Banqiao Dam Disaster
Banqiao Dam Disaster
the River
Ru in Zhumadian City,
Henan province,
China.
Its
traveled across Taiwan, it entered the Taiwan Straight (Formosa Strait), the body of water that
separates the island from Mainland China. A significantly weakened Nina (peak winds 110
km/h [69 mph]) made a second landfall as a tropical storm near Jinjiang Fujian, China on 3 rd
August.
It then moved northwest before shifting north and arriving in the east-central province of
Henan on 5 August. The storm brought heavy rainfall as it stalled over this area for 3 days.
Approximately 1,060 millimeters (41.7 inches) of rain fell during those three days. The storm
produced more rainfall in 24 hours than an average years worth of rain in the Henan
Province, 800 millimeters (31.5 inches).
By August 8, the Banqiao and Shimantan Dams, which had been built in the province to
protect against heavy rainfall, were both filled over their capacity. At the Banqiao Reservoir
on the Ru River, the water had reached 118 meters (386 feet) and was still rising- the dam
could not release the water as fast as its reservoir was filling.
Early on August 9, the main part of the Banqiao dam collapsed, sending a wall of water 6
meters (19.7 feet) high and 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) wide rushing down the river channel,
followed by 600 million cubic meters of water. Thirty minutes earlier, the Shimantan
Reservoir reached its maximum capacity and collapsed. One hundred and twenty (120)
million cubic meters of water burst forth from the Shimantan dam and within 5 hours, the
entire reservoir was empty. In total, 15.738 billion tons of water poured out onto the Henan
Province destroying parts of the city as well as 62 smaller dams. Flood diversions and other
systems downstream could not handle the rushing waters; dikes collapsed, creating huge
lakes. Several dams were intentionally destroyed by Chinese military air strikes in order to
release water in desired directions in attempts to protect larger reservoirs and populations
from the floodwaters. By the evening of 9 August, floods had reached the Fuyang Area in the
Anhui Province, roughly 250 kilometers away (156 miles).
7.0 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it was the design of the Banqiao Reservoir Dam and the other reservoirs, along
with the principles pertaining to the containment of the river, which should be blamed for the
failure and subsequent calamity. While many pointed fingers at the weather forecast all those
years ago, researchers are citing that the tragedy was man-made and not entirely a natural
disaster.
During the late 1950s, scientists warned that any given reservoir`s flood control was being
ignored and that the irrigation functions of those reservoirs were overemphasized during the
heat of the construction frenzy. It has been estimated that China continues to have 87,000
reservoirs across the nation that were built during this low standard construction era and most
of these have fallen into serious disrepair. On top of sub-par construction standards, the
country also lacked any early warning system as well as an evacuation plan that could have
saved lives.
In the aftermath of the devastation, the Banqiao Reservoir reconstruction was considered a
crucial national project in The Seventh Five-Year Plan of China, which was a series of
important economic and social development initiatives. The rebuilding project lasted from the
end of 1986 to June 5, 1993.
Today, engineering programs throughout the world educate students on the devastating
history of dam failures and outline the construction methods that need to be taken in order to
prevent such a widespread calamity in the future.
8.0 REFERENCES
The Banqiao Reservoir Dam Failure. (2012, June 19). Retrieved April 5, 2015, from
http://engineeringfailures.org/?p=723