Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact

Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact

Treaty of Non-aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Molotov signs the German–Soviet non-aggression pact. Behind him are Ribbentrop and Stalin.
Signed	August 23, 1939
Location	Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Signatories	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Nazi Germany
Languages	German, Russian
Full text
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact at Wikisource

Text of the secret protocol (in German)

The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, colloquially named after Soviet foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov and German foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, was an agreement officially titled the Treaty of Non-aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed in Moscow in the early hours of August 24, 1939, dated August 23, that renounced warfare between the two countries and pledged neutrality by either party if the other were attacked by a third party. Each signatory promised not to join any grouping of powers that was “directly or indirectly aimed at the other party”. The Pact is known by a number of different titles. These include the Nazi–Soviet Pact, Hitler–Stalin Pact, German–Soviet Non-aggression Pact and sometimes as the Nazi–Soviet Alliance. It remained in effect until Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 in Operation Barbarossa.

In addition to stipulations of non-aggression, the treaty included a secret protocol dividing the independent countries of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania into Nazi and Soviet spheres of influence, anticipating "territorial and political rearrangements" of these countries' territories. All were subsequently invaded, occupied, or forced to cede territory by Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, or both. Only Finland was able to resist and remained an independent democracy.

Background

Main article: Soviet–German relations before 1941

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German and Soviet soldiers in front of a FAI armoured car

In the aftermath of World War I, the map of Central and Eastern Europe had drastically changed. Early in 1918, by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Bolshevist Russia agreed to cede sovereignty and influence over parts of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, and parts of Armenia and Georgia as a concession to the Central Powers. Most of those countries became ostensible democratic republics following Germany's defeat in the autumn of 1918. With the exception of Belarus and Ukraine, all of these countries also became independent and fully sovereign — however, in many cases, independence was followed by civil wars related to the Russian revolution. The 1919-1921 Polish–Soviet War ended with the Peace of Riga. In the 1920s, fear of the Soviet Union and of Communism motivated attempts to foster political cooperation and defense treaties between these so-called buffer states.

For its part, the Soviet Union was not interested in maintaining a status quo, which it saw as disadvantageous to its interests, deriving as it did from the period of Soviet weakness immediately following the 1917 October Revolution and Russian Civil War. Helping Germany grow strong had accordingly been Soviet policy from 1920 to 1933. A fourth partition of Poland was suggested at regular intervals, satisfying Lenin's imperative that Versailles be undermined by destroying Poland. Once Hitler renounced the military cooperation between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia that Hans von Seeckt had arranged, Stalin adopted the Popular Front policy, trying to draw the Western powers into war with Germany. Soviet leaders adopted the position that war between what they characterized as rival imperialist countries was not only an inevitable consequence of capitalism, but by weakening the participants would also enhance conditions for the spread of Communism. This strategy worked out well for the victorious Soviets, who spread Communism into eastern Europe after the countries were weakened during World War II.

In 1936, troubled by the failing five year plan, the Soviet Union started tacking closer to Germany again, returning to economic cooperation.

The Moscow Trials of the mid-1930s seriously undermined Soviet prestige in the West, signifying that either (if the accused were guilty) the Soviet government was hopelessly infiltrated by fascist powers or (if the accused were innocent) that Stalin was mercilessly killing his opponents and subordinates. George Kennan stated that the "purges made some sense" only in the context of the search for an accommodation with the Third Reich. Soviet intervention in the Spanish Civil War, as well as the blatant attempts to undermine the governments of foreign countries, were also viewed with skepticism. Furthermore, the Western countries were still hoping to avoid war by a policy of appeasement.

Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and other countries, such as Hungary and Bulgaria, aspired to regain territories lost in World War I and its aftermath. Germany and Fascist Italy, which would later align with Japan to form the Axis Powers, supported the victorious right-wing rebels in their destruction of the Soviet supported Spanish Republic in the Spanish Civil War of 1936–39. In Moscow, the reluctance of the Western nations to go to war against Germany was seen as indicative of a lack of interest in opposing what it viewed as the growing Fascist movement, already exemplified by the events of the Spanish Civil War.

The Soviets were not invited to the Munich Conference regarding Czechoslovakia . The Munich Agreement that followed marked the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1938 through a partial German annexation, which is seen as part of an appeasement of Germany. After this, some Soviet concern existed about the possibility that France and the United Kingdom would stay neutral in a war initiated by Germany, hoping that the warring states would wear each other out and put an end to both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. The resulting agreement violated France's 1924 treaty with Czechoslovakia, which caused the Soviets to suspect that their 1935 alliance pact with France was worthless.

Following's Japan's entry into the Anti-Comintern Pact on November 25, 1936, the Soviets received espionage reports from from Richard Sorge, an NKVD spy based in Tokyo on crucial German negotiatio attempts to persuade Japan to enter into an alliance against the Western nations (France and Britain). Stalin decided that this information, combined with the announcement of Germany's "Pact of Steel" with Italy, indicated that Hitler was more interested in western aggression at the time. Thereafter, the Soviet Union encountered border incidents with Japan, culminating in the Battle of Khalkhin Gol.

In 1938, the Soviet Union blockaded the free navigation of ships from the Baltic Sea to Finnish ports on Lake Ladoga via the Neva river.

