Process Safety Europeasn Conference

Process Safety
Competence
European Strength
degrading to Weakness?
Booklet on the ECCE 8s special session
on process and plant safety
Preface2
Programme4
Index of Speakers, Chairpersons, Panelists
188
imprint
DECHEMA Gesellschaft fr Chemische Technik
und Biotechnologie e.V.
Theodor-Heuss-Allee 25, 60486 Frankfurt am Main, 2012
Responsible for the contents of each contribution in this book is

the corresponding author/speaker. DECHEMA e. V., any person
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may be put, nor for any errors which may appear, despite careful
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The publication does not necessarily reflect the view or the position
of DECHEMA e. V.
Editors:
Dr.-Ing. P. Schmelzer, Leverkusen
Prof. Dr. C. Jochum, Bad Soden
Prof. Dr. N. Pfeil, Berlin
Dr.-Ing. K. Mitropetros, Frankfurt am Main
P r o c e s s
S a f e t y
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ISBN Nummer: 978-3-89746-130-7
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preface
Booklet on the ECCE 8s special session on process and plant safety

Process Safety Competence European Strength degrading
to Weakness?
Two days of lectures and discussions on something which all stakeholders in all areas of chemical and petrochemical
industry doubtlessly strive for: a high level of competence in process and plant safety. Representatives from industry,
associations, universities, non-governmental organisations and authorities have exchanged their respective opinions
and experiences for one of Europes most important economic sectors. Was such an effort really necessary? The
answer at the end of the two days: Yes, it was!
The idea of a special session on process and plant safety (PPS) competence within the 8th European Congress of Chemical
Engineering (ECCE 8) from 25th to 29th September 2011 at the ICC Berlin was born six years after having started a respective German initiative (Maintaining and improving competence in safety engineering, Position Paper of the DECHEMA/GVC
Research Committee Safety Engineering in Chemical Plants, March 2004). In 2009 a corresponding Dutch initiative followed
(Strategic Approach for Safe Chemical and Energy Industries Knowledge Infrastructure for Safety and Hazardous Substances
for the Netherlands of 2020, Hazardous substances Council). Questions arose like
Is it assured that the appropriate level of competence in process and plant safety is maintained in Europe for the
future?
Do we have indications for a trend (degradation, standstill or further strengthening of PPS competence) in Europe?
What can different stakeholders do to maintain or further develop the high level of process and plant safety
competence?
More than 50 congress participants joined the special session titled Process safety competence European strength degrading to weakness? on average. What are the major results? In the view of the members of the sessions organization committee
the generally accepted views also reflected in the concluding panel discussion are:
Most incidents or accidents happen because necessary knowledge or competence was not available at the right
time in the right place. Increased automation and its improved reliability would not necessarily support the presence
of PPS competence, especially when it is needed in abnormal situations.
Todays level of safety benefits from extensive basic research in the past decades and from continuous learning from
incidents and near misses. Currently the development of process safety relies to a far extend on the initiatives by a
very few remaining academic or research institutions, on industry funded expert organizations, relevant associations
and on a few leading companies.
Process and plant safety competence requires specific knowledge and skills beyond what can be expected of
graduates having successfully passed a standard curriculum in chemistry or chemical engineering. However
a sound basic knowledge in process and plant safety has to come with every relevant bachelor or master degree.
Obviously this is only rarely the case. Furthermore, to achieve students necessary awareness of safety needs as
a first step from knowledge to competence, academic teaching must be complemented by industrial traineeships.
Therefore, both universities and the individual professors need to be encouraged or even urged and enabled
to ensure this necessary basic knowledge. A better European or even worldwide understanding on what this
knowledge for the relevant bachelor and master degrees comprises would help.
Industry and industry sponsored associations have practice proven concepts how to develop and maintain the new
hired or existing coworkers to/at the required level of PPS competence. This for all levels of responsibility in a company from operation to board members. As in the past industry continues to offer opportunities to gain practical
experiences for students also.
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preface
Another way to keep process and plant safety in the focus of academic education would be to use the steering
effect of public research funding programs. Process and plant safety has to keep up with other developments in science and engineering. Since years, research funding programs primarily support topical research areas like climate
change, life sciences or security. Other areas like safety remain neglected. One consequence is that the academic
research on process and plant safety continues to decrease more than desirable. And with respect to education,
there is no doubt that research rather has a positive than a negative influence on the quality of teaching.
Last, but not least: ensuring a high level of process and plant safety needs adequate competence at different levels
of responsibility, relevant societal areas or bodies as there are industry itself, the educational and scientific system,
legislation and inspection, test bodies, consultants, non-governmental organisations and industry associations.
The broad agreement on the statements above encourages the bodies having prepared this session on process and plant
safety competence to approach stakeholders at both national and European level. Long lasting solutions have to be found to
prevent any degradation in process and plant safety competence in Europe. Chemical and petrochemical products are indispensable for the todays world, not to forget the important economic impact of the respective industrial branches. A high level
of safety (health and environment protection included) is intrinsically tied to a sustainable economic success. The necessary
process and plant safety competence must be available wherever and whenever needed.
To support this goal it was found necessary to compile and to preserve all the presentations given in the ECCE 8s special
session on process and plant safety competence in this booklet. On the basis of what was discussed and concluded in this
session all stakeholders in process and plant safety are invited to
continue and strengthen existing initiatives developing systematic approaches to create and maintain process
safety competence for design and operation
benefit from the currently fair or even better process safety performance in Europe giving stakeholders a good
degree of freedom to develop these systematic approaches without external pressure
support the idea of an European university curriculum on process and plant safety for relevant bachelor and master
degrees, best preferably with EFCE taking the lead
The organizing committee of the ECCE 8s session on process and plant safety competence will continue with its own
activities, but is also prepared to support other initiatives considered helpful to strengthen process and plant safety competence creation in Europe and elsewhere. Let us start now and jointly!
P. Schmelzer
C. Jochum
N. Pfeil
K. Mitropetros
01. Nov. 2011
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programme
Wednesday, 28.09.2011
Page
Chairman: Eddy De Rademaeker

10:30
Avoiding accidents Process Safety Competence could make the difference

Manuel R. Gomez, CSB, USA
11:30
Competence conceptual introduction from a pedagogic and scientific point of view

Peter Dehnbostel, Helmut-Schmidt-University, Hamburg
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12:00
Universities teaching process and plant safety the european map

Niels Jensen, EFCE WP LP (DK)
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12:30
Lunch
Chairman: Norbert Pfeil

13:30
Plant safety: ProcessNets curriculum recommended to universities

Jrgen Schmidt, ProcessNet
35
14:00
Safety competence key insights from a study on the Dutch situation

Hans Pasman, Dutch Council of Hazardous Substances
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14:30
How to achieve high quality teaching in higher education?

General approaches applied to the field of process and plant safety.
Jrg Steinbach, Prsident der TU Berlin
52
15:00
Leading from the top in making process safety competence a reality

David Brown / Lee Allford, IChemE, UK
53
15:30
Coffee break
Chairman: Peter Schmelzer
16:00
Process Safety Competence Management

Paul Delanoy, EPSC / DOW, UK
65
16:30
Promoting Process Safety Competency Work of the Center for Chemical Process Safety
(CCPS)
Louisa Nara, CCPS, USA
72
17:00
The DECHEMA approach to Process and Plant Safety knowledge transfer

Andreas Frster, DECHEMA e.V.
82
17:30
Promoting incident prevention decades of experience to share

Gerd Uhlmann, BG RCI
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programme
Thursday, 29.09.2011
Page
Chairman: Konstantinos Mitropetros

10:30
Teaching Safety in Chemical Engineering What, How and Who?

Martin Pitt, EFCE Working Party Education (UK)
110
11:30
Process and Plant Safety competence the authorities view

Jan Slijpen, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, NL
131
12:00
Process and Plant Safety Competence How to sustain this success factor for the European
Chemical Industry
Peter Schmelzer, CEFIC
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12:30
Lunch
Chairman: Christian Jochum
13:30
High Process Safety competence an asset of a chemical company

Hans Schwarz, BASF
152
14:00
Process Safety through Operational Management

Hermann Van Roost,Total Petrochemicals Base Chemicals, BE
163
14:30
Training In Industrial Safety: The OECD-Experience

Mark Hailwood, OECD Working Group on Chemical Accidents
179
15:00
EPSC Award 2011

Christian Jochum / Klaus-Juergen Niemitz, EPSC, UK
187
15:30
Coffee break
Chairman: Michael Drscher
16:00 17:00
Panel Discussion & Wrap-Up

Process Safety Competence the way forward
N. Pfeil (BAM), M. Pitt, H. Passman, U. Fischbach (Industry/Seveso working group of the European Environmental Bureau EEB), P. Schmelzer
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Avoiding accidents Process safety competence could make the difference

Manuel R. Gomez
U.S. Chemical Safety Board
2175 K Street, NW
Washington, DC
United States of America
Email: daniel.horowitz@csb.gov
Since its establishment in 1998, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) has investigated the root causes of most of the significant chemical-related disasters across the United States. The reports of the CSB contain many striking examples where major
accidents resulted from inadequate knowledge and implementation of process safety concepts, standards, and good practices that is, a lack of process safety competence. Scientists and engineers involved in the design and development of new
processes are themselves the product of a university system where systems-level safety thinking is rarely emphasized. CSB
investigations reveal many common findings related to competence, including: (a) erosion of corporate knowledge through
downsizing, attrition, and the lack of formal reporting and learning mechanisms; (b) lack of knowledge and education on
chemical reactivity hazards; (c) inadequate communication of safety information between process developers and production
personnel; (d) lack of sufficient design safeguards to protect against foreseeable accident scenarios; (e) inadequate operator
understanding of control systems; and (f) unavailability of competent engineering expertise to troubleshoot complex process
safety issues. Although the lack of competence is sometimes perceived as a problem of smaller businesses, even the largest
corporations can be vulnerable to accidents caused by a lack of knowledge and action to control established hazards. The
CSB has thus urged that corporate boards of directors and executives take measures to ensure sustained process safety
competence in all their operations.
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AVOIDING ACCIDENTS:
PROCESS SAFETY COMPETENCY COULD

MAKE THE DIFFERENCE
Manuel R. Gomez, DrPH, MS, CIH
Director of Recommendations, CSB
8tH European Congress of Chemical Engineers (ECCC-8)
Berlin, Germany
September 28, 2011
Disclaimer
This presentation by Manuel R. Gomez of the US
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
(CSB) on 9/28/11 to the 8th European Congress of
Chemical Engineers has not been approved by the
Board and is given for general informational
purposes only. Conclusions or other statements do
not represent the official views of the CSB. Any
material in the presentation that did not originate in
Board-approved reports is solely the responsibility
of the author and does not represent an official
finding, conclusion, or position of the Board.
Copies of all CSB reports can be found at
www.csb.gov
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Outline
Primer on US Chemical Safety Board
CSB Cases and Safety Competence

Current Cases and Issues
The Future of the CSB
www.csb.gov
CSB OVERVIEW
1990 Federal Clean Air Act Amendments
Trigger: Bhopal
Modeled after National Transportation Safety Board

(NTSB): Not regulatory
Law also mandated:
Process Safety Management Standard (PSM, 1992) by the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
Risk Management Program (RMP) regulations (1996) by the
Environmental Protection Administration (EPA)
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CSB OVERVIEW
Mission
To promote prevention of industrial

chemical accidents that harm employees,
damage the environment and endanger
the public.
Activities
Incident Investigations & Safety Studies

Find Causes & Issue preventive
recommendations
Data Collection role (not yet in place)
www.csb.gov
CSB OVERVIEW
Agency straddles occupational &
environmental arenas
PSM nominally a performance-based
(management system) standard, but:
Relies heavily on Recognized and Generally

Accepted Good Engineering Practices
(RAGAGEP) as enforcement benchmarks, or
minimum specification performance
criteria.
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CSB IN CONTEXT
Staffing:
EPA: 17,000
OSHA: 1,700
NTSB: 400
CSB: 45-50
www.csb.gov
INVESTIGATIONS & STUDIES

Independent: No oversight or pre-publication review of
reports or conclusions by anyone.
Multidisciplinary teams, multiple visits, interviews,
extensive data collection, subpoena powers.
Investigate regulatory and voluntary standards,
industry common and best practices, similar incidents.
Public meetings & reports (1-2 yrs.)
Output:
3-6 major investigations + 5 assessments/yr.
Study every 3 years
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Agencys Primary Preventive Tool
To regulatory agencies (OSHA, EPA),
industry, trade groups, standards
organizations, unions, others.
Not obligatory, only moral authority
If We Do Them Right: Prevention
www.csb.gov
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www.csb.gov
Safety (In)Competence Where?

Societal Factors (e.g., market forces, legislation)
Government/Regulatory System
Company (e.g., cost cutting, mergers/acquisitions)

Organizational (e.g., management systems,
programs)
Front line (e.g., equipment failures, faulty procedures,

human errors)
(*Modified from Hopkins, AcciMap of Esso Gas Plant Explosion)

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BP Refinery, Texas
March 23, 2005
Largest US refinery
Start-up of process
Liquid overfill of tower,
gas cloud
Massive explosion,
fire, toxic release
www.csb.gov
Summary
15 deaths
>180 injured
Large property
loss
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BP Texas Refinery Disaster
Front Line or Direct Causes (Incompetence?)

Start-up pursued despite knowledge of faulty safety critical
equipment (esp. tower level indicator, others).
Error: Improper closure of a valve led to overfilling tower.
Tower not equipped with automatic safety devices (SIS).
Insufficient control board flow display.
Insufficient skilled staffing during dangerous start-up
Operators:
Fatigued (some with 29 consecutive 12-hour shifts); and,

Inadequately trained, especially for abnormal situations.
15
www.csb.gov

Site Organizational Causes
Use of obsolete blowdown drum & atmospheric stack, despite
multiple recommendations to replace it with adequately sized
flare system.
Eight previous releases from unit were essentially ignored.
Temporary trailers with non-essential personnel placed near
high-risk start-up.
Run to failure mechanical integrity mentality.
Routine tolerance of violation of procedures.

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Corporate Causes
Cost-cutting pressures (continued use of obsolete
technology, reduced staffing, poor maintenance,).
Improper measurement of high risk

performance through routine injury rates
(distorted image of good performance).
Inadequate Board oversight of high-risk
programs and safety culture.
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www.csb.gov

Government/Regulatory Causes
No requirement for high-risk indicators.
No limits on hours of work = fatigue
No requirements for Board accountability of
high-level risks
Regulation lags technical knowledge:
Obsolete technology allowed by
government and industry standards
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Bayer Cropscience, West Virginia

Runaway and Explosion
Sister plant to Bhopal

Only facility in US still making, storing
and consuming large amounts of methyl
isocyanate
Long-standing community concerns
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www.csb.gov

GO TO:
http://www.csb.gov/videoroom/detail.aspx?
vid=50&F=0&CID=1&pg=1&F_All=y
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Front-line causes:
Rush to start unit

Accepted violation of procedures;
Operator errors
New computer-control system not fully
operational, and operators not trained to it
Corporate causes:
Proximity of MIC tank not fully evaluated
Regulatory and Societal causes:
Insufficient inspection resources

No legal or regulatory requirement for inherently
safer technology
21
www.csb.gov
T2 Laboratories, Florida
Reactive Chemical Explosion
GO TO:
http://www.csb.gov/videoroom/detail.aspx?
VID=32
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T2 Laboratories, Florida
Reactive Chemical Explosion
Front-line cause:
Lack of knowledge of reaction & hazards

Inadequate hazard analysis; no redundancy in
controls (cooling, pressure relief)
Little or no management of change (scale-up)
Corporate causes:
No safety oversight by French parent company

Multiple warning signals unheeded
Regulatory and Societal causes:
Facility not covered by regulations (PSM & RMP)

Small, specialty chemical, supply-chain
production
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www.csb.gov
CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS & STUDIES

18 ongoing investigations, one Deepwater (BP)
Gulf explosion
Some Major Current Issues:
Gas safety (purging and blows)

Combustible dust in general industry
Petroleum Storage Tanks
Academic Laboratories
Always a Central Issue: OSHA PSM Standard
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GAS SAFETY
Two Investigations
Conagra Slim Jim (food product) plant

Kleen Energy Power Plant (in construction)
Common Issue: Release of natural gas in

work areas under inherently dangerous
conditions
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www.csb.gov
CONAGRA SLIM JIM FACTORY
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Kleen Energy
6 Deaths
Many injuries
Significant
damage to
~ $1 billion
facility
www.csb.gov
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www.csb.gov
Gas Safety Recommendations

Same goal for all: Purge gas to outside,
and replace natural gas blows with
inherently safer alternatives
OSHA: Promulgate gas safety standard; not yet

accepted or in progress.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA): No
indoor purging or gas blows; nearly fully
implemented.
State of Connecticut: Ban gas blows, legislature
adopted unanimously earlier this year.
Amer. Society Mechanical Engineers: Will likely
be silent on pipe cleaning.
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Combustible Dust-General Industry

Study issued in 2006:
Some 300 dust explosions in general industry (1980-2005);

119 deaths, >700 injuries, property losses
OSHA grain dust standard in 1986 was very effective.
Major Recommendation: OSHA Standard

In progress, but very slowly;
Two CSB investigations since study, 29 deaths
Numerous others in same period, no decline is visible
Other Recommendations
Improve MSDS under ANSI, HazCom & GHS

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www.csb.gov
Imperial Sugar Co., Port

Wentworth GA
February 7, 2008
14 killed; 49 burned
workers survived
Sugar Dust
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OTHER CURRENT ISSUES

Petroleum Storage Tanks:
Youth deaths, accidental, need to make them inaccessible
Academic Research Laboratories
Unpredictable environment, changing conditions

Great autonomy of professors
Little specific guidance available
PSM concepts not adapted to lab environment
Little culture of safety
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www.csb.gov
THE FUTURE FOR THE CSB?

Inherently Safer Technology:
Not a major thrust of our work so far, but changing

Ongoing NAS committee: IST methods to make MIC
Replace natural gas blows: IST recommendation
Recycled water treatment: Move from Cl to bleach
PSM is 20 years old:
Two major CSB recommendations to OSHA:

Reactives & Management of Organizational Change.
Other gaps have been noted:
Design, Inherently Safer Technology, Safety Culture
Under Consideration: Symposium in 2012
What have we learned? What has worked? Not worked?

