK decision but would
continue to support Israel’s defensive capabilities. The US State Department
said that “there’s been no determination by the United States that they
[Israel] have violated international humanitarian law”. 217

215
HC Deb, 2 September 2024, cc37-40, 45, 48, 144; PQ 3745 [F-35 aircraft], 5 September 2024
216
UK suspends 30 of 350 arms export licenses to Israel, Times of Israel, 2 September 2024; Netanyahu
condemns UK suspension of some arms exports to Israel, ITV News, 3 September 2024
217
White House, On the record press gaggle by […], John Kirby, 3 September 2024

40 Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 November 2024

 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

2.3 Post-conflict Gaza and the two-state solution

Government statements on post-conflict Gaza

On 19 July 2024 the Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, said he had been talking
with Middle East governments on the post-conflict situation, including
“reforming and empowering” the Palestinian Authority. 218

Mr Lammy said that Hamas could not be allowed to remain in Gaza and
continue to threaten Israel’s security after the conflict. He said that the IDF
would also have to leave the territory. He said what would come next was a
“complicated picture”, but it may involve Arab states that Israel trusts to
maintain security. 219

In opposition, Mr Lammy had also said a new UK special envoy on the Middle
East should be appointed to “recharge” negotiations on a two-state solution,
as a well as a “Western and Arab-led vehicle” established to lead
reconstruction and future talks on a two-state solution. 220

The Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer, has also said that the UK
Government considers “all Israeli settlements as illegal under international
law, present a threat to peace, and threaten the physical viability of a two-
state solution”. 221

Government statements on a two-state solution

In July 2024 the Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, said that the UK
Government’s “overarching goal” is a “viable, sovereign Palestinian state
alongside a safe and secure Israel”. He said the UK would recognise a
Palestinian state “at a time we determine” to be “most conducive” to the
peace process. 222

Mr Lammy opposed suggestions that immediate recognition of a Palestinian

state “would bring about peace” and said the acceptance of the three-stage
plan proposed by President Biden was the best way to achieve this. 223

In October 2023, then Leader of the Opposition, Keir Starmer, said statehood
“is not in the gift of a neighbour [Israel]. It is the inalienable right of the

218
HC Deb, 19 July 2024, c300
219
HC Deb, 19 July 2024, c304
220
David Lammy MP, Labour will work for a Palestinian state, The Guardian, 4 November 2023; David
Lammy, Labour will oppose expulsion of Palestinians […], The Guardian, 9 December 2023
221
PQ 10867 [Gaza: Israel], 31 October 2024
222
HC Deb, 19 July 2024, c301; HC Deb, 30 July 2024, c1150
223
HC Deb, 30 July 2024, c1150

41 Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 November 2024

Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Palestinian people”. 224 In October 2024, he said that the “ultimate goal” is a
two-state solution but a ceasefire and hostage release must be achieved first:

[the] ultimate goal here is well understood: it must be a two-state solution.

There is no other option that offers stability and security. We need to build a
political route towards it, so that Israel is finally safe and secure, alongside the
long-promised Palestinian state. That requires support for the Palestinian
Authority to step into the vacuum in Gaza; it requires an urgent international
effort to support reconstruction; and it requires guarantees for Israel’s
security. We will work with our allies and partners to that end, but the key to
all this remains a ceasefire in Gaza now, the unconditional release of
the hostages, and the unhindered flow of aid. 225

Mr Lammy said a vote in the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) in July against

recognising a Palestinian state was “hugely disappointing”. 226

In November 2024 the Middle East Minister Hamish Falconer also condemned
the comments of Israeli minister Bezalel Smotrich that parts of the West Bank
be annexed by Israel. Mr Falconer said “annexation only undermines the
prospects for peace, would lead to greater instability and would be illegal
under international law” and the Israeli Government must reject the
approach. 227

Conservative Party
In government, the Conservatives said the UK would recognise a Palestinian
state when it judged this to “best serve the objective of peace” and that
“bilateral recognition alone cannot end the [Israeli] occupation”. 228 In July
2024, the then Shadow Foreign Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, confirmed this
remained its position:

We should certainly recognise the state of Palestine, but it must be at the right
time, as part of an overall solution. To do so prematurely could send a signal
[to Hamas and others] that terror pays. 229

Liberal Democrats
Speaking in the Commons in July 2024, the then Liberal Democrat Foreign
Affairs spokesperson, Layla Moran, said she would introduce a bill for the
immediate recognition of a Palestinian state. She introduced similar
legislation in the previous Parliament, including in the 2022–23 and 2023–24

224
Labour Party, Keir Starmer’s speech on the international situation […] , 31 October 2023; Labour
Party, Change: 2024 manifesto (PDF), pp124-5
225
HC Deb, 7 October 2024, c25
226
HC Deb, 19 July 2024, c310
227
Hamish Falconer MP Twitter/X, “I condemn Minister Smotrich’s comments […],” 14 November 2024
228
HC Deb, 30 January 2024, c705
229
HC Deb, 18 July 2024, c222

42 Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 November 2024

 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

sessions. 230 The bill has been introduced as Palestinian Statehood

(Recognition) (No 3) Bill 2024-25. There are two similar bills in Parliament.

Layla Moran argued recognition would “send a powerful message to the

Israeli government” that the UK was “serious” about a two-state solution and
that it would also provide “hope” to Palestinians. However, she
acknowledged recognition “is not enough” and said steps would also have to
be taken against illegal Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories. 231

Scottish National Party

In November 2023, then First Minister Humza Yousaf called for the UK to
recognise a Palestinian state to “break, once and for all, the political
impasse” in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 232 In May 2024, First Minister John
Swinney said the SNP will bring forward a vote in the UK Parliament after the
July 2024 general election if the UK does not recognise a Palestinian state.233

2.4 Role of the International Criminal Court (ICC)

What is the International Criminal Court?

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an international court (PDF)
dedicated to prosecuting individuals for “the most serious crimes of
international concern”. It is a court of last resort, complementing, but not
replacing, national criminal courts. It is not part of the UN. 234

In 2015 the Palestinian Authority joined the ICC, a move opposed by the Israeli
Government. Israel has rejected ICC jurisdiction over the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, stating “that no sovereign Palestinian state exists nor does any
territory belonging to such an entity”. Israel is not a signatory to the Rome
Statute (PDF), which established and governs the court (neither is the US). 235

As set out in section 4 of the Commons Library research briefing, Israel and
the Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2023/24: UN, ICC and ICJ statements
and actions, in 2021 the ICC began an investigation into the situation in the
West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem.

