ISRAEL, IRAN & HEZBOLLAH - IS ANOTHER CONFLCIT ON

THE HORIZON?

Introduction

1. The possibility of an imminent conflict involving Israel, Iran and

Hezbollah has been a critical issue in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Tensions
escalated significantly following Hamas's terrorist attacks on southern Israel
on October 7, 2023, almost leading Israel to launch a preventive war against
Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Israeli intelligence assessed that Hezbollah
fighters were on the verge of crossing the border into northern Israel as part of
a multi-pronged attack sponsored by Iran. Although, this immediate threat was
averted, the potential for conflict remains high, driven by a volatile security
environment and strategic calculations by the involved parties. Exchanges of
fire between Israel and Iran backed Hezbollah, persistent over the past eight
months, have intensified in recent weeks. The situation can escalate into a
full-blown war in either of two ways. One is for the present tit-for-tat to spin out
of control in a manner that neither side plans. The other route to escalation
would be an intentional resort to full-scale war by one side.

2. Traditionally Tehran lets others fight its fights and stays in the
background, but that changed in April when, in retaliation for the Israeli strike
on its diplomatic complex in Damascus, Tehran responded with a volley of
hundreds of missiles and drones toward Israel.

3. Since October, tensions on the Lebanon-Israel border have fluctuated.

In the last few weeks, however, those tensions have escalated and war is
looking ever more likely. The rhetoric on both sides is heating up. Many
countries are calling on their nationals to leave Lebanon immediately. If ever
there was a danger of a regional war in the Middle East, that moment is now.
Thus, it becomes important as military practitioners to understand the current
regional dynamics and analyze the possibility of an all-out war between Israel
and Iran’ crown jewel Hezbollah.

4. Aim. To explore the potential for a future conflict involving Israel, Iran
and Hezbollah amidst current geopolitical landscape.

5. Scope. The paper will be covered under following heads: -

(a) Part I. Historical Context.

(b) Part II. Current Security Landscape.
(c) Part III. Hezbollah’s Capabilities and Objectives.
(d) Part IV. Israel’s Objectives and Options.
(e) Part V. Iran’s Objectives and Options.
(f) Part VI. Implications for Lebanon & UNIFIL.
(g) Part VII. Recommendations.
 PART I: HISTORICAL CONTEXT

6. The origins of the Israel-Iran nexus trace back to the establishment of

Israel in 1948, following the end of the British Mandate in Palestine. Initially,
Iran, under the Shah, maintained amicable relations with Israel. This dynamic
shifted dramatically post-1979, with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which saw
the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini and a vehemently anti-Israel regime. Hezbollah
emerged in the early 1980s, catalyzed by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in
1982, with substantial Iranian support.

7. Key Events Influencing Contemporary Relations: -

(a) Israel’s Independence. The state of Israel declared

independence on 14th May 1948. The next day, Egypt, Syria,
Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon declared war on Israel. The Israeli
forces repelled the attack and temporarily occupied part of south
Lebanon. An armistice was signed on March 23, 1949, and Israeli
troops withdrew to the internationally recognised border.

(b) Emergence of Fatah. A Palestinian nationalist group,

emerged in 1965, as a powerful force in the region coincided
with renewed border skirmishes between Israel and Lebanon.

(c) 1967: Six-Day War. The Israel’s victory in war fought between
Israel and surrounding Arab states led to influx of thousands of
Palestinian refugees to Lebanon causing internal rifts and violence
against Lebanon’s Jewish population, leading many to emigrate.

(d) Rise of Yasser Arafat. In 1968, Yasser Arafat’s Fatah

took control of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), a broad
coalition representing the Palestinian people and started to launch
operations against Israel with the 14 groups under the umbrella of the
PLO.

(e) 1978. Lebanon-based Palestinian fighters continued to

conduct cross-border raids and in March 1978, Israel invaded
Lebanon, advancing as far as the Litani River. In response, the United
Nations Security Council passed Resolution 425, which called for the
immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces. It also established the UN
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which still operates to this day.

(f) 1982 Lebanon War. Israel attacked Lebanon to stop PLO raids
in its area. The invasion led to the eventual departure of the PLO from
Lebanon under the supervision of a multinational peacekeeping force
on September 1, however it precipitated Hezbollah’s formation,
bolstered by Iranian backing to resist Israeli occupation.

(g) 1985. Israel withdrew to the Litani River in South Lebanon and
created what it called a security zone there. The Israeli occupation of
the southern region continued until 2000.
 (h) 1992-2000. Persistent guerrilla warfare by Hezbollah against
Israeli forces culminated in Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon
in 2000.

(j) 2006 Lebanon War. In an operation into Israeli territory,

Hezbollah killed three soldiers and captured two. Hezbollah demanded
the release of Lebanese prisoners in exchange for the Israeli soldiers.
The July War broke out and lasted 34 days. Approximately 1,200
Lebanese people died and 4,400 were wounded, mostly civilians. 2006
wasn’t as much a war between Lebanon and Israel as much as it was
between Hezbollah and Israel.

(k) Syrian Civil War. Iran and Hezbollah's support for the Assad
regime increased their regional military footprint, bringing them closer
to Israel's borders.

(l) 2007 to 2022. Until 2023, the border had been relatively
quiet. Occasional rockets or drones crossed from Lebanon into Israel
without leading to serious escalation, while Israel violated Lebanese
airspace more than 22,000 times from 2007 to 2022.

(m) Nuclear Tensions. Iran’s nuclear ambitions have been a

central Israeli security concern, leading to international sanctions and
the contentious 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA).

8. Relations Between Israel, Iran and Hezbollah . The relationship

among Israel, Iran, and Hezbollah is characterized by hostility and mutual
distrust. Israel perceives Iran and Hezbollah as primary threats due to their
explicit anti-Israel objectives and military capabilities. Iran views Hezbollah as
a strategic proxy, providing it with financial, logistical and military support.
Hezbollah, aligning with Iranian strategic aims, prioritizes its opposition to
Israel.

