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Understanding HAZOP: Process Safety Analysis

The document provides an overview of Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies. HAZOP is a technique used to identify potential hazards in chemical processes. It involves a team reviewing process documentation like P&IDs and evaluating possible deviations from the design intent using guide words. The team then considers what could cause and result from any deviations to identify safety issues and corrective actions. Key documents needed for a HAZOP study include P&IDs, process descriptions and calculations, and equipment data sheets. Guide words help the team systematically think of different ways the process could deviate, such as having no, less, or more of a parameter.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
146 views41 pages

Understanding HAZOP: Process Safety Analysis

The document provides an overview of Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies. HAZOP is a technique used to identify potential hazards in chemical processes. It involves a team reviewing process documentation like P&IDs and evaluating possible deviations from the design intent using guide words. The team then considers what could cause and result from any deviations to identify safety issues and corrective actions. Key documents needed for a HAZOP study include P&IDs, process descriptions and calculations, and equipment data sheets. Guide words help the team systematically think of different ways the process could deviate, such as having no, less, or more of a parameter.

Uploaded by

Ekopribadi
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

HAZOP

Designed by
Hossam A. Hassanein
2

Goals
Basic understanding of HAZOP

HAZOP requirements

How it works

Case study

HAZOP team

Advantage & disadvantage


3

Scenario What is the


cause of the
accident?
You and your family are on a road trip by using a car in the
middle of the night. You were driving at 100 km/h and, it was
raining heavily.
Can we be The car hits a deep hole and, one of your tire
prepared What is the
blows. You hit
before thethe brake, but due to slippery road and your car
consequence
tire thread was thin, the car skidded andofwas
accident thrown off the
the event?

road.
occurs?
Points to
Ponder

What other What can we


possible do to prevent
accidents all those
might happen things to
on the road happen in the
trip? first place?
4

Definition

- Is structured technique, which may be


applied typically to a chemical production
process, identifying hazards resulting from
HAZOP potential malfunctions in the process
(Hazard &
Operability)
Study
5

History

Initially prepared by
Dr. H G Lawley and
associates of ICI at
Wilton in 1960s .
In 1977, Chemical
Industries Association
published the edited
version.
ICI expanded the
procedure called
HAZARD STUDY levels
1 to 6.
6

ICI Six Levels


Project exploration / preliminary project assessment

Project definition

Design and procurement

During final stages of construction

During plant commissioning

During normal operation, some times after start-up


7

REMEBER

HAZOP is an
identifying technique
and not intended as
a means of solving
problems
8

Features of HAZOP Study

Subsystems of interest line and valve, etc Equipment,


Vessels

Modes of operation Normal operation


Start -up mode
Shutdown mode
Maintenance /construction /
inspection mode

Trigger events Human failure


Equipment /instrument/component
failure
Supply failure
Emergency environment event
9

Features of HAZOP Study

Effects within plant Changes in chemical conditions


Changes in inventory
Change in chemical physical
conditions

Corrective actions Change of process design


Change of operating limits
Change of system reliability
Improvement of material
containment
Change control system
Add/remove materials
10

Features of HAZOP Study

How would hazardous conditions During normal operation Upon


detected ? human failure
Upon component failure In other
circumstances

Contingency actions Improve isolation Improve


protection
11

Documents Needed for


HAZOP Study

Process Flow Sheet or digram ( PFS or PFD )


Preliminary
Description of the Process
HAZOP

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (P & ID)


Process Calculations
Process Data Sheets
Instrument Data Sheets
Detailed Interlock Schedules
Layout Requirements
HAZOP Hazardous Area Classification
Description of the Process
12

Process Flow Diagram (PFD)

The PFD displays the


Is a diagram commonly used
relationship
in chemical and process
between major equipment
engineering to indicate the
of a plant facility and does
general flow of plant
not show minor details such
processes and equipment.
as piping details and
designations
13

Process Flow Diagram (PFD)


Example
14

P&ID

A Piping and
Instrumentation
Diagram - P&ID, is a
schematic illustration P&ID represents the
of functional last step in process
relationship of piping, design.
instrumentation and
system equipment
components.
15

