Emergence of Bangladesh: A Simplified Study Guide

Early 20th Century Bengal and the Seed of Division (1905–1919)

• Partition of Bengal (1905) and its Reversal (1911): In 1905, the British colonial

administration divided Bengal into two provinces – East Bengal (with a Muslim majority)

and West Bengal (Hindu majority) – ostensibly for easier governance. This Partition of

Bengal sparked widespread protests by Hindus in West Bengal, who saw it as an attempt

to weaken nationalist unity. Under pressure, the British reunited Bengal in 1911, revoking

East Bengal’s separate status[1]. The reversal pleased Hindu elites but upset many Bengali

Muslims, who had briefly enjoyed political prominence in their own province. This

episode left communal tensions unresolved, as Bengali Muslims felt politically

disadvantaged once Bengal was reunited under Hindu-dominated leadership[2].

• Founding of the All-India Muslim League (1906): To voice Muslim interests, the All-

India Muslim League was founded on December 30, 1906, in Dhaka (then Dacca)[3].

Important founders included Nawab Khwaja Salimullah of Dhaka and Aga Khan III,

with early involvement by Muhammad Ali Jinnah (who later became the League’s most

prominent leader)[3]. The League’s purpose was to protect the political rights of Indian

Muslims and ensure they had a platform in British India’s politics. The British initially

encouraged its formation as a counterweight to the mostly Hindu-led Indian National

Congress[4]. The League achieved early successes like securing separate electorates for

Muslims in elections (through the Morley-Minto Reforms of 1909)[5]. However, its rise
 also sharpened communal identities, contributing to a growing divide between Hindus

and Muslims in Indian politics[6].

• World War I and Rising Nationalism (1914–1918): During World War I, Indian leaders

of both the Congress and Muslim League supported Britain’s war effort, hoping this loyalty

would be rewarded with self-government[7]. India contributed money, resources, and over

a million soldiers. Instead of significant political freedom, India got only vague promises

of “self-rule” after the war[8]. The war effort also caused economic hardship: over £1

billion was taken from India as a "gift" to Britain, food and grain were requisitioned for

troops, and these policies led to famine-like conditions in India[9]. This betrayal fueled

discontent and strengthened the resolve for independence. Some Indian revolutionaries

even took radical steps during WWI – for example, young activists like Khudiram Bose

attempted bomb attacks on British officials, and groups like the Bengal revolutionaries and

the Sikh Ghadar Party sought German and Ottoman support to incite uprisings against

British rule[10]. These efforts were harshly suppressed, but they showed that beyond

loyalism, a section of Indians were ready to fight for freedom, even by force.

• Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) – Early Life and Vision: Jinnah was born in 1876

in Karachi. He studied law in London and became a successful barrister in Bombay[11].

Initially, Jinnah was a member of the Indian National Congress and worked for Hindu–

Muslim unity – he helped broker the Lucknow Pact (1916), an agreement between

Congress and the Muslim League for shared political goals[12]. However, he grew

disillusioned with Congress, especially after 1920 when Mahatma Gandhi launched the

mass Non-Cooperation Movement. Jinnah disagreed with Gandhi’s methods and what he

saw as Congress’s unwillingness to share power with Muslims. He left Congress in

 1920[13]. Over the next two decades Jinnah became the unchallenged leader of the Muslim

League. He argued that India’s Muslims were a “nation” distinct from the Hindus – this

came to be known as the “Two-Nation Theory.” Jinnah believed Muslims should have

a separate state to protect their political and economic rights[14]. He outlined demands to

safeguard Muslim interests (notably in his Fourteen Points in 1929) and led the League

to pass the Lahore Resolution in 1940, formally calling for “independent states” in

Muslim-majority areas (the foundation for Pakistan)[15][16]. Jinnah’s evolution from an

ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity to the champion of a separate Pakistan was a key factor

in India’s partition.

• Government of India Act 1919 – Limited Reforms: After WWI, the British did enact

constitutional reforms through the Government of India Act of 1919 (part of the

Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms). This introduced a system called “dyarchy” in provincial

governments. Under dyarchy, some areas of governance (like education, health,

agriculture) were controlled by Indian ministers elected to provincial councils, while

critical areas (finance, police, revenue) remained under the British provincial governors’

direct control[17]. The Act slightly widened Indian participation in government by

allowing limited elections to provincial legislatures, but franchise (voting rights) was

very restricted – only a small percentage of Indians could vote, based on property and

education criteria[17]. Importantly, the British retained decisive power in central

government and in key provincial matters, so true self-rule was denied. These half-

hearted reforms disappointed Indian nationalists. Still, the Act set the stage for Indian

politicians to gain administrative experience. In Bengal, elections under this Act brought

some nationalist leaders into office: for example, Chittaranjan Das (known as
 Deshbandhu, “Friend of the Country”) became the first elected Mayor of Calcutta in the

early 1920s, and he made efforts to involve more Muslims in governance[18]. A young

Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy (1892–1963) started his political career then as Deputy

Mayor of Calcutta in 1924[18]. Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945), another rising star,

was appointed Chief Executive Officer of the Calcutta Corporation under Mayor Das[19].

These developments showed Indian leaders taking on limited power, but always under the

watchful eye of the British governors.

The Freedom Movements and Ideological Currents (1919–1939)

• Khilafat and Non-Cooperation Movements (1919–1922): After World War I, two major

movements united many Indians against British rule. One was the Khilafat Movement,

led by Muslim leaders like Maulana Mohammad Ali and Maulana Shaukat Ali, aimed

at pressuring Britain to preserve the Ottoman Caliphate (which Muslims worldwide held

in high regard) after the war[20]. The other was Mahatma Gandhi’s Non-Cooperation

Movement, launched in 1920, which urged Indians to boycott British goods, institutions,

and titles in a non-violent protest[21]. Gandhi (Mohandas K. Gandhi, 1869–1948) had

emerged as a leading figure in Congress, advocating satyagraha, or non-violent civil

disobedience, as the method for achieving self-rule[22]. He even temporarily allied with

the Khilafat leaders, hoping Hindu-Muslim unity in a joint protest would force the British

to make concessions. For a while, Hindus and Muslims agitated together in a common

cause. However, when some protests turned violent (notably the Chauri Chaura incident in

1922, where protesters killed policemen), Gandhi abruptly called off the Non-

Cooperation movement[23]. This sudden retreat disappointed many followers and

particularly alienated Muslim supporters, who felt let down after mobilizing for the
 Khilafat cause. The failure of this joint movement revealed the difficulty of maintaining

Hindu-Muslim unity. Gandhi’s mixing of religion with politics (calling for a return to

“Ram Rajya”, an ideal Hindu spiritual state) and his stance as a Hindu leader made some

Muslim and lower-caste groups uneasy[24]. The early 1920s thus ended with increased

communal distrust, as each community began pursuing its own political path again.

• Rise of New Leaders in Bengal – C. R. Das and Subhas Bose: In Bengal, Chittaranjan

Das (C.R. Das) became a prominent nationalist leader who tried to heal communal rifts.

C.R. Das (1870–1925) was a respected lawyer and was fondly called Deshbandhu,

meaning Friend of the Country[25]. In 1923, as Congress leader in Bengal, he proposed

the Bengal Pact, an agreement to share power and opportunities between Hindus and

Muslims. This pact allocated government jobs and legislative seats roughly in proportion

to the population (about 55–60% for Muslims, who were the majority in Bengal) and

included cultural respect clauses (for example, no music would be played before mosques

during prayer times, and cow slaughter would be regulated to respect Hindu

sentiments)[26]. Although the Bengal Pact was not fully implemented, it was an important

attempt to maintain Hindu-Muslim unity in Bengal’s politics. C.R. Das also mentored

young leaders. One of them was Subhas Chandra Bose, a brilliant Cambridge-educated

Bengali who had resigned from the prestigious Indian Civil Service to join the freedom

struggle[27]. Bose was bold and charismatic, and unlike Gandhi, he believed in more

direct, even militant, methods to oust the British[28]. He became the President of the

Indian National Congress in 1938–39 but resigned after policy clashes with Gandhi. Bose

wanted immediate independence and was willing to seek help from Britain’s enemies to

achieve it, which many in Congress disagreed with. Another figure, Huseyn Shaheed
 Suhrawardy, also rose in Bengal’s political ranks. Suhrawardy (1892–1963) came from a

well-educated Bengali Muslim family (he studied at Oxford)[29]. He started in politics as

an enthusiastic supporter of the pro-Caliphate Khilafat movement and then joined the

Muslim League in Bengal. In the 1920s–30s, Suhrawardy made a name as a champion of

Muslim causes in Bengal, winning elections to the Bengal Legislative Council and working

to quell communal riots[30]. These leaders – Das (a Hindu), Bose, and Suhrawardy (both

Bengal Muslims) – all worked, in their own ways, toward ending British rule, whether

through unity, revolution, or communal mobilization.

• Revolutionary Underground and Peasant Unrest: Alongside mainstream politics,

armed revolutionary groups were active, especially in Bengal. In Chittagong

(southeastern Bengal), a revolutionary leader Surya Sen organized the Chittagong

Armoury Raid in April 1930. His group of young patriots seized the British armory and

cut Chittagong off from the rest of Bengal for a few days[31]. They even proclaimed a

provisional revolutionary government. Although the British quickly crushed this uprising

and later executed Surya Sen, it became a legendary episode inspiring future generations.

It showed the frustration of youth who felt mainstream agitation was not enough.

Meanwhile, Bengal’s peasants suffered under a feudal zamindari system (large Hindu

landlords, Muslim tenant farmers). In the 1930s, a new party called the Krishak Praja

Party (KPP) was formed by A.K. Fazlul Huq to represent peasant interests[32]. Fazlul

Huq (1873–1962), nicknamed Sher-e-Bangla (“Tiger of Bengal”), was a prominent

Muslim politician who had earlier worked for Hindu-Muslim unity (he was part of the

Lucknow Pact in 1916)[33]. He founded the KPP in 1929 to fight for farmers’ rights and

an end to oppressive landlordism[34]. The British Government of India Act 1935 had
 introduced further provincial autonomy and expanded voting rights, enabling many more

Bengalis (especially Muslims) to vote[34]. In the first elections under that Act, Fazlul Huq

became the Prime Minister (Chief Minister) of undivided Bengal in 1937, heading a

coalition and representing the voice of ordinary Bengali Muslims[35]. This was a

significant power shift – a Bengali Muslim-led government in a province long dominated

by a Hindu elite. Huq’s government introduced reforms to help poor farmers (like debt

relief programs)[36]. These socio-economic struggles – revolts by revolutionaries and

peasants organizing for rights – ran parallel to the larger independence movement,

highlighting the class struggle underlying colonial society (peasants and workers vs.

landlords and colonial capitalists).

• Subhas Chandra Bose and the INA (1940s): Subhas Bose’s journey took a dramatic turn

during World War II (1939–1945). The war created an opportunity for Bose to seek

foreign help for India’s independence. In 1941, he escaped British surveillance in India and

made his way to Europe. He ultimately went to German and Japanese territories, aiming to

raise an army. In 1943, Bose arrived in Japanese-controlled Singapore and assumed

leadership of the Indian National Army (INA) – an army of Indian POWs and expatriates

determined to fight the British[37]. Bose, honored by his followers as Netaji (“Respected

Leader”), formed a Provisional Government of Free India in exile and allied with the

Axis powers. The INA fought alongside Japanese forces in Burma and even reached Indian

soil (the INA hoisted the tricolor flag in northeastern India during the Imphal campaign).

However, the campaign failed and the INA had to retreat. In August 1945, as Japan was on

the verge of defeat, Subhas Bose died in a plane crash in Taiwan (although his death is

shrouded in mystery, it is widely accepted he died on August 18, 1945)[38]. Bose was thus
 one of the few top leaders of the subcontinent who died in battle against the British, and

he is remembered for his slogan “Give me blood, and I will give you freedom,” appealing

for all-out sacrifice. His efforts, although militarily unsuccessful, sent a strong message.

The bravery of the INA soldiers later inspired post-war Indian armed forces (many of

whom were sympathetic to their cause) and created pressure on the British, who realized

they could no longer count on the loyalty of even their Indian troops. Bose’s legacy added

to the many factors convincing the British that holding on to India was no longer tenable.

• Mahatma Gandhi’s Role and the Quit India Movement (1942): Gandhi remained the

figurehead of the non-violent struggle. During WWII, while Bose chose the militant path,

Gandhi launched the Quit India Movement in August 1942, calling for the British to leave

India immediately. This movement led to mass protests across India. The British responded

with force: they jailed Gandhi and virtually the entire Congress leadership for the war’s

duration, and they brutally crushed the uprisings by 1943[39]. In some places, revolts

turned violent and the colonial authorities used extreme measures (including reports of

torture and even rape) to put them down[40]. Although the Quit India Movement did not

immediately liberate India, it showed the British the depth of Indians’ desire for

independence. By the war’s end in 1945, Britain was economically and militarily

exhausted, and large-scale unrest in India made governing the colony increasingly difficult.

Towards Partition: The Final Years of British Rule (1940–1947)

• The Lahore Resolution (1940): A critical turning point came in March 1940, when the

Muslim League, led by Jinnah, held its session in Lahore. A.K. Fazlul Huq, then Prime

Minister of Bengal, presented the Lahore Resolution, which was adopted by the
 League[41][42]. This resolution called for the establishment of “independent states” in

the Muslim-majority regions of India, especially in the northwest and the east[41].

Although the wording was somewhat vague (intentionally so, to maintain unity among

Muslims from different provinces), it essentially laid the groundwork for the creation of

Pakistan. The resolution energised Muslims of India, who increasingly rallied behind

Jinnah’s vision. Hindus and the Congress, however, were alarmed by the demand to

partition India on communal lines. The Lahore Resolution thus set the stage for a clash of

visions: a united India versus a divided one.