9. Strategic Objectives and Security Concerns.

(a) Israel. Focuses on safeguarding its national security, countering

Iranian entrenchment in Syria and neutralizing Hezbollah’s missile
threat. Preventing Iran’s nuclear armament remains paramount.

(b) Iran. Seeks to expand its regional influence, counter US and

Israeli presence and bolster allied groups such as Hezbollah and the
Assad regime.

(c) Hezbollah. Committed to resisting Israeli influence,

maintaining its dominance within Lebanon and advancing Iranian
strategic interests in the region.
 PART II : CURRENT SECURITY LANDSCAPE

10. Israel has repeatedly fought Hezbollah since the group’s inception in
the early 1980s. Indeed, Hezbollah has defined itself from the start in
opposition to Israel and dedicated itself to driving Israel out of Lebanon.
Despite Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah continued occasional
attacks on Israel, using the pretext that Israel occupied Shebaa Farms, a
small area at the intersection of the Lebanon-Syria-Israel border. Hezbollah
claimed Shebaa Farms was Lebanese territory and thus that Israel’s
occupation continued, despite the United Nations concluding that Shebaa
Farms is Syrian and that Israel had evacuated its forces from Lebanon
completely.

11. Another area of dispute was the village of Ghajjar, just west of Shebaa
Farms and bisected by the Israel-Lebanon border. Its residents have both
Lebanese and Israeli citizenship. For years, a fence divided Ghajjar, but
Israeli forces reoccupied all of Ghajjar in 2006 and today retain control there.

12. The 2006 war ended with UNSCR 1701, which created a zone
between the Blue Line and the Litani River along the borders of Israel,
Lebanon, and Syria. According to UNSCR 1701, the area between the Blue
Line and the Litani River should be free from any armed personnel, assets,
and weapons except for those of the government of Lebanon and UNIFIL.

13. Today, however, the situation is delicate for several reasons. First, the
October 7 attacks dramatically increased Israeli insecurity. Secondly,
Hezbollah joined the war against Israel by firing along the entire northern
border of Israel. These clashes between Hezbollah and Israel have displaced
more than 150,000 people on both sides of the Israel-Lebanon border,
including roughly 80,000 civilians from northern Israel and 75,000 from
southern Lebanon.

14. For Israel, resettling its internally displaced persons back to their
homes and villages in northern Israel will require creating and ensuring a
security environment that currently does not exist. Israeli leaders need to
convince their population that, this time, the intelligence services can
anticipate any attack and the military can stop it. Domestic pressure has been
growing to improve the security situation.

15. Post 2006, Hezbollah has dramatically improved its military and
stockpiled over 120,000 stand-off weapons in Lebanon and Syria. Hezbollah
has repeatedly violated UNSCR 1701 by stationing its forces in the zone
between the Blue Line and the Litani River, sometimes under the cover of the
fake nongovernmental organization “Green Without Borders.” As shown in
Figure 1, Geo-located footage from Hezbollah propaganda videos indicates
that Hezbollah ATGMs have struck Israeli forces from concealed launch sites
less than five kilometers from the Blue Line on several occasions since
October 7, a clear violation of UNSCR 1701.
 Figure 1: Assessed Areas of Operations of Hezbollah ATGM Teams ( Oct 8, 2023 to Mar 2024)

16. Since Oct 07, there has been a steady escalation in tensions between
the two archrivals Israel & Iran. While Israel & Iran have been locked in a
‘Shadow War’ for decades, recent months have brought tensions to a boiling
point. Though, Iran denies any prior knowledge of Hamas attack or any
involvement in it, but Israel has consistently blamed Iran for its support for the
Palestinian group that is a part of so called “Axis of Resistance”, an Iran led
informal alliance of players like Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthi rebel
groups, the Syrian government & groups in Iraq. Yemen’s Houthis, an ally of
Iran have seized and attacked several ships in the southern Red Sea. They
have consistently targeted ships associated with Israel or the United States in
the Red Sea.

17. Over past year, Iran and Israel have been engaged in series of
incidents like an Israeli air strike, outside the Syrian capital of Damascus killed
Sayed Razi Mousavi, one of the top commander and senior adviser in Syria of
IRGC, an Israeli air raid in Damascus killing five members of IRGC on 20 th
Jan, strikes on Iran’s consulate in Syria, seizing of Israel linked ship in Strait
of Hormuz etc. On April 13th Iran launched more than 300 drones & missiles
against Israel as part of Operation True Promise. This was first ever direct
strike on Israel from Iranian soil. The missiles were largely shot down outside
of Israel’s borders.

18. Apart from these Tit-for-Tact reaction, there is a large threat looming on
Israel, the Iranian nuclear program. Since the collapse of JCPOA also known
as Iran nuclear deal - Iran has been inching closer to a bomb, Israeli
population have long worried that a nuclear-powered Israel has not been able
to deter Iran’s conventional missile and drone attack, how will it deter Iran’s
nuclear program to ensure its own security. This makes Israeli preemptive
action against the Iranian nuclear program all the move likely, despite same
significant military challenges.
 PART III: HEZBOLLAH’S CAPABILITIES AND OBJECTIVES

19. Central to Hezbollah’s revolutionary and anti-imperialist ideology has

been its struggle against Israel and the party has derived much of its
legitimacy from fighting it. Hezbollah portrays itself as the guardian of
Lebanon—its doctrine, according to a 2009 manifesto, is that resistance is a
“permanent national necessity” as long as there is an Israeli threat and “the
absence of a strong, stable state in Lebanon.”

20. This could change and Hezbollah could lose support (especially from
its Christian supporters) if it sparks an all-out war. Yet given its autonomy
inside Lebanon due to its political influence and military strength—including
tens of thousands of fighters and over 150,000 missiles, rockets, and drones
—Hezbollah does not need to respond to domestic calls for restraint or
attempts to curb its autonomy. Lebanese authorities have openly admitted
this. Thus, to gaze Hezbollah’s future move it becomes imperative for us to
understand Hezbollah's overall objectives, force design, defensive positions;
rocket, missile, and unmanned aircraft system (UAS) arsenal, anti-tank
capabilities, air defense capabilities and proficiency as a fighting force.