Following Hitler's March 1939 denunciation of the 1934 German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact, Britain and France had made statements guaranteeing the sovereignty of Poland, and on April 25, signed a Common Defence Pact with Poland, when that country refused to be associated with a four-power guarantee involving the USSR.

Soviet-Anglo-Franco and Soviet-German negotiations

Initial discussions

The Soviet Union, Britain and France began negotiations regarding a potential agreement in April of 1939. Britain and France believed that war could still be avoided and the Soviet Union, weakened by purges, could not serve as a main military participant. The Soviet Union feared Western powers and the possibility of a "capitalist encirclements", had little faith either that war could be avoided or in the Polish army, and wanted guaranteed support for a two-pronged attack on Germany. On 17 April, Soviet foreign minister Litvinov outlined a French–British–Soviet a mutual assistance pact between the three powers for five to 10 years, including military support, if any of the powers were the subject of aggression. Although informal French–British–Soviet consultations started immediately after that, the main negotiations began in May. By that time Stalin replaced Litinov, who was considered pro-Western by the standards of the Kremlin, with Molotov as Foreign Minister, thereby significantly increasing his freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy. Litvinov's disappearance meant chiefly the loss of an admirable technician or perhaps shock-absorber, so, as a result, French and British negotiators faced with a more truly Bolshevik as opposed to diplomatic or cosmopolitan modus operandi. In his first main speech as a foreign minister on 31 May, Molotov criticized of Anglo-French position and proposed to sing an immediate and wide-ranging military agreement, his western colleagues refrained 'to talk military secrets with the Soviet government' before there was a political understanding.
On June 2, 1939, the Soviet Union submitted a proposal to France and Britain suggesting tripartite military action if (i) a European Power (i.e., Germany) attacked a contracting party; (ii) Germany acted aggressively against Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, or Finland (all of whom the contracting parties had promised to defend); (iii) a participant became involved in the in a war due to rendering assistance to a European country which has pled for aid.

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Maxim Litvinov

For months, Germany had also secretly hinted to Soviet diplomats that it could offer the Soviets better terms than Britain and France. On the same day as the April 17 Litvinov proposal, a German official's account states that a Soviet official told him in April that "there exists for Russia no reason why she should not live with us on a normal footing" and "from normal, the relations might become better and better", though this could be an exaggeration or inaccurate recounting of the Soviet officials' statement.

On May 20, Molotov told the German ambassador that he no longer wanted to discuss only economic matters, and that it was necessary to establish a "political basis." On May 30, German diplomats in Moscow were directed that "we have now decided to undertake definite negotiations with the Soviet Union." In June, Molotov told a Bulgarian diplomat serving as an unofficial intermediary to Germany that a deal with Germany was a better option for the Soviets than a pact with Britain and France or more inconclusive negotiations.

Baltic sticking point and German rapprochement

On June 2, the Soviet Union insisted that any mutual assistance pact should be accompanied by a military agreement describing in detail the military assistance that the Soviets, French and British would provide. That day, the Soviet Union also submitted a proposal to France and Britain suggesting tripartite military action. Five days later, Estonia and Latvia signed non-aggression pacts with Germany, creating suspicions that Germany had ambitions in a region through which it could attack the Soviet Union. After weeks of political talks that had begun in mid-June after the arrival of Central Department Foreign Office head William Strang, on July 8, the British and French submitted a proposed agreement, to which Molotov added a supplementary letter. Talks in late July between the Soviets, Britain and France stalled over an issue in Molotov's supplementary letter whether a political turn to Germany by the Baltic states constituted "indirect aggression", which Britain feared might justify Soviet intervention in Finland and the Baltic states or push those countries to seek closer relations with Germany (while France was less resistant to the supplement). On July 23, France and Britain agreed with the Soviet proposal to draw up a military convention specifying a reaction to a German attack.

Joachim Ribbentrop

On July 26, German and Soviet officials informally discussed the possibility of a political rapprochement over dinner. Germany had learned about the military convention talks before the July 31 British announcement and was skeptical that the Soviets would reach a deal with Britain and France during those planned talks in August. On August 3, German Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop told Soviet diplomats that "there was no problem between the Baltic and the Black Sea that could not be solved between the two of us." The Germans also stated that, unlike Britain, Germany could permit the Soviets to continue their developments unmolested, and that "there is one common element in the ideology of Germany, Italy and the Soviet Union: opposition to the capitalist democracies of the West." On August 12, Germany received word that Molotov wished to further discuss these issues, including Poland, in Moscow.

Final negotiations in Moscow

The Soviets, British and French began military negotiations in August. They were delayed until August 12, because the British military delegation, which did not include Strang, took six days to make the trip traveling in a slow merchant ship, undermining the Soviets' confidence in British resolve. On August 14, the question of Poland was raised by Voroshilov for the first time, requesting that the British and French pressure the Poles to enter into an agreement allowing the Soviet army to be stationed in Poland. The Polish government feared that the Soviet government sought to annex disputed territories, the Eastern Borderlands, received by Poland in 1920 after the Treaty of Riga ending the Polish–Soviet War. The British and French contingent communicated the Soviet concern over Poland to their home offices and told the Soviet delegation that they could not answer this political matter without their governments' approval.