• Communal Tensions and the 1946 Crisis: As the British prepared to leave after WWII,

Hindu-Muslim tensions reached a fever pitch. In August 1946, the Muslim League,

frustrated by Congress’s stance and eager to press for Pakistan, declared “Direct Action

Day.” Massive riots erupted, most notoriously in Calcutta (Kolkata). The violence in

Calcutta left thousands dead and is remembered as the “Great Calcutta Killings.” At that

time, H.S. Suhrawardy was the Muslim League Chief Minister of Bengal. He was accused

by some of not doing enough to prevent the carnage. Following Calcutta, retaliatory

communal violence spread elsewhere (for instance, in Noakhali in East Bengal and Bihar).

The interim government (which included Congress and League members) was paralyzed

by distrust. British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, seeing India on the brink of civil war,

announced in February 1947 that the British would leave India by June 1948 at the

latest[43]. To manage the transfer of power and maintain order, a new Viceroy, Lord Louis

Mountbatten, was appointed in March 1947[44]. Mountbatten quickly concluded that an

outright partition of India into two countries was the only solution to the deadlock

between the Congress and the Muslim League.

• The United Bengal Proposal (1947): In the midst of these decisions, Bengal had its own

unique twist. Not everyone in Bengal wanted the province to be split between India and

Pakistan. Suhrawardy (a Muslim League leader) and Sarat Chandra Bose (Subhas

Bose’s elder brother, a Congress leader) jointly proposed an independent, united Bengal

in April 1947, as a third sovereign entity separate from both India and Pakistan[45][46].

They argued that Bengal, with its distinct culture and economic importance, could survive

on its own. This plan had some high-profile support – even Muhammad Ali Jinnah was

willing to consider a single, independent Bengal (likely because it would mean a large

Muslim-majority nation not under Congress rule)[47]. However, the plan faced strong

opposition from multiple sides. The Indian National Congress leadership (especially

Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel) and the Hindu nationalist Hindu Mahasabha

opposed it vehemently[45]. They did not want a powerful independent Bengal which might

lean towards Pakistan or socialism. Some feared that if Bengal remained whole and

sovereign, it might encourage other provinces to break away, undermining India’s

unity[48]. Meanwhile, support within the Muslim League for a united Bengal waned as

many in the League preferred the clear-cut Pakistan they had been fighting for. Ultimately,

the United Bengal plan failed – when put to vote in Bengal’s assembly, Hindu and Muslim

members split on communal lines, and partition of Bengal proceeded[49]. This remains a

historical “what-if,” but at the time, the forces in favor of partition were too strong.

• Partition of India (1947): It was decided that British India would be partitioned into two

independent dominions – India and Pakistan – by mid-August 1947. The plan (the

June 3 Plan or Mountbatten Plan) was rushed into implementation. Provinces with mixed

populations like Punjab and Bengal were to be divided along religious majorities[50].
This process ignored local complexities and no referendum or direct consultation of the

people was done in Bengal or Punjab’s case – instead, existing provincial assemblies voted

(and they voted split, as expected). Boundary lines (the Radcliffe Line) were drawn in

great haste, being revealed only at the last moment, after independence. The result was a

chaotic and bloody partition. Punjab, in particular, saw horrific violence as the province

was split between India’s Punjab and Pakistan’s West Punjab. Mobs from both

communities engaged in massacres. It is estimated that over 1 million people were killed

in the 1947 Partition riots overall[51]. Some 12 to 15 million people fled their homes in

one of history’s largest mass migrations – Hindus and Sikhs fled from Pakistan to India,

and Muslims fled from India to Pakistan[52]. Bengal’s partition (into India’s West Bengal

and Pakistan’s East Bengal) was comparatively less bloody than Punjab’s[53]. Bengal did

witness communal riots (notably in Calcutta in 1946 and in some areas like Noakhali), but

it did not see the same scale of carnage during the 1947 transfers. Many Bengali Hindus

did migrate from East Bengal (which became East Pakistan) to the new Indian state of West

Bengal, and some Bengali Muslims from the Indian side moved to East Pakistan, but

Bengal’s cultural cohesion somewhat mitigated the violence. A poignant aspect in Bengal

was that even amidst communal strife, there were instances of unity – for example, just

before partition, in 1946–47, leftist peasant movements like the Tebhaga movement saw

Hindu and Muslim sharecroppers united in demanding two-thirds of their harvest from

landlords[53]. This class-based solidarity across communities only underscored how tragic

the communal division was. On August 14-15, 1947, British rule in India ended. The

subcontinent was split into the secular Union of India and the Islamic Dominion of

Pakistan. Pakistan itself had two wings separated by 1,600 kilometers of Indian territory:
 West Pakistan (made up of western provinces like Punjab, Sindh, etc.) and East Pakistan

(the former East Bengal). Bengal’s long history as a cultural unit was cut into two.

Two Wings of Pakistan: Early Challenges (1947–1952)

• Birth of Pakistan and Bengal’s Position: The new nation of Pakistan was created as a

homeland for Muslims, but it was geographically and ethnically diverse. East Pakistan

(formerly East Bengal) had a Muslim majority (about 44 million people, slightly more than

West Pakistan’s population at the time) and a rich Bengali culture. West Pakistan (with

around 33 million people in 1947, spread across regions like Punjab, Sindh, NWFP,

Balochistan, etc.) was dominant in the new country’s power structure from the start.

Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, became the first Governor-General.

However, Jinnah was based in Karachi (in West Pakistan) and, like most of Pakistan’s early

leaders, he was not Bengali. In fact, Bengali Muslims, despite being the majority in

Pakistan, found themselves underrepresented in the central government and military.

Culturally and economically, the two wings were quite different:

• Language: The majority in East Pakistan spoke Bengali (Bangla) as their mother tongue,

a language with its own script and a rich literary heritage. In West Pakistan, there was no

single majority language – people spoke Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashto, Balochi, Urdu, and others

– but the ruling elite promoted Urdu (a language of Indian-Muslim origin written in

Persian script) as the national language of Pakistan. Urdu was not spoken by East Pakistanis

(and even in West Pakistan, only about 7% of people spoke it natively)[54][55].

• Ethnicity & Culture: Ethnic Bengalis formed the vast majority in East Pakistan. They had

traditions of music, literature (like the works of poet Rabindranath Tagore), and a history
 of the Bengal Renaissance that were distinct from the cultures of West Pakistan. West

Pakistanis were a mix of Punjabis, Sindhis, Pashtuns, Baloch, etc., with Urdu-speaking

migrants (Mohajirs) from north India. The West Pakistani elite tended to identify with an

Islamic, Persian-influenced culture and saw Hindu-influenced Bengali culture as “less

Islamic.” This would later lead to efforts to suppress Bengali cultural expressions (for

example, Tagore’s songs were banned on radio in the 1960s as “un-Islamic”)[56].

• Economic and Social Differences: Upon partition, East Pakistan was economically less

developed in terms of industry. Colonial Bengal’s jute, tea, and rice trade had been largely

controlled by Hindu businessmen (many of whom left in 1947) and British companies[57].

East Pakistan was left with fertile land and a hardworking peasantry, but little industry or

infrastructure – and it had lost its traditional urban capital, Calcutta, to India. West

Pakistan, especially Punjab, inherited most of the colonial military installations and

bureaucratic institutions. West Pakistan also received an influx of educated Muslim

refugees from north India who filled administrative and professional positions. Thus, West

Pakistan started off with a stronger hold on the civil service, military, and commerce.

East Pakistanis hoped that being part of Pakistan would uplift them – for instance, Bengali

Muslims expected to advance in government and business once Hindu competition

was gone[57]. However, in practice, new forms of inequality emerged between the two

wings.

• The Language Controversy Begins (1947–1948): One of the first flashpoints was

language. In 1948, Pakistan’s government (dominated by West Pakistani leaders) declared

that Urdu would be the sole state language of Pakistan, even though the single largest

linguistic group in the country was Bengali. This decision was made without consulting
the people of East Pakistan. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, during his only visit to Dhaka (the

capital of East Pakistan) in March 1948, addressed the issue bluntly. He proclaimed, “Urdu

and only Urdu shall be the state language of Pakistan.”[58]. He dismissed agitations for

Bengali, and even warned that anyone misleading Bengalis on this issue was an “enemy of

Pakistan”[59]. East Pakistani students and the public were shocked and angered by this

stance. In fact, opposition to Urdu-only had begun in East Pakistan almost

immediately after Partition. As early as December 1947, student groups and intellectuals

in Dhaka had formed organizations to demand Bengali’s recognition. A notable group was

the Tamaddun Majlish, a cultural organization established by East Bengali Muslim

intellectuals in September 1947[60]. They published a pamphlet “Pakistan’s State

Language: Bangla or Urdu?” and demanded that Bengali be made an official language

(for use in education, courts, and administration in East Pakistan, and alongside Urdu at

the central level)[61]. Additionally, in February 1948, in the very first session of Pakistan’s

Constituent Assembly, a Bengali representative Dhirendranath Datta proposed that

Bengali be one of the languages of the assembly (and by implication a state language). The

proposal was rejected by the Pakistan leadership – West Pakistani politicians like Prime

Minister Liaquat Ali Khan and East Pakistan’s own Chief Minister Khawaja

Nazimuddin (a Bengali who aligned with the central government) turned it down[62][63].

On the same occasion, a female member from West Pakistan, Begum Shaista Ikramullah,

noted the growing feeling in East Pakistan of being neglected and treated like a colony of

West Pakistan[64]. Thus, barely six months into independence, the seeds of linguistic

rebellion were sown in East Pakistan.

• Formation of Political Opposition – Awami League (1949): In the early years, Pakistan

was essentially a one-party state dominated by the Muslim League (the party of Jinnah).

But as discontent grew in East Pakistan, politicians from East Bengal began forming their

own parties. On June 23, 1949, in Dhaka, a new party called the East Pakistan Awami

Muslim League was founded[65]. Its first president was Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan

Bhashani (1880–1976), a veteran Islamic scholar and peasant leader known for his left-

leaning, populist views[65]. The word “Awami” means “people’s,” indicating a focus on

the common people. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1920–1975), a young Bengali politician,

was a founding joint-secretary of this party; he would later become its most famous leader.

The Awami Muslim League (which in the 1950s dropped the word “Muslim” to include

non-Muslims, becoming simply the Awami League) arose to champion the rights of

Bengalis. Its formation signaled that many East Pakistanis no longer trusted the ruling

Muslim League (dominated by West Pakistanis) to represent them. This new political force

would, in time, spearhead the movement for autonomy and ultimately independence.

• The Language Movement and Martyrs’ Day (1952): Tensions over language kept rising.

In early 1952, the stage was set for a showdown. By this time, Jinnah had passed away

(1948) and Khwaja Nazimuddin, the Bengali who toed the central line, had become

Pakistan’s Prime Minister. On January 27, 1952, Nazimuddin visited Dhaka and reiterated

that “Urdu shall be the only state language of Pakistan,” backtracking on earlier hints

that Bengali might be accommodated[66]. This U-turn by a fellow Bengali leader infuriated

the public. Students in Dhaka called for protests on February 21, 1952, despite the

administration imposing Section 144 (a law banning public gatherings)[67]. On that day,

students defied the ban and assembled near the Dhaka University campus to demand their
linguistic rights. The police opened fire on the unarmed demonstrators. Several young

students were killed, including Abdus Salam, Rafiq Uddin Ahmed, Abul Barkat, Abdul

Jabbar, and others[68]. One student, Abdul Matin, had been a key organizer (later dubbed

“Bhasha Matin” for his role in the language movement). The killings continued the next

day: on February 22, during protests mourning the dead, more people were shot, including

a young man named Shafiur Rahman[69]. In total, around 8–9 people lost their lives in

those two days[70]. These martyrs are honored as the Language Martyrs. The events of

February 21, 1952, had an enormous impact. There was an outpouring of grief and anger

across East Pakistan – strikes, rallies, and mourning gatherings spread in the following

days[71]. The authorities, alarmed, finally began to concede that Bengali could not be

ignored. In the following years, the demand for Bengali’s recognition as a state language

was gradually realized: the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan would eventually declare

Bengali an official language alongside Urdu. But more than that, February 21 became a

symbol of Bengali identity and resistance – later commemorated as “Ekushey February”

(21st February), it is now observed as International Mother Language Day worldwide.

A temporary monument was erected on Feb 23, 1952, and later the beautiful Shaheed

Minar (Martyrs’ Monument) in Dhaka became a site of annual remembrance[72]. The

Language Movement showed the power of mass mobilization in East Pakistan. It marked

the “reawakening of Bengali nationalism” in a new form – based not on religion (as the

Pakistan movement was) but on language and culture[73]. This movement also politically

educated a new generation of activists and future leaders. It is often said that the road to

Bangladesh’s independence began on 21 February 1952.

 • Significance of the Language Movement: The Language Movement was not just about

linguistics; it was about dignity and political power. For Bengalis, mother tongue

(matribhasha) was tied to their cultural heritage and also to access in government,

education, and jobs. The struggle proved that cultural rights could become a rallying point

for political action. It also exposed the widening gulf between East and West Pakistan.

West Pakistan’s insistence on Urdu was seen as an attempt to impose an alien culture on

East Pakistan and deny its majority’s rights. The success of the movement (in terms of

awareness and later concessions) gave Bengalis confidence that they could stand up to

central diktats. It is noted by historians that every major mass movement in East

Pakistan after 1952 drew inspiration from the Language Movement[73][74]. It truly

became the “first step” towards full independence. As one writer, Syed Mujtaba Ali, boldly

predicted in 1949, if Urdu were forced on the East, the Bengalis would never accept it and

it would ultimately lead to separation from Pakistan[75]. The Language Movement indeed

planted the seeds for East Pakistan’s later autonomy movement.

The Cold War and How It Affected Pakistan

After World War II, the world split into two big groups. One group was led by the United States

(capitalist countries) and the other by the Soviet Union (communist countries)[1]. This period of

tension was called the Cold War. It was "cold" because the US and USSR did not fight each other

directly in a war, but they competed for power and influence around the world. New countries that

became independent (like those in Asia and Africa) felt pressure to choose a side in this global

rivalry[1].
Pakistan became independent in 1947, just as the Cold War was starting. Pakistan decided to

become an ally of the United States and join the US-led group. Pakistan did this because it wanted

security (protection) and economic help from the West[1]. Being a new and vulnerable country

(especially worried about its neighbor India), Pakistan thought that having a powerful friend like

the US would help. On the other hand, India chose not to join either side formally – India helped

start the Non-Aligned Movement, trying to stay neutral (not taking sides) in the Cold War. In

practice, India leaned somewhat closer to the Soviet Union for support, while Pakistan leaned

toward the USA[1]. This difference in choices affected Pakistan’s politics, economy, and military

decisions for many years.