21. Objectives. Hezbollah has several objectives that could lead to a

conflict with Israel, though the organization has numerous and at times
competing, goals, some of which make a conflict less likely or at least would
lead Hezbollah to be cautious.

(a) Hezbollah sees itself as a revolutionary organization that is one

of the leaders of the broader Muslim struggle against Israel. Destroying
Israel has been a part of its core ideology since its founding and most
of its members are sincerely against the very existence of the Jewish
state. Hezbollah shares this goal with Iran, which also rejects Israel
ideologically and sees it as a threat to the Islamic Republic.

(b) Hezbollah also sees itself as the defender of Lebanon, and

various territorial disputes and Israeli incursions are a constant source
of tension. Also, Hezbollah, like Hamas, seeks the release of prisoners
in Israeli custody.

(c) Hezbollah, however, has important reasons for caution. Most

importantly, Hezbollah seeks broader popularity in Lebanon and
triggering a destructive war could grievously undermine support,
particularly outside its Shiite core constituency.

(d) Iran also may seek to keep Hezbollah in reserve as a weapon to

use should Israel or the United States launch a major attack on Iran
itself.
22. Force Design.

(a) Hezbollah has approximately 30,000 active fighters and up to

20,000 reserves. Its forces primarily consist of light infantry, which have
historically been trained and built for stealth, mobility and autonomy.

(b) Hezbollah has employed a version of what the United States

calls “mission command,” empowering subordinates to make
independent battlefield decisions based on a commander’s intent. This
force design has allowed Hezbollah to operate effectively under
conditions of overwhelming Israeli firepower.

(c) In 2006, for example, its rocket units were designed to set up a
launch site, fire and disperse in less than 28 seconds, relying on
prepositioned equipment, underground shelters and mountain
bicycles to achieve such a small window of exposure. In the wake of
the 2006 war, Hezbollah continued to build on the strengths of this
approach, decentralizing its command and control and reorganizing to
force the IDF into more urbanized terrain where its fighters can take
advantage of concealed, fortified positions.

(d) Hezbollah’s experience fighting in support of Bashar al-Assad in

Syria for the past decade has given it access to capabilities and
competencies used by conventional armies. Hezbollah can now
conduct coordinated maneuvers of larger forces, employ suppressive
artillery and conduct logistics to support larger groupings of forces.

(e) Hezbollah also fought against a different enemy in Syria -

irregular forces that look very different from the modern military of the
IDF. Hezbollah’s ability to effectively employ the capabilities it has
gained since 2006 in the face of IDF firepower, especially air power, is
also unclear, and indeed, it is likely that any large, heavy forces would
be quickly destroyed if they were deployed.

23. Geography and Defensive Positions. The geography of southern

Lebanon offers several advantages that Hezbollah fighters could exploit in a
war with Israel.

(a) The region, including much of the area directly across the Israeli
border, predominantly consists of rocky hills. In 2006 and in other
clashes with Israel, small and mobile groups of Hezbollah militants
used trees, patches of vegetation, caves, surface irregularities and
buildings along the slopes of the hills to conceal their movements and
fire rockets, UASs and ATGMs at Israeli positions on the border.

(b) Any heavy Israeli military ground force attempting to move

throughout the region would likely be restricted to the major hard-
packed roadways due to the hilly terrain and would therefore be
vulnerable to harassment with ATGMs, improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) and ambushes.
 (c) Hezbollah has built a network of tunnels and bunkers in the hills
of southern Lebanon to host and move equipment and personnel
relatively securely. Hezbollah also uses this infrastructure to launch
ambushes and rocket attacks. Where it lacks purpose-built military
fortifications, Hezbollah fighters can exploit existing civilian
infrastructure in the cities, towns, and villages throughout the region.

(d) During the 2006 war, civilian infrastructure was critical to

Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon. They used it in place of formal
military fortifications to hide command centers, complicate Israeli
targeting, conceal fighters for ambushes and enable fighters to
disperse, maneuver and defend in depth.

(e) Thousands of civilians fled from southern Lebanon as strikes

between Hezbollah and Israel intensified after October 7, 2023. Some
of the towns and villages along Lebanon’s southern border almost
completely emptied. In a war with Israel, Hezbollah could exploit
civilian infrastructure and its network of tunnels and bunkers to attack
Israeli ground forces and quickly retreat. Aware of Hezbollah’s
fortifications and probable tactics, Israeli attacks would likely
emphasize clearing and destroying Hezbollah’s tunnel network in
Southern Lebanon.

(f) Several rivers run through southern Lebanon, including the

Litani River, which flows south from the Lebanon Mountains before
bending west where it empties into the Mediterranean. Control of these
rivers and their features represents an important strategic objective,
including controlling the movement of troops, equipment, and
supplies. These rivers also serve as natural defensive
fortifications that can be exploited for tactical advantages in combat by
defending forces.

24. Rockets,Msls and Unmanned Aerial Systems . Hezbollah’s rockets

and missiles pose two distinct threats to Israel.

(a) The first is their coercive effect: continuous rocket, missile and
UAS barrages can kill or wound Israelis - both civilians and military
personnel or destroy important political or economic infrastructure in
Israel. This is the way Hezbollah’s rockets and missiles were primarily
used in 2006.

(b) The second threat comes from the tactical and operational
effects of these systems: suppressing or attritting IDF forces to limit the
effectiveness of Israeli operations. Hezbollah gained experience
conducting combined arms operations in Syria and the group may
attempt to use rockets and missiles as part of ground operations
against Israeli forces.
25. Hezbollah is probably the most heavily armed non-state group in the
world and its stockpiles of rockets, missiles, and UASs are a major part of its
arsenal.

(a) Estimates of how many rockets and missiles Hezbollah

possesses vary from 120,000 to 200,000. Because of Hezbollah’s
close relationship with Iran, it is likely that Tehran would resupply
Hezbollah quickly if it used this arsenal in a conflict with Israel.

