THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

POLICY NOTES DECEMBER 2023

NO. 142

An Heir and a Spare?

How Yemen’s “Southern Hezbollah”
Could Change Iran’s Deterrent Calculus
Michael Knights

T
he Israel-Hamas war has underlined the strengths and weaknesses of Iran’s
extended deterrence system, which encompasses a coalition of militias
drawn from the populations of Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, the Palestinian
territories, Syria, and other countries.1 On the plus side for the “axis of resistance,”
all its partners have provided some level of military support for Hamas since
the October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. This has either been through direct
attacks targeting Israeli territory or, indirectly, by striking U.S. military bases—
A military truck carries
employing the rationale that the United States is supporting Israel in the conflict.
a massive Quran image
during a military parade The extended deterrence system has also seemingly responded to orders from
held to mark the above, stopping operations almost entirely during the November 24–December 1
anniversary of the Houthi ceasefire and avoiding steps that might trigger unintended escalation against
takeover of Sanaa, Iran, Syria’s Assad regime, or Lebanese Hezbollah by either Israel or the
September 21, 2023.
Reuters.
United States.
 MICHAEL KNIGHTS

Yet the limits of some axis of resistance assets This paper is intended to help U.S. policymakers and
have also been clear, in particular the Iranian and influencers understand why the Houthis would take
Lebanese reticence to gamble the future of Iran’s such risks on behalf of Hamas, the axis of resistance,
premier partner, Lebanese Hezbollah, by striking and Iran. The short answer is that the Houthis are
the Israeli interior and crossing other Israeli and neither Iranian proxies nor wartime partners of
U.S. red lines to support Hamas. On November 3, convenience. Based on evidence gathered in a multi-
Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah year research effort by The Washington Institute and
confirmed this quandary when he reacted to the West Point Combating Terrorism Center,3 a strong
Israel’s ground operation in Gaza with a fiery but case can be made that the Houthi-Iran relationship
de-escalatory speech signaling that his movement should not be viewed as one of necessity but rather
had done enough to hold one-third of Israeli forces as a deep-rooted alliance underpinned by tight
away from the Gaza battle and that now other ideological affinity and geopolitical alignment. Today,
pro-Iran militias had their chance to act in support a “southern Hezbollah” in Yemen is arguably a fact on
of Hamas.2 Both Iran and Hezbollah itself seem to the ground. Even as the United States seeks a peace
know that the Lebanese group is too valuable a accord in Yemen, the current reality suggests the
piece on the regional chessboard to sacrifice for need to develop a pragmatic U.S. policy of containing
Hamas. Taking everything into account, the and ideally diminishing Houthi military and political
extended deterrence system ultimately failed to power within Yemen. Positioned astride the world’s
prevent Israel from invading Gaza. most strategic maritime lanes, Yemen will matter
greatly to the United States (and its adversaries) in
Enter the Houthi putschists in Yemen—the de facto the future, and it should not be allowed to fall entirely
rulers of the capital, Sanaa, and much of northern under the control of a southern Hezbollah.
Yemen since their coup nine years ago. Since the
October 7 attack, it has been Yemen’s Houthis—not
Lebanese Hezbollah—that have made the first
attempts to strike Israeli critical infrastructure with
Iran-provided advanced conventional munitions. For The Houthis During the
the first time, Iran is fighting a regional conflict not
only alongside its “heir,” Lebanese Hezbollah, but Gaza Crisis
also with spare deterrent capacity provided by its
new military protégé, the Houthis. Houthi military actions have increased dramatically
since the Iran-led axis of resistance joined Hamas
Since October 27, about a week after the Houthis in the war following the October 17 al-Ahli Hospital
started their military strikes against Israel, the explosion in Gaza City, as illustrated in figure 1.
Houthis have launched three medium-range ballistic Activating their military front a day later than pro-Iran
missiles (MRBMs) at Israel, something no enemy Iraqi militias, the Houthi contribution to the axis effort
has done since Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein fired began October 19, when the Houthis launched nine-
Scud missiles at Israel in 1991, and something that teen cruise missiles and drones toward Israel,4 with
Iran itself has never done. The Houthis have also all but one apparently intercepted by the air defense
launched at least eight salvos of cruise missiles and destroyer USS Carney, then on-station covering Israel’s
long-range explosive drones at Israel, focused on the southern flank in the Red Sea. (One cruise missile
southern port of Eilat. One U.S. military MQ-9 Reaper appears to have been downed by a Saudi air-launched
drone has been shot down by the Houthis during the interceptor.) Then, on October 27 and 31, Israel
crisis, and numerous Houthi missiles and drones intercepted new northbound drones,5 some of which
have been routed near U.S. Navy vessels. If further crashed in Jordan and northern Sinai. Most dramat-
developed, the Houthis may give Iran, Hezbollah, and ically, the Houthis launched an Iran-made Zolfaqar
the broader axis of resistance a new piece to use on MRBM at Israel on October 31, which was intercepted
the chessboard of their deterrent strategy. by an Israeli Arrow 2 interceptor missile near Eilat.6

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Figure 1.

Houthi Attacks on Israel, the U.S. Military, and Global Shipping Since the October 7 Crisis Began*

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Since then, the Houthis have launched drones or Houthi Risk Acceptance in the
missiles toward Israel on at least eight occasions (at Current Crisis
the time of writing), including two more Zolfaqar
strikes that were intercepted by Arrow 3 interceptors, In the current Gaza crisis, the Houthis have
plus a number of drones intercepted by U.S. Navy demonstrated greater risk acceptance than Iran,
vessels in the Red Sea. The Houthis also appear to Lebanese Hezbollah, Assad-led Syria, or Iraq’s
have the dubious distinction of being the only axis pro-Iran militias. After more than two decades of
of resistance partner to attack Israel during the purely rhetorical resistance to Israel, the Houthis
November 24–December 1 ceasefire, through a moved unhesitatingly in October 2023 to undertaking
long-range drone launch on November 29 that was ballistic and cruise missile and drone attacks against
intercepted by the USS Carney in the Red Sea. The the Israeli homeland at a moment of extraordinary
Houthi mixed-weapon salvos—combining MRBMs, tension, when Israel appeared quite likely to retaliate.10
cruise missiles, and drones—build on similar tactics The Houthis furthermore fired numerous projectiles
tested against Saudi Arabia in 2021.7 directly at or near U.S. naval vessels on a high state
of alert, and shot down a valuable U.S. drone, risking
In parallel to strikes on Israel, the Houthis have taken a clash with American forces. (In October 2016, the
a number of aggressive steps toward shipping and United States struck back against Houthi radars
U.S. military vessels in the Red Sea. Setting aside the after the unsuccessful antishipping attack on the
possibility that some of the drone and cruise missile USS Mason, so the Houthis had experienced U.S.
attacks since October 19 were aimed at U.S. Navy retaliation before.)
vessels—and not merely past them, on track toward
Israel—the Houthis have also undertaken confirmed This risk-acceptant behavior can be explained
attacks on U.S. assets. The first deliberately anti- partly by geographic and historical context. The
U.S. strike came on November 8, when Houthi air Houthis have been embroiled in brutal warfare for
defenses shot down a U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drone off almost all of the last twenty years, so exposure to
the coast of Hodeida, the approximate location from enemy airpower does not hold the same shock effect
which many Houthi drones and cruise missiles for them as for other potential recipients of U.S. or
have probably been launched. On November 14, the Israeli retaliation. The Houthi leadership is well
Houthis escalated again by threatening to attack hidden, employing remarkable operational security
Israeli vessels in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Red measures, and the country is perhaps large enough
Sea, a threat they realized quickly on November 19 and distant enough that the Houthis may doubt
when a helicopter-borne Houthi boarding party and Israel’s capacity to strike back effectively at short
more than a dozen speedboats seized an Israeli- notice. The Houthis might also calculate that the
owned, Japanese-leased tanker called the Galaxy United States and Israel are unlikely at this moment
Leader. During the November 24–December 1 Gaza to risk upsetting the Yemen peace process, which
ceasefire, the Houthis responded aggressively to a is drawing close to some form of Saudi-brokered
U.S. naval boarding action against Somali pirates in resolution and which both Washington and Riyadh
the Red Sea, splashing two projectiles (referred to as are keen to conclude so that Saudi-U.S. and Saudi-
“ballistic missiles” by the United States) into the sea Israel diplomatic initiatives might move forward in
ten miles away from a U.S. warship, the USS Mason,8 the future.
coincidentally the same ship the Houthis had
previously attacked with antishipping missiles But in addition to these calculations, the Houthis
during a crisis in October 2016.9 As noted earlier, display a level of ideological determination and
another Houthi drone was intercepted by the USS ambition almost unique among Iran’s partners in
Carney in the Red Sea on November 29. the axis of resistance. Lebanese Hezbollah and the
Iraqi factions certainly try to support Iran’s strategic
needs, but they also actively balance Iran’s needs

