1

Christopher Bannister Writing Sample

The following extract comes from the third chapter of my PhD thesis, entitled Revolution or
Victory Cenetista motivations in the Popular Army. The chapter details the ideological
questions facing the anarcho-syndicalist Confederacin Nacional de Trabajo (National
Confederation of Labour, CNT) during the Spanish Civil War and how these were dealt with
in a military context. More specifically, it details how soldiers who had previously gone to
war with the express aim of dismantling the state and reforming society were later convinced
to fight for that same state against Franco. This extract is a study of the men charged with
motivating these CNT-affiliated soldiers, the political commissars of their units.

2
Republican Anarchists: The Political Commissars of the CNT

The Political Commissariat, as with all units, was fundamental in the political motivation of
CNT affiliated troops. If, as we have established, following May 1937, anarchist troops
needed to become, as Juan Garcia Oliver urged, cogwheels in the military machine, the
commissars undoubtedly provided the ideological axle-grease.1 This section of the chapter
will focus on the commissars of the cenetista units of the Ejrcito Popular, their political
outlook and how this informed the cenetista military press and propaganda, of which they
were the authors. Therefore, understanding more about the commissars themselves is vital.
These men had a very specific duty; not only were they expected to follow the general
teachings of the Ejrcito Popular, their task being instilling into the soldiery the concepts of
traditional discipline and obedience to the Republic and its constitution, they were also
required to make these diktats palatable for anarchist soldiers, who had, up until May 1937,
held legitimate hopes of overthrowing the state they were now being enthused to obey. It was
therefore essential that the commissars in question fulfilled two criteria the first was that
they themselves understood the raison dtre of the Ejrcito Popular, the ideas of
Republicanism, and the second was that they understood the CNT, its soldiers and their
beliefs in the post-revolutionary epoch. The main source for this section will be the
completed questionnaires filled out by all serving and prospective cenetista commissars over
the summer of 1938. Distributed by the office of Miguel Gonzlez Inestal, in his position as
the general sub-commissar of the General Commissariat, on 9 July 1938 the questionnaire
offers a broad and detailed impression of the men who made up the Commissariat in the CNT
brigades. The questionnaire consisted of thirteen back ground questions and one essay
section. The first thirteen asked the Commissar to provide his personal details, literacy and
his military and political history; namely his political affiliation, the date he joined the union
or political party, his military unit and the date he volunteered or was enlisted. The fourteenth
and final question was a more open ended affair, asking the candidate to present their
thoughts on the following the origins of the war, the origins of the Commissariat, the
purpose of the Commissariat, the daily conduct of a commissar and the work of the
Commissariat in regards to soldiers, officers and their own organization. 2 It is in the answers

Le Libertaire, 8 April 1937, cited in Bolloten, The Spanish Revolution, p. 308.

CDMH, SECCIN POLTICO-SOCIAL, PS-MADRID, 439, 1. For a full transcript of the Questionnaire
see Appendix I, p. 323.
2

3
to this fourteenth question that we will learn about the CNTs affiliates in the Commissariat
and the subsequent paragraphs will examine their responses.
Before the analysis begins, a note on the sources themselves is necessary. The
obvious criticism of using these sources as a reflection of cenetista commissars attitudes is
that as they were written for their superiors, the assumption would be that their content is
simply what each commissar believed their superior wanted them to say, not a reflection of
their actual attitudes. However, the whether or not this is true is inconsequential, as, these
were official attitudes and, as we shall see, the output of propaganda by the commissars
matches the answers of the questions, showing us, that in the official sphere at least these
were the ideals that commissars displayed and instilled in the men. Ultimately, it is the task of
the historian to determine the veracity of the content at hand and, in reading the earnest and
verbose responses given by the commissars, the conclusion to be drawn is that either they
honestly believed what they wrote or were talented in the presentation of an ideology they did
not support; both of which, in the context of this thesis, are one and the same.
Analysis of these answers allows for several key themes of the anarchist commissars
value system to come to the fore. These were; a class based, internationalist, antifascist and
anti-capitalist view of the war in general, a fervid support for the Popular Army and the work
of the Commissariat complemented by a vehement abhorrence for the traditional military
system and a strong, almost zealous anti-partisanship. In regards to the interpretation of the
war, the majority of these opinions arose in answer to the question origin of the war. The
class based interpretation of the war was unsurprisingly strong amongst cenetista
commissars. To these commissars, the war could be understood as a conflict between the
working class and an alliance of all the traditional reactionary enemies of the Spanish
proletariat. This conglomerate of reactionaries was agreed to be a combination of any or all
of militarists the nobility, bureaucracy, the large landowners and high finance as well as
politicians nostalgic for lost privileges and priests in the service of monarchical
absolutism.3 Luis Garca Luque, commissar for the Compaia de Sanidad (medical section)
of the 147th Mixed Brigade, CNT member since March 1932 and former militant in the
Tierra y Libertad column described a subversive trilogy of Obscurantism, Militarism and
Capitalism while Jos Mara Garca Salceda, a cenetista since 5 May 1931 and a veteran of
the 26th Division (Durruti Column) described the Civil War as a split between two camps, in
one the bankers, the bourgeoisie, the Army, monks and all of the mentally retarded of Spain;

INESTAL..., 14B, Manuel Garca Planes; 13A:.Adolfo Juste Salinas.

