3.

Authentication
Computer Security Courses @ POLIMI
Identification vs. Authentication
Identification: an entity declares its identifier
● Examples: "I am Stefano", "I am Michele"

Authentication: the entity provides a proof that

verifies its identity.
● Examples: "Here is Stefano's ID card"

2
Authentication
Can be unidirectional
"I am Entity 1"
Entity 1 Entity 2 unidirectional
"Proof that I am Entity 1"

3
Authentication
Can be unidirectional or bidirectional (mutual).
"I am Entity 1"
Entity 1 Entity 2 unidirectional
"Proof that I am Entity 1"
mutual
"I am Entity 2"
Entity 1 Entity 2 unidirectional
"Proof that I am Entity 2"

Can happen between any entity:

● Human to human
● Human to computer
● Computer to computer

Foundation for the subsequent authorization phase 4

Three Factors of Authentication
Something that the entity knows (to know)
1. Example: password, PIN, secret handshake.
Something that the entity has (to have)
2. Example: Door key, smart card, token.
Something that the entity is (to be)
3. Example: Face, voice, fingerprints.

Humans:
Machines:

5
Three Factors of Authentication
Something that the entity knows (to know)
1. Example: password, PIN, secret handshake.
Something that the entity has (to have)
2. Example: Door key, smart card, token.
Something that the entity is (to be)
3. Example: Face, voice, fingerprints.

Humans: (3) more used than (2), more used than (1).
Machines:

6
Three Factors of Authentication
Something that the entity knows (to know)
1. Example: password, PIN, secret handshake.
Something that the entity has (to have)
2. Example: Door key, smart card, token.
Something that the entity is (to be)
3. Example: Face, voice, fingerprints.

Humans: (3) more used than (2), more used than (1).
Machines: (1) more used than (2), more used than (3).

7
Three Factors of Authentication
Something that the entity knows (to know)
1. Example: password, PIN, secret handshake.
Something that the entity has (to have)
2. Example: Door key, smart card, token.
Something that the entity is (to be)
3. Example: Face, voice, fingerprints.

Humans: (3) more used than (2), more used than (1). Usab
ilit
Machines: (1) more used than (2), more used than (3). y

Multi-factor authentication uses two or three factors. 8

The "to know" Factor
Passwords and PINs
The "to know" Factor: Passwords
User must prove that it knows something.
Advantages
● Low cost,
● ease of deployment,
● low technical barrier.
Disadvantages

10
The "to know" Factor: Passwords
User must prove that it knows something.
Advantages
● Low cost,
● ease of deployment,
● low technical barrier.
Disadvantages
Secrets can be
a. stolen/snooped
b. guessed
c. cracked (enumerated)
11
The "to know" Factor: Passwords
User must prove that it knows something.
Advantages
● Low cost,
● ease of deployment,
● low technical barrier.
Disadvantages
Secrets can be
a. stolen/snooped
b. guessed
c. cracked (enumerated)
12
Disadvantages
Secrets can be
a. stolen/snooped
b. guessed
c. cracked (enumerated)
13
Disadvantages
Secrets can be
a. stolen/snooped
b. guessed
c. cracked (enumerated)

14
https://www.ilmessaggero.it/social/gasparri_password_gaffe_tv_ironia_social-6828648.html
The "to know" Factor: Passwords
User must prove that it knows something.
Advantages
● Low cost,
● ease of deployment,
● low technical barrier.
Disadvantages
Secrets can be
a. stolen/snooped
b. guessed
c. cracked (enumerated)
15
The "to know" Factor: Passwords
User must prove that it knows something.
Advantages
● Low cost,
● ease of deployment,
● low technical barrier.
Disadvantages
Secrets can be
a. stolen/snooped
b. guessed
c. cracked (enumerated)
16
The "to know" Factor: Passwords
User must prove that it knows something.
Advantages
● Low cost,
● ease of deployment,
● low technical barrier.
Disadvantages Countermeasures (i.e., costs)
Secrets can be Enforce passwords that
a. stolen/snooped ○ change/expire frequently
b. guessed ○ are long and have a rich character set
c. cracked (enumerated) ○ are not related to the user

17
Why are Countermeasures Costs?
Humans are not machines
● Inherently unable to keep secrets
● Hard to remember complex passwords
Can’t pick unlimited countermeasures
○ how to choose?