The investigation’s announcement was criticised by the governments of Israel,

the United States and the UK. Then Prime Minister Boris Johnson said that

230
HC Deb, 18 July 2024, c229
231
HC Deb, 18 July 2024, c229
232
Scottish Government, Gaza and Israel: First Minister letter to UK Government, 21 November 2023
233
SNP will force vote on Palestinian statehood, John Swinney says, The National, 28 May 2024
234
Commons Library research briefing, Recent developments at the ICC, January 2021
235
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel rejects the ICC’s decision regarding the scope of its
territorial jurisdiction […], 7 February 2021; ICC, State of Palestine: Situation (Investigation)

43 Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 November 2024

Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

while the UK Government respected the court’s independence, it did “not

accept that the ICC has jurisdiction in this instance, given that Israel is not a
party to the Statute of Rome and Palestine is not a sovereign state”. 236

The ICC investigation continues and in November 2023, the Chief Prosecutor of
the ICC, Karim Khan, said his office has “jurisdiction over current events in
Gaza and in the West Bank”. 237

Application for warrants, May 2024

In May 2024, the prosecutor of the ICC, Karim Khan, announced he would
apply to the court’s judges to issue warrants for the arrest of three Hamas
and two Israeli leaders. 238 Two of the three Hamas leaders that the ICC
prosecutor has requested warrants for have been killed. The third,
Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri, was reported killed by Israel in Gaza in
July but this is unconfirmed.

The two Israeli leaders were the Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, and the
Defence Minister Yoav Gallant. Mr Khan said he had “reasonable grounds” to
believe that they “bore criminal responsibility for several war crimes and
crimes against humanity” in the 2023/24 conflict.

The full ICC press release details allegations against the specific individuals.
No decision on the application has been made.

On 10 June 2024, the UK, then led by Prime Minister Sunak, applied to the ICC
to file an observation on whether the court can exercise jurisdiction over
Israeli nationals in the context of the 1990s Oslo Accords.

The Oslo Accords, signed between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation
Organization, established the Palestinian Authority and governance
arrangements over the Occupied Palestinian Territories (among other
elements). The UK submission noted that in a previous ICC case, the court had
left a ruling on the interpretation of the Oslo Accords for Palestinian
jurisdiction over Israeli nationals for a later stage.

In response to the submission, the ICC said it would consider the request on
its merits, and that the UK had a deadline of 26 July 2024 to submit written
observations. 239 However, under the Labour government, the UK did not
submit any information to the court by the 26 July deadline.

On 29 July 2024 the UK Government confirmed it would not submit any

observations to the court, “in line with its position that this is a matter for the

236
Boris Johnson condemns ICC Palestine investigation as an “attack on Israel”, The Independent, 14
April 2021
237
Karim Khan in the Guardian, We are witnessing a pandemic of inhumanity: To halt the spread, we
must cling to the law, 10 November 2023
238
This section from ICC, Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan [...], 20 May 2024
239
ICC allows the UK to submit arguments on jurisdiction over Israel, Reuters, 27 June 2024; ICC,
Situation in the state of Palestine, pre-trial chamber I, No. ICC-01/18 (PDF), 27 June 2024

44 Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 November 2024

Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Court to decide on”. 240 Mr Lammy said the UK’s decision on the ICC did not
represent “an abandonment of our close ties and relationship with Israel”. 241

Decision to issue warrants, November 2024

In November 2024 the ICC pre-trial chamber said it would issue warrants for
Benjamin Netanyahu, Yoav Gallant and Hamas leader Mohammed Diab
Ibrahim Al-Masri. 242 The separate ICC press releases for the Israeli and
Hamas leaders provide more information on the grounds for the decision.

Politicians from across the Israeli political spectrum criticised the decision to
issue warrants. The country’s Attorney General says they will challenge it. 243

For further information and the Israeli, Palestinian, American and European
response, see the Commons Library research briefing, Israel and the
Occupied Palestinian Territories in 2023/24: UN, ICC and ICJ statements and
actions.

Response in the UK to the warrant application

UK drone flights over Gaza

The UK has been conducting unarmed RAF surveillance flights over Gaza since
December 2023. 244 The UK Government says their “mandate is narrowly
defined to focus on securing the release of hostages only” and “only
information relating to hostage rescue will be passed to the relevant
authorities”. 245
The Ministry of Defence says it “would consider any formal request from the
International Criminal Court to provide information relating to investigations
into war crimes”. The court has not made such a request to date. 246

UK Government
In May 2024, Mr Lammy, as Shadow Foreign Secretary, said Labour’s position
was that warrant decisions are matters for the ICC and that the UK, as an ICC
member, has a legal obligation to implement them (if issued):

240
Israel disappointed with new UK Government’s position on ICC arrest warrants, official says,
Haaretz, 26 July 2024; PQ 811 [Gaza: Israel], 29 July 2024
241
HC Deb, 31 July 2024, c1166
242
ICC, […] ICC pre-trial chamber I rejects state of Israel’s challenges to jurisdiction […], 21 November
2024; ICC, […] ICC pre-trial chamber I issues warrants for arrest of Mohammed Diab Ibrahim Al-
Masri, 21 November 2024
243
Arrest warrants issued […], BBC News, 21 November 2024
244
HCWS90 [Update on the situation in Israel and Gaza], 5 December 2023
245
PQ 11899 [Gaza: air force], 4 November 2024
246
UK willing to hand over Gaza intelligence to war crimes court, BBC News, 25 October 2024

45 Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 November 2024

Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Labour’s position is that the ICC chief prosecutor’s decision to apply for arrest
warrants is an independent matter for the Court and the prosecutor. […]

Labour believes that the ICC’s independence must be upheld and respected,
and that it is right that the conduct of all parties is addressed by the Court [..]

Labour believes the UK and all parties to the Rome statute have a legal
obligation to comply with orders and warrants issued by the ICC. Democracies
that believe in the rule of law must submit themselves to it. […]. 247

In response to an urgent question in the Commons following the warrant

decision, on 25 November 2024 the Middle East Minister, Hamish Falconer
said the UK would adhere to its international obligations as an ICC member:

We will comply with our international obligations. There is a domestic legal

process through our independent courts that determines whether to endorse
an arrest warrant by the ICC in accordance with the International Criminal
Court Act 2001. That process has never been tested, because the UK has never
been visited by an ICC indictee. If there were such a visit to the UK, there would
be a court process, and due process would be followed in relation to those
issues.