Simple Theories About World Power (Heartland, Rimland, Sea Power)

During the Cold War, some old ideas about world power became important. Here are three big

ideas (theories) explained in very simple words:

• Heartland Theory: This idea said that the center of the world – a huge area in Eurasia

(Europe + Asia) called the "Heartland" (for example, Central Asia and Eastern Europe) –

was the key to controlling the whole world. In other words, if a country could control the

central lands, it could eventually control the world[2]. During the Cold War, people saw

that the Soviet Union controlled much of this central “Heartland” area, and that made the

Western countries (like the US) worried about Soviet power.

• Rimland Theory: This idea was the opposite of the Heartland idea. It said that the edges

or coasts around the big landmass of Eurasia (the rimland, meaning the coastal regions of

Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, East Asia, etc.) were more important to control than

the center[3]. In simple terms: control the coasts and you control the world. The United
 States liked this idea and tried to form alliances around the Soviet Union’s borders (in the

rimland areas) to contain or limit Soviet expansion[3].

• Sea Power Theory: This idea said that having a strong navy and controlling the seas and

ocean trade routes is the key to being the most powerful country[4]. Countries with

powerful navies can protect their trade and influence other regions by sea. The United

States followed this idea by building a very strong navy and setting up naval bases across

the world (for example, in the Pacific and Indian Oceans)[5].

How the USA acted on these ideas: The United States used these theories to guide its strategy. It

tried to contain the Soviet Union by surrounding it with allied countries and military bases (this

is called the containment strategy)[6]. The US formed alliances in both Europe and Asia (for

example, NATO in Europe, and SEATO and CENTO in Asia) to encircle the communist bloc. It

built military bases in countries near the Soviet Union and China (including a base in Pakistan)[6].

The US also kept a strong naval presence in key waters and gave money and weapons to friendly

countries in the "rimland" areas to help them stay on the US side[6]. This global strategy is how

the Cold War was fought – with alliances, military aid, and positioning, rather than direct fighting

between the superpowers.

SEATO and CENTO – Pakistan Joins US-Led Alliances

Two important alliances during the Cold War in Asia were SEATO and CENTO, and Pakistan

joined both of them. These alliances were like clubs of countries that promised to help each other,

mainly to stop the spread of communism:

 • SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization): This was formed in 1954[7]. Its

headquarters was in Bangkok, Thailand. Members included countries like the USA, UK,

France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines – and Pakistan[8]. SEATO was

meant to be a kind of "Asian NATO," created to prevent communism from spreading in

Southeast Asia. In reality, SEATO did not work as well as hoped (many Southeast Asian

countries didn’t join, and eventually SEATO dissolved in 1977), but Pakistan’s

membership showed that Pakistan was siding with the US and Western powers.

• CENTO (Central Treaty Organization): This alliance started in 1955 (originally called

the Baghdad Pact, later renamed CENTO)[9]. It included countries in the Middle East and

South Asia. Members were Britain (UK), Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan; the United States

joined a bit later as well[10]. The goal was to block the Soviet Union from expanding

influence into the Middle East and South Asia. CENTO’s headquarters was in Ankara,

Turkey. Like SEATO, this alliance also ended later (it fell apart by 1979). But during the

1950s and 1960s, Pakistan being in CENTO meant it was firmly tied to the Western camp.

By joining SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan became a strong ally of the United States during the

Cold War[11]. Pakistan allowed the US to use its territory for military bases and intelligence (for

example, a base near Peshawar in Pakistan was used by the US to spy on the Soviets)[12]. In

return, Pakistan received military equipment and economic aid from the Western countries. This

alliance system made Pakistan part of the American-led side in the global conflict.

Pakistan Aligns with the US, While India Stays Neutral

Pakistan’s choice to join the US-led alliances set it apart from India. India, under Prime Minister

Nehru, was one of the founders of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). This meant India did not
formally join either the US bloc or the Soviet bloc. India wanted to stay neutral and independent

in the Cold War rivalry. In practice, India often leaned toward the Soviet Union for support (for

example, the USSR helped India build industries and provided military equipment), but India did

not sign up for US-led alliances or Soviet-led pacts. India’s non-alignment gave it more flexibility

to be friendly with both sides when convenient[11].

In contrast, Pakistan fully aligned with the United States. By signing treaties and alliances with

the Western bloc (like SEATO and CENTO), Pakistan was seen as a part of the American team in

the Cold War[11]. This had several effects: Pakistan received weapons and aid from the US, and

the US expected Pakistan to support it against communism. Meanwhile, India often criticized

Pakistan for bringing Cold War conflicts into South Asia. The different paths of the two countries

– Pakistan choosing a side and India staying mostly neutral – led to different international

relationships. Pakistan was closely tied to the West, whereas India led the Non-Aligned Movement

and kept a distance from military alliances.

Why this mattered for Pakistan: Being on the US side meant Pakistan fought in smaller regional

conflicts as a US ally and got aid, but it also meant Pakistan’s policies were influenced by what

the US wanted. For example, Pakistan’s focus was more on defense and alliances against

communism (and also against India), rather than staying out of big power politics. This alignment

also affected Pakistan’s internal development, as we will see in how it shaped economic decisions

and regional disparity within Pakistan.

Capitalism, Socialism, and Communism (Basic Definitions)

During this era, people talked about different economic and political systems. The three main ideas

were capitalism, socialism, and communism. Here are very simple explanations for each:
• Capitalism: An economic system where private individuals or businesses own property

and companies. People are free to buy and sell, and markets determine prices (a free

market). The goal in capitalism is to make profit. In a capitalist system, the government’s

role in the economy is limited, and businesses are owned by people or corporations. For

example, the United States and other Western countries followed capitalism[13].

• Socialism: A system where the government owns or controls major industries and

resources. The idea is to distribute wealth more equally among the people. Under

socialism, the state may provide free or cheap services like education and healthcare

(welfare), and it may take charge of things like factories, transport, or energy, instead of

private owners. The goal is to reduce class differences (rich vs. poor) by redistribution –

taking some wealth from the rich (through taxes, for instance) to help the rest of

society[13]. Some countries (like India in the early years, or many European countries with

social programs) adopted socialist ideas to various degrees.

• Communism: A system that aims for a classless society where all property is owned by

the community as a whole (in practice, this means owned by the state on behalf of the

people). In pure theory, communism means there are no rich or poor – everyone is equal,

and eventually there would be no need for a government or state at all. In reality,

communist countries (like the Soviet Union, China, etc.) had governments that controlled

the economy and one political party. There is no private ownership of businesses in a

communist system; the government plans and owns everything for the people[13]. The idea

was to eliminate exploitation by the rich. However, in those countries, political freedom

was usually limited under communism.

(There was also Marxism, a theory by Karl Marx behind socialism and communism, which said

society would naturally move from capitalism to socialism and then to communism. But in simple

terms, capitalism vs. socialism vs. communism are the key concepts.)

In the Cold War context, the US-led bloc championed capitalism, while the USSR-led bloc

championed communism (and socialism). Many newly independent countries had to debate which

path to follow for development.

Pakistan’s Alliance with the US and Capitalist Development Plans

Because Pakistan joined the US side, it also embraced capitalist development policies and

received a lot of help from the United States. The U.S. was eager to show that a poorer country

could become prosperous by following capitalism rather than communism. In fact, the U.S. held

up Pakistan as a “model” for development without communism[14]. Here’s how Pakistan’s

development was influenced by this alliance:

• U.S. Economic Aid: The United States gave Pakistan a large amount of economic aid

(money, grants, loans) and military aid in the 1950s and 1960s. This foreign aid was very

important for Pakistan’s early development. For example, in Pakistan’s early Five-Year

Plans (the government’s development plans), foreign aid made up a huge portion –

about 35% of the First Five-Year Plan and 50% of the Second Five-Year Plan came

from outside aid[14]. Much of this was from the US and Western organizations. This

money was used to build dams, roads, factories, and also to strengthen the military.

• Western Advisors and Plans: American experts helped guide Pakistan’s economic

planning. A famous example is the Harvard Advisory Group – a team from Harvard
 University – which advised Pakistan’s planning commission[14]. They promoted capitalist

ideas like industrialization led by private businesses. They encouraged Pakistan to create

an environment friendly to private investors and to focus on growth. The idea was to make

Pakistan a showcase that capitalist development (with American help) would lead to fast

growth, unlike the socialist route India was taking or the communist model.

• Focus on Industrial Growth: Pakistan’s government, with encouragement from Western

advisors, prioritized industrial and capitalist growth especially in West Pakistan. Big

projects and industries were often set up in West Pakistan, and policies were made to

support private industry there. For instance, the government kept the currency exchange

rate high which helped import machines cheaply for factories in West Pakistan, and it

meant East Pakistan’s farmers got less money for exports like jute (because they were paid

in local currency that was overvalued)[15]. Policies like import licenses and loans were

designed in a way that mostly benefited West Pakistani businessmen. All these are

examples of a capitalist development strategy – helping the business owners and

industrialists grow, hoping the benefits would trickle down to everyone.

Pakistan’s leaders at the time (especially during the 1960s under President Ayub Khan) often spoke

of a “Decade of Development.” Indeed, Pakistan’s economy grew in those years, but as we will

see next, the growth was uneven. While Pakistan was praised by Western allies for its economic

growth and anti-communist stance, not everyone in Pakistan benefited equally. The partnership

with the US brought wealth to some, mainly in West Pakistan, and helped create a richer upper

class and powerful military, but it also widened the gap between the two wings of Pakistan – West

and East.
West Pakistan Got More Money, East Pakistan Got Less

Pakistan was created with two main regions (wings) – West Pakistan (today’s Pakistan) and East

Pakistan (today’s Bangladesh). One major issue from 1947 to 1970 was that West Pakistan

received more investment and government money, while East Pakistan received much less.

This created a big economic disparity (difference) between the two regions.

Some key points about this unequal distribution:

• Government Spending: The government of Pakistan collected taxes and also received

foreign aid, then spent this money on development and running the country. Over the years,

West Pakistan consistently got a larger share of this money, and East Pakistan got a

smaller share[16]. In numbers, roughly two-thirds of all government spending went to

West Pakistan and only about one-third went to East Pakistan[17]. This is very unequal

because East Pakistan actually had more people (East had about 55% of the country’s

population). Despite the majority of people living in East Pakistan, they saw only one-third

of the spending[17]. This meant fewer schools, hospitals, roads, and development projects

in East, compared to West.

• Foreign Aid and Development Projects: As mentioned, Pakistan got a lot of foreign aid.

But even that aid was not shared equally. About two-thirds of all foreign aid went to

West Pakistan, and one-third to East[18]. Many big development projects (like major

factories, military installations, dams, etc.) were done in West Pakistan. West Pakistan,

being where the capital city and most of the administration were, attracted more funds for

infrastructure. East Pakistan often got secondary priority.

 • Income and Wealth Gap: Over time, the average income in West Pakistan grew faster

than in East Pakistan. From 1947 to 1970, West Pakistan became much richer per person

compared to East Pakistan. One study showed that between 1949 and 1970, West

Pakistan’s per capita income (average income per person) grew much more than

East’s, almost doubling the gap between them[19]. This means if West Pakistan was

somewhat richer in 1949, by 1970 it was a lot richer, and East Pakistanis felt left behind.

West Pakistan had more industries and jobs, whereas East remained mostly agricultural

and didn’t get the same level of investment.

• Infrastructure and Services: Basic facilities like electricity, healthcare, education, and

transportation were developed more in West Pakistan. For example, West Pakistan had

more roads, more hospitals and doctors, more universities, and so on[20]. East Pakistan,

even though it had a larger population, lagged in these areas. People in East Pakistan could

see that their region was not progressing as fast as West Pakistan.

In summary, West Pakistan got a bigger slice of the pie in terms of money and development,

while East Pakistan was given a smaller slice. This unequal treatment created resentment among

the people in East Pakistan. They felt they were not getting their fair share even though they

contributed so much to the country (as we will discuss next, East Pakistan earned a lot of foreign

money for Pakistan through jute exports). The economic policies during the 1950s and 1960s,

under a capitalist model guided by Western aid, ended up favoring West Pakistan’s elite and did

not fairly benefit East Pakistan.

East Pakistan Earned Money (Jute Exports) but West Pakistan Spent More

Another important factor in the regional disparity was how money flowed between East and

West Pakistan. East Pakistan was the main exporter for the country, especially of a crop called

jute (jute is a fiber used to make rope, burlap, etc., and in the 1950s and 60s it was a very valuable

export). West Pakistan, on the other hand, was importing goods and building industries. Here’s

what happened in simple terms:

• East Pakistan earned foreign money: East Pakistan’s jute and tea were big export

earners. When East Pakistan’s jute was sold abroad, it brought in foreign exchange (US

dollars and other foreign currencies which are crucial for a country to buy things from

abroad). In the early years, East Pakistan actually earned more foreign exchange than it

spent, meaning it was making a profit or surplus for the country[21].

• West Pakistan spent more than it earned: West Pakistan was setting up industries and

also importing many goods (including machinery, luxury items, and military equipment).

West Pakistan’s imports and spending in foreign exchange were higher than its own

export earnings, meaning West Pakistan had a trade deficit (it was spending more foreign

currency than it earned). However, this deficit was covered by the foreign currency that

East Pakistan earned from jute and other exports[22]. In effect, East Pakistan’s earnings

were used to pay for West Pakistan’s imports.

• Transfer of resources from East to West: Over the years 1948 to 1969, studies showed

that a huge amount of money actually flowed out of East Pakistan to benefit West Pakistan.

