PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.

ROLANDO DEDUYO Y PIRYO alias "BATMAN" AND ISAGANI MAAGO (ACQUITTED), accused, SYLLABUS 10.ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; TRIAL IN ABSENTIA WAS PROPERLY CONDUCTED BY THE TRIAL COURT SINCE THE ACCUSED HAD ESCAPED AFTER HIS ARRAIGNMENT. Because the appellant escaped, trial in absentia proceeded against him. Sec. 14 (2) of the Constitution allows trial in absentia provided the accused has been arraigned and his failure to appear after due notice unjustifiable. In the present case, trial in absentia was properly conducted by the trial court inasmuch as the appellant had already been arraigned when he escaped. By escaping, the appellant waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until his custody was regained. SYNOPSIS: Based on the evidence presented during the trial in absentia, Rolando Deduyo was convicted by the trial court of the crime of kidnapping with ransom and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In this appeal, Deduyo contended that there was no kidnapping because the victim voluntarily went with him. The contention held no water. In the case of People vs. Santos, the Court ruled that the fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused did not remove the element of deprivation of liberty because the victim went with the accused on a false inducement without which the victim would not have done so. Such is the situation in the present case the victim, a boy 16 years of age, would not have voluntarily left with the appellant if not for the false assurance that his mother had supposedly permitted him to accompany the appellant to the airport "to get the baggage" and bring it back to the victim's house. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that, in kidnapping, the victim need not be taken by the accused forcibly or against his will. What is controlling is the act of the accused in detaining the victim against his or her will after the offender is able to take the victim in his custody. Since the crime charged is kidnapping in its qualified form, that is, committed for the purpose of exacting ransom, the abduction must in addition be shown to have been committed for such purpose. In the present case, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence on record to prove that appellant abducted the victim for ransom. Further, the crime was committed after the death penalty was reimposed by RA 7659 on December 31, 1993. Since kidnapping for ransom carries the penalty of death under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, no other penalty can be imposed on the appellant. Thus, the Court modified the penalty imposed by the trial court from reclusion perpetua to the supreme penalty of death.

FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and FEDERICO B. MERCADO, petitioners, vs. HON. RAMON E. NAZARENO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu and TEODORO DE LA VEGA, JR., respondents. SYLLABUS 3.ID.; ID.; TRIAL IN ABSENTIA; REQUISITES. A trial in absentia may be had when the following requisites are present: (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified. 5.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE; NOT VIOLATED BY RENDITION OF JUDGMENT AFTER TRIAL IN ABSENTIA. The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 7.ID.; ID.; RIGHTS TO CROSS-EXAMINE AND TO PRESENT EVIDENCE IN HIS BEHALF, WAIVED IN TRIAL IN ABSENTIA. An escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. In the same vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and protection, may be waived by him. An escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him. FACTS: On August 3, 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr., were charged with the crime of murder. On August 22, 1973 all the above-named accused were arraigned and each of them pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Following the arraignment, the respondent judge, Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for September 18, 1973 at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. All the accused, including private respondent, were duly informed of this. Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the private respondent escaped from his detention center and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case (the petitioners herein) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case against all the accused praying that private respondent de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides: "SECTION 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. (Emphasis supplied.) *

Pursuant to the above-written provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave the private respondent the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court. 1 After due trial, or on November 6, 1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent. The dispositive portion is as follows: "WHEREFORE, insofar as the accused Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando Cargando, and Rogelio Baguio are concerned, this case is hereby dismissed. The City Warden of Lapu-Lapu City is hereby ordered to release these accused if they are no longer serving sentence of conviction involving other crimes. The proceedings in this case against the accused Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. who has escaped on August 30, 1973 shall remain pending, without prejudice on the part of the said accused to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution and to present his defense whenever the court acquires back the jurisdiction over his person." 2 On November 16, 1973 the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the above-quoted dispositive portion on the ground that it will render nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However, this was denied by the lower court in an Order dated November 22, 1973. ISSUE: Whether or not under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, an accused who has been duly tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and crossexamine witnesses who testified against him. HELD: REQUISITES FOR TRIAL IN ABSENTIA: 1. that there has been an arraignment; 2. that the accused has been notified; and 3. that he fails to appear and his failure to do so is unjustified. In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial in absentia. As the facts show, the private respondent was arraigned on August 22, 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and 19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by the lower court. 7 It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police Blotter 8 that private respondent escaped from his detention center. No explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings was given. Even the trial court considered his absence unjustified. The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of the 1973 Constitution, correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of the prosecution and the other accused in the absence of private respondent, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to the private respondent and rendered a decision as to the other accused only.

Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the time until the accused who escaped from custody finally decides to appear in court to present his evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be presumed innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no violation of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard. Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains his rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. By his failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the accused to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a personal right and may be waived. 10 In the same vein, his right to present evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and protection, may be waived by him. cdll Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in this case is buttressed by the provisions of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 1 (c) of Rule 115 which clearly reflects the intention of the framers of our Constitution, to wit: " . . . The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused under custody had been notified of the date of the trial and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JERRY FERRER, accused-appellant. SYNOPSIS Appellant herein was charged with the rape of his 11-year-old stepdaughter of his common-law wife. After arraignment, he was temporarily released for medical treatment to the custody of Ustadj Sinoding Langcoa, a trusted member of the society. During the pre-trial, appellant and his lawyer failed to appear. Trial in absentia followed. The trial court considered appellant as having jumped bail since he did not show up in court. Thus, the trial court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and imposed upon him the death penalty. In his appellant's brief, appellant assailed the decision as violative of the Constitution. He argued that the decision failed to distinctly point out the applicable law on which it was based and that there was nothing in the decision that would show how the court arrived at its conclusion convicting him of the crime charged. The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the trial court. The records of the case were remanded to said court for further proceedings and for proper rendition of judgment. The court found that the decision of the trial court failed to comply with the rudimentary requirements of due process and the constitutional provisions that vouchsafe the same. The five-page decision failed to express therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it was based. After a summation of the evidence presented, which consisted only of the prosecution's evidence, considering that the defense failed to adduce evidence in its behalf, the trial court immediately declared, in a most sweeping manner, the guilt of the appellant. The Court also found that the appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.

SYLLABUS 1.POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. Appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel as enshrined in Section 14, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, viz.: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. This constitutional requirement is also reflected in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure particularly in Section 1(c), Rule 115 thereof, which provides that it is a right of the accused at the trial to be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment. TAECSD 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEEDS FROM THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF DUE PROCESS. The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic

rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. . . . It may be stressed that the right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client. Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation.

ELIAS CARREDO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VICTORIA CATOSTOS, and HON. GENEROSO A. JUABAN (Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch VII), respondents.

SYLLABUS 1.REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WAIVER OF RIGHT TO BE PRESENT AT ALL STAGES OF THE PROCEEDING; EXCEPTION; AQUINO VS. MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 2 (63 SCRA 546) AND PEOPLE VS. PRESIDING JUDGE (125 SCRA 269), CITED. In Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2 where a similar issue was presented, six justices were of the view that petitioner may waive his right to be present at all stages of the proceedings, while five justices were in agreement that he may so waive such right, except when he is to be identified. The result was that the order of the respondent military commission requiring his presence at all times during the proceedings before it should be modified in the sense that petitioner's presence shall be required only in the instance just indicated. In People vs. Presiding Judge, 185 SCRA 269 (1983) this court sustained the position of the accused on the strength of the ruling of this Court in Aquino. However, this Court made the following disquisition: "In the case of People vs. Prieto, Sr., 84 SCRA 198, it was held that [r]espondent Judge unfortunately assumed that thereby a defendant was thus conferred a fundamental right to ignore the terms of the bond posted by him in accordance with his constitutional right to bail. The present Constitution certainly has not made a dent on the traditional and correct concept of a bail as given to allow the release of a person in the custody of the law on condition that he would appear before any court whenever so required. Upon failure to do so, the warrant of arrest previously issued can be a sufficient justification for his confinement.' Further, in Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2, et al., 63 SCRA 546, the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, clearly stated that "the accused may waive his presence in the criminal proceedings except at the stages where identification of his person by the prosecution witnesses is necessary. I might agree to the proposition of 'total' waiver in any case where the accused agrees explicitly and unequivocally in writing signed by him or personally manifests clearly and indubitably in open court and such manifestation is recorded, that whenever a prosecution witness mentions a name by which the accused is known, the witness is referring to him and to no one else." Stated differently, the 1973 Constitution now unqualifiedly permits trial in absentia even of capital offenses, provided that after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in the case on trial. The reason for requiring the presence of the accused, despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all the stages of the proceedings without giving the People's witnesses the opportunity to identify him in court, he may in his defense say that he was never identified as the person charged in the information and, therefore, is entitled to an acquittal. Furthermore, it is possible that a witness may not know the name of the culprit but can identify him if he sees him again, in which case the latter's presence in court is necessary." 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; TRIAL IN ABSENTIA; EXPLAINED. It is important to state that the provision of the Constitution authorizing the trial in absentia of the accused in case of his non-appearance after

arraignment despite due notice simply means that he thereby waives his right to meet the witnesses face to face among others. An express waiver of appearance after arraignment, as in this case, is of the same effect. However, such waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does not mean that the prosecution is thereby deprived of its right to require the presence of the accused for purposes of identification by its witnesses which is vital for the conviction of the accused. Such waiver of a right of the accused does not mean a release of the accused from his obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so required. The accused may waive his right but not his duty or obligation to the court. FACTS: On February 3, 1983, petitioner was charged with malicious mischief before the Municipal Trial Court of Malabuyoc, Cebu City. He deposited a cash bond for his provisional liberty. Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty and thereafter he filed a written waiver of appearance dated May 14, 1984. At the hearing on August 14, 1985 the prosecution moved for the recall of its principal witness for the purpose of identifying the accused-petitioner who was not then present. Hence, the hearing was rescheduled on October 9,1985 and a subpoena was issued to petitioner who failed to appear on said date. The defense counsel justified petitioner's absence in that the latter's presence can no longer be required as he already filed a written waiver of appearance. Nevertheless, the municipal judge issued an order dated May 27, 1986 ordering the arrest of petitioner, the confiscation of the cash bond, and at the same time ordering the bondsman, who is the petitioner himself, to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against the bondsman. LLphil A motion for reconsideration thereof having been denied, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In an order dated January 28, 1987, the said trial court denied the same. Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari questioning the dismissal of the petition by the trial court and submitting for determination the issue of whether or not petitioner can be compelled, on pain of being arrested and his cash bond getting confiscated, to be present during the trial for purposes of his identification by the prosecution witnesses in a complaint for malicious mischief despite his written waiver of appearance. ISSUE: Whether or not an accused who, after arraignment, waives his further appearance during the trial can be ordered arrested by the court for non-appearance upon summons to appear for purposes of identification.

HELD: The petition is denied. Section 19, Article 4 of the 1973 Constitution which was then in force provides as follows: "SEC. 19.In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." in People vs. Presiding Judge, 6 this Court reiterated the rule in Aquino that the accused may waive his presence at the trial of the case his presence may be compelled when he is to be identified. Petitioner, however, argues that he should not be ordered arrested for non-appearance since he filed a written waiver stating that "he admits that he could be identified by witnesses who have testified at the time that said accused was not present" following the ruling of this Court in People vs. Presiding Judge. The aforestated statement in the waiver of appearance of petitioner that he admits he could be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution even in his absence is not such unqualified admission contemplated in Presiding Judge. What is stated in Presiding Judge as an exception is when the accused "unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as defendant in the case on trial," no more no less. In the present case petitioner only admits that he can be identified by the prosecution witnesses in his absence. He did not admit that he is the very person named as defendant in the case on trial. His admission is vague and far from unqualified. He cannot therefore seek the benefit of the exception recognized in Presiding Judge. It is important to state that the provision of the Constitution authorizing the trial in absentia of the accused in case of his non-appearance after arraignment despite due notice simply means that he thereby waives his right to meet the witnesses face to face among others. An express waiver of appearance after arraignment, as in this case, is of the same effect. However, such waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does not mean that the prosecution is thereby deprived of its right to require the presence of the accused for purposes of identification by its witnesses which is vital for the conviction of the accused. Such waiver of a right of the accused does not mean a release of the accused from his obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so required. 7 The accused may waive his right but not his duty or obligation to the court.