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Subsea Engineering
Handbook

Second Edition
Gulf Professional Publishing is an imprint of Elsevier
50 Hampshire Street, 5th Floor, Cambridge, MA 02139, United States
The Boulevard, Langford Lane, Kidlington, Oxford, OX5 1GB, United Kingdom
Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Details on how to seek
permission, further information about the Publisher’s permissions policies and our
arrangements with organizations such as the Copyright Clearance Center and the Copyright
Licensing Agency, can be found at our website: [Link]/permissions.

This book and the individual contributions contained in it are protected under copyright by
the Publisher (other than as may be noted herein).
Notices
Knowledge and best practice in this field are constantly changing. As new research and
experience broaden our understanding, changes in research methods, professional practices,
or medical treatment may become necessary.
Practitioners and researchers must always rely on their own experience and knowledge in
evaluating and using any information, methods, compounds, or experiments described
herein. In using such information or methods they should be mindful of their own safety and
the safety of others, including parties for whom they have a professional responsibility.

To the fullest extent of the law, neither the Publisher nor the authors, contributors, or editors,
assume any liability for any injury and/or damage to persons or property as a matter of
products liability, negligence or otherwise, or from any use or operation of any methods,
products, instructions, or ideas contained in the material herein.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN: 978-0-12-812622-6

For information on all Gulf Professional publications visit our website at

[Link]

Publisher: Brian Romer

Senior Acquisition Editor: Katie Hammon
Editorial Project Manager: Charlotte Kent
Production Project Manager: Anitha Sivaraj
Designer: Greg Harris

Typeset by TNQ Technologies

About the Authors

Professor Yong Bai is the president of Offshore Pipelines & Risers Inc. in Houston,
and also the director of the Offshore Engineering Research Center at Zhejiang Univer-
sity. He has previously taught at Stavanger University in Norway where he was a pro-
fessor of offshore structures. He has also worked with ABS as manager of the Offshore
Technology Department and DNV as the JIP project manager.
Professor Yong Bai has also worked for Shell International E & P as a staff engi-
neer. Through working at JP Kenny as manager of advanced engineering and at MCS
as vice president of engineering, he has contributed to the advancement of methods
and tools for the design and analysis of subsea pipelines and risers. Professor Bai is
the author of the books Marine Structural Design and Subsea Pipelines and Risers
and more than 100 papers on the design and installation of subsea pipelines and risers.
OPR has offices in Houston, Texas, USA; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; and Harbin,
Beijing, and Shanghai, China. OPR is engaged in the design, analysis, installation, en-
gineering, and integrity management of pipelines, risers, and subsea systems such as
subsea wellheads, trees, manifolds, and PLET/PLEMs.

Dr. Qiang Bai has more than 20 years of experience in subsea/offshore engineering
including research and engineering execution. He has worked at Kyushu University
in Japan, UCLA, OPE, JP Kenny, and Technip. His experience includes various as-
pects of flow assurance and the design and installation of subsea structures, pipelines,
and riser systems. Dr. Bai is coauthor of Subsea Pipelines and Risers.
List of Abbreviations

A&R Abandonment and recovery

AA Anti agglomerate
AACE Advancement of cost engineering
AAV Annulus access valve
ACFM Alternating current field measurement
AHC Active heave compensation
AHV Anchor handling vessel
AMV Annulus master valve
APDU Asphaltene precipitation detection unit
APV Air pressure vessel
ASD Allowable stress design
ASV Annulus swab valve
AUV Autonomous underwater vehicle
AWV Annulus wing valve
B&C Burial and coating
BM Bending moment
BOPD Barrels of oil per day
BR Bend restrictor
C/WO Completion and workover
CAPEX Capital expenditures
CAPEX Capital expenditures
CAT Connector actuation tool
CCD Charge-coupled device
CCO Component change-out tool
CDTM Control depth towing method
CFP Cold flow pipeline
CG Center of gravity
CI Corrosion inhibitor
CII Colloidal instability index
CIU Chemical injection unit
CMC Crown-mounted compensator
CoB Cost of blowout
CoG Center of gravity
CP Cathodic protection
CPT Compliant piled tower
CPT Cone penetration test
CRA Corrosion-resistant alloy
CV Coefficient value
CVC Pipeline end connector
xviii List of Abbreviations

CVI Close visual inspection

DA Diver assist
DCU Dry completion unit
DDF Deepdraft semi-submersible
DEG Diethylene glycol
DFT Dry film thickness
DGPS Differential global positioning system
DH Direct hydraulic
DHSV Downhole safety valve
DOP Dilution of position
DP Dynamic positioning
DSS Direct simple shear
DSV Diving support vessel
EC External corrosion
EDM Electrical distribution module
EDP Emergency disconnect package
EDU Electrical distribution unit
EFAT Extended factory acceptance test
EFL Electric flying lead
EGL Energy grade line
EH Electrical heating
EI External impact
EOS Equation of state
EPCI Engineering, procurement, construction and installation
EPU Electrical power unit
EQD Emergency quick disconnect
ESD Emergency shutdown
ESP Electrical submersible pump
FAR Flexural anchor reaction
FAT Factory acceptance test
FBE Fusion bonded epoxy
FDM Finite difference method
FE Finite element
FEA Finite element analysis
FEED Front-end engineering design
FEM Finite element Method
FMECA Failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis
FOS Factor of safety
FPDU Floating production and drilling unit
FPS Floating production system
FPSO Floating production, storage and offloading
FPU Floating production unit
FSHR Free standing hybrid riser
FSO Floating storage and offloading
FSV Field support vessel
FTA Fault tree analysis
GL Guideline
GLL Guideline-less
GoM Gulf of Mexico
List of Abbreviations xix

GOR Gas/oil ratio

GPS Global positioning system
GSPU Polyurethane-glass syntactic
GVI General visual inspection
HAZID Hazard identification
HCLS Heave compensated landing system
HCM HIPPS control module
HCR High collapse resistance
HDM Hydraulic distribution module
HDPE High density polyethylene
HFL Hydraulic flying lead
HGL Hydraulic grade line
HIPPS High integrity pressure protection system
HISC Hydrogen-induced stress cracking
HLV Heavy lift vessel
HMI Human machine interface
HP/HT High pressure high temperature
HPU Hydraulic power unit
HR Hybrid riser
HSE Health, safety, and environmental
HSP Hydraulic submersible pump
HT Horizontal tree
HTGC High temperature gas chromatography
HXT Horizontal tree
HXU Heat exchanger unit
IA Inhibitor availability
IBWM International bureau of weights and measures
IC Internal corrosion
ICCP Impressed current cathodic protection
IE Internal erosion
IMR Inspection, maintenance, and repair
IPU Integrated production umbilical
IRP Inspection reference plan
IRR Internal rate of return
ISA Instrument society of America
ISO International Organization for Standards
IWOCS Installation and workover control system
JIC Joint industry conference
JT Joule Thompson
KI Kinetic inhibitor
L/D Length/diameter
LARS Launch and recovery system
LBL Long baseline
LC Life cycle cost
LCWR Lost capacity while waiting on rig
LDHI Low dosage hydrate inhibitor
LFJ Lower flexjoint
LOT Linear override tool
LP Low pressure
xx List of Abbreviations

LPMV Lower production master valve

LRP Lower riser package
LWRP Lower workover riser package
MAOP Maximum allowable operating pressure
MASP Maximum allowable surge pressure
MBR Minimum bend radius
MCS Master control station
MEG Mono ethylene glycol
MF Medium frequency
MIC Microbiological induced corrosion
MMBOE Million barrels of oil equivalent
MOPU Mobile offshore drilling unit
MPI Magnetic particle inspection
MPP Multiphase pump
MQC Multiple quick connector
MRP Maintenance reference plan
MTO Material take-off
NAS National aerospace standard
NDE None destructive examination
NDT Nondestructive testing
NGS Nitrogen generating system
NPV Net present value
NS North sea
NTNU The Norwegian university of science and technology
O&M Operations and maintenance
OCR Over consolidation ratio
OCS Operational Control System
OHTC Overall heat transfer coefficient
OPEX Operation expenditures
OREDA Offshore reliability data
OSI Oil States Industries
OTC Offshore Technology conference
PAN Programmable acoustic navigator
PCP Piezocone penetration
PGB Production guide base
PHC Passive heave compensator
PhS Phenolic syntactic
PIP Pipe in pipe
PLC Programmable logic controller
PLEM Pipeline end manifold
PLET Pipeline end termination
PLL Potential loss of life
PMV Production master valve
PoB Probability of blowout
POD Point of disconnect
PP Polypropylene
PPF Polypropylene foam
PSCM Procurement and supply chain management
PSV Production swab valve
List of Abbreviations xxi

PT Pressure transmitter
PTT Pressure/Temperature Transducer
PU Polyurethane
PWV Production wing valve
QC Quality control
QE Quality engineer
QP Quality program
QRA Quantitative risk assessment
RAO Response amplitude operator
RBD Reliability block diagram
RBI Risk-based inspection
RCDA Reliability-centered design analysis
RCMM Reliability capability maturity model
REB Reverse end bearing
ROT Remote operated tool
ROV Remote operated vehicle
RPPF Polypropylene-reinforced foam combination
RSV ROV support vessel
SAM Subsea accumulator module
SAMMB Subsea accumulator module mating block
SBP Sub-bottom profiler
SCF Stress concentration factor
SCM Subsea control module
SCMMB Subsea control module mounting base
SCR Steel catenary riser
SCSSV Surface controlled subsurface safety valve
SDA Subsea distribution assembly
SDS Subsea distribution system
SDU Subsea distribution unit
SEM Subsea electronics module
SEP Epoxy syntactic
SEPLA Suction embedded plate anchor
SIS Safety instrumented system
SIT Silicon intensified target
SIT System integration test
SLEM Simple linear elastic model
SPCS Subsea production control system
SPCU Subsea production communication unit
SPS Subsea production system
SPU Polyurethane-syntactic
SSC Sulfide stress cracking
SSCC Stress corrosion cracking
SSP Subsea processing
SSS Side-scan sonar
SSTT Subsea test tree
SU Separator unit
SUTA Subsea umbilical termination assembly
SV Satellite vehicle
TDP Touchdown point
xxii List of Abbreviations