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against their own domestic survival calculations and which invariably draw in the United States? How
state capture strategies. As the detailed discussion might it affect great power competition in the region?
to follow will evidence, the Houthis’ ideological “fit”
with the Islamic Republic of Iran—and their shared
enmity against Israel and the United States—is
arguably so close that the most senior Houthi
leaders see their interests and obligations as indis- Iranian Proxy, Hezbollah
tinguishable from the Islamist revolutionaries in
Iran. As a result, Iran is not exercising control over
Clone, or Just Fellow
the Houthis in this crisis, but rather allowing them Traveler?
to demonstrate their superior commitment to the
objectives of the axis. The Houthis need only be let The Houthis—formally Ansar Allah (Partisans of
loose, not necessarily told what to do. Allah)—are a family and caste-based leadership
group that requires some explaining to appreciate
Thinking Through the Emergence their relationship to Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah.
of a “Southern Hezbollah” The Houthi movement’s composition has changed
throughout its life span. Its “first incubator,” in the
More broadly, the current crisis offers an opportune words of Marieke Brandt, a preeminent anthropologist
moment to think through the implications of of the Houthi area,13 involved the tribal marriage
a potential southern Hezbollah to complement ties of movement founder Badr al-Din al-Houthi,
the northern one in Lebanon. The motif used for a religious scholar who married five times and
many years to envisage this outcome—mainly on fathered thirteen sons who lived to adulthood. This
the hawkish right—was that of an Iran-led “Shia created a network of families and in-laws across the
Crescent” in the Middle East, cutting a swath from Khawlan tribal confederation of northern Yemen that
Iran in the north through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon empowered Badr al-Din in the 1970s. In addition
and southward into Yemen. Using the same kind of to being a charismatic preacher, Badr al-Din and
imagery, Iranian commentators have themselves most key Houthi leaders until today are sadah—
claimed Iranian control of four Arab capitals— collectively, Ahl al-Bait, descendants of the Prophet
Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, and Sanaa—which one Muhammad—thus seeing themselves as superior to
parliament member in September 2015 famously other Yemenis and the only caste fit for leadership.
claimed “belong to the Islamic Iranian revolution.”11
The Houthi leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, put it more What made Badr al-Din and his sons unique even
poetically, saying in November 2014 that “Barack among sadah was the combination of (1) their
Obama, after having drunk from the poisoned membership in the Jarudi sect of Islam’s Zaidi branch;
chalice at the gates of Damascus, the walls of Gaza, and (2) their steadfast dedication to the example of
and the suburbs of Baghdad, was drinking from it Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, and the subsequent
for the fourth time in Yemen.”12 export of the revolutionary model to Lebanon via the
Hezbollah movement. The Jarudi belief structure is
Regardless of how imprecise or even hyperbolic important because the Houthis are the only Yemenis
these claims may have seemed in the past, the to adhere to the same principles as the prevalent
Israel-Hamas war has caught Israel in a pincer Twelver strand of Shia Islam dominant in Iran, Iraq,
between northern and southern arms of Iran- and Lebanon. In theological terms, this means that
organized opponents. This is a reality now; not a Jarudis and other Twelvers believe the proper line
model. And if the Houthis have in fact entered into from Muhammad runs via one descendant—the Fifth
the deterrent equation as an embryonic but confident Imam, Muhammad al-Baqir—via a strictly defined
and fast-maturing “southern Hezbollah,” then what set of divine imams to a messianic Twelfth Imam,
does that foreshadow for crises involving Israel, while the non-Jarudi majority of Yemen’s Zaidis

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(“Fivers”) believe in a different line of descent and IRGC and the Houthis: Not Wartime
method of succession. In the realm of power politics, Partners but Soulmates
these affiliations mean that Badr al-Din and his sons
were warmly welcomed by the fledgling Islamic The early narrative of the current Yemen war has
Republic and by Hezbollah in the 1980s and 1990s. been that the Houthis are a reluctant partner to the
IRGC, driven into the Iranian force’s arms by the
The second “incubator” of the Houthi movement, to Saudi-led military response to the 2014 Houthi coup
once again borrow the term, was a Zaidi revivalist in Sanaa. Yet this narrative falls apart under detailed
movement called Believing Youth, led by Badr investigation. A combined U.S.-Yemeni research
al-Din and modeled after post-revolutionary Iran effort, including work by this author, in CTC Sentinel—
and Hezbollah—i.e., propagating ideology through the publication of the West Point Combating
summer camps, youth indoctrination efforts, social Terrorism Center—documented in unprecedented
programs, and a political party. By the early 1990s, depth how the Houthi-IRGC relationship was never
Badr al-Din and his senior sons had two main a marriage of necessity, but rather a decades-
political influences: Iran’s first Supreme Leader, spanning, highly intentional shared effort to replicate
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and Osama bin Laden, the Lebanese Hezbollah model inside Yemen18 (see
both of whose speeches they followed with particular figure 2). The Houthis’ Ansar Allah movement is not
fascination due to their willingness to stand up to a proxy of Iran; rather, it is a fully committed fellow
Israel and to American “arrogance.”14 traveler embodying a deliberate—and successful—
effort to clone Hezbollah. When Badr al-Din died in
In 1994, Badr al-Din and his oldest son, Hussein, 2010, five eligible older sons were bypassed in order
began sending forty religious students a year to to elevate Abdul-Malik, then a young man in his early
Qom—a flow that would eventually produce around thirties but also the companion who had joined him
eight hundred Qom-trained students,15 some of on more visits to Iran than any other son, and who
whom, based on similar treatment of Lebanese, most closely shared the founder’s pursuit of an Iran-
Saudi, and Bahraini students, are likely to have been and Hezbollah-modeled Islamic revolution. Abdul-
groomed with paramilitary training by the Islamic Malik leads Ansar Allah today and, given his relative
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).16 In 1999–2000, youth, could run northern Yemen for decades,
Hussein spent a year studying religion in Khartoum perhaps beyond the reign of Hezbollah’s sixty-three-
at a time when Sudan was the most active IRGC and year-old Hassan Nasrallah.
Iranian Ministry of Intelligence outstation on the
Red Sea.17 He thereafter traveled to Iran and, upon Amid their closeness with the IRGC, the Houthis have
returning to Yemen in 2001, introduced the now absorbed costs for Iran and the axis of resistance
infamous slogan that supercharged the Houthi during recent Middle East crises. For instance, on
movement, known as The Scream (al-Sarkha): May 14, 2019, the Houthis claimed to have launched
“Death to America / Death to Israel / Curse upon the drones against Saudi Arabia’s vital East-West
Jews / Victory to Islam.” Though Hussein was killed Pipeline, but this attack was subsequently shown to
by the Yemeni government in 2004, this remains have originated when Iranian drones were launched
the Houthi slogan until today. The Houthis, however, from Iraq.19 Then again, on September 14, 2019, the
no longer control small corners of remote mountains, Houthis initially claimed to have undertaken drone
as they did in the early 2000s, but rather the most and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia’s largest oil
densely populated third of Yemen and its capital, processing plant at Abqaiq, a claim later proven to
Sanaa, a mini-state with a population of 14 million be false.20 (The attacks were conducted by Iranian
and—if U.S.-backed peace talks conclude—a forces from launch points in Iran and Iraq.) Both
commanding share of Yemen’s mineral wealth of these episodes came during the tenure of U.S.
along with restored aerial transportation and president Donald Trump and could easily have drawn
maritime ties to the rest of the axis of resistance. a heavy U.S. response targeting Ansar Allah and

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Figure 2. Houthi Jihad Council

The Washington Institute’s
original graphic created to
support an article in the CTC
Sentinel journal of the West
Point Combating Terrorism
Center. What jumps out
from this organogram is the
extraordinary effort put into
creating a clone of Lebanese
Hezbollah and Islamic
Republic of Iran security
agencies, notably the Jihad
Council, the Preventive
Security mechanism, and
the jihad mobilization
organizations. The Houthis
may not simply be a clone
of Lebanese Hezbollah but
the next evolutionary step
in Iran’s support for such
movements.