4
the other, the progressive, the worker; the moral and the intellectual.4 The reasons given for
the uprising followed a similar class based tack, with the war being seen as the final desperate
act of bourgeois repression and the reaction of the people against the attempted subjugation.
Jos Mateu Cusido, a CNT member since 1923 and an activist during the Primo de Rivera
dictadura argued that, following the February elections the Right could not console itself
with the loss of all its posts and raged against the Republic creating a conspiracy between
the military and the political to crush the few liberties that remained for our people.5 To
Toms Mingot Lloret, cenetista since September 1931, volunteer in the militias since August
1936 and founder of a pre-war anarchist weekly entitled La Verdad, the war was a natural
consequence of social inequality and the unchecked egotism of capitalism, the uprising was
a reaction to the victory of February [by priests], landowners and the military and rather
than just resulting in another pronunciamiento the origin of the war was the political
maturity of the working class, the only force that initially faced the enemy army. 6
commissar in the 7th Transport Battalion, Julio Miguel Britapaja, who joined the
Confederation in January 1931, took this idea further, giving full agency to the working class,
the war being the result of the revolutionary training and rebellious spirit of the proletariat
that one day uncontrollably had to take up arms for the conquest of their rights as men
against the aristocratic Spanish bourgeoisie and their minions and supporters, THE ARMY,
THE POLICE and THE ROMAN CHURCH.7 Class lines of the conflict were therefore
clearly defined to cenetista commissars. The war was the working class Republic against any
and all of its enemies from the Republican period and before. The various class differences of
the Republic, namely the bourgeois Republican and Catalan Nationalist groups, were ignored
and any considerations for the social subtleties of the rebels were equally disregarded. It was,
simply, a war between the Spanish proletariat and its enemies.
The conspicuous presence of foreign troops from fascist nations, namely the Italian
Corpo Truppe Volontarie (Corps of Volunteer Troops, CTV) and the German Legion Condor
(Condor Legion), meant that the conflict had a distinctly internationalist edge. This, as
highlighted in Chapter Two, was a key part of the propaganda of the Ejrcito Popular and
was also a key part of cenetista commissars interpretation of the war. Every reference to the
presence of foreign troops was accompanied by the obligatory moniker of invasion, foreign
invasion or fascist invasion. The invaders, Italy, Germany and occasionally Portugal, often
4

INESTAL..., 14B, Luis Garca Luque; 17A, Jos Mara Garca Salcedo.
INESTAL..., 13C, Jos Mateu Cusido.
6
INESTAL..., 13C, Toms Mingot Lloret,.
7
INESTAL..., 13C, Julio Miguel Britapaja, Capitals from source.
5

5
replaced by the synecdochical figures of Hitler, Mussolini and Salazar, were not a complex
enemy. To the commissars, the fascist nations were nothing more than adventurists attacking
Spain for her resources, her territory and a desire to make our Spain a country of slaves.8
Luis Villaroel Jeraz, a member of the CNT since April 1931 and a delegate of the Local
Federation of Madrids Commission of Propaganda and Press and commissar for the 70th
Brigade, believed the invaders who came to the aid of the rebels had been lurking, waiting
for the approaching time to slake their desire for territorial expansion, conceptualizing
like crumbs the Spanish soil.9 Antonio Mereciano Bruna, commissar of the 7th Transport
Battalion, CNT member since September 1930 and an original volunteer of the Durruti
Column, echoed these thoughts, describing Italy and Germany succinctly: nations that had
already set their sights on the Iberian Peninsula for plans of territorial and economic
expansion.10 The war was therefore a national one, in the words of Miguel Melero Lorenzo,
a CNT veteran since 1928 and newly graduated commissar awaiting placement, it was a war
of true independence against the invasion of the Italo-Germanic countries and their
expulsion from our soil and any Spaniards fighting on their side were traitors, without any
scruple and without honour, that mortgaged to the richest, most coveted Spanish subsoil to
totalitarian countries, leading to the war of invasion.11
Many commissars chose to conflagrate the class and invasion interpretations, making
the war a peoples revolt against both Capitalism at home and its allies abroad. Pedro Garca
Garca, a CNT member since 1931, former delegate of the Albacete CNTs Commission of
Propaganda and an acting commissar in the 147th Mixed Brigade argued that the foreign
invasion was an inevitable consequence of the victory of the People:

The people triumphed on the street, capitalism remained undeterred, it was all
scheduled and what began as a civil war becomes a war of independence. The Italians
and Germans invaded our soil occupying the main areas of wealth of our beloved
Spain Capitalism has no Patria; it persists provided the capitalists do not mind
giving to another nation the wealth of the country of their birth.12

Garca Garca, by combining both of these ideas, robbed the rebels of their claim to the
nation. Capitalism had no Patria, and, in his definition of fascism as merely a new modality
8

INESTAL..., 17B Manuel Villanueva Martinez; 13B, Antonio Miras Nebot,.