What needs to be changed? How?
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QUESTIONS?
www.csb.gov
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Peter Dehnbostel
Helmut-Schmidt-Universitt
Hamburg, Germany
Successful enterprising needs both companies and their individual employees to perform their jobs properly and competence
based. Therefore both corporate and individual competences are needed. For the chemical and petrochemical industries process safety competence is indispensible for safety and environmental reasons. When a two days expert meeting is going to
discuss what the European state of process safety competence is, it was found worth to spend half an hour in an introduction
to the term competence from a pedagogic/scientific point of view.
The lecture answers in brief what competence is and addresses specific types of competences which are specifically needed
in the professional area. Competence building processes are exemplified concerning the development of individuals from
childhood to working life (general education in schools, vocational education with apprenticeships and further education, and
university education) and in the further career (training on the job, gaining experience, training courses etc.). The definition of
competence will be combined with the holistic action competence as a unity of technical, social and personal competences.
The development of corporate competence will also be reflected and extended to management and controlling concepts in
companies.
Introducing into the competence related vocabulary and some generally accepted pedagogic principles could help the session
to step successfully into the discussion of the specific situation and needs in process safety competence maybe not only in
Europe.
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Process Safety Competence European

Strength degrading to weakness
Berlin, 29th of September 2011
Competence
Introduction to the
Concept from a
Pedagogic and
Scientific Point of
View
Prof. Dr. Peter Dehnbostel

www.peter-dehnbostel.de
Process www.hsu-hh.de/debo
Safety Competence European
Competence
Introduction to the Concept from a
Pedagogic and Scientific Point of View
1. Approaches to competences
2. European use in qualifications
frameworks
3. Occupational competence
2
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From Skills and Knowledge to Competences

Individual Capacity to Act
Reflection of Action
Competence
Qualification
Range of Action
Skills /
Knowledge
Execution of Action
Dimensions of Actions

Formal and informal competences in work processes
formal
27%
informal
73%
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Process Safety CCompetence

ompetence conceptual
European introduction from a pedagogic and scientific point of view
Areas of competence and competence development

World of Work
(formal, informal & non-formal Competences)
General
Education
Vocational
Education
and Training
Higher
Education
Further
Vocational
Education
and
Training
World of Life
(formal, informal & non-formal Competences)

Competence
frameworks
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European Qualifications Framework for lifelong

learning (EQF)
EQF
NQF Country B
NQF Country A
= Level
= Certificates

European and German definitions of competences

European Qualifications Framework (EQF)
Competence means the proven ability to use knowledge, skills and
personal, social and/or methodological abilities, in work or study
situations and in professional and personal development. In the context
of the EQF, competence is described in terms of responsibility and
autonomy.
German Qualifications Framework (DQR)
Competence within the DQR describes the ability and readiness of the
individual to use knowledge, skills and personal, social and
methodological competences and to behave in a considered, individual
and socially responsible manner. Competence is understood in this
sense as comprehensive action skills. The DQR presents competence
within the dimensions of professional competence and personal
competence.
8
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Competence
frameworks
9

Occupational Competence
Technical Competence
Personal Competence
Occupational
Competence
Social Competence
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Definition of occupational competence

as a basis for individual competence development,
team competence, organizational competence and
Technical Competence constitutes a persons ability and readiness to
process tasks and problems in an autonomous, professionally
appropriate and methodical manner and to evaluate the result.
Social Competence describes a persons ability and readiness to work
together with others in a target oriented manner, understand the
interests and social situations of others, deal with and communicate with
others in a rational und responsible way.
Personal Competence describes a persons ability and readiness to
develop further and to shape his or her own life in an autonomous and
responsible manner within the respective social, cultural or occupational
context.
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Universities teaching process and plant safety

the European map
Niels Jensen
Safepark Consultancy, Slangerup, Denmark
E-mail: niels.jensen@safepark.dk
The Map of European teaching of process and safety presented here is based primarily on information available publicly on the
web-sites of the universities.
In order to get a feel for how much process and safety teaching there is at European Universities a survey of all universities with
public websites have been performed. Time only allows the data relevant to process and safety teaching to be presented here.
The survey has been supplemented with a questionnaire e-mailed to selected professors at selected European universities.
Todays presentation will contain 3 parts:
An overview of where you can obtain a process safety degree from a European university.
Where you can get the degree, which allows you to study process safety in more detail. In this presentation the
focus will be on chemical engineering degrees, but other engineering degrees can also be a ticket to study process
safety.
Finally there will be a discusion of the two different approaches to teaching process safety either as a separate
course or immersed in the chemical engineering curriculum.
Of the almost 1400 European universities surveyed less than 1.5% offer a degree in process safety. However, this does not
include offerings of a fire safety degree which is mostly concerned with prevention of fires in buildings.
You are lucky if you live in either the France, Germany, Hungary, Norway, Russia, Scotland, Spain or Sweden because then you
can study process safety without travelling to a foreign country.
The relatively large number of Norwegian universities offering a process safety degree is properly a result of the large Norwegian
oil industry, and a focus on safety in this nation which for years have faced the dangers of the sea.
I have not found a university which offers a Ph.D. In Process Safety. However, that is not the same as saying you cannont
specialize in process during in your Ph.D. Work. Many chemical engineering and other engineering departments offer that
possibility.
A number of universities offer either a degree in fire safety, which is aimed at people involved in fire safety from a public perspective, or a degree in safety engineering which a clear focus on occupational safety. These are not counted here.
One of the strange finding is that it is not necessarily the large and respected engineering schools among the universities which
offer process safety degrees, and you can see on this and the following two slides.
Ostrava is a city in eastern end of the Czech Republic. Sheffield is abou 100 kilometers east of Manchester. Caen is near the
English Channel, Auvergne in the middle of France, and Limoges about 200 kilometers west of Auvergne. Wuppertal is in the
Ruhr area of Germany, and Magdeburg is just west of Berlin.
The Norwegian University of Science and Technology is located in Trondheim. Troms is a good deal further north, and Stavanger is in western Norway, and Haugesund is a bit north of Stavanger.
Kazan is more than 500 kilometers east of Moscow.
It seems clear that both the Norwegian universities and the Scottish universities offering process safety degrees is a result of
the development of the oil industry in these countries during the last quarter century.
But you cannot start studying process safety with your high school diploma. At least not at European universities. You need
some degree as a basis for studying process safety.
This basis could be a chemical engineering degree, a petroleum engineering degree or a mechanical engineering degree or any
other batchelor degree in the field of engineering.
In the following the survey results as it relates to were a chemical engineering degree may be obtained will be presented.
About 220 European universities offers either a batchelor of chemical engineering or a master of chemical engineering or both.
That is about 16% of the European universities.
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A little less than half of the universites, which have a chemical engineering or similar department offer a doctoral program in
chemical engineering.
Most of the universities in Europe have by now aligned with the Bologna model. However, that are universities offering a 4 year
master of engineering degree. Others offer a 4 year batchelor of engineering degree. Both of these can be suplemented with
either 2 year or 1 year master degrees.
The survey done have not used the length of the programme to categories the degrees, but rather relied on the information
provided by the university.
About 220 European universities offers either a batchelor of chemical engineering or a master of chemical engineering or both.
That is about 16% of the European universities.
A little less than half of the universites, which have a chemical engineering or similar department offer a doctoral program in
chemical engineering.
Most of the universities in Europe have by now aligned with the Bologna model. However, that are universities offering a 4 year
master of engineering degree. Others offer a 4 year batchelor of engineering degree. Both of these can be suplemented with
either 2 year or 1 year master degrees.
The survey done have not used the length of the programme to categories the degrees, but rather relied on the
information provided by the university.
Most university website use a standard layout. It is almost
as if you need to be in arts to be creative. At least the creativity of engineering is not expressed through the design of
the web-sites of engineering schools.
While many have clear parts aimed at prospective students
and already enrolled students. Not many sees companies
or parents as a website visitor which they should aim for.
The website shown above is Miguel Hernandez University
of Elche http://www.umh.es/. They do offer an engineering
degree, but not in any of the tradtional fields.
The globalization of university education means that more
and more universities have web-sites in multiple language.
A few attempt to accomplish this using Google Translate.
That is definitely not yet a good idea.
English is of course the dominating language. But websites
aimed at chinese students are starting to appear. My impression is mostly in southern Europe.
Then I have discovered that there are almost as many ways
of specifying the URL of a secondary language site, as
there a multiple language university website.
Some web-masters fail to specify the language of the
web-site in the HTML code for the main page. That makes
Google Translate a bit confused.
My initial idea was to mainly base this presentation on an
online survey of selected processors at chemical engineering departments across Europe.
However, due to a limited database of relevant contracts and lag of contracts in many countries this idea was dropped in the
middle of the summer.
The survey is still available online, and on the following slides I will highligth some of the questions especially about the outcome
of process safety courses. You can take the survey at http://safepark.limequery.org/14514/lang-en .
Since the number of responses is very low no statistical significance should be placed on the results.
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The specialization in process safety is normally part of the master degree program.
Not all view the chemical unit operations laboratory as an opportunity to teach process safety.
The picture is from Wikipedia Commons and shows a Poly-Silicon Plant.
The survery shows, that after a process design course at a chemical engineering
department not all students are able to
Use inherently safer design principles to improve the design

Use CAMD to choose safer solvents for use in extraction
Use Insurance company separation distances in plant layout
Use tools to calculate safe distances to neighbors for possible releases
I dont think these are acceptable outcomes from a process design course.
I find it a bit disturbing that all students after taking a process safety course cannot
identify the relevant US and EU regulations such as the Seveso II directive in EU,
OSHAs PSM and EPAs RMP in US.
I guess we have to be satisfied, that at least they can identify the risk of chemical production, i.e. releases, fires and explosions.
They can also create a plant layout respecting safety distances. They know appearantly how to use both the Dow Indices, i.e.
the Fire & Explosion Index and the Chemical Exposure Index.
They can also create fault trees and event trees, and contribute to a Seveso II safety report and participate in a HAZOP study.
However, these results tell me, that the process safety course in some places is just another tools course. That I find rather
disturbing.
Immersion of the safety teaching into the different parts of the curriculum has in my view the advantage of presenting information in a relevant context.
Some elements such as emergency procedures can be used in several courses to focus of relevance in relation to types of
emergencies and amounts of material handled and the conditions of the handling.
A pre-startup safety check becomes much more relevant in the unit operations course in my view than in a lecture on
checklist in a process safety or risk assessment course.
The process design course is another change to emphasize process safety by asking students not just to create the flowsheet
and size the major pieces of equipment.
But also to create a layout, which attempts to satisfy all the
different access needs operations, maintenance, emergency.
Or choose extraction processes which use less dangerous
chemical.
And have the students choose a location based on the
needs for transport of raw materials and products.
The picture is a screen capture from the program ProCAMD
developed by students at the CAPEC research group at
DTU.
The immersion approach to process safety does precent
some difficulties.
Primarily it requires extensive collaboration on curriculum
design. Most places just within a single department, but at some universities also among different departments.
Also to be successful in the execution phase of the teaching this approach requires a safety culture among the faculty members.
Maybe these difficulties are the reason that the immersion approach is not seen at many universities. Although some also in
Europe have started implementing parts of it.
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However, it is worht noting, that companies like Dow Chemicals and Imperial Oil (partly owned by ExxonMobil) have
been extremely successful with the immersion approach to
process safety. Read for example a reasent article by a Dow
executive on ChemicalProcessing.com
The reason most universities choose to teach process
safety as a separate course is because this is the easy approach to process safety.
As chairman of the department you just have to find a faculty
member willing to teach process safety
or in wurst case hire a new faculty member for this job.
Then send the selected person on some training. I can
highly recommend the CCPS Workshops for
Professors conducted at different US chemical facilities.
Then all the other faculty members can get back to work on
their research and teaching and forgetabout process safety.
The picture is from the CCPS Workshop at ExxonMobils Baton Rouge Chemical Plant. I am the second person form the left
in the front row.
The conclusion is that,...
There are high quality process safety education at the master level at a number of European universities
Teaching process safety immersed in the curriculum is better, but separate course is easier
I will like to acknowledge the extensive use of Wikipedia especially their list of European universities in the collection of data
for this presentation.
Also my language skill are to limited to read most of the native language website of many European universities. There Google
Translate with whatever limitations it currently has has been another valuable tool.
Finally the use of some pictures and other material from Wikipedia Commons is aknowledged.
The above comments are based on the comments giving orally at the symposium
at ECCE-8 in Berlin on Wednesday, September 28th, 2011.
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Process and plant safety ProcessNets curriculum recommended to universities

Jrgen Schmidt
BASF, Ludwigshafen
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
Karlsruhe, Germany
Germanys chemical and petrochemical industry is the largest in Europe and one of the largest in the world. Hence high competence in chemical engineering including safety engineering is amongst others - indispensable for keeping this position.
With its activities in process and plant safety ProcessNet and its parent institutions supported the exchange of relevant knowledge and experience since long. 1978 a Research Committee Safety Engineering in Chemical Plants was established with
a number of specialized working parties, later extended to a German community of interested experts from industry, science
and administration.
In accordance with its goals, the Research Committee published already in 1997 a curriculum on process and plant safety
usable both for basic academic studies in chemistry or chemical engineering as well as for specializing in safety engineering (Lehrprofil Sicherheitstechnik Teaching Profile Safety Engineering [1]). Just about that time it began to show that safety
engineering shifted out of the focus of many professorships since both national and European research programs in this field
expired. The Research Committee was concerned about adverse developments with respect to both teaching and research
and started in 2004 a still standing competence initiative [2]. Convincing government, universities and industry that something
should be done to avoid a loss of necessary competence in process and plant safety, it was necessary to update the Teaching
profile Safety Engineering according to the state of the art as well as to the Bologna Process.
The lecture introduces briefly into ProcessNet, its activities in general, and the initiative above, and mainly presents details of
ProcessNets updated process and plant safety curriculum for bachelor and master studies.
[1] Lehrprofil Sicherheitstechnik, DECHEMA e. V., Frankfurt am Main, Februar 1997

[2] Position paper Maintaining and improving competence in safety engineering, DECHEMA/GVC Research Committee Safety Engineering in Chemical
Plants, March 2004
http://www.processnet.org/processnet_media/Elsen/Maintaining+and+improving+competence+in+safety+engineering.pdf
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8th European Congress on Chemical Engineering

Berlin 25th to 29th of September 2011
Session:
Process Safety Competence
European strength degrading to weakness ?
Process and plant safety

ProcessNets curriculum
recommended to universities
Jrgen Schmidt,
BASF SE, Ludwigshafen / KIT Karlsruhe
Content
Process Safety European Competence
Lifecycle
Competence Initiative
ProcessNetss Curriculum for Universities
ProcessNet
Industrial Demand on Safety Competences
Key Aspects for Education of Safety Engineers
09.09.2011
P r o c e s s
Jrgen Schmidt, BASF SE Ludwigshafen / KIT Karlsruhe
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Process Safety European Strength

Process & Plant Safety Performance
Number and severity of incidents continuously decreased
g exchange
g enforced
National and international knowledge
(e.g. Dechema/VDI-GVC safety community / ProcessNet WGs / EDUG)
Industrial safety competence sustainably enlarged
Globalization & Trends
Harmonizing
H
i i off regulations
l ti
/ managementt processes
Decreasing public risk acceptance
2000
Outsourcing of process safety divisions / concentration on expert groups

Lowering of over-conservatisms due to improved safety methods
09.09.2011
Process Safety Lifecycle

funding
public risk
acceptance
Communication
St t off Technology
T h l
State
Incidents
Government
Industry
Process
Safety
Public
relevance
young
accademics
9/9/2011
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Process Safety: current state in Germany

Funding
We are
safe !
< 5% of 1995
> 20 institutes
closed
public risk
acceptance
Process
Safety
degrading to
weakness ?
Perspective:
deficit in
education
qualified trainees
reduced innovation
risk to loose expertise
decrease in safety awareness
young
accademics
neg.
g demografie
g
&
low attractance
Process Safety development

Demand of
safety experts
m
measu
ure
We are
safe!
competence
initiative
competence level
risk sensitivity
funding / education
70
09.09.2011
P r o c e s s
80
90
00
10
20 year
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Competence Initiatives
2004: Dechema/GVC Position Paper
2008: VCI supports Dechema/GVC Initiative
2011: ECCE Symposium: Workshop Competence Preservation
Objectives (Industrial view): Safety Engineering to
maintain competence
p
transfer sustainably
y (young
(y
g acad. / retired experts)
p
)
provide adequate prevention concepts for latest technologies (R&D)
Solution steps
1. Universities: Process Safety Education as integral component
of chemical and process engineering disciplines ProcessNets curriculum
2 Industry / third parties: allied initiative for financing of R&D activities
2.
(intensive cooperation of University / Industry)
09.09.2011
ProcessNet Section Safety Engineering

E
Exchange
change platform
for expert knowledge
(Working parties)
Board
(chairpersons of working bodies &

elected members)
Conferences
Training courses
Publications
P bli ti
Safety Engineering Community

of DECHEMA and VDI-GVC
with more than 700 safety experts (members)
Property
data base
working
ki
groups
working
parties
(temporary)
Safety
community
since 1978
Safety Engineering Curriculum

9/9/2011
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ProcessNets
ProcessNet
s curriculum
Process and Plant Safety lectures
Target group / majors:
process engineering / technical chemistry / chemistry mandatory
mechanical- / bio- / industrial-engineering optional
Bachelor
(~28 h per semester lecture / ECTS: 2-3 credit points)
Objective:
Obj ti
Basic
B
i training
t i i off allll aspects
t off process safety
f t engineering
i
i
(safety typical mindset / complete set of basic principles)
Consecutive Master (elective module
module, major concentration)
Objective: (1) project-oriented intensification of Bachelor knowledge
(2) formation of a technical safety mindset & approach
(cope with uncertain data basis / abnormal conditions)
(3) prep for safety engineering research (PhD thesis)
09.09.2011
ProcessNets curriculum
(Bachelor module)
Lecture topics (time units)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Introduction in process and plant safety (1)

Safety and risk management (4)
Hazard evaluation of substances (3)
Hazard evaluation of chemical processes (2)
Plant safety concept (2)
Protection of equipment (end-of-pipe-technology) (4)
Disposal systems (2)
PLC safety concepts (4)
Dispersion calculations of hazardous substances (4)
Fire and explosion protection (3)
Electrostatic (1)
09.09.2011
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Key Competence of Safety Experts

M t & PhD candidates
Master
did t
Young Safety Professionals
should have a distinct technical safety mindset, e.g.
try to get the bottom of a problem / find backgrounds,

stay with conservative boundaries instead of averaging results
question interpolations / assumptions
double-check / short-cut complicate results,
consolidate safety approaches in expert networks
New safetyy educated generation
g
maintain
i t i the
th safety
f t culture
lt
apply self evident safety methodologies / practices

estimate possible consequences of their safety recommendations
(application of risk management principles)
are able to work interdisciplinary / intercultural (e.g. HAZOP teams)
evaluate new approaches from a safety point of view
develops innovative plant safety concepts
by improving safety while increasing reliability
09.09.2011
11
Key Aspects of Education