TDS Total dissolved solid

TDU Tool deployment unit
TDZ Touchdown zone
TEG Triethylene glycol
TFL Through-flowline
TGB Temporary guide base
THI Thermodynamic inhibitor
TLP Tension leg platform
TMGB Template-mounted guide base
TMS Tether management system
TPPL Total plant peak load
TPRL Total plant running load
TRT Tree running tool
TT Temperature transmitter
TTF Time to failure
TTR Top tensioned riser
TUFFP Tulsa university fluid flow project
TUTA Topside umbilical termination assembly
TVD True vertical depth
TWI Thermodynamic wax inhibitor
UFJ Upper flexjoint
UHF Ultra high frequency
UPC Pull out capacity
UPMV Upper production master valve
UPS Uninterruptible power supply
USBL Ultra short baseline
USV Underwater safety valve
UTA Umbilical termination assembly
UTH Umbilical termination head
UU Unconsolidated, undrained
VG Vetco Gray
VIM Vortex Induced Motion
VIT Vacuum insulated tubing
VIV Vortex induced vibration
VRU Vertical reference unit
VT Vertical tree
VXT Vertical Xmas tree
WA West africa
WAT Wax appearance temperature
WBS Work breakdown structure
WD Water depth
WHI Wellhead growth index
WHP Wellhead platform
WHU Wellhead unit
WS Winter storm
WSD Working stress design
XLPE Cross linked polyethylene
XOV Crossover valve
Preface

Subsea engineering is now a big discipline for the design, analysis, construction,
installation and integrity management of subsea wellheads, trees, manifolds, jumpers,
PLETS and PLEMs, etc. However, there is no book available that helps engineers
understand the principles of subsea engineering.
This book is written for those who wish to become subsea engineers.
With the continuous encouragement of Mr. Ken McCombs and Ms. Katie Hammon
of Elsevier, the authors spent a couple of years writing this book. The authors would
like to thank those individuals who provided editing assistance (Ms. Lihua Bai & Ms.
Shuhua Bai), initial technical writing for Chapters 1 through 4 (Mr. Youxiang Cheng),
Chapters 6-8 (Mr. Xiaohai Song), Chapter 11 (Mr. Shiliang He), Chapter 5 (Mr. Hon-
gDong Qiao), Chapter 23 (Mr. Liangbiao Xu) and Chapter 27 (Mr. Mike Bian). The
authors also would like to thank Prof. J. K. Paik for his support and advice to the
new chapters of the 2nd edition, Mr. F. Zhang for the initial writing of Chapter 26.
Thanks to all persons involved in reviewing the book, particularly Ms. Mohanambal
Natarajan and Ms. Anitha Sivaraj of Elsevier, who provided editory assistance.
We thank our families and friends for their support.
The first author would like to thank Zhejiang University for their support for
publishing this book.
Prof. Yong Bai, Dr. Qiang Bai
Houston, USA
October, 2018
Contents

About the Authors xiii

Preface xv
List of Abbreviations xvii

Part One Subsea Production Systems 1

1. Overview of Subsea Engineering 3

1.1 Introduction 4
1.2 Subsea Production Systems 6
1.3 Flow Assurance and System Engineering 12
1.4 Subsea Structures and Equipment 16
1.5 Subsea Pipelines 22
References 22

2. Subsea Field Development 23

2.1 Subsea Field Development Overview 24
2.2 Deepwater or Shallow-Water Development 25
2.3 Wet Tree and Dry Tree Systems 25
2.4 Subsea Tie-Back Development 30
2.5 Stand-Alone Development 34
2.6 Artificial Lift Methods and Constraints 38
2.7 Subsea Processing 43
2.8 Template, Clustered Well System, and Daisy Chain 45
2.9 Subsea Field Development Assessment 49
References 53

3. Subsea Distribution System 55

3.1 Introduction 56
3.2 Design Parameters 57
3.3 SDS Component Design Requirements 58
References 79

4. Subsea Surveying, Positioning, and Foundation 81

4.1 Introduction 83
4.2 Subsea Survey 83
vi Contents

4.3 Subsea Metrology and Positioning 92

4.4 Subsea Soil Investigation 97
4.5 Subsea Foundation 104
References 120

5. Installation and Vessels 123

5.1 Introduction 123
5.2 Typical Installation Vessels 124
5.3 Vessel Requirements and Selection 131
5.4 Installation Positioning 134
5.5 Installation Analysis 136
References 140

6. Subsea Cost Estimation 143

6.1 Introduction 144
6.2 Subsea Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) 146
6.3 Cost Estimation Methodologies 147
6.4 Subsea Equipment Costs 152
6.5 Testing and Installation Costs 161
6.6 Project Management and Engineering Costs 163
6.7 Subsea Operation Expenditures (OPEX) 164
6.8 Life Cycle Cost of Subsea System 164
6.9 Case Study: Subsea System CAPEX Estimation 168
References 172

7. Subsea Control 173

7.1 Introduction 173
7.2 Types of Control Systems 174
7.3 Topside Equipment 182
7.4 Subsea Control Module Mounting Base (SCMMB) 184
7.5 Subsea Control Module (SCM) 185
7.6 Subsea Transducers/Sensors 190
7.7 High-Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS) 193
7.8 Subsea Production Control System (SPCS) 196
7.9 Installation and Workover Control System (IWOCS) 199
References 201

8. Subsea Power Supply 203

8.1 Introduction 203
8.2 Electrical Power System 205
8.3 Hydraulic Power System 213
References 220
Contents vii

9. Project Execution and Interfaces 221

9.1 Introduction 222
9.2 Project Execution 222
9.3 Interfaces 232
References 238

10. Subsea Risk and Reliability 239

10.1 Introduction 240
10.2 Risk Assessment 242
10.3 Environmental Impact Assessment 246
10.4 Project Risk Management 250
10.5 Reliability 251
10.6 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 256
10.7 Qualification to Reduce Subsea Failures 259
References 260

11. Subsea Equipment RBI 263

11.1 Introduction 264
11.2 Objective 264
11.3 Subsea Equipment RBI Methodology 265
11.4 Pipeline RBI 274
11.5 Subsea Tree RBI 282
11.6 Subsea Manifold RBI 287
11.7 RBI Output and Benefits 296
References 296

Part Two Flow Assurance and System Engineering 297

12. Subsea System Engineering 299

12.1 Introduction 299
12.2 Typical Flow Assurance Process 301
12.3 System Design and Operability 308
References 312

13. Hydraulics 315

13.1 Introduction 316
13.2 Composition and Properties of Hydrocarbons 317
13.3 Emulsion 323
13.4 Phase Behavior 325
13.5 Hydrocarbon Flow 329
13.6 Slugging and Liquid Handling 343
13.7 Slug Catcher Design 351
13.8 Pressure Surge 353
13.9 Line Sizing 355
References 359
viii Contents

14. Heat Transfer and Thermal Insulation 363

14.1 Introduction 364
14.2 Heat Transfer Fundamentals 365
14.3 U-Value 374
14.4 Steady-State Heat Transfer 379
14.5 Transient Heat Transfer 382
14.6 Thermal Management Strategy and Insulation 387
Appendix: U-Value and Cooldown Time Calculation Sheet 401
References 406

15. Hydrates 409

15.1 Introduction 409
15.2 Physics and Phase Behavior 412
15.3 Hydrate Prevention 420
15.4 Hydrate Remediation 424
15.5 Hydrate Control Design Philosophies 427
15.6 Recovery of Thermodynamic Hydrate Inhibitors 432
References 434

16. Wax and Asphaltenes 435

16.1 Introduction 435
16.2 Wax 436
16.3 Wax Management 443
16.4 Wax Remediation 445
16.5 Asphaltenes 447
16.6 Asphaltene Control Design Philosophies 451
References 453

17. Subsea Corrosion and Scale 455

17.1 Introduction 456
17.2 Pipeline Internal Corrosion 457
17.3 Pipeline External Corrosion 468
17.4 Scales 479
References 487

18. Erosion and Sand Management 489

18.1 Introduction 490
18.2 Erosion Mechanisms 491
18.3 Prediction of Sand Erosion Rate 496
18.4 Threshold Velocity 500
18.5 Erosion Management 505
18.6 Sand Management 507
18.7 Calculating the Penetration Rate: Example 510
References 513
Contents ix

Part Three Subsea Structures and Equipment 515

19. Subsea Manifolds 517

19.1 Introduction 518
19.2 Manifold Components 524
19.3 Manifold Design and Analysis 532
19.4 Pile and Foundation Design 546
19.5 Installation of Subsea Manifold 559
References 569

20. Subsea Manifold Design 573

20.1 Introduction 574
20.2 Subsea Manifold System 576
20.3 Structural Analyses 580
20.4 Component Analysis 590
20.5 Mudmat Analysis 595
20.6 FAT Procedure 600
20.7 Site Integration Test 609
References 612

21. Pipeline Ends and In-Line Structures 613

21.1 Introduction 614
21.2 PLEM Design and Analysis 618
21.3 Design Methodology 619
21.4 Foundation (Mudmat) Sizing and Design 622
21.5 PLEM Installation Analysis 627
References 638

22. Subsea Connections and Jumpers 639

22.1 Introduction 640
22.2 Jumper Components and Functions 646
22.3 Subsea Connections 656
22.4 Design and Analysis of Rigid Jumpers 661
22.5 Design and Analysis of a Flexible Jumper 663
References 672

23. Subsea Wellheads 675

23.1 Introduction 675
23.2 Subsea Completions Overview 676
23.3 Subsea Wellhead System 676
References 696
x Contents

24. Subsea Trees 697

24.1 Introduction 698
24.2 Function Requirements 698
24.3 Types and Configurations of Trees 699
24.4 Design Process 702
24.5 Service Conditions 704
24.6 Main Components of Tree 706
24.7 Tree-Mounted Controls 720
24.8 Tree Running Tools 722
24.9 Subsea Xmas Tree Design and Analysis 722
24.10 Subsea Xmas Tree Installation 725
References 729

25. Subsea Tree Design 731

25.1 Introduction 732
25.2 Material Selections 738
25.3 Tree Structure Analysis 743
25.4 Tree Piping Analysis 747
25.5 Fitting Analyses 752
25.6 Cathodic Protection 755
25.7 Factory Acceptance Test 763
25.8 Site Integration Test 766
25.9 Shallow Water Test 767

26. Subsea Processing 769

26.1 Introduction 770
26.2 Subsea Pumping 777
26.3 Subsea Separation 787
26.4 Subsea Gas Compression 797
References 803

27. ROV Intervention and Interface 805

27.1 Introduction 806
27.2 ROV Intervention 806
27.3 ROV System 810
27.4 ROV Interface Requirements 820
27.5 Remote-Operated Tool (ROT) 829
References 833