INESTAL..., 14B, Luis Villaroel Jeraz.
10
INESTAL..., 13C Antonio Mereciano Bruna.
11
INESTAL..., 13B Miguel Melero Lorenzo; Manuel Villanueva Martinez 17 A3-C;
12
INESTAL..., 14B, Pedro Garca Garca.
9

6
of capitalism, neither did fascism.13 These fascists, namely the treacherous generals, were,
as capitalists, out to rob Spain of her riches and nothing more. They had no regard for the
nation, only interested in handing over its wealth to the Italo-German invaders. The Republic,
on the other hand, was a union of the working class, fighting to protect the nations people
and her sovereignty, repelling both invaders and capitalists, for they were one and the same.
Garca Garca ultimately surmised his ideas into the rhetorical conceit of Is it a war of
independence that we wage in Spain? Yes! But it is also a class war!.14
Garca Garca was not alone in his rhetorical desire to combine the two ideas and
frame the war as an anti-Republican international capitalist-fascist conspiracy. Further
examples of this attitude were frequent; Fernando Mauri-Vera Iscar, a forty year old former
provocateur against the Primo dictatorship and cenetista since early 1936 argued that the
absolute and resounding victory of the people in the early days radically changed the
struggle and it became a war of invasion:
A war of invasion to which we have pushed these classes of privileged and
murderous cowards, who rather than surrender into the hands of the people that had
overcome them [and] face the justice they deserved, preferred to give over our wealth,
our mines, pieces of our Spain to the Italian and German hordes.15

Rafael Molin Fernndez, a volunteer from in his words the first moment of the war,
political delegate for the 91st Mixed Brigade and member of the CNT from the first day of
1932, offered an equally proletarian and antifascist chronology, stating that the narrow
minded bourgeoisie did not count on the enthusiasm and incomparable revolutionary spirit
of the working class who took to the streets to overthrow the traitors in little time, and
subsequently asked for help from the imperial countries, offering slices of our territory in
exchange for war materiel and the necessary manpower to crush the workers movement,
transforming the struggle from a civil war to a war of independence. 16 This conflagration of
the two ideas allowed for class traitors to become national traitors and for the working class
to be the only worthwhile Spaniard. As we shall later see, this idea that Republican Spain was
a Republic of the working classes was to be fundamental to the anarchist propaganda as the

13

Ibid...
Ibid...
15
INESTAL..., 13C, Fernando Mauri-Vera Iscar.
16
INESTAL..., 13B, Rafael Molin Fernndez.
14

7
presentation of the war as a fascist invasion and the combination of these two ideas would
serve as a powerful means of mobilization for cenetista troops.
While interpreting the war in these terms meant that the commissars of the CNT saw
the enemy in the same Manichean context as the overarching discourse, their attitude about
the Ejrcito Popular was to be equally in keeping with the Republican concept. In regards to
the antecedents of the Popular Army, the militia columns, attitudes varied. Some commissars,
such as Adolfo Juste Salinas, commissar of the 121st Mixed Brigade of the 26th Division,
described the glorious militia as the living example of courage, honesty and austere
heroism.17 Others, like Jos Candea Garca Cadiz, commissar of the Rearguard, were more
objective, acknowledging their short history as heroic but ill-organized poorly disciplined
and even worse directed.18 There were even some that were actively critical of the militias,
Jos Madrid Navarro, CNT member since 4 April 1921 and a former militia volunteer,
surmised their contribution as wasteful enthusiasm.19 One thing all commissars agreed
upon, however, was that the progression of the conflict, from class struggle to war, from civil
war to struggle against invasion, meant that the fruitless effort and sacrifice of life
exemplified by the militias could no longer continue.20 Regardless of their merit in the early
stages of the war, they were now obsolete, unfit for purpose. The militias, lacking in all
weapons and especially the military organization necessary to fight the enemy were unfit to
face, in the words of Madrid Navarro the reality of modern warfare and weaponry.21 The
solution, therefore, according to Manuel Maeztu Tolosa, member of the guipuzcoana CNT
since September 1928, was the necessary creation of an Army with command posts and
the whole organization to be efficient, to channel the heroism and not to proceed with
useless sacrifice.22 According to, Gumersindo Marfil Martin, a political commissar of the
61st Mixed Brigade, the Army created was to have a strong political instruction, able to cope
with abnegation, with as many sacrifices as may be required to quickly liberate us of the
invasion we have suffered and strengthen, as a power, the Spanish Republic.23
There remained, however, an ideological problem to overcome for anarchist
commissars, namely the deeply rooted hatred for the old military, and it is on this subject that
the cenetista commissars most resembled their dogmatic militia forbearers. The troubled
17

INESTAL..., 13A., Adolfo Juste Salinas.

