Chapter 14: Protection
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Chapter 14: Protection
Goals of Protection
Principles of Protection
Domain of Protection
Access Matrix
Implementation of Access Matrix
Access Control
Revocation of Access Rights
Capability-Based Systems
Language-Based Protection
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.2 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Objectives
Discuss the goals and principles of protection in a modern
computer system
Explain how protection domains combined with an access
matrix are used to specify the resources a process may
access
Examine capability and language-based protection systems
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.3 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Goals of Protection
In one protection model, computer consists of a collection of
objects, hardware or software
Each object has a unique name and can be accessed through
a well-defined set of operations
Protection problem - ensure that each object is accessed
correctly and only by those processes that are allowed to do so
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.4 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Principles of Protection
Guiding principle – principle of least privilege
Programs, users and systems should be given just
enough privileges to perform their tasks
Limits damage if entity has a bug, gets abused
Can be static (during life of system, during life of
process)
Or dynamic (changed by process as needed) – domain
switching, privilege escalation
“Need to know” a similar concept regarding access to
data
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Principles of Protection (Cont.)
Must consider “grain” aspect
Rough-grained privilege management easier, simpler,
but least privilege now done in large chunks
For example, traditional Unix processes either have
abilities of the associated user, or of root
Fine-grained management more complex, more
overhead, but more protective
File ACL lists, RBAC
Domain can be user, process, procedure
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Domain Structure
Access-right = <object-name, rights-set>
where rights-set is a subset of all valid operations that can
be performed on the object
Domain = set of access-rights
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.7 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Domain Implementation (UNIX)
Domain = user-id
Domain switch accomplished via file system
Each file has associated with it a domain bit (setuid bit)
When file is executed and setuid = on, then user-id is
set to owner of the file being executed
When execution completes user-id is reset
Domain switch accomplished via passwords
su command temporarily switches to another user’s
domain when other domain’s password provided
Domain switching via commands
sudo command prefix executes specified command in
another domain (if original domain has privilege or
password given)
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Domain Implementation (MULTICS)
Let Di and Dj be any two domain rings
If j < I Di Dj
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.9 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Multics Benefits and Limits
Ring / hierarchical structure provided more than the basic
kernel / user or root / normal user design
Fairly complex -> more overhead
But does not allow strict need-to-know
Object accessible in Dj but not in Di, then j must be < i
But then every segment accessible in Di also
accessible in Dj
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.10 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Access Matrix
View protection as a matrix (access matrix)
Rows represent domains
Columns represent objects
Access(i, j) is the set of operations that a process
executing in Domaini can invoke on Objectj
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.11 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Use of Access Matrix
If a process in Domain Di tries to do “op” on object Oj, then “op”
must be in the access matrix
User who creates object can define access column for that
object
Can be expanded to dynamic protection
Operations to add, delete access rights
Special access rights:
owner of Oi
copy op from Oi to Oj (denoted by “*”)
control – Di can modify Dj access rights
transfer – switch from domain Di to Dj
Copy and Owner applicable to an object
Control applicable to domain object
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.12 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Use of Access Matrix (Cont.)
Access matrix design separates mechanism from policy
Mechanism
Operating system provides access-matrix + rules
If ensures that the matrix is only manipulated by
authorized agents and that rules are strictly enforced
Policy
User dictates policy
Who can access what object and in what mode
But doesn’t solve the general confinement problem
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.13 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Access Matrix of Figure A with Domains as Objects
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Access Matrix with Copy Rights
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Access Matrix With Owner Rights
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Modified Access Matrix of Figure B
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Implementation of Access Matrix
Generally, a sparse matrix
Option 1 – Global table
Store ordered triples <domain, object,
rights-set> in table
A requested operation M on object Oj within domain
Di -> search table for < Di, Oj, Rk >
with M ∈ Rk
But table could be large -> won’t fit in main memory
Difficult to group objects (consider an object that all
domains can read)
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.18 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Implementation of Access Matrix (Cont.)
Option 2 – Access lists for objects
Each column implemented as an access list for one
object
Resulting per-object list consists of ordered pairs
<domain, rights-set> defining all domains with
non-empty set of access rights for the object
Easily extended to contain default set -> If M ∈ default
set, also allow access
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.19 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Implementation of Access Matrix (Cont.)
Each column = Access-control list for one object
Defines who can perform what operation
Domain 1 = Read, Write
Domain 2 = Read
Domain 3 = Read
Each Row = Capability List (like a key)
For each domain, what operations allowed on what objects
Object F1 – Read
Object F4 – Read, Write, Execute
Object F5 – Read, Write, Delete, Copy
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.20 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Implementation of Access Matrix (Cont.)