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Yemen. At the very least, they soured international of God, a uniquely prestigious name—as a favorite
sympathy for the Houthis. son gifted with unprecedented transfer of what the
U.S. Defense Department calls “advanced conven-
Despite such downsides, Abdul-Malik evidently did tional weapons”—accurate drone, rocket, and missile
not hesitate to offer up his movement to camouflage systems, plus intelligence support and training that
Iran’s actual launch points. In the context of the rivals the IRGC’s own.
2023 Israel-Hamas war, this willingness has
surfaced once again, with the Houthis risking Now, for the first time, Hezbollah has a unified peer
major Israeli and U.S. retaliation in contrast to both competitor—the Houthi movement. In contrast to
Hezbollah and Iran’s partners in Syria and Iraq, smaller wings of the axis of resistance in Iraq and
which have been much more circumspect in their Syria, where Iran bets on multiple horses and fosters
actions. On November 9, 2023, the Houthis even competition, the IRGC backs one horse in Yemen—
repeated their earlier practice by falsely claiming a Abdul-Malik al-Houthi—just like it backs Hezbollah
drone attack on Israel that actually originated in Abu leader Hassan Nasrallah. Iran’s favoritism toward
Kamal, Syria, possibly diverting retaliation away the Houthis as its shiny new ally does not seem to
from other members of the axis of resistance. Iran cause animosity between Hezbollah and Ansar Allah:
has developed a responsive, risk-acceptant partner based on the deep research effort undertaken for the
in the Houthi movement, and the Houthis are earlier-noted CTC Sentinel paper, the Houthis defer
outshining other axis members—notably the Iraqi to their Lebanese “big brothers” in a way that the
militias—in derring-do, devotion, and overall utility. Houthis are loath to do with any other foreigners,
The Gaza war of 2023 may be seen in retrospect as whether Arabs or Iranians. But Yemen’s Partisans
the moment when the Houthis moved to the next of God (Ansar Allah) are arguably developing a lot
level of confidence, ambition, and aggressiveness. faster than the original Party of God did in Lebanon,
and the Houthis have a tighter grip on domestic
opposition. Furthermore, they will eventually control
a larger country with an even more strategic position
than tiny Lebanon. In time, they could thus outgrow
A Bigger, Badder Hezbollah? their Hezbollah mentor.

Credited with an arsenal of 130,000 missiles, Let’s look at the evidence to back up this thought
rockets, and drones, Lebanese Hezbollah is used to experiment. Starting with the basics, Houthi-
being the biggest and scariest attack dog in Iran’s controlled Yemen has nearly three times the
axis of resistance.21 Established by Iran in 1982, population of Lebanon, translating into foot soldiers
Hezbollah had overpowered all its domestic rivals by (as a later section will detail). The Houthis also have
1989, including other Iran-backed militias sponsored natural resources. Yemen is ranked twenty-ninth
by the Amal Party, a distinction no other Iranian in the world for oil reserves and thirty-first for gas,
partner achieved until the emergence of the Houthis and the Houthis constantly try to capture the
in northern Yemen. For instance, in today’s Syria, country’s most prolific energy fields, in the mean-
the Assad regime plays a nonstop backroom game time using drone strikes to prevent the internation-
aimed at preventing exactly this kind of consoli- ally recognized government from monetizing those
dation of Iran-backed groups on its territory; Iraq’s fields until the Houthis receive the lion’s share.24 In
disparate militias compete and scratch like cats in a contrast, Lebanon does not crack the top hundred
bag,22 driving their Iranian handlers to distraction; for oil and ranks 114th for gas, practically dead last
and the Palestinian groups were historically so among world producers. (Lebanon’s Block 9 drilling
fractious that Monty Python even lampooned their results were completed just days before the Israel-
bewildering number of fronts in The Life of Brian.23 In Hamas war erupted and showed no commercially
contrast, Iran built up Hezbollah—literally, the Party viable gas discoveries.25) A Saudi-Houthi peace

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deal—and a resumption of Yemeni oil exports—will these contextual factors apply to Iraq’s militias too—
be conditioned on a revenue-sharing deal that sees many of which have been working with the IRGC for
half or more of oil and gas proceeds going to the as long as Lebanese Hezbollah—yet these Iraqis have
Houthis. This could be more than a billion dollars a been left in the dust by the Houthi development of
year, a significant addition to around $2–3 billion of long-range strike systems. Perhaps Iraqi militias are
existing annual revenues going to the internationally harboring long-range guided tactical missile systems
recognized Yemeni government. (While this is a low like the Iran-provided Houthi Badr-1P, but these
level of income for a nation, it compares favorably have never been used or even shown off at a parade,
with Lebanon, where government revenues have which probably would have happened by now due to
completely collapsed and where the state is beset the undisciplined nature of the Iraqi groups. (Even
by an even deeper economic and monetary crisis in the current Gaza crisis, the most advanced Iraqi-
than Yemen.26 operated system used has been an unguided rocket
called al-Aqsa 1.)
A southern Hezbollah also has sheer physical space
and standoff distance from Israel that Lebanese Iraqi fielding of Iran-provided drone systems such
Hezbollah will never have. Lebanon is just over as the Qasef-2K has likewise been limited, stingily
four thousand square miles in area, while Houthi- and highly conditioned by the IRGC. Iraqi use of the
controlled Yemen covers 27,000 square miles, even Qasef-2K in 2022 lagged a year behind the first use
if the Houthis never conquered another mile of by the Houthis and Hamas in 2021.27 Is this because
the country. Proximity to Israel has been a factor the Houthis have been in a major conventional war
in Hezbollah’s favor as a part of Iran’s extended with Saudi Arabia since 2015? Maybe, but Iraq’s
deterrence system, but it also means that Israel can militias have also fought tough struggles with
invade Lebanon at will and that Israel is constantly the Islamic State and with the United States since
overhead, offshore, and raiding inside Hezbollah’s 2015, and they would have appreciated the help
home turf. As long-range precision-strike systems and the status symbols of Iran’s newest drones
proliferate, the more distant Yemen is shaping and rockets—as opposed to the flying trash cans
up, like eastern Syria and western Iraq, as an (under the moniker of improvised rocket-assisted
increasingly attractive launchpad for Iran’s attacks munitions) that they used to barrel-bomb targets.
on Israel, the Gulf, and U.S. bases and ships too. It (The Washington Institute’s Militia Spotlight platform
is close enough to reach out and touch Israel—and assesses that some Iranian drone systems shown at
Saudi crown prince Muhammad bin Salman’s Iraqi parades were literally “loaners” for the parade
NEOM giga-project, the Suez Canal, and the holy that were then withdrawn, a rather pathetic sign of
cities of Mecca and Medina—but also sufficiently Iran’s lack of trust.28)
far away and mountainous to pose real military and
intelligence challenges to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and In contrast, the Houthis went from launching
America. unguided Katyusha rockets against targets twenty
miles away in 2014 to launching medium-range
Iran’s Fast-Tracking of Its Yemeni ballistic missiles at Riyadh, six hundred miles away,
Partner Force by 2016. It is the Houthis who have been enabled
by Iran to leapfrog the Iraqi militias in military
Iran seems to agree with this assessment, because capability. In 2004–9, the Houthis were hemmed
it is building up Ansar Allah much faster than it into their northern mountain region of Saada and
did Lebanese Hezbollah. Partly, this is a product of unable even to seize ground from decrepit Yemeni
context: precision-strike systems are more available government forces or execute a sophisticated road-
and easier to build today than in past decades from side bombing attack—whereas Iraqi farmers and
commercially available subsystems, such as drone Afghan tribesmen at that time collectively mounted
engines, avionics, and mission planners. Of course, hundreds of effective attacks a week. The 2010