One analysis showed that East Pakistan had a net loss of resources – billions of rupees

worth – that went to West Pakistan[23]. For example, about Rs. 15.8 billion of foreign
 aid that was meant for development was used in West Pakistan instead of East, and

East’s export money was used to buy things for West Pakistan[24]. Overall, it was

estimated that around Rs. 11.8 billion (a very large sum at the time) was essentially

transferred from East to West over two decades[23].

• Exchange rate and pricing policies: The government kept the Pakistani currency (the

rupee) overvalued in the 1950s and 60s. This meant when East Pakistan sold jute

internationally, the earnings converted to fewer rupees for the jute growers (they got

roughly half of what they could have gotten if the currency was valued fairly)[25].

Meanwhile, West Pakistani businesses could import machines cheaper because the rupee

was strong. So the policies made East Pakistan’s farmers and exporters earn less, while

helping West Pakistani importers and industries pay less. This was an example of how rules

were set that favored West Pakistan’s economy at the expense of East’s economy.

The result of all this was that East Pakistan, despite being the “golden goose” that earned money

through exports, remained poor. West Pakistan used that money and aid to grow its own industries

and cities. From East Pakistan’s perspective, they were being economically exploited – their

resources were taken to enrich West Pakistan. This created a strong sense of injustice in East

Pakistan. People saw that East Pakistan was generating wealth (through agriculture and

exports), but West Pakistan was the one enjoying that wealth. This imbalance is a key reason

why the people in East Pakistan became increasingly upset and demanded change.
Growing Anger and Demand for Fair Treatment in East Pakistan

As the 1960s went on, the people of East Pakistan became more and more frustrated and angry

about their situation. They felt they were not treated fairly by the West Pakistani-dominated central

government. Several things contributed to this anger:

• Awareness of Disparity: Educated people and students in East Pakistan started to openly

discuss the disparity (difference) between the two wings. Newspapers and public figures

in East Pakistan pointed out that East was being short-changed in budgets, development,

and jobs. Many East Pakistani economists and intellectuals, such as Rehman Sobhan, Nurul

Islam, and others, wrote papers and articles showing the structural discrimination in

Pakistan’s policies[26]. They demonstrated with facts and figures how East Pakistan was

consistently getting less and how its resources were siphoned off to West Pakistan.

• Political Marginalization: East Pakistanis also felt underrepresented politically. Even

though East Pakistan had the majority of the population, West Pakistanis held most of the

top positions in the military and the central government. West Pakistan (especially the

Punjab) dominated the army and bureaucracy. The feeling that "we are second-class

citizens in our own country" grew among East Pakistanis.

• Language and Cultural Issues: (This was earlier in the 1950s with the Language

Movement, but it set the stage for discontent.) The attempt to impose Urdu as the only

national language had already made East Pakistanis (who mainly speak Bengali) distrustful

of West Pakistani rulers. Cultural differences and prejudice from West Pakistanis (some of

whom looked down on Bengalis) added to the anger.

 • Economic Exploitation: By the late 1960s, it was clear that East Pakistan was being

economically exploited. The data showed huge gaps in income, spending, and resource

allocation. East Pakistanis saw that their poverty and struggles were not just due to

"natural causes" but were because of man-made policies. This realization made people

demand justice. They wanted the government to address these inequalities.

All these factors led to a rising demand in East Pakistan for autonomy – that is, more self-rule and

control over their own affairs. They argued that if the central government (based in West Pakistan)

would not treat them fairly, then East Pakistan needed more power to make its own decisions.

Protests and political movements grew in East Pakistan, especially under leaders like Sheikh

Mujibur Rahman and his party (the Awami League). Students and young people were also a big

part of the protests. They all demanded an end to the unfair treatment.

By the end of the 1960s, the sentiment in East Pakistan was very strong: people wanted fair

treatment, equal share of resources, and respect. Many East Pakistanis were even thinking that

if things didn’t change, East Pakistan should govern itself separately. The call for regional

autonomy became the central political issue. This public anger and movement in East Pakistan set

the stage for the famous Six Points demand, which was a proposal to rearrange Pakistan’s structure

to give East Pakistan much more independence in running its own economy and government.

The Six Points – East Pakistan’s Demands for Economic Independence

In 1966, East Pakistani leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman announced a set of demands known as the

Six Points. These six points were basically a plan for giving East Pakistan greater autonomy (self-

governance) and fixing the economic injustices. Each point was aimed at making East Pakistan
economically independent or protected from exploitation by West Pakistan. Here are the Six Points

explained in very simple terms:

1. Federation and True Democracy: Pakistan should be a federation as it was originally

intended. This means East Pakistan and West Pakistan would be like two states with a lot

of their own powers. It also means Pakistan should have a parliamentary democracy

based on universal adult voting rights (one person, one vote for every adult)[27]. In short,

East Pakistan wanted a government where power is shared and both East and West have

self-rule in their own regions, under a democratic system.

2. Only Two Subjects for the Central Government: The central federal government of

Pakistan should only handle defense (the military) and foreign affairs (relations with

other countries)[28]. All other matters – like taxes, education, health, industry, trade, etc.

– should be handled by the respective provinces (East Pakistan would handle its own, West

Pakistan its own)[29]. This would prevent the central government (dominated by West

Pakistan) from controlling everything. East Pakistan would make decisions for itself in all

other areas, so it couldn’t be cheated out of funds or projects.

3. Separate Currencies or Strong Economic Safeguards: East Pakistan wanted either two

separate currencies – one for East Pakistan and one for West Pakistan – or one single

currency with strict rules to stop money from being taken out of East Pakistan to West

Pakistan[30]. Why this point? Because East Pakistan’s leaders were worried that wealth

made in East Pakistan was quickly sent to West Pakistan. If there were separate currencies,

West Pakistan couldn’t just take East’s money because it would be a different currency. If

having two currencies was not possible, then the demand was to have constitutional
 provisions (strong legal rules) to stop the “flight of capital” (meaning money leaving East

for West)[30]. Essentially, this point was about protecting East Pakistan’s wealth.

4. Power of Taxation to the Provinces: East Pakistan should have the power to collect taxes

and revenue in its own territory, and the federal center should not have this power[31]. In

other words, East Pakistan’s government should gather the money from its people and

businesses, and then give a share to the central government for the two subjects (defense

and foreign affairs). This is opposite of what was happening, where the central government

collected all taxes and then doled out money to East. By collecting its own revenue, East

Pakistan could ensure it gets what it needs and isn’t dependent on the central government’s

mercy.

5. Separate Foreign Exchange Accounts and Trade: East Pakistan should have its own

account for foreign exchange earnings (the money from exports) and should be allowed to

make its own trade deals with other countries[32]. This means if East Pakistan exports

jute or tea, the dollars it earns would go into East Pakistan’s account, not to the central

bank for the whole country. Also, East Pakistan could directly, for example, trade with

Nepal or Burma or any country, to sell and buy goods. This point aimed to stop the central

government from using East’s export money for West’s needs. It would give East Pakistan

direct control over its international trade and earnings.

6. Militia/Paramilitary for East Pakistan and Naval Headquarters in East: East Pakistan

wanted to have its own militia or paramilitary force for its security, and also demanded

that a navy headquarters be established in East Pakistan[33]. At that time, almost all

military high commands were in West Pakistan. This point was symbolic as well as
 practical: East Pakistanis felt they had no security of their own (in 1965, when Pakistan

had a war with India, East Pakistan was left almost undefended). By having its own force,

East Pakistan would not be at the mercy of West Pakistan for protection. A naval

headquarters in East (meaning some part of the navy stationed in East Pakistan) would

ensure East Pakistan wasn’t ignored in defense matters. Overall, this was about giving East

Pakistan a sense of safety and importance in the military structure.

[34][35]

In summary, the Six Points were a blueprint for economic and political autonomy for East

Pakistan. They didn’t outright call for independence, but essentially they wanted East Pakistan to

handle everything on its own except defense and foreign diplomacy. If these points were

implemented, East Pakistan would practically be self-governing in most ways (sometimes people

described it as a kind of confederation). The Six Points became extremely popular in East Pakistan.

When Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League campaigned on this platform, almost all East

Pakistanis supported it because they saw it as the solution to years of injustice.

The Pakistan central government and West Pakistani leaders, however, rejected the Six Points.

They saw it as a threat to national unity or as a step towards splitting the country. The disagreement

over the Six Points and the refusal to grant East Pakistan greater autonomy eventually led to a

political crisis. This crisis, combined with ongoing disparities and resentments, set the stage for

the eventual separation of East Pakistan and the creation of an independent Bangladesh in 1971.

But as of 1970, the Six Points represented the hope of East Pakistani people for fair treatment and

a prosperous future where they would have control over their own destiny, after decades of feeling

like a colony of West Pakistan.

Political and Economic Marginalization (1950s–1960s)

• Economic Disparities in Pakistan: From the very early years, East Pakistan began to feel

economically exploited by the West Pakistani ruling elite. East Pakistan’s jute (a valuable

cash crop used for making burlap and export sacks) was the country’s biggest export earner

in the 1950s. Yet the profits from jute sales largely went to West Pakistani businesses and

to the central government, which spent predominantly in the West. The central economic

policies were designed in a way that disadvantaged East Pakistan:

• The Pakistani government maintained an overvalued exchange rate for its currency. This

meant when East Pakistani jute exporters sold jute abroad, they were forced to convert

earnings at an artificially high rate, effectively getting about 50% less in local currency

than they would have under a market rate[76]. The gain from this went to central coffers

and helped keep import costs low for West Pakistani industries.

• The government also implemented a system of foreign exchange controls and import

licenses. Essentially, industrialists (mostly in West Pakistan) could import machinery and

materials at favorable rates and with easy access to foreign exchange, whereas East

Pakistani entrepreneurs struggled to get licenses. This allowed West Pakistani industries

to grow rapidly, while East Pakistan industrialization lagged[77].

• The state heavily promoted industry in West Pakistan by giving low-interest loans,

subsidies, and protection from competition (e.g., high tariffs on imported goods which

made locally made goods – usually West-made – the only choice, even if expensive)[77].

Some industries originally set up by the state were later privatized into the hands of a few

rich families. East Pakistan got some state investment – for example, the Pakistan Industrial

Development Corporation (PIDC) did establish a few factories in East Pakistan, like jute
 mills and the Karnaphuli Paper Mill – but these were often managed by non-Bengali

personnel or later owned by West Pakistanis[78].

• Non-Bengali control of business: After Partition, many Hindi/Bengali-speaking Hindu

businessmen left East Bengal. In their place, Urdu-speaking migrants (Biharis) and

West Pakistani entrepreneurs moved in. By the late 1950s, Non-Bengalis owned a

disproportionate share of industry in East Pakistan – according to one account, non-

Bengalis in East Pakistan received about 62% of all industrial bank loans, controlled

nearly half of the industrial assets in the East (versus roughly a quarter by ethnic

Bengalis), dominated the trade sector (over 90% of large import-export firms were in

non-Bengali hands), and even controlled most of the banking deposits[78]. In short,

Bengalis often felt like second-class citizens in their own land, with West Pakistanis or

central authorities reaping the economic benefits of East Pakistan’s resources.

• Infrastructure and spending: The central government’s development budgets were also

seen as biased. Major development projects (dams, factories, military bases) were

concentrated in West Pakistan. Statistics from the 1960s showed that West Pakistan’s per

capita income rose much faster than East’s, and by the end of the decade West Pakistanis

on average earned significantly more. A prominent Bengali economist, Dr. Rehman

Sobhan, highlighted how Pakistan was essentially operating as “two economies” – one for

the West, one for the East – with the East generating surpluses that were siphoned off to

finance West Pakistan’s growth[79]. For example, foreign aid and loans obtained in the

name of Pakistan were mostly invested in West Pakistan[77]. The foreign exchange

earned by East Pakistan (through exports like jute and tea) was largely spent on

imports and industrial development in the West. These unjust structures fit into what
 later came to be known as “dependency theory” – the idea that one region (the

“periphery”) is kept underdeveloped and dependent, while its resources are used to develop

another region (the “core”). In the Pakistan context, East Pakistan was the periphery

dependent on (and exploited by) the West Pakistani core.

• Resentment and Political Awakening: The economic grievances did not go unnoticed.

From 1960 onwards, Bengali economists and intellectuals vocally critiqued these

inequalities[79]. Men like Rehman Sobhan, Akhlaqur Rahman, Nurul Islam,

Mosharraf Hossain, Anisur Rahman, and others wrote articles and papers showing with

data how East Pakistan was being short-changed. Their analysis gave intellectual heft to

the political demands for autonomy. At the mass level, ordinary Bengalis might not grasp

the figures, but they felt the disparities in daily life – unemployment remained high in the

East, incomes were lower, and development lagged. The sense grew that West Pakistan

treated East Pakistan almost like a colony to extract raw jute, tea, and taxes, while

investing elsewhere[80]. Even in 1948, as mentioned, a politician had warned that East

Pakistan was being treated as a colony[80]. By the 1960s, this view was widespread. A

powerful slogan emerged: “Golden Bengal is now a graveyard”, reflecting the pain that

the once prosperous Bengal (often romantically called “Sonar Bangla,” golden Bengal)

was being impoverished under Pakistan’s rule.

• Political Instability and Military Rule: Pakistan’s early years were politically turbulent.

In East Pakistan, the Muslim League’s popularity plummeted after 1952. A turning point

came in 1954, when the United Front, a coalition of East Pakistani parties (including the

Awami League under Suhrawardy and Fazlul Huq’s Krishak Sramik Party), won a

landslide victory in provincial elections, defeating the Muslim League. The United Front
had a 21-point platform that demanded autonomy and justice for East Pakistan. Fazlul Huq

became Chief Minister of East Pakistan in 1954 as a result[81]. However, the central

(West-dominated) government dismissed the United Front ministry within months,

invoking governor’s rule. This high-handedness reinforced Bengali feelings of

disenfranchisement. In 1956, Pakistan adopted its first constitution, which, to appease East

Pakistanis, declared Bengali as one of the state languages and renamed East Bengal as

“East Pakistan”. Bengali was thus officially recognized, which was a victory of the

language movement. But the political structure remained very centralized. In 1958,

Pakistan faced a deadlock and instability in governance. General Ayub Khan, the Army

Chief, staged a military coup – imposing the first dictatorship in Pakistan. He declared

martial law, abrogated the constitution, and ruled as President for the next decade (1958–

1969). This was a dictatorship – a form of government where a single person or a small

group holds absolute power, typically acquired by force. Ayub Khan’s regime banned

political activities, silenced dissent, and sought to modernize Pakistan from the top down.