Option 3 – Capability list for domains
Instead of object-based, list is domain based
Capability list for domain is list of objects together with operations
allows on them
Object represented by its name or address, called a capability
Execute operation M on object Oj, process requests operation and
specifies capability as parameter
Possession of capability means access is allowed
Capability list associated with domain but never directly accessible
by domain
Rather, protected object, maintained by OS and accessed
indirectly
Like a “secure pointer”
Idea can be extended up to applications
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.21 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Implementation of Access Matrix (Cont.)
Option 4 – Lock-key
Compromise between access lists and capability lists
Each object has list of unique bit patterns, called locks
Each domain as list of unique bit patterns called keys
Process in a domain can only access object if domain
has key that matches one of the locks
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.22 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Comparison of Implementations
Many trade-offs to consider
Global table is simple, but can be large
Access lists correspond to needs of users
Determining set of access rights for domain non-
localized so difficult
Every access to an object must be checked
– Many objects and access rights -> slow
Capability lists useful for localizing information for a given
process
But revocation capabilities can be inefficient
Lock-key effective and flexible, keys can be passed freely
from domain to domain, easy revocation
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.23 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Comparison of Implementations (Cont.)
Most systems use combination of access lists and
capabilities
First access to an object -> access list searched
If allowed, capability created and attached to
process
– Additional accesses need not be checked
After last access, capability destroyed
Consider file system with ACLs per file
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.24 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Access Control
Protection can be applied to non-file
resources
Oracle Solaris 10 provides role-
based access control (RBAC) to
implement least privilege
Privilege is right to execute
system call or use an option
within a system call
Can be assigned to processes
Users assigned roles granting
access to privileges and
programs
Enable role via password to
gain its privileges
Similar to access matrix
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.25 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Revocation of Access Rights
Various options to remove the access right of a domain to an
object
Immediate vs. delayed
Selective vs. general
Partial vs. total
Temporary vs. permanent
Access List – Delete access rights from access list
Simple – search access list and remove entry
Immediate, general or selective, total or partial,
permanent or temporary
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.26 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Revocation of Access Rights (Cont.)
Capability List – Scheme required to locate capability in the system
before capability can be revoked
Reacquisition – periodic delete, with require and denial if revoked
Back-pointers – set of pointers from each object to all capabilities
of that object (Multics)
Indirection – capability points to global table entry which points to
object – delete entry from global table, not selective (CAL)
Keys – unique bits associated with capability, generated when
capability created
Master key associated with object, key matches master key for
access
Revocation – create new master key
Policy decision of who can create and modify keys – object
owner or others?
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.27 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Capability-Based Systems
Hydra
Fixed set of access rights known to and interpreted by the system
i.e. read, write, or execute each memory segment
User can declare other auxiliary rights and register those with
protection system
Accessing process must hold capability and know name of
operation
Rights amplification allowed by trustworthy procedures for a
specific type
Interpretation of user-defined rights performed solely by user's
program; system provides access protection for use of these rights
Operations on objects defined procedurally – procedures are
objects accessed indirectly by capabilities
Solves the problem of mutually suspicious subsystems
Includes library of prewritten security routines
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.28 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Capability-Based Systems (Cont.)
Cambridge CAP System
Simpler but powerful
Data capability - provides standard read, write, execute
of individual storage segments associated with object –
implemented in microcode
Software capability -interpretation left to the
subsystem, through its protected procedures
Only has access to its own subsystem
Programmers must learn principles and techniques
of protection
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.29 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Language-Based Protection
Specification of protection in a programming language
allows the high-level description of policies for the
allocation and use of resources
Language implementation can provide software for
protection enforcement when automatic hardware-
supported checking is unavailable
Interpret protection specifications to generate calls on
whatever protection system is provided by the hardware
and the operating system
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.30 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Protection in Java 2
Protection is handled by the Java Virtual Machine (JVM)
A class is assigned a protection domain when it is loaded by
the JVM
The protection domain indicates what operations the class
can (and cannot) perform
If a library method is invoked that performs a privileged
operation, the stack is inspected to ensure the operation can
be performed by the library
Generally, Java’s load-time and run-time checks enforce type
safety
Classes effectively encapsulate and protect data and
methods from other classes
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.31 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
Stack Inspection
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition 14.32 Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
End of Chapter 14
Operating System Concepts – 9th Edition Silberschatz, Galvin and Gagne ©2013