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military entry of Iran and Hezbollah into the Houthi Houthi Mass Mobilization Potential
wars prompted an abrupt turnaround.29 Hezbollah-
style Houthi commando tactics helped defeat the Today, the Houthi movement is overseeing a mass
Saudi military on its own border, leading to a loss of military mobilization in Yemen unprecedented in
Saudi farmland that remains unreversed to this day. the country’s history, comparable only to Iran’s own
From 2011 to 2014, the Houthis utilized Iranian and mass mobilization during the Iran-Iraq War, and
Hezbollah training support to mount a devastatingly perhaps to that following the 2014 fatwa activating
effective expansion campaign that exploited post– Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces during the
Arab Spring chaos in Yemen and which employed counter-IS war. At the aforementioned nine-year-
exactly the same intelligence-led “stick and carrot” anniversary parade, the Houthi-controlled SABA
tactics with northern tribes that Hezbollah employed news agency claimed (and video seemed to show)
in its own expansion within Beirut and southern that around 35,000 uniformed troops participated
Lebanon. In September 2014, after the Houthis over- in the event.37 To give context, this parade alone
threw the United Nations–backed, U.S.-supported included as many troops as the entire Yemeni
Yemeni government, they nearly overran the rest of military in 2001, and the Houthis were able to
the country in a series of well-orchestrated offensives concentrate this many troops in Sanaa at the same
that benefited from Iranian and Hezbollah advice time that they maintained active frontline forces
and a surge of fuel, munitions, and spare parts via across seven hundred miles of battlefront in Yemen.
twice-daily shuttle service operated by Mahan Air,30
a government-controlled airline used by the IRGC How was this achieved? In recent years, the Houthis
Qods Force to ferry trainers and equipment to war have developed a sophisticated military human
zones.31 In the same period, an Iranian cargo ship resources system that penetrates almost every
unloaded 180 tons of military equipment in the Red neighborhood, village, and household under their
Sea port of al-Salif under tight security.32 control. The system is run by a very senior—currently
unidentified—Houthi officer known as the “jihad
On September 21, 2023, the Houthis celebrated the preparation official,” drawing upon a 130,000-man
nine-year anniversary of their coup with a massive General Mobilization Authority reserve pool
military parade in Sanaa that underlined just how modeled on Iran’s Basij reserve force. The Houthi
far they have come as a military force.33 There, they military is an ideologically brainwashed force: its
unveiled a new MRBM called the Toophan (Storm), “Spiritual Guidance Department”—based on IRGC
which bears a remarkable similarity to Iran’s and Hezbollah precedents—has now been active for
1,200-mile-range Ghadr ballistic missile. A never- almost a decade, and younger Yemeni soldiers were
before-seen Iranian rocket engine in the Ghadr class just small children when the Houthis seized Sanaa
was also displayed, perhaps to prove that the Houthi in 2014. Many likely cannot remember a time before
missile was not an empty mockup. Then, on October the slogan “Death to America / Death to Israel /
19—as detailed in figure 1—the Houthis fired four Curse the Jews / Victory to Islam.” These trends
land attack cruise missiles (likely Iranian-designed will become more pronounced each year as Yemeni
Quds-class34) and fifteen drones (likely Sammad-4 youths increasingly grow up without a memory of the
or Waed drones, similar to those Iran provided to pre-Houthi period. During the current Israel-Hamas
Russia35). In the current Gaza war, the Houthis have war, the Houthis undertook a mass recruitment drive
conducted more strikes against Israeli economic under the banner “Jihad in Palestine,” thereafter
infrastructure and shipping than has Hezbollah, deploying around 16,000 new volunteers to internal
and have seemingly suffered no real consequences frontlines such as Marib and the Red Sea coast in
as a result.36 This experience could underline for Iran November 2023.
the future potential of Houthi-controlled Yemen as a
launchpad for attacks against Israel, the Gulf states,
U.S. forces, and global shipping.

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Extended Deterrence Iran Can Afford

Implications of a Southern to Use
Hezbollah for U.S. Interests While Iran appears hesitant to “spend” the carefully
built retaliatory capability of Lebanese Hezbollah in
Having achieved much to date, the Houthis still have the current conflict, it seems much less risk averse
room to grow. All their accomplishments thus far regarding the Houthis. For their part, the Houthis are
have been gained under an international blockade remarkably confident and they do not seem to fear
and on a shoestring budget. Even now, Iran can Israeli, Saudi, or U.S. retaliatory actions. Partly, this is
smuggle Toophan and Zolfaqar ballistic missiles and because the Houthis are inured to war after spending
Quds cruise missiles right through the increasingly almost all of the last twenty years in conflict with
feeble UN inspection effort off Yemen’s ports. In the domestic enemies and nearly ten fighting Saudi
future, after a Saudi-brokered Yemen peace deal, Arabia. Their leadership is well hidden. And they
the Houthis may face even weaker inspections, plus have already weathered American strikes without the
reopened flights to and from Iran and Lebanon, and a sky falling on them: in October 2016, as noted, the
commanding share of Yemeni government revenues Houthis fired antishipping missiles at the USS Mason,
and Saudi aid. As in Lebanon, Iran will probably a guided missile destroyer, triggering very limited
continue to develop precision-guided drone and U.S. retaliation against Houthi naval radar posts.
missile industries in Houthi-held Yemen. The result Houthi actions since October 19, 2023, demonstrate
will be a secure power projection hub for Iran and its that they have no fear of U.S. or Israeli counteractions.
axis of resistance, lodged on the Arabian Peninsula,
able to hold hostage global oil supply and Saudi Recent strikes by the Houthis on Israel will
Arabia’s Vision 2030 economic plans, and poised to undoubtedly further boost their sense of impunity
shut the Suez Canal and Israel’s southern maritime and growing ambition. The aforementioned Iranian
corridor through the Straits of Tiran. pundit, Mohammad Sadeq al-Hosseini, crowed:
“Abdal-Malik al-Houthi is now the boss in Yemen, and
These outcomes were exuberantly foreseen just three he will become the boss of the Arabian Peninsula.”39
days after the Houthis seized Sanaa in September This boundless confidence may stem from the
2014 by Iranian commentator Mohammad Sadeq awareness that a Zaidi imam has run northern
al-Husseini, who boasted on Hezbollah’s al-Mayadeen Yemen (and sometimes parts of southwest Saudi
television station: “The Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the Arabia) for 897 of the last 1,126 years. The Houthis
Strait of Hormuz tighten the noose on the Red Sea talk about reclaiming Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast,
and on Israel and the Suez Canal...We in the Axis of which includes the two holiest cities in Islam—Mecca
Resistance are the new sultans of the Mediterranean and Medina—and speak of the al-Saud as “a tribe on
and the Gulf. We in Tehran, Damascus, Dahiya [the the verge of extinction.”40 Even as a Houthi militarily
Hezbollah-held southern area of Beirut], Baghdad, venture northward into Saudi Arabia may seem
and Sanaa will shape the map of the region. We unthinkable, the threat from Yemen is precisely why
are the new sultans of the Red Sea as well.”38 These Riyadh built its major west coast military base at
claims would sound ridiculous if they did not Khamis Mushait decades ago. It was also unthinkable
accurately reflect the current tightening of Iran’s that the Islamic State would shatter six Iraqi military
grip on these sea-lanes using advanced conventional divisions and seize a third of Iraq in 2014, or indeed
weapons and a partner force in Houthi-controlled that the Houthis would seize Yemen’s most populated
northwest Yemen. The pincer movement today felt cities the same year—yet these events also occurred.
by Israel—generated by a northern and southern
Hezbollah—could be felt tomorrow by global shipping The addition of a confident, risk-acceptant southern
in the East Mediterranean, Suez, Straits of Tiran, Hezbollah with useful standoff distance from Israel
Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and Indian Ocean. could affect Iran’s deterrent calculations in a number