While there was economic growth during Ayub’s time (often called the “Decade of

Development”), the benefits were uneven. In fact, income inequality widened, and a

famous study noted the rise of just 22 wealthy families dominating Pakistan’s economy

(only 1 of which was Bengali)[82]. To many in East Pakistan, Ayub’s rule only entrenched

the dominance of West Pakistani bureaucrats, generals, and businessmen. Democracy was

stifled – oligarchy (rule by a small elite) and autocracy prevailed under Ayub. East

Pakistanis had little say in their governance during this period, as all decisions came from

West Pakistan’s military regime.

• Continued Cultural Suppression: During Ayub Khan’s rule, attempts to undermine

Bengali culture persisted. One extreme proposal by the regime’s education commission

(Sharif Commission, 1959) was to replace the Bengali script with Roman (English)

script for writing Bengali[83][84]. This outrageous idea was seen as an attack on the very

identity of the Bengali language (it was not implemented due to backlash). The government

also viewed Bengali literary icons with suspicion – for example, in 1967 Radio Pakistan

banned the works and songs of Nobel-laureate Rabindranath Tagore from broadcasts,

deeming them “against the ideology of Pakistan”[56] (because Tagore was a Hindu and his

humanist philosophy didn’t align with the regime’s Islamic-nationalist narrative).

Additionally, the regime frowned upon Bengali folk traditions and even the celebration of

Pahela Baishakh (Bengali New Year), dismissing it as a Hindu-influenced festival[56]. In

response, Bengalis formed cultural groups like Chhayanaut (est. 1961) to preserve and

promote Bengali music, arts, and traditions, often in defiance of the regime[56].

Meanwhile, English and Urdu were favored in elite education, and Bengali language was

somewhat marginalized in higher administration. This cultural repression further alienated

East Pakistanis, who felt their identity was under siege.

• The Education Movement of 1962: Another spark in East Pakistan’s resistance came

from education policy. Ayub Khan’s regime set up the Sharif Commission (headed by

S.M. Sharif) to reform education. The Commission’s report, made public in 1962,

recommended policies that were very unfavorable for East Pakistanis[85][83]:

• It suggested Urdu be made the primary national language in education (even in East

Pakistan).
 • It wanted English taught from grade 6 (not a bad idea per se, but in context it meant less

emphasis on Bengali).

• Shockingly, it proposed that Bengali script be replaced by Roman script in

education[86].

• And perhaps most significantly, it recommended ending free education, meaning no free

primary schooling; education should be self-funded[87]. Given that East Pakistan was

poorer, this would hit Bengalis hard, many of whom relied on government schools.

When these recommendations became known, there was outrage in East Pakistan. Students took

to the streets in what became the Education Movement of 1962[88][89]. They saw the policy as

closing the doors of education to the poor and forcing an alien language/script upon them. Protests

and strikes spread across East Pakistan’s schools and colleges. In Dhaka University and other

institutions, students organized rallies and demanded the withdrawal of the Sharif Commission’s

recommendations[89]. The regime reacted with force; even prominent leaders like Suhrawardy

(who by then was a former Prime Minister and a respected elder statesman critical of Ayub) were

arrested in January 1962 to pre-empt them from supporting the student movement[89][90].

Despite arrests and intimidation (at one point the government even positioned a field cannon on

Dhaka streets to threaten students![91]), the protests intensified. On 17 September 1962, a

massive student strike in Dhaka was met with police gunfire – some students and a bystander

laborer were killed[92]. This day is commemorated as Education Day in Bangladesh, honoring

those who died for the cause of accessible education. The pressure ultimately worked: by 1964,

the Ayub regime backed down and scrapped the unpopular education measures[93][94]. The

Education Movement was another example of East Pakistanis successfully mobilizing against

policies seen as unjust, and it kept the spirit of resistance alive after the language movement.
• Ideological Currents – Capitalism, Socialism, and Marxism: In the political discourse

of 1950s–60s East Pakistan, many students and intellectuals were influenced by leftist

ideologies. Marxism (the theories of Karl Marx) and socialism provided a framework to

understand their situation. Marxism emphasizes the concept of class struggle – the idea

that history advances through conflict between the oppressed classes (workers, peasants)

and the ruling classes (capitalists, landlords). For Bengali leftists, Pakistan’s structure

seemed to exemplify class and colonial-style exploitation: wealthy West Pakistani elites

and local East Pakistani landlords were the “oppressors,” while ordinary East Pakistani

peasants and workers were the “oppressed.” The Communist Party and other left

organizations, though often banned, had underground influence. There were peasant

rebellions like the Tebhaga movement (1946–47) where sharecroppers fought landlords

for a larger share of crops, reflecting class struggle. On the other hand, Pakistan’s ruling

establishment championed capitalism – an economic system of private ownership and

profit-making – and aligned with Western capitalist countries (Pakistan was a U.S. ally

during the Cold War). Ayub’s regime especially promoted a capitalist, private-sector-

driven development, hoping wealth would trickle down. But in East Pakistan, this led to a

concentration of wealth among a few (like the 22 families) and did not alleviate poverty,

fueling criticism that capitalism under Pakistan was creating oligarchy (rule by a few rich)

rather than prosperity for all. Dependency theory, an idea popularized by economists in

the 1960s, also resonated: it said that rich regions/countries develop by keeping poorer

regions dependent and extracting their resources. East Pakistan’s experience – exporting

jute and tea and getting little in return – was often cited as an example of dependency

exploitation within one country. Meanwhile, feudalism – an old system where landowners
 dominate peasants – was still present in parts of East Pakistan (although land reform had

begun). Many Bengali politicians like Maulana Bhashani were vocal against the feudal

lords and capitalist tycoons, advocating for socialism (economic equality). In simple

terms:

• Capitalism: An economic system where businesses and property are privately owned and

run for profit. In Pakistan, this meant encouraging private industries, but in practice, most

big businesses were owned by non-Bengalis, and the profit motive did not benefit the poor

masses much.

• Marxism: A philosophy that analyzes society through class relations. Marxists in East

Pakistan saw the struggle not just as East vs West Pakistan, but also poor vs rich. Many

student leaders were inspired by Marxist ideas of revolution to uplift peasants and workers.

• Feudalism: A hierarchical system where peasants are dependent on landlords. In East

Pakistan’s rural areas, something akin to feudalism existed with zamindars and jotdars

(land controllers). The Awami League and others promised land reforms to break this,

appealing to peasants.

• Class Struggle: This term describes the ongoing conflict of interest between different social

classes. For example, in East Pakistan, the class struggle could be seen in movements

where workers or farmers demanded better treatment from factory owners or landlords. It

tied into the national struggle, because many felt that the Bengali “nation” as a whole was

like an exploited class under West Pakistani elite.

These ideologies contributed to the demands for change. It’s worth noting that while the Awami

League started as fairly moderate, by the 1960s its student wing and many activists were pushing

it towards a more radical stance on economic justice.

• Six-Point Program (1966): Autonomy Demand: In 1966, the Awami League – under the

leadership of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) – put forward a Six-Point Program that

effectively became the manifesto for East Pakistan’s autonomy. Sheikh Mujib (who had

taken over the Awami League after Suhrawardy’s death in 1963) was convinced that East

Pakistan needed a large degree of self-government to end exploitation. The 6 Points were

a set of demands to fundamentally restructure Pakistan, almost making East and West

Pakistan into a loose federation. In simple terms, the Six Points called for:

• Federation on the basis of the 1940 Lahore Resolution: Pakistan should be a true

federation of two largely self-governing units (East and West), with a parliamentary

democracy elected by universal adult vote[95].

• Central government with only two subjects: The federal (central) government’s power

should be limited to defense and foreign affairs only[95]. All other matters (currency,

trade, taxation, etc.) should be handled by the federating units (i.e., East and West

separately)[96].

• Separate currencies or strict economic measures: East and West Pakistan could each

have their own currency to prevent capital flight from East to West. If not separate

currencies, then one currency with constitutional safeguards to stop money from being

unfairly transferred out of East Pakistan[97].

• Power of taxation and revenue collection to the states: Each wing should control its own

taxes and revenues, giving the central government an allocation for its two subjects[98].

• Separate foreign exchange earnings accounts: Each wing would keep its own foreign

exchange earnings from exports, and have the right to make international trade agreements
 on its own[99]. (This was aimed at East Pakistan retaining its export income from jute

instead of it all going to West Pakistan.)

• East Pakistan to have its own militia/paramilitary forces: While defense was central,

East Pakistan wanted to have a militia or paramilitary and for the navy headquarters to

be in East Pakistan[100]. This was to ensure its own security and representation in

defense.

Mujib’s Six Points were essentially a peaceful constitutional proposal to solve East Pakistan’s

grievances by granting maximum autonomy – which means self-government in local matters.

Autonomy in this context is the freedom for a region to govern itself without external control in

most affairs. If the Six Points were implemented, Pakistan would become Pakistan in name only –

effectively two countries loosely connected. When Mujib announced the Six Points, the West

Pakistani establishment was furious. They saw it as a secession plan – a break-up of Pakistan. The

military regime of General Ayub Khan and General (later President) Yahya Khan (who succeeded

Ayub) vowed never to allow the Six Points. Mujib was arrested by Ayub’s government in 1966 on

charges of sedition (the infamous Agartala Conspiracy Case, where he and others were accused of

plotting with India to separate East Pakistan). But mass protests in East Pakistan in 1968–69 forced

the government to drop the case and release Mujib, who by then was widely hailed by East

Pakistanis as “Bangabandhu” (Friend of Bengal). The Six Points became the rallying cry for the

Awami League and East Pakistani people: “We want our Six Points!” They symbolized the

aspiration for self-rule and an end to exploitation.

• Mass Uprising of 1969: Discontent with Ayub Khan’s dictatorship finally boiled over in

late 1968 and early 1969. Initially sparked by grievances in West Pakistan as well (students

and lawyers were protesting there too), the protests became a nationwide upheaval. In East
 Pakistan, the movement was even more intense – students, including those from Dhaka

University, formulated an “Eleven Points” program (which endorsed Mujib’s Six Points

and added more radical social demands). Demonstrations, strikes (hartals), and clashes

rocked the province. Maulana Bhashani famously held a million-strong rally saying

“Farewell Ayub” (Ayub Khan ke aiubidha!). By March 1969, Ayub Khan resigned, and

Pakistan’s second military strongman, General Yahya Khan, took over. Yahya promised

to hold the first general elections on the basis of one-person-one-vote (something East

Pakistanis had long wanted, since they had majority population). The year 1970 was set for

these elections, which would decide Pakistan’s future.

The Road to Liberation (1970–1971)

• Elections of 1970 – Bengali Landslide: True to his word, General Yahya Khan’s regime

organized general elections in December 1970, the first time Pakistan’s people would

freely choose their national and provincial representatives. The results were historic. In

East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujib’s Awami League won an overwhelming mandate – they

won 167 out of 169 National Assembly seats allotted to East Pakistan (and also almost all

seats in the East Pakistan provincial assembly). This was well over half of the 300-seat

National Assembly for all of Pakistan. In West Pakistan, the leading party was Zulfikar

Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which won around 81 out of 138 West seats,

mostly in Punjab and Sindh. No party won any significant seat outside its regional base.

The verdict was clear: the Awami League had the right to form the national

government, and Sheikh Mujib, as leader of the majority, should be the Prime Minister of

Pakistan. Mujib’s platform was essentially the Six Points (autonomy for East Pakistan).
 The people of East Pakistan had spoken decisively for self-determination within a federal

Pakistan framework.

• Political Deadlock and Betrayal: The power structure in West Pakistan was not ready to

accept what the election mandated. Bhutto, whose PPP had come second, refused to

accept Mujib as Prime Minister of Pakistan. He famously said, “Udhar tum, idhar hum,”

meaning “You rule there (East), we rule here (West)”, indicating a proposal to effectively

keep the country divided politically. General Yahya Khan and the military brass were also

deeply suspicious of Mujib’s autonomy plans, fearing they would break up the country.

During early 1971, negotiations were held between the Yahya regime, Mujib, and Bhutto

to try to resolve the impasse. Mujib was firm that the Six Points must form the basis of the

new constitution, given his democratic mandate. Bhutto and the generals maneuvered to

delay the National Assembly’s convening. In March 1971, Yahya Khan postponed the

opening of the National Assembly indefinitely, under pressure from Bhutto. This led to

massive protests in East Pakistan – their democratic victory was being stolen. From

March 1, 1971, East Pakistan was essentially in an unofficial state of rebellion: Mujib

launched a non-cooperation movement; virtually the entire civil administration in East

Pakistan started taking orders from Mujib’s Awami League rather than the central

government. The Bangladesh flag was flown by activists, and a spirit of uprising was in

the air. During this month, Mujib stopped short of declaring independence, but in his

historic 7th March 1971 speech in Dhaka, he told the crowd, “The struggle this time is

for our freedom, the struggle this time is for our independence,” while still keeping a door

open for negotiation. The speech electrified the Bengali nation, effectively preparing them
 for possible independence if their rights were denied. It is a landmark moment remembered

for giving East Pakistanis the direction: “Be ready with whatever you have.”

• Operation Searchlight – The Genocidal Crackdown (March 1971): Negotiations in

Dhaka in mid-March 1971 between Yahya’s team and Mujib’s team failed to reach a

compromise. Unbeknownst to the Bengalis, the Pakistani army had been secretly flying in

troops and preparing a massive crackdown plan (code-named Operation Searchlight). On

the night of March 25, 1971, the Pakistan Army launched a brutal campaign in major cities

of East Pakistan. In Dhaka, they attacked the University, student dormitories (e.g.,

Jagannath Hall, targeting many intellectuals and Hindu students), and old town areas.