18
The "to know" Factor: Passwords
User must prove that it knows something.
Advantages
● Low cost,
● ease of deployment,
● low technical barrier.
Disadvantages Countermeasures (i.e., costs)
Secrets can be Enforce passwords that
a. stolen/snooped ○ change/expire frequently
b. guessed ○ are long and have a rich character set
c. cracked (enumerated) ○ are not related to the user
Estimate the most likely attack in the Accordingly choose the countermeasure(s) that are worth
asking users to adhere to (remember indirect costs?) 19
scenario.
 Why are Countermeasures Costs?
Humans are not machines
● Inherently unable to keep secrets
● Hard to remember complex passwords
Can’t pick unlimited countermeasures
○ how to choose?
Countermeasure guideline: important, may help, unimportant

Against snooping Against cracking Against guessing

complexity complexity complexity
change change change
being related to users being related to users not being related to users

20
 Why are Countermeasures Costs?
Humans are not machines
● Inherently unable to keep secrets
● Hard to remember complex passwords
Can’t pick unlimited countermeasures
○ how to choose?
Countermeasure guideline: important, may help, unimportant

Against snooping Against cracking Against guessing

complexity complexity complexity
change change change
being related to users being related to users not being related to users

21
 Why are Countermeasures Costs?
Humans are not machines
● Inherently unable to keep secrets
● Hard to remember complex passwords
Can’t pick unlimited countermeasures
○ how to choose?
Countermeasure guideline: important, may help, unimportant

Against snooping Against cracking Against guessing

complexity complexity complexity
change change change
being related to users being related to users not being related to users

22
 Why are Countermeasures Costs?
Humans are not machines
● Inherently unable to keep secrets
● Hard to remember complex passwords
Can’t pick unlimited countermeasures
○ how to choose?
Countermeasure guideline: important, may help, unimportant

Against snooping Against cracking Against guessing

complexity complexity complexity
change change change
being related to users being related to users not being related to users

23
User Education and Password Complexity
User education: "human" == "weak link".
● enforce strong passwords in the process.
● enforce password expiration/change policies

Password complexity
● must h4v3 4 r1ch, ch4r4ct3r, s3t!
● mUsT hAvE a MiXeD cAsE
● muuuuust beeeeeee loooooong enoooogh

Use password meters to balance usability. 24

Password Meters
 Password meter:

No meter (users choose

weak passwords).

Good (users choose

strong passwords).

B. Ur, P.G. Kelley, S. Komanduri, J. Lee, M. Maass, M. Mazurek, T. Passaro, R. Shay, T. Vidas, L. Bauer, N. Christin, and L.F.
Cranor. How does your password measure up? The effect of strength meters on password creation. USENIX Security 2012.
26
27
passfault

28
 Secure Password “Exchange”
Authentication is about sharing a secret.

How to minimize the risk that secrets get stolen?

● use mutual authentication if possible
● use a challenge-response or zero knowledge proof
scheme
Example of a simple challenge and response scheme

"My identifier is 'Entity 1'. Let me authenticate."

<secret> <secret>
"Compute hash(<this random data> + <secret>)" + "<this random data>"
Challenge
Computation

hash(<this random data> + <secret>) Challenge

verification
Entity 1 Entity 2
"Compute hash(<this random data> + <secret> + <other random data>)" + "<other random data>"
Challenge
Computation

Challenge
hash(<this random data> + <secret> + <other random data>)
verification
use random data to avoid replay attacks 29
Secure Password Storage
Authentication is also about storing a secret.
OS stores a file with usernames and passwords.
An attacker could try to compromise the confidentiality and
integrity of this password file
How to minimize the risk that secrets get stolen?
● Cryptographic protection
○ Never store passwords in clear: hashing + salting to mitigate
dictionary attacks)
● Access control policies (privileges to w/r)
● Never disclose secrets in password-recovery schemes.
Caching problem (information is held in intermediate storage
locations)
30
31
The "to have" Factor
Tokens, smart cards, smart phones.
The "to have" Factor
User must prove that it possesses something.