M t & PhD candidates
Master
did t
Focus education on
safety methodologies / practices based on real industrial projects
interdisciplinary training / safety typical networking & communication
Basis for innovative safety concepts / maintaining the safety culture
h i l essentials
ti l (Sh
th d )
physical
(Shortt cutt methods)
safe&fast double-check of key important results / estimation of consequences
fundamental knowledge and experience in numerical modeling

e.g.
g Aspendynamics
p
y
/g
gProms / CFD,, potential
p
& limitations
experimental training / method validation

Valuation of suiteablity of methods for applying at abnormal plant conditions
y Engineers
g
Safety
should
think lateral
examine carefully
communicate actively
evaluate discipline overlapped
act socially responsible and convinced
seek economical solutions
09.09.2011
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Excellence in Safety Engineering

Personal Motivation
Top-Level Safety Engineering Education
ProcessNets
ProcessNet
curriculum
Idea
Safety
Mi d
Mindset,
Principles
Idea
S f t Engineering
Safety
E i
i
R&D Education
Idea
safety concepts / methodologies up to date

safety innovations
09.09.2011
Competence
Development
Jrgen
_____
Schmidt,
______
BASF SE
___________
Ludwigshafen / KIT
________
Karlsruhe
13
Summary
European Safety engineering currently on a world class level
Strong demand on innovations in Safety Engineering to balance
the decrease in risk acceptance
Sustainable transfer of competences and
innovative follow up of safety concepts to new technologies
are major challenges for the near future
ProcessNets Section Safety Engineering suggests:
a curriculum for education in Safety Engineering
mandatory for Bachelor engineers and
as elective module and R&D platform for Master engineers
Adequate R&D Funding in Safety Engineering will make the difference
between future strength or weakness (SafEEs Initiative)
09.09.2011
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Working Group ProcessNet Curriculum

Curriculum
Temporary working group of ProcessNet
ProcessNets
s Section Safety Engineering:
Prof. Dr. Schnbucher, University Duisburg-Essen
p
, Universityy Magdeburg
g
g
Prof. Dr. Hauptmanns,
Prof. Dr. Brenig, Fachhochschule Kln
Prof. Dr. Moritz, University Hamburg
Dr. Klais, Bad Soden
Dr. Mitropetros, Dechema, Frankfurt
Prof. Dr. Schmidt, Karlsruher Institut of Technology, Karlsruhe
09.09.2011
Jrgen
_____
Schmidt,
______
BASF SE
___________
Ludwigshafen / KIT
________
Karlsruhe
15
Acknowledgement
Prof
Prof. Dr.
Dr Norbert Pfeil,
Pfeil BAM
(Chairman of the Board of ProcessNets Safety Engineering Section)
Dr. Peter Schmelzer, Bayer Healthcare AG
Dr. Rainer Kohlen, Evonik Industries AG
Dr. Sebastian Muschelknautz, Linde AG
Dr. Kai Ehrhardt, BASF SE
9/9/2011
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Hans J. Pasman
Member Council on Hazardous Substances
The Hague, NL
With the growth of process industry and the development of technology together with the growing awareness in the 70s and
80s that safety must be assured and risks controlled, special concepts, approaches, methods and tools were developed and
people trained to apply these. Over the years safety knowledge grew into a discipline of its own to be applied in all stages of
design and engineering, construction and operation of process plant and in handling and transport in which hazardous substances are involved. In the 80s and 90s various levels of education in personal and process safety became institutionalized,
also at university level. Research in subjects as protective and safe technology, risk analysis methods, management systems,
human behavior and safety culture started to flourish since for adequate prevention there was and still is - a need for investigating mechanisms, further development of methods and new approaches.
The efforts had success and accident rates declined. With more recent economic pressures and the feel an adequate safety
level has been achieved the urge to educate and invest in safety faded away and seemed to be suppressed by more direct
potential gains in work on material and process innovation. This seemed to be true most prominently at university level. Since
university should be the nursery for future teachers of teachers and feeling that on the longer run decline would lead to problems the Council on Hazardous Substances in the Netherlands decided to perform a more systematic study. It consisted of
mapping the global production of process safety papers over a period of ten years in a broad sense and trying to understand
trends, and to interview various groups being part of the knowledge infrastructure: research institutes, industry, university and
government, to survey their stand on future perspective. A number of university professors some in process engineering,
others in safety were consulted for guidance of the effort. The findings of the study were discussed in a platform with broad
representation of stakeholders from industry, government and other organizations. As a result an advice was issued to the
Cabinet how the knowledge infrastructure can be maintained, elementary safety concepts can be part of education of future
engineer generations, how young graduates can be attracted to specialize in safety and what funding will be needed to be
able to participate internationally and to stay abreast of developments. The paper will present details of the study, conclusions
and recommended actions.
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8th ECCE, Berlin, 28-29 Sep 2011
"Safety competence -
Key insights from a study on the Dutch situation"
Hans Pasman
Mary Kay OConnor Process Safety Center, Texas A&M University

Previously, chairman AGS Knowledge Infrastructure Committee
Emeritus TU Delft, retired TNO
History in brief
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History in brief (2)

70-90s: With development of process industry university chairs established on
process safety/loss prevention; Ph.D. studies funded; (sub-)discipline developed.
Competence = product of interaction practical experience - knowledge research
TU Delft 1978 first general safety curriculum: behavioral safety/risk
management; later specialist chair process industry in Faculty ChemTech; much
later Toptech Master for policy makers in public safety.
Abundance of courses on applied levels and special topics: e.g. gas and dust
expl.
90s and later: Governmental support diminished, beta-education lost popularity,
less interest for chemical engineering, knowledge level students broadened but
not deepened.
At the same time industrial competition strengthened; cost cutting, less
positions.
Market paradigm in funding research ; rush on the pots with gold;
safety = softie.
Process safety chairs at TU Delft, TU Eindhoven and UTwente silently vanished.
Deliberations with:
Chemical industry association (VNCI): Do they see need?
University professors to discuss knowledge domain.
Ministry representatives: Education, Economy, Infrastructure.
Funding agency NWO: Vision?
Knowledge institutes, industrial research labs.
Assignments to:
Institute for Scientific and Technology Studies, CWTS, Leiden :
mapping articles process safety, 10 years worldwide; trends?
Technopolis, Amsterdam: Interviewing people in R&D;
what are their relationships; what perspectives do they see?
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Process safety as a discipline

to be distinguished from personal safety
Typical areas:
Properties: Combustion, thermal stability, deflagration, detonation, toxicity
System safety: Safe design principles, FTA, reliability engineering, IEC 61508.
Process technology, engineering, operation and organization: Inherent safer, SMS.
Risk analysis: LOPA, Consequence analysis, QRA, Decision analysis, Criteria.
test methods, criteria, classification, regulation.
Institute for Scientific and Technology Studies, CWTS, Leiden :

Web of science 8300 articles process safety 1997-2006
data mining, combinations of nouns, frequency grouped
position circles = degree of association, size = fraction of world; number = %
USA
Germany
Color is class indication
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The Netherlands: some emphasis on risk analysis

U.K.: emphasis on culture, HF, thermal; France: on properties
Interview results Technopolis, Amsterdam:

Many bilateral relationships exist between industry knowledge institutes universities.
Research is rather fragmented, narrow areas
lack of overview.
Research still lives on successes in the 70-80s.
Work declines slowly; areas disappear; groups are
below critical mass.
Funding is for projects with immediate pay-off.
No budgets for longer term strategic work.
Researchers themselves see little future perspective.
There is a need for a plan, roadmap, platform and
leadership.
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Conclusions AGS study:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
In general, Dutch process safety research at university is

below critical mass. Level of education is tied to level of
thinking, hence research.
There is international exchange of knowledge: ETPIS, EPSC,
IGUS, Loss Prevention, but if no contribution, no gain
because there is no or little connection.
If no expertise build-up at academic level, in the long run
knowledge institutes will suffer as well.
If no deep knowledge available then scope of training
courses will become narrow or too superficial.
In a few years remaining expertise may have disappeared.
People will assume safety is an obvious matter. Only after an
accident, one would exclaim : How is it possible?
Recommendation: Install a chair, increase R&D 3X + platform
Actions after delivery advice?

Yes, some!
o October 2010: Reaction of Cabinet of Ministers on Advice (of

March 2009)
Thanks for all the work; we also talked with all stakeholders
At universities possibilities are very limited (program full)
NL cannot be excellent in all fields
Industrial thematic area Chemistry will take care: PPP funding
o Strategic Knowledge Platform founded by Ministry (Public

Safety)
P r o c e s s
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First meeting October 2008; second meeting January 2011

Active participants knowledge institutes; presence of industry
Short-middle term research (hence not strategic)
Meanwhile financial crisis; new cabinet; R&D funding is now
problem
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In the mean time developments

in industry and in the country:
1.
2007 Business plan chemical industry: growth! Now one of top-sectors.
2.
Transportation chemicals in NL: growth!
3.
VNCI-NWO: research projects 10% for safety aspects.
4.
Need for academic position recognized (teacher of teachers), however

action failed TUs budget cuts.
5.
Globally gap academic knowledge level - industry is growing. (Industry

people have no time academic people not much industrial experience)
6.
General safety (safety management) at TU Delft seems barely to survive

(but no properties substances/chemical technology).
7.
AGS will be reduced from 10 members to 1. That member part of a

general council for the Living environment and Infrastructure.
8.
Letter VNO-NCW (Conf. industry and employers) to minister, 13

September 2011, proposes to discuss university education
1. Situation in Be, Cz, Dk, Fi, It, No, Po, Sl, Sw, Sp may be
less dramatic. (Niels Jensens presentation)
2. Is effort in Fr, Ge and UK decreasing?
3. USA : TeXas A&M, North-Eastern, Michigan-Tech;
SAChE (Safety in Chem.Engrg Education) of CCPS/AIChE;
ABET (Accreditation Board for Engrg&Tech) : all chem. engrg
faculties in U.S. shall teach principles of process safety.
(Safety in nulear engineering and aeronautics/aerospace)
N.B. At MKOPSC ,TX A&M, director Dr Mannan organizes in
October a workshop to develop a process safety
research agenda for next decade.
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After-burners:
1. It will be great if WPLP EFCE supported by
EPSC (incl. IChemE) establishes a kind of
SAChE in Europe!
(Is EFCE Working Party on Education still active?)
2. Can companies create career perspectives in

process safety?
(In fact, board members should have a notion of basic concepts

of process safety and quality )
3. Is public-private partnership for funding of

university chairs an option?
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How to achieve high quality teaching in higher education?

General approaches applied to the field of process and plant safety.
Jrg Steinbach
Technische Universitt Berlin
Germany
Since Wilhelm von Humboldts concept of a university in unity of research and teaching a common interpretation was that
high quality academic teaching can only exist in conjunction with high quality research. Although such a conclusion is simply
wrong it is worth to elaborate accepted and possible correlations between research and teaching as the two cornerstones of
the university.
The lecture starts with a brief introduction on the main academic teaching methods, their areas of application and educational
objectives. Using examples from the area of process and plant safety it will then be worked out how the research background
of an academic teacher can positively improve content and transfer of knowledge. Inversely, possible adverse impacts on the
quality of academic teaching will be shown for the case that teaching staff is completely cut off from own research activities.
Building on that, the situation in teaching process and plant safety at German universities will be assessed and proposals for
improvement be given.
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Lee Allford
MIChemE CEng
EPSC Operations Manager
IChemE
Increasingly it is recognised that across Europe many organisations have a role to play in promoting competence in process
safety within the chemical and allied industries. The compe-tence and expertise that practitioners in process safety need is
clearly different to that required by specialists in occupational safety and in other industry sectors such as transport, construction etc. IChemE has many years experience already in training process and chemical engi-neers in process safety and with
the formation of IChemE Safety Centre (ISC) in 2009 has taken the initial steps together with other UK bodies of defining formal
accreditation criteria for process safety training.
The presentation will describe a multi stakeholder competence project that the IChemE has recently led in
compiling information on existing process safety training provision & guidance

drafting a skills matrix against various job levels using a high level process safety framework
developing a simple benchmarking tool using word models to describe desired behav-iours at various levels for
each element of competence.
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Assuring competence in
process safety
Lee Allford
IChemE
ECCE-8
Berlin 2011
Chemical engineers and process

safety
Process Safety refers to the prevention of unintentional releases
of chemicals, energy, or other potentially dangerous materials
that can have a serious effect to the plant and environment
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safety
Safety Culture + Safety Knowledge

safety
Safety is CORE!
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Why it matters?!!
Huge Consequences
Why it matters?!!
1984: Hundreds die
accident - BBC News
in
Bhopal
chemical
2005: A global oil company has been ordered to

pay more than 1m for breaching health and
safety regulations after an explosion at its
Humber refinery.
2011: Pembroke
Chevron refinery blast:

Inquiry after four die
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IChemE & Safety

Qualifying for Chartered status
Degree accreditation
Conferences and events
Hazards, Hazards AP
Training and master classes

Publications
academic, Loss Prevention Bulletin, tce
Special interest group

Collaboration across the profession
Advocacy
Safety Challenges
Introducing the IChemE Safety Centre
Review and reset the strategic direction of safety
within IChemE
Align with and deliver on IChemEs Technical
Roadmap
Build on inherent strength of expertise and range
of activities
Enhance further the relationships with and among
major employers
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IChemE Safety Centre

Brings together a comprehensive range of
activities and services
New model for company participation
Initial launch Australia 2012
Process Safety Management

Ensure
that the process industries, and

particularly the operators of high hazard sites,
have access to comprehensive fit-for-purpose
safety-related training, offered by duly accredited
training providers and delivered by competent
and knowledgeable presenters
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PSM Initiative
Safety
Competences
(EI Frame Work)
Mapping of
required
level of
safety
competences
Identification
of job role
categories
Level of
Competences
Safety Competences
Focus areas
Elements
Expectations
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Safety Competences
Focus areas
Process safety
leadership
Risk
identification
and assessment
Risk
management
Review and
improvement
Job Role Categories
Role Category
Above-site Senior Executives
Job titles
Board level directors
Chief executives
Business manager
Supply chain manager
Manufacturing VP
Site manager
Production/plant manager
Technical assurance managers (process,
engineering)
Engineers (process, mechanical, power &
control, inspection, etc)
Process safety assessors
Design engineers (plant & process)
Production team leaders
Shift managers
Production supervisors
Maintenance planners
Process operators
Maintenance technicians
Contractors
Site Leadership
Technical Specialists
Front-line supervisors
Front-line staff
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Level of Competences
Required
Competence
Level
3
Company/site expert
Professionally able
General awareness
Not necessary
Training
Very little training
available at the board
and operator level!!
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Training Standards
Mapping of
safety
competences
Development
of training
standards
Training Standards
Start at Top
- Company Leadership
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Training Standards
Pedagogical
+ content
Adjust
style to
audience
IChemE
accredited
Adequate
training
standards
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Rolling out the standard

Top tier hazardous sites
Good response so far at Leadership level
Pilot stage in progress
Work through a series of training standards

Encourage course development to fill gaps
But not reinvent the wheel
Future plans
Message cascaded from the top
Forthcoming standards
Join IChemE Safety Centre to take part
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Paul Delanoy
Dow Chemical Co. Ltd
In response to requests from members and other interested parties, the European Process Safety Centre (EPSC) set up a
Working Group project to examine Process Safety competence. The Work Group comprises people from industry or industry
support ensuring a hands on, practical approach to the topic. The objective of the project is to develop a Management System for Process Safety competence. This work should complement the works of others who are defining Process Safety skill
sets and developing Process Safety assessment tools.
As a management system the concepts of the process developed could be applied to most fields where competence is required, however, the detail of this work is tailored to specific groups in the chemical process industry. The aim is to target the
people who have a direct influence on the chemical process such as: Process Operators and Supervisors, Maintenance staff,
Production and Process Engineers, Plant and Site Managers and Process Safety Specialists.
The management system establishes a framework of requirements to ensure that the people with direct influence on chemical
process operations achieve and maintain the necessary Process Safety competence:
Selection and recruitment of personnel

Individual competence needs analysis
Facility minimum competence requirements
Training and development
Communicating individual expectations
Relationship of competence and supervision
Competence assessment
Maintaining competence
Competence reassessment
Managing competence gaps
Special competence requirements for emergency situations
Monitoring trends in competence
None of the elements above represent new ideas but this project provides guidance for their application to the Chemical
Process Industry. It advises a holistic approach whereby the competence requirements for the overall safe operation of the
facility are examined as well as those of the individuals who contribute to this. The project also addresses some of the specific
challenges of the Chemical Process Industry such as training people to deal with situations they are unlikely to ever encounter,
dealing with stress in emergencies and ensuring people have knowledge beyond that required for their normal work such that
they can make the correct decisions when unplanned events occur.
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Process
ocess Sa
Safety
ety Co
Competence
pete ce Management
a age e t
Framework for an EPSC Report
8hE
8th
European C
Congress off Ch
Chemical
i lE
Engineering
i
i
Paul Delanoy
D
Dow
Ch
Chemical
i lC
Company
The EPSC Working Group

In response to requests from members and other interested parties
parties, the European
Process Safety Centre (EPSC) set up a Working Group project to examine Process
Safety competence
The Work Group comprises people from industry or industry support ensuring a hands
on, practical approach to the topic
GerryBrennan
ABB
NorbertBaron
ExxonMobil
HermanvanLochem
Hans Schwarz
HansSchwarz
AkzoNobel
BASF
MartindeZeeuw
Iain Clough
IainClough
LyondellBasell
Marsh
PeterSchmelzer
Bayer
CarlosVidela Ivanissevich
Repsol
DavidSullivan
TataSteel Europe
ElenaMarin
Repsol
PaulDelanoy
DowChemicalCo.
FriedrichStoll
Tuev Sued
ChristianJochum
EPSC
LindaBellamy
WhiteQueenBV
Alb t W l
AlbertWalrave
D P t
DuPont
Matthias Burkhardt
MatthiasBurkhardt
DSM
KlausJuergenNiemitz
Clariant
Urbain Bruyere
BP
RobertRobinson
Marsh
2
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Current Competence Issues