INESTAL..., 15A, Jos Candea Garca Cadiz.
19
INESTAL..., 13A, Jos Madrid Navarro.
20
INESTAL..., 13A, Adolfo Juste Salinas.
21
INESTAL..., 13B, Rafael Molin Fernndez; 13A, Jos Madrid Navarro.
22
INESTAL..., 13A, Manuel Maeztu Tolosa.
23
INESTAL..., 13A, Gumersindo Marfil Martin.
18

8
history between the CNT and the armed forces, the ongoing succession of betrayals and
sabotage of military professionals, cast a long shadow.24 Andrs Marquez Navarro, a
cenetista since February 1928 and former President of the section of Sanitary Material in
Murcia, argued that all that existed in the previous army was despotism and inequality.25
Pedro Garca Garca, highlighted the class hatred that was perceived to define the old Army,
stating that before the Civil War the children of producers never had access to military
schools and while Rightists monopolized the right to direct defence of the Patria, the
children of workers could only be cannon fodder.26 The problem (and solution) to this
quandary was summarized by Rafael Molin Fernndez:
the deep anti-military and refractory attitude towards discipline of the revolutionary
workers made it necessary that for the militants of the organizations to understand the
need for control and discipline and obedience [this] would take an intensive labour, so
the work of the Commissariat began to be defined.27

The Commissariat was, therefore, in the eyes of cenetista commissars, the difference between
the old Army and the Popular Army and its contribution was not to be understated: The
commissar is today the basis of the performance of our Army, he who in his heroism,
capacity and tireless resistance is the most firm point of our war.28 It served two fundamental
ends; the first was to ensure the army maintained a democratic essence, a proletarianism
in order to prevent its officers rekindling the interventionist tendencies of its predecessor, the
second was the education and motivation of the soldiery to better understand and accept
military discipline and organization.29 In regards to the former, commissars were convinced
of the Commissariats necessity and there was a marked wish for the new Popular Army to be
distinctly different, ensuring against history repeating itself. Pedro Muoz Garca, cenetista
since 1925, explained that the Popular Army, the flesh of the working people, had to be
given political guidance and that the confidence placed in [officers] was not enough for the
government, to this end the Peoples Commissariat was created and with the
Commissariat there was no fear that [officers] would undermine the Army with treason. 30
24

INESTAL..., 13B, Fabin Moro Esteban.

INESTAL..., 13B, Andres Marquez Navarro,
26
INESTAL..., 14B Pedro Garca Garca.
27
INESTAL..., 13B, Rafael Molin Fernndez.
28
INESTAL..., 13C Fernando Mauri-Vera Iscar.
29
INESTAL..., 13B, Fabin Moro Esteban.
30
INESTAL..., 13B Pedro Muoz Garca,
25

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This mistrust of officers was clear to see in most commissars responses; Enrique Garca
Vigneaux, a serving commissar and former subeditor of the Gerona CNT daily stated that the
Commissariat within the army, represents a guarantee that this newly forged organism, in
such difficult conditions, does not make the same mistakes as the monarchist military.31
Julio Miguel Britapaja echoed this, arguing that, while the commissar should side with
officers over soldiers as a guarantee of discipline, he should as a delegate of the people in the
Army, seek to ensure that they do not take mistaken paths that can lead to the same vices and
defects of the army of the Monarchy.32 Antonio Mereciano Bruna, a volunteer with the
Durruti Column since July 1936 and serving commissar of the 7th Transport Battalion was
clear on the point: The Commissariat was established as political control and guarantee of
the effective military officers who were available to the Government, fearing defections.33
The second of these fundamental ends, the education of soldiers in support of military
discipline, had the full support of cenetista commissars, who enthusiastically pursued this
mission. Every commissar would cite the necessity for discipline, to instil in the men a love
of the antifascist cause, the courage to fight, respect for superiors and observation of military
rule.34 The Commissariat was created to maintain discipline, but also to maintain a popular
aspect in the Army, it was, in the words of Manuel Maeztu Tolosa absolutely necessary to
create a Regular Army, but the Army should be soaked in precisely the wisdom that the
militias thrived on before it.35 The commissars duty, in the words of Saturnino Vila
Bescompta, commissar of the 7th Transport Batallion and cenetista since 1927, was to
create in everyone a confidence in the orders striving that military discipline is
pervaded with strength and combines more flexible companionship with higher energy, by
which we mean that rather than imposing, we should first try to explain.36 For Andrs
Monter Buil, commissar in the 26th Division and member of the Confederation since 1929, he
was to be a role model among all fighters from his unit, he will seek to meet their needs and
if we cannot, [we will] tell them why, always encouraging them despite all setbacks.37 In
practice discipline meant that the commissar was expected to take the side of the officer;
however, in regards to the Armys popular moniker, it was imperative that he make soldiers
understand the reasons for their orders. To Antonio Miras Nebot, a Commissar without
31

INESTAL..., 14B, Enrique Garca Vigneaux,

INESTAL..., 13C, Julio Miguel Britapaja.
33
INESTAL..., 13B, Antonio Mereciano Bruna.
34
INESTAL..., 13B, Juan I Miralles Garca.
35
INESTAL..., 13A, Manuel Maeztu Tolosa.
36
INESTAL..., 17A, Saturnino Vila Vescompta,
37
INESTAL..., 13B, Andrs Monter Buil.
32