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 MICHAEL KNIGHTS

of ways. First, the IRGC may have a more resilient,

less vulnerable option than Lebanese Hezbollah Issues and Options for
for use in future crises. Compared to less reliable
partners such as Syria’s Assad regime or Iraq’s U.S. Policy
fractious militias, the Houthis are dedicated,
seemingly secure, and very willing to sacrifice for What all this discussion points to is that Yemen
the axis of resistance. Second, if Iran has only one matters to U.S. policy, and so do the Houthis as a
Hezbollah, it cannot afford to risk its destruction fast-growing regional threat. In the understandable
in an Iran-initiated “war of choice” with Israel, but desire to end the war in Yemen, Washington has
if it has two Hezbollahs, that calculation may no arguably overlooked a disconcerting development
longer hold. Third, and least surely, an even stronger in the regional security affairs of the Middle East;
conventional deterrent triad—covering Hormuz namely, the emergence of a powerful new military
(Iran), the Red Sea and Indian Ocean (Yemen), and actor in Yemen’s Houthi movement, which might be
the Mediterranean Sea (Lebanon)—could shape thought of as a kind of non-nuclear North Korea—an
Iranian calculations about whether developing insular, aggressive, well-armed player hostile to the
and declaring their ownership of nuclear weapons United States and sitting on key geography.
ownership is necessary. At the very least, Iran might
be emboldened to use its leverage in these three Ending the Yemen war should remain a central
choke points as an asset during future military goal for U.S. policymakers, not just to stop a hugely
adventures or nuclear crises. destructive conflict but also to remove a major
bilateral complication at a time when Washington
A final analytic exercise is to imagine how a and Riyadh have been discussing the potential
strengthened Houthi movement might shape great conditions for an Israeli normalization deal and
power competition at the nexus of global sea-lanes. deeper U.S.-Saudi defense commitments. The United
There is a reason why Yemen’s Aden became, for a States is therefore tied to any outcome that brings
time, the world’s busiest port after the Suez Canal the current war in Yemen to a formal end, but U.S.
opened, and a reason why Osama bin Laden officials should be clear-eyed that peace is unlikely
considered it a better base than Afghanistan from to hold and that a sequel conflict is highly likely.
which to run global terrorist plots. In great power The Houthis are an expansionist power, with deep
competition, Yemen may fulfill what remain the animosity toward Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the United
three top considerations: location, location, location. States. Furthermore, America should recognize that
In the old Cold War, Yemen was developed as a Iran and the Houthis share a strong, deep-rooted
bomber base by the Soviets, and its large island— alliance underpinned by tight ideological affinity and
Socotra—attained mythical status as a place where geopolitical alignment. They cannot be separated.
each superpower supposedly jockeyed for basing
rights. Today, with Iran cozying up to Russia and Pragmatically, the United States should commit to
courting China, these ideas are not far-fetched at all. the long-term containment and hopefully diminish-
Though the Houthis are suspicious of any external ment of Houthi military power. Here, America should
power, Iran might one day convince them to allow draw upon its own history to conceptualize this
Yemen to serve as a powerful forward-basing containment process. If the deeply flawed Saudi-led
location for China or Russia, overlooking the Suez military campaign since 2015 achieved a Korean
Canal, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the Straits War–type result—allowing Yemen’s south to avoid
of Tiran, and a variety of U.S. bases and logistical being overrun by the north—then the logic follows
nodes. The additional strategic depth earned by that the non-Houthi area should be supported,
displacing U.S. bases westward away from Iran—to militarily and economically, much as an initially
Jordan, Oman, and western Saudi Arabia—could be nondemocratic South Korea was supported until it
effortlessly outflanked by Yemen. eventually became defensively sound, economically

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successful, and—over time—more democratic. When the Houthis last tried to overrun the whole
Yemen does not have to be formally reunified, much country in 2015, the U.S. reaction was to tepidly
as Korea has not been reunified, but the anti-U.S. support an indigenous and regional (i.e., Yemeni and
forces in the north must not be allowed to snuff out pan-Arab) military response—Operation Decisive
their opposition in the south and east. In addition to Storm and its successors, which collectively make
ensuring a fair peace deal in Yemen, the United up the current Yemen war. Very quickly, U.S. political
States must take concrete steps to enforce the 2015 leaders decided this was not, in fact, such a good idea
UN arms embargo,41 and to prevent destabilizing and withdrew even the initial weak U.S. diplomatic
shifts in the military balance of power that could and logistical support. U.S. politicians did not want
restart the war. History supports the finding that the Houthis to overrun all of Yemen, but nor did they
the Houthis will opportunistically seize military want the Saudi-led coalition to fight a brutal war
openings, so they must not be tempted with such to prevent that overrun, or for the United States to
opportunities. become more directly involved. This dichotomous
mess is clearly not a model for future policy in
Yemen, no matter how politically unpopular U.S.
Military Support to Non-Houthi military involvement may be in the Middle East at
Areas of Yemen any given time. The right model is U.S.-assisted
prevention and deterrence so that the Houthis do
The first priority is thus to ensure that the Houthis not attack again and neither regional players nor the
cannot overrun any more areas of Yemen. The United States are drawn into another conflict.
oil- and gas-rich governorate of Marib has been a
consistent—almost pathological—focus for the Houthi As with North Korea, militarily deterring and
military since the current war began in 2015.42 containing the Houthis will be a defensive mission,
By the end of 2021, the Houthis had advanced to intended to ensure that they do not scent weakness
within ten miles of Marib city, the closest since their or opportunity, and that they know they would likely
initial lunge to take the city in 2015. A Saudi- and fail and be punished heavily if they attacked again.
UAE-backed counteroffensive by the non-Houthi The United States would not be alone in assisting
Yemeni factions—which are now gathered under the PLC factions to achieve baseline defensive
the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council resilience—which may not be a particularly high
(PLC)—succeeded in driving the Houthis back at the bar because Houthi offensives have historically
last moment, undoing two years of creeping Houthi been quite easy to block if the defenses are alerted,
advances and preventing a war-winning Houthi entrenched, and provided with fire support. Both
victory at Marib.43 Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates retain
direct ties to different PLC players and are already
Now, the Houthis have crept forward again to arming and training them, most importantly with
within twenty miles of Marib under the cover of the small numbers of long-range artillery systems that
UN-mediated partial ceasefire in effect since April have previously proved decisive in blunting Houthi
2022. Marib simply must not fall to the Houthis, or advances.44 Though the United States and the Gulf
else they will control almost all Yemen’s hydrocarbon states should be careful not to create imbalances
assets and would have very little incentive to stick that could encourage the PLC factions to attack the
to any internationally brokered peace deal. Other Houthis—or other PLC factions!—the Houthis should
strategic areas like Aden and the Bab al-Mandab be made to feel uncertain that they can hold all their
Strait, recaptured from the Houthis by UAE-Yemeni many frontlines against the PLC. This will counteract
forces in 2015–16, must also be held due to the even a key failure of the UN-brokered December 2018
more serious threat Houthi control of these areas Stockholm Agreement—namely, the encouragement
would pose to global shipping and to the viability of it gave to the Houthis to safely transfer commanders
non-Houthi enclaves in Yemen. and forces from the Hodeida front to Marib, knowing

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the international community would prevent anti- unsustainable situation for a superpower that prides
Houthi action on the lightly held Red Sea coast. itself on being the guarantor of global sea-lanes. In
the current war, the Houthis have not been militarily
In early 2022, the Houthis saw how easily they deterred by either Israel or the United States from
could be evicted from terrain when the Saudi- and taking destabilizing actions that are forcing global
UAE-backed forces worked in unison and with the traffic to avoid the Suez Canal.45 The October 2016
benefit of advanced firepower—in that case, from U.S. strikes on Houthi coastal radars seem not to
Saudi and UAE strike aircraft. This is the broad have impressed the Houthis, leaving them today
formula the United States needs to support whenever willing to shoot at—or at least through—groups of U.S.
the Houthis consider expansionist efforts. The Navy surface vessels and also to destroy valuable U.S.
United States needs to use its intelligence systems drones. The Houthis have demonstrated, particularly
to alert the PLC members and their Gulf backers if since 2021, a sense of complete freedom to use newly
the Houthis are detected planning a new offensive. available Iran-provided drones and other capabilities
Then America should use its good offices to ensure to strike PLC-controlled oil targets, Yemeni political
timely military coordination within the PLC-Saudi- leaders—including the entire Yemeni cabinet in one
UAE coalition, aided by U.S. intelligence, planning, attack46—and international shipping. Whether in their
and logistical support. In a miniature version of the strikes on Saudi and UAE cities, Saudi economic sites
old Reforger exercises, which enacted transatlantic and airports, or more recently in Israel, the Houthis
U.S. reinforcement of NATO, the PLC-Saudi-UAE have demonstrated a wanton disregard for collateral
coalition—aided by U.S. noncombat forces—might damage. It is only a matter of time before Houthi
exercise rapid switching of forces between sub- strikes result in a mass-casualty event or a massive
theaters in Yemen, sometimes to signal awareness oil spill or fire. (For example, when rockets hit Saudi
of preparations for Houthi offensives and to Arabia’s Abha airport on February 10, 2021, they set
underline PLC readiness to blunt such offensives. fire to a civilian airliner, luckily without loss of life.47)