Part Four Subsea Umbilical, Risers & Flowlines 835

28. Subsea Umbilical Systems 837

28.1 Introduction 838
28.2 Umbilical Components 840
Contents xi

28.3 Umbilical Design 841

28.4 Ancillary Equipment 847
28.5 System Integration Test 852
28.6 Installation 852
28.7 Technological Challenges and Analysis 855
28.8 Umbilical Industry Experience and Trends 861
References 862

29. Drilling Risers 863

29.1 Introduction 863
29.2 Floating Drilling Equipment 864
29.3 Key Components of Subsea Production Systems 869
29.4 Riser Design Criteria 871
29.5 Drilling Riser Analysis Model 872
29.6 Drilling Riser Analysis Methodology 874
References 883

30. Subsea Production Risers 885

30.1 Introduction 886
30.2 Steel Catenary Riser Systems 891
30.3 Top Tensioned Riser Systems 900
30.4 Flexible Risers 904
30.5 Hybrid Risers 911
References 917

31. Subsea Pipelines 919

31.1 Introduction 920
31.2 Design Stages and Process 921
31.3 Subsea Pipeline FEED Design 925
31.4 Subsea Pipeline Detailed Design 927
31.5 Pipeline Design Analysis 929
31.6 Challenges of HP/HT Pipelines in Deep Water 938
References 939

Index 941
Part One

Subsea Production Systems

Overview of Subsea Engineering
1
Chapter Outline

1.1 Introduction 4
1.2 Subsea Production Systems 6
1.2.1 Field Architecture 8
1.2.2 Distribution Systems 9
1.2.3 Subsea Surveys 9
1.2.4 Installation and Vessels 10
1.2.5 Cost Estimation 10
1.2.6 Subsea Control 11
1.2.7 Subsea Power Supply 11
1.2.8 Project Execution and Interfaces 11
1.3 Flow Assurance and System Engineering 12
1.3.1 Subsea Operations 12
1.3.2 Commissioning and Start-Up 14
1.3.3 Production Processing 14
1.3.4 Chemicals Injection 14
[Link] Hydrate Inhibition 15
[Link] Paraffin Inhibitors 15
[Link] Asphaltene Inhibitors 15
1.3.5 Well Testing 16
1.3.6 Inspection and Maintenance 16
1.4 Subsea Structures and Equipment 16
1.4.1 Subsea Manifolds 16
1.4.2 Pipeline Ends and In-Line Structures 16
1.4.3 Jumpers 17
1.4.4 Subsea Wellheads 17
1.4.5 Subsea Trees 20
1.4.6 Umbilical Systems 20
1.4.7 Production Risers 21
1.5 Subsea Pipelines 22
References 22

Subsea Engineering Handbook. [Link]

Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
4 Subsea Engineering Handbook

1.1 Introduction
The world’s energy consumption has increased steadily since the 1950s. As shown in
Figure 1-1, the fossil fuels (oil, natural gas, and coal) still amount to 80% of the
world’s energy consumption even though a considerable number of initiatives and in-
ventions in the area of renewable energy resources have decreased their use. The rapid
rises in crude oil prices during the late 2000s is a response to increasing demand for oil
and gas. Of the fossil fuels consumed, almost 80% are oil and gas; therefore, the pro-
duction of oil and gas is of major importance to the stability of the world’s energy
supply.
The offshore oil and gas industry started in 1947 when Kerr-McGee completed the
first successful offshore well in the Gulf of Mexico (GoM) off Louisiana in 15 ft (4.6 m)
of water [2]. The concept of subsea field development was suggested in the early 1970s
by placing wellhead and production equipment on the seabed with some or all compo-
nents encapsulated in a sealed chamber [3]. The hydrocarbon produced would then
flow from the well to a nearby processing facility, either on land or on an existing
offshore platform. This concept was the start of subsea engineering, and systems
that have a well and associated equipment below the water surface are referred as sub-
sea production systems. Figure 1-2 shows the number of shallow and deepwater subsea
completions in the GoM from 1955 to 2005. Subsea completions in less than 1,000 ft
(305 m) water depths are considered to be shallow-water completions, whereas those at
depths greater than 1,000 ft (305 m) are considered to be deepwater completions. In the
past 40 years, subsea systems have advanced from shallow-water, manually operated
systems into systems capable of operating via remote control at water depths of up to
3,000 m (10,000 ft).
With the depletion of onshore and offshore shallow-water reserves, the exploration
and production of oil in deep water has become a challenge to the offshore industry.

Figure 1-1 Coal, Oil, and Natural Gas Consumption [1].

Overview of Subsea Engineering 5

Figure 1-2 Number of Shallow and Deepwater Subsea Completions Each Year from 1955 to
2005 [4].

Figure 1-3 Maximum Water Depth of Subsea Completions Installed Each Year from 1955 to
2005 [4].

Offshore exploration and production of oil and gas are advancing into deeper waters at
an increasing pace. Figure 1-3 shows the maximum water depth of subsea completions
installed each year in the GoM. Figure 1-4 illustrates offshore oil production trends in
the GoM from shallow and deep water. Offshore oil production from deep water has
increased sharply since 1995, starting at approximately 20 million barrels of oil equiv-
alent (MMBOE) per year from deep water.
The subsea technology used for offshore oil and gas production is a highly special-
ized field of application that places particular demands on engineering. The subsea
6 Subsea Engineering Handbook

Figure 1-4 Offshore Oil Production in GoM [5].

production system carries some unique aspects related to the inaccessibility of the
installation and its operation and servicing. These special aspects make subsea produc-
tion a specific engineering discipline. This book will discuss the topics of subsea en-
gineering in four parts:
Part 1: Subsea Production Systems
Part 2: Flow Assurance and System Engineering
Part 3: Subsea Structures and Equipment
Part 4: Subsea Umbilicals, Risers, and Pipelines.