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position and CNT member since 1933, the soldiers had to be aware of the command they are
held under by their officers but also understood what [the officers] stand for and this way
we obtain a double result, the result of military discipline and the courage and conscience for
moral discipline.38 Manuel Molins Mary, a member of the CNT since 1931, stated that the
troops of the Ejrcito Popular could not be automatons without consciousness or will as
existed in the old Army, but instead conscious men, cognisant of why they fight.39
The means of making the men understand the necessity of discipline was by making
them understand, through education, that the Popular Army was the people in arms against
the fascist enemy; for them to know, in the words of Pedro Garca Garca, that the
Commanders of our army are the people.40 Everything was to be given over to this belief, for
Enrique Garca Vigneaux, the Commissar had to be he who plays the role of diplomat,
psychologist, military-technical advisor to the greatest possible extent and be an example of
the spirit of sacrifice, serenity and courage in difficult times, basing all of them on a solid
foundation of antifascist struggle.41 Antonio Miras Nebot felt the Commissar had to feel
[the soldiers] suffering and aspire to their greatness in an Army representing the soul of the
people.42 As we shall see, the propaganda efforts of cenetista Commissars would focus
heavily on both anti-fascism and the idea of the people. Manuel Garca Planes, a
Commissar of the 10th Artillery Corps of the Army of the East, CNT member since 1929 and
a volunteer in the Durruti Column at its inception, placed this idea of the antifascist struggle
and the people in arms in a starkly political context:
the Army should be imbued with the essence of peace, freedom and work, for which
the people gave their blood, and should be therefore a genuine representation of
political and syndical organizations that supported the Government and the
Revolution.43

The implication made is that the CNT was not the only proletarian organization represented
in either the Ejrcito Popular or the Republic. Garca Planes expanded that the commissar
had to create a sense of unity and mutual understanding of all the ideas and beliefs, erasing
differences theoretical or method, and therefore should make it a general policy of the
38

INESTAL..., 13B, Antonio Miras Nebot.

INESTAL..., 13B, Manuel Molins Mary.
40
INESTAL..., 14B, Pedro Garca Garca.
41
INESTAL..., 14B, Enrique Garca Vigneaux,
42
INESTAL..., 13B, Antonio Miras Nebot
43
INESTAL..., 14B, Manuel Garca Planes.
39

11
Antifascist Popular Front and persuade the personnel that our only enemy is fascism, making
no allowance for derogatory or disreputable phrases towards organizations that make up the
antifascist conglomerate.44 This attitude was not limited Garca Planes, in fact, it was a point
of policy of commissars to make this as apparent as possible. Jos Mateu Cusido, argued that
this bi-partisanship was the most important of the commissars duties: the neuralgic point of
the Commissariat and where he has best course to work, is the need to harmonize the
ideological disagreements of the Army, taking into account the formation and spirituality
of it.45 Rafael Molin Fernndez was in concurrence, stating that the primary purpose of the
commissar is to bring together all sectors that make up our Army and form a homogenous
whole that responds to the purpose for which it was created.46 To Andrs Monter Buil, the
commissar should be strictly objective, with there being no attempts to politically influence
the soldiery to any tendency other than antifascist. He argued:
[all commissars duties] should be brought about in a straightforward manner, without
inclination to some end, without proselytizing of any kind, all channeled according to
the moment in which we live, the moment of Spanish Independence. Partisanship in
the military currently is disruptive to the good work of our struggle.

Manuel Villanueva Martinez, provisional commissar of the 6th Shell Battery, was of the same
opinion the commissars job was to be attentive and not seek to exert any kind of
propaganda and political constraints of any kind, solely spreading the slogans emanating
from the Government of National Union.47 These examples highlight that ideological
impartiality was crucial to cenetista commissars, Juan Cabellos Garca, a commissar in the
70th Brigade and cenetista since 1934, offers an example of closest that the responses to the
questionnaires came to showing a suggestion of bias:
Give them, with great restraint, examples of those members of ones own
organization, and others, who have given their lives heroically in our struggle against
fascism, while avoiding all manner of partisanship.48

44

Ibid....
INESTAL..., 13C, Jos Mateu Cusida.
46
INESTAL..., 13B, Rafael Molin Fernndez.
47
INESTAL..., 17A, Manuel Villanueva Martinez.
48
INESTAL..., 15A, Juan Cabellos Garca.
45

12
As is very clear, Cabellos Garca labours the point that even in the recognition of the heroic
deeds of comrades, the commissar could not afford to show any fissures in the Republican
antifascist monolith. It therefore safe to say that cenetista commissars were committed to
presenting the Popular Army and the Commissariat as strictly non-sectarian organizations,
devoid of political competition and solely committed to the antifascist struggle. There is, of
course, the likelihood that in these official questionnaires commissars would not confess to
attempting to proselytize soldiers, but this to look at the problem from the wrong perspective.
The interest of the chapter is anarchist military units, so their attempts at proselytization are
irrelevant, but their adamance over the need to remain objective, even amongst their own
troops highlights a firm public commitment to the Republican project. Furthermore, the
propaganda created by the commissars for the soldiery would also corroborate this idea.
As we have seen, all the commissars mentioned in the Inestal Questionnaires were
longstanding members of the CNT. This was a point of policy, with the best positions and
opportunities for promotion going to commissars who had a longstanding history with the
Confederation.49 Furthermore, commissars were also encouraged to influence the officers of
their units not of the cenetista persuasion to adopt a sympathetic approach to the Unions
sensibilities.50 Of all the rival political affiliations the most acceptable to cenetistas were
those of the Unin General de Trabajadores (General Workers Union, UGT), its youth arm
the Juventudes Socialistas Unificadas (Unified Socialist Youth, JSU) or Izquierda
Republicana.51 Fundamentally, a better understanding of CNT ideas within the units served a
dual purpose for the Confederation. The first function was, as previously mentioned, one
based in practical military concerns, cenetistas, or at least CNT-sympathizers, in positions of
authority could better understand soldiers and tailor their command appropriately, leading to
a more harmonious unit. The second was a political purpose. Given the low number of CNT
officers in the Popular Army it did not have any meaningful representation in the middle
ranking officialdom that other groups, most notably the PCE enjoyed. Therefore an
alternative approach to maintain a modicum of influence in Army affairs was needed. The
solution was to maintain as high a percentage of CNT members in positions of authority as
49