The U.S. military would not need to play a combat The only surefire way to avoid these potential
role in deterring Houthi attacks, but would instead disasters is by convincing the Houthis to stop their
support intelligence, planning, and logistics, as it missile, drone, and rocket attacks. That may require
has done in the past. The United States has directly a painful reimposition of basic deterrence. Despite
resupplied Yemeni military forces by air as recently having a high pain threshold after decades of war,
as 2012, when Yemeni army units were provided the Houthis do seem to be sensitive about certain
with air-dropped ammunition to sustain them when targets, namely: their leaders; drone and missile
surrounded by al-Qaeda forces overrunning Abyan storage sites; irreplaceable helicopters and fixed-
governorate in the chaotic aftermath of the Arab wing aircraft; Iranian and Hezbollah specialists
Spring. Likewise, in 2021, the United States provided and advisors; liquid-fuel systems and storage; and
Arab partners with timely targeting intelligence to the antishipping capabilities they have built,
allow them to strike Houthi MRBM launchers after including “mother ships” and “spy dhows” operating
they fired missiles at Gulf cities. The United States far from Houthi-held areas. Covert action—possibly
should also expand access to its military academies in collaboration with Israel or Saudi Arabia or both48—
for PLC officers through International Military might be the most effective way to operate against
Education and Training grants. the proud Houthi leadership, who will otherwise use
attacks to exploit the traditionally strong reaction in
Yemen toward foreign “invaders.” The United States
Reestablishing Deterrence should quietly aid interested parties such as Israel to
conduct cleaner and more effective defensive strikes
The Israel-Hamas war has underlined the lack further “upstream,” before missiles and drones are
of a U.S. answer for deterring the Houthis, an built, deployed, or launched, and indeed to help PLC

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groups kill Houthi leaders if the Houthis themselves Houthi-held ports but also other ports in Yemen and
continue to assassinate senior PLC officers using Oman through which missile, rocket, and drone
drones. components flow. These include dual-use materials
such as fiberglass, which is used in drone and
In certain cases, the United States should also missile bodies. All aircraft that land in Houthi-held
extend its deterrent support to key economic areas should be inspected, since even small aircraft
initiatives inside Yemen, notably the Yemen Liquefied can carry large cargos of specialized components.
Natural Gas (YLNG) project in Marib and Shabwa, The United States, moreover, should support the Gulf
a Yemeni-U.S.-French-Japanese joint venture with states in seeking ongoing prevention of direct air
the potential to add well over a billion dollars to freight and passenger flights between Yemen and the
the miniscule Yemeni budget—which, as alluded to following states: Lebanon, Iran, Syria, and Iraq.
earlier, currently records annual revenues of just
$2–3 billion by necessarily approximate wartime The Israel-Hamas war has quietly focused Red Sea
estimates. A restart of this gas project—which is players—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel—on
located in PLC territories—has been prevented thus greater cooperation against Houthi MRBM, cruise
far by Houthi military threats, and its eventual missile, and drone capabilities, as well as attacks on
achievement should be underwritten with strong shipping. This is fertile ground for the creation of
U.S., French, and Japanese assurances that threats what former undersecretary of state David Schenker
or attacks toward YLNG could result in broad called “a multilateral Red Sea security mechanism
international sanctioning of the Houthi leadership to interdict illicit weapons shipments, stop human
figures (see below). U.S. security assistance to the and other trafficking, and prevent the harassment of
PLC might also include critical infrastructure shipping, including by laying mines, at the southern
resilience planning and modest funding support end of the Red Sea.”49 As Schenker—currently a
at key oil and gas nodes, with a view to making Washington Institute expert—concluded, such a
such facilities less vulnerable to Houthi intimidation force could be built onto the existing counterpiracy
efforts. mission known as Combined Task Force 151. Given
the growing threat posed by the emerging “southern
Hezbollah” to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan,
Isolating the Houthis, Connecting Washington should also quietly convene a closed-
the PLC door meeting of this Red Sea security quartet and
develop medium-term plans for southward-facing
The existing UN arms embargo on the Houthis—and defensive cooperation.50 If the current Gaza war has
U.S., UN, and European Union sanctions on Iran’s seen any bright spots, one is the highly effective
military exports—should be vigorously enforced. effort to counter Houthi missiles and drones, led by
The Houthis are increasing their missile salvos the United States but leveraging the assets of both
against Israel because they have no fear that their Saudi Arabia and Israel.
resupply route will be cut. Iran smuggled MRBMs
capable of reaching Israel into Yemen despite the UN Recalling the case of South Korea, the non-Houthi
inspections regime and U.S.-led maritime patrolling. areas of Yemen need to be strengthened economi-
More U.S. and partner resources need to be focused cally if they are to survive. While this effort would
on interdicting Iran-provided guidance systems, likely be led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, there
engines, and large liquid-fuel tanks, particularly would be value in a U.S. role. First, the United States
when they are delivered via smaller ships and via can at times help deconflict the separate—and
transshipment points on the Horn of Africa. The sometimes competing—efforts of the two most
United States likewise needs to work with interna- powerful Gulf states. Second, Washington can lobby
tional partners to tighten the intelligence-driven for additional help from international financial
arms embargo on Yemen, with a focus on not only institutions to help make Yemen’s non-Houthi areas

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into a more successful model than the unreformed designating various leaders of Ansar Allah under
Houthi-held territories, thus reducing Houthi Executive Order 13611, the authority used for
resources and increasing the potential for internal blocking the property of individuals who threaten
challenges to the movement’s despotic rule. Nor “the peace, security, or stability of Yemen.” Under
should the United States shy away from the idea of Executive Order 13224, individual Houthi entities can
a divided-country solution in which Yemen reverts also be sanctioned through “derivative designations”
to two or more entities, albeit with a number of that tie their activities to previously designated
highly autonomous PLC-governed areas held loosely entities such as Iran’s IRGC Qods Force or Lebanese
together in matters of self-defense. Yemen has only Hezbollah.53 And Houthi leaders and entities might
fleetingly existed as one state, and even a monolithic fruitfully be sanctioned for nonterrorism offenses,
southern Yemen is an artificial and unconvincing such as corruption or human rights violations, which
edifice.51 A confederation of PLC statelets—not could prove more damaging to the Houthis in the
dissimilar to the old federations of southern Arabia— international, U.S. congressional, and domestic
should be supported by the United States if that is Yemeni environments. Thus, Houthi leaders might
how PLC factions wish to self-organize and if key be designated individually and in small groups for
Gulf states back the idea. A little economic aid in a wider range of violations, from missile and drone
Yemen goes a long way, especially in the southern proliferation to “jihad preparation” efforts, and from
port cities, where genuine potential exists for the imposition of draconian social codes54 to gross
logistics and trade development if Houthi drones human rights abuses55 and the mobilization of child
can be kept away. soldiers.56 If the Houthi movement is redesignated as
an FTO, possibly most likely under a Republican-led
A final consideration for U.S. policy is whether to government in 2025, the layers of parallel individual
redesignate the Houthi Ansar Allah as a Foreign sanctions just outlined will also be useful to draw
Terrorist Organization under Executive Order attention to nonterrorism aspect of Houthi misrule.
13224, the post-9/11 formula by which groups such
as the Taliban have been sanctioned. This was the Above all, the principle guiding U.S. policy should be
designation briefly applied to the Houthis by the a clear-cut effort to weaken the Houthi authorities in
Trump administration, only to be revoked by the northern Yemen, ideally until they collapse, which is
Biden administration shortly after entering office. in the best interest of most Yemenis, most Arabs,
The rationale for revocation was that designation and most international players who seek to bolster
as an FTO under counterterrorism sanctions would the future stability of the Middle East. The moral
make it difficult to ensure humanitarian carve-outs imperative of ending the post-2015 Yemen war has
during a moment of extreme humanitarian crisis. obscured the underlying reality that a profoundly
Even if that crisis has subsided somewhat, which is anti-U.S. and anti-Israel armed group has seized a
questionable, sanctions experts—even those with large swath of Yemen on the strategic southern tip of
a negative view of the Houthis52—still argue that the Arabian Peninsula. The U.S. government should
redesignation may not be the optimal way to use not welcome the emergence of a new, aggressive
sanctions. Hezbollah-type movement that attacks the United
States and its partners, Arab or Israeli. Nor should
Breaking up a designation into smaller packages Washington be content to leave the Houthis in control
against individual leaders, agencies, and businesses of millions of innocent people or emboldened to
might be more effective in linking a campaign of expand their domination. The still-free peoples of
sanctions to individual negative actions, which can Yemen must be supported by U.S. policy to remain
confer greater legitimacy and perhaps effect some outside of Houthi control, with gradually improving
change in behavior—though this will be especially governance and economic prospects that show the
difficult with the Houthis. One option would be free areas outperforming Houthi-dominated Yemen. v