There is no moral equivalence between Israel, a democracy, and Hamas and

Lebanese Hezbollah, two terrorist organisations. This Government have been
clear that Israel has a right to defend itself in accordance with international
law. That right is not under question […] 248

The UK’s relationship with the ICC is governed through the Rome Statute,
which established the court, and The International Criminal Court Act 2001.
Under the act, an ICC warrant seeking an arrest must be transmitted to an
“appropriate judicial officer” to first be endorsed before the UK would detain
an individual and bring them before a competent court. The act also includes
provisions for diplomatic or state immunity, in specific circumstances. To
date, the act has not been used. 249

In November 2024 the Shadow Foreign Secretary Dame Priti Patel expressed
“serious concerns over process, jurisdiction and the position on the
complementarity principle”. She asked the Middle East Minister three
questions:

1. whether the court has jurisdiction, as Israel is not a party to the Rome
statute and Palestine is not a recognised state

2. if there were any process errors in the ICC investigation

3. whether Benjamin Netanyahu, as Israeli Prime Minister, has diplomatic

immunity. 250

247
HC Deb, 20 May 2024, c657
248
HC Deb, 25 November 2024, c513
249
International Criminal Court Act 2001, section 2 and 23. See also the bill’s explanatory notes.
250
HC Deb, 25 November 2024, c514

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

The minister replied that the “issues on jurisdiction and complementarity

were heard by the pre-trial chamber”. 251

In response to questions on whether the UK Government would uphold the ICC

arrest warrants, the minister said:

What I have said […] is not that the government will uphold arrest warrants.
What I have been clear about […] is that due process will be followed. These
are questions for independent courts in the UK, and it is independent courts
that would review the arrest warrants if that situation were to arise. 252

Position of other political parties in the UK

Following the ICC decision to issue warrants in November 2024, the Shadow
Foreign Secretary, Dame Priti Patel, and Shadow Justice Secretary, Robert
Jenrick, said the court’s decision was “motivated by politics and not the law”
and it “has no proper basis in international law”. 253

The Shadow Foreign Secretary reiterated the position of the former

Conservative government that the ICC does not have jurisdiction, arguing
“Israel is not a signatory to the Rome statute, and […] Palestine is not
recognised as a state”. She called on the government to challenge the ICC
decision. 254

Liberal Democrat Foreign Affairs spokesperson Calum Miller said the Labour
government should “comp[ly] with our obligations under international law by
committing to upholding this ruling, including enforcing arrest warrants”. 255
The SNP have also called for the UK to enforce the warrants. 256

2.5 Role of the International Court of Justice (ICJ)

What is the ICJ, and what has it ordered?

The ICJ is the UN’s highest court.

In December 2023, South Africa began proceedings against Israel at the ICJ,
alleging Israel is breaching its obligations under the Genocide Convention. 257
The full case will likely last several years.

In 2024, the ICJ has issued three sets of provisional measures on Israel’s
actions in Gaza, in January, March and May. These are summarised in section
3 of the Commons Library research briefing, Israel and the Occupied

251
HC Deb, 25 November 2024, c514
252
HC Deb, 25 November 2024, c517
253
Tories urge PM to reject Netanyahu arrest warrant [...], Evening Standard, 24 November 2024
254
Priti Patel MP Twitter/X, The decision by the ICC to issue warrants […], 21 November 2024
255
Liberal Democrats, ICC arrest warrants for Hamas and Netanyahu […], 22 November 2024
256
Stephen Flynn MP Twitter/X, The Labour party will apologize […], 21 November 2024
257
ICJ, Case overview 192

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Palestinian Territories in 2023/24: UN, ICC and ICJ statements and actions.
These included, in its January measures, increasing humanitarian aid to Gaza
and Israel taking “all measures” to prevent the “commission of genocidal
acts”. 258

Israel argues the case is a “distort[ion]” of the Convention. South Africa and
the Palestinian Authority argue Israeli military operations must end. 259

Response of Conservative government, to July 2024

In February 2024, the UK Government argued South Africa’s case, brought
under the 1948 Genocide Convention, was “provocative” and “not helpful in
the goal of achieving a sustainable ceasefire”. It said Israel’s actions in Gaza
“cannot be described as genocide”.260

While disagreeing with the action, in February the government said it

“respect[s] the role and independence of the ICJ” and its “ruling is binding”. 261

Speaking in the Commons in January 2024, the then Deputy Foreign

Secretary, Andrew Mitchell said some of the court’s provisional measures
were steps the government had already raised in the conflict, such as
increasing aid to Gaza, the immediate release of hostages, and for all parties
to be bound by international humanitarian law. 262

At the UN, the government also reiterated its position that it is “for courts, not
governments, to determine genocide”. 263

Response of Labour government, from July 2024

As Shadow Foreign Secretary, in January 2024, David Lammy said that Israel
“must now comply with the orders in [the] ruling in full” and that the orders
“align closely” with the party’s previous calls for a humanitarian truce and
sustainable ceasefire. 264

Position of Liberal Democrats and SNP

In July 2024 then Liberal Democrat Spokesperson for Foreign Affairs, Layla
Moran, argued that the UK should give its “full throated support” to the ICJ
(as well as the ICC), in their investigations and judgement. 265

258
ICJ, Case 192, South Africa v Israel, 26 January 2024 Order (provisional measures), paras 79, 80,
259
UN, Humanitarian response in Gaza ‘completely dependent’ on Palestinian refugee agency, 31
January 2024
260
FCDO, ICJ interim ruling on South Africa vs Israel, 27 January 2024
261
PQ 14354 [Gaza: Israel], 21 February 2024
262
HC Deb, 29 January 2024, c621
263
FCDO, We continue to work intensively with the UN and partners […], 31 January 2024
264
Israel must comply with ‘profoundly serious ICJ ruling [...], The Independent, 26 January 2024
265
HC Deb, 20 May 2024, cc649, 659; HC Deb, 18 July 2024, c230

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

In January 2024 the SNP’s Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, Brendan O’Hara,

called on the UK to ensure Israel complies with ICJ’s provisional measures. 266

Separate ICJ advisory opinion, July 2024

The case brought by South Africa is separate to an advisory (non-binding)
opinion issued in July 2024 by the ICJ, which followed a referral by the UN
General Assembly in 2022. This found that “Israel’s continued presence in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory is unlawful” and its presence should be
brought to an end “as rapidly as possible” (among other conclusions). 267

UK Minister for the Middle East, Hamish Falconer, said in November 2024 that
the UK Government “does not disagree with the central findings of the ICJ’s
Advisory Opinion”. He said Israel should bring its presence in the OPTs to an
end “as rapidly as possible” but “we are clear that every effort must be made
to create the conditions for negotiations towards a two-state solution”. 268

2.6 Israeli settler violence and sanctions

From December 2023 to May 2024, the UK introduced visa restrictions against
some Israelis linked to settler violence in the West Bank (see section 3.4).