PS-MADRID 439, 1, .PROPUESTA QUE HACE LA SECCION DEFENSA DEL SUB-COMITE NACIONAL
DE LA CNT AL COMISARIO GENERAL DE SERVICIO DE LA AGRUPACION DE EJERCICIOS DE LA
ZONA SUR. In this dispatch, the only commissars recommended for promotion had been members of the CNT,
the FAI or the FIJL since before the outbreak of war.
50
INESTAL..., 13C5.
51
Ibid..., in a dispatch from A Igualada, Commissar of the XVIII Body of Engineers to Inestal, he referenced the
case of one Julian Castellanos, the Izquierda Republicana supporting commander of his unit, who had
completely won him over, because he possesses a righteous judgement and can be compared to an anarchist in
how he acts and how he acts towards others.

13
possible, filling any gaps left with those sympathetic to the cause and maintaining the
integrity of cenetista units.52 The upshot of this was the brigades formed from the original
militia columns remained essentially anarchist until the end of the war.53
The CNT and the Commissariat did not begin their relationship on the best of terms
as, in the words of Macario Royo when the first exams for political commissars were held,
not a single CNT member passed. Illiterates had been sent, the CNT lacked men with
education.54 However, as the war progressed the movement became more and more involved
in the recruitment and training of commissars, vetting candidates on political acumen and
their cultural understanding before recommending them for advancement.55 In addition, as
we have seen in answers to the final section of questionnaire, the CNTs commissars were all
members of the CNT long before the war, more often than not having been militants and
more than capable of showing an understanding of the issues at hand with lucidity. In a list of
applicants for commissars on the central front in 1937, the majority candidates were over 30,
married and had a longstanding history with the union. All were literate having filled out their
own forms and most offered, in their own words, the a good understanding of culture that
was desired by the CNT. Furthermore many came from the syndicates of more skilled
industries, such as teaching, industrial chemicals, graphic arts and water, gas and electricity.56
The impression here is a clear one, that there was a specific kind of cenetista that the
Confederation wished to serve as commissars, namely a reasonably well educated,
longstanding militant. These individuals, many members since before the dictatorship of
Primo de Rivera, had experience of the movements various tribulations, conflicts and
schisms and were more likely to better understand the exceptional circumstances that the
CNT faced. Much like the 37 year old Juan Garcia Oliver, the 40 year old Cipriano Mera and
the 40 year old Ricardo Sanz, they would maintain a sense of perspective in regards to the
task they were charged with and the political situation at hand.
52

The CNT would maintain control over its own recruitment throughout the Civil War, recruiting its own
soldiers through its National Commission of Voluntary Recruitment, CDMH, BARCELONA, 279; Jos Garca
Pradas gives a succinct summary of CNT recruitment during the war in Bolloten, The Spanish Revolution, p.
312.
53
Ibid..., p. 312.
54
Fraser, Blood of Spain, p. 339. Given that it had long been established that CNT activists were required to
be literate it would appear that, if we take Royo at his word, those enlisting in the Commissariat early one were
not the best the Confederation had to offer highlighting the turnaround in opinion that the CNT had towards
the institution. Anna Monjo, Afiliados y militantes: la calle como complemento del sindicato cenetista en
Barcelona de 1930 a 1939, Historia y Fuente Oral, No. 7, Analfabetismo y Poltica, (1992), p. 90.
55
PS-MADRID, 439, 1, RELACION DE COMPAEROS PERTENECIENTES A LAS INDUCTRIAS DE ESTA
LOCALIDAD QUE HAN SIDO PROPUESTAS POR CONSIDERARLOS APTOS PARA OCUPAR LAS PLAZAS
DE COMISARIOS EN LOS CUERPOS DE SEGURIDAD, AVIACION Y MARINA, pp. 64-66.
56
Ibid..., pp. 64-66.