The competence of the Operator and Engineering staff in
petrochemical plants is being reduced by:
Increasing
g automation
Improved reliability
The
Th trend
t d ttowards
d centralization
t li ti off P
Process E
Engineering,
i
i
Design and Software Development functions
The loss to retirement of the people who retain an in depth
knowledge of the plant from the time of largely manual operation
The EPSC Competence Initiative

Most Chemical Companies have
ha e programmes in place to address
competence
These programmes vary greatly in scope and quality but it is likely that every
element required for a competence system already exists
What is often lacking is a structured approach
The EPSC Competence Working Group concluded that the most beneficial
product it could work on was a framework to ensure:
p
o All essential elements to ensure Competence are in place
o The Competence process is integrated into the other work processes
o The function of the Competence process is periodically verified
o The
Th C
Competence
t
process iis practical
ti l and
d workable
k bl
In short a Process Safety Competence Management System
4
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The EPSC Project Scope

The EPSC Project is intended to cover all the elements necessary for a
Process Safety Competence Management System
To keep the size manageable it is focused on the people expected to have
a direct influence on the process operations:
o Process Operators
o Supervisors
o Maintenance staff
o Production and Process Engineers
o Plant and Site Managers
o Process Safety Specialists
Adding other groups to the Process Safety Competence Management

System should be relatively easy
5
The EPSC Project Objective

The most important objective is to produce something which is helpful:
Process description kept at a high level minimising text
A 300 page document which nobody reads has little value!
As far as possible the content of the appendices will provide the detail for
the project.
The appendices will provide the working documents and are intended to
turn the Competence Management System theory into reality:
o Templates
o Tools (e.g. Excel)
o Audit and/or review checklists
o Process Safety Competence Standards (some Thou shalt statements of
the sort often provided by regulators, pointing out the key points)
6
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The Report Structure

Section 1: Introduction
1.1 Preface
1.2 How to use this guidance
1.3 What is Process Safetyy Competence
p
(PSC)
(
) in the context of
this report?
1.4 Why is PSC Important?
1.5 Challenges
1.6 How a PSC Management System can help
7
The Report Structure (continued)

Section 2: Guidance on Creating a PSC Management System
2 1 The need for a holistic approach
2.1
2.2 The elements of a PSC Management System
2.3.1 2.3.12 (1-2 pages per element)
2.3 How to implement and maintain a PSC Management system

2.4 Definition of success
Section 3: Appendices
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Elements of the PSC Management System

Section 2
2.3
3 The elements of a PSC Management System:
1. Facility minimum PSC requirements
2 Selection and recruitment of personnel
2.
3. Individual competence needs analysis
Objective
4 Training and development

4.
Keyy elements
5. Communicating individual expectations
Features of a mature system
6. Relationship
p of competence
p
and supervision
p
Audit and review
7. Competence assessment
Templates and Tools
8. Maintaining
g competence
p
Records
9. Competence reassessment
10. Managing competence gaps
11. Special competence requirements for emergency situations
12. Monitoring trends in competence
9
Use of the Report

The report is intended as an aid to enable people to create a Process
Safety Competence Management System
Section 1
The aim of the introduction is to demonstrate why such as system is
necessary
Section 2
The guidance section provides an easy to read overview of the process
and highlights the essential elements and objectives
Section 3
The appendices
pp
are the heart of the process
p
allowing
gp
people
p to turn the
process described above into a working system
10
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Differentiation from other Work

Specific to Process Safety in the (Petro-) Chemical Industry
Concise, easy to read and absorb guidance
Written using industry terms and language
Guidance
G id
linked
li k d tto appendices
di
which
hi h llead
d users th
through
h th
the
implementation process
o Implementation flow chart
oTools and templates
o Audit/Review documentation provides a checklist for the entire
process
Possible links to other sources of information e.g. DNV or IChemE
11
Project Timeline
First meeting of the Working Group was in January 2011
Section 1 of the report is largely complete
Sect
Section
o 2e
exists
sts in a
an ea
early
yd
draft
a t form
o but st
still requires
equ es work
o
Section 3 will use existing processes where possible and these are
being sought from member companies
The completed report will require an extensive pilot programme
before it can be shared
The target completion date for the project is the end of 2012
12
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Promoting Process Safety Competency Work of the Center

for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS)
Louisa Nara
Technical Director (Presenter)
Scott Berger
Executive Director
Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers
Contact: louna@aiche.org +1.646.495.1371
The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) was established in 1985 following the Bhopal toxic gas disaster to lead the
global chemical engineering professions effort to prevent future process safety incidents. CCPS goals include developing
process safety technology and management practices, making these practices available to support competency development,
promoting education to develop competency, and promoting process safety as a key business value. Over the past 26 years,
CCPS has produced and presented globally hundreds of books, courses, training modules, conferences, university lecture
modules, and monthly electronic newsletters, all aimed at promoting process safety competency around the world.
In recent years, CCPS has come to recognize a need to define more precisely the types of competencies according to job
function and across all levels of the organization, including front line chemical operators, mechanics and instrument technicians
through senior management, including financial and business executives. This recognition led to a current project to develop
such a comprehensive framework for competencies and the training and education needed at all levels to build those competencies. The CCPS framework will reference materials through which to gain this knowledge, building on CCPSs extensive
library of materials.
The project would develop a comprehensive matrix, vertically and diagonally, covering all roles within a corporation, for all
relevant aspects of Process Safety Management knowledge. For example, what makes one competent to conduct a QRA,
what does the CEO need to know about QRA, what does the DCS operator need to know about QRA.each of those cells
referencing where one might go to seek that level of knowledge on the topic, etc. The final product will also include a gap
analysis tool and will be flexible to tailor to companies specific requirements and needs.
Coupled with CCPS longstanding Safety in Chemical Engineering Education (SAChE) initiative, the competency project will
create a comprehensive roadmap to career-long learning in process safety.
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Promoting Process Safety Competency Work of the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS)
Promoting
Process Safety Competency
Work of the
Center for Chemical Process Safety
Presented at the
European Congress of Chemical Engineers
ECCE- 8 - Process Safety Competence
September 28, 2011
Louisa A. Nara, CCEP

Technical Director
Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS)
New York Mumbai - Qingdao
Copyright 2011 Center for Chemical Process Safety of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers
Mission
Established in 1985, to eliminate catastrophic process
incidents by:
ADVANCING state-of-the-art process safety technology and

management practices.
SERVING as the premier resource for information on process

safety.
FOSTERING knowledge of PS by engineers, students, and

the public.
PROMOTING process safety as a key industry value.

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26 Years
Leading Process Safety
Creating Books
and Publications
Sharing Best Practices
Creating Industry-wide
Tools, Programs and
Guidelines
Process
Safety
Beacon
Conducting Global Conferences and Training
Risk Based
Process Safety
Published in 2007
Over 4,600 international users and
counting
Adopted by companies worldwide
20 Elements
Commitment to Process Safety
Understanding Hazards and Risks
Managing Risks
http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCdLearning from Experience
0470471978152.html
Not regulatory driven
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Trying to Balance Between

Resources and Results
Resources
Results
Leads to a Risk Based Process Safety Approach to stabilize

the system and provide the best results with limited resources.
Elements of Risk Based

Process Safety
COMMIT TO PROCESS SAFETY
UNDERSTAND
HAZARDS
&
RISK
MANAGE RISK
Management Review & Continuous Improvement
Auditing
Measurement & Metrics
Incident Investigation
Conduct of Operations
Emergency Management
Operational Readiness
Training
Management of Change
Contractor Management
Safe Work Practices
Asset Integrity & Reliability
Operating Procedures
Hazard Identification & Risk Analysis
Process Safety Information
Stakeholder Engagement
Workforce Involvement
Compliance with Standards
Process Safety Culture
Process Safety
Management
LEARN FROM
EXPERIENCE
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Commit to
Process Safety
Process Safety
Culture
Compliance with
Standards
Process Safety
Competency
Workforce
Involvement
Stakeholder
Engagement
COMMIT TO PROCESS SAFETY
UNDERSTAND
HAZARDS
&
RISK
Auditing
Management Review & Continuous Improvement
Incident Investigation
Measurement & Metrics
Conduct of Operations
Operational Readiness
Training
Management of Change
Contractor Management
Safe Work Practices
Asset Integrity & Reliability
Operating Procedures
Process Safety Information
Hazard Identification & Risk Analysis
Workforce Involvement
Stakeholder Engagement
Process Safety Culture
Compliance with Standards
Process Safety
Management
LEARN FROM
EXPERIENCE
MANAGE RISK
Driver for Change

in the United States
US Chemical Safety Board Recommends
Improvements in Process Safety Competencies
Recommendation #3 - Baker Panel Report
Develop and implement a system to ensure that its
executive management, its refining line management
above the refinery level, all US refining personnel,
including managers, supervisors, workers and contractors
possess an appropriate level of process safety knowledge
and expertise.
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Competency
What is it?
Knowledge
Skill
Behavior
Why is it important?
Process Safety
Competency
Developing Process Safety Competencies
encompasses three interrelated actions
Continuously improving knowledge and
competency
Ensuring that appropriate information is
available to the people who need it
Consistently applying what has been
learned
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Your Book of
Process Safety Knowledge
Best Practices
What does this include?
Process
Safety
Knowledge
Who should know this?

When should they know it?
How do they identify hazards?
New Supervisor
Review Process
EXAMPLES
Chemicals used in this operation (and their hazards)

Operating set points and limits
Production rates
Upstream and downstream requirements
Regulatory requirements
Maximum and operating capacities
Operating procedures
Startup, Normal, Abnormal, Emergency,
Shutdown
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Competency Inputs and Outputs (examples)

Outputs from the Competency
Element
RBPS Element
Inputs to Competency Element
Culture and
Involvement
The competency element must be supported by a

culture and management system that encourages
learning and facilitates sharing of information, both
internally and externally
A continual supply of ideas for

enhancing culture and involvement
that have proven successful
elsewhere
Standards
New technical information (e.g., previously

undiscovered or undocumented failure modes, new
equipment inspection practices)
External requirements such as regulations, codes, and
standards, including changes to these requirements
Participation in efforts to develop,

revise, or update codes, standards,
recommended practices, and
industry guidelines
Risk
Requests for technical and other process safety, hazard

identification, or risk information from outside
sources, either directly from teams charged with
performing hazard or risk analysis activities or via the
knowledge element
Responses to requests, either based

on formal initiatives such as
technical committees, or informal
networks
Knowledge and performance gaps in knowledge

(identified by difficulties encountered during training
of personnel)
New hazards identified while training personnel
Topics that need to be covered (or

emphasized) in initial or refresher
training
Newly identified hazards or other
critical information for inclusion in
training programs
Training
Developing Tools for

Process Safety Competencies
Committee representing 15+
international companies
Developing comprehensive
matrices covering all roles within
an organization
Gap analysis can be developed to
identify targeted training
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Competency Matrix
Equipment
Operators II
Equipment
Garage III
RTG- Fixed III
RTGRotating III
RTGInstrument III
RTGInspection II
Safety SWP
CSO IA/IB
Safety IA
Mechanics II
Maint.
Engineers III
LDAR II
Warehouse III
Run-It Day
Support III
Lab QC II
Lab Tech III
Minimum Knowledge
Level Expectations
Level Expert knowledge of SWP; Able to trouble-shoot

IA: complex scenarios, facilitate Cold-eyes,
Understands how to interpret SWP issues
Level Expert user of SWP; Able to field-execute
IB: procedure w/o help, Understands how to interpret
SWP issues
Level II: Regular user of SWP; Knowledgeable on critical

steps of the procedure; Able to execute or
understand procedure w/o help, Understands
issues requiring an interpretation of SWP
Level III: Occasional User of SWP; Needs paper reference
and possible refresher training prior to use to
follow all steps correctly
III
III
III
III
III
II
III
III
III
III
II
III
II
III
III
III
II
III
III
III
II
II
II
II
Energy
Control
Blinding
Hot Work
SAFE WORK PRACTICES

EXPECTATIONS
Confined
Space
Permitting
(used by permission of Flint Hills Resources)
IA/IB IA/IB IA/IB IA/IB

IA
IA
IA
IA
II
II
II
II
III
II
III
III
II
III
III
II
III
III
II
III
II
II
III
III
II
III
III
II
III
III
II
III
Safety and Chemical

Engineering Education
Enhance the value of Process Safety in
Undergraduate Education
Student Handbook on Process Safety
Outreach to 160 Colleges and Universities
Internationally
Scale-up Program provides corporate support
of University Programs
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Final Thoughts
Where do we go from here?
Continually improve ways to strengthen
process safety competencies
Improve interactive training programs
Document successes
Sharing lessons learned and best practices
Thank You!
Louisa A. Nara, CCEP

LouNa@AIChE.org
+1.646.770.7350
www.ccpsonline.org
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Andreas Frster
DECHEMA e.V.
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Safety expertise is a key competence for the process industries. Maintaining and further strengthening this competence is
necessary from an environmental, economic and societal point of view. Therefore, mechanisms of keeping the know-how in
the companies and the scientific community have to been ensured.
In the last decade the question of adequate mechanisms for knowledge transfer or rather the growing lack of such mechanisms has become a dominant aspect in the discussion on safety competence.
DECHEMA as a scientific society with a non-profit status commits significant own resources to improve knowledge transfer
in the safety community. DECHEMAs main approach is to be a reliable, dynamic link between science, industry, politics and
the general public, thus enabling significant multifold synergies. These synergies demonstrate themselves in particular through
activities such as:
a growing number of continuing training and education -courses for students and professionals, the organization of
national and international scientific events, e.g. workshops, colloquia, annual meetings
prominent addressing Industrial Safety in scientific program of ACHEMA, the worldwide largest exhibition for the
process industries
the DECHEMA-Databases for Industrial Safety, e.g. CHEMSAFE, Safety Incidents (Initiation, coordination or
execution of) research projects
a close cooperation with relevant national and international organization, like: BG-RCI, NAMUR, VCI, VDI, VDE,
ISSA Section Chemistry, EPSC
In addition, a significant role for extending and promulgating knowledge of safety engineering is played by ProcessNet, a neutral multidisciplinary platform provided by DECHEMA and VDI-GVC. ProcessNet provides a unique platform for
public and confidential discussions within the community

regulatory processes: information, influence, participation
political research initiatives, compilation of position papers on cutting-edge safety themes
supporting the modernization / maintenance of norms and technical guidelines
offering scientific advisory support to research projects
the compilation of safety books
ProcessNet unites today more than 5,000 experts from all process industry related disciplines. Its section Safety Engineering
has since 1978 a wide range of successful activities
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The DECHEMA approach to

Process and Plant Safety knowledge transfer
Andreas Frster
Plant Safety within DECHEMA / ProcessNet
1. DECHEMA
Your professional network
2. Plant safety @ DECHEMA

Multifold active contributions since 1978
3. A short introduction to ProcessNet

A joined initiative of DECHEMA and VDI
4. ...and of the ProcessNet-Section

Safety Engineering
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- Your professional network

a scientific society for Chemical Engineering and Biotechnology
non-profit organisation, founded in 1926
mission: to support the interdisciplinary co-operation
between scientists and engineers
today:
> 5,500 members from science and industry
headquarters in
Frankfurt am Main
approx. 200 co-workers
supports Plant Safety since 1978

Main focus:
Safe design and safe operation
of processes
Areas of activities (examples):
Risk assessment
Process safety management
Inherently safe processes
Safety characteristics
Safety devices
Competence transfer
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Activities in the field of Plant Safety
DECHEMA-Databases
- e.g. CHEMSAFE, Safety Incidents
Reseach projects
Nine continuing education courses for students and professionals
Safety always an important part of the scientific programme of ACHEMAs
Cooperation with relevant organisations
(e.g. BG RCI, NAMUR, VCI, VDI, VDE, ISSA Section Chemistry, EPSC)

DECHEMA-Databases
Reseach projects
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DECHEMA-Databases
Reseach projects
lessons learned by non-notifiable incidents relevant to safety

>130 reports so far
free online access: http://www.processnet.org/incidentdb
contents:
working party Lessons from Process Safety Incidents

The database Chemsafe contains assessed
safety parameters and properties for more
than 3,000 flammable liquids, gases and
dusts.
Since 1985: Database
The Problem: Reliable Data

The Solution: CHEMSAFE
The Sources: BAM and PTB
The Data: Safety Parameters and
more
Rated safety parameters like:

-flash points, autoignition temperatures,
explosion limits, minimum ignition energy, max.
explosion pressure, ...
http://www.dechema.de/chemsafe.html
Besides the rated safety parameters:

- substance identification data, thermophysical
data, labelling and classification according to
national and international regulations, maximum
working place concentration (MAK), ....
Currently > 79 000 data sets are available!
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DECHEMA-Databases
Reseach projects

BMBF-research project VT-Guide
Chapters
1. Introduction
2. Economical aspects
3. Safety aspects
4. Industrial experience
with microreactors
5. Current research on
microreactors
Microreactor from Microinnova

with an output of 3 t / h
(K. Mitropetros and A. Bazzanella; 130 pages, 2010,

ISBN 978-3-89746-114-7)
10
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IGF-research projects
(application oriented research for SMEs)
Examples:
2009: Project 14782 BG, Entwicklung eines inhrent sicheren, kostengnstigen und flexiblen
Verfahrens zur Herstellung von Wasserstoffperoxidlsungen durch Direktsynthese mittels
katalytisch beschichteter Membranen, DECHEMA e.V., Karl-Winnacker-Institut; Hermsdorfer
Institut fr Technische Keramik e.V.
2008: Project 14261 BG, Beurteilung und Verhinderung von Selbstentzndung und
Brandgasemission bei der Lagerung von Massenschttgtern und Deponiestoffen, Universitt
Halle-Wittenberg; BAM Berlin
2007: Project 14264 N, Ausblassichere Dichtungen fr Flanschverbindungen mit emaillierten und
glasfaserverstrkten Kunststoffflanschen in der chemischen Industrie, Universitt Stuttgart
2004: Project 13238 N, Explosionsauswirkungen bei der thermischen Selbstzndung von
verdichtetem Ethen, TU Darmstadt
Detailed information: www.dechema.de
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DECHEMA-Databases
Reseach projects
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Courses 2011
approx. 220 participants1.

in 2010
Sicherheit chemischer Reaktionen
2.
Sicherheitstechnik in der Chemischen

Industrie
3.
Druckentlastung und Rckhaltung von

gefhrlichen Stoffen
4.
Grundlagen und rechtliche Anforderungen

des Explosionsschutzes
5.
Anlagensicherung mit Mitteln der

Prozessleittechnik in der
Verfahrenstechnik
6.
Probabilistik bei PLT-Schutzeinrichtungen /