1.2 Subsea Production Systems

A subsea production system consists of a subsea completed well, seabed wellhead, sub-
sea production tree, subsea tie-in to flowline system, and subsea equipment and control
facilities to operate the well. It can range in complexity from a single satellite well with a
flowline linked to a fixed platform, FPSO (Floating Production, Storage and Offload-
ing), or onshore facilities, to several wells on a template or clustered around a manifold
that transfer to a fixed or floating facility or directly to onshore facilities.
As the oil and gas fields move further offshore into deeper water and deeper geolog-
ical formations in the quest for reserves, the technology of drilling and production has
advanced dramatically. Conventional techniques restrict the reservoir characteristics
and reserves that can be economically exploited in the deep waters now being
explored. The latest subsea technologies have been proven and formed into an engi-
neering system, namely, the subsea production system, which is associated with the
overall process and all the equipment involved in drilling, field development, and field
operation, as shown in Figure 1-5. The subsea production system consists of the
following components:
• Subsea drilling systems;
• Subsea Christmas trees and wellhead systems;
despatch cited above, or even the special Instructions sent a little
earlier; but he knew enough to warrant his speaking in lofty tones,
which were destined to dash the hopes of Catharine and the Prince
Royal of Denmark.
We left Gustavus at Stockholm. There he did his best to quell the
discontent of the burghers; but it is probable that a Revolution would
have broken out but for the threat of a Danish invasion and the
impending loss of Gothenburg. The national danger tended to still the
strife of parties; and the King, commending his queen and children to
his people, rode away to Dalecarlia in order to arouse the loyal miners
and peasants of that region against the invaders. Though he
harangued them on the spot where Gustavus Vasa made his
memorable appeals, their response was doubtful; but, having raised a
816
small band, he proceeded towards the threatened city.
On his way he met the British envoy at the town of Carlstadt. For
eleven days Elliot had searched for the King, and now found him
without troops, without attendants, and with a small following of ill-
armed peasants (29th September, 1788). Bitterly the monarch
exclaimed that, like James II, he must leave his kingdom, a victim to
the ambition of Russia, the treachery of Denmark, the factious treason
of his nobles, and his own mistakes. Thereupon Elliot replied: “Sire,
give me your Crown; I will return it to you with added lustre.” He then
told him of the offer of mediation by England and Prussia on his
behalf. At first, mindful of his engagements to France, Gustavus
hesitated to accept it. Had he known that Elliot was acting without
official instructions he might have slighted the offer. In truth, Elliot was
acting only on the general direction, that he was “to prevent by every
means any change in the relative situation of the Northern nations.” If
this formula was vague, it was wide; and it sufficed, along with the
more definite support from Berlin, to decide the fate of Sweden.
Gustavus at once resolved to place himself wholly in Elliot’s hands. The
latter therefore made his way to the Danish headquarters; while the
817
King proceeded to Gothenburg. At that fortress the spirit of the
defenders was as scanty as the means of defence. But affairs took on
a new aspect when, at nightfall of 3rd October, a drenched and weary
horseman sought admittance at their gate. A tumult of joy arose in the
town when it was known that Gustavus was in their midst, the
precursor of succouring bands. Now there was no thought of
surrender.
Nevertheless, things would have gone hard with the burghers had
the Danes pushed their attack home. This they seemed about to do.
Elliot in his interview at their headquarters made little impression on
the Prince Royal and the Commander-in-Chief, the Prince of Hesse.
Their kinship to Gustavus seemed but to embitter their hostility; and
they undoubtedly hoped, after the reduction of Gothenburg, to
dismember the Swedish realm, and aggrandise the closely related
houses of Russia and Denmark. They pressed on to Gothenburg and
made ready for an assault. But in the meantime Gustavus, receiving
help from seamen on British vessels in the harbour, encouraged the
citizens to make ready and man the guns. So firm a front did the
defenders present that the Danes on 9th October assented to Elliot’s
offer of an armistice of eight days. Within that time the Prussian
Declaration reached their headquarters, and lust of conquest now gave
way to fear of a Prussian invasion of Jutland. Again therefore Elliot
succeeded in prolonging the armistice, which finally was extended to
six months (13th November–13th May 1789).
It is clear, then, that the initiative boldly taken by Ewart and Elliot,
backed by the threats from Berlin, saved Sweden from a position of
acute danger. The King of Sweden himself confessed in a letter to
Armfelt that Elliot’s grand coup in effecting an armistice had saved his
kingdom, had restored the balance of Europe, and covered England
with glory. Erskine, British Consul at Gothenburg, also declared that
but for “the spirited and unremitted exertions of Mr. Elliot, there is not
a doubt but this city and province would have fallen into the hands of
818
the enemy on their first advancing.” Elliot also described his
achievements in flamboyant terms, which were called forth by an
unmerited rebuke of our Foreign Office, that his instructions were to
819
restore peace, not to threaten the Danes with war. His reply of
15th November ran as follows: “The success of my efforts has been
almost miraculous.... Had I arrived at Carlstadt twenty-four hours later
than I did; had I negotiated with less energy or success at Gothenburg
than what has drawn upon me the resentment of Russia and the
abettors of the boundless ambition of that Court, the Revolution in
Sweden was compleated, and a combination formed in the North
equally hostile to England and Prussia.” He then charged Bernstorff
with duplicity in expressing a desire for peace, “while the Danes were
marching on an almost defenceless town, the capture of which decided
irrevocably the fate of Sweden and the Baltic.”... “Six weeks after my
arrival in Sweden a victorious army of 12,000 men, animated by the
presence of their Prince, in sight of a most brilliant conquest, were
checked in their progress by my single efforts; were induced to
evacuate the Swedish territories, and consented to a truce of six
months.... Perhaps in the annals of history there is not to be found a
more striking testimony of deference paid by a foreign prince to a King
of England than what the Prince Royal of Denmark manifested upon
this trying occasion.” He then stated that the efforts of the Prussian
envoy were of no avail owing to the dislike in which he was held; and
that only his [Elliot’s] influence availed to undo the harm caused by a
violent action of Gustavus III in the middle of October.
It would be interesting to know what Pitt thought of this bombast;
but on 5th December Carmarthen guardedly commended the
magniloquent envoy, and urged him to gain over Denmark to the Triple
Alliance; for, as Catharine had now declined the mediation of the Allies,
while Gustavus had accepted it, Denmark could justly refuse her
demands for help in the next campaign. Ostensibly Denmark refused;
but, owing to the profuse expenditure of the Russian Embassy at
Copenhagen (estimated by our chargé d’affaires, Johnstone, at £500 a
820
day ), Catharine gained permission to have fifteen warships from
the White Sea repaired in that dockyard.
Gustavus III no sooner found himself safe than he laid his plans
for humbling his enemies both at home and abroad. He summoned a
Diet, and proceeded to educate the electors in their duties by drawing
up a list of the ten deputies whom the men of Stockholm should
choose. They held other opinions, and sent up six declared opponents
821
of the King. On the whole, however, the Estates were with him,
and he imposed a constitution on the recalcitrant Order of the Nobles,
whereby he gained absolute control of foreign policy. This triumph for
autocracy took place at the end of April 1789, only a week before the
assembly of the States-General at Versailles, which sounded the knell
of the House of Bourbon. Gustavus informed Elliot of his resolve to
keep at peace with Denmark, because a war with her “would turn me
from my great aim—the safety of the Ottomans and the abasement of
Russia.” He therefore begged Elliot to assure the prolongation of the
Danish armistice for six months. That envoy had now come to see that
the chief danger of Sweden lay in “the romantic projects of glory and
aggrandisement formed by the Sovereign himself”; and he pointed out
the need for the Allies to prescribe the terms of peace before he
822
succumbed to the superior forces of Russia. Already Catharine had
announced her resolve in the words—“When Gustavus has had his say
to his Diet, I will have my say to him.”
With Elliot’s view of things Pitt and the Duke of Leeds (formerly
Marquis of Carmarthen) were in complete accord. On 24th June they
informed him that Gustavus must not expect the Allies to make peace
for him on his own terms, but only on that of the status quo ante
bellum. In this effort England would cordially join in order to keep the
balance of power in the Baltic. “I cannot,” continued Leeds, “too often
repeat the earnest desire of this Government to conciliate the Court of
Denmark in the first instance; nor do we lose sight of another material
object—I mean, a cordial and permanent connection with Russia.”
Above all, England would not go to war unless the balance of the
Baltic Powers were seriously endangered, to the detriment of the
823
commercial States.
Here, then, we have another proof of the peaceful and cautious
character of Pitt’s policy. He distrusted the crowned Don Quixote of the
North, was resolved to save him only on England’s terms, viz., the
status quo, and hoped that the pacification might lead up to an
alliance with Denmark and finally with Russia. In fact, he kept in view
the Northern System which had guided British statesmen of the earlier
generation. His aims were frustrated by the shifty policy of Denmark
and the vindictiveness of Catharine. “Hamlet” and “Semiramis,” as
Harris once termed them, thought lightly of England and longed for
the partition of Sweden. Accordingly the Danish fleet convoyed the
fifteen Russian men-of-war, long refitting at Copenhagen, into the
Baltic, until they joined the Cronstadt squadron of twenty-six ships
near Bornholm, and thereby secured for it a superiority in that sea.
The Duke of Leeds sent a sharp protest to Copenhagen, with the hint
that furthur actions of this kind might entail disagreeable
824
consequences for Denmark. Even with this unfair help accorded to
Russia, the Swedes sustained no serious reverse either by land or sea.
Gustavus summed up the results of the campaign in the words: “After
fighting like madmen about every other day for two months, here we
are at the same point at which we started.” Nevertheless he had
clogged the efforts of Catharine against the Turks, and thus enabled
his allies to prolong the unequal struggle against two great empires.
Neither the loss of Oczakoff, nor the accession of the less capable
Sultan, Selim III, daunted the resolve of the Ottomans to continue a
war which was for them an affair of religious zeal and national honour.
 CHAPTER XXII
PARTITION OR PACIFICATION?

He who gains nothing, loses.—Catharine II.

We cannot be considered as in any degree bound to support a
system of an offensive nature, the great end of which appears to
be aggrandisement rather than security.—Pitt and the Duke of
Leeds, 24th June 1789.