Advantages
● Human factor (less likely to hand out a key),
● relatively low cost,
● good level of security.

Disadvantages Countermeasures

33
The "to have" Factor
User must prove that it possesses something.

Advantages
● Human factor (less likely to hand out a key),
● relatively low cost,
● good level of security.

Disadvantages Countermeasures
● Hard to deploy, ● none
● can be lost or stolen. ● use with second factor.
34
 Example Classic Technologies
One-time password generators:
● Secret key + counter synchronized with the host.
● Client: MAC-compute(counter, key).
● Host: MAC-verify(counter, key).
● Check that the counter is the expected one.
● The counter changes every 30–60 seconds.

Application examples: online banking, admin console

(e.g., Amazon AWS).

Smart cards (also w/ embedded reader in USB keys)

● CPU + non-volatile RAM with a private key.
● The smart card authenticates itself to host via a
challenge-response protocol.
○ Uses the private key to sign the challenge.
● The private key does not leave the device.
● Should be tamper proof to some extent.

Application examples: credit cards (+PIN). 35

Static OTP lists (cheaper alternative)

● Known to both client and host.

● Host chooses a challenge: random numbers (e.g., "second digit of the 14th cell").
● The client transmits the response (hopefully, over an encrypted channel).
● The host should not keep the list in clear (e.g., hashing).

36
 Modern Technologies: TOTP

Software that implements the same functionality of password generators:

● Key difference
○ password generators are closed, embedded systems.
○ password-generation apps work on general-purpose sw/hw platforms.
● What if the device is infected by a malicious app: Dmitrienko et al., When More
37
Becomes Less: On the (In)Security of Mobile Two-Factor Authentication, FC 2014
 38
https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/public-awareness-and-prevention-guides/sim-swapping-%E2%80%93-mobile-phone-scam
 Modern Technologies: Secure Keys
(e.g., Yubikeys)
A hardware-based authentication
device

● Plug & Touch: Insert the

YubiKey into a USB port (or use
NFC) and tap it when prompted.
● Generates a Secure Code: The
device sends a one-time
password (OTP) or
cryptographic key for
authentication.
● Multi-Factor Authentication
(MFA): Used alongside a
password for added security.
● Public Key Cryptography:
Uses FIDO2/WebAuthn for
passwordless logins and secure
authentication.
39
The "to be" Factor.
Biometric authentication.
The "to be" Factor: Biometric.
User must prove that it has some specific characteristics.
Advantages
● high level of security and robustness
● requires no extra hardware to carry around.
Disadvantages Countermeasures
● Hard to deploy, ● none
● probabilistic matching, ● none
● invasive measurement, ● none
● can be cloned, ● none (see next slides)
● bio-characteristics change, ● re-measure often,
● privacy sensitivity, ● secure the process,
● users with disabilities. ● need alternate (weaker?) 41
Technology examples
Extract the characteristics (i.e., features) of:
● Fingerprints (http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/fprint/)
● Face geometry
(https://code.google.com/p/pam-face-authentication/)
● Hand geometry (palm print)
● Retina scan
● Iris scan
● Voice analysis
● DNA
● Typing dynamics (http://flyer.sis.smu.edu.sg/ndss13-tey.pdf)
● Grasp Smartphones
(https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S18770509
19313845)
42
Example: Fingerprint
● Enrollment: reference sample of the user’s fingerprint is
acquired at a fingerprint reader.
● Features are derived from the sample.
○ Fingerprint minutiae: end points of ridges, bifurcation points, core,
delta, loops, whorls, ?
○ For higher accuracy, record features for more than one finger and
different positions.
● Feature vectors are stored in a secure database.
● When the user logs on, a new reading of the fingerprint
is taken; features are compared against (similarity) the
reference features. User is accepted if match is above a
predefined threshold.
Main issue: false positives and false negatives 43
Consumer-level Biometric Auth
Manufacturer Model Technology Date Difficulty