Pragmatische Wege zur quantitativen
Sicherheitsbetrachtung (SIL)
7.
Strungsbedingte Stoff- und

Energiefreisetzungen in Chemieanlagen
8.
Der SIL-Tag: Spezialthemen zu PLTSchutzeinrichtungen
9.
Zndgefahren infolge elektrostatischer

Aufladungen
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DECHEMA-Databases
Reseach projects
Safety always an important part of the scientific programme of ACHEMA
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ACHEMA 2009
Scientific programme Plant Safety
10 Sessions (= 53 oral presentations)
10 expert round tables (= about 10 hours)
ISSA workshop explosion safety (2 days)
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DECHEMA-Databases
Reseach projects
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DECHEMA-Databases
Reseach projects
But most importantly, DECHEMA provides the safety community with
ProcessNet: a neutral plattform for initiation / support of
political initiatives
research, networking etc.
public as well as non public (i.e. confidential) discussions within the community
many more activities (e.g. publications, events, initiatives)
by the ProcessNet-Section Safety Engineering!
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A dynamic platform for interdisciplinary activities

Annual meeting
Workshops
ProcessNet Community
Project and Partner

Brokerage
Cooperation
among commitees
Funding
Initiatives
Sections
Chemical
Reaction Engineering
Fluid Dynamics
and Separation
Safety Engineering
Particle Technology
and Product Design
Sustainable
Production, Energy
and Resources
DECHEMA e. V.
Biotechnology
Research Management
Conferences
Process-,
Apparatus- and
Plant Technology
Materials,
Construction,
Lifetime
cooperation with
GDCh, DPG, APV,
VCI, VDMA,
NAMUR,
EFCE . . .
Education
and Innovation
VDI e. V.
Societies
z. B. GET, KUT, KRdL...
kjVI
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ProcessNet in numbers
ProcessNet
Sections
Committees within these sections
2010
9
93
Well over 5.000 specialists are members of the ProcessNet-Community

Section Safety Engineering: > 1000 members*
(*including the VDI-GVC safety community; Status: 01.09.2011)
19
Committees of the section Safety Engineering
usually for 2 years
permanent commitees
- Steering committee
(Status: Aug. 2011)
Pfeil, Berlin
9 Working parties
- Safeguarding of Industrial Process Plants by Means of Process Control Engineering
Matalla, Ludwigshafen
- Releases and Impacts of Hazardous Materials
Schalau, Berlin
- Electrostatics
Schwenzfeuer, Basel/CH
- Lessons from Process Safety Incidents
Schmelzer, Leverkusen
- Chemical Process Safety
Moritz, Hamburg
- Risk Management
Leimer, Hllriegelskreuth
- Safe Design of Chemical Plants
Schmidt, Ludwigshafen
- Safety Parameters
Schendler, Berlin
- Preventive Industrial Fire Safety
Wehmeier, Lampertheim
4 Working groups
- Teaching Profile of Safety Engineering (since 2009)
Schnbucher, Essen
- Maintenance Support IEC 61511 (since 2010)
Weidlich, FFM
- Application of Process Control Engineering in Explosion Safety (since 2010)
Matalla, Ludwigshafen
- Source Term
Schnbucher, Essen
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ProcessNet / Section Safety Engineering
Public events:
o Joined organisation of safety conferences in Germany
e.g. Fachtagung Kthen 2010
o Organisation of safety-colloquia and other safety related public events
Publications
o Coordinated publication of research papers by the safety community,
e.g. 30-years anniversary of safety at DECHEMA: over 60 papers in 5 journals!
o Safety books (proceedings, monographies, etc.),
o the biannual newsletter of the section safety engineering,
o guidelines
Proposal for a curriculum for university safety courses (1997 and 2011)
Initiative Maintaining and improving competence in safety engineering
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ProcessNet-annual meetings
25. - 29. September

together with ECCEEuropean Congress of Chemical Engineering
and ECIB 1st European Congress
of Industrial Biotechnology
in Berlin
10.-13. September
togehther with the
30. DECHEMA-annual meeting
of Industrial Biotechnology
in Karlsruhe
2012
2011
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http://www.dechema.de
http://www.ProcessNet.de
23
Thank you for your attention!
24
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Dr. Gerd Uhlmann
BG RCI Maikammer
Paper 2972 by
The statutory accident insurances all together are, after the state educational institutions, the largest educational institution in
Germany.
Their training and continuing education is an integral part of the legally required prevention to protect workers against accidents, work-related illnesses and occupational diseases.
As part of the prevention work of the German Social Accident Insurance Institution for the raw materials and chemical industry
(BG RCI), training and further training of managers and employees of member companies, plays for more than 45 years an
outstanding role.
The training and further training on occupational safety and health is closely linked to the supervisory and advisory business
of BG RCI in the companies themselves, as well as the accompanying activities of specialized departments of the BG RCI.
Requirements as well as measures and activities for the protection of employees in the chemical industry are inextricably linked
to the safety of people, environment and property as well as outside the plant; therefore our training program provides to a
large extent also these objectives of plant and process safety.
Our activities
Our activities are divided into:
Target group seminars

Seminars for fields of expertise
Company related seminars
Target group seminars are aimed at managers at all levels, occupational safety and health specialists (OSH specialists), safety
representatives, councils and various specialists, e.g. Engineers, electricians, planners and other services.
The qualification consists of basic courses, advanced seminars for these specific target groups and a wide range of seminars
to which the target groups, when the conditions apply, can access.
One focus of the target group training consists of industry specific qualification of OSH specialists.
This is at BG RCI almost exclusively of issues, which are assigned to the subject plant and process safety:
Fire and explosion protection

Explosives
Biological Safety
Pressure equipment / inspections and approvals
Plant and Process Safety
Machinery of the chemical industry
With this type of seminar, which currently accounts for almost 40% of our activities, we support companies from an operating
size that allows a sufficient number of seminar participants from one company or one corporation.
In these events very specific process safety / plant safety issues can be discussed after consultancy with the specific company and the relevant prevention branch of the BG RCI- depending on interest and desire.
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Benefits of these seminars:

1. There is a greater flexibility in the choice of topics (based on one respective company)
2. The possibility of undisturbed discussions exists between managers, specialists and operational staff on daily problems of
the respective company.
3. Since all the participants come from the same company, there is usually a greater openness in the discussion of specific
events or real weaknesses. This is particularly in the area of process safety / plant safety of particular importance.
Seminars with focus on technology

The HAZOP seminar on risk assessment in chemical plants is our oldest one. Many member companies use this weeklong
event, which is realized by five tutors from the practice, for basic training of employees who will later participate in HAZOP
teams. Although the basic version of HAZOP is trained, through the support of tutors from different companies most of the
tasks are assured to be worked in a small group, which guarantees a broad experience exchange regarding variable or flexible
HAZOP application and other aspects of process safety.
Course description HAZOP:
Introduction with examples

Tasks of the moderator
Practical experience of member companies
Case Study: In sections under constant editing tutorial support in small groups
Systematic analysis procedure: alternatives, benefits, limits
Another special seminar covers but in a compact form the application of other methods for risk assessment of plant and
process safety (FMEA, LOPA, ZHA, F+E- index)
Other seminars focused on technology:
Safe operation of chemical processes focus: Exothermic reactions
Basics of exothermic chemical reactions, heat balance and scale-up
Safety analysis methods
Case studies, analysis of incidents
Safety concepts for reaction, storage and distillation
Computer based simulation
The participant will receive an insight into the problems of exothermic chemical reactions taking into account the normal operation and upset operation process in a holistic process based and risk-based safety concept.
Fire and explosion protection in the chemical industry

The explosion-protection issues, with particular reference to plant and process safety, we devote to four types of seminars: a
connected trilogy for engineers as well as a compact seminar for operational managers.
Explosion protection in the chemical industry Technical Basics
Basics of explosion protection (hazard identification, assessment, safety parameters)
Avoiding hazardous explosive atmospheres
Inerting
Avoiding effective ignition sources
Reliable explosion protection
Explosion-proof construction, explosion venting
Explosion suppression, Explosion Isolation
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Explosion protection in the chemical industry Technical Specialties:

Applied principles (practical examples)
Explosion protection by means of process control systems
Explosion protection in the thermal exhaust air cleaning (Case Study)
Non-electrical equipment
Control of static electricity problems (experimental lecture)
Requirements of explosion protection according to applied regulation

Complementary seminar for the formal requirements of the regulations
Explosion protection for industrial experts (foreman):
In this compact seminar, the focus is on the practical detection of potential problems caused by the risk of explosion.
A brief overview of the technical principles of explosion protection and the formal requirements of the regulations are intended
to enable the operational managers in a position to properly assess risks and to obtain the adequate assistance from explosion
protection experts.
Closely linked with the explosion protection is the subject of industrial fire protection, because fires are often the result of explosions.
The seminar Fire protection in the chemical industry covers:
Statutory and private law rules
Structural fire protection
Operational fire protection
Emergency response planning
Fire extinguishing mediums, fire extinguishing systems, personal on fire
Fire protection concept
Basic information about explosion protection and fire protection are taught in all the (target groups)-basic courses for operational managers and safety representatives in the form of an experimental lecture with a focus on professional-specific risk
assessment.
Seminars with focus on organization

Based on the fact that a large proportion of unwanted events with or without personal injury occur not in normal operation,
but for maintenance, servicing and repairs, and during construction and after changes, a special focus lies also in our training
program in this part of the company practice.
I would like to put special emphasis on the seminar :
Safety during maintenance and modification of chemical plants:
(Seminar for operational managers)
Content:
Release notes
Maintenance and management of change in complex systems
Risk analysis on a case study
Conflict area safety costs schedules availability
Enforcement of occupational health and safety measures
In 2011 we dedicate this issue because of special importance and contractor-problematic an additional workshop, with the
inclusion of the sectors of metals and construction, as most of the contracting companies for these tasks are not a members
company of the BG RCI ( but are members of the relevant specialist German Social Accident Insurance Institution).
The issue of safety on construction sites in the chemical industry is also a large part of the training of OSH specialists.
Specifically in relation to construction sites are also classic occupational safety issues become part of plant and process
safety, e.g. the risk of collision losses in the range of internal transport and traffic.
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Further seminars on organization with considerable focus on the concerns of process safety / plant safety include for example:
Occupational Health and Safety Management
Risk assessment in practice
Tools for professional safety work
All management or organization seminars focus on the theme of relationships, this means there are fewer individual problems
treated, but the whole work system recorded.
Examples include the human-technology interface, the interaction of the various organization units (e.g. production, logistics and distribution), the communication and the interaction of its own employees and departments with external partners and contractors.
The inclusion of the employees in design and change of processes also is of special importance.
Since executives and management seminars place a special emphasis on continuous improvement and less on the observance of
regulations, in such events seminar- methods like experience sharing sessions and workshops are standing in the foreground.
Communication with coaches and other seminar participants, the discussion about successes and failures of implemented
measures, together with real incidents or near misses, making contacts and finding of potentially useful information sources
represent the main usefulness of these events.
Seminars with focus on people (human factors)

The protection of the people themselves, but also the protection of uninvolved people as well as the environment and property
against the consequences of people s incorrect actions are the focus of our seminars on health and safety.
In many ways, this also affects plant and process safety issues.
Despite modern technology and largely secure technic the (plant and process -) safety is still significantly affected by fitness and
qualifications, but also affected by peoples performance. This is e.g. influenced by communication, motivation and physical
and mental health of employees. Significant aspects (and especially with regard to the interests of plant safety) are for example
Leadership communication information instruction

Individual-performance, self-assessment of employees
Excessive and low demand (e.g. during monitoring activities)
Physical health or problems
Mental health or problems
Problems, hazards, limited responsiveness and performance due to alcohol, drugs and medicines
Our programme offers various seminars and seminar groups that are devoted to this wide and important topic. Examples
include:
Conversation techniques in occupational health and safety
Instruct employees effectively
Psychology in occupational safety motivation to achieve safer behaviour
Fit and healthy at shift work
Introduction to Conflict Management
Drug use in the organization
and other services
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Methodology, experiences, benefits and limitations, outlook

Our modern seminar program uses all the (educational and technical) possibilities of adult education, in addition to presentations and workshops, discussions and case studies, all applicable media such as video, Internet, self-learning CDs, simulators,
visual aids in a display case, practice fields (that are operated active modules), experimental lectures.
Especially when it comes to plant and safety, the availability of practical active modules is very limited. Of course, no demonstrations with real plant parts or equipment can be carried out, which can pose some risk. This must remain a focus of the
work-related instruction in the workplace. We are however dependent on relatively few simulations and experimental lectures.
The methodologies as well as the seminar programme are constantly being evaluated and developed. This is done in close
cooperation with the companies themselves, the BG RCIs industry prevention in the company plants, as well as our special
departments (e.g., for plant and process safety in general, pressure vessels or explosion protection) and numerous external
experts.
Our speakers are primarily from the active practice or from consulting companies, thus the reference to reality is given as much
as possible.
Seminar materials and handouts to rework are mostly part of current professional publications, which are constantly updated
by the BG RCI in collaboration with numerous experts drawn from industry.
Especially in further training courses, a great challenge to every instructor is the intension to have a similar competence level
in the group..
On the subject process and plant safety we frequently reach limits. The heterogeneity of participants with regard to pre-experience, expectations and work-based or professional environment is very high.
A further problem is the legitimate desire of current participants to practice examples that are close to reality.
On the subject plant and process safety we get to limits:
BG RCI does not operate any plants!
All information on technology, organization, successes and failures, events and near-misses must come practical, credible and
understandable from outside.
Last but not least, our efforts have only a limited and sustainable impact, for us difficult to estimate: improvements and success through training and further training are always influenced to a very large extent by the seminar participants determination
and also by the professional environment, i.e. from the boundaries of workplace practices.
Therefore, I finally address four petitions :
A further improvement of our seminars or its sustainable value requires from our member companies:
1. Continue to provide skilled speakers from the industry that are close to practice
2. A further optimized, i.e. target group-oriented pre-selection of seminar participants
3. To provide practice-oriented training material in the future (examples, incidents/accidents, pictures, videos, this is of particular importance for plant and process safety)
4. Increased theming or follow-up of seminar contents after the seminar has finished.
If these conditions are met: the continuous development of effective support for effective prevention in our member companies through training and further training with the BG RCI is guaranteed.
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8. ECCE, Berlin 2011
Promoting incident prevention

decades of experience to share
by
Dr.Gerd Uhlmann
BG RCI
gerd.uhlmann@bgrci.de
Seite
BG RCI :
Industry :
Supervisory and
advisory business
in the companies
Safety concept
Industrial
Training and
further education
Specialized
departments of the
BG RCI
Safety
Safety technology
Safety organisation
Experts
Standard
Experience, training
and further education
of the employees
Seite
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Our activities :
Target group seminars
Seminars for fields of expertise
Seite
Target group seminars :

Managers at all levels
OSH specialists
Safety representatives
Works councils
Specialists : e.g. engineers,
planners, electricians and other services
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Qualification of OSH specialists

Industry specific qualification by the BG RCI :
Fire and explosion protection
Explosives
Biological safety
Pressure equipment / inspections and approvals
Plant and process safety basics
Machinery of the chemical industry
Seite

Seminar participants from one company only
Possibility of undisturbed discussions between
managers, specialists and operational staff
Greater flexibility in the choice of topics
Greater openness in the discussion of specific
events or real weaknesses
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Focus on technology
Special seminar: HAZOP
Introduction with examples
Task of the moderator
Practical experience of member companies
Case study : under constant editing tutorial support
in small groups
Systematic analysis procedure: alternatives,
benefits, limits
Another special seminar on risk assessment methods:
Content : FMEA, LOPA, ZHA, F+E-Index
Seite
Special seminar :
Exothermic reactions
Basics of exothermic reactions, heat balance,
scale-up
Safety analysis methods
Case studies, analysis of incidents
Safety concepts for reaction, storage and distillation
Computer based simulation
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Explosion protection (for engineers)

Seminar : Explosion protection-technical basics
Basics of explosion protection (hazard identification,
assessment, safety parameters)
Avoiding hazardous explosive atmospheres
Inerting
Avoiding effective ignition sources
Reliable explosion protection
Explosion-proof construction, explosion venting
Explosion suppression, explosion isolation
Seite
Explosion protection
Further seminars :
-Technical specialities (for engineers)
-Requirements of explosion protection according to applied
regulation (for engineers)
-Explosion protection for industrial experts (for foremen)
Basic information about explosion and fire protection :
taught as experimental lecture in all basic seminars for
safety representatives and operational managers
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Fire protection
Seminar : Fire protection in the chemical industry
Statutary and private law rules
Structural fire protection
Operational fire protection
Organizationel fire protection,
emergency response planning
Fire extinguishing mediums/-systems
Personal on fire
Fire protection concept
Seite
Focus on Organization :
Example - Seminar for operational managers:
Safety during maintenance and modification of
chemical plants
Release notes
Maintenance and MOC in complex systems
Risk analysis on a case study
Conflict area safety-costs-schedules-availability
Enforcement of occupational health and safety
measures
Seite
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Focus on Organization
(further seminar examples)
Safety on construction sites
(part of the training of the OSH specialists)
Special seminars for example :
- Occupational Health and Safety Management
- Risk assessment in practice
- Tools for professional safety at work
- Emergency Management
Seite
Focus on people in our seminars

Protection of people (in the plant) themselves
but also :
Protection of
-uninvolved people
-environment
-property
against the consequences of people`s incorrect actions
Seite
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Focus on people
Significant aspects in our seminars :
-Leadership communication information - instruction
-Individual-performance, self-assessment of employees
-Excessive and low demand (e.g. during monitoring
activities)
-Physical health or problems
-Mental health or problems
-Problems, hazards, limited responsiveness and
performance due to alcohol, drugs and medicines
Seite
Focus on people
Our programme offers
various seminars and seminar groups :
- Conversation techniques in occupational health and safety
- Instruct employees effectively
- Psychology in occupational safety motivation to
achieve safer behavier
- Fit and healthy at shift work
- Introduction to Conflict Management
- Drug use in the organization
-and other services
Seite
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Methodology, experiences, benefits,

limitations of our seminars
All modern possibilities of adult education are used
Constant evaluation and development
Speakers primarily from the active practice
Problems / limitations :
-Often no similar competence level in the groups
-Limitation of practice-examples - close to the reality
-No demonstrations with real plant parts or equipment
Seite
Practical effekt of our seminars :

Quality of
Participant`s
our seminars
determination
sustainable
achievement
?!
Boundaries of
workplace practices
Seite
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Thank You
for Your attention
Seite
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Dr Martin J. Pitt
Chemical & Biological Engineering
University of Sheffield
Sheffield S1 3JD, UK
Martin Pitt is Chairman of the EFCE Working Party on Education, and has over 30 years experience of teaching safety to
chemical engineers in universities and industry.
The Chemical Safety Board of the USA reported on the T2 Laboratories explosion that neither the chemist nor the chemical
engineer in charge were aware of the dangers of runaway reactions. They recommended that this should be added to all
Bachelor degrees in chemical engineering. UK courses have long been required to include a substantial safety component:
the situation in other European countries varies, but incidents such as the Toulouse explosion have increased interest.
It is not a matter of telling students to be safe, it is giving them the capability of increasing safety in their professional work by
knowledge, skills and awareness. This is not a trivial matter. There are three things to determine: the syllabus, the method of
delivery and the people needed to do it.
Some options will be discussed, based on the authors experience and recent Workshops on safety teaching run by the Working Party on Education, along with work by other bodies.
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Chemical &
Biological
Engineering.
Teaching Safety:
What, Who, How?
And When?
Martin J. Pitt
Hazop on the Degree Course

Intention:
FLOW of safety knowledge to student.
Academic
Lecture
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S t r e n g t h
Student
d e g r a d i n g
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DEVIATIONS
NO FLOW because:
NO LECTURE
NO KNOWLEDGE in academic
Student NOT PRESENT
Academic
Student
Lecture
DEVIATIONS
LESS FLOW because:
INEFFECTIVE TEACHING by academic

LACK OF EFFORT by student
Academic
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Lecture
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DEVIATIONS
OPPOSITE FLOW =
at the end the student knows less
OTHER FLOW =
the student learns unsafe practice
Academic
Student
Lecture
Cycling 101
1. Rotational inertia
2. Multiple rotations in a gravitational

eld
3. Dynamic control of oscillating
metastable systems
....................
20. Cycle safety

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Lecture 20: Cycle Safety
Failure modes of bicycle components

Probability calculations
Incidents:
1903, 1940, 1974
Pictures of dead cyclists
WHAT do we mean safety?