T HE excess of an evil tends to produce its own cure. The resources

of two great Empires were being used for a partition of the
Turkish dominions, in a way which must have led to a succession of
wars without benefiting the Christians of the East. But the prospect of
the aggrandisement of Russia speedily led the hardy Gustavus to strike
a blow at her northern capital; and when Catharine incited the Danes
to deal a counterstroke at his unguarded rear, Great Britain and
Prussia intervened to prevent the overthrow of Sweden and of the
balance of power in the Baltic. Thus, forces which pressed on towards
Constantinople produced a sharp reaction in widening circles and
prompted States to attack or arm against their neighbours—Sweden
against Russia, Denmark against Sweden, and England and Prussia
against Denmark. Consequently Gustavus III might claim to have
saved the Turkish Empire; for his action brought into the arena
England and, to some extent, the Dutch Republic.
Less obvious but more potent was the influence of Prussia. Her
forces, cantoned along the Austrian and Russian borders, halved the
efforts of those Empires against the Turks and encouraged the Polish
nationalists to resist Russian predominance at Warsaw. Thus, by the
year 1789, instead of moving the forces of two Empires and of Poland
against the Turks, Catharine found her energies clogged, her resources
strained, and only one important conquest achieved, that of Oczakoff.
Over against this triumph she had to set the menacing attitude of the
Triple Alliance lately framed by Great Britain, Prussia, and the Dutch
Republic.
For a time the Czarina cherished the hope that the insanity of
George III, and the accession of the Regent, would lead to the
downfall of Pitt and the reversal of British policy. On 8/19 December
1788 she wrote to her ambassador at London, Count Vorontzoff
(Woronzow), charging him to make overtures to Fox and the Dukes of
Portland and Devonshire for the renewal of the Anglo-Russian alliance,
which for the last five years she had spurned. With a vehemence of
style, in which feelings figured as facts, she inveighed against Pitt for
slighting her many offers of friendship, for allowing Ainslie and Elliot to
incite Turkey and Sweden to attack her, and for entangling himself in
the dangerous and visionary schemes of Hertzberg. All this, however,
would be changed when the Prince of Wales and Fox came to power.
On 19/30 January Vorontzoff replied that he had seen Fox, who
accorded him a hearty welcome, and said that in a fortnight the
Regency would be established. He (Fox) would then be Foreign
Secretary, and would be able to speak of England’s treaty obligations
to Prussia. The language of Fox showed some measure of caution, and
partly palliated the gross imprudence of according an interview at all.
A little later (perhaps before receiving Vorontzoff’s answer) the
Empress expressed her admiration of the reply sent by the Prince of
Wales (it was really Burke’s and Sheridan’s) to Pitt, as it argued
distinguished talents. The Prince and Fox, she said, would certainly
prevent their people being dragged at the heel of Prussia. As for
herself, she declared her wish to grant them a commercial treaty,
which she had refused two years before. The correspondence throws a
curious light on the feline diplomacy of Catharine and on the singular
825
folly of Fox. It also prepares us for the unpatriotic part which he
played in the Anglo-Russian dispute of the year 1791. The recovery of
George III, about the time when Catharine indited the latter epistle,
pricked the bubble, and left Pitt in a position of greater power than
ever.
 Thus, in the spring of 1789, the general position was somewhat as
follows. England, Prussia, and Holland, acting in close concert, were
resolved to prevent any revolutionary changes in the Baltic. This
implied that Denmark could not attack Sweden, and that Gustavus
might war against Catharine until she chose to accept the mediation of
the Allies for the re-establishment of the status quo ante bellum. As for
the other Powers, France was almost a nullity owing to the internal
troubles which were leading up to the Revolution. Spain was friendly
826
to the Allies and favoured the cause of Sweden and Turkey.
Moreover the Poles, acting on hints from Berlin, were beginning to
shake off Russian tutelage and to feel their way towards a drastic
reform of their chaotic polity. Early in 1789 the Prussian Court sought
for a close political and commercial union with Poland. The ensuing
compact freed the Poles from the obligations contracted by King
Stanislaus with his former mistress, Catharine II; it further promised to
bind their realm to England and Holland; above all, it opened up vast
possibilities for the regeneration of that hapless people.
As for the concert of the two Empires, discords were already
heard. Joseph II, alarmed at the turmoil in Hungary and Belgium, as
well as disgusted at the results of his first Turkish campaign, talked of
waging merely a defensive war, and of offering easy terms to the
Ottomans. Potemkin, puffed up by the capture of Oczakoff, announced
his resolve that Moldavia and Wallachia should never fall to the
Hapsburgs—an aim that had been distinctly formulated at Vienna.
Russia herself, a prey to the greedy gang who fawned on the Empress
and drained her treasury, seemed unable to bear for long the strain of
war on two frontiers, and of precautionary measures against Prussia.
The Court of Berlin, as Mirabeau had pointed out, was honeycombed
by intrigues and favouritism; but it was sound at the core compared
with Russia. The French author of the “Secret Memoirs of the Court of
St. Petersburg” states that in the declining years of Catharine the
Russian finances were exploited in a way more disgraceful than even
France had seen; that none were so little as the great; and that
officers notoriously lived on the funds of their regiments. Catharine
herself once jauntily remarked about a colonel—“Well! If he be poor, it
is his own fault; for he has long had a regiment.” It speaks volumes for
the patriotism and stupidity of the troops that they still had enough of
the old Muscovite staunchness to carry them to victory over the Turks.
But such was the case. In the campaigns of 1789 the army of Suvóroff
gained several successes, and the troops of Joseph II, once more
urged onwards by that ruler, also had their meed of triumph.
This was partly due to the death of Abdul Hamid I, which brought
to the Ottoman throne a feebler successor, Selim III (April 1789). The
Grand Vizier, the soul of the war party, was soon overthrown, and the
next commander-in-chief, the Pacha of Widdin, impaired by his
827
slothfulness the fighting power of the Ottomans. Belgrade and
Semendria were lost. But even more serious, perhaps, than these
reverses was the emergence of plans at Berlin which portended gain to
Prussia at the expense of Turkey. We are concerned here with
European affairs only so far as they affected British policy, and must
therefore concentrate our attention on the statecraft of the years 1789
and 1790, which threatened sweeping changes on the Continent and
brought into play the cautious conservatism of Pitt. The French
Revolution and its immense consequences will engage our attention
later.
As we saw in Chapter XVI, the Prussian statesman, Hertzberg, had
long been maturing an ingenious scheme for the aggrandisement of
Prussia, by a general shuffling together of boundaries in the East of
828
Europe. On 13th May 1789 he presented it in its complete form to
Frederick William, who, after long balancings on this question, now
accorded his consent. The Prussian monarch thereby pledged himself,
at a favourable occasion, to offer his armed mediation to Russia,
Austria, and Turkey. If the two Empires overcame the Sultan, as
seemed probable, Prussia was to threaten their frontiers with masses
of troops and, under threat of war, compel them to accept her terms.
If, however, victory inclined to the crescent, Dietz, the Prussian envoy
at Constantinople, was to remind the Sublime Porte that the triumph
was largely due to Prussia’s action in enabling Sweden to continue the
war against Russia, and in thwarting Catharine’s plan of an invasion of
Turkey by the Poles. Dietz was also to hint “in a delicate and not
threatening manner,” that if Prussia threw her weight into the scales
against the Turks, the new Coalition must speedily overwhelm her.
“Therefore the Porte will do well not to balance on that point,” but will
829
accept Prussia’s terms. There was a third alternative, that the war
would drag on indecisively, in which case the exhaustion of the
belligerents must enable Prussia to work her will the more readily.
Accordingly Hertzberg hoped that, however the fortunes of war
inclined, he would gain his ends. They were as follows. The Turks, if
victorious, must sacrifice their gains (the Crimea, etc.) at the demand
of Prussia, and thus enable her to compel Austria to restore to the
Poles the great province of Galicia, torn from them in the partition of
1772. The Poles in their turn were to reward Frederick William by
ceding to him the fortresses of Danzig and Thorn, along with part of
Great Poland, which so inconveniently divided Prussia’s eastern lands.
The same general result was to follow in the event of Russia and
Austria driving back the Turks to their last natural barrier, the Balkans.
Prussia was then to draw the sword on behalf of Turkey and Sweden,
restore the balance in the South-East, and give the law to all parties.
In that case, it appeared (though Hertzberg wavered on this point),
Austria might acquire Moldavia and Wallachia from Turkey, and thereby
close against Russia the door leading to the Balkans. At times
Hertzberg stated that Austria must in any case gain those commanding
830
provinces, which would sever her friendship with Russia. As for
Catharine, she might retain the Crimea, and gain land perhaps as far
as the Dniester. On the whole, however, Hertzberg hoped that Prussia
need not go to war, but that the Turks would make a good enough
stand at the Danube to enable the mere appearance of the splendid
army of Prussia on the frontiers of the two Empires to enforce his
demands.
Much has been written for and against this scheme. Among the
many projects of that time it holds a noteworthy place. Certainly it
would greatly have simplified the boundaries of Eastern Europe. The
recovery by Poland of her natural frontier on the south-west, the
Carpathians, would strengthen that State, and enable her, with the
help of her Prussian ally, to defy the wrath of the two Imperial Courts.
Hertzberg believed that the Poles would gladly accept the offer. For
was not the great province of Galicia worth the smaller, though
commercially valuable, districts on the lower Vistula which would go to
Frederick William? Further, would not a good commercial treaty
between the Allies (in which England, it was hinted, might have her
share) make up for the loss of the prosperous city of Danzig? In truth,
the proposal reminds one of the schemes for scientific frontiers which
Rousseau outlined and Napoleon reduced to profitable practice.
It might have succeeded had nations been mere amoebae,
divisible at will. Traders and philosophers might acclaim Hertzberg as
the Adam Smith of Prussia and Poland. In truth, his plan was
defensible, even on its Machiavellian side—the aggrandisement of
Prussia, ultimately at the expense of the Turks. For it might be argued
that the ultimate triumph of the crescent was impossible, and that only
the action of Sweden, Prussia, and to a less extent England, could
avert disaster. Hertzberg also claimed that Prussia and her Allies
should guarantee to Turkey the security of her remaining possessions,
and deemed this a set-off to the disappointments brought by his other
proposals.
Nevertheless the balance of argument was heavily against the
scheme. As the Pitt Cabinet pointed out in a weighty pronouncement
on 24th June, Hertzberg proposed to use Turkey as a medium for the
attainment of his ends, which were the depression of Austria and the
aggrandisement of Prussia. However well and successfully the Turks
fought, the gain was to accrue to Frederick William, not to the Swedes,
who were fighting desperately for the Ottoman cause. True, Prussia
promised in the last resort to help the Sultan to recover some of his
lost provinces; but even then, the acquisitions of the two Empires at
the end of costly campaigns were scarcely to balance those of Prussia
and Poland. Well might the British Cabinet say of the Turks: “It seems
very doubtful whether either their power or their inclination would
answer the expectations of the Court of Berlin.”
After this ironical touch the verdict of the Pitt Ministry was given to
Ewart as follows:
 You will not fail to assure the Ministers at Berlin of the
satisfaction with which the King will see any real and solid
advantages derived to His Prussian Majesty by such arrangements
as may be obtained by way of negotiation and without the danger
of extending those hostilities [which] it is so much the interest of
all Europe to put an end to. We cannot but acknowledge the
friendly attention manifested by His Prussian Majesty towards his
Allies in taking care not to commit them in the event of the Porte
acceding to the proposed plan of co-operation, the operations of
which go so much beyond the spirit of our treaty of Alliance,
which is purely of a defensive nature, and by which we cannot of
course be considered as in any degree bound to support a system
of an offensive nature, the great end of which appears to be
aggrandisement rather than security, and which from its very
nature is liable to provoke fresh hostilities instead of contributing
to the restoration of general tranquillity.
In discussing these points, and indeed upon every other
occasion, I must beg of you, Sir, to remember that it is by no
means the idea of His Majesty, or of his confidential servants, to
risk the engaging this country in a war on account of Turkey,
either directly or indirectly; and I am to desire you would be
particularly careful in your language, to prevent any intention of
that nature being imputed to us. I think it necessary to mention
this distinctly, as I observe in one of your dispatches, you state the
continuance of the Northern War as in some degree
advantageous, as it would be a powerful diversion in case the
Allies should take part in the Turkish War. This I must again
observe to you is an object by no means in our view.
With respect to any future guarantee of the Ottoman Empire it
is impossible for us to commit ourselves at present. The
consideration will naturally arise how far such a guarantee is either
necessary or beneficial when the terms of peace come under
discussion. The effect which a guarantee of the Turkish
possessions might create in Russia likewise deserves some
consideration; and I cannot but observe that the whole tenor of
these Instructions [those sent to Dietz] seems likely to throw at a
 greater distance the chance of detaching Russia from Austria and
connecting it with us; whereas hitherto it has been our object,
and, as it appeared to us, that of Prussia, while we made Russia
feel the disadvantage of being upon distant terms with us, and
avoided doing anything which looked like courting her friendship,
still to avoid pushing things to an extremity or precluding a future
831
connection.

At several points this pronouncement challenges attention. Firstly,

it does not once refer to the feelings and prejudices of the peoples
who were to be bartered about. Only four days previously the
Commons of France had sworn by the Tennis Court Oath that they
would frame a constitution for their land—a declaration which rang
trumpet-tongued through England; but not the faintest echo of it
appears in the official language of Pitt and the Duke of Leeds. Their
arguments are wholly those of the old school, but of the old school at
its best. For, secondly, they deprecate changes of territory forced by a
mediating Power on the people it ostensibly befriends, which tend to
their detriment and its own benefit. They question whether Prussia can
press through these complex partitions without provoking a general
war—the very evil which the Triple Alliance has sought to avoid.
Certainly England will never go to war to bring them about; neither will
she draw the sword on behalf of Turkey. On the contrary, she hopes
finally to regain the friendship of Russia. Most noteworthy of all is the
central criticism, that the aim of Hertzberg is “aggrandisement rather
than security.” We shall have occasion to observe how often Pitt used
this last word to denote the end for which he struggled against
Revolutionary France and Napoleon; and its presence in this despatch
bespeaks the mind of the Prime Minister acting through the pen of the
Duke of Leeds.
The defensive character of Pitt’s policy further appears in a
despatch to Ewart, also of 24th June, cautioning that very zealous
envoy that all possible means are being taken to win over Denmark
peacefully to the Triple Alliance, in order that it may “command the
keys of the Baltic.” Gustavus is to be warned that the Allies cannot
help him unless he agrees to forego his hopes of gain at the expense
of Russia, and “to act merely upon the defensive.” The status quo ante
bellum would be the fairest basis of peace in the Baltic, and it would
prove “that the real object of our interference was calculated for
general views of public utility, and not founded upon any motives of
partiality for one Power or resentment to another.”
For a time events seemed to work against the pacific policy of Pitt
and in favour of the schemes of Hertzberg. The summer witnessed not
only the advance of the Russians and Austrians into the Danubian
Provinces, but also the wrigglings to and fro of the Danish Court,
which enabled the Russian squadron at Copenhagen to join the
Cronstadt fleet and command the Baltic. Nevertheless, Prussia felt that
she had the game in her own hands, however much her Allies might
hold aloof; for the Austrian Government was distracted by news of the
seething discontent of the Hungarians, of the Poles in Galicia, and,
above all, of the Brabanters and Flemings. Joseph II, too, was
obviously sinking under these worries, which seemed to presage the
832
break up of his Empire. The Prussian Court therefore resolved to
concentrate its efforts on wresting Galicia and the Belgic Provinces
from the Hapsburg Power, especially as the Porte, despite its recent
defeats, refused to listen to Dietz when he mentioned the cession of
833
Moldavia and Wallachia to the infidels. Until the Moslems had
learnt the lessons of destiny, it was obviously desirable to set about
robbing Austria by more straightforward means.