14
The opinions presented by the cenetista commissars who completed these
questionnaires were indicative of the attitudes throughout the CNT hierarchy in the Popular
Army. Yet the attitude towards the Commissariat was not wholly positive across the entire
movement. Critics, led by Diego Abad de Santilln, lined up to decry it as a communist-led,
counter-revolutionary institution. To these anarchists, the Commissariat was disinterested in
fulfilling the function to which it belongs and was more concerned with serving the party
that gave him its nomination [the PCE], a policy that had led to disastrous results for unity
of the Army.57 On 20 August 1938, the Peninsular Committee of the Federacin Anarquista
Ibrica (Iberian Anarchist Federation, FAI) released a dossier of its opinions following its
plenary that offered a root to branch criticism of the Negrn government, one of the
institutions that received most censure was the Commissariat.58 The plenary asserted that the
Commissariat was, by implementing a dual command structure of officers and commissars, a
bureaucratic machine without manifest utility to our Army, it was unnecessary. Most
astonishingly and in a complete reversal of any anarchist position, it advocated a return to the
old military system, one without a Commissariat, criticising the current state of affairs as one
which and did not follow good military doctrine, [where] command of all things must come
from the soldier. Commissars themselves were novices, lacking in military knowledge and
understanding, the entire institution was under the control of the PCE, harming the war
effort with its interference, with the political proselytizing that is effected in favour of one
party.59 This attitude, however, was not shared by Miguel Gonzlez Inestal, who in a
message to the Peninsular Committee in October 1938, rebuked the charges made against the
Commissariat. In his response, Inestal would echo the points his commissars did in their
informes, that the Commissariat was fundamental to the way the Republic was waging its
war. Inestals tone throughout was recalcitrant, to him the Commissariat was necessary
precisely because the character and state of morale of the Ejrcito Popular demanded the
existence of military command and political leadership for the simple reason that the military
has no time to meet the political needs of the army, or in many cases would be unable to do

57

The opinions of Hilario Esteban, in Seccin Coordinacin del Comit Regional de Catalua, 1 September
1939, cited in Abad de Santilln, Por que luchamos, p. 221. The FAI was the militant wing of the CNT which
had gained disproportionate influence over the 1930s, it counted among its members Buenaventura Durruti,
Juan Garcia Oliver and Federica Montseny. Stuart Christie, We, the Anarchists! A Study of the Iberian
Anarchist Federation (FAI) 1927-1937, (East Sussex: The Meltzer Press, 2000), passim; Casanova,
Anarchism, pp. 54-9.
58
Informe que presenta el Comit peninsular de la FAI al Gobierno de la repblica. Barcelona, 20 August
1938, cited in Abad de Santilln, Por que luchamos, pp. 215-232
59
Abad de Santilln, Por que luchamos, pp. 220-221; INESTAL..., 14B, Miguel Gonzlez Inestal, Al pleno
de la F.A.I., p. 1.

15
so.60 In direct response to this and to criticisms of the dual command system that this led to,
the message was that it was necessary given the exceptional circumstances:
to date there has been no war that has had the dual characterization of social being
informed by the elements involved therein, and to contribute our politics to its
diversity of political influences is our policy that we have put into play. In our case,
this dual control, not only must necessarily exist, but it also is the only way to see the
new Army fulfill its basic mission and make war and at the same time be able to
ensure the harmonious coexistence of the various political sectors that comprise it,
while at the same time help build the morale of the new army in a fully consistent
manner to its purpose and the aspirations of the elements within it.61

To Inestal, dual command was not only a means to ensure the correct political education of
troops, an education that the CNT had means to influence, but it also acted as a bulwark
against the Armys excesses. In regards to this, the Peninsular Committees alternative to the
Commissariat, good military doctrine, met harsh criticism. Fundamentally, this good
military doctrine meant, in the eyes of the Committee, leaving the political and military
inculcation of troops to the officers, ninety percent of whom, according to the dossier, had
been politically vetted.62 Predictably, given the attitudes of the majority of commissars, the
reaction to this statement was not positive as the FAI was accused of speaking the language
of militarists, of ignoring the lessons of the past and the value of having political experts
amongst the soldiery:

It is desirable that the Committee of the FAI point out the good or bad military
doctrine, because that good military doctrine is precisely what failed on July 19. And
frankly, it failed because the soldier was not interested, in general, nothing but an
instrument of oppression. Thus, evil could gain the confidence of the soldier he was
treated despotically as a mere instrument, as a being no account was taken of him It
is therefore absurd to invoke the good military doctrine, when we are specifically
paying the consequences for it.63

This wholehearted defence of the methods of the Commissariat by a dedicated cenetista

commissar to his own comrades highlights his commitment, and the commitment of others
60