It is easy to tell someone to BE safe.
More useful to tell them HOW to be
safe.
Much harder for those whose actions

affect other people, perhaps years
later.
The costs we will see now,
the benets never.
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HOW do we teach it?
Or should we teach it at all?
Is bad teaching better than none?
Confucius (about 500 B.C.)

Learning without thought is labour
lost.
Thought without learning is perilous.
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Alexander Pope (1711)
A little learning is a dangerous thing;

.......
While from the bounded level of our

mind Short views we take, nor see the
lengths behind,
Learning depends onDifferent
learning is
possible at
different times
in the career.
Prior knowledge
Motivation
Memory
Understanding
Intellectual
engagement
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Skill
Safety is the hardest subject

It covers other subjects
technical and human
And the interactions between them
Small amounts of ignorance can be

fatal
Success cannot be measured
Nobody knows it all
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t o
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T2 Laboratories 4 killed
Chemical
Thermodynamics
How things can go

wrong Human factors
Chemical Kinetics
Physical
Thermodynamics
Heat Transfer
Process Control
WHO?
Needs to learn?
Students
Should do the
teaching?
Chemical Engineers
Operators
Other professionals
Management
Academics
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WHO?
Academics
Students
Management
Chemical Engineers
Chemical Engineers
Other professionals
Operators
Operators
Other professionals
Management
Academics
Students
Training and Education

TRAINING prepares
you for the anticipated.
Understanding is not
strictly necessary.
Obey the rules!
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Training and Education

EDUCATION prepares you
for the unexpected.
Knowledge and
understanding are required.
Understand the rules and
how to vary them.
For Example
Substance A is corrosive, so rubber

gloves and goggles must be worn.
Substance A is hydrochloric acid, so
has certain properties in contact with
other substances and if heated.
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Training
For the certain, e.g. protective

clothing:
needs to be in good time, practical.
For the unlikely emergency:
needs to be repeated yearly;
go through the motions as far as
possible.
Chief Executive
Continuing
Professional
Development
Manager
Professional Engineer
Graduate Trainee
University Student
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Different
Requirements
Methods
S t r e n g t h
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Knowledge decays
If thoroughly learned, the half-life is

about 18 months to 2 years.
(Education)
If not reinforced or used, 6 to 10
weeks. (Training)
Skills (physical or mental) need to be

practised to be maintained.
Effect of training on
knowledge
Su et al (2000) Academic Emergency Medicine, vol 7 no 7 p779
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New Chem Eng Graduate

BIG COMPANY
SMALL COMPANY
Group teaching is
economic
Safety office
Sending individuals on
courses problematic
Part time Safety Officer
Formal training
Ad hoc training
Many colleagues
Experienced Mentor
Range of technical
support
Few colleagues
Sink or Swim!
Limited support,
probable multi-tasking
Safety and Competence
Correct calculations lead to safe design

Skilled workers lead to safe installation
Good workplans lead to safe operation
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To follow rules it helps
To understand why the rule is there

Dont just tell people the rule
Give them the reason or consequence
No Smoking
Reason
It is the arbitrary rule
Consequence
You will be punished
Not to be offensive
Not to set off smoke
alarm
You will be disliked

Evacuation and
disruption
To deny you pleasure

To protect your health
Sensitive material
Flammable material
P r o c e s s
S a f e t y
C o m p e t e n c e

Contamination of
product
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t o
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Effective Safety Education

Should be in your own language
Think of...
Foreign students or workers
Illiterate, blind or deaf workers
Managers who are not chemical

engineers
Some Traps
Familiarity
Magic Paper
Big Danger
Small Danger
Hazop
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t o
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The Familiarity Trap
Weve been using xxxxxx for years.

I am a qualied engineer/ chemist/
etc.
The design procedures work.
The management system works.

Weve never had a problem.
N Lieberman A Working
Guide to Process Equipment
Worked as a process engineer for
Amoco
Designed 50 distillation columns and

saw hundreds of others without
understanding how the thermosyphon
worked.
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The Magic Paper Trap

Permits to work
Certicates of safety
Legal compliance
The Big Danger Trap

We focus on one danger
and overlook others, or
pay insufficient
attention to them.
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The Small Danger Trap
We spend our time on lots of things we

can understand.
Do not take time to consider more

complex interactions or major hazards.
The Hazop Trap
Its been Hazoped, it will be all right.
Hazop is good at some things but not

all
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Universities
Universities should provide the deep

knowledge of the basic subject, and
teach the students how to learn.
New graduates need an appreciation of

the range of hazards, and an
awareness of techniques to deal with
them; but do not have the experience
for much more.
Industry
By providing Summer or year places for

students, industry can make better,
safer graduates.
Training should be provided for

immediate safety issues, and graduates
must also have the opportunity for
more education.
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Managers
Need to take time to learn about safety

themselves, especially when taking on
new responsibilities.
Need to include employee training and
education as part of safety policy.
Finally
Education is less effective than you

think!
It is better to design out hazards than

train people to manage them.
All life is a risk.
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t o
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Ing. JHG Slijpen
Head Inspection Team MHC-South, Directorate for Major Hazard Control, Dutch Labour Inspectorate, Ministry van Social Affairs and Employment
Needs and coverage of PPS competence needs for authorities developing legislation, performing inspections and their oversight duties
What does Europe (or which parts of EU) need to achieve and maintain appropriate PPS competencies?
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8th European Congress

Chemical Engineering
- Authorities view in Europe
Jan Slijpen
Head Inspection Team
MHC-South-NLD
Directorate
Major Hazards Control
Dutch Labour Inspectorate
I.
Major Accident Fire in Netherlands
II. MH-accident Prevention

III. Efficiency of Supervision
IV. Competences for Supervision
02/13/12
Personal Information
Education:
Additional:
Chemical Engineering
Risk Management, OSH Management, Occupational Hygiene,
Process Safety, Social Skills, Lead Auditor, Management Skills
Experience:
Chemical Industry: Environmental + Safety Engineer (5 years)
National Government (DLI): 30 years in total
Several positions with the Dutch Labour Inspectorate
International Experience (ILO, OPCW, EC):

10 years in total
International Project Leadership:
4 years in total
Head MHC-team South-Netherlands (12 inspectors): 8
Current Position:
years
Special Task: Trainer on Seveso-II + OSH (also internationally)
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Introduction
Major Accident Fire in The Netherlands 2011
Data
Date: January 2011
Time: afternoon
Nature of company
Medium-size company: 50 employees
Storage / Handling Hazardous Chemicals
Pesticides, minerals and cleaning materials
Flammable and toxic chemicals
Family-owned Company
Activities
Storage and Packaging
Filling of Bags and Drums
Low Knowledge and low Awareness of Process Safety
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Features of Major Accident Fire

Type of major accident: Fire
Combustion of huge amounts of Chemicals
Smoke contained toxic combustion products
Small Explosions (drums)
Direct consequences
No employees injured
No direct consequences onsite nor in neighbourhood
Fire Fighting Approach
Insufficient Information about chemicals onsite
Fire combat initially with water spreading the fire
Coverage with foam at the end
Continuous measuring of toxic substances
Emergency Response
Chaos
Communication and information problems
Several websites providing contradictory information
Technical problems with official government website: www.crisis.nl
Press: approaching different authorities
Social media
Social media
Twitter: efficient communication medium
Many people rely more on Twitter than other communication media
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Supervision History
Inspection History
All inspections at company led to enforcement activities
Enforcement activities havent led to sufficient compliance
Safety culture and leadership is of reactive nature
Conclusion for Major Accident Fire:

Companys Prevention Policy for MH-Accidents inefficient
Inadequate Safety Management System
Leadership and Safety Culture hamper improvement of Process Safety
New Supervision and Enforcement Strategy needed for such
companies
What is needed to prevent such MH-Accidents

At the Company Side
Process Safety Policy: Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP)
Appropriate Safety / Risk Management System
Appropriate Technical Knowledge and Expertise
Trained and skilled workers with appropriate Competences
Well-balanced Safety Culture + Leadership in Process Safety
At the Authorities Side

Competent and Qualified Supervision / Inspection Authorities
Competent and Qualified Inspectors, in particular for MHC-inspections
Appropriate Inspection Methodology for Process Safety
Appropriate Methodology for Investigation of MH-Accidents
Appropriate Enforcement Strategy
Continuous and assured (Refreshment) Training Programs
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Inspection Methodology:System-based Supervision

System Check
System-oriented Supervision
IH+AR
MAPP
Top-Down
CHECK
PLAN
Management System
MR
Measures-oriented Supervision
ACT
PO
PDCA
Deming circle
IA
OC
PSP
MoC
EP
Technical + Organisational Measures

Preventive LODs
Repressive LODs
Scenario
LoC
DO
Bottom-Up
Workplace Check
WORKPLACE
Appraisal Process
Observations
Document review
Interviews
Topic
Suitable?
Implemented?
Criterium
Documented?
Finding
Norm
Workplace Inspection
Finding
Good
Moderate
Poor
Bad
Judgement
Conclusion
Follow Up: Enforcement?
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Risk Management Development

Technology /
Standards: LODs
HSE
Accidents
Management
Systemen
Safe Design
Integrity
Safety Awareness
Law Compliance
Safety Culture
Leadership
Safety Culture
Time
Engagement?
11
Safety Culture Ladder
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Supervision
Aim of Supervision
Contribution to Prevention / Reduction / Control of Major
Hazard Risks
Enhancement of Law Compliance
Enforcement and Restoration of Violations
Supervision Approach
Risk-based
Information-based
System-based
Trust-based
Enforcement-based
Unannounced
Competences
Definition of Competency
A competency is a cluster of:
related knowledge, expertise, skills and attitudes
that affects a significant part of a person's job,
which combined with the requirements for that task
can be measured and compared to accepted standards and
which can be improved through training and personal
development.
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Competences
Competent Inspection Authority
Sufficient Competent Staff

Minimum number of Seveso sites under supervision
Competent MHC Inspectors
Continuous and assured (Refreshment) Training Program
Assured Work Procedures
Appropriate Inspection Methodology
Appropriate Enforcement Strategy
Basic Requirements MHC Inspectors
Bachelor or Master Degree in:

Chemical, Mechanical or Electrical Engineering
Master degree in Health and Safety Management

Work Experience in relevant industry
Specific Training in supervising Major Hazards Control
Inspectors Duties
1. Analysing + Assessing Quality of Process Safety Studies
(PSS)
2. Analysing + Assessing Quality of Lines of Defences (LODs)
3. Analysing + Assessing Suitability of the Maintenance
Management System (MMS)
4. Analysing + Assessing Suitability of Safety Management
System / Risk Management System (SMS / RMS)
5. Analysing + Assessing Suitability of Major Accident
Prevention Policy (MAPP)
6. Drawing Conclusions from Supervision / Inspections
7. Enforcing Law Violations, if and when needed
16
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Competences
Inspectors Competences
Functional Competences (job skills)
Knowledge
Experience
Job skills
Personal Competences
Generic Personal Competences
Core Personal Competences
Competence Diagram
Adaptability
Conceptual Thinking
Decisiveness
Judgement Capability
Flexible
Customer-oriented
Analy+cal Ability
Convincing
Coopera+ve
Quality-oriented
Vision Ability
Integrity
Curiosity
Communica+ve
Responsibility
Trust-building Ability
Poli+cal
Sensi+vity
Result-oriented
Social Sensi+vity
Sensi+vity for Details
Networking Ability
18
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Competences
Inspectors Core Personal Competences
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Analytical ability
Communicative
Quality oriented
Result oriented
Political sensitivity
Knowledge
Knowledge Domains
P r o c e s s
Legislation
Technology
Safety Technology
Safety Management
Inspection Techniques
Work procedures (ISO 9001)
Investigation Techniques
Audit Techniques
Interview Techniques
Reporting Skills
S a f e t y
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Questions?
21
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Process and Plant Safety Competence How to sustain this success factor
for European Chemical Industry
Dr. Peter G. Schmelzer
CEFIC, Chair of Issue Team on Process and Plant Safety
Bayer AG, Chair of Bayer Group PPS Committee
Bayer HealthCare AG, Leverkusen, Head of global HSE Platform
Europes Chemical Industry is important part of an increasingly more global acting industry and delivering important products
for the worlds societies and population. Be it as supplier of intermediates for industry partners or for final products. There is
almost nothing women or men do today which is not involving chemical industry products. With this comes a tremendous
responsibility regarding the assurance of continuous and sufficient supply of materials and goods because economies and individuals deeply rely on availability and quality. With this comes the request and obligation to produce materials and goods thus
the likelihood of negative impact to people, to the environment or to assets from the manufacturing processes etc. is reduced
as far as reasonably practicable. Adequate and increasingly higher performance regarding process and plant safety is rightfully
so expected by societies and the individual customer and citizen: PPS performance is an important success factor for industry.
First of all it is of paramount importance to acknowledge that Process and Plant Safety performance depends on people.
People who in different phases of the process of risk identification, assessment and mitigation determine the level which PPS
performance can be achieved.
Secondly we have to account for that we depend on the quality of organizational as well as on technical processes. Such as
e.g. the systematic and thorough hazard identification and risk evaluation criteria and process, or such as the proper design
and availability on demand of a safety critical devices, or such as a proper operation and maintenance approach in the manufacturing facilities themselves, etc. etc..
Industry in any case requires appropriately educated people to develop and maintain each safety critical process. Depending
on the level of qualification which is available from public education and training systems industry is more or less developing
specific skills themselves by using again publically available training institutions, associations or on the job with own facilities.
Industry associations (e.g. Cefic or national industry associations etc.) and industry funded or sponsored institutions play an
important role in this context since decades. Either as a source for education, standardization and experience exchange platform. One important question is, if the system of education sources from the public, industry and other institutions meets the
requirements of today and tomorrow or needs adjustment and/or specific additional attention.
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Process and Plant Safety Competence How to sustain this success factor for European Chemical Industry
Process and Plant Safety Competence

How to sustain this success factor
for European Chemical Industry
Dr.-Ing. Peter G. Schmelzer, Bayer HealthCare AG
Chairman CEFIC Issue Team Process and Plant Safety
*
Process Safety Competence - European Strength degrading to Weakness?
8th ECCE, September 28th+29th 2011, Berlin
* Conseil Europen des Fdrations de l'Industrie Chimique
Competence
Ability of an individual
to perform a job properly.
Observable
abilities,
skills,
knowledge,
motivations or traits
needed for successful
job performance.
Geri Winkler on top of Mount McKinley
8.ECCE Berlin, Process Plant Safety Competence, Cefic 2011-09-29 Dr.-Ing. Peter G. Schmelzer
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Ensuring PPS competence in operation (simplified)

1. Defining / reviewing the job requirements and responsibilities
3. Identifying gaps between employees

capabilities / competencies and job requirements
4. Closing identified gaps with additional education / studies:
external or internal courses
on the job training
participation in experience exchanges
Continuous
Improvement
Cycle
2. Hiring / Contracting; Job Rotation; Succession Planning
Its people who need and create PPS competence

People involved in
Human Resources
Training / Education
Research
Process Development,
Plant / Process Design
Construction
Operation
Maintenance
Procurement
Decommissioning
People working at
Schools, Universities,
Training Institutions
Research Centers,
Laboratories
Industry
Authorities
NGOs
3rd Party Inspection
companies
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PPS competence must have solid foundations

People involved in
Human Resources
Training / Education
Research
Construction
Operation
Maintenance
Procurement
Decommissioning
People working at
Research Centers,
Laboratories
Industry
Authorities
NGOs
(including industry
associations)
companies
Consultants
Competence
Competence is
is about
about people
people
People
People working
working at
at
Schools,
Universities,
Training
Institutions
Research
Research Centers,
Centers,
Laboratories
Laboratories
Industry
Industry
Authorities
Authorities
NGOs
NGOs
(including
(including industry
industry
associations)
associations)
3rd
3rd Party
Party Inspection
Inspection
companies
companies
Consultants
Consultants // Contractors
Contractors
People involved in
Performance
of
Performance
of the
the system
system
Human Resources
benefits
benefits from
from
Training/Education
Research
Process
Development,
employees
employees
Plant / Process
and
and Design
business
Construction
partners
business
partners
Operation
who
who
Maintenance
are
particularly
are
particularly fit
fit for
for their
their
Procurement
duties
duties
Decommissioning
and
and
on
work
work
on common
common grounds
grounds
66
8.ECCE
8.ECCEBerlin,
Berlin,Process
ProcessPlant
PlantSafety
SafetyCompetence,
Competence,Cefic
Cefic 2011-09-29
2011-09-29Dr.-Ing.
Dr.-Ing.Peter
PeterG.
G.Schmelzer
Schmelzer
P r o c e s s
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t o
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Industry fostering the common grounds