P&ID Example
16

HAZOP Procedure
List of guide words
for generation of
process deviations

Possible Process Possible


Causes Deviations Consequences
17

Definitions
18

Study Nodes

The locations (on


piping and
instrumentation
drawings and
procedures) at which
the process
parameters are
investigated for
deviations.
19

Intention

The intention defines


how the plant is
expected to operate
in the absence of
deviations at the
study nodes.
20

Deviations

Is a way in which the


process conditions
may depart from their
design/process intent
21

Causes

These are the reasons


why deviations might
occur
22

Consequences

The results of the


deviation, in case it
occurs.
23

Safeguards

Facilities that help to


reduce the
occurrence
frequency of the
deviation or to
mitigate its
consequences.
24

Guide Words

A short word to
create the
imagination of a
deviation of the
design/process intent.
25

Guide Words Used


(most 7 used)
Guide Words Meaning
No Negation of the design intend
Less Quantitative Decrease
More Quantitative Increase
Part of Qualitative Decrease
As Well As Qualitative Increase
Reverse Logical opposite of the intend
Other Than Complete Substitution
26

HAZOP Deviation Guide


Guide No, Less, More, Part of As Well As, Other Than Reverse
Process Words Not, Low, High, Also
Variable None Short Long

Flow No Flow Low Rate High Rate Missing


Ingredient
Misdirection,
Impurities
Wrong
Material
Backflow

Pressure Open to
Atmosphere
Low Pressure High
Pressure
____________ ____________ ____________ Vacuum

Temperature Freezing Low


Temperatur
High
Temperatur
____________ ____________ ____________ Auto
refrigeration
e e

Level Empty Low Level High Level Low


Interface
High
Interface
____________ ____________

Agitation No Mixing Poor Mixing Excessive


Mixing
Mixing
Interruption
Foaming,
Extra Phase
____________ Phase
Separation

Reaction No Reaction Slow


Reaction
Runaway
Reaction
Partial
Reaction
Side
Reaction
Wrong
Reaction
Decompositi
on

Time Skipped or
Missed Step
To Short,
To Little
Too Long,
Too Much
Action
Skipped
Extra Action
(Shortcuts)
Wrong
Action
Out of
Order,
Procedure Opposite

Speed Stopped Too Slow Too Fast Out of


Synch
____________ Web or Belt
Break
Backward

Special Utility Failure External


Leak
External
Rupture
Tube Leak Tube
Rupture
Startup,
Shutdown,
____________
27

Process Parameters
Process parameters may generally be classified into the following groups:

Physical parameters related to input medium properties

Physical parameters related to input medium conditions

Physical parameters related to system dynamics

Non-physical tangible parameters related to batch type processes

Parameters related to system operations


28

Examples of Process
Parameters
Flow Pressure Composition Addition Separation Time

pH Signal Start/stop Operate Maintain Services

Communication Temperature Mixing Stirring Transfer Phase

Speed Particle size Measure Control Level Viscosity

Reaction Sequence
29

Simply How does it work?

NODE: Pipe after pump and splitter

PARAMETER: Flow rate

GUIDE WORD: Less (less than normal


value)
DEVIATION: less flow than normal
A group members
CAUSE: of deviation, can be more than
focus on the same
one
issue
CONSEQUENCE: of the deviation/cause
ACTION: initial idea for correction/
prevention/mitigation
30

The HAZOP Process


Select Equipment Node

Choose Deviation OR Parameters & Guide Words

Identify Causes

Associate Consequences

Apply Risk Ranking

Agree Actions To Be Taken

Monitor Actions For Completion


31

Case
Study
32

Case Study 1: Preliminary


HAZOP on Reactor
Cooling Water Refer to reactor system shown.
The reaction is exothermic. A cooling system
is provided to remove the excess energy of
reaction. In the event of cooling function is
lost, the temperature of reactor would
increase. This would lead to an increase in
reaction rate leading to additional energy
release.
The result could be a runaway reaction with
pressures exceeding the bursting pressure of
the reactor. The temperature within the
reactor is measured and is used to control
the cooling water flow rate by a valve.