Meanwhile, Molotov spoke with Germany's Moscow ambassador on August 15 regarding the possibility of "settling by negotiation all outstanding problems of Soviet–German relations." The discussion included the possibility of a Soviet-German non-aggression pact, the fates of the Baltic states and potential improvements in Soviet-Japanese relations. Molotov stated that "should the German foreign minister come here" these issues "must be discussed in concrete terms." Within hours of receiving word of the meeting, Germany sent a reply stating that it was prepared to conclude a 25 year non-aggression pact, ready to "guarantee the Baltic States jointly with the Soviet Union", and ready to exert influence to improve Soviet-Japanese relations. The Soviets responded positively, but stated that a "special protocol" was required "definig the interests" of the parties. Germany replied that, in contrast to the British delegation in Moscow at that time without Strang, Ribbentrop personally would travel to Moscow to conclude a deal.

In the Soviet-British-French talks, the Anglo-Franco negotiators were sent to discuss "general principles" rather than details. On August 15, the British contingent was instructed to move more quickly to bring the military talks to a conclusion, and thus, were permitted to give Soviet negotiators confidential British information. The British contingent stated that Britain only currently had six army divisions but, in the event of a war, they could employ 16 divisions initially, followed by a second contingent of 16 divisions -- a sum far less than the 120 Soviet divisions. In discussions on August 18-19, the Poles informed the French ambassador that they would not approve Red Army troops operating in Poland.

After Soviet and German officials in Moscow first finalized the terms of a seven year German–Soviet trade agreement, German officials became nervous that the Soviets were delaying its signing on August 19 for political reasons.. When Tass published a report that the Soviet-British-French talks had become snarled over the Far East and "entirely different matters", Germany took it as a signal that there was still time and hope to reach a Soviet-German deal. Hitler himself sent out a coded telegram to Stalin stating that because "Poland has become intolerable," Stalin must receive Ribbentrop to sign a Pact by August 23 at the latest. Controversy surrounds a related alleged Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939 asserting that a great war between the Western powers was necessary for the spread of World Revolution. Historians debate whether that speech ever actually occurred.

After the Poles resistance to pressure, on August 21, the Anglo-Franco-Soviet talks stalled over the failure to reach agreement on the Soviet demand to move Red Army troops through Poland and Romania (which Poland and Romania opposed), and were adjourned by Voroshilov. The primary reason may have been the progress being made in the Soviet-German negotiations.

That same day, August 21, Stalin has received assurance would approve secret protocols to the proposed non-aggression pact that would grant the Soviets land in Poland, the Baltic states, Finland and Romania. That night, with Germany nervously awaiting a response to Hitler's August 19 telegram, Stalin replied at 9:35 p.m. that the Soviets were willing to sign the pact and that he would receive Ribbentrop on August 23. The Pact was signed sometime in the night between August 23-24.

The day after the Pact was signed, the French and British military negotiation delegation urgently requested a meeting with Voroshilov. On August 25, Voroshilov told them "[i]n veiw of the changed political situation, no useful purpose can be served in continuing the conversation."

The signing of the Pact

"The Prussian Tribute in Moscow", satirical newspaper "Mucha", September 8, 1939, Warsaw

Ribbentrop and Stalin at the signing of the Pact

On August 22, one day after the talks broke down with France and Britain, Moscow revealed that Ribbentrop would be visiting Stalin the next day. This happened while the Soviets were still negotiating with the British and French missions in Moscow. With the Western nations unwilling to accede to Soviet demands, Stalin instead entered a secret Nazi–Soviet alliance: On August 24, a 10-year non-aggression pact was signed with provisions that included: consultation; arbitration if either party disagreed; neutrality if either went to war against a third power; no membership of a group "which is directly or indirectly aimed at the other."

Last page of the Additional Secret Protocol

of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact

Most notably, there was also a secret protocol to the pact, revealed only on Germany's defeat in 1945, according to which the states of Northern and Eastern Europe were divided into German and Soviet "spheres of influence". The USSR was promised an eastern part of Poland, primarily populated with Ukrainians and Belarusians, in case of its dissolution, and additionally Latvia, Estonia and Finland were recognized as parts of the Soviet sphere of influence, with Lithuania added in a second secret protocol in September of 1939. In the North, Finland, Estonia and Latvia were apportioned to the Soviet sphere. Poland was to be partitioned in the event of its "political rearrangement"—the areas east of the rivers Narev, Vistula and San going to the Soviet Union while the Germans would occupy the west. Lithuania, adjacent to East Prussia, would be in the German sphere of influence. According to the secret protocol, Lithuania would retrieve its historical capital Vilnius, occupied during the inter-war period by Poland. Another clause of the treaty was that Bessarabia, then part of Romania, was to be joined to the Moldovan ASSR, and become the Moldovan SSR under control of Moscow. A German diplomat Hans von Herwarth informed his U.S. colleague Charles Bohlen of the secret protocol on August 24, but the information stopped at the desk of President Franklin Roosevelt.

On 24 August, Pravda and Izvestia carried news of the non-secret portions of the Pact, complete with the now infamous front-page picture of Molotov signing the treaty, with a smiling Stalin looking on (located at the top of this article). The news was met with utter shock and surprise by government leaders and media worldwide, most of whom were aware only of the British-French-Soviet negotiations that had taken place for months.