Speaking for the Conservatives in July 2024, Shadow Minister Alicia Kearns
asked whether more sanctions would be forthcoming. 269 Foreign Secretary
David Lammy did not commit to further sanctions but said:

[Israeli] Settlement expansion and settler violence have reached record levels.
The Israeli Government have seized more of the West Bank in 2024 than in the
past 20 years. That is completely unacceptable. This government will in
challenge those who undermine a two-state solution. 270

On 30 July 2024, International Development Minister, Anneliese Dodds, said

the government is “keeping all sanctions under review”. 271

Liberal Democrat Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, Layla Moran, and her

successor, Callum Miller, have called for a ban on trade with illegal
settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 272

In its guidance on overseas business risk for Israel, the FCDO and Department
for Business and Trade states the government considers Israeli settlements in
the West Bank to be illegal, that it does not encourage or support trade with

266
SNP urges Cameron to be on ‘right side of history’, ITV News, 28 January 2024
267
UN, Israel’s continued occupation of Palestinian Territory “unlawful”: UN world court, 19 July 2024
268
PQ 10451 [Israel: Occupied Territories], 4 November 2024
269
HC Deb, 19 July 2024, c303
270
HC Deb, 19 July 2024, c300
271
HC Deb, 30 July 2024, c1154
272
HC Deb, 18 July 2024, c229; HC Deb, 28 October 2024, c549

49 Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 November 2024

 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Israeli settlements in the OPTs, that goods imported from them must be
labelled, and that goods from them are not entitled to any preferential
tariff. 273

Debate on sanctioning two Israeli ministers

In October 2024, former Foreign Secretary Lord Cameron said he had been
“working up” plans to sanction Israeli Minister of National Security
Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich when he was in office.
He said the two ministers had “said things like encouraging people to stop aid
convoys going into Gaza, [and] they have encouraged extreme settlers in the
West Bank with the appalling things they have been carrying out”.

Lord Cameron called on the UK Government to introduce these sanctions. 274

Liberal Democrat Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, Layla Moran, has also argued
the UK Government should sanction these two ministers and the “connected
entities that provide support or enable those extremist individuals”. 275

In response to a question from Liberal Democrat Leader Sir Ed Davey on 16

October 2024, Prime Minister Keir Starmer said the government was “looking
at” sanctioning the two Ministers. 276

On 22 October 2024 Minister for the Middle East, Hamish Falconer said the
government kept its sanctions policy under review:

The UK government condemns the unacceptable language that has been used
by Israeli ministers Smotrich and Ben-Gvir. Israel should condemn this
language and clamp down on the actions of those who seek to inflame
tensions. The UK government does not speculate about possible future
sanctions designations, as to do so could reduce their impact. 277

Ministers Ben-Gvir and Smotrich have said any sanctions would not lead to a
change in their positions or statements. 278

2.7 Reports of sexual violence and mistreatment

Reports and statements, October 2023 to July 2024

In March 2024, the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict
said that there are “reasonable grounds to believe that conflict-related
sexual violence occurred at several locations […] during the 7 October 2023

273
FCDO and others, Overseas business risk: The Occupied Palestinian Territories, 24 February 2022.
274
I had plans to sanction Israeli ministers- Cameron, BBC News, 15 October 2024
275
HC Deb, 18 July 2024, c229
276
HC Deb, 16 October 2024, c828
277
PQ 9469 [Israel: sanctions], 22 October 2024
278
UK PM Starmer: Sanctions are being considered [...], Jerusalem Post, 16 October 2024

50 Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 November 2024

Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

attacks [by Hamas]” and that there is “clear and convincing evidence” that
some of the hostages taken to Gaza have also been subject to conflict-related
sexual violence. 279

Hamas denies the reports of sexual violence. 280

On 15 December 2023 the then UK Minister for the Middle East, Lord Ahmad,
expressed “serious concern” about sexual violence perpetrated against
hostages and called for a full investigation. 281

The UN Security Council held a session on sexual violence in conflict in Israel

and the Occupied Palestinian Territories in March 2024, following the mission
report by the UN Secretary General’s special representative on conflict
related sexual violence, Pramila Patten. 282 In the session, Lord Ahmad again
expressed deep concern about reports of sexual violence used in the 7th
October attack and against hostages:

I refer to the report [cited above] and note with deep concern the findings of
SRSG [UN Special Representative of the Secretary General] Patten, including
“reasonable grounds” to believe that sexual violence occurred in Israel on 7
October and the existence of, and I quote, “clear and convincing” information
that sexual violence has been committed against hostages.

Mr President, it is deeply disturbing to know that “such violence may be

ongoing against those still in captivity” a direct quote from the report. We
continue to call [for] an immediate, safe and unconditional release of all
hostages.

And to work through every channel to secure an immediate stop in the fighting,
then progress towards a sustainable ceasefire […]

He went on to say he was shocked by reports of sexual violence perpetrated

by Israeli forces against Palestinian detainees:

I am also deeply shocked by the very concerning reports, referenced in the

SRSG report and also by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
of sexual violence perpetrated by Israeli forces against Palestinian detainees
of which we’ve just heard [from others in the session], who have been arrested
and held by Israel.

These reports, as we’ve heard, are being investigated. I therefore call on Israel
to take immediate measures to prevent conflict-related sexual violence, to
abide by international humanitarian law, and to ensure thorough
investigations into these reports, and ultimately for perpetrators to be held to
account.

279
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on sexual violence in conflict, Official
visit of the Office [….] to Israel and the Occupied West Bank (PDF), 4 March 2024, p21-22. Warning:
these and other references in this section covers themes related to sexual violence, which readers
may find distressing.
280
Hamas ‘rejects occupation’s lies on rape cases’ […], BBC Monitoring, 4 December 2023
281
FCDO, Reports of sexual violence perpetrated by Hamas, 15 December 2023
282
UN, Civilians in Israel and Palestine “cannot be abandoned” […], 11 March 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Mr President let me be absolutely clear – we the United Kingdom condemn

conflict-related sexual violence unequivocally, wherever it occurs, and stand in
solidarity with all victims and survivors. 283

In the same session, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Israel Katz, said “I am calling
on the Security Council to put as much pressure as possible on the Hamas
organization to release immediately and unconditionally all kidnapped
hostages”. The Palestinian Authority representative, Riyad Mansour , said UN
bodies should be supported to “carry out full-fledged investigations into all
alleged violations” against Palestinians.284