(b) This resupply is easier than in the past, as Iran’s presence in

Syria expanded considerably after Tehran came to the rescue of the
Syrian regime when civil war broke out after 2011, creating a land
bridge that enables weapons to go from Iraq to Syria to Hezbollah in
Lebanon. This stands in sharp contrast to Hamas, where weapons and
people must be smuggled via tunnels from Gaza.

(c) As shown in Table 1 above, the bulk of Hezbollah’s arsenal

consists of short-range unguided projectiles. Hezbollah has also
dramatically increased its access to long-range missiles since 2006,
meaning that most of Israel will feel the threat of Hezbollah attacks if
the conflict escalates.

(d) Finally, Hezbollah’s precision-guided missiles pose an

acute threat to Israel’s most important political, military, and economic
centers a threat that did not exist in [Link]’s guided missiles
make up an even smaller number of those long-range missiles but
creates greater pressure on Israeli air defense systems and provide
Hezbollah with the capability to strike high-value targets, vital
economic centers and critical infrastructure.
26. While Hezbollah has historically used its rockets and missiles to
impose pain on Israel rather than as part of combined arms operations, an
important unknown is how Hezbollah might use its rocket and (to a lesser
extent) missile capabilities in support of ground operations against the IDF.

(a) Hezbollah could attempt to capture territory in northern Israel or

the Golan Heights in a Hezbollah-Israel war or at least conduct raids
there. This would require ground maneuver, which modern armies
usually enable using suppressive fire from artillery or air platforms.

(b) Hezbollah demonstrated the ability to integrate ground

maneuver with suppressive fires in Syria and it may attempt to do so
in a war with Israel. Such tactics are difficult in practice and expertise
is probably unevenly distributed across Hezbollah’s military forces.
IDF air defenses and air power would also limit Hezbollah’s ability to
use its rockets and missiles in this manner.

27. In addition to its rocket and missile stockpiles, Hezbollah possesses a

significant arsenal of UASs that include commercial quadcopters, suicide
drones, loitering munitions and more sophisticated platforms with surveillance
and strike capabilities.

(a) Hezbollah’s UASs are almost entirely supplied by Iran

and are used to conduct surveillance of and strikes against Israeli
targets. On January 25, 2024, the IDF struck a 1,200- meter runway in
Southern Lebanon that it alleges Hezbollah built with Iranian
assistance and was used by Hezbollah to launch large UASs. The
airstrip and the surrounding base illustrate the advancement of
Hezbollah’s UAS capabilities to include larger and more sophisticated
systems.

(b) Should war with Israel break out, Hezbollah would likely receive
additional imports of drones from Iran and emphasize adapting
commercial off-the-shelf systems to their needs. After all, Iran has
established logistics supply routes—both air and land bridges—that
can bring weapon systems and other equipment from Iran to Lebanon
through Iraq and Syria. The result is that Hezbollah would probably be
able to sustain a campaign of UAS attacks against Israeli targets in
Lebanon and Israel unless supply routes were cut.

28. Anti-Tank Guided Missiles and Improvised Explosive

[Link] and IEDs give Hezbollah potent capabilities to attack
armored vehicles and fortified locations. These capabilities were vital to its
tactical successes in the 2006 war.

(a) Hezbollah has almost certainly improved its anti-tank

capabilities since 2006. It currently fields an ATGM system, Tharallah,
that is designed to overcome the active protection system used by the
IDF’s Merkava MBTs, although its efficacy is unclear from open
sources.
 (b) Hezbollah has taken steps to improve the mobility of its
anti-tank units, mounting Kornet anti-tank missiles on all-terrain
vehicles.

(c) On the tactical side, analysis of Hezbollah’s combat

performance in Syria suggests that its members remain well schooled
in using ATGMs against armored vehicles and fortified infantry
positions. The result is that Hezbollah’s ATGMs are likely to remain
one of its deadliest capabilities, even if they do not attain the success
rate of 2006.

29. IEDs. Hezbollah also has a considerable IED capacity.

Hezbollah employed IEDs with explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) against
Israel in the 1990s and will almost certainly seek to do so again. Hezbollah
could also conduct attacks on Israeli forces using tunnel bombs, which were
used in Iraq and Syria to literally undermine fortified [Link] IED
capabilities, combined with Hezbollah’s ATGMs, would allow the group to
harass and disrupt the advance of Israeli ground forces in Lebanon. IEDs will,
however, inflict casualties, which Hezbollah leaders probably believe would
undermine political will in Israel.

30. Air Defense. Since the 2006 war, Hezbollah has emphasized the
advancement and expansion of its air defense capabilities to degrade Israeli
air superiority.

(a) Hezbollah’s air defenses include a range of systems primarily

manufactured by Iran and Russia, including anti-aircraft guns, man-
portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and short- and medium-
range surface-to-air (SAM) missile systems. Hezbollah has
occasionally used them to engage Israeli UASs flying over southern
Lebanon in recent years.

(b) In the event of war, Hezbollah’s air defenses would likely force
Israeli aircraft to fly at higher altitudes, reducing their ability to
accurately hit targets on the ground. At the same time, Hezbollah’s air
defense systems would be high-priority targets for Israel. Although
Hezbollah’s upgraded air defense systems pose a greater threat to
Israeli aircraft than they did in previous conflicts, Israel still has
immense air superiority over Lebanon.

31. Human Factors. Hezbollah’s tactical proficiency, combat experience

and will to fight make it a much deadlier threat than Hamas and even other
regional militaries.

(a) Hezbollah’s combat experience in Syria has given its troops

experience in ground combat that few regional militaries possess,
forcing them to learn how to conduct offensive operations and exposing
them to the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the Russian
military.
 (b) Hezbollah members have also repeatedly displayed a
willingness to accept decisive engagement and fight to the last
soldier—attitudes that will only be increased by the desire to defend
their homes from an Israeli offensive.

(c) However, in past few months IDF has targeted important

Hezbollah’s military commanders, this has given a serious blow to
Hezbollah's command and control structure.