Ibid..., p. 6.
Ibid..., p. 5.
62
Ibid..., pp. 3-4.
63
Ibid..., p. 4.
61

16
like him, to the Popular Army project. Both the traditional military system and the militia
system were criticised as outdated and unfit for purpose, and, as we have seen, the
Commissariat was, in the eyes of CNT commissars, the only way to guarantee a functioning
Popular Army with traditional military discipline.
To the assertion that Communists were in control of the institution, Inestal countered
that although this may have been true in the immediate aftermath of the events of May 1937,
the current situation was far more balanced, with PCE representation in the Commissariat
dropping by 42%, while that of the CNT, amounted to 26% of PSOE to 27% and
Republicans have also gained some ground.64 Furthermore, Inestal offered a clear
summation of the reason why the PCE were permitted such previous mastery in the
Commissariat, due to them gaining official favour [through] their guarantee of absolute
discipline of their members and affiliates.65 They had offered the necessary attributes to form
an army while the CNT units of the time, had neither the vision necessary to focus the
orientation of the militants, or the solvency required to impose a line of conduct consistent
with the requirements of the time.66 The message was one of clear support for the current
military system and, by reflecting on the previously failed anarchist military policies, critical
of the only other popular alternative.
The FAIs concerns in regards to the PCE were in fact shred by many cenetistas
serving in the Popular Army were fully aware of the machinations of the PCE and
Communists were viewed with a distinct mistrust by cenetista commissars. Yet rather than
deal with them publically, they were kept internalised to maintain the faade of unity. The
concern was such that in August 1938 the cenetistas of the Commissariat put together a
dossier on Proselytism in the Army of the East and sent it to Gonzlez Inestal. The nineteen
page document provided various accounts of the attempts of the PCE to gain control of the
levers of power in Popular Army and indoctrinate the men. According to one commissar the
64

Ibid..., p. 3; This assertion was true, as, following Prietos reforms and the reorganization of the
Commissariat in October 1937 the percentages of commissars ascribed to each political tendency was as
follows:
Socialist Tendency
33%
Libertarian Tendency
33%
Communist Party
14%
Republican Parties
10%
Syndicalist Party
5%
Regional Parties
5%
PS-MADRID, 439, 1, PROYECTO DE REORGANIZACION DEL COMISARIADO GENERAL, QUE SOMETE
A LA CONSIDERACION DEL EXCELENTISIMO SR. MINISTRO DE DEFENSA NACIONAL, EL
SUBCOMISARIO GENERAL DE LA C.N.T. MIGUEL GONZALEZ INESTAL, p. 5
65
Ibid..., p. 2.
66
Ibid..., p. 2.

17
whole war policy of the Army of the East was subordinate to these activities, without much
regard for the general interests of the country and war.67 Another felt so strongly about this
issue, stating that, when faced with the extent of proselytization, I could not hide my
disgust.68 Ricardo Sanz would, in an internal CNT memorandum to non-military hierarchy
of the CNT, make clear his frustration with these machinations stating that it seemed the PCE
wanted to play the game of parties, forgetting how expensive and hard for us it is proving
to be, and costing this damn war.69 Yet, despite this antipathy towards the Communist party
and its methods, the commissars maintained their commitment to the maintaining the partypolitical objectivity of the Commissariat. These issues were never made public and cenetista
commissar-authored propaganda contained nothing detrimental about the PCE until the fall of
the Party in the final months; on the contrary there were even complimentary pieces about
certain Communists.70 Ultimately, for CNT-affiliated commissars, the benefits of criticizing
the PCE in public were outweighed by the negatives. It appears that undermining Republican
unity and the war effort was a far greater crime than political proselytization.
The responses by the commissars to the questionnaire and those of Miguel Gonzlez
Inestal to the FAI plenary clarify that CNT affiliated commissars were committed to the ideas
of the Commissariat, both its existence as a practical necessity in a standing Army and its
non-partisan political programme. CNT-affiliated commissars were dedicated cenetistas, their
longstanding history as members and the militant past of many makes this clear, however
their attitudes towards the war, the Popular Army and the proletariat were almost identical to
those of general Republicanism. To individuals like Gonzlez Inestal, Saturnino Vila, Jos
Mara Garca Salcedo and Rafael Molin Fernndez the CNT was part of an antifascist
alliance that needed to remain strong against a greater foe and any sedition from this was
counter-productive. The reasons for this attitude lay in the post-revolutionary political
situation that the CNT found itself in. It must be understood that, by autumn of 1937,
following the repression of the more extreme elements of the Confederation, the CNT could
no longer maintain a stance of pursuing the revolution while the war was being fought. May
1937 had put an end to any revolutionary ideas that may have still been entertained by
cenetistas in the short to medium term. Furthermore, the subsequent UGT-CNT pact and
67

INESTAL..., 13A, INFORME SOBRE EL PROSELITISMO EN EL EJERCITO DEL ESTE

ESPECIALMENTE EN EL X CUERPO DE EJERCITO, p. 1.
68
Ibid..., p. 4.
69
CDMH, SECCIN POLTICO-SOCIAL, PS-BARCELONA 809, 1, Internal memo from Ricardo Sanz to
Comit de Enlace, Comit Regional de Catalua CNT Defensa; Comit Regional de Catalua FAI; Comit
Nacional de la CNT; Comit Peninsular de la FAI; Comit Ejecutivo del Movimiento Libertario, p. 1.
70
La 70 rgano Semanal de la Brigada, 8 June 1938, p. 6.

18
never realised plans to stand in elections were clear evidence of an ideological shift away
from apoliticism by the hierarchy. The task at hand for the CNT was to now win the war and,
following militarization, this was only possible through participation in the Republic and its
Popular Army. Political disagreements were likely, however the place for debate was outside
of the Army hence the harsh criticism of the PCE remaining private and the strong response
from Inestal to the FAI Peninsular Committees criticism. There was a war to be won and the
commissars of the CNT could not afford to undermine the Gran Unidad with the political
game.71

71

PS-BARCELONA 809, 1, Ricardo Sanz, Puesto Mando, 20 Mayo 1938, p.1.

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