Thousands of unarmed Bengali civilians were killed in a single night. The army

specifically targeted the Bengali nationalist intelligentsia, students, and any police or

soldiers of Bengali origin who might resist. This night is often termed the start of the

Bangladesh Liberation War. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested in the early hours

of March 26 by the military and flown to West Pakistan to be imprisoned. But before his

arrest (some accounts say just after midnight on March 26), Mujib had sent a message (via

wireless radio) declaring Bangladesh’s independence. On March 26, 1971, East Pakistan

effectively declared itself the independent nation of Bangladesh – though at that moment

it was a declaration in principle, as the Pakistani military was in control of the cities.

• Liberation War (1971): After the March 25 onslaught, Bengali soldiers and officers in

the Pakistan army, as well as East Pakistani police and civilians, quickly organized

resistance. Defections of Bengali military units occurred. The Bangladesh Armed Forces

began to form, notably with the Mukti Bahini (Freedom Fighters), which were guerrilla

fighters composed of civilians, students, and the East Bengal regiments that mutinied. A
 provisional government of Bangladesh was formed in April 1971 in Mujib’s absence (since

he was jailed in West Pakistan) – with exiled Awami League leaders. Bangabandhu

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was declared the President of the new Republic (in absentia),

and Tajuddin Ahmad served as the Prime Minister of the government-in-exile. The

Liberation War raged for about nine months. The Pakistani military, with superior arms,

controlled the cities and launched operations to quell the rebellion, but the countryside

largely became a center of guerrilla warfare. The Pakistan army also carried out widespread

atrocities: they targeted Bengali intellectuals, professionals, youth, and especially the

Hindu minority (whom they accused of being pro-India; many Hindus were massacred or

had to flee). This campaign is considered by many historians as a genocide – estimates of

Bengali deaths range up to 3 million, though exact numbers are debated. What is certain is

that hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed, and over 10 million refugees fled

to neighboring India to escape the carnage. The economy of East Pakistan was shattered,

villages were burned, and an estimated 200,000+ Bengali women were subjected to rape

and violence by the Pakistani forces and their local collaborators. The human toll was

immense.

• International and Indian Involvement: The crisis quickly gained international attention

due to the refugee exodus and reports of mass killings (for example, the Blood Telegram

sent by a U.S. diplomat condemned the atrocities). India, led by Prime Minister Indira

Gandhi, initially gave refuge to the millions of Bengalis pouring across its borders. By mid-

1971, India decided that the refugee crisis and the instability caused by the conflict required

action. India began openly aiding the Mukti Bahini with training and arms. On December

3, 1971, Pakistan pre-emptively attacked Indian airfields (in the Western front), and war
 between India and Pakistan officially broke out. This is known as the Indo-Pak War of

1971. Indian forces joined the Mukti Bahini in a coordinated offensive in East Pakistan.

Within two weeks, the Pakistani military in the east was overwhelmed. Facing a multi-

front war and complete encirclement in Dhaka, the Pakistani Eastern Command

surrendered. On December 16, 1971, Pakistan’s army in East Pakistan surrendered in

Dhaka to the joint Indo-Bangladesh forces. This day is celebrated as Victory Day in

Bangladesh.

• Birth of Bangladesh: With the Pakistani surrender, Bangladesh emerged as an

independent nation on December 16, 1971. The Liberation War had been won at a great

cost. The new country had to start almost from scratch, as millions were displaced and

infrastructure was ruined. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was released from Pakistan’s jail in

January 1972 and returned to a hero’s welcome as the founding leader (later the first Prime

Minister) of Bangladesh. The dream that so many Bengalis had nurtured – whether in the

form of autonomy or outright independence – was realized, ending a 24-year union with

West Pakistan that had begun with hope in 1947 but ended in bloodshed in 1971.

Key Political Concepts (Simple Definitions)

• Monarchy: A form of government where a single person (a monarch, like a king or

queen) is the head of state for life, often inherited through a royal family line. In a

monarchy, the monarch’s powers can range from purely ceremonial (as in constitutional

monarchies) to absolute control (as in historical absolute monarchies). For example, Britain

during colonial times had a monarchy (the King/Queen of England), though it was a
 constitutional monarchy by then. A monarch typically symbolizes continuity of a nation,

and legitimacy is based on tradition or divine right.

• Dictatorship: A system of government where one person (or a small group) holds

complete power, without effective constitutional limitations or input from the public.

Dictators usually come to power through force or manipulation (not free elections) and

often suspend democratic processes. Citizens under a dictatorship have few or no political

freedoms. An example in our context is General Ayub Khan’s regime in Pakistan (1958–

1969) which was a military dictatorship – he seized power and ruled by decree. In a

dictatorship, dissent is often suppressed and opposition is not tolerated, which can lead to

human rights abuses.

• Oligarchy: A form of power structure where a small number of people (usually the elite)

control the government or organization. The word comes from Greek meaning “rule of

the few.” These few could be distinguished by nobility, wealth, family ties, corporate

interests, or military control. In an oligarchy, decisions benefit the small ruling group, often

at the expense of the wider population. One might say that during Pakistan’s Ayub Khan

era, an oligarchy of generals, bureaucrats, and wealthy businessmen (often referred to as

the “establishment”) wielded power behind the scenes. The general population had little

say, and resources were controlled by this small elite.

• Autonomy: Autonomy means having the freedom to govern yourself or manage your

own affairs. In a political context, when a region or group seeks autonomy, they want self-

government in certain areas without interference from a central authority. It is not

complete independence, but rather a degree of self-rule. For example, East Pakistan’s
 demand via the Six Points was essentially for autonomy – East Pakistan wanted to handle

its own economy, taxation, and internal matters, while remaining part of Pakistan for

defense and foreign affairs. Autonomy is like a province or state running its own show in

most things, with only a loose tie to the central government. The idea is to preserve local

rights and preferences, especially when a central government is seen as distant or unjust.

In 1971, when autonomy was denied, East Pakistanis felt they had no choice but to seek

full independence.

Geopolitical Theories

1. Mahan’s Sea Power Theory (1890s)

Mahan, a U.S. naval thinker, said a strong navy and control of sea trade routes made nations

powerful. Britain and later the U.S. grew rich and strong this way. Pakistan linked to this because

it had two important ports, Karachi and Chittagong, which could help the U.S. in the Cold

War. That’s why the U.S. gave Pakistan military and naval aid in the 1950s. Example: Pakistan

allowed the U.S. to use the Karachi port and navy bases to monitor the Indian Ocean.

2. Heartland Theory (1904, Halford Mackinder)

This theory said whoever controlled Central Asia (the “Heartland”) would dominate the world. It

emphasized land power rather than sea power. Pakistan’s location made it a gateway to

Afghanistan and Central Asia, so the U.S. valued it as a partner to block Soviet influence.

During the Cold War, Pakistan gave the U.S. access to bases to watch the USSR. Example: In

the 1980s, Pakistan was used by the U.S. to support the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviets.
3. Rimland Theory (1944, Nicholas Spykman)

Spykman argued the “Rimland” (the coastal edges of Eurasia, including South Asia and the

Middle East) was the key to global control. Pakistan’s position on the Rimland, next to the

Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, made it important to U.S. strategy. America helped Pakistan join

SEATO and CENTO to guard this region. Example: Pakistan’s bases let the U.S. project power

into the Rimland during the Cold War.

Doctrines & Global Strategies

4. Truman Doctrine (1947)

The U.S. promised to help any country fighting communism. This made Pakistan attractive as a

U.S. ally during the Cold War. Pakistan joined U.S.-led military pacts and received aid and

weapons in return. Example: In the 1950s, Pakistan got billions of dollars in U.S. economic and

military aid under this doctrine. But it also tied Pakistan tightly to U.S. policies.

5. Theory of Spillover (1950s, Europe)

This idea said that if countries cooperate in economics, it will “spill over” into cooperation in

politics and unity. In Pakistan, West leaders claimed that economic growth in West Pakistan

would spill over and benefit East Pakistan. But the East stayed poor while the West advanced.

Example: The “Decade of Development” (1958–68) helped West Pakistan industries, but East

Pakistanis saw no spillover.

6. Clash Between Spillover and Truman Doctrine

Spillover meant integration through cooperation, but the Truman Doctrine meant
confrontation and military alliances. Pakistan chose confrontation by joining the U.S. bloc,

instead of regional integration with India or China. This made East Pakistanis feel Pakistan was

being used for U.S. Cold War needs rather than its own people. Example: Instead of investing in

East Pakistan, most U.S. aid went to West Pakistan’s army and industries.

Economic Systems & Global Institutions

7. Dollarization: Dollarization means relying on U.S. dollars in trade and economy. Pakistan

depended heavily on U.S. aid, so its economy was dollar-linked. This made Pakistan less

independent in financial decisions. Example: Many development projects in Pakistan in the 1950s–

60s were paid in U.S. dollars, not Pakistani rupees.

8. WTO (World Trade Organization): The WTO regulates world trade and tries to reduce tariffs.

Pakistan depended on exporting jute (from East) and cotton/textiles (from West). WTO-type rules

affected whether Pakistan could sell freely to the U.S. and Europe. Example: When the U.S. put

quotas on textiles, Pakistan’s garment exports suffered.

9. Bretton Woods System (1944): This system made the U.S. dollar the main world currency,

linked to gold, and created IMF and World Bank. Pakistan joined and received loans, but these

were mostly used in West Pakistan for industry and army projects. Example: World Bank loans

helped West Pakistani industries, while East Pakistan’s needs were ignored.
Socialist Models & Reactions

10. Stalin’s Socialist Reforms: Stalin in the USSR created heavy industries, collective farming,

and full state control. In Pakistan, leftist leaders like Maulana Bhashani admired this and wanted

socialism for East Pakistan. They opposed Pakistan’s U.S.-backed capitalist model. Example:

Many East Pakistani students supported socialism, arguing it would end exploitation by West

Pakistan.

11. Communism: Communism means no private property and collective ownership, with equality

for all. Pakistan never became communist, but the Awami League’s student wing and some trade

unions in East Pakistan used communist ideas to explain exploitation. They said West Pakistan

was the “bourgeoisie” and East Pakistan the “proletariat.” Example: The 1969 student “Eleven-

Point” program in East Pakistan was inspired by communist thinking.

Development Theories & Pakistan

12. Dependency Theory: This theory says poor countries (periphery) are kept dependent on rich

countries (core). East Pakistan was the periphery inside Pakistan itself: it exported jute and tea, but

profits went to West Pakistan. Example: East’s foreign exchange earnings were used to build

West’s industries, leaving East underdeveloped.

13. World System Theory (Wallerstein): The world is divided into Core (rich), Semi-periphery

(middle), and Periphery (poor). In Pakistan, West Pakistan acted as semi-periphery, while East
Pakistan was treated as periphery. Example: East Pakistan gave cheap jute and labor; West

Pakistan built industries and sold goods at higher prices.

Key Figures and Their Early Lives

• Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948): Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, known as Mahatma

(“Great Soul”), was born on October 2, 1869, in Porbandar, in a coastal part of western

India. He studied law in London and briefly practiced in South Africa, where he first

employed non-violent protest against racial discrimination. Returning to India, Gandhi

became the foremost leader of the Indian independence movement. He championed non-

violent civil disobedience (satyagraha) as a means to challenge British colonial rule.

Gandhi’s simple lifestyle, spiritual approach, and focus on the poorest citizens made him

very popular. However, his mixing of religion and politics and his emphasis on Hindu

symbols sometimes caused discomfort among minorities. He strove for Hindu-Muslim

unity but could not prevent Partition. Gandhi was assassinated in January 1948 by a Hindu

extremist upset at his perceived sympathy for Muslims. Despite controversies, he is

remembered globally as an icon of peace and non-violence.

• Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948): Born on December 25, 1876, in Karachi (then part

of British India), Jinnah came from a mercantile family. He went to England at age 16 to

study law and became a barrister. In his early career, Jinnah was among the moderates in

the Indian National Congress and was called an “ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity” for

working on agreements like the Lucknow Pact (1916)[12]. Initially a member of both

Congress and the Muslim League, he left Congress as it became more mass-oriented under
 Gandhi. Jinnah was a sophisticated, Anglophone lawyer – known for his sharp dressing

and eloquence. Over time he became the sole spokesman for Indian Muslims’ political

rights. He put forth constitutional proposals (e.g., his Fourteen Points in 1929) to protect

Muslims in a Hindu-majority India[101]. Frustrated with Congress dominance and

incidents like the denial of power-sharing after 1937 provincial elections, Jinnah turned to

the idea of a separate nation[102]. As the founder of Pakistan, Jinnah became its first

Governor-General in 1947. He is revered in Pakistan as Qaid-e-Azam (“Great Leader”). He

died shortly after independence, on September 11, 1948, due to tuberculosis[103]. Early in

life, Jinnah was influenced by Western liberal thought and believed in constitutionalism;

by the end, he had carved out a sovereign state to secure what he believed were the interests

of his community.

• Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy (1892–1963): Suhrawardy was born on September 8,

1892, in Midnapore (Bengal). He came from an illustrious Muslim family; his father was

a judge and his elder brother a renowned scholar. Suhrawardy studied at St. Xavier’s

College in Calcutta, then earned degrees from Oxford University in England[104]. He was

a charismatic and eloquent figure. In the 1920s, he joined the Khilafat movement and also

worked with C.R. Das for Hindu-Muslim unity in Bengal[30]. Suhrawardy’s early political

career involved efforts to integrate Muslims into Bengal’s political power structure –

he served as Deputy Mayor of Calcutta in the 1920s and helped mediate communal

tensions[30]. In the 1930s, he became a prominent leader of the Bengal Provincial Muslim

League, advocating for the Pakistan idea among Bengali Muslims[105]. Suhrawardy

played a key role in winning the 1946 provincial elections in Bengal for the Muslim

League and became the last Chief Minister of undivided Bengal. He initially opposed the
 partition of Bengal (through the United Bengal proposal) as he valued Bengal’s unity[106].