Soviet propaganda and representatives went to great lengths to minimize the importance of the fact that they had opposed and fought against the Nazis in various ways for a decade prior to signing the Pact. However, the Party line never went as far as to take a pro-German stance. Still, it is said that upon signing the pact, Molotov tried to reassure the Germans of his good intentions by commenting to journalists that "fascism is a matter of taste". For its part, Nazi Germany also did a public volte-face regarding its virulent opposition to the Soviet Union, though Hitler still viewed an attack on the Soviet Union as "inevitable".

Concerns over the possible existence of a secret protocol were first expressed by the intelligence organizations of the Baltic states scant days after the pact was signed, and speculation grew stronger when Soviet negotiators referred to its content during negotiations for military bases in those countries. The German original was presumably destroyed in the bombing of Germany, but a microfilmed copy was included in the documents archive of the German Foreign Office. Karl von Loesch, a civil servant in Foreign Office, gave this copy to British Lt. Col. R.C. Thomson in May, 1945. The Soviet Union denied the existence of the secret protocols until 1988, when politburo member Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev admitted the existence of the protocols, although the document itself was declassified only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992. In December 1989, the first democratically elected Congress of Soviets "passed the declaration admitting the existence of the secret protocols, condemning and denouncing them".

Planned and actual territorial changes in Central Europe 1939–1940

Stalin's motives

Stalin, who had feared that the Western nations were encouraging Hitler to attack the Soviet Union, must have been aware that the secret clause made a European war more likely, because it freed Hitler from the prospect of a war against the USSR while fighting France and the United Kingdom. For a long time, the primary motive of Stalin's sudden change of course was assumed to be the fear of German aggressive intentions.

Defenders of the Soviet position argued that it was necessary to enter into a non-aggression pact to buy time, since the Soviet Union was not in a position to fight a war in 1939, and needed at least three years to prepare. Edward Hallett Carr stated: "In return for non-intervention Stalin secured a breathing space of immunity from German attack." According to Carr, the "bastion" created by means of the Pact, "was and could only be, a line of defense against potential German attack." An important advantage (projected by Carr) was that "if Soviet Russia had eventually to fight Hitler, the Western Powers would already be involved." However, during the last decades, this view has been disputed. Historian Werner Maser stated that "the claim that the Soviet Union was at the time threatened by Hitler, as Stalin supposed,...is a legend, to whose creators Stalin himself belonged." (Maser 1994: 64). In Maser's view (1994: 42), "neither Germany nor Japan were in a situation [of] invading the USSR even with the least perspective [sic] of success," and this could not have been unknown to Stalin.

Some critics, such as Viktor Suvorov, claim that Stalin's primary motive for signing the Soviet–German non-aggression treaty was Stalin's calculation that such a pact could result in a conflict between the capitalist countries of Western Europe. This idea is supported by Albert L. Weeks. It must be noted, however, that other claims by Suvorov, such as the Stalin's planning to invade Germany in 1941, have remained under debate among historians, with some like David Glantz opposing, and others like Mikhail Meltyukhov supporting it.

Critics of Stalin question his determination to oppose Germany's growing military aggressiveness, as the Soviet Union began commercial and military cooperation with Germany in 1936 and upheld this relationship until the German invasion began. After the British and French declaration of war on Germany, these economic relationships allowed Germany to partially circumvent the Allied naval blockade, allowing it to avoid the disastrous situation it faced in World War I. However, Soviet industry also benefited from cooperation with Germany, so such cooperation itself provides no argumentation for or against Stalin's motives.

Implementing the division of Eastern Europe

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Soviet and German officers meeting after the invasion of Poland

Poland never will rise again in the form of the Versailles treaty. That is guaranteed not only by Germany, but also… Russia.

— Adolf Hitler in a public speech in Danzig in the end of September, 1939

Initial invasions

On September 1, barely a week after the pact had been signed, the partition of Poland commenced with the German invasion. On the first day, the Germans immediately began massacres, with Polish POWs murdered at Pilchowice, Czuchów, Gierałtowice, Bojków, Lubliniec, Kochcice, Zawiść, Ornontowice and Wyry The next day, the Germans began executions of civilians and others, which typically were conducted in a public place such as a town square. These executions took place in over 30 towns and villages in the first month of German occupation alone. The Luftwaffe also took part by strafing refugees on the road and an aerial bombing campaign. The number of civilians wounded or killed by aerial bombing has been estimated at over 100,000.. At least 156 towns and villages were attacked by the Luftwaffe. The Soviet Union assisted the Germans by allowing them to use Radio station at Minsk to guide Luftwaffe planes.

On September 17, the Red Army invaded eastern Poland and occupied the Polish territory assigned to it by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, followed by co-ordination with German forces in Poland, violating the 1932 Soviet–Polish Non-Aggression Pact. A famous September 20 cartoon by David Low depicts Hitler and Stalin greeting each other over the corpse of Poland.

Rendezvous. David Low's cartoon, published in the Evening Standard on 20 September 1939, shows Hitler greeting Stalin, following their joint invasion of Poland, with the words, "The scum of the earth, I believe?". To which Stalin replies, "The bloody assassin of the workers, I presume?"