Perform HAZOP Study


Case Study 1: Preliminary 33

HAZOP on Reactor
Cooling
Water

Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

No
Reverse
More
Other
As Well Than
As No
MoreCooling
Reverse
Another
Reactor cooling
cooling
material
product Cooling
Failure
Control
Water ofwater
waterin
source
valve
More pressure Temperature
Less
Too
May cooling,
much
be cooling
Off-spec product Install
Instruct
If high
check
less cooling,
Check operators
flow
besides
in coils cooling valve
source
failure, resulting
contaminated
reactoroperator increase
cooling, in and
possible runaway
ineffective
reactor temperature
valve
on
TAH procedures
will detect. If
maintenance
water malfunction
in backward
fails to take flow reactor
reaction
cool
effect on the alarm
detected,(TAH)isolate
procedures and
action on alarm reaction water
schedulessource.
Back up water
source?
34

Case Study 2: Shell & Tube


Heat Exchanger

Using relevant guide words, perform


HAZOP study on shell & tube heat
exchanger
35
Case Study 2: Shell & Tube
Heat Exchanger (Answer 1)

Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action


Less
More
More of Less
Moreflow
More of
cooling
pressure on Pipe blockage
Failure
Failure of cooling
of of
process Temperature
Bursting of tubeof High
Low
InstallTemperature
high
Contamination Contamination of Leakage tube Contamination of Proper
Corrosion cooling
flow water
Corrosion
tube side of tube Hardness
water of
valve
fluid cooling
valve Less cooling
process fluid and Temperature
Proper
Alarm
pressure alarm
process fluid line and process fluid maintenance
cooling water remains
crack ofconstant
decrease tube Alarm
maintainence
water goes in and operator
alert
36
Case Study 2: Shell & Tube
Heat Exchanger (Answer 2)

Guide Word Deviation Causes Consequences Action

None
More No
Morecooling water
cooling Failure
Failure of
of inlet
inlet Process
Output fluid
of Process Install
Install
Less
Reverse Less cooling
Reverse process Pipe
Failureleakage
ofwater
process Process
Product fluid
off set Installation
Install check of
Contamination flow
Process
water fluid
flow cooling
Contamination
cooling water in temperature
Outlet
fluid is
temperature Temperature
Proper
Temperature
water
fluid flow fluid inletopen
valve temperature too flow meter
valve
contamination valve
valve to
cooling towater
close not lowered
temperature
too low too indicator
indicator before
maintenance before
low
accordingly
low after the
and after
operatorprocess
process
alert
fluid line fluid line
Install
Install TAH
TAL
37

HAZOP Team
Design Engineer

Process

5 to 7 members
Engineer
Operations
Supervisor
Instrument
Design Engineer

Chemist

Maintenance
Supervisor
Safety Engineer
(team leader)
38

HAZOP Advantage
Easy to learn

Stimulates creativity and generates ideas

Systematic and through procedure

Participants gain valuable knowledge of process

Readily acceptable to regulatory authorities


39

HAZOP Disadvantage

Time consuming

Focusing too much on solutions

Team members allowed to divert into endless


discussions of details

HAZOP is poor where multiple-combination


events can have severe effects.
40

Division Into Sections


Guideline
Each section should contain
active components, which
Section based on process and
Choices of linesP&ID must be gives rise to deviations. e.g Materials in section contain
states of materials. Only 1
divided logically. Not too piping which contains control significant amount of
process operation per 1
many sections. valves can give rise to flow hazardous materials.
section.
deviations, heat exchangers
can cause Temp. deviations.

Define one line section Define additional line sections Define a process section at
Define each major process
between each major process for each branches off the each connection to existing
component as a section.
component. main process flow. equipment.

Define only one line at the Define only one additional line
Define only one process
end of a series of components section if there are alternative
section for equipment in
if there are no other flow flow paths, regardless of how
identical service.
paths. many branches there are.
41

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