32. In short, the Hezbollah that Israel would face if violence were to
escalate to major ground operations is more capable than in 2006. Hezbollah
is larger, better armed and more experienced, thanks to its experience fighting
in Syria. It is most effectively designed to fight a coercive campaign aimed at
killing Israeli soldiers and civilians at a steady rate through rocket, long-range
missiles, ATGM and UAS attacks. But it may also have some ability to
conduct combined arms offensives against Israeli troops and limit Israeli air
dominance. Even so, it remains technologically outmatched by the IDF, which
has long prepared for a rematch of the 2006 war, has been engaged in a war
with Hamas since October 2023 and will be able to bring much greater
firepower to bear from its land- and air-based platforms.

PART IV: ISRAELI OBJECTIVES AND OPTIONS

33. In light of the changing strategic landscape and Hezbollah’s evolving

capabilities, what options does Israel have? There are at least four
reasonable options: -

(a) Return to the pre–October 7 status quo and emphasize

deterrence.

(b) Start an all-out war with Hezbollah to destroy the group’s

capabilities and force it to comply with Israel’s demands.

(c) Engage in a limited war with Hezbollah to put pressure on the

group and push its forces further from the Israeli border.

(d) Use coercive diplomacy to better implement UNSCR 1701.

34. OPTION 1: THE STATUS QUO ANTE AND A RETURN TO

DETERRENCE.

(a) Israel might try to return to a deterrent approach, which

has uneasily kept the peace for almost 20 years. Deterring Hezbollah
rests on the idea that the threat of war—including the potential
destruction of portions of Lebanon and punitive strikes on the group
 and Lebanese infrastructure will keep the group from launching
attacks or at least massive strikes on Israel.

(b) This threat works by endangering something Hezbollah holds

dear, such as the lives of its leaders, its power in Lebanon and the
well-being of its constituents. After Israel left Lebanon in 2000, it
retaliated against the occasional rocket strike or other violation of the
peace with the threat of more massive strikes should Hezbollah mount
a larger attack. circumstances change. Hezbollah strikes focus on a
discreet target set along the border even though the group has the
capacity to launch far more attacks and to strike all of Israel.

(c) It is clearly trying to limit its attacks even as it shows solidarity.

Hezbollah cares about its constituents and recognizes that a repeat of
the 2006 war, let alone something much worse, would be a disaster for
these supporters.

(d) In recent years, Lebanon’s economy has plummeted and

Hezbollah does not want to take the blame for a war that would further
devastate the country. Israeli threats have made clear to Hezbollah that
Lebanon would be hit hard if an all-out conflict resumes and the
devastation of Gaza reinforces the credibility of this threat.

35. Deterrence, however, could fail for several reasons. A strike that kills
large numbers of Israeli civilians, even if accidental, would inflame the
situation. Deterrence also rests on understanding an adversary’s decision
calculus and Israel might misunderstand Hezbollah’s tolerance for attacks on
Hamas leaders or the continued loss of Hezbollah cadre, including important
operational leaders. As previously noted, Israel’s risk tolerance has changed,
and Israeli leaders might decide that even a small chance of Hezbollah
attacking Israel needs to be preempted.

36. OPTION 2: AN ALL-OUT WAR. Should deterrence fail, whether by

accident or by choice, an all-out war is possible. Israel’s chief of staff, Herzi
Halevi, told Israeli soldiers that the chances of war against Hezbollah are
growing. Part of Israel’s logic is that a war with Hezbollah at some point is
inevitable and that Israel should not wait for a surprise attack.

(a) A war would likely focus on preventing a more dangerous repeat

of October 7, going after Hezbollah’s rocket, missile and drone
capabilities and trying to push the group’s fighters farther from the
border, probably to the other side of the Litani River. Even a decisive
defeat of Hezbollah, however, would not lead to the group’s destruction
given its deep roots in Lebanon and strong support from Iran.

(b) The IDF outnumbers Hezbollah in troops, tanks, artillery and

other forms of military power. Israel’s equipment is also far more
sophisticated and its forces are better trained. Since its poor
performance in the 2006 war, Israel has prepared for war with
 Hezbollah, in contrast to its lack of preparation for the invasion of
Gaza. Israel has prepared a target set it can draw on at any time for strikes.

(c) An Israeli attack would probably involve massive airstrikes that

would seek to target Hezbollah leaders, disrupt command and control
(which would also involve counterattacks) and hit Hezbollah’s rocket
launcher sites, especially those that involve Hezbollah’s precision
munitions arsenal.

(d) Although Israel would target Hezbollah leadership and

military sites in Beirut and in the Beqaa Valley, it would likely
focus most of its effort on Hezbollah’s presence near the border.

(e) Using lessons learned in Gaza, Israel would likely also attempt
to destroy Hezbollah’s tunnel network. Finding and targeting Hezbollah
tunnels has been an Israeli military and intelligence priority for years,
though Hezbollah showed in 2006 that it could successfully use
deception to build an extensive network.

37. Israel might then invade Lebanon with several divisions (it used four in
Gaza, where the dense urban terrain required extensive manpower), seeking
to uncover and destroy hidden tunnels and force Hezbollah fighters to the
other side of the Litani River. Although southern Lebanon is not densely
populated like Gaza, some of the fighting would involve urban warfare. If
Israel were to successfully remove Hezbollah forces, it would then carefully
monitor the area and conduct extensive strikes if necessary to prevent any
return.

38. Hezbollah would respond in several ways.

(a) Hezbollah forces would conduct guerrilla attacks, likely

using an extensive tunnel network and well-prepared defensive
positions near the Israeli border, taking advantage of the rough terrain
there.

(b) Hezbollah would also attempt cross-border attacks as

well as perhaps maritime infiltration to strike at Israel directly.

(c) In addition, Hezbollah would use its massive rocket and

missile arsenal to attack Israel, overwhelming Israel’s defensive
systems and striking at targets throughout the entire country.

(d) Finally, Hezbollah might conduct international terrorist

attacks at Israeli targets around the world, working extensively with Iran
to do so. Hezbollah would also use its influence over the Lebanese
government to ensure that any ceasefire was on its own terms.