Reports and statements, July 2024 to November 2024

In September 2024 the UN’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in
Conflict, Pramila Patten, made a further statement on the situation in Israel
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This was in response to reports
issued by the UN, including the UN Office of Human Rights. 285

The special representative said that the reports described “a dramatic

deterioration in conditions of detention for Palestinian men, women and
children under Israeli custody” since 7 October 2023. Acknowledging “some
steps” to investigate the allegations by Israeli authorities, she called for the
“effective investigations into all alleged violations”. She also expressed
concern for Israeli hostages held in Gaza and called for their immediate and
unconditional release.286

The IDF says that the abuse of detainees contravenes the law, and that
criminal investigations, where necessary, are launched in response to
allegations. 287

In November 2024 the Minister for the Middle East, Hamish Falconer, said the
UK “unequivocally condemns all alleged violations and abuses, including
sexual violence, and calls for all reports to be fully investigated to ensure
justice for victims and survivors” in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian
Territories. 288 In August 2024 the UK told the UN Security Council that:

The UK is […] horrified by the reports of sexual violence and abuse faced by the
hostages in Gaza and Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli detention, many of
whom are children. Hamas must release all the hostages immediately. Hamas
must also stop endangering civilians. And Israel must grant the ICRC
[International Committee of the Red Cross] access to prisoners immediately

283
FCDO, The UK is deeply concerned by Special Representative Patten’s findings […], 11 March 2024
284
UN, S/PV.9572, 11 March 2024, p22
285
For example, UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human rights, Detention in the context of
escalation of hostilities in Gaza, 31 July 2024
286
UN, UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict […] expresses serious concerns […], 9
September 2024
287
IDF court extends arrest of 8 soldiers […], Times of Israel, 31 July 2024; UN report says Palestinian
detainees in Israel subjected to torture, mistreatment, Times of Israel, 31 July 2024
288
PQ 11113 [Palestinians: gender based violence], 31 October 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

and ensure accountability if anyone is found to be responsible for the abuse of

detainees. 289

Israel has not allowed the ICRC to visit Palestinians held in military and prison
service custody since 7 October 2023. In August 2024 the Israeli High Court
ordered the Israeli Government to state its reasons for the ban. The
government says it is planning a new mechanism to allow for visits. 290

The ICRC has also been unable to visit the hostages held by Hamas in Gaza. 291

The Middle East Minister has called upon Israel to ensure regular access of
the International Committee of the Red Cross to Palestinian detainees:

We believe it is critical that the International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC) is given regular access to detainees to carry out its independent visiting
role, as enshrined within the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Currently, the ICRC
cannot fully investigate these reports, as Israel continues to deny it access to
places of detention. The UK calls on all parties to the conflict to comply with
international law and grant immediate and unfettered access for the ICRC. 292

He has also said Hamas is “behaving abominably and outwith any

international norm” in holding the hostages. He said the UK was calling for
the ICRC and other appropriate organisations to be allowed to access
them. 293

The minister has also said that “the treatment of [Palestinian] detainees was
a factor taken into account in our decision on arms export licences, as set out
in the summary of the international humanitarian law (IHL) process, decision
and the factors taken into account” (see section 2.2 for UK arms exports). 294

The UK Government established the Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict

Initiative (PSVI) in 2012. The initiative aims to strengthen the global response
to conflict-related sexual violence and enhance support for survivors and
holding perpetrators to account.

In November 2024 the Labour government appointed the Minister for Africa,
Lord Collins, the UK Special Representative on PSVI. Lord Ahmad was the
previous post-holder. 295 The government says a PSVI team will support a
gender-responsive and survivor-response to reports of sexual violence in
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 296

289
FCDO, Palestinians have nowhere safe to turn: UK statement, 13 August 2024
290
High court orders gov’t to justify ban on Red Cross visits […], Times of Israel, 27 August 2024; Israel
wants US involvement in new body to replace Red Cross in visits […], Haaretz, 27 November 2024
291
British Red Cross, What is the Red Cross doing to help hostages taken from Israel?, 2 October 2024
292
PQ 11113 [Palestinians: gender based violence], 31 October 2024
293
HC Deb, 26 November 2024, c623
294
PQ 4458 [Israel: Palestinians], 12 September 2024
295
FCDO, Lord Collins appointed Special Representative on PSVI, 15 November 2024
296
PQ 10864 [Israel: Palestinians], 5 November 2024

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

2.8 Terrorist threat to the UK

In October 2024 the former chief of MI6, Sir John Sawers (in role 2009 to 2014)
warned that conflict in the Middle East and new leaders for Hezbollah and
Hamas (following the killing of previous leaders by Israel) may raise the risk
of Islamist terrorism in the UK:

[Islamist] terrorism may actually get a further boost, if that's the right word,
from events in the Middle East.

The frustrations that we'll be seeing because of the lack of movement on the
Palestinian question, because of the violence people are witnessing every day.

And it could be that Hezbollah and Hamas, the new leaderships there are
focused so much on violence that they've become not just terrorist
organisations designated by Western countries and aimed against Israel, but
they could revert back to international terrorism, including here in the UK. 297

Both Hamas and Hezbollah are proscribed terrorist groups in the UK. 298

In October 2024 the Director General of MI5, Ken McCallum, in his annual
threat update, also said that conflict in the Middle East risked “short-run
mobilisation to attacks [and] slower-burn radicalisation”. 299

The House of Lords debated the threat of Hezbollah to the UK in November

2024. The Home Office Minister, Lord Hanson, told the House that since
October 2023 “there has been a 15% increase in intelligence submissions [on
potential links to terrorist groups or actions] following the 7 October [2023]
attacks” compared with the previous year, and around 3,000 public referrals
had been referred to the counter terrorism referral unit by June 2024. 300

The minister also set out the government’s view on the effectiveness of
proscribing organisations as terrorist organisations:

It makes its assets subject to seizure as terrorist property, and it makes it an

offence to wear clothing or carry articles in a public way to arouse reasonable
suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of Hezbollah. Those
linked to Hezbollah may be excluded from the UK using immigration powers.
[…] those are severe and strong penalties, and it is the job of the law
enforcement agencies to make and continue that assessment.

The minister also said that that the police and security services were also
working to address individuals supporting terrorist organisations online. 301

297
Ex-MI6 boss warns UK may face more Islamist extremism due to Middle East, Sky News, 20 October
2024
298
Commons Library, Proscribed terrorist organisations
299
MI5, Director General Ken McCallum gives threat update, 8 October 2024
300
HL Deb, 5 November 2024, c1467
301
HL Deb, 5 November 2024, c1468

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

3 UK Government actions

UK military action against the Houthis and Iran

From January to June 2024, UK forces have conducted five strikes against the
Houthis in Yemen in response to their attacks on ships in the Red Sea. In April
2024, the RAF shot down drones and missiles launched by Iran against Israel.
For more on UK military action and sanctions, see the Commons Library
research briefings Houthis in the Red Sea 2024, Israel-Iran April 2024 and
Israel-Iran October 2024. The briefing UK forces in the Middle East provides
background on the UK presence and ongoing operations in the region.