Polish troops already fighting much stronger German forces on its western side desperately tried to delay the capture of Warsaw in the hope that France and Britain would stand by their agreements to start military activity against Nazi Germany, and consequently, Polish forces were not able to mount significant resistance against the Soviets. The Soviet Union marshaled 466,516 soldiers, 3739 tanks, 380 armored cars, and approximately 1,200 fighters, 600 bombers, and 200 other aircraft against Poland. The Polish armed forces in the East consisted mostly of lightly-armed border guard units of the Korpus Ochrony Pogranicza (KOP), the 'border protection corps'. In the Northeast of Poland, only the cities of Postawy, Wilno, Lida, Baranowicze, Wolkowysk, and Grodno were defended. After a heavy but short struggle in the Northeast of Poland, Polish forces withdrew to Lithuania where they were interned. Some of the Polish forces which were fighting the Soviets in the far South of the nation withdrew to Romania. At Brest-Litovsk, Soviet and German commanders held a joint victory parade before German forces withdrew westward behind the demarcation line.

Soviet authorities immediately started a campaign of sovietization of the newly-acquired areas. The Soviets immediately organized staged elections, the result of which was to become a legitimization of Soviet annexation of eastern Poland. Soviet authorities attempted to erase Polish history of occupied areas by eliminating connections to Polish culture and the Polish state. The Soviets withdrew the Polish currency without exchanging roubles, resulting in massive losses to the Polish populace. Enterprises were seized by the state, while agriculture was made collectivized. Soviet authorities regarded service for the pre-war Polish state as a "crime against revolution" and "counter-revolutionary activity", and subsequently started arresting large numbers of Polish citizens. The Soviets began confiscating, nationalising and redistributing all private and state-owned Polish property.

Modifying the secret protocols

Eleven days after the Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland, the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was modified (German–Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty,), allotting Germany a larger part of Poland and transferrring Lithuania's territory (with the exception of left bank of river Scheschupe, which remained in the German sphere) from the envisioned Germans to the Soviets. On September 28, 1939 the Soviet Union and German Reich issued a joint declaration in which they declared:

"Second Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact" of 28 September 1939. Map of Poland signed by Stalin and Ribbentrop adjusting the German–Soviet border in the aftermath of German and Soviet invasion of Poland.

They mutually express their conviction that it would serve the true interest of all peoples to put an end to the state of war existing at present between Germany on the one side and England and France on the other. Both Governments will therefore direct their common efforts, jointly with other friendly powers if occasion arises, toward attaining this goal as soon as possible.

Should, however, the efforts of the two Governments remain fruitless, this would demonstrate the fact that England and France are responsible for the continuation of the war, whereupon, in case of the continuation of the war, the Governments of Germany and of the U.S.S.R. shall engage in mutual consultations with regard to necessary measures.

Three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, were given no choice but to sign a so-called Pact of defence and mutual assistance which permitted the Soviet Union to station troops in them.

Soviet and German soldiers in Lublin

By the end of fighting on 2 October 1939, the Red Army had taken 99,149 Polish prisoners of war. While most of the soldiers were released after a time, all officers were kept in camps and many were later executed.

Early political reactions

The active military collaboration between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia caused great shock in the Western world among those governments that had feared such an outcome, and even more so among the communists themselves, many of whom found Soviet dealings with their Nazi enemy incomprehensible. However, Winston Churchill declared on October 1 1939:

That the Russian armies should stand on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace. At any rate, the line is there, and an Eastern Front has been created which Nazi Germany does not dare assail.

The pact also affected Comintern policies: despite an unwillingness by some Western Communists to accept Nazi Germany as a 'friend' (on December 3, CPGB declared the war against Germany 'just'), Moscow soon forced the Communist Parties of France and Great Britain to adopt an anti-war position. On September 7, Stalin called Georgi Dimitrov, and the latter sketched a new Comintern line on the war. The new line – which stated that the war was unjust and imperialist – was approved by the secretariat of the Communist International on September 9. Thus, the various western Communist parties now had to oppose the war, and to vote against war credits. A number of French communists (including Maurice Thorez, who fled to Moscow), deserted from the French Army, owing to a 'revolutionary defeatist' attitude taken by Western Communist leaders. This anti-war line was in effect for the duration of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, i.e., until the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941. This despite the fact that Nazi Germany proceeded to start rounding up Communists in the various European nations that it invaded and conquered in the interim.

The Soviet war with Finland

After unsuccessfully attempting to install a communist puppet government in Finland, in November of 1939, the Soviet Union invaded Finland. After more than three months of heavy fighting, the Finnish defense defied Soviet expectations, and after stiff losses, Stalin settled for an interim peace granting the Soviet Union less than total domination by annexing only the eastern region of Karelia (10% of Finnish territory) and a lease on the Baltic port of Hanko, although the "Terijoki Government" episode suggests that occupation of the entire country was among Stalin's goals in the war). Soviet official casualty counts in the war exceeded 200,000, while Soviet Premier Nikita Kruschev later claimed the casualties may have been one million. About 400,000 Finnish inhabitants of the occupied territories were evacuated and resettled in Western parts of Finland.