* * * * *
The folly of Joseph II favoured this scheme of robbery. His reforms
in the Belgic Provinces had long brought that naturally conservative
people to the brink of revolt, so that in the spring of the year 1789
plans were laid not only at Brussels but also at Berlin for securing their
independence. Hertzberg sought to work upon the fears of Pitt by
hinting that Austria might call in the French troops to stamp out the
discontent—a contingency far from unlikely, were it not that France
was rapidly sliding into the abyss of bankruptcy and revolution. By a
curious coincidence the repressive authority of Joseph II was exerted
on 18th June, the day after the Third Estate of France defiantly styled
itself the National Assembly. While Paris was jubilant at the news of
this triumph, the mandates of the Emperor swept away the Estates
and ancient privileges of Brabant. As this action involved the
suppression of the ancient charter of privileges, quaintly termed La
Joyeuse Entrée, the Brabanters put into practice its final clause, that
the citizens might use force against the sovereign who infringed its
provisions. “Act here as in Paris” ran the placards in Brussels and other
cities. The capture of the Bastille added fuel to the fire in Belgium; and
the nationalist victory was completed by a rising of the men of Liége
834
against the selfish and deadening rule of their Prince Bishop.
The likeness between the Belgian and French Revolutions is wholly
superficial. Despite the effort of Camille Desmoulins to link the two
movements in sympathy—witness the title of his newspaper “Les
Révolutions de France et de Brabant”—no thinking man could
confound the democratic movement in France with the narrowly
national and clerical aims of the majority in Brabant and Flanders.
True, an attempt was made by a few progressives, under the lead of
Francis Vonck, to inculcate the ideas of Voltaire and Rousseau; but the
influence of the Roman Church, always paramount in Flanders, availed
to crush this effort. Van der Noot and the clericals gained the upper
hand, and finally compelled the Vonckists to flee over the southern
border.
In the month of July Van der Noot declared in favour of a Belgian
Republic under the guarantee and protection of England, Prussia, and
Holland. He set on foot overtures to this end which met with a friendly
835
response at Berlin and The Hague. The Prussian Court sent
General Schliessen to discuss the matter with the British Government;
but Pitt and Leeds behaved very guardedly on a question involving a
recognition of the Belgian revolt and the end of the Barrier System on
which we had long laid so much stress. Their despatch of 14th
September to Ewart emphasized the difficulties attending Van der
Noot’s proposal, even if his statements were correct. At the same time
Ministers asserted that the Allies must at all costs prevent the Belgians
becoming dependent on France, a noteworthy statement which
foreshadows Pitt’s later policy of resisting the annexation of those rich
provinces to the French Republic or Empire. For the present, he
strongly advised Prussia and Holland to await the course of events and
do nothing “to threaten the interruption of that tranquillity it is so
much their interest, and, I trust, their intention, to preserve.” Above
all, it would be well to wait for the death of Joseph II, already
announced as imminent, seeing that his successor might grant to the
836
Belgians the needed concessions.
The Belgians seem to have trusted the Pitt Cabinet far more than
Hertzberg, whose restless policy aroused general distrust. They made
two overtures to the British Court. The former of these, strange to say,
came through a French nobleman, the Comte de Charrot, who called
on Lord Robert Fitzgerald, our envoy at Paris, on or about 21st
October, and confided to him his resentment against France, his warm
sympathies with the Belgians (he was a descendant of the old Counts
of Flanders), and his fear that France would dominate that land after
the downfall of Austrian authority. He besought Fitzgerald to forward
to the Duke of Leeds a letter warning the Cabinet of the efforts of the
National Assembly to form a party among the Brabanters and
Flemings, who, however, were resolved not to accept the rule of a
foreign prince, but to form a Republic under the protection of Great
Britain. To this end they were willing to place in her hands the city of
Ostend as a pledge of their fidelity to the British connection. A German
prince, he added, would never be tolerated, save in the eastern
provinces, Limburg and Luxemburg. His letter, dated Antwerp, 15th
837
October, to the Duke of Leeds, is couched in the same terms.
The proposal opens up a vista of the possibilities of that strange
situation. By planting the British flag at Ostend, and by allowing
Prussia to dominate the eastern Netherlands, Pitt could have built up
once more a barrier on the north-east of France. All this was possible,
provided that Charrot’s proposals were genuine and represented the
real feelings of the Belgians. Evidently Pitt and Leeds distrusted the
offer, which seems to have been left unanswered.
Early in November, when the plans of the Belgian patriots for
ousting the Austrians were nearing completion, they sent as
spokesman Count de Roode to appeal for the protection of George III.
Pitt laid the request before the King; and the result will be seen in
Pitt’s letter to the Count:

Downing St. Nov. 13, 1789.

I have received the letter which you honoured me with,
informing me that you were employed on the part of the people of
Brabant to solicit the King’s protection, and desiring to see me for
the purpose of delivering a letter to me on that subject. I thought
it my duty to lay these circumstances before His Majesty, who has
not been pleased to authorize me to enter into any discussion in
consequence of an application which does not appear to be made
by any regular or acknowledged authority. I must therefore, Sir,
beg you to excuse me, if, on that account, I am under the
necessity of declining seeing you for the purpose which you
838
propose.

Somewhat earlier the Duke of Orleans had come on a mission to

London, ostensibly on the Belgian Question, but really for a term of
forced absence from Paris. It will therefore be well to describe his visit
in a later chapter.
Cold as were Pitt’s replies to de Roode, he certainly kept a
watchful eye on Belgian affairs. For, on the one hand, if Joseph II
succeeded in establishing despotic power at Brussels, he would gain
complete control over the finances and armed forces of that flourishing
land, with results threatening to the Dutch and even to Prussia. If,
however, the Brabanters succeeded as the Flemings had done, French
democracy might rush in as a flood and gallicize the whole of that land
to the detriment of England. Pitt therefore approved of the Prussian
proposal to send troops to occupy the Bishopric of Liége, seeing that
the deposed bishop had appealed to Austria for armed aid. With the
prestige gained by the military occupation of Liége, Hertzberg hoped
to dominate the situation both in the Low Countries and in the East.
Most pressingly did he urge the need of instantly recognizing the
independence of the Belgian provinces; but after long arguments
Ewart convinced him that it might be better, even for Prussia, to press
for the restoration of their old constitution, with all its limitations to the
power of the Emperor, under the guarantee of the three Allies. If Ewart
succeeded with Hertzberg, he failed with Frederick William, who on
that and other occasions showed himself “very elated” and determined
839
to tear from Austria that valuable possession, as well as Galicia.
Hertzberg did his utmost to persuade England to combine the two
questions so as the more to embarrass Austria; but he met with steady
refusals.
On 30th November Pitt took the sense of the Cabinet. It was
clearly in favour of non-intervention and the restoration as far as
possible of the previous state of things. Nevertheless, the men of
Brabant, in case of defeat by the Imperialists, were encouraged to
hope that the Allies would declare for the restoration of the old
constitution. On the other hand, in case of victory, they were to be
induced “to take steps for preventing the prevalence of democratical
840
principles.” Obviously, then, Pitt desired to keep out both Prussian
and French influence, and to leave the Belgians free to come to terms
with the successor of Joseph II after the imminent demise of that
monarch. Events favoured this solution. In December Brussels and all
parts of Brabant shook off the yoke of the Imperialists, who retired to
Luxemburg. Early in the year 1790 deputies from the nine Belgic
provinces met at Brussels, declared the deposition of Joseph, and
formed a Federal Congress for mutual protection. The clerical and
conservative party, headed by Van der Noot, sent to Paris an appeal
for support, which found no favour either with Louis or the National
Assembly, the King desiring not to offend Austria, and the French
deputies distrusting the aims of the majority at Brussels.
Pitt and his colleagues were equally cautious. On the news of the
successful revolt of Brussels, they seemed for a time to incline to the
841
Prussian plan of recognizing the independence of Belgium, and on
9th January 1790 they framed a compact with Prussia and Holland
with a view to taking common action in this affair. But the most urgent
demands from Berlin in favour of immediate action failed to push Pitt
on to this last irrevocable step. It does not appear that the King
controlled his action; for at that time he was so far absorbed in the
escapades of his sons (those of Prince Edward were an added trouble)
as to be a cipher in all but domestic concerns. Pitt and Leeds therefore
had a free hand. They were influenced probably by the news that
Joseph, despite the progress of his mortal disease, had resolved to
subdue the Netherlands. The tidings opened up two alternatives—war
between Austria and Prussia, or the possibility of a peaceful
compromise after the death of Joseph and the accession of his far
more tractable brother, Leopold.
These seem to have been the motives underlying the decision of
the Pitt Cabinet, early in 1790, to defer any decisive action by the
Allies. The Duke of Leeds pointed out to Ewart on 9th February that
the feuds between the Belgic provinces made them useless as allies;
that any immediate recognition of their independence would have
“mischievous effects”; and that a reconciliation between them and
their future ruler seemed highly probable. They should, therefore, not
be encouraged to hope for recognition by the Allies. Leeds closed by
very pertinently asking the Court of Berlin “how far this new Republic,
once established, could be (and by whom) prevented from becoming
indirectly, if not directly, totally dependent upon France.” The argument
derived added force from the fact that a “French emissary” was then
at Brussels offering the recognition by France of the proposed Belgian
Republic, with the help of 20,000 troops against any who should
842
oppose it. This offer was not official; but as the moods of the
National Assembly varied day by day, it might at any time become so.
Certainly the chance of French invervention added a sting to the
reproaches soon to be levelled at Pitt from Berlin.
They were called forth by the missive above referred to, and by a
“secret and confidential” despatch of the same date. In the latter Pitt
and Leeds warned Ewart that the proposed armed mediation of
Prussia against Catharine and Joseph was outside the scope of the
Triple Alliance. The British Government wished Prussia the success
which might be expected from the power of her army, the flourishing
state of her revenue, and the present doubtful condition both of Russia
and Austria; but it could not participate in “measures adopted without
843
the previous concurrence of the Allies.”
 A storm of obloquy broke upon Ewart when he announced these
decisions. The Court of Berlin insisted on the need of immediately
recognizing Belgian independence, adding a threat that otherwise
those provinces would do well to throw themselves upon France. Our
ambassador partly succeeded in stilling the storm, especially when
news came of tumults at Brussels and the uncertainty of the outlook
throughout Brabant. Frederick William then recognized the wisdom of
waiting until affairs were more settled, but he declared that he “was
abandoned by his Allies,” and that, unless Galicia could be detached
844
from Austria, he would prefer to see the Netherlands go to France.
This piece of royal pettishness served at least to show that his
friendship for England depended on her serving his designs against
Austria.
Here was the weakness of the Triple Alliance. The Allies had
almost nothing in common, except that the British and Dutch both
wished to live in peace and develop their trade. Prussia, on the
contrary, saw in this time of turmoil the opportunity of consolidating
her scattered Eastern lands by a scheme not unlike the Belgic-Bavarian
Exchange. On the score of morality we may censure such plans; but
vigorous and growing States will push them on while their rivals are
abased, and will discard Allies who oppose them. In this contrariety of
interests lay the secret of the weakness of the Anglo-Prussian alliance
during the upheavals of the near future. It also happened that the
House of Hohenzollern matured these plans at the very time when the
fortunes of the House of Hapsburg, after touching their nadir, began
once more to rise; and the revival of Austria under Leopold II helped
Pitt to maintain the existing order of things in Central Europe against
all the schemings of Hertzberg. The success of Pitt in this work of
statesmanlike conservation marks the climax of his diplomatic career;
and, as it has never received due attention, I make no apology for
treating it somewhat fully in the following chapter.
 CHAPTER XXIII
PARTITION OR PACIFICATION (Continued)