3.1 UK diplomatic activity

As set out in the Commons Library briefing Israel and the Occupied
Palestinian Territories: A parliamentary reading list, 2020-July 2024, from 7
October 2023 the UK Government has engaged with leaders in the Middle East
to seek de-escalation, the release of hostages and an end to the conflict, and
an increase in humanitarian aid.

Activity since 5 July 2024

Israeli Government and the Palestinian Authority
On taking office in July 2024, Prime Minister Keir Starmer has spoken to the
Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli President, Issac
Herzog and the Palestinian Authority President, Mahmoud Abbas.

In July 2024 Mr Starmer told Mr Netanyahu that there was an “urgent and
clear need” for a ceasefire, the return of hostages and an immediate increase
in aid. He also said the conditions for a two-state solution need to be in place,
including adequate funding of the Palestinian Authority (Israel collects
revenue on its behalf: see above, section 1.6). Mr Starmer also said Israel had
the right to self-defence, in accordance with international law.302

302
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), PM call with Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel, 7 July 2024 and PM
meeting with President Herzog of Israel, 28 July 2024

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

Mr Starmer raised similar issues with Mr Abbas, and said it was important
that the Palestinian Authority undertook reforms. Mr Starmer said he
supported recognising a Palestinian state as part of the peace process and
that statehood was a “undeniable right” of Palestinians. 303

Engagement with Iran and others in the region

On 12 August 2024 Mr Starmer spoke with the new Iranian president, Masoud
Pezeshkian, in which he said all parties must de-escalate and Iran must end
its support for its allies and proxy groups in the region. 304

Mr Starmer has also spoken to the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE on regional de-escalation and security. 305

Foreign Secretary visits to the region

Since taking office, the Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, and other ministers
have visited Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Bahrain, Egypt,
Jordan, Qatar, and Lebanon to discuss the conflict. 306

3.2 Deployment of UK military forces

Since the Labour government took office on 5 July 2024, no substantial

changes have been announced in the status of UK forces. In August 2024
additional UK military personnel were deployed to the region to assist in the
possible evacuation of British nationals in the event of a wider Israel-
Hezbollah conflict. 307

The government estimates that 16,000 British nationals are in Lebanon. 308 In
the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict, around 4,500 British nationals were
evacuated from Lebanon under Operation Highbrow. 309

The list below details actions taken from 7 October 2023 to 4 July 2024.

303
PMO, PM call with President Abbas of the Palestinian Authority, 7 July 2024
304
PMO, PM call with President Pezeshkian of Iran, 12 August 2024
305
PMO, Call with King Abullah II of Jordan, 15 July 2024; Call with the Sultan of Oman, 15 July 2024;
Call with Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, 15 July 2024; Call with the UAE President, 7 July 2024;
Meeting with Emir of Qatar, 28 July 2024; Meeting with King Abullah of Jordan, 23 July 2024; PM
meeting with Prime Minister of Lebanon, 28 October 2024
306
FCDO, Regional de-escalation a priority as Foreign Secretary […], 31 July 2024; FCDO, UK pushes for
Middle East stability, 16 October 2024; FCDO, UK to push for de-escalation [...], 9 October 2024;
FCDO, Ministerial visit to Israel and the OPTs, 16 August 2024; FCDO, Development Minister calls for
peace and security […], 7 August 2024
307
FCDO, UK bolsters support to British nationals in Lebanon, 3 August 2024
308
HC Deb, 13 July 2024, c1204
309
Cabinet Office, GOSE Op Highbrow lessons learnt, undated

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

On 13 October 2023, the UK Government announced it would deploy some UK

military assets to the eastern Mediterranean to “support Israel, reinforce
regional stability and prevent escalation.” Assets deployed are: 310

• 12 maritime patrol and surveillance aircraft, to patrol against the

potential transfer of weapons to terrorist groups.

• A Royal Navy task group to deliver humanitarian aid. It includes aircraft,

helicopters, royal marines, and two ships (RFA Lyme Bay and RFA
Angus).

• An additional destroyer, HMS Diamond, to support Operation Kipion (the

UK’s existing maritime presence in the Gulf and Indian Ocean).311 HMS
Richmond and HMS Duncan have been deployed as relief. 312

• 2,500 military personnel (up 1,000 since 7 October 2023). 313 Some have
been deployed to Tel Aviv, Beirut and Jordan to protect British citizens. 314

• In 2024, the UK deployed RFA Cardigan Bay to provide accommodation

for US personnel while they constructed a pier to increase humanitarian
aid into Gaza (this closed in July 2024). 315

UK military and other aid to Israel

In December 2023, the Ministry of Defence said that, during the current
conflict, it would provide Israel with “only defensive [military] matériel, or
matériel that might help with the recovery of hostages”. 316
In response to parliamentary questions, the government said that, to 25 April
2024 (the most recent government statement), it has provided no lethal or
other military equipment to Israel. It has provided some life-saving medical
supplies, including defibrillators. 317
No government financial support has been provided to Israel during the
conflict. Israel is ineligible to receive aid from the UK’s aid budget under
internationally agreed aid rules because it is a high-income economy. 318
The government has also said it will not “confirm, deny or comment” on
foreign states’ military aircraft or operations within UK airspace or UK
overseas bases. This includes the Sovereign Bases Areas on Cyprus. 319

310
PQ 48 [Military aircraft: Mediterranean region], 12 November 2023
311
Ministry of Defence, Defence Secretary sends Royal Navy destroyer east of Suez, 30 November 2023
316
HC Deb, 5 December 2023, c219
317
PQ 5416 [Israel: Military aid], 11 December 2023; PQ 23050 [Israel: Military aid], 25 April 2024
318
OECD, Development Assistance Committee: List of Official Development Assistance recipients
319
PQ 5840 [RAF Akrotiri], 14 October 2024

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

3.3 UK humanitarian aid

The Commons Library research briefing, West Bank and Gaza Strip: UK aid
and UNRWA, provides more on UK aid to the Occupied Palestinian Territories,
the continuation of funding to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian
Refugees (UNRWA) and aid access. No UK aid is provided via Hamas.
The Charity Commission for England and Wales has published advice on
giving to charities safely to help those impacted by the conflict. The Disasters
Emergency Committee launched an appeal on 17 October 2024. The UK
Government has said it will match donations, up to a value of £10 million.