At around this time, Soviet NKVD officers also conducted lengthy interrogations of 300,000 Polish POWs in camps that were, in effect, a selection process to determine who would be killed. On March 5 1940, in what would later be known as the Katyn massacre, orders were signed to execute 25,700 Polish POWs, labeled "nationalists and counterrevolutionaries", kept at camps and prisons in occupied western Ukraine and Belarus. It is estimated that between 15,000 and 21,000 Poles, both military personnel and civilians, were executed by the Soviet Union in the aftermath to the invasion.

Soviets take the Baltics and Bessarabia

In mid-June of 1940, when international attention was focused on the German invasion of France, Soviet NKVD troops raided border posts in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. State administrations were liquidated and replaced by Soviet cadres, in which 34,250 Latvians, 75,000 Lithuanians and almost 60,000 Estonians were deported or killed. Elections were held with single pro-Soviet candidates listed for many positions, with resulting peoples assemblies immediately requested admission into the USSR, which was granted by the Soviet Union. The USSR annexed the whole of Lithuania, including the Scheschupe area, which was to be given to Germany. On January 10, 1941, the German ambassador to Moscow von Schulenburg and Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov signed another secret protocol: the Lithuanian territories west of the river Scheschupe were to be regarded as within the Soviet sphere of influence, and Germany was paid 7.5 million dollars (31.5 million Reichsmark) compensation by the USSR.

Finally, on June 26, four days after France sued for an armistice with the Third Reich, the Soviet Union issued an ultimatum demanding Bessarabia, Bukovina, and the Hertza region from Romania. Alerted to this Soviet move, Ribbentrop stressed in his reply to the Soviet leaders on June 25, 1940, the strong German "economic interests" (the oil industry and agriculture being paramount) in Romania. This ensured that Romanian territory wouldn't be transformed into a battlefield. Additionally, Ribbentrop claimed that this German interest also arose from a concern over the "faith" and "future" of 100,000 ethnic Germans of Bessarabia. In September, almost all ethnic Germans in Bessarabia were resettled in Germany as part of the Nazi–Soviet population transfers.

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German and Soviet soldiers at the so-called Border of Peace established by the pact

With France no longer in a position to be the guarantor of the status quo in Eastern Europe, and the Third Reich pushing Romania to make concessions to the Soviet Union, the Romanian government gave in, following Italy's counsel and Vichy France's recent example.

Additional German atrocities

At the end of October, 1939 the Germans induced the death plenty for disobedience to the German occupation. Germany enacted a campaign of "Germanization", which meant to assimilate the occupied territories politically, culturally, socially, and economically into the German Reich Accordingly, Germany attempted to replace Polish culture with German culture in the occupied territories by closing or destroying universities, schools, museums, libraries, and scientific laboratories. Reich Commissioner Heinrich Himmler directed the kidnapping of Polish children to be Germanized. Germany took approximately 50,000 (some estimate are as high as 200,000) Polish children from their families for "Germanisation."

Polish hostages being blindfolded during preparations for their mass execution in Palmiry, 1940

In May of 1940, Germany launched AB-Aktion, a plan to eliminate the Polish intelligentsia and leadership class. More than 16,000 members of the intelligentsia were murdered in Operation Tannenberg alone. The German occupying force also suppressed the Roman Catholic Church. Between 1939 and 1945, an estimated 2,801 members of the Polish clergy were murdered; of these, 1,926 died in concentration camps (798 of them at Dachau).

Germany also planned to incorporate all land into the Third Reich. In a speech to German colonist, Arthur Greiser said ‘’In ten years there will not even be a peasant smallholding which will not be in German hands’’. This effort resulted in the forced resettlement affected 2 million Poles. Families were forced to travel in the severe winter of 1939-40, leaving behind almost all of their possessions without recompense As part of Operation Tannenberg alone, 750,000 Polish peasants were forced and their property given to Germans. A further 330,000 were murdered. Germany eventually planned to move ethnic Poles to Siberia.

Although Germany used forced labourers in most occupied countries, Poles and other Eastern Europeans viewed as inferior and, thus, better suited for such duties. Between 1 and 2.5 million Polish citizens. were transported to the Reich for forced labour, against their will. All Polish males were required to perform forced labor.

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German policemen tormenting a Jew in Rzeszów, Poland.

While ethnic Poles were subject to selective persecution, all ethnic Jews were targeted by the Reich. Himmler ordered all Jews in the annexed lands to be deported to central Poland. In winter 1939-40, about 100,000 Jews were thus deported to Poland. They were initially gathered into massive urban ghettos. The first ghetto was established in October 1939 at Piotrków The combination of excess numbers, unsanitary conditions and lack of food killed large numbers of ghetto inhabitants. The Warsaw Ghetto was the largest, with 380,000 people, and the Łódź Ghetto the second largest, holding 160,000. They were, in effect, immensely crowded prisons, used to slowly kill their inhabitants. Over 43,000 Warsaw ghetto residents died there in 1941.

Poles and ethnic Jews were imprisoned in nearly every camp of the extensive concentration camp system in German-occupied Poland and the Reich. A major labour camp complex at Stutthof, east of Gdańsk/Danzig, beginning in September of 1939. The Auschwitz concentration camp went into operation in occupried Poland on June 14, 1940. 1.1 million died in Auschwitz alone

Later actions

In August 1940, fear of the Soviet Union, in conjunction with German support for the territorial demands of Romania's neighbors and the Romanian government's own miscalculations, resulted in more territorial losses for Romania. The Second Vienna Award (orchestrated mainly by Ribbentrop) created a competition between Romania and Hungary for Germany's favor concerning Transylvania. By September 1940, Romania's economic and military resources were fully dedicated to German interests in the East.