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NOTES

1 Iran also recruits Shia Afghans and Pakistanis, and some Shia Gulf Arabs, into the axis of resistance militias. Axis
members in Gaza include Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
2 David Daoud, “The Mouth of Hezbollah Chief Hassan Nasrallah Hath Spoken—and Nothing Useful Came Out,”
MENASource, Atlantic Council, November 6, 2023, [Link]
lah-speech-israel-hamas-gaza/.
3 Michael Knights, Adnan al-Gabarni, and Casey Coombs, “The Houthi Jihad Council: Command and Control in
‘the Other Hezbollah,’” CTC Sentinel 15, no. 10 (October 2022), [Link]
cil-command-and-control-in-the-other-hezbollah/. Also see Michael Knights, “The Houthi War Machine: From
Guerrilla War to State Capture,” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 8 (September 2018), [Link]
machine-guerrilla-war-state-capture/.
4 Tara Copp and Lolita C. Baldor, “U.S. Military Shoots Down Missiles and Drones in the Middle East,” Navy Times,
October 19, 2023, [Link]
siles-heading-north-out-of-yemen/.
5 Emanuel Fabian, “IDF Releases Footage of Houthi Missiles Being Downed over Red Sea,” Times of Israel, November 2,
2023, [Link]
6 Barak Ravid, “Israel Says It Thwarted Missile Attack by Yemen’s Houthi Rebels,” Axios, October 31, 2023,
[Link]
7 For instance, on March 7, 2021, the Houthis launched ten Sammad-3 loitering munitions and one Zolfaqar
MRBM against Saudi economic targets in the Eastern Province, while at the same time using four Qasef-2K
loitering munitions and seven Badr-1P precision long-range tactical rockets against targets in southwest Saudi
Arabia. On February 28, 2021, the Houthis claimed to target Riyadh with a Zolfaqar and nine Sammad-3s, while
also launching six Qasef-2Ks against Khamis Mushait and Abha in southwest Saudi Arabia. See Michael Knights,
“Continued Houthi Strikes Threaten Saudi Oil and the Global Economic Recovery,” PolicyWatch 3449, Washing-
ton Institute for Near East Policy, March 12, 2021, [Link]
ued-houthi-strikes-threaten-saudi-oil-and-global-economic-recovery.
8 Diana Stancy Correll, “CENTCOM: Yemen-Based Ballistic Missiles Fired near USS Mason,” Navy Times,
November 27, 2023, [Link]
missiles-fired-near-uss-mason/.
9 Sam LaGrone, “USS Mason Fired Three Missiles to Defend from Yemen Cruise Missile Attacks,” USNI News,
October 11, 2016, [Link]
missiles-attack.
10 An explosion was registered within a Houthi missile complex in Sanaa on November 30, 2023, but no confirma-
tion has (at the time of writing) linked this event to an attack. Andie Parry et al., “Iran Update,” Institute for the
Study of War, November 30, 2023, [Link]
11 Sharif Nashashibi, “Iran’s Regional Ambitions Are Clear and Worrying,” Al Jazeera, March 25, 2015, [Link]
[Link]/opinions/2015/3/25/irans-regional-ambitions-are-clear-and-worrying.
12 Lt. Col. (Ret.) Michael Segall, “How Iran Views the Fall of Sana’a, Yemen: ‘The Fourth Arab Capital in Our Hands,’”
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, November 3, 2014, [Link]
13 Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (Hurst: forthcoming 2024).
14 Knights, Gabarni, and Coombs, “The Houthi Jihad Council,” [Link]
command-and-control-in-the-other-hezbollah/.
15 Forty students per year in the twenty years between 1994 and 2014 equals eight hundred individual students.
Knights, Gabarni, and Coombs, “The Houthi Jihad Council,” [Link]
command-and-control-in-the-other-hezbollah/.
16 Colin Clarke and Phillip Smyth, “The Implications of Iran’s Expanding Shi‘a Foreign Fighter Network,” CTC
Sentinel 10, no. 11 (November 2017), [Link]
eign-fighter-network/.
17 See “Sudan and Terrorism,” hearing before U.S. Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, Committee on Foreign
Relations,” May 15, 1997, available at [Link]
[Link]; Jonathan Schanzer, “The Islamic Republic of Sudan?” Foreign Policy, June 10, 2010,
[Link] and Giorgio Cafiero, “Is a Sudanese-
Iranian Rapprochement Possible?” Middle East Institute, May 19, 2019, [Link]
nese-iranian-rapprochement-possible.
18 Knights, Gabarni, and Coombs, “The Houthi Jihad Council,” [Link]
command-and-control-in-the-other-hezbollah/.