39. OPTION 3: LIMITED WAR. Another approach is to continue the

current level of conflict, in which there is no all-out war, but dozens of
Hezbollah fighters are killed every month, as well as a small number of
Israelis. Civilians would die on both sides, but if current patterns continue, far
more Lebanese would be killed than Israelis.

(a) Limited war would involve regular Israeli airstrikes on Hezbollah

forces near the border and on the occasional Hezbollah commander,
while Hezbollah would fire anti-tank missiles at military and civilian
infrastructure across the border, allow Palestinian groups based in
Lebanon to attempt the occasional cross-border attack and launch
rocket and mortar attacks on Israeli positions.

(b) Limited war would serve several purposes for both Israel and
Hezbollah. For Israel, such strikes keep Hezbollah off balance, forcing
its commanders to hide or risk being killed and putting its weapons
caches at risk. In addition, the strikes show the Israeli people that the
government is actively trying to defend them and make it hard for
Hezbollah to amass forces that might conduct a surprise attack across
the border.

(c) For Hezbollah, limited war allows it to show solidarity with

Hamas and affirm Iran’s “resistance” agenda. Although Hezbollah has
lost over 100 fighters since October 7, this level of casualties is
manageable for a large organization with many skilled personnel. For
both Hezbollah and Israel, limits to the conflict help avoid the costs of
an all-out war.

40. At the same time, limited war poses problems for both groups, in
addition to the regular casualties. The biggest problem is the impact on
civilians along the border. The conflict worsens Lebanon’s always-simmering
instability and mounting economic problems and Hezbollah risks taking the
blame. Perhaps over 75,000 Lebanese have fled southern Lebanon, with no
immediate prospect of return: a similar political problem for Hezbollah to what
Israel faces, with its displaced citizens, who are unlikely to return to their
homes en masse as long as limited war continues. Finally, it is unclear
whether a limited war would remain limited.

41. OPTION 4: COERCIVE DIPLOMACY. Another approach is to

use coercive diplomacy to compel Hezbollah to abide by UNSCR 1701.

(a) To this end, the United States, often represented by mediator

Amos Hochstein, is using diplomacy to negotiate with Lebanese
leaders and thus indirectly with Hezbollah, while Israel is putting
military pressure on the group through a mix of strikes on Hezbollah
forces and leaders. The renewed threat of an all-out war gives this
pressure additional strength. Hezbollah, however, does not want to be
seen as surrendering to Israeli pressure, particularly at a time when
Israeli attacks on Palestinians are dominating the headlines.

(b) In addition to ending Hezbollah attacks on Israel, the goal for

Israel would be for Hezbollah to move its armed forces back, as
promised under UNSCR 1701, to the Litani River. It is possible that
 Israel would also accept a less comprehensive withdrawal that moves
Hezbollah farther back from the Israel-Lebanon border but not all the
way to the Litani River. UNIFIL might need to be bolstered
substantially and be far more aggressive in its use of force in
response to any incursion, both of which would be difficult to
accomplish.

(c) Israel, too, would be asked to make concessions and changes in

response to UNSCR 1701 and to appease Hezbollah. Israel regularly
violates Lebanese airspace, which Israel does to strike and monitor
Hezbollah positions. Hezbollah would also likely seek an Israeli
evacuation of Shebaa Farms and the village of Ghajar, perhaps placing
them under UNIFIL so that the group could claim a political victory
even as it made concessions.

PART V: IRAN’S OBJECTIVES AND OPTIONS

42. Israel and Iran once had close economic and strategic ties; Iran
imported Israeli arms and Israel bought Iranian oil prior to the Iranian
revolution in 1979. Both countries also had close ties with the US and
considered fighting the Soviet Union and the spread of communism part of
their foreign policy, according to the US Institute for Peace. But the 1979
revolution brought in a hard-liner Shia government that considered Israel
usurpers on Muslim land and considered the US an enabler.

43. For its part, Iran has not changed its strategic goals since October 7.
As has been the case throughout the Islamic Republic’s history, Tehran seeks
to expel U.S. forces from the Middle East, assert itself as the regional
hegemon, and challenge Israel’s existence. After October 7, Iranian leaders
saw an opportunity to pursue these goals more aggressively by activating
proxies across the region, focusing on actions that they believed would
pressure Israel, impose costs on the United States for supporting its partner,
and drive a wedge in the US-Israel alliance.

44. Most recently, Iran launched a state-on-state attack against Israel on

April 13. The abysmal failure of the April 13 missile and drone attack on Israel
has also cast doubt on Iranian deterrence. Tehran now finds itself the subject
of international condemnation as the aggressor, with more diplomatic
attention devoted to its airspace violations against multiple countries. In
addition, the attack galvanized the United States, Israel, and allies in Europe
and the Middle East to work together on intercepting many of the drones and
missiles used in the attack.

45. It is essential to note that the Iranian regime’s actions do not reflect the
desires of the broader Iranian population, most of whom seek peaceful
coexistence with other countries in the region. This distinction which highlights
the widening rift between the regime and its people is critical to understanding
the motivations and timelines for Tehran’s military strategies and its
investment in offensive capabilities. In all likelihood, the regime will continue
moving further away from its people, using military adventurism as a tool to
assert regional dominance and mask its catastrophic domestic failures.

46. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, has repeatedly

predicted that Israel, founded in 1948, would not reach its 80th anniversary.
Iran’s goal has been to gradually weaken Israel through an endless war of
attrition. Forcing the country to keep its reserve force permanently mobilised
would undermine the economy and sap morale.

47. In light of the changing strategic landscape and to avoid direct

retaliation, it arms irregular forces and evolves capabilities of the Axis of
Resistance groups. This enables Iran to generate two possible options to
handle the present Israel-Hezbollah situation: -

(a) Engage in a limited war using its proxies like Hezbollah to put
pressure on Israel and push it to end Gaza offensive,

(a) Start an all-out war using Hezbollah to open a new front along
Israel’s Northern areas.