UK aid funding in 2023/24

Over £100 million in aid was provided to the Occupied Palestinian Territories
(OPTs) during 2023/24. The UK also appointed a humanitarian coordinator. 320

Aid funding in 2024/25

In July 2023, the government said it planned £29 million for the OPTs in
2024/25. It has made five announcements on spending in 2024:

• June: £15 million in aid for the Palestinian Authority, to be spent via the
World Bank. This will pay public sector salaries, support essential
services and fund anti-corruption and other reforms. 321

• July: £5.5 million, for the charity UK-Med. 322

• July: £21 million for UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in
the Near East (UNRWA). 323

• August: £6 million for UNICEF, the UN children’s fund, in Gaza. 324

• September: Together with Kuwait a joint £4.5 million for UNICEF (covering
UNICEF work in both Gaza and Yemen). 325

316
HC Deb, 5 December 2023, c219
317
PQ 5416 [Israel: Military aid], 11 December 2023; PQ 23050 [Israel: Military aid], 25 April 2024
318
OECD, Development Assistance Committee: List of Official Development Assistance recipients
319
PQ 5840 [RAF Akrotiri], 14 October 2024
320
Commons Library research briefing, UK aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip: FAQs, section 1.3
321
FCDO, UK contributes financial aid to the OPTs to increase stability, 1 June 2024
322
FCDO, Foreign Secretary calls for immediate ceasefire in Gaza […], 15 July 2024
323
See section 4 of the Commons Library research briefing, UK aid to the West Bank and Gaza Strip
324
FCDO, Development minister calls for peace and security in the Middle East, 7 August 2024
325
FCDO, UK and Kuwait agree new partnership to provide vital aid, 4 September 2024

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

The announcement of UNRWA funding followed a decision by the Foreign

Secretary, David Lammy, to resume UK funding for to the agency in July.

In January 2024 the Conservative government had paused decisions on future

UK funding to UNRWA following allegations that several of its staff were
involved in the Hamas assault of 7 October. Mr Lammy’s decision followed UN
reviews into UNRWA and commitments of the agency to carry out reforms. 326

The UK Government says it will monitor UNRWA’s neutrality and work. 327

In October 2024 David Lammy said some of the aid not entering Gaza as the
result of Israeli restrictions was from the UK:

There is no excuse for the Israeli Government’s ongoing restrictions on

humanitarian assistance; they must let more aid in now. Aid is backed up at
Gaza’s borders, in many cases funded by the UK and our partners but now
stuck out of reach of those who need it so desperately. These restrictions fly in
the face of Israel’s public commitments. They risk violating international
humanitarian law. 328

3.4 New UK sanctions and visa restrictions

Sanctions against Hamas and others

Before October 2023, the UK applied sanctions against Hamas and other Iran-
aligned groups in the Middle East, including Hezbollah and the Houthis. 329 UK
sanctions include travel bans, asset freezes and arms embargoes. New
sanctions include:

• 14 November 2023: four members of Hamas and two financers. 330

• 13 December: leaders and financers of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic

Jihad.331

• 14 December: seven people, including the Hamas representative to Iran

and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members. 332

• 22 January 2024: five individuals and one entity involved in arranging

finance for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. 333

326
Commons Library research briefing, West Bank and Gaza Strip: UK aid and UNRWA, section 4
327
PQ 868 [UNRWA], 26 July 2024
328
HC Deb, 28 October 2024, c545
329
Commons Library, Iran’s influence in the Middle East, sections 2.2, 2.3
330
FCDO, The UK sanctions list; FCDO, UK and US hit Hamas leadership with targeted sanctions, 14
November 2023
331
FCDO, UK and US target Hamas with new sanctions to isolate terror group, 13 December 2023
332
FCDO, New Iranian sanction regime comes into force, 14 December 2023
333
FCDO, UK, US and Australia sanction key figures in Hamas’ financial network, 22 January 2024

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

• 27 March 2024: two financers for a Hamas-supporting media network. 334

• 29 August 2024: a travel ban against two previously sanctioned

individuals respectively linked with Hezbollah and a media network,
“Gaza Now” (linked to terrorism promotion). 335

• 4 September 2024: Three members of the IRGC and an IRGC unit for
“destabilis[ing] the region”. 336

Proscribing Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist group

In January 2024, the Home Secretary proscribed Hizb ut-Tahrir, an armed
Islamist group based in Lebanon which operates in 32 countries and praised
the Hamas assault of 7 October, under the Terrorism Act 2002. 337

Visa restrictions against Israeli settlers

In December 2023, then Foreign Secretary, Lord Cameron, announced the UK
would ban those responsible for settler violence in the West Bank from
entering the UK. He called on Israel to “hold the preparators accountable”. 338

Three sets of sanctions have been announced:

• February 2024: travel and financial restrictions against four individuals

involved in West Bank violence. 339

• May 2024: a further four individuals were sanctioned, and two groups:
Hilltop Youth and Lehava. 340

• October 2024: three settler outposts and four organisations were

sanctioned for supporting violence against communities in the West
Bank. 341

3.5 Debate on sanctioning the IRGC

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was established as a

counterweight to Iran’s regular armed forces following the Iranian revolution

334
HM Treasury, New sanctions on persons linked to Hamas supporting media network, 27 March 2024
335
HM Treasury, Travel ban on two individuals […], 29 August 2024
336
FCDO, UK suspends around 30 arms export licences to Israel […], 2 September 2024
337
Home Office, Home Secretary declares Hizb ut-Tahrir as terrorists, 15 January 2024
338
UK Foreign Secretary announces ban on ‘extremist Israeli settlers’, BBC News, 14 December 2023
339
FCDO, UK sanctions extremist settlers in the West Bank, 12 February 2024
340
FCDO, UK sanctions extremist groups and individuals for settler violence, 3 May 2024
341
FCDO, New UK sanctions target illegal outposts and organisations […], 15 October 2024

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

of 1979 that overthrew the last Shah. In addition to personnel in Iran, it exerts
wider influence in the region by providing money, technology, and training.342

The UK sanctions the entirety of the IRGC under its nuclear sanctions,
meaning it applies asset freezes and travel bans. The Leader of the Liberal
Democrats, Sir Ed Davey, and the former Chair of the Foreign Affairs
Committee, Alicia Kearns, have called for the proscribing of the IRGC as a
terrorist group. This would create offences in the UK for being a member,
among other things. 343