The Soviet-occupied territories were converted into republics of the Soviet Union. During the two years following the annexation, the Soviets arrested approximately 100,000 Polish citizens and deported between 350,000 and 1,500,000, of whom between 250,000 and 1,000,000 died, mostly civilians. Forced re-settlements included sending large categories of people -- such as kulaks, Polish civil servants, forest workers, university professors or osadniks -- to Gulag labour camps and exile settlements in remote areas of the Soviet Union. According to Norman Davies, almost half of them were dead by July of 1940.

Soviet-German relations during the Pact's operation

The Finnish and Baltic invasions began a deterioration of relations between the Soviets and Germany. Stalin's invasions were, however (as the intent to accomplish these was not communicated to the Nazis beforehand), a severe irritant to Berlin and prompted concern that Stalin was seeking to form an anti-Nazi bloc. Molotov's reassurances to the Nazis, and the Nazis' mistrust, intensified. On June 16, 1940, as the Soviets invaded Lithuania, but before they had invaded Latvia and Estonia, Ribbentrop instructed his staff "to submit a report as soon as possible as to whether in the Baltic States a tendency to seek support from the Reich can be observed or whether an attempt was made to form a bloc."

After the Germany entered a Tripartite Pact with Japan and Italy, in October of 1940, Stalin wrote to Ribbentrop about entering an agreement regarding a "permanent basis" for their "mutual interests." Stalin sent Molotov to Berlin to negotiate the terms for the Soviet Union to join the Axis and potentially enjoy the spoils of the pact.. Molotov insisted on interest in Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Greece, though Stalin had earlier unsuccessfully personally lobbied Turkish leaders to not sign a mutual assistance pact with Britain and France.

Ribbentrop asked Molotov to sign another secret protocol with the statement: "The focal point of the territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union would presumably be centered south of the territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean." Molotov took the position that he could not take a "definite stand" on this without Stalin's agreement. Stalin did not agree with the suggested protocol, and negotiations broke down. In response to a later German proposal, Stalin stated that the Soviets would join the Axis if Germany foreclosed acting in the Soviet's sphere of influence. Shortly thereafter, Hitler issued a secret directive on the eventual attempts to invade the Soviet Union.

There is an opinion that Stalin's strike in Finland and occupation of the Baltics was a factor in prompting Hitler to turn East when he did. Two weeks after Soviet armies had entered the Baltics, Berlin requested Finland to permit the transit of Nazi troops. Five weeks after, Hitler had issued a secret directive "to take up the Russian problem, to think about war preparations," a war whose objective would include establishment of a Baltic confederation. According to historian E. H. Carr, Stalin was convinced that no German leader would be so foolish as to engage in hostilities on two fronts. He therefore considered it to be a foregone conclusion that, if Germany was at war with the West, it would have to be friendly with, or at least neutral towards, the Soviet Union.

By early 1941, the German and Soviet occupation zones shared a border running through what is now Lithuania and Poland. Nazi–Soviet relations began to cool again, and signs of a clash between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army began to show in German propaganda—a clash that was not without appeal to some in occupied Western Europe, where anti-Bolshevism stemming from the time of the Russian Civil War twenty years before had not faded. The Nazis had started recruiting for their cynical 'great crusade' against the Soviet Union. By appearing as the unifying leader of the West against the East, Hitler hoped to boost Nazi popularity at home and abroad, and used this as an instrument for peace feelers with the United Kingdom.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was supporting Germany in its war effort against Western Europe through the German–Soviet Commercial Agreement, with supplies of raw materials (including phosphates, chromium, iron ore, mineral oil, grain, cotton, and rubber). These and other supplies were being transported through Soviet and occupied Polish territories, and this allowed Nazi Germany to circumvent the British naval blockade.

In an effort to demonstrate peaceful intentions toward Germany, on April 13, 1941, the Soviets signed a neutrality pact with Axis power Japan. While Stalin had little faith in Japan's commitment to neutrality, he felt that the pact was important for its political symbolism, to reinforce a public affection for Germany. Stalin felt that there was a growing split in German circles about whether Germany should initiate a war with the Soviet Union.

Hitler breaks the Pact

Nazi Germany terminated the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact with its invasion of the Soviet Union in Operation Barbarossa on June 22, 1941. Hitler issued a proclamation at 5:30am dissolving the non-aggression Pact. At the same time a note indicating a state of war now existed between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union was delivered to Molotov. However, the Pact had already been annulled nearly two hours earlier with the commencement of military operations at 3:15am. After the launch of the invasion, the territories gained by the Soviet Union due to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact were lost in a matter of weeks, and the Baltic countries were incorporated into Reichskommissariat Ostland by the Germans, while the native population were conscripted for either labour or military service by the occupation authorities.