I want the trumpet of an angel to proclaim to the ears of

sovereigns that it is become their universal interest as well as their
moral duty to have a period of peace.—Lord Auckland to Sir Robert
Murray Keith, 7th May 1790.

P ROBABLY at no time in the history of Europe have all the leading

States been so bent on plans of mutual spoliation as in the closing
weeks of the life of Joseph II of Austria. The failure of his schemes
and the probability of a break up of the Hapsburg dominions whetted
the appetites of all his neighbours and brought Europe to the verge of
a general war. In these circumstances it was providential that one
Great Power stood for international morality, and that its counsels
were swayed by a master-mind. The future of Europe depended on the
intelligent conservatism of Pitt and the duration of the life of his
political opposite, Joseph II. That life had long been wearing rapidly
away; and on 20th February 1790 he died, full of pain,
disappointment, and regret that crowned the tragedy of his career.
His death brought new life and hopes to the Hapsburg peoples.
The new sovereign, Leopold II, his brother, soon proved to be one of
the astutest rulers of that race. He has been termed the only ruler of
845
that age who correctly read the signs of the times. If Joseph was
called the crowned philosopher, Leopold may be styled the crowned
diplomatist. Where the former gave the rein to the impulses of
Voltairian philosophy and romantic idealism, his successor surveyed
affairs with a calculating prudence which resulted, perhaps, from the
patriarchal size of his family—he had twelve children—and from his
 846
long rule in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. Certainly he knew how
impossible it was to thrust advanced Liberal ideas and central
institutions on the tough and unenlightened peoples of the Hapsburg
realm. Above all he discerned the folly of aggressive foreign policy
while all was turmoil at home. He therefore prepared to pacify his
subjects before the war cloud hanging over the Riesengebirge burst
upon Bohemia.
His caution and pliability opened up a new future for Central
Europe. Had the headstrong and pertinacious Joseph lived much
longer (though some gleams of prudence lighted on him in his last
months) revolts could scarcely have been staved off in Hungary and
the Low Countries, where even his belated concessions inspired
distrust. Above all, he could never have coped with the forceful policy
of Prussia. There is little room for doubt that the continuance of his life
would have involved the loss of the Belgic provinces, Galicia, and,
perhaps, even Bohemia. The Hohenzollerns would have leaped to
heights of power that would always challenge to conflict; and Europe,
a prey to Revolution in the West, must have been torn at the heart by
deadly strifes, both dynastic and racial.
In closing the sluices against the currents about to be let loose at
Berlin, Pitt had latterly counted on the well-known prudence of
Leopold of Tuscany. On 26th February, before the decease of Joseph
was known in London, the British Government stiffly opposed the
Prussian plan of acknowledging the independence of the Austrian
Netherlands. Great Britain—so ran the despatch to Ewart, our envoy to
Berlin—had covenanted merely to prevent the Emperor making “an
unrestrained use of the wealth and population” of those provinces, and
to obviate the possibility of their going to swell the power of France.
England (added Pitt in a side note of his own) must counteract French
intrigues in Brabant; but they were unofficial, and would probably
847
fail. He therefore deprecated any action which must lead to a war
with Austria; but he offered to help Prussia in restoring the former
state of things in the Low Countries. Stress was then laid on “the
necessity of enabling Sweden to defend herself by another campaign
against Russia”; England would pay her part of the sum needed for the
support of Gustavus, and would also secure the neutrality of Denmark;
but war against Russia and Austria was denounced as altogether
foreign to our cardinal principle of restoring the former condition of
things. Pitt and Leeds closed their despatch with the following
noteworthy words:

The commencement of hostilities against the Imperial Courts,

either indirectly by an immediate recognition of the Belgic
Independence, or directly by our joining in the measures of
offensive operations which Prussia may feel it her interest to
adopt, would go beyond the line which this country has uniformly
laid down, and from which it does not appear that the present
circumstances should induce her to depart. If either the joint
representations of the Allies, or the subsequent measures such as
they have been here stated, should be successful in bringing
about a peace on the terms of the status quo, this country would
then be willing to include Turkey, Poland, and Sweden in the
alliance and to guarantee to them the terms of that
848
pacification.