In January 2023 the then Shadow Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, said
Labour would support proscribing, “either by using existing terrorism
legislation or by creating a new process of proscription for hostile state
actors”. 344

The 2024 Labour Party manifesto said that the UK “lacked a comprehensive
framework to protect” itself from the actions of hostile states and groups. It
cited examples of the Skripal poisonings in Salisbury and actions of the IRGC.
Labour said it would “take the approach used for dealing with non-state
terrorism and adapt it to deal with state-based domestic security threats”. 345

On taking office in July 2024, Mr Lammy said he “stood by” his comments in
opposition and would, over the coming months, review the context of terrorist
activity and state threats with the Home Secretary. 346 In October 2024 Keir
Starmer said the government was “working at pace” to deal with state
threats, including from the IRGC, 347 and Mr Lammy said:

the Home Secretary and I are looking far more closely at what it means to bear
down on a state [Iran] that is causing the activity [of supporting terrorism,
missile development and violence in the region], rather than a terrorist cell
that is causing it. 348

For more information on the UK debates on proscription, see section 2.4 of the
Commons Library research briefing, Iran’s influence in the Middle East.

342
Commons Library, Iran’s influence in the Middle East
343
HC Deb, 6 July 2023, c1001; HC Deb, 16 October 2023, cc28-9
344
HC Deb, 31 January 2023, c186
345
Labour Party Manifesto 2024, p15
346
HC Deb, 19 July 2024, c304
347
HC Deb, 7 October 2024, c27
348
HC Deb, 28 October 2024, c552

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 Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

3.6 How has the UK voted at the UN?

UN Security Council (UNSC)

The UK has not used its veto at the UNSC since 1989, and not on an issue
relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since the 1956 Suez Crisis. 349

In 2023 and 2024 UNSC disagreements centred on whether a resolution should

support a humanitarian “ceasefire” or “pause” and if it should condemn the
actions of Hamas on 7 October. 350 In 2023 the UK said it wanted a “balanced
text” which condemned Hamas and re-affirmed Israel’s right to self-defence,
the protection of civilians and the delivery of aid.351

Since October 2023, the UNSC has passed four resolutions on the conflict:

• UNSC Resolution 2735, 10 June 2024. The full text of the resolution can be
found on the UN Library site. It noted a proposed three-stage resolution
to the conflict and urged Israel and Hamas to accept it. The UK voted
yes. 352

• UNSC Resolution 2728, 25 March 2024. The full text of the resolution can
be found on the UN Library site. It “demands” an immediate ceasefire for
the month of Ramadan by all parties and the unconditional and
immediate release of all hostages. The UK voted yes. 353

• UNSC Resolution 2720, 22 December 2023. The full text of the resolution
can be found on the UN Library site. It “demanded” humanitarian aid to
Gaza be increased. The UK voted yes.354

• UNSC Resolution 2712, 15 November 2023. The resolution’s full text can be
found on the UN Library site. The UNSC said it called for the urgent
creation of humanitarian corridors and for the immediate and
unconditional release of all hostages. The UK abstained. 355

For more detail on these resolutions and the eight votes at the Security
Council on resolutions that did not pass, see section 2.2 and 2.3 of the
Commons Library research briefing, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian
Territories in 2023/24: UN, ICC and ICJ statements and actions. This includes
information on US, Israeli and Palestinian Authority reaction to the
resolutions.

349
UN Library, UNSC meetings and outcomes tables: Vetoes
350
See next paragraph for sources on these debates
351
UN, Deadlock deepens as Security Council rejects competing resolutions […], 25 October 2023
352
FCDO, UNSC adopts resolution on proposed ceasefire and hostage deal, 10 June 2024
353
FCDO, The UK has long called for an immediate humanitarian pause, 25 March 2024
354
FCDO, The UK supports Security Council resolution 2720 on aid to Gaza, 22 December 2023
355
FCDO, It is right the Security Council calls for a humanitarian pause in Gaza […], 15 November 2023

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Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

UN General Assembly (UNGA)

All members of the UN make up the UNGA. UNGA votes are non-binding.
There have been three votes at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on Israel
and the Occupied Palestinian Territories since October 2023.

The UK abstained in all three votes. In the two cases in October 2023, it
argued that the resolution should have condemned Hamas: 356

• 27 October 2023: UNGA voted 121 to 14 (with 44 abstentions) for an

“immediate, durable and sustained humanitarian truce leading to a
cessation of hostilities”. The resolution called for all parties to
“immediately and fully comply” with obligations under international law,
for Hamas to release its hostages and for Israel to rescind the order for
civilians to evacuate northern Gaza. 357

• 12 December 2023: UNGA backed a resolution “demanding” the release

of hostages, an immediate humanitarian ceasefire and for all parties to
comply with international humanitarian law. A total of 153 states voted in
favour, 10 voted against (including the US and Israel) and 23 abstained
(including the UK and Germany). 358

• 18 September 2024: UNGA backed a resolution by 124 to 14 (with 43

abstentions) that referred to the ICJ advisory opinion of July 2024 (see
above, 2.5) which included determinations that Israel’s continued
occupation in the OPTs as illegal (among other determinations).

– The UNGA resolution says that in accordance with the advisory

opinion the assembly demanded that Israel withdraw all its military
forces from the OPTs, cease immediately all settlement activity,
allow Palestinians displaced during the occupation to return to their
original place of residence, and comply with obligations indicated
by the ICJ measures in 2023/24 (among other measures). 359

– The UK said it had abstained because the resolution did not have
“sufficient clarity to effectively advance our shared aim” of a two-
state solution. It also said it was its “clear view” that “Israel should
bring to an end its presence in the OPTs as rapidly as possible”. 360

Section 2 of the Commons Library research briefing, Israel and the Occupied
Palestinian Territories in 2023/24: UN, ICC and ICJ statements and actions

356
FCDO, Condemning Hamas’ terrorism should not be controversial, 27 October 2023 and PQ HL1172
[Gaza: Ceasefires], 29 December 2023
357
UN, GA adopts resolution calling for “humanitarian truce”, 27 October 2023
358
UN, UNGA votes by large majority for immediate humanitarian ceasefire, 12 December 2023
359
UN, UNGA demands Israel end ‘unlawful presence’ […], 18 September 2024 and UNGA, A/ES-
10/L.31/Rev.1 (PDF), 13 September 2024
360
FCDO, The UK’s explanation of vote on the UNGA resolution on the ICJ’s Advisory opinion, 18
September 2024

63 Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 November 2024

Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: UK response to the conflict since July 2024

provides more on these debates, including statements by the Palestinian

Authority and Israeli Government.

64 Commons Library Research Briefing, 29 November 2024

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