After 1947, Suhrawardy faced criticism in Pakistan for his past stance, but he remained

influential. He later became the Prime Minister of Pakistan in 1956–57 (one of the few

Bengalis to reach the top). He was a mentor to Sheikh Mujib and helped form the Awami

League in 1949. Suhrawardy died in Beirut in 1963 under mysterious circumstances. His

early life as a highly educated, cosmopolitan politician set the stage for him to be a bridge

between communities, and later, one of the voices for democracy in Pakistan.

• Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945): Subhas was born on January 23, 1897, in Cuttack,

Orissa (in British India) into a well-off Bengali family. An exceptionally bright student, he

studied philosophy at the University of Calcutta and later at Cambridge University in

England[107]. In 1920, he famously resigned from the Indian Civil Service – a prestigious

job secured by only the top Indian candidates – because he couldn’t reconcile serving the

colonial government with patriotism[107]. Bose plunged into the freedom movement in

the 1920s under the mentorship of C.R. Das in Bengal. He was jailed multiple times by the

British (a total of eleven times) for his activism[108]. Bose was known for his intense

energy and leadership skills; he became President of the Indian National Congress in 1938

and 1939, but resigned after disagreements with Gandhi’s passive resistance

approach[109]. During WWII, Bose escaped house arrest, sought Axis support to fight the

British, and led the Indian National Army (INA), recruiting Indian POWs and expatriates

in Southeast Asia. His early life as a top student and principled youth who gave up personal

career for the nation made him a folk hero. Netaji Subhas Bose’s defiant slogan “Jai Hind”

and call to arms left a lasting legacy, even though he tragically died (reportedly in a plane

crash in August 1945) before seeing India free[110].

• A.K. Fazlul Huq (1873–1962): Abul Kasem Fazlul Huq, born October 26, 1873, in

southern Bengal (Barisal), was a brilliant student who became a lawyer. By early 20th

century, he was involved in public service and politics. He was a member of the Bengal

Legislative Council and was known for championing the cause of Bengali peasantry and

tenant rights. In 1916, he worked with both Congress and the Muslim League for the

Lucknow Pact, bridging communities[33]. Huq gained fame as a voice of the common

people. In 1935, he founded the Krishak Praja Party (Peasants’ Party) to push for

agrarian reforms[34]. He became the first Prime Minister (Chief Minister) of Bengal in

1937, heading a coalition that gave a greater share of power to Muslims in Bengal’s

government[35]. Fazlul Huq is most celebrated for moving the Lahore Resolution in 1940

which articulated the demand for Pakistan[111]. Later, in Pakistan, he remained active in

politics: he was Chief Minister of East Bengal in the 1950s, helped form the United Front

(which swept the 1954 elections in East Pakistan), and briefly became Home Minister of

Pakistan. He also served as Governor of East Pakistan (1956–58)[112]. Huq was

affectionately nicknamed “Sher-e-Bangla” (Tiger of Bengal) for his fearless advocacy.

His early life experiences of growing up in rural Bengal, seeing peasant hardships under

zamindari, shaped his populist politics.

• Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1920–1975): Mujib was born on March 17, 1920, in

Tungipara, a rural village in Gopalganj, Bengal. He came from a middle-class family; his

father was a court clerk. Mujib got involved in politics as a student in Kolkata in the 1940s,

initially in the Muslim League. He was a follower of Suhrawardy and was active during

the Pakistan movement. After partition, Mujib pursued law studies in Dhaka but quickly

engaged in political organizing for the rights of Bengalis. He was a founding member of
 the Awami Muslim League in 1949 and became a close aide to its president Maulana

Bhashani. Mujib’s early political career was marked by advocacy for language rights (he

was jailed during the Language Movement period) and for the poor (he had a role in

organizing movements like the 1952–53 Assam Bengal railway workers’ action). He was

charismatic and known for his ability to connect with the masses. Throughout the 1950s,

Mujib held positions in East Pakistan’s provincial government and was a prominent voice

against West Pakistani domination. By the early 1960s, after a split between moderate and

radical elements, Mujib took full leadership of the Awami League, dropping “Muslim”

from its name to make it inclusive. His Six-Point Program of 1966 propelled him as the

unequivocal leader of the autonomy movement. Mujib’s towering role in 1971 – leading

his people through the non-cooperation movement and then the war (even though he was

imprisoned during the war) – earned him the title “Father of the Nation” in Bangladesh.

Sadly, after independence, Mujib’s rule faced challenges, and he was assassinated in 1975

during a military coup. His early life as a village boy who witnessed British colonial

oppression and then the injustices in Pakistan shaped his lifelong commitment to Bengali

self-determination.

• Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani (1880–1976): Bhashani was born in 1880

(approx) in Sirajganj, in rural Bengal. He was an Islamic scholar (hence the title

“Maulana”) who became involved in anti-British activism from a religious and peasant-

rights perspective. Bhashani was a fiery orator in the Bengali and Urdu languages, and he

connected deeply with peasants and the underprivileged. In the 1940s he was part of the

Muslim League but was critical of its elitist leadership. He became the founding president

of the Awami Muslim League in 1949[65], giving a platform for secular Bengali
 nationalism. Bhashani was decidedly left-leaning; he earned the nickname “Red

Maulana” for his socialist ideals. In 1957, frustrated with the Awami League moderates,

he split and formed the National Awami Party (NAP), which leaned more socialist and

aligned with Communist China’s outlook. Bhashani is famed for his strong stance in 1971

– even before the war started, he said “Assalamualaikum” (farewell) to West Pakistan in a

1970 rally, implying East Pakistan should part ways if rights weren’t granted. His lifelong

championship of the peasants and his early life as a religious preacher among the people

made him a beloved figure in rural East Pakistan. He lived simply, almost like an ascetic,

and continued to voice people’s causes until his death in 1976.

Each of these figures played a part in the long journey from World War I through Partition to

the Liberation of Bangladesh. Their early experiences, whether in the form of education abroad,

interaction with peasant communities, or legal practice, all influenced how they led and what

visions they offered to the people. This study guide has traced the chronological progression of

events and the evolution of ideas, showing how the ideals of self-rule, cultural identity,

economic fairness, and social justice all interwove in the story of Bangladesh’s emergence. By

understanding these key events, concepts, and personalities in simple terms, a student from any

background can appreciate how Bangladesh came to be – rising from the ashes of colonialism

and Partition to establish its own identity as a nation.

The Liberation War of 1971

Political Crisis After the 1970 Election: The refusal of Pakistan’s authorities to honor the

election results of December 1970 pushed East Pakistan to the brink. From January to March 1971,
Sheikh Mujib and the Awami League negotiated with President Yahya Khan and West Pakistani

politicians, trying to reach a compromise. During this period, East Pakistanis launched a massive

non-cooperation movement – essentially a campaign of civil disobedience. Mujib gave a historic

speech on March 7, 1971, before a huge crowd in Dhaka, where he said, “The struggle this time

is for our freedom, the struggle this time is for our independence.” While he stopped short of an

outright declaration, he told the people to prepare for a fight if needed. Bengali nationalism was at

its peak; millions were ready to secede if their democratic rights continued to be denied. Talks in

Dhaka dragged on through March, but West Pakistan’s leaders were secretly planning to use

force[18]. On March 25, 1971, talks abruptly broke down – Yahya Khan left Dhaka secretly that

evening, and the stage was set for a crackdown. That night, the Pakistan Army unleashed

Operation Searchlight, a coordinated military assault aimed to “silence” the East Pakistani

resistance in one swift blow[20].

Operation Searchlight – The Night of Horror: Beginning on the night of March 25, the Pakistani

military carried out a brutal campaign across East Pakistan. In the capital Dhaka, they targeted the

University of Dhaka (attacking students and professors in dormitories), the headquarters of the

East Pakistan Rifles (a paramilitary force of locals), police barracks, and densely populated

Bengali neighborhoods. The army had a list of pro-independence activists, including journalists,

professors, and politicians, many of whom were arrested or killed. Fires burned across the city as

the army used heavy weapons against unarmed civilians. This surprise offensive led to thousands

of deaths in just the first few days. Outside Dhaka, other cities and towns saw similar attacks. The

goal was to eliminate the leadership and intellectual backbone of the East Pakistani autonomy

movement, thereby terrifying the population into submission. Instead, the cruelty of Operation
Searchlight outraged and terrified Bengalis, convincing even moderate people that independence

was the only option. To the Bengalis, the Pakistani army had declared war on its own people.

Declaration of Independence: In the early hours of March 26, 1971, in the midst of the violence,

East Pakistani leaders made a declaration that Bangladesh is an independent country. Different

accounts exist of how the declaration was delivered: according to one version, Sheikh Mujibur

Rahman drafted a message before being arrested by the army on March 25, which was then

broadcast by others; according to another, on March 27 a Bengali army officer (Major Ziaur

Rahman) briefly broadcast a declaration over a makeshift radio in Chittagong on behalf of Mujib.

The exact timing aside, the key point is that once the mass killings began, Bengali political

leaders and defecting military officers publicly announced that East Pakistan was now the

independent nation of Bangladesh. March 26 is commemorated as Bangladesh’s Independence

Day. Sheikh Mujib was taken prisoner by the Pakistan Army and flown to West Pakistan to be

kept in custody, but other Awami League leaders escaped and went to India to continue the

struggle.

The Mujibnagar Government (Government-in-Exile): Top political leaders of the Awami

League regrouped on Bengali soil in Meherpur (a border area which they named Mujibnagar in

honor of Mujib) in April 1971. There, on April 10, they formally formed the Government of the

People’s Republic of Bangladesh in exile. Syed Nazrul Islam was made acting President (since

Mujib was in jail, he was symbolically the President) and Tajuddin Ahmad was appointed Prime

Minister. This Mujibnagar government coordinated the war effort. They moved their base to

Calcutta (Kolkata) in India for safety and set up offices to lobby internationally[40]. The

government-in-exile did several crucial things: it gave political direction to the resistance, it helped

unite various fighting forces under one command, and it worked to gain recognition and support
from other countries. They established missions (offices) abroad, in places like London and New

Delhi, to tell the world about the genocide occurring in Bangladesh and to gather diplomatic

support[40]. One of their big tasks was to organize the freedom fighters (Mukti Bahini) and secure

weapons and training for them – India became the main provider of such support.

Mukti Bahini – The Freedom Fighters: The Mukti Bahini (which means “Liberation Force” in

Bengali) was the guerrilla fighting force of Bengali freedom fighters. It was composed of Bengali

soldiers who defected from Pakistan’s army, as well as students, farmers, and ordinary

citizens who volunteered to fight for independence. Under the leadership of General M.A.G.

Osmani (a retired Pakistani army officer who joined the Bangladesh cause), the freedom fighters

were organized into various units[41]. The country was divided into eleven sectors, each led by a

sector commander, to carry out guerrilla warfare in different regions. These fighters used hit-and-

run tactics against the occupying Pakistani forces: blowing up bridges, ambushing patrols, and

gathering intelligence. They were not as well-armed or trained as the Pakistani army in open

combat, but their strength was in their determination and knowledge of local terrain. Training

camps were set up in India where thousands of young Bengalis trained in guerilla tactics.

Throughout 1971, the Mukti Bahini kept the spirit of resistance alive inside Bangladesh and made

it difficult for the Pakistani army to gain full control. They are honored as heroes in Bangladesh’s

history.

Refugee Crisis and War Crimes: The Pakistani military’s harsh campaign in 1971 led to a

humanitarian catastrophe. Millions of Bengali civilians fled the country to escape killings, rape,

and starvation. It’s estimated that around 10 million refugees (mostly Hindus and also many

Muslims seen as pro-liberation) poured into neighboring India, settling in crowded refugee

camps[42]. This created a massive burden on India and also generated international sympathy for
the Bangladeshi people. Inside Bangladesh, the Pakistani army and allied militias (such as the

Islamist Razakar forces that opposed independence) committed atrocities that today are

recognized as genocide by Bangladesh. Civilians were massacred in villages; there were

systematic rapes of Bengali women (some estimates say over 200,000 women were victims of

rape and sexual violence during the war)[43]. Particularly, the army targeted Bengali Hindus (a

religious minority) for slaughter, as well as the educated elites of Bengali society. One especially

tragic event was the killing of intellectuals in December 1971: as Pakistan’s defeat became

imminent, local collaborator militias abducted and murdered professors, doctors, writers, and other

leading figures, dumping their bodies in mass graves. This happened on December 14, 1971, just

two days before the war ended, and is commemorated in Bangladesh as Martyred Intellectuals

Day[44]. In total, the Bangladeshi government later stated that around 3 million people were

killed in 1971, though independent estimates of fatalities vary (some say the number was lower).

Regardless of the exact figure, there is no doubt that what happened in 1971 in Bangladesh was

one of the worst humanitarian atrocities of the 20th century.

International Support and the Indo-Pak War: The plight of Bangladesh did not remain

unnoticed. Throughout 1971, news of the genocide and the refugee crisis filtered out through

journalists and broadcasts. International media coverage (for example, reports by Anthony

Mascarenhas, a Pakistani journalist who leaked news of the atrocities in June 1971) helped turn

world opinion against the Pakistani military actions. Civil society also responded – George

Harrison and Ravi Shankar organized the Concert for Bangladesh in New York in August

1971, which was the first benefit concert of its kind, raising awareness and aid for Bengali

refugees[45]. Governments were split in their views largely due to Cold War politics: the United

States, under President Nixon, was an ally of Pakistan and continued to support Yahya Khan’s
regime (even sending a naval fleet to the Bay of Bengal as a show of force)[46]. China also

supported Pakistan diplomatically (Pakistan was a bridge for Nixon to reach China). On the other

hand, India had obvious reasons to support Bangladesh – aside from moral reasons, India was

overwhelmed by refugees and saw an opportunity to weaken its regional rival Pakistan. The Soviet

Union backed India’s stance; in August 1971 India and the USSR signed a friendship treaty, which

ensured that if India came into direct conflict with Pakistan (and by extension risked a

confrontation with China or the US), the Soviets would block any UN resolutions against India

and provide support[47]. This superpower alignment gave India confidence to intervene. After

months of providing covert help, India officially entered the war on December 3, 1971, when

Pakistan’s air force launched preemptive strikes on Indian airfields. This sparked the Indo-

Pakistan War of 1971, which lasted just under two weeks[48][49]. Indian forces, along with

Mukti Bahini fighters, advanced rapidly in East Pakistan on multiple fronts. Facing a multi-front

war and superior Indian military, the Pakistan Army in the East collapsed quickly.