48. OPTION 1: LIMITED WAR.

(a) The dynamics in Tehran have shifted, and the likelihood of a US

military strike against Iran's nuclear program has decreased as the
Biden administration seeks to disengage from the Middle East and
focus on the Pacific. Meanwhile, Israel appears weakened, with a
deeply unpopular and divided government that hinders its ability to
make strategic decisions.

(b) Tehran may seize this opportunity to secretly accelerate its nuclear
capabilities and pursue its goal of regional dominance. To achieve this, Iran
needs to continue supporting and empowering its regional allies, including
Hezbollah, as a deterrent against Israeli or US actions targeting its nuclear
ambitions.

(c) Although Iran and Israel have been in conflict since the 1979 Iranian
revolution, they have never engaged in direct war. However, Iran has
supported regional proxies, including Hezbollah, a Shia militant group
in southern Lebanon. Iran also provides material support, training, and
funding to Hamas, as well as other groups like the Fatemiyoun Brigade
in Syria, the Badr Organization in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen.

49. OPTION 2: ALL OUT WAR.

(a) Since October 7, Israel has launched airstrikes in Syria,

targeting key members of Iran's nuclear program. Iran retaliated with a
drone and missile attack in April, but it failed to inflict significant
 damage on Israel. Instead, it drew international condemnation,
damaging Iran's reputation and popularity among its domestic
population. The current tensions between Israel and Hezbollah provide
Iran with an opportunity to divert international attention, mobilize its
military, and suppress domestic unrest.

(b) The April 1 airstrike, attributed to Israel, which killed senior Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders at the Iranian consulate in
Damascus, could escalate the long-standing "shadow war" between
Israel and Iran into an open and all-out regional conflict. Tehran has
vowed to take revenge, exchanging threats with Israel over retaliatory
action that US and allied intelligence agencies believe is imminent.

50. A direct attack by Iranian forces on Israel would likely provoke an

escalatory response, including Israeli reprisals. Israeli officials have made it
clear that they would respond in kind to a direct attack on their territory. The
US is also unlikely to remain neutral, despite its disagreements with Israel
over Gaza. In other words, even a calibrated and limited Iranian action could
quickly spiral into a wider conflict involving each side's respective allies.

PART VI: IMPLICATIONS FOR LEBANON & UNIFIL

EFFECT ON LEBANON.

51. Hezbollah, a powerful Shiite Muslim political party and militant group,
wields significant influence in Lebanon, where it operates as a proxy of Iran.
With its sophisticated combat capabilities and revenue streams, Hezbollah
has become the most powerful political force in Lebanon, rejecting public
oversight while insisting on veto power over government decisions.

52. By providing alternative social support networks and parallel

institutions, such as clinics, schools and banks, Hezbollah has insulated its
followers from Lebanon's economic collapse. This has allowed it to maintain
a strong grip on the country, despite the government's chronic failure to
provide national services.

53. The memories of the war almost two decades ago linger. The war in
2006 had a devastating impact on Lebanon. Reconstruction cost over
US$10 billion (£7.86 billion) and was funded largely by Saudi Arabia, Iran
and others. Since then, the geopolitical landscape has shifted. It would be
far harder to finance any rebuilding projects. Meanwhile the loss of life is
likely to be catastrophic – particularly in Lebanon’s crowded urban areas.

54. Hezbollah's control over Lebanon renders war with Israel

unavoidable, putting the country at risk of catastrophic damage,
displacement and loss of civilian lives. In the event of such a war, Lebanon
would likely become collateral damage, with Hezbollah using violence to
intimidate opponents and critics and ultimately silencing them. This would
usher in an extremely dangerous phase for Lebanon, where Hezbollah
would declare victory and demand payback for its losses from anyone who
did not stand by it, further entrenching its grip on the country and solidifying
Iran's sphere of influence.

EFFECT ON UNIFIL.

55. UNIFIL has roughly 10,000 troops stationed in southern Lebanon.

Under UN Security Council Resolution 1701, passed in 2006, UNIFIL must
ensure, among other things, that the area between the Lebanon’s Litani
River and the so-called Blue Line (the de facto border between Israel and
Lebanon, roughly 30 km south of the river) is “free of any armed personnel,
assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of
UNIFIL.”

56. The UN resolution also authorizes UNIFIL to “take all necessary

action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its
capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile
activities of any kind.” Unfortunately, UNIFIL has failed to fulfill this
mandate.

57. In the event of a war between Israel and Hezbollah, UNIFIL's

presence along the Blue Line in South Lebanon will be significantly
impacted. With tensions along the UN-demarcated Blue Line higher than they
have been for years, United Nations and member states must redouble their
efforts to avoid war. This means taking more concerted steps to implement
Resolution 1701 and push back against Hezbollah’s increasing violations.

58. United States, France and Germany have been carrying regular
interactions with the parties involved and have proposed new measures to
prevent escalations of the situation. These proposed measures will be a boost
to UNIFIL for ensuring the given mandate. However, a new status quo in the
north will require an indirect understanding with Hezbollah.

(a) The outlines of such an arrangement have been put forward by

American and French mediators. They include a withdrawal of critical
Hezbollah’s capabilities up to six miles from the border, an enhanced
presence by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the United Nations
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a peacekeeping force that
straddles the border, coupled with guarantees and strategic monitoring
by the U.S. and France. Progress toward resolving some of the
contested points along the border would further facilitate such an
agreement.

(b) In addition, the Lebanese government and armed forces must

be held accountable for colluding with Hezbollah—and they cannot use
the country’s severe crisis as an excuse to delay change.
 (c) Going forward, economic and logistical aid should be
conditioned on Lebanon performing its professed duties as host
country—namely, protecting UN forces, bringing offenders to justice,
allowing prompt UN access to areas of interest, and ceasing its efforts
to cover up for Hezbollah.