P O L I C Y N O T E 142 17
 MICHAEL KNIGHTS

19 Isabel Coles and Dion Nissenbaum, “U.S.: Saudi Pipeline Attacks Originated from Iraq,” Wall Street Journal, updat-
ed June 28, 2019, [Link]
20 Michelle Nichols, “Exclusive: UN Investigators Find Yemen’s Houthis Did Not Carry Out Saudi Oil Attack,” Reuters,
January 9, 2020, [Link]
gators-find-yemens-houthis-did-not-carry-out-saudi-oil-attack-idUSKBN1Z72VX/.
21 “Missiles and Rockets of Hezbollah,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, updated August 10, 2021,
[Link]
22 Michael Knights, Crispin Smith, and Hamdi Malik, “Discordance in the Iran Threat Network in Iraq: Militia
Competition and Rivalry,” CTC Sentinel 14, no. 8 (October 2021), [Link]
iran-threat-network-in-iraq-militia-competition-and-rivalry/.
23 See, e.g., “The People’s Front of Judea,” available at [Link]
Front_of_Judea.
24 Revenue-sharing appears to mirror population numbers, and the Houthis control at least 14 million of the
country’s 32 million people, and probably a higher level if displaced persons return to the Houthi-held areas
under a peace deal. No other single player controls as much territory or population as the Houthis. See “Yemen:
The Key Economic Incentives of Peace,” ACAPS Analysis Hub, May 17, 2022, [Link]
Data_Product/Main_media/20220517_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_key_economic_incentives_of_peace_0.pdf.
25 Reuters, “No Gas Finds After Drilling at Lebanon’s Offshore Block 9,” October 13, 2023, [Link]
world/middle-east/no-gas-finds-after-drilling-lebanons-offshore-block-9-source-2023-10-13/.
26 Samara Azzi and Hanin Ghaddar, Cash Cabal: How Hezbollah Profits from Lebanon’s Financial Crisis, Policy Note 136
(Washington DC: Washington Institute, June 2023), [Link]
bal-how-hezbollah-profits-lebanons-financial-crisis.
27 Andrew Hanna, “Iran’s Drone Transfers to Proxies,” Iran Primer, U.S. Institute of Peace, June 30, 2021, [Link]
ly/46RPBvR -proxies.
28 Farzin Nadimi and Michael Knights, “Militias Parade Under the PMF Banner (Part 1): Drone Systems,” Militia
Spotlight, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 3, 2021, [Link]
cy-analysis/militias-parade-under-pmf-banner-part-1-drone-systems.
29 Michael Knights, “The Houthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to State Capture,” CTC Sentinel 11, no. 8
(September 2018), [Link]
30 Knights, “The Houthi War Machine,” [Link]
31 U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Supporters of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and
Networks Responsible for Cyber-Attacks Against the United States,” press release, September 14, 2017, https://
[Link]/news/press-releases/sm0158.
32 Knights, “The Houthi War Machine,” [Link]
33 Michael Knights and Farzin Nadimi, “Yemen’s ‘Southern Hezbollah’ Celebrates Coup Anniversary in Deadly Fash-
ion,” PolicyWatch 3790, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, September 28, 2023, [Link]
[Link]/policy-analysis/yemens-southern-hezbollah-celebrates-coup-anniversary-deadly-fashion.
34 Known as Ya-Ali cruise missiles in Iranian service. See also Fabian Hinz, “Little and Large Missile Surprises in
Sanaa and Tehran,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance (blog), October 17, 2023, https://
[Link]/online-analysis/military-balance/2023/10/little-and-large-missile-surprises-in-sanaa-and-tehran/.
35 The Sammad-4 is labeled by the United States as “KAS-04 loitering munitions” in Iranian service: see David
Hambling, “Houthis Step Up Long-Range Drone Attacks on Saudi Oil Facilities,” Forbes, March 31, 2021,
[Link]
oil-facilities/?sh=4d892b15142a. The Waed is labeled as “Shahed-136 loitering munitions” in Iranian service:
see Ibrahim Jalal, “The Houthis’ Red Sea Missile and Drone Attack: Drivers and Implications,” Middle East
Institute, October 20, 2023, [Link]
ers-and-implications.
36 Recalling again the unexplained November 30, 2023, explosion within a Houthi missile complex in Sanaa. See
Parry et al., “Iran Update,” [Link]
37 Knights and Nadimi, “Yemen’s ‘Southern Hezbollah’ Celebrates Coup Anniversary,” [Link]
[Link]/policy-analysis/yemens-southern-hezbollah-celebrates-coup-anniversary-deadly-fashion.
38 “Iranian Analyst Mohammad Sadeq Al-Hosseini: Saudi Arabia Is on the Verge of Extinction; We Are the New
Sultans of the Mediterranean, the Gulf, and the Red Sea,” Middle East Media Research Institute, TV clip 4530,
September 24, 2014, [Link]
bia-verge-extinction-we-are-new-sultans.
39 “Iranian Analyst Mohammad Sadeq Al-Hosseini,” [Link]
eq-al-hosseini-saudi-arabia-verge-extinction-we-are-new-sultans.

18 T H E WA S H I N G T O N I N S T I T U T E F O R N E A R E A S T P O L I C Y
 HOW YEMEN’S “SOUTHERN HEZBOLL AH” COULD CHANGE IR AN’S DE TERRENT CALCULUS

40 “Iranian Analyst Mohammad Sadeq Al-Hosseini,” [Link]

eq-al-hosseini-saudi-arabia-verge-extinction-we-are-new-sultans.
41 The UN Security Council established the sanctions regime on Yemen, including an asset freeze and travel ban,
and the 2140 Committee, referring to UNSCR 2140 (2014). Bolstered by UNSCR 2216 (2015), the UN has main-
tained a decade-long targeted arms embargo on the Houthis since they seized the capital by coup. See UN
Security Council, “UN Documents for Yemen: Security Council Resolutions,” [Link]
org/un_documents_type/security-council- resolutions/?ctype=Yemen&cbtype=yemen.
42 Nabil Hetari, “The Battle of Marib: The Challenge of Ending a Stalemate War,” Fikra Forum, Washington Insti-
tute for Near East Policy, July 9, 2021, [Link]
lenge-ending-stalemate-war.
43 Alex Almeida and Michael Knights, “Breaking Point: Consolidating Houthi Military Setbacks in Yemen,” Policy-
Watch 3565, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 19, 2022, [Link]
policy-analysis/breaking-point-consolidating-houthi-military-setbacks-yemen.
44 Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been providing 155-millimeter and 105-millimeter artillery systems to PLC
forces to bolster their defensive resilience, as well as engineering vehicles to build up defensive lines facing
the Houthis. Significant local defensive positions have been developed in places like Marib and to the south
of Hodeida. The UAE has been particularly active in laying down the kind of “access” infrastructure (airfields,
fuel storage, and port facilities) that might allow rapid reinforcement of PLC forces in emergency cases. These
farsighted efforts should be applauded and supported by the United States. For just one example of many, see
Joseph Trevithick, “Construction of a Large Runway Suddenly Appears on Highly Strategic Island in the Red Sea,”
The Drive, March 10, 2021, [Link]
denly-appears-on-highly-strategic-island-in-the-red-sea.
45 Noam Raydan, “Houthi Ship Attacks Are Affecting Red Sea Trade Routes,” PolicyWatch 3820, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, December 7, 2023, [Link]
ship-attacks-are-affecting-red-sea-trade-routes.
46 Jonathan Landay, Ghaida Ghantous, and Mahmoud Mourad, “Exclusive: UN Team Finds Houthis Launched Aden
Airport Attack That Killed 22—Diplomats,” Reuters, March 29, 2021, [Link]
curity-attack-exclusive-int-idUSKBN2BL30R/.
47 “Plane Catches Fire After Houthis Attack Abha Airport: Saudi TV,” Al Jazeera, February 10, 2021, [Link]
[Link]/news/2021/2/10/plane-catches-fire-after-houthi-attack-abha-airport-saudi-tv.
48 This could involve sharing U.S. intelligence with Israel in support of efforts to diminish any long-range missile
capabilities in Houthi-held Yemen. For instance, industrial sabotage operations could target materiel such as
liquid-fuel systems and storage, while other efforts could focus on Iranian and Hezbollah missile technicians.
49 David Schenker, “Biden Needs a Plan B for Yemen if Houthis Win,” Foreign Policy, November 4, 2021, [Link]
[Link]/2021/11/04/yemen-biden-war-houthi-saudi-iran/.
50 Patrick Schmidt, “The Saudi Air Defense Problem Is a U.S. Opportunity,” PolicyWatch 3450, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, March 17, 2021, [Link]
fense-problem-us-opportunity.
51 For background on Yemen’s various incarnations and divisions, see the introduction to Elana DeLozier, Yemen
Matrix: Allies & Adversaries (Washington DC: Washington Institute, 2020), [Link]
policy-analysis/yemen-matrix-allies-adversaries.
52 Katherine Bauer, “A Goldilocks Approach to Sanctioning Yemen’s Houthis,” PolicyWatch 3579, Washington
Institute for Near East Policy, February 18, 2022, [Link]
locks-approach-sanctioning-yemens-houthis.
53 The U.S. government appeared to start down this road with its December 7, 2023, sanctions package, which
targeted Houthi financial connections to the IRGC Qods Force using the counterterrorism authority in Executive
Order 13224. See U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets Network Financing Houthi Regional
Aggression,” December 7, 2023, [Link]
54 A good example is the public-sector employee code of conduct that the Houthis imposed on all employees, even
those of different religions and practices. Laila Lutf al-Thawr, “Between the Lines: Understanding the Houthi
Employment Code of Conduct,” Fikra Forum, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 15, 2023, https://
[Link]/policy-analysis/between-lines-understanding-houthi-employment-code-conduct.
55 Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2023: Yemen Events of 2022,” [Link]
country-chapters/yemen.
56 Associated Press, “In Yemen, Child Soldiering Continues Despite Houthi Promise,” Voice of America, June 19, 2023,
[Link]

P O L I C Y N O T E 142 19
The Author
MICHAEL KNIGHTS is the Jill and Jay Bernstein Fellow at The
Washington Institute and coauthor (with Adnan al-Gabarni and Casey
Coombs) of “The Houthi Jihad Council: Command and Control in ‘the
Other Hezbollah,’” published in CTC Sentinel (Combating Terrorism
Center at West Point) in October 2022.

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