In order to understand the importance of this pronouncement, we

must remember that at this time the chances of success attending the
dismembering schemes of the two Empires and those of Prussia were
curiously equal. In bulk Russia and Austria had the advantage. Their
armies also seemed likely to drive the Turks over the Balkans in the
next campaign, unless potent diversions in the rear impaired their
striking power. But these diversions were imminent. The fate of the
Hapsburg dominions still hovered in the balance. Catharine was face to
face with another Swedish campaign which her exhausted exchequer
could scarcely meet. How then could these two Empires withstand the
shock of 200,000 trained Prussians, with the prospect that an Anglo-
Dutch fleet would sweep the Russian warships from the sea? And this
was not all. Hertzberg had already detached Poland from the Russian
alliance and was on the point of adding the resources of that kingdom
849
to his own; and the prospect of consolidating Poland, both
politically and geographically, opened up hopeful vistas for that
interesting people and the whole European polity. Above all it promised
to strengthen Prussia on her weakest flank.
It is not surprising, then, that the ambitious and enterprising Dietz
exceeded his instructions by signing a treaty with the Porte on 31st
January 1790. He thereby pledged Prussia to make war on Russia and
Austria in the spring, and not to lay down her arms until she secured
for the Sultan an “honourable and stable peace,” which assured safety
for Constantinople against an attack by sea. If the Turks were
victorious, Prussia promised to secure the Crimea for them. The
Sultan, on his side, promised to compel Austria to restore Galicia to
the Poles, who were, if possible, to be brought into the Triple Alliance.
Finally Prussia, England, Holland, Sweden, and Poland were to
guarantee the Turkish possessions as then defined.
These grandiose designs were furthered by the Prusso-Polish
treaty, signed at Warsaw on 29th March. By it Frederick William, in
case of hostilities, would send 18,000 men to assist the Republic,
which would send 8,000 horsemen and half that number of footmen,
850
or an equivalent in money or corn. In case of great need the
numbers of troops might be raised to 30,000 and 20,000 respectively.
More important than this material succour was the advantage of
marching through Polish Volhynia down the valley of the Dniester to
cut the communications of the Russian army on the lower Danube.
Meanwhile the Poles would overrun Galicia, and the Prussians invade
Bohemia and Moravia for the purpose of inciting the Czechs and
Hungarians to open revolt. On the whole the chances of war favoured
Frederick William and his Allies, especially when the British
Government agreed to join with Prussia in subsidizing Sweden for the
campaign of 1790. The valour of the Swedes and their nearness to the
Russian capital compelled Catharine to concentrate her efforts largely
against them, and the prospect of a Prusso-Polish alliance aroused
grave fears at Petersburg. “Everyone here wears a look of
consternation,” wrote the Prussian envoy to his Court on 5th February.
Probably this explains the passing flirtation of Catharine with England,
which Pitt seems to have taken at its true value, in view of the
851
exorbitant terms previously offered by her to Gustavus.
In fact, the air was charged with insincerity and intrigue. The
Prussian alliance with the Poles, which might have brought salvation to
that distracted people, was accompanied with extremely hard
conditions. Hertzberg saw in it the opportunity of once more forcing on
his scheme of gaining Danzig and Thorn in return for the halving of
the Prussian duties on Polish trade down the Vistula. His Shylock-like
insistence on these terms deprived the compact of all worth from the
outset; for the Poles claimed, and with reason, that the cession of
those valuable districts should be bought, not by the halving of certain
customs dues, but by the recovery of the whole of Galicia from
Austria. In these demands the Court of Berlin seemed to concur; but
ultimately, as we shall see, it allowed them to be frittered away under
pressure from Vienna. As a result, the Poles felt no less distrust of
Prussia than of the two Empires; and our envoy at Warsaw, Daniel
Hailes, found that British policy alone inspired a feeling of confidence,
852
and that a keen desire prevailed for a close alliance with England.
Pitt also, guided by our naval experts, who wished England to be
freed from dependence on Russia for naval stores, saw the advantage
of a compact with Poland, provided her trade were freed from Prussian
shackles. But his hands were so far tied by his alliance with Prussia,
that he supported her demand for Danzig (not Thorn), if it were
accompanied by an enlightened commercial treaty in which England
might have a share. Events soon proved that greed rather than
enlightenment prevailed at Berlin. That Court clung to its demand for
Danzig and Thorn, and its envoy at Warsaw, the subtle, scheming, and
masterful Lucchesini, more than once showed a disposition to hark
back to the policy of Frederick the Great, and to choke the disputes
853
with Austria and Russia by a partition of Poland.
For a time this seemed to be the natural upshot of an entente
which unexpectedly came about between Berlin and Vienna. Not long
after his accession Leopold wrote to his brother of Prussia in the terms
of sensibility then in vogue. Frederick William answered in equally
effusive strains; and but for the austere domination of the old
Chancellor, Kaunitz, at Vienna, and the “turbulent genius” of Hertzberg
854
at Berlin, there seemed a faint hope of a reconciliation. But Kaunitz
knew well how to keep up the bitterness against the upstart Protestant
State; and Hertzberg had resolved to keep his master up to the high
level of his own ambitions. Ingeniously he sowed the seeds of discord
between the Imperial Courts by suggesting that Catharine should
accept the mediation of the Allies with a view to a peace with the
855
Porte. This would leave Austria at the mercy of Prussia, and involve
the loss of Galicia and the Netherlands. This last topic lay near to the
heart of his Sovereign. Lord Auckland wrote thus on 19th March from
his new Embassy at The Hague: “I have the fullest evidence that
nothing less than absolute and inevitable necessity will induce him
[Frederick William II] to contribute by word or deed to replacing the
Netherlands under their old Government.” And three weeks later he
expressed his astonishment that, in view of the widespread anarchy,
Prussia and all Governments should not feel it their prime duty to
restore those ideas of order and just subordination to legal authority
which the world so urgently needed. Otherwise the European fabric
would be sapped by French theories and succumb to a new series of
856
barbarian invasions.
These were the views of Pitt, though he expressed them with less
nervous vehemence. His aim, and that of his colleagues, was to bring
Austria first, and afterwards Russia, to a pacification. They reminded
the Court of Berlin that Leopold had “neither the same predilection for
Russia, the same jealousy of Prussia, [n]or dislike to the mediation of
England” as Joseph had displayed, and that the status quo might now
find favour at Vienna. Leopold, they added, could not possibly accept
the last proposal of Hertzberg, of ceding Galicia to the Poles on
857
condition of being allowed to regain the Netherlands. The British
Cabinet also, on 30th March, charged Keith to press for an immediate
armistice between Austria and Turkey, with a view to summoning a
Congress of the Powers for a general pacification, which Great Britain
earnestly desired. But, they added, with a touch of guile, as it would
take much longer to communicate with St. Petersburg, they hoped
that Austria would act alone, and immediately grant an armistice to
the Turks. If Austria would further pledge herself to admit the
restoration of the old constitution in the Netherlands, Keith might
accept this as satisfactory, and send off a courier to Constantinople to
858
warn Ainslie to bring the Porte to reason.
The aim of saving Austria from many dangers is here so obvious
that one learns with astonishment that Kaunitz received these offers
most haughtily. The belated concessions granted by Joseph on his
death-bed to his malcontent subjects had met with his approval, but
only, as it seems, in order to press on the war with Turkey à outrance,
as if that, and that alone, would impose on the Court of Berlin. With
senile obstinacy and old-world hauteur, he repulsed Keith, who
thereupon executed a skilful flanking move by appealing to the Vice-
Chancellor, Count Cobenzl. This astute diplomat saw the gain that
might accrue from the British proposals, and assured Keith that his
Sovereign had received them with “very great satisfaction.” Seeing his
advantage, the British envoy warned Cobenzl against the extravagant
claims of Potemkin, and urged him to work hard for a separate
armistice with Turkey, now that “the most upright Court in Europe”
offered its good services for that purpose. He further hinted that the
recent treaties of Prussia with Turkey and Poland were a serious
menace to Austria, and that the British proposal now made to her was
“pointed and peremptory.” Finally they agreed that Kaunitz should so
far be humoured as to draft the official reply, but that Cobenzl should
be its interpreter on behalf of Leopold II. With this odd arrangement
Keith had to put up for some weeks; and in that time the desire for
859
peace grew apace at Vienna.
Any other way of looking at things was sheer madness. The ablest
of Austrian Generals, Marshal Laudon, warned Leopold of the terrible
risks of a war against both Prussia and Turkey. The Aulic Council also
knew full well that the almost unbounded influence of Prince Potemkin
over the Czarina was ever used against Hapsburg interests, that
pampered favourite having sworn vengeance against all who promoted
the erection of Moldavia and Wallachia, which he coveted for
860
himself, into an independent principality. This scheme, so fatal to
Hapsburg hopes, played no small part in sundering the two Empires.
While, therefore, Leopold armed, as if for war with Prussia, he was
secretly disposed to treat for a separate peace with the Turks if they
would cede to him the limits of the Peace of Passarowitz, namely,
North Servia and Wallachia as far east as the River Aluta. On the other
hand he was resolved (so he told Keith on 9th May) to fight rather
than lose the Netherlands, and in that case intended to gain the
alliance of France by a few cessions of Belgian land. Still he hoped for
a peaceful settlement through “the wise and kind intervention of
861
England.”
The position was now somewhat as follows: Leopold had staved
off a general revolt in his dominions by soothing concessions or
promises, but he insisted on the continuance of hostilities against
Turkey in order, as he said, to predispose her to peace. To the
Brabanters and Flemings he granted an armistice, but seemed about
to send forces thither as if for the restoration of unlimited power.
Meanwhile Sweden and Turkey continued the unequal fight against
Russia, and the Triple Alliance imposed prudence on Denmark. In this
uneasy equipoise England offered her mediation, not only to the
belligerents—Russia, Austria, Turkey, and Sweden—but also to Prussia,
with a view to a general armistice for the discussion of a
862
settlement.
Nowhere did this proposal meet with a cooler reception than at
Berlin. Accordingly, on 21st May, Pitt and Leeds justified their conduct
in a despatch to Ewart, in which the hand of the Prime Minister is
plainly visible. He declared his earnest desire for the joint intervention
of the three Allies, but explained that it was possible only by adhering
to “that system of moderation to which he [His Majesty] has uniformly
endeavoured to adhere.” England desired to see the power of Sweden
and Turkey maintained, and would secretly advance a subsidy to
Gustavus, but did not feel justified in going to war with the two
Empires. If Prussia drew the sword, England would not only keep
France and Denmark quiet, but would also prevent the march of
Austrian troops to the Netherlands during the armistice there. The
earnest hope was expressed that Prussia would give up the Galician
project, and limit her gains to the restoration of the former
boundaries, with a few reasonable changes. Nothing was further from
the wish of England than to sacrifice the interests of Prussia to those
863
of Austria.
It soon appeared that Pitt and Leeds were prepared to meet the
Court of Berlin half way. On receiving the curt refusal of Catharine to
the British offer of mediation, they admitted that the Prussian plan of
exchanges of territory was not objectionable in itself, if Austria agreed
to it—a large assumption. The arrangement might be that Russia
should retain the Crimea and all her present conquests up to the
Dniester, that is, inclusive of Oczakoff. In that case she must restore to
Sweden the wider Finnish limits of the Peace of Nystadt. As for Austria,
she should gain North Servia and West Wallachia as far as the River
Aluta—the Passarowitz limits; and she ought to retain the whole of
Galicia except the districts about Brody, Belez, and Cracow. As a
reward for these services to Poland, Prussia would gain her heart’s
desire—Danzig, Thorn, and the Wartha territory. These would be “not
864
sacrifices, but exchanges of territory.”
The British Cabinet would clearly have preferred the status quo;
but in this alternative scheme it sketched arrangements highly
favourable to Prussia, Austria, Russia, and Sweden, less so to Poland,
but wholly unfavourable to the Turks. Certainly it corresponded more
nearly to the actual or probable fortune of war, the prospects of the
Moslems being at this time gloomy, those of the Swedes doubtful, but
those of Prussia brilliant. The Sultan, it was hinted, might be soothed
by the guarantee of his possessions and the hope of admission to the
865
Triple Alliance along with Sweden and Poland. This curious
despatch shows that Pitt and Leeds cared little about Turkey, and that
their adhesion to the status quo was conditioned by a politic
opportunism.
A sudden and perplexing change now came over Hapsburg policy.
Possibly Leopold relied on the wheedling assurances of support
received from Catharine. Certain it is that in the middle of June he
demanded “indemnities” for the proposed gains to Poland and Prussia;
and his haughty tone was not lowered by the news of a sharp defeat
inflicted by the Turkish garrison of Giurgevo on the Austrian besiegers.
Bared to the waist, and armed with sword and dagger, they suddenly
burst from the gates in three uncontrollable torrents, which swept the
Imperialists out of trenches and camp, and far on to the plain. In vain
also did Keith warn Cobenzl not to rely on Russia. The Hapsburgs now
seemed bent on dismembering Turkey and defying their northern
866
neighbours. At the end of June Leopold declared his resolve not to
treat with the rebels in the Netherlands, and to denounce the armistice
with them. Probably this threatening tone was a screen to hide the
weakness of Austria’s position. On all sides her enemies held her fast.
The Hungarians and Flemings firmly demanded their ancient rights;
and persistence in the game of bluff must have led to the break up of
her dominions.
Another curious change also came over the scene on the arrival of
news at Berlin that Potemkin had offered to restore to the Porte all the
Russian conquests of the present war, on condition of peace. This
sudden adoption of the rôle of peacemaker by that ambitious and
867
masterful favourite has never been fully explained. It may have
been due either to Turkish bribes or to a crafty resolve to checkmate
Hertzberg’s scheme of making Turkey pay for Prussia’s gains. For how
could the professed friend and ally impose on the Porte sacrifices far
greater than those demanded by the enemy? The report that Leopold
was disposed to accept the status quo, finding it far less objectionable
than Hertzberg’s plan of exchanges, also gave food for thought.
Accordingly, Frederick William, before opening negotiations with
Austria, decided that this should form the general basis, but with
certain modifications. The Turks were to be warned that, as Prussia’s
armaments had saved them from destruction, they would now do well
to conclude an armistice with Austria and hope for admission to the
Triple Alliance. They should also humour their preserver by giving up
Western Wallachia to Austria, so that she in her turn might cede the
outer districts of Galicia to the Poles, who of course would yield to
Prussia her reward for these troublesome bargainings. As for Great
Britain, she was expected to favour these scientific readjustments
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