Victory and the Birth of Bangladesh: On December 16, 1971, the Pakistani Eastern Command

in Dhaka surrendered unconditionally to the joint Indian and Bangladeshi forces. This day is

celebrated as Victory Day in Bangladesh, marking the official liberation of the country. The

surrender was one of the largest in modern history – around 90,000 Pakistani troops became

prisoners of war. Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) emerged as an independent nation based

on the principles of Bengali language, culture, and self-determination. Jubilant crowds in Dhaka

and across the country welcomed the end of the war and the dawn of freedom[50]. The war had

been devastating – millions were dead or displaced – but Bangladesh now had the chance to rebuild

and govern itself. The new country’s journey would not be easy, but 1971 remains the proudest
moment in Bangladesh’s history, when a people’s long-held aspirations for autonomy and respect

culminated in independence.

The 1971 Genocide and the Struggle for Recognition

Understanding “Genocide”: The term genocide means the deliberate attempt to destroy, in

whole or in part, a group of people because of their identity – typically nationality, ethnicity,

race, or religion. This was defined in the UN Genocide Convention of 1948[51]. Genocide is not

just mass killing; it implies an intent to wipe out a targeted group. The atrocities committed in

Bangladesh in 1971 – widespread killings, rapes, and other crimes against Bengali civilians – are

considered a genocide by Bangladesh. The Pakistani army specifically targeted Bengali

nationalists, intellectuals, and Hindus as groups, which fits the definition of genocide (as national,

ethnic, and religious groups were attacked with intent to destroy them)[43]. Estimates often cited

by Bangladesh say that in 1971 the Pakistani forces and their local collaborators killed

approximately 3 million people and raped over 200,000 women[43], in one of the worst mass

atrocities of the 20th century. It is important to note that determining intent and official recognition

of genocide can be politically complicated. The UN definition excludes political groups and

requires clear evidence of intent, which can make legal recognition difficult[52]. Still, the scale

and brutality of 1971 leave little doubt that it was an attempt to annihilate the Bengali opposition

and break the spirit of the Bengali people.

Lack of International Recognition: More than fifty years later, the 1971 Bangladesh Genocide

has not been formally recognized by the United Nations or most countries as a “genocide.”

This lack of recognition is surprising given the scale of the violence. Several factors explain why.

One major reason is global politics at the time of and after the war. During the 1971 war, key
international players like the United States and China were allied with Pakistan – they remained

mostly silent or dismissive of the genocide as it unfolded[53]. The U.S. government (under Nixon

and Kissinger) was more interested in its Cold War strategy (using Pakistan to open relations with

China and to counter Soviet influence) than in condemning Pakistan for human rights abuses[46].

This meant that at the UN and other forums, there was no concerted push to label Pakistan’s actions

as genocide in 1971. After the war, Pakistan was a Cold War ally of the West, and recognizing

the genocide formally would have implicated the Pakistani military and leadership in international

crimes, something many governments were reluctant to do. Another reason is the legal and

diplomatic challenges – declaring an event a genocide can be sensitive, as it often demands action

or accountability, and countries sometimes avoid the term for political convenience.

Internal Politics and Silence (Post-1975): Within Bangladesh itself, efforts to get international

recognition for 1971 were stalled for decades by internal political changes. After the war, in 1973,

Bangladesh did set up tribunals to try local collaborators for war crimes, and there was a strong

acknowledgment domestically of the genocide. But in 1975, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (the

founding leader and first president) was assassinated. After Mujib’s death, subsequent

governments in Bangladesh (especially under presidents Ziaur Rahman in late 1970s and Hussain

Ershad in the 1980s) took a much softer stance toward Pakistan and the 1971 legacy. Many known

local collaborators of the Pakistan army were rehabilitated into politics and society[54]. The

official narrative of 1971 was downplayed; terms like “genocide” and the pursuit of war crime

trials were largely shelved during those years. In essence, from 1975 until the 1990s, Bangladesh’s

rulers did not press the issue internationally – some even fostered a “forget the past” approach to

build relations with Pakistan. This meant valuable time was lost in building a global case for

recognizing the genocide. It was only in the late 2000s and 2010s, with war crimes tribunals re-
established in Bangladesh and a renewed focus on 1971, that the country again started to talk about

international recognition. “Genocide Day” was declared in Bangladesh in 2017 (observed on

March 25 each year) to officially acknowledge what happened in 1971 and to spur the international

community to do the same[55]. But by then, decades had passed without a concerted global

campaign.

International Reluctance and Other Barriers: Apart from Cold War politics, there are other

reasons the 1971 genocide isn’t globally recognized. One is a lack of global awareness and

documentation. Unlike the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide, the 1971 events were not widely

taught or known around the world. Bangladesh itself did not invest enough in global publicity or

academic research about the genocide for many years[56]. Another factor is that some international

human rights groups and Western governments became critical of how Bangladesh handled war

crimes trials in recent years (for example, Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal from 2010

convicted several war criminals, but these trials were criticized by some as being flawed or too

punitive, especially due to death penalty sentences)[57]. This controversy somewhat politicized

the narrative – some countries were hesitant to fully endorse Bangladesh’s calls for genocide

recognition while such trials were ongoing under criticism. Additionally, Pakistan has never

acknowledged that genocide occurred; to this day, the official line in Pakistan is often that the

casualty numbers are exaggerated and that the army’s actions were against “terrorists” or

separatists. Pakistani diplomacy, therefore, opposes any use of the term genocide. Many countries

prioritize their diplomatic and economic relations with Pakistan (or with China, Pakistan’s

ally) and do not want to reopen a sensitive issue from 1971. All these factors combined have made

global recognition challenging.

Why Recognition Matters: From Bangladesh’s perspective, getting the 1971 atrocities

recognized internationally as a genocide is about justice and historical truth. Official recognition

could mean global remembrance (such as a UN resolution or days of remembrance) and would

honor the victims properly. It’s also argued that recognizing past genocides is important for

preventing future atrocities – acknowledging the crime is a way of saying the world will not

ignore such crimes. Bangladesh points out that a failure to hold perpetrators fully accountable in

1971 may have emboldened others; for example, some draw a line to later ethnic cleansings in

South Asia (even the recent persecution of Rohingya in Myanmar) as being easier to carry out

because the world was silent in 1971[58]. In short, recognition is seen as both a moral obligation

and a means to strengthen global genocide prevention norms.

Efforts to Achieve Recognition – Government, Academics, and Diaspora: In recent years,

Bangladesh’s government and civil society have started taking steps to push for recognition. The

government can use diplomatic channels – for instance, lobbying the United Nations and

individual friendly countries to pass resolutions acknowledging the genocide. To do this

effectively, experts suggest Bangladesh should make it a foreign policy priority[59]. Bangladesh

can also encourage research and education on 1971: for example, funding universities or centers

(like the Center for Genocide Studies at the University of Dhaka) to produce scholarly work in

English and other major languages[60]. Translating documents and witness accounts into

languages like English, French, etc., is important so the story of 1971 can reach a global

audience[61]. Organizing international conferences on the Bangladesh genocide is another strategy

– bringing historians, genocide scholars, and jurists together can raise the profile of 1971’s

events[59].
Beyond government, academics and researchers play a key role by publishing books and articles,

which help build an irrefutable historical record. There has been progress: more books and

documentaries about 1971 have emerged globally in the past decade. Diaspora communities

(Bangladeshi-origin people living abroad) are also crucial. They can campaign in their countries

of residence – for example, writing to lawmakers, hosting events, and pushing for recognition in

places like the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and so on[62]. In some cases,

diaspora activism has yielded results: a few local or national legislatures have debated or even

passed motions about the 1971 genocide. For instance, in 2022, the U.S. Congress introduced a

resolution to recognize the Bangladesh genocide of 1971[63], which was a result of awareness

efforts. These are important steps, but a worldwide recognition (like a UN designation) is still

pending.

ICSF’s 7-Point Plan: An organization called the International Crimes Strategy Forum (ICSF)

– a global network of activists and experts – proposed a seven-point strategy in 2017 to achieve

worldwide recognition of the 1971 genocide. The plan includes several practical steps[64][65]:

• Access to War Records: Work with the Indian government to access wartime records

(since India captured many Pakistani documents in 1971) and with international bodies to

formally acknowledge the 1971 atrocities as genocide[64]. These records can provide more

evidence of the planning and intent behind the mass killings.

• Engage International Organizations: Actively involve the United Nations and other

international organizations to raise the issue on global platforms[64]. For example,

Bangladesh could push for a UN recognition day for the Bangladesh genocide or for

statements from the UN Secretary-General.

• Work with Friendly Governments: Approach friendly foreign governments to pass

resolutions in their parliaments recognizing the 1971 genocide[64]. This could create a

ripple effect. Countries with close ties to Bangladesh or large Bangladeshi communities

(like India, Bangladesh’s neighbor, or countries in Europe) might be willing to do this.

• Genocide Education: Implement education about the 1971 genocide in Bangladesh’s

own curriculum[65]. This ensures the new generation learns the correct history and

understands the significance, which in turn strengthens global campaigning because a well-

informed population is more likely to advocate internationally.

• Preserve Memorials: Preserve important Liberation War sites and memorials in

Bangladesh[66]. By protecting mass graves, monuments, and museums, Bangladesh can

keep the memory alive and also encourage international visitors and researchers to witness

these sites, reinforcing the reality of what occurred.

• Archive and Digitize Evidence: Invest in archiving and digitizing documents related to

1971 and make them easily accessible globally[67]. This includes declassified government

documents, newspaper archives, video/oral testimonies of survivors, etc. If the evidence of

genocide is readily available online and in libraries, it becomes harder for the world to

ignore or forget.

• Support Citizen Initiatives: Extend support to citizen-led and diaspora initiatives

worldwide that seek recognition of the genocide[68]. This means encouraging and possibly

funding grassroots campaigns, petitions, exhibitions, or cultural programs abroad that

highlight the 1971 genocide. People-to-people diplomacy can often achieve what

governments cannot.
These seven points are essentially a roadmap for how Bangladesh and its supporters can build a

strong case for recognition and keep the issue alive internationally. Already, some progress has

been noted – for example, in 2023, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution to

recognize the Bangladesh genocide of 1971, which was a significant moral victory for this

campaign[63][69].

Conclusion: The story of Bangladesh from 1947 to 1971 is one of a people’s yearning for respect,

rights, and identity, leading to a brutal war and the birth of a new nation. The Pakistan period

was marked by inequality and denial of democracy, which sowed the seeds of the independence

movement. The Liberation War of 1971 was tragic yet heroic – a testament to Bangladesh’s

resolve to determine its own destiny. However, the shadow of 1971 lingered in the form of

unacknowledged trauma. Recognizing the 1971 genocide is not only about honoring those who

were killed, but also about learning from history. It serves as a reminder that the world should

not stay silent in the face of mass atrocities. Bangladesh continues to seek this recognition on the

global stage. With persistent effort, education, and international solidarity, there is hope that the

genocide of 1971 will be acknowledged worldwide – ensuring that the cries of the victims and the

resilience of the survivors are never forgotten. [58]

[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23]

[24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43]

[44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] [53] [81] [101] [102] [103] [104] [105] [106] [107]

[108] [109] [110] [111] [112] Lecture_8_Road to Independence.pptx

file://file-3vLbjqqjZxzQJqcmS2bHDE

[54] [55] [56] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] [74]

[75] [80] [83] [84] [85] [86] [87] [88] [89] [90] [91] [92] [93] [94] Lec 9.pptx

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Yesterday at the Liberation War Museum in Agargaon, Dhaka, the curator spoke in simple, heavy

words: he told how soldiers even crushed a 4-month-old baby under boots, and how 38 young men

set off from Jessore to Delhi in 1971 as the Bishwa Bibek Jagaran Mancha; then we watched

Tanvir Mokammel’s film “The Liberation Struggle of the Bengalees.” The museum sits in

Agargaon and has galleries full of photos, maps, weapons, and personal things that make the war

feel close and real. Wikipedia In Gallery 4 we learned about the naval commandos of Sector 10:

eight Bengali submariners who had been in France helped form the unit; on the first big night, 15

August 1971, commando teams struck Chittagong, Mongla, Heron Point, Narayanganj, and

Chandpur, using limpet mines and detonators, with “Ami Tomay Joto Shuniyechilem Gaan” on

Akashbani as the go-signal; about 517 commandos took part, damaged around 50 ships that night,

and later carried out many more attacks. liberationwar.orgWikipediaThe Daily Star A moving

display told the Bakunda Bridge story from Faridpur, where a six-member team hid as ordinary
travelers and an eight-year-old girl, Hasna Khan Rani, with her mother, helped them keep their

disguise and carry explosives. iaaw.hu-berlin.de Other cases showed the Battle of Belonia and how

joint forces won ground in November, step by step. The Daily Star Another room spoke about

sexual violence against Bengali girls and women, which was used as a weapon of terror. We also

saw material on 14 December, when the killers targeted teachers, doctors, and writers and dumped

bodies by rivers like the Buriganga; the plan is linked to Rao Farman Ali. Banglapedia The

museum explains how our small Air Force began on 28 November 1971 at Dimapur, Nagaland,

called Kilo Flight, and how on 11 December paratroopers dropped at Tangail to speed up the final

push to Dhaka. daily-sunWikipedia It also shows the Mujibnagar government: declared on 10

April in Tripura, oath on 17 April at Meherpur; on 11 July MAG Osmani became the army chief

and made eleven sectors; and from 21 November, India and Bangladesh ran a joint command under

Lt Gen J. S. Aurora. Wikipedia One exhibit names Father Mario Veronesi, a priest at Shimulia,

Jessore, as the first foreigner killed in our war while serving people at Fatima Hospital. Asia News

Walking through the galleries, the story felt clear: brave people fought on land, river, and in the

air, with help from many corners, and after great pain and courage we reached victory on 16

December 1971.