The Soviet Union's and Stalin's critics maintain that one reason why the Soviet Union was not in a position to fight a war was Stalin's Great Purge of 1936 to 1938 which, among other things, eliminated much of the military's most experienced leadership. One result of this was that, when German forces did attack the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the Red Army was completely unprepared for the assault, despite multiple advanced warnings from foreign, as well as Soviet, intelligence. At this point, defenders of Stalin's policies reply that these military leaders (e.g., Marshal Tukhachevsky) were actually poorly experienced, had no good military record outside of the Soviet Union, and that their elimination made possible the emergence of the next generation of Soviet military leaders (e.g., Marshal Zhukov) who eventually played a central role in the subsequent defeat of Germany. Some historians, however, believe that most of the succeeding generation was reactionary, dissolving the most modern part of the Red Army, and that one of the critical problems for the Soviets during the war was a shortage of commanders. The retention by Stalin of a number of inept ultraconservative 'old-guard' military leaders such as Budenny, Grigory Kulik, and Voroshilov argues against the first part of this argument having any merit.

The extent to which the Soviet Union's post-Pact territorial acquisitions may have contributed to preventing its fall (and thus a Nazi victory in the war) remains a factor in evaluating the Pact. Soviet sources point out that the German advance eventually stopped just a few kilometers away from Moscow, so the role of the extra territory might have been crucial in such a close call. Others postulate that Poland and the Baltic countries played the important role of buffer states between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, and that the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was a precondition not only for Germany's invasion of Western Europe, but also for the Third Reich's invasion of the Soviet Union. The military aspect of moving from established fortified positions on the Stalin Line into undefended Polish territory could also be seen as one of the causes of rapid disintegration of Soviet armed forces in the border area during the German 1941 campaign, as the newly constructed Molotov Line was unfinished and unable to provide Soviet troops with the necessary defense capabilities.

It is now known that during the first visit by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in the Soviet Union in 1941, after the attack of the Soviet Union by Germany, the Soviet side proposed to include into the planned treaty with Great Britain a secret protocol stipulating that parts of Eastern Poland in future post-war Europe will be given to the Soviet Union. Anthony Eden refused to enter in this agreement as the one which can by only decided by the Prime Minister.

Denunciation of the Secret Protocol's existence by the Soviet Union

For decades, it was the official policy of the Soviet Union to deny the existence of the secret protocol. On August 23, 1986, tens of thousands of demonstrators in 21 western cities including New York, London, Stockholm, Toronto, Seattle, and Perth participated in Black Ribbon Day Rallies to draw attention to the secret protocols. It was only after the Baltic Way demonstrations of August 23, 1989, set on the 50th anniversary of the pact, that a special commission under Alexander Nikolaevich Yakovlev started an investigation into the existence of the secret protocols. In December 1989, Yakovlev concluded that the protocol had existed and revealed his findings to the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies. As a result, the first democratically elected Congress passed a declaration admitting the existence of the secret protocols, and condemning and denouncing them.

"Communazi Pact"

TIME Magazine began to use the term "Communazi Pact" and adjective "Communazi" (occasionally all lowercase: "communazi") in mid-September 1939, to refer to the Molotov-Ribbentrop (then, more commonly known as the Hitler-Stalin) Pact:

• "Arms & Art" (September 11, 1939)
• "Children of Moscow" (September 18, 1939)
• "Moscow's Week" (October 9, 1939)
• "Revival" (October 9, 1939)
• "Communazi Columnists" (June 3, 1940)
• "The Revolt of the Intellectuals" (January 6, 1941), by Whittaker Chambers
• "In Again, Out Again" (April 7, 1941)

See also

In chronological order:

• Curzon Line
• German–Polish Non-Aggression Pact
• German–Estonian Non-Aggression Pact
• German–Latvian Non-Aggression Pact
• Stalin's speech on August 19, 1939
• Soviet invasion of Poland (1939)
• German–Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty
• Nazi–Soviet population transfers
• Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact
• Great Patriotic War (term)
• Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 1942
• Ryti-Ribbentrop Agreement between Finland and Nazi Germany
• Percentages agreement between Stalin and Churchill
• Baltic way, protest marking the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact on August 23, 1989
• Stalin's Missed Chance, research by military historian Mikhail Meltyukhov, covering Stalin's alleged offensive plans

Bibliography

• Carr, Edward H., German–Soviet Relations between the Two World Wars, 1919–1939, Oxford 1952
• Maser, Werner Der Wortbruch: Hitler, Stalin und der Zweite Weltkrieg. München: Olzog 1994.
• Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, London 1961
• Shirer, William L. (1959). The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0-671-72868-7.
• Richard M. Watt (1979). Bitter Glory: Poland & Its Fate 1918–1939. Simon & Schuster, NY. ISBN 0-7818-0673-9.
• Izidors Vizulis (1990). The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of 1939: The Baltic Case. Praeger Publishers. ISBN 0-275-93456-X.
• Fisher, David. Read, Anthony. The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin, and the Nazi–Soviet Pact 1939–1941. W. W. Norton & Company 1999.

External links

• Text of the pact
• Nazi–Soviet Relations 1939–1941
• Leonas Cerskus. The Story of Lithuanian soldier
• Modern History Sourcebook, a collection of public domain and copy-permitted texts in modern European and World history has scanned photocopies of original documents
• The Meaning of the Soviet–German Non-Aggression Pact Molotov speech to the Supreme Soviet on Aug. 31, 1939