(d) Unfortunately, unimpeded access to sites of interest cannot be

expected anytime soon, meanwhile so member UN should provide
detailed, up-to-date statistics and geographical documentation of
UNIFIL’s actual operational footprint, identifying all locations where UN
patrols were allowed to pass and where they were blocked or
attacked. This picture would clarify both UNIFIL’s shrinking footprint and
the expanding, unmonitored swaths of land where Hezbollah is building up
its illicit military presence and increasing the risk of war.

(e) UN should spearhead a vigorous effort to change the way

UNIFIL does business. In short, the monitors need monitoring. For
example, UNIFIL should be allowed to start flying reconnaissance
drones over the south, to conduct recce of Non State Actors
unhindered move and making the video feeds publicly available for
preventing allegations from Hezbollah.

(f) At the same time, United Nations and member states should
attempt to engage and leverage the population of south Lebanon,
where many residents have little use for Hezbollah, its endless conflict
with Israel, or the evacuations they have had to endure for months.

(g) In this regard, UNIFIL’s presence does provide a pair of real

benefits, increased economic activity and less chance of getting caught
up in armed clashes with Israel. If southern towns want to reap these
benefits, they should be expected to proactively request and welcome
UN outposts and patrols, even when these deployments prove intrusive
on occasion. Ideally, locals would also signal their unwillingness to
tolerate militia activity in other ways.

(h) Ultimately, fixing UNIFIL and deploying the LAF to the

south may not be sufficient to prevent a future conflagration.

PART VII: RECOMMENDATIONS

59. To prevent a devastating war between Iran-backed Hezbollah and

Israel in South Lebanon, the United Nations, the United States and other
stakeholders must take immediate and concerted action.

(a) Urgent Diplomacy. The United States, France and other

international actors should intensify diplomatic efforts to broker a
ceasefire and a wider deal between Israel, Lebanon and Hezbollah.
The Biden administration's proposal for a ceasefire and a deal in which
Hezbollah keeps its forces 7 kilometers from the frontier, in exchange
for Israel ending some air operations over Lebanon and Beirut
deploying 15,000 troops from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) south
of the Litani river, should be pursued vigorously.

(b) Regional Non-Actors Withdrawal. The United Nations

should continue to push for the withdrawal of regional non-actors from
southern Lebanon to reduce tensions and prevent escalation.

(c) Lebanese Armed Forces Deployment. The Lebanese

government should deploy 15,000 troops from the LAF south of the
Litani to assert its authority and prevent Hezbollah's dominance.

(d) Development Plan for Southern Lebanon. The international

community should support a development plan for southern Lebanon
to address the region's economic and humanitarian needs, reducing
the appeal of Hezbollah's influence.

(e) Border Dispute Resolution. Israel and Lebanon should

commence discussions on disputed border points along the so-called
Blue Line, with the aim of resolving outstanding issues and modifying
the border in Lebanon's favor in areas where Israel acknowledges it
has gone north of the Blue Line.

(f) Incentivizing Hezbollah's Acquiescence. The international

community should consider offering incentives to Hezbollah, such as
supporting its preferred candidate for Lebanon's presidency, to
encourage its cooperation in a ceasefire and border deal.

(g) Monitoring and Verification. A robust monitoring and

verification mechanism should be established to ensure
compliance with any agreement, including the deployment of a
separate German and/or French ground monitoring presence to
bolster UNIFIL's efforts.

(h) Addressing Israeli Concerns. Israel's concerns about

Hezbollah's military presence and activities in southern Lebanon
should be addressed through a combination of diplomatic efforts and
security arrangements, such as continued drone reconnaissance
flights over south Lebanon.

(i) Humanitarian Assistance. The international community should

prepare for and respond to the humanitarian consequences of a
potential war, including providing aid to displaced persons, supporting
the Lebanese economy and addressing the needs of affected
communities.
 (j) Sustained International Engagement. The international
community should maintain a sustained engagement in the region,
providing diplomatic, economic and humanitarian support to prevent a
war and promote a lasting peace.

(k) Provide US Guarantees to Iran. The US can offer

guarantees to Iran that Israeli attacks against its allies in the region,
including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen, will cease.
This can help alleviate Iran's concerns about the safety of its allies and
reduce the likelihood of its involvement in a conflict.

(l) Establish a Truce in Gaza. Reaching a truce in Gaza

can help reduce tensions in the region and create an environment
conducive to diplomacy.

60. By implementing these recommendations, the risk of an all-out war

between Iran-backed Hezbollah and Israel in South Lebanon can be mitigated
and the region can move towards a more stable and peaceful future.

Conclusion

61. As the situation between Iran, Israel, and Hezbollah continues to

simmer, the risk of another devastating war looms large. The lethal logic of
each side trying to deter the adversary's future attacks by responding strongly
to the most recent attack could lead to an escalation of violence. Moreover,
Israel's internal political and emotional factors may drive it to launch a full-
scale war in Lebanon, despite the lack of a clear-headed and objective
analysis of what would be in the best interests of Israeli security.

62. However, it is not too late to prevent a war. The United Nations, the
United States, and other stakeholders must take immediate and concerted
action to broker a ceasefire and a wider deal between Israel, Lebanon, and
Hezbollah. The recommendations outlined above, including urgent diplomacy,
regional non-actors’ withdrawal, Lebanese Armed Forces deployment,
development plan for southern Lebanon, border dispute resolution,
incentivizing Hezbollah's acquiescence, monitoring and verification,
addressing Israeli concerns, humanitarian assistance, and sustained
international engagement, offer a way forward.

63. While the current circumstances for reaching a deal are difficult, it is
crucial to separate the Israel-Lebanon equation from the ongoing disaster in
Gaza and to address the negative atmospherics that are fueling tensions. The
United States' efforts to support a deal, including the proposal by U.S. envoy
Amos Hochstein, should be pursued vigorously.

64. Ultimately, preventing another war between Iran, Israel, and Hezbollah
requires a collective and sustained effort from all parties involved. It is
imperative to prioritize diplomacy, dialogue, and cooperation over military
action and escalation. The consequences of a war would be catastrophic, and
it is our responsibility to work towards a peaceful and stable future for the
region.