Identix TS-520 Optical Nov. 1990 First attempt

Fingermatrix Chekone Optical Mar. 1994 Second attempt

Dermalog DemalogKey Optical Feb.1996 First attempt

STMicroelectronics TouchChip Solid state Mar. 1999 First attempt

Veridicon FPS110 Solid state Sept.1999 First attempt

http://cryptome.org/fake-prints.htm Identicator DFR200 Optical Oct. 1999 First attempt

20 september 2013 RELEASED

21 september 2013 CRACKED

Examples:
● http://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2013/ccc-breaks-apple-touchid (short) -
https://www.heise.de/multimediadatei/iPhone-5s-Touch-ID-hack-in-detail-1965628.html
(long)
● https://www.ccc.de/en/updates/2017/iriden
● https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Chen-Biometric-Authentication-
Under-Threat-Liveness-Detection-Hacking.pdf
● https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZwCNG9KFdXs&ab_channel=Forbes
44
Novel (and Experimental)
factors of authentication
 The "social" Factor: Who you know.
Alice must prove that she knows someone.

https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/a-continued-commitment-to-security/486790652130 RELEASED

Papers

● H. Kim, J. Tang, and R. Anderson. Social authentication: harder than it looks. In Proceedings of the 2012 Financial
Cryptography and Data Security conference.
●
CRACKED J. Polakis, M. Lancini, G. Kontaxis, F. Maggi, S. Ioannidis, A. Keromytis, S. Zanero, All Your Face Are Belong to Us:
Breaking Facebook's Social Authentication. In Proceedings of 2012 Annual Computer Security Applications Conference.
46
Single Sign On
Problem: managing and remembering multiple
passwords is complex.
● Users re-use passwords over multiple sites,
● Password policies replicated ($$$).

Solution: 1 identity, 1-2 auth. factors, 1 trusted host.

● elect a trusted host,
● users authenticate (sign on) on the trusted host,
● other hosts ask the trusted host if a user is
authenticated.
47
Example: Shibboleth (AunicaLogin)
1. I am "John G. Student"

6. You can access the service.

User (e.g., you)

Service (e.g., WeBeeP)

3. I need your
credentials. 2. Is "John G. Student"
a student?
4. Here is my
username and
password 5. Yes. I confirm.

Identity Provider (e.g., AunicaLogin) 48

Example: OAuth2 Flow (Facebook)

49
Single Sign On: challenges
Single point of trust: the trusted server.
● If compromised, all sites are compromised.
● Password reset scheme must be bulletproof.
○ Email is the trusted element
Kontaxis G. et al., SAuth: Protecting User Accounts from Password Database Leaks. In Proceedings of
the 20th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2013.

Difficult to get right for the developers.

● The flow is complex to implement.
● Libraries exist, but they can be bugged.
http://homakov.blogspot.it/2014/02/how-i-hacked-github-again.html
50
Password Managers [~Déjà vu]

Problem: managing and remembering

multiple passwords is complex.
● Users re-use passwords over
multiple sites,
● Password policies replicated ($$$).

Solution: 1 identity, 1-2 auth. factors, 1

password manager.
● select a (trusted) password manager,
● users authenticate (sign on) on the
password manager with a master password
● generate/copy a password for each service
51
 Password Managers
Pros Cons
● No need to remember all ● A single point of trust
passwords and failure
● It allows generating ● Larger attack surface
robust passwords ○ Password managers
different for each service are softwares...
● Usability ○ Extensions
○ Auto.. ○ Auto..
■ Fill ■ Fill
■ Synch ■ Synch
○ Multiple Devices
● https://stuartschechter.medium.com/before-you-use-a-password-manager-9f5949ccf168
● Gangwal, A., Singh, S., & Srivastava, A. (2023, April). AutoSpill: Credential Leakage from Mobile Password Managers. In Proceedings of the
Thirteenth ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy (pp. 39-47). 52
Passwordless Auth - Passkeys

53
Passkeys Overview (1)

54
Passkeys Overview (2)

55
https://departmentofproduct.substack.com/p/knowledge-series-23-passkeys-explained
Conclusions
Identification, authentication and authorization are
three distinct, yet inter-dependent, concepts.

There are three types of authentication factors,

which should be used in combination.

Passwords are increasingly showing their limits.

New authentication schemes are promising, but

should be used with care. 56