Universities / Schools
Cooperation, research activities,
Practica, workplaces, sponsorship, master / PHD theses,
Cooperation with external partners
e.g. operator and engineer training
Institutions, Associations, Training, e.g.
IChemE (in Germany e.g. DECHEMA, ProcessNet, )
EPSC
EFCE
Cefic, national chemical associations,
Working on Standardization, Legislative Initiatives
ISO, CEN, Namur,
National and EU governmental bodies
7
The operator needs to cover all bases

People involved in
Human Resources
Training/Education
Research
Construction
Operation
Maintenance
Procurement
Decommissioning
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Keys to high level Process & Plant Safety

People involved in
Training/Education
Research
Construction
Operation
Maintenance
Procurement
Decommissioning
People apply
Hazard
TrainingIdentification
Institutions
Risk Assessment
Research Centers,
Risk Mitigation
Laboratories
Industry
Authorities
Inherently Safer
Design
NGOs
Technical and
companies
organizational measures
and recognizing their
interdependencies
Key competencies to ensure Process & Plant Safety

Substances, Process
Interdependencies of substances,
Hazard
materials, process conditions etc.
Identification
Technical installation / capabilities
Risk Assessment
normal operation incl. Start-up
Risk Mitigation
and Shut-down
Deviations from normal
abilities
Emergency Response
Inherently Safer
Design skills
Organisational means / capabilities
Human Behavior, Group dynamics
knowledge
Technical and
Legal Requirements
organizational measures
motivations
Work Environment
and recognizing their
traits
Public Expectations
interdependencies
10
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PPS competence must rely on in-house training

Methodologies
Risk Evaluation Methods and Criteria
Risk Mitigation Measures
Basic PPS Knowledge
Basics in natural science and
engineering
PPS Knowledge related to and
about the specific workplace
11
PPS competence must rely on in-house training

Methodologies
External
Common Ground
Risk Evaluation Methods and Criteria
Risk Mitigation Measures
Basic PPS Knowledge
Basics in natural science and
engineering
Internal
PPS Knowledge related to and
Company
about the specific workplace
and Process
Specific
12
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PPS competence outside industrial operation
Board
of
Management
Non Operation
Guests
13
Building blocks for PPS competence
Managing
top Process
Plant Safety
Performance
Experience / Practice
Research / Innovation
Laying
the
foundation
School
University
14
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Fit for the future

On the basis of the already high level of achievements Industry
is committed to develop PPS knowledge, competence and
performance further
Industry regrets the decrease of number of universities and
institutions providing a comprehensive curriculum for PPS as
part of engineering and natural science studies
Efforts of all stakeholders regarding PPS would be more
efficient and effective, if
more engineering and natural science students have
thorough basic knowledge regarding process and plant
safety
more opportunities for specialization on process and plant
safety at universities is provided
15
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High Process Safety competence a valuable asset for a chemical company
Dr H.V.Schwarz
VP process safety BASFgroup
BASF SE
Hans.schwarz@basf.com, phone: +49-174 3199 852
The value of high process safety competence is illustrated by looking at the example of BASF, the worlds largest and most
diversified chemical company.
BASF looks back at a long history of improving process safety after a traumatic explosion in 1921.
The main hub, Ludwigshafen has achieved a leading position through forming and following industry trends like higher automation, systematic hazard analysis, building high competence of its employees and management focus on implementation.
Its strong safety culture is founded in leading process technologies and deep technical knowledge of its employees. Learning
from accidents of the past and throughout the industry, statistical analysis of small incidents, and consequent management of
safety hazards with the help of a semiquantitative risk matrix, as well as cooperation with other leading chemical companies
are key elements of BASFs competence in process safety. On a personal level, process safety competence of production and
engineering employees and process safety experts is kept up by training- and awareness programs. A strong set of corporate
guidelines provides guidance in processes like new plant design, facility siting, management of change, updating of existing
facilities.
Recent challenges are arising from efficiency pressures in operations and maintenance, a growing number of sites and cultures
through acquisitions and globalization, which forced the company to strengthen its process safety organisation and develop
process safety competence in many new employees globally.
There is a growing realization that process safety is closely linked with plant reliability, as well as enterprise risk management
and therefore a must for the economical success of the company. Add this to the core of process safety, the protection of
employees and neighbors from chemical hazards, and it becomes evident that process safety has become a core value and
receives the clear and uncompromised support of BASFs top management.
Based on this strong culture, the potentials for further improvement are seen in the skills and knowledge of employees, like
strong individual understanding of processes and their risks, knowledge of process safety approaches and techniques in plant
operation, more efficient use of detailed incident data as a source of learning, more consequent Management of Change, as
well as in further technical advancement, such as further automation, including in older plants, further improved hazard identification methods, including the hazard analysis of transient state, and a stronger economical motivation of further improved
process safety, with even less downtime from incidents.
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ECCE, Berlin, Sept 29, 2011
High Process Safety Competence

a valuable asset for a
chemical company
Dr Hans V Schwarz
(BASF SE, GUS/A)
9/2011
Process Safety at
BASF SE, Ludwigshafen
n BASF organizes EHS work under the framework of Responsible
Care Initiative, an independent industry approach
n High priority for Process Safety

is integral part of BASFs DNA
since 1921 explosion in
Ludwigshafen Oppau.
n Optimization of Process Safety remains a continuous effort

l Safety has priority over production targets
l Synergies of Safety and Production (mostly or partly ?) pay the bill
H.Schwarz, KUT/P, 6/2005
P r o c e s s
S a f e t y
Folien/polioles safety project 2005.ppt
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Process Safety development

BASF SE, Ludwigshafen
n Process Safety hugely improved since beginnings
l 1890s:
l 1950s/60s:
~ 1% of employees killed per year !

Yearly fatalities normal on larger sites
l 1970s to 2000s: Western countries:

Fatalities became a rare exception
Reduced number of major incidents
30
Fatalities Process Safety, Ludwigshafen
West
Nord
23
15
l Last decade:
Still some high profile incidents
Increasing publicity
Pressure for further improvements
8
0
1970s
1980s
1990s
2000s
Improvements driven by industry trends

n More reliable equipment
l Materials of construction, advanced gaskets
l Mechanical equipment design; Intelligent equipment
n Automation, narrower process control
l Control systems, sensors allow narrower process control
l Less people in the plants ( less injuries)
n Systematic hazard analysis methods, like HAZOP
l Broadly used since the early 90s
n Management focus
l Safety given priority, larger role in company image
l Industry initiatives beyond compliance
n Regulation
l Plant inspection programs; targets replace rigid rules
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Improvements depend on Culture and

Competence
n Commitment of top management leads to better Safety Culture, which in
turn sets the frame for further improvements
l Basis for development of competence of the organisation
(processes, which support process safety)
n Competence of the workforce is the most important enabler for high
quality in the actual tasks:
l Process design for inherent safety
l Design of instrumented safety systems
l Hazard Analysis / Safety Reviews
l Management of Change
l Measurements of
substance safety properties
l Incident analysis, data evaluation
l Development of company guidelines and rules
Competence of the organisation

example: BASF
n Decentralization of the expert organisation
l Regional hubs of experts
n More formal approach to ensure sufficient qualification of decentral
experts
n Globalized mandatory guidelines, regional differentiation with successfull
practises
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Process Safety Competence development

example: BASF
n Functional groups (production, maintenance engineering,..) receive
specific training (knowledge, awareness)
Dif
l Production employees, all levels
Ge ficult
y
l Production leadership functions
ma tting :
na agr
l Maintenance employees and managers
da
tor eem
y tr ent
l Engineering employees and engineering managers
ain on
ing
l Executives with production responsability
l Executives in general management functions
n Process Safety specialists and experts
l Come from defined career tracks
(production, engineering, maintenance)
l Receive in depth process safety education
l Participate in continuous learning
Dif
Ge ficult
y
thr tting :
ou
gh cons
ou
t th istenc
ec y
om
pa
n
y7
What makes a good process safety expert ?

(= competent expert), example: BASF
n Career background:
l Solid academic education in science, or engineering:
chemistry, physics, thermodynamics, kinetics,
related engineering disciplines,
l Some years in R&D, process development,
l Several years in production or maintenance role
n Job specific:
l Training in methods and concepts (hazard analysis,
incident analysis, process safety management,)
l Growing experience in process safety
n Academic training in process safety:
l Doesnt play a significant role in BASF so far
l Could provide conceptual understanding
l Could help improve safety attitudes of new hires if
integrated in engineering and science degrees
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Training, safety education

example: BASF
n Experts, production-, technical- professionals:
BASF SE uses training from
l Own process safety department and own firebrigade
l BG RCI (e.g. PAAG HAZOP class)
l Dechema process net (e.g. training for expert in specific topics)
n Executives:
l Events targeted at leadership behaviour
l Discussion groups executives with process safety leadership
l Regular information on important incidents and KPI trends
n Operators:
l Plant internal training
l BG RCI
l Awareness programs through Safety department
(recently: 2500 operators in Sicher 11)
Event SICHER 11 Schau hin: Sichere

Anlagen! (Watch, safe plants !) For plant operators,
Ludwigshafen
n Part 1: Experimental presentation on fire and explosion hazards
n Part 2: 6 information boots on focus topics where operators can
influence process safety in their plant (derived from incident statistics)
l ELEKTROSTATICS
l ALARMMANAGEMENT
l PRODUCT RELEASES
l OPERATING ERRORS
l STARTUP and SHUTDOWN in CONTINUOUS PLANTS
l RUNAWAY REACTIONS
n Participation of 2400 operators in 14 events
l Very positive feedback
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t o
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Event Sicher 11 targeted at Operator awareness

examples of 2 topics
n Runaway Reaction:
l Animation
n Bleve Explosions:
270 m
l Foto of
exploding tankcar
l Experiment
Cigarette lighter
11
Sicher 11: Schau hin Sichere Anlagen
Goal
What will be different

in one year (or in two)
regarding the Safety culture
in the plants?
What are the indicators
for changing Safety
culture in the plants ?
P r o c e s s
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12
E u r o p e a n
158
S t r e n g t h
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t o
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Challenges
for further process safety improvements
n Achieving consistency throughout the organisation
l Regional cultures; variations between sites, departments
Openness to learn from errors differs widely between countries,
companies, and even different plants within same company
l Acquisitions
n Developping and maintaining competence of workforce
l Demographics
l Acquisitions
l Organisational change
Productivity driven reorganizations of manufacturing, maintenance,
expert services
13
Lack of competence plays a role in historical

large incidents
n Oppau 1921, BASF: Ammonium Nitrate explosion
l > 1000 t Ammonium Nitrate exploded
l Lack of understanding product properties,
consequences of a process change
l Large offsite impact, 1 km Radius of destruction
l 560 Fatalities
n Bhopal 1984, UC: Methyl-Isocyanat release
l 30 tons of MIC released (highly toxic gas)
l Operator Mistake, (Sabotage ?)
l Leadership failure
l Large offsite impact, 3 km Radius
l 2500 Fatalities, 300 000 injured
P r o c e s s
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14
E u r o p e a n
159
S t r e n g t h
d e g r a d i n g
t o
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Examples of incidents, last decade

n Toulouse 2001, AZF: Ammonium Nitrate explosion
l 300 t Ammonium Nitrate exploded
l Lack of understanding of product properties
l offsite impact; 0,5 km Radius of destruction
l 30 Fatalities
l Similarities to 1921 BASF accident;
n US, Texas City 2005, BP: Refinery explosion

l Explosion after liquid release from flare
l Startup, Management of change,
Safety Management system
l 16 Fatalities; 2 Billion $ damage
15
Competence impacts plant design
Process Safety
Competence
Secondary
Safety
Measures
Protective
Devices
Process control
impact
controls, procedures, training
Equipment and Materials

Facility Siting
For minimzed exploion impact, toxic impact
Process design
Risk minimization: holdup, pressure, temperature
Chemistry
Risk minimization: chemicals and reactions
P r o c e s s
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C o m p e t e n c e
16
E u r o p e a n
160
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d e g r a d i n g
t o
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Globalisation is a challenge for development

of Competence
Welds
Process design
Automation
Small company in Asia
BASF
17
Competence is the basis of superior solutions
n Secondary
Containment,
T+ Material
l All equipment
with T+ material
in containment
l Defined airflow,
10 air changes/hr,
offgas to destruct
system,
l Resists100 mbar
blastwave
P r o c e s s
S a f e t y
C o m p e t e n c e
18
E u r o p e a n
161
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d e g r a d i n g
t o
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Good guidelines require Competence

Responsible Care
Management
System
BASF Group
Directives
Requirements
Successful
Practices
19
Significance of process safety for the

chemical industry today
n High awareness from the operator to the board and Management
commitment to plant safety. Safety gets top priority, ahead of throughput
n Competence in Process safety leads to
less incidents, and avoided costs from incidents
n Competence in Process safety (PS) contributes to
reliability and on-stream time of plants, with an
associated economic payback
n Improved PS has positive effect on public image of chemical industry
n Being in control of PS is a necessary condition
Stock value
1 mth after inc.
of company sustainability (Union Carbide !),
BP 2010
- 40 %
and a must for a high stock valuation (BP !)
BP 2005
- 10 %
High Process Safety Competence is an asset for a chemical company

P r o c e s s
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20
E u r o p e a n
162
S t r e n g t h
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t o
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Herman Van Roost
After 30 years of automation, the process industry has reached unprecedented levels of sophistication and intelligent control.
A lot of effort was successfully spent to enhance the reliability of both process and control equipment.
During the same period, the role of human intervention with the process has changed from production support activities towards abnormal situation management. To that extent, it is today realized that the residual need for human presence in our
plants is fundamentally driven by Process Safety, to cope with situations which are not foreseen by the automated system.
This changed role of the human operator s and technicians is so crucial and irreplaceable that it requires a highly reliable
performance of them. Faced with this new requirement, todays operational management is challenged by the question how
to maximize their peoples positive impact on the process rather than minimize their disturbance. The managements limited
success is visible through a continuing series of Process Safety incidents which become a threat for the very acceptance of
the process industry in the modern world.
Other industries like the nuclear and aviation industry have been in the same situation many years ago . They found effective
improvement recipes in the field of Human Factors, which describes the capabilities of the human machine. Many Human
Factors applications and solutions in these industries are readily available for simple translation to the process industry.
Doing so, it is striking how the modern subject of Human Factors appears to re-introduce the old concept of Rule Based
Management, and confirms on scientific basis the overwhelming importance of management and supervision in order to be
successful in achieving Process Safety.
P r o c e s s
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Process Safety
through Operational Management
Herman.van-roost@total.com
8th Annual Congress of Chemical Engineering, Berlin, September 29 th , 2011
TOTAL : hundreds of high risk installations worldwide

168 sites
84 terminals
68 sites
25 terminals
28 sites
4 terminals
34 sites
11 terminals
151 sites
82 terminals
Chemicals UPSTREAM
(75)
70
5 sites
16 terminals
450 operated sites,

222 terminals,
23 000 km pipelines
DOWNSTREAM
(309)
P r o c e s s
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C o m p e t e n c e
E u r o p e a n
164
S t r e n g t h
d e g r a d i n g
t o
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For all : Safety first = also survival first

(the duty of every business)
8th Annual Congress of Chemical Engineering, Berlin, September 29th , 2011
Incident Investigation : huge effort at Total

All new incidents have already happened before
Central effort to extract the full learning potential of every
incident : REX = Return of EXperience from sites are
challenged, translated and distributed to all sites.
Opportunity for the involved site to transform their problem
into something positive for Total Petrochemicals.
Strong focus on High Potential (HIPOs) : often Process Safety
But how effective are we ?
P r o c e s s
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C o m p e t e n c e
E u r o p e a n
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S t r e n g t h
d e g r a d i n g
t o
W e a k n e s s ?
Why didnt we see these coming ?

LPG derailment by push & pull without
break connection between 2 locomotives
Collapse of new storm basin during first

test, damage to hydrogen line with leak
Unadapted tractor for heavy load on unbreaked

wagon, almost damage to hydrocarbon pipes
Why wasnt this prevented ?
5 ton benzene spill by rupture of bellow

after visual misalignment (15mm)
Crane without support shoe on unstable
ground : disaster just avoided
Worker died while moving persons lift from

cabin using cabin arm as counterweight
6
P r o c e s s
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E u r o p e a n
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S t r e n g t h
d e g r a d i n g
t o
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Do we continue mastering the

basics of our profession ?
500 kg propylene cloud during 1 hour
after contractor removed valve on
reactor body under pressure
2 operators died and 6

got burnt by explosion
of superheater during
startup
2 workers wounded by explosion of sulphuric acid

tank in which hydrogen had formed by adding water
Common findings
as produced by actual Incident Investigation system
Root causes for human error :

Lack of Competency
Procedure not followed
Procedure incomplete
Which people ?
Contractors
Maintenance technicians
Operators
P r o c e s s
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167
S t r e n g t h
d e g r a d i n g
t o
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Could we be mislead by our Incident Investigation?

Incident
CURRENT
INFLUENCES
External
standards
Company
culture
Incident
reporters
Analysis framework
/ root cause
segmentation
Relevant ?
Objective ?
Outcome =
everything what our current industry
/ company culture anticipates as
being the problem
9
= Critical element :
Filter producing
standardized
information for
management use
Conclusions
for learning
process
Abnormal situation Management Consortiums detailed 2008 survey

on public and shared member incidents revealed a key insight :
10
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ASM Consortium deep dive on communication

and coordination failures
14 selected incidents
207 failures
80% = 5 failure modes
11
Deep dive insight
12
P r o c e s s
S a f e t y
C o m p e t e n c e
Who is in charge of this ?
E u r o p e a n
169
S t r e n g t h
d e g r a d i n g
t o
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Incident Investigation Paradox

1.
Up to 80% of all incidents are related to human error
Up to 80% of all human error is related to organizational matters
2.
Up to 80% of all incidents are related to workers behavior
Workers behavior is overwhelmingly influenced by their management
So :
Why are organizational / managerial matters not the primary criterion of
the incident investigation ?
13
Management emphasis on Human Error approach

in the Aviation Industry
Managerial
defense
barriers
(Resources, tools,
equipment, )
Human error,
Cockpit
failures
Only possible after

breaking through
managerial defence barriers
Figure from Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001
14
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The Operational Management as Defense Barrier

High level mission :
Conduct the operations at a high standard of excellence
(total safety and effectiveness)
All accidents can be prevented by ensuring
ORGAN.
That every hazard is identified
That effective organizations (rules) are in place against everySUPERV.
COND.
hazard
That the rules are effectively implemented
That all conditions are adapted to the work requirements
Also human error ?
Human
error
YES
How about risk and probability considerations ?
15
Accident
Message : Operational Management = Rule Based !
Effective
Rules
B
D
Hazard
Organize
Analysis
Upstream
16
Supervise
Execute &
Comply
Operational Management
P r o c e s s
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171
S t r e n g t h
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t o
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Without good rules and compliance :
stuck in the matrix
A
E
be aware
17
Operational decisions require guidance with rules, not just risk

considerations and awareness
Should I wear a hard hat on a production site, to reduce the risk of
being injured by falling objects, or not?
Is it too hot to work in the normal way, or not?
Am I too fatigued to fly this aircraft, or not?
Should I stop a process now because of the risks involved, or not?
Effectiveness of Managerial Defense Barriers as

relevant segmentation for incident investigation
Risk
covered
?
Hazard
leading to
incident or
near-miss
Effective
rule in
place ?
N
35%
A1 :
outside
attention of
management
Rule
effectively
imposed ?
5%
25%
B:
absence of
effective rule
(no consensus,
stuck with risk
consideration)
A2 :
not identified
despite mgt.
attention
25%
C:
Supervision
failure
10%
D:
Conditions
not adapted
to work
Advantage : categories identify clearly the corrective action to be taken, by the

resource which has the single most direct impact : the operational management
18
P r o c e s s
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S t r e n g t h
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t o
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Observed recent tendencies undermining the

excellence of the human manager
Effect of outsourcing and lump sum contracting
Considered not core for the company : human (managerial) reaction = focus on other
aspects which have hierarchy attention
Contractual result = prescribed : human reaction not my problem any more (mgt.
failure cat. A1)
After a while : we are not competent for this, we have no professional experience
Risk and probability considerations in operations :

Message to the young manager = whatever you do, these (the matrix) are the
probabilities that incidents happen in your area and everyone knows it and agrees
Degradation of good rules by add-on in order to move at lower risk position in matrix
Human reaction : despite the 10-4 it happened in my duty : just bad luck
Audits focused on administrative management systems

Instead of detecting field weakness to trace underlying management problem
General score system leading to congratulations may stop the learning and reduce the
essential sense of vulnerability
19
Organisations competency evolution

1950
1980
hired
+
+
New
concept
New
concept
New
concept
retired
+
+
2000
2010
New
concept
New
concept
New
concept
Detailed procedures
Continuous learning
Contractors
Risk matrix
SMS
Bow-tie
BBS
Safety culture
Human Factors
Fundamental
organizational
principles ? Never
heard about them
retired
+
20
8th
Mtce vs. prod. perimeter

Permit vs. execution
Signature commitment
Single line of command
Written instructions
TAG numbering
Nothing w/o work order
Supervision
Perimeter of accountability
Training :
Fundamental
Organizational
Principles
for Process
Industry
+
Murphy !
Annual Congress of Chemical Engineering, Berlin, September 29th , 2011
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What are good rules for the Process Industy ?

Simple to understand
Universally applicable
Focused on avoiding human error : Organizational Layers of Protection

Not necessarily the most efficient way to do things, but their universal
application generates overall predictability of the complex reality and
overall efficiency
Cfr. Airplane landing
Specifically reinforcing Process Safety (the heart of our profession)
Organizational layers of protection : not just any rule, but part of a

constitution for the process industry to which all procedures,
organizations and work methods should comply
21
Conclusions
Operational managers are HUMANS too !
Not immune to human errors
Subject to Human Factors
Needing guidance and clear expectations framework to perform well
Their impact is huge : probably most important improvement tool
Much more direct than show commitment
Should not be placed in the role of observers of their department
Operational Management performance vs. high expectation standard
should be part of any Incident Investigation
Modern concepts like BBS, risk matrix etc.

do NOT replace good organization and RULES
but come on top of it
22
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Attachment
Organizational FUNDAMENTALS
For the Process Industry
23 - Reference,
date,
place of Chemical Engineering, Berlin, September 29th , 2011
8th Annual
Congress
1. Leadership, organisation and accountability

Strict role separation : Operations vs. Maintenance / Construction
Each has its own accountability perimeter and demonstrates ownership behaviour
Formal interaction and hand-over between all perimeters
Each equipment is, at any moment, either in Operations or in Maintenance /
Construction perimeter
Operations = overall coordinator

Strong ownership behaviour required, both day and shift organisation
Keeps overall view on perimeters (which equipment or zone is owned by whom),
their coherence and compatibility with evolving process or operations status
Access and occupancy control on operations perimeter
Requires to be informed of any event with potential impact on the process even
without being the initiator (e.g. electrical operations or tests, )
Clear line of command within each accountability perimeter
24
No confusion who gives which orders

No contradictions
Domino system towards plant / site manager
Contractors : report / belong to 1 single functional accountability perimeter
P r o c e s s
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2. Safe work procedures and work permits

Single set of coherent procedures and instructions
All non-routine work () is based on safe work procedure and permit
Permit = second person implication + analysis + prevention + personal authorisation
Single scope and planning definition ; change requires new permit

Authorisation : independent from work execution ; proper level
Signed paper = 1) necessary gate to work and 2) for traceability, to support process quality
Special Works requiring special permit

Installation not de-energised
Hot work confined space entry roof access elevated work line opening
Hot tapping excavations vehicles in process areas use of heavy construction equipment
Fire system impairment relief valve isolation interlock bypassing electrical test / switch /
maintenance potentially causing interruption
Use of ionizing radiation (effect on instruments)
Standard process in place to authorize any deviation from existing procedure

Objective to realise equivalent safety level
Incl. procedure review and start of change process, prior to deviation
() including 1st line maintenance (small works by operators)

25
3. Safe work practices

All non-routine work () is formally initiated, approved and registered
Mentioning equipment TAG nr.

Proper description of required work
Golden rule of first choice : installation de-energised
Visual physical separation criterion

Complementary protective measures : first common, then personal
Written justification if Golden Rule not applied
Special Works require special coordination (operations - maintenance)
Could be common supervision, standby, open communication line, hierarchy attention,

See list on previous page
Changes to the work plan require new authorisation
Any relevant deviation from defined work description
equipment TAG area timing method resources
Individual signature = personal commitment
In interaction between operations electrical maintenance construction

Within each functions accountability perimeter
Paperwork is complete before work execution

Work execution follows strictly the permit prescriptions
Both common and personal protection measures
() including 1st line maintenance (small works by operators)

26
8th
Annual Congress of Chemical Engineering, Berlin, September 29th , 2011
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4. Proper plant and equipment status

Each equipment is in a well defined accountability perimeter
Operations Maintenance / Construction
Coherent with available paperwork
Accountability perimeters in the field are indicated and

respected
Working area indication
Energy status of equipment
Field equipment is properly TAG numbered

Coherent with up-to-date plans and registers ; no confusion possible
Good housekeeping
Clean and organised working areas
People and materials logistics
Proper lighting
27
5. Proper operational communications

Proper shift transfer
Each new shift is fully aware of the actual situation before it becomes in charge
(and writes permits, initiates operations, )
Function per function
Proper coordination with operational day organisation
Daily instructions are clear, followed and result reported back

Written instructions, written feedback
No confusion between orders and information
Effective communication between operators
Oral : two-way communication

Briefing debriefing
Permanent coherence between field and control room
Registers, logbooks,
Proper and frequent operator tours
Effective inter-team (and inter-unit) communication
28
Two-way communication
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6. Operations discipline and capability
Operations are conducted within formally defined safe operating limits
Defined Process Operating Window : for all critical parameters

Process position is tracked and information is known
Complex operations are conducted with adapted formalism and preparation
Formal initiation, operator assignment, status tracking, singing-off checklists

Verify initial stable status before start of procedural operation
Operations support tools are effectively used
E.g. critical procedures are at hand during operation

Critical checklists are signed off after each step
Operators are aware of the field / process situation
Information is correct, complete, smart, readily available and effectively used

Diagnoses are correct
Any recent changes are known, trained, documented
Operations are within the operation teams capability
Adequate resources are available

People are trained, concentrated, prepared, fit for duty (permit to operate)
Tools and environment are 100% adapted to the task, functioning and in good shape
Plant design and layout allows proper operability
Operator performance assurance

29
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Training of engineers in safety and risk management: the OECD experience
Mark Hailwood
Chair OECD Working Group on Chemical Accidents
LUBW State Institute for Environment, Monitoring and Nature Conservation Baden-Wrttemberg
Karlsruhe, Germany
The training of engineers in risk assessment and risk management was the subject of an OECD Workshop organised under
the auspices of the OECD Working Group on Chemical Accidents in Montreal, Canada in 2003. The conclusions and recommendations from this workshop consider the professional responsibility to society, as well as to themselves, their employers,
their colleagues and other stakeholders, which is exercised by engineers. In fulfilling this responsibility safety and risk management considerations should be integrated into every aspect of engineers work. Safety should not be considered as an add-on
activity, nor should it be considered to be the sole domain of safety specialists.
It is recognised that engineers have different roles within organisations and enterprises. These may range from design, development and production activities to advisory, inspection and management roles. Engineers also work within government
authorities, as consultants or within other safety related organisations such as third-party inspectors, insurance companies
or training organisations. Thus safety relate activities of engineers are very often inter-disciplinary in nature and may diverge
substantially from initial academic qualifications. In addition their work may require interaction with professionals from other
fields such as legal, health, psychology, economics, etc.
The workshop recognised the need for continuous development through training, with the initial academic qualification being
an initial phase within the professional career of an engineer. In a number of countries the professional status is recognised
through professional organisations which accredit qualifications and monitor continuing professional development (CPD). In
addition some countries require professional recognition as a precondition to being able to practice as an engineer.
The OECD Workshop took place over eight years ago, and even then it was clear that a range of challenges in relation to the
education and professional development of engineers in the field of safety and risk management lay ahead. Amongst these
are the continued threats of closure to academic chemical engineering departments and the retirement of professors over the
years from within the field of process safety.
This presentation concludes with a few personal thoughts on potential future developments and challenges for process safety
in an ever increasingly diverse world.
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Training of engineers in safety and risk

management: the OECD experience
Mark Hailwood
Chair, OECD Working Group on Chemical Accidents
Referat 31 Immissionsschutz, Umwelttechnologie
OECD
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Slide 2
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Motivation
The OECD Guiding Principles for Chemical Accident

Prevention Preparedness and Response (2nd Ed. 2003,
Addendum 2011) describe fundamental aspects which have
been developed in consensus.
The OECD Chemical Accident Programme considers all
aspects of chemical accident prevention, preparedness and
response the engineers responsible for risk management
are an important part of this process.
In 2003 needs for improved training in safety and risk
management were identified 8 years later the needs remain,
however the conditions and constraints have shifted.
Slide 3
OECD Workshop on Sharing Experience in the

Training of Engineers In Risk Management,
Montreal, Canada, 21 - 24 October 2003
ethical and legal aspects related to risk management;

risk communication;
multi-disciplinary approach to risk management;
training examples including harmonisation/accreditation of
training courses;
training of engineers working in industry and working as public
authorities. Inspectors;
research and development in risk management.
Slide 4
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t o
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OECD Workshop on Sharing Experience in the

Training of Engineers In Risk Management,
Montreal, Canada, 21 - 24 October 2003
Report published in 2004
OECD Environment, Health and Safety Publications

Series on Chemical Accidents, No. 13
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=ENV/JM/MONO(2004)
4&docLanguage=En
Slide 5
General Workshop Conclusions - selected
Engineers have a professional responsibility to society, as well

as to themselves, their employers, their colleagues, and other
stakeholders, to take appropriate account of the potential for
their work to create, increase or decrease risks to human
health, environment, and property.
Safety/risk considerations should be integrated into the core of

every engineer's activities and not be considered an add-on
activity. Nor should safety be considered a concern only of
safety specialists.
It was recognised that engineers may have different roles

within organisations/enterprises
Slide 6
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General Workshop Conclusions selected (2)
Senior managers, designers, operators, maintenance and

support personnel, and others should have an appropriate
understanding of hazards and risks, as well as an
understanding of the relevant aspects of risk management
needed to carry out their roles and responsibilities with
respect to safety.
Engineers have a duty to identify safety issues and to provide

leadership with respect to safety issues to others in their
organisations and to their communities in general.
Slide 7
General Workshop Conclusions selected (3)
As part of their training, engineers should be taught the skills

necessary to persuade others to take into account, as
appropriate, health, safety and environmental issues.
It is important for engineers to be aware of the limits of their

own knowledge and to seek ways of acquiring additional
information.
Because of the multidisciplinary nature of risk assessment and

risk management, training activities should take this into
account and integrate, to the extent practical, qualified and
informed professionals from various engineering specialties
and other sectors.
Slide 8
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Training related conclusions selected

It was suggested that most engineers working today had little
or no exposure to the concepts of risk assessment and
management during their undergraduate training and that
further efforts are needed to address this.
General consensus that the training of all engineers should, at
a minimum, include concepts of risk and risk management,
while recognising that specific training programmes should
take into account the different educational systems in different
countries/localities.
The Workshop recommended university courses related to
risk management involve students from all engineering
specialties. It was noted that chemical engineering courses
have generally made greater strides than other engineering
courses in incorporating practical training related to risk
management into their overall programme.
Slide 9
Training related conclusions selected (2)

Participants suggested that training in risk management
should not be limited to engineers but should also be available
for business managers as well as for other professionals such
as lawyers, economists, chemists, biologists, etc.
It was recognised that programmes and methods for training
of engineers have been expanding and evolving in light of the
diversity of risks in a modern society and consequent
increased demand. Such risks involve, for example,
genetically modified organisms, terrorism, computer security,
pandemics, as well as risks in the nuclear, chemical and
transport fields.
Slide 10
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Training related conclusions selected (3)

The Workshop also noted that concepts of safety and risk,
including risk assessment and management, should be
introduced to all students in schools and universities (in
addition to specialised engineering courses) in order to
develop a safety culture in society generally.
While universities and training programmes can provide a
good grounding for engineers, it remains necessary for
employers to provide additional training.
Participants suggested that professional associations (e.g.,
engineering societies) should support the continuing training
of practicing engineers in the area of risk management.
Concern was raised about how to maintain and expand
interest in risk management programmes, particularly with the
resource limitations being faced by industry and universities.
Slide 11
Eight years on a personal view

The first graduates from the Bachelor / Master programmes in
Germany are now entering the workforce following the
restructuring of university courses due to the Bologna
Process.
Hazard Identification and Risk Management do not appear to

have been integrated into these courses generally; neither as
compulsory nor as optional elements.
There is a need to recognise that safety entails more than
designing to accepted standards.
The general publics view of engineers and engineering is that

the subject is difficult, and that the financial rewards do not
match the effort required.
Slide 12
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Eight years on a personal view (2)

Within the public authorities, partly due to financial cuts:
there is an ageing workforce;

those who retire are often not replaced;
specialists, e.g. in process safety, are not encouraged;
continual training in process safety / risk management is limited
by available resources.
There are concerns that more and more decisions are being
made by lawyers, administrators, economists and politicians,
and that the views of the engineering profession are
insufficiently sought and often ignored.
Engineers need to improve their communication (generally

and in risk related issues) with all sectors of society.
Slide 13
Eight years on a personal view (3)

Without (process) engineers with training and understanding
in safety and risk management, both in industry and public
authorities, we run the risk of having industrial sites:
Which are inappropriately designed,

Which are not adequately maintained,
Which are not properly licensed, and regularly overseen and
inspected by the authorities,
In which accidents occur, that could be avoided and which will
not be adequately investigated in the event.
There needs to be a professional approach to furthering the

needs of industry, authorities and society as a whole.
Slide 14
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EPSC Award 2011
The European Process Safety Centre (EPSC) is a company member network dedicated to the development and promotion of
best practice in process safety. The Centre is hosted by IChemE and was established by EFCE in 1992.
Each year EPSC acknowledges progress to a less hazardous Europe with the presentation of an EPSC Award to either an
individual or team. The contribution may be in the form of a project, report, published paper, conference paper or book which,
in the consideration of the EPSC Award panel, has considerably advanced the theory or practice of process safety.
The call for the EPSC Award 2011 puts a focus on achievements related to process safety competence, not excluding work
which has general relevance to process safety. For the 2011 award, EPSC has chosen to recognise the work of Dr. Martin Glor
in the field of electrostatic interaction between fluids and pipes. The study of charge accumulation in flammable liquids is well
known to be a crucial issue in safe transport and storage of these materials. Martin Glors work has extended knowledge on
safe transfer of fluids, allowing experimentally validated safe limits to be set for aspects of handling non-hydrocarbon fluids,
such as limits on flow speeds through pipes. Dr. Glor has a long history of safety research throughout his career, with a focus
on electrostatics and explosives, has headed projects for many groups including Ciba-Geigy AG and the Swiss Institute for the
Promotion of Safety & Security. He is currently senior expert and CEO of a process safety consulting firm.
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Lee Allford
is a chartered chemical engineer who joined the European Process Safety Centre (EPSC) in 2000
as Operations Manager in the development and promotion of best practice in process safety
across Europe. He has supported numerous EPSC working groups on process safety topics,
written & edited member reports, and given papers and presentations at international meetings
and conferences. He is currently a member of the editorial panel of the IChemE publication Loss
Prevention Bulletin (LPB). Prior to EPSC he worked for RTZ Chemicals, Diageo & Vivendi in line
management and site based staff roles including that of process improvement, quality management and asset maintenance.
Peter Dehnbostel
is professor emeritus of vocational and work pedagogy from the Helmut-Schmidt-University,

Hamburg, currently teaching at a number of other universities and involved in different projects.
After an apprenticeship, he studied mathematics and social sciences at the Free University Berlin
with graduation in mathematics, followed by doctorate and habilitation at the Technical University
of Berlin in the field of vocational education. Today Peter Dehnbostel has over 35 years of experience in teaching in the tertiary sector and in the field of vocational training and also in research,
innovation, development and quality assurance mostly in the sector of vocational education,
further education and organisational development.
Paul Delanoy
worked for about 10 years as an Industrial Chemist, initially at British Sugar Plc and later with the
Dow Chemical Company where he still works today. In 1993 he moved to a role as a Production Engineer. Subsequently, he added units from a Chemical Engineering Degree to his existing
Chemistry degree and completed the Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE) Design Project
(for which he was awarded the IChemE MacNab medal) in order to make this equivalent to a
Chemical Engineering Degree and qualify as a Member of the IChemE. At the end of 2003, after
about 10 years experience in various Chemical Engineering roles, Paul moved into Process Safety
as a Process Safety Technology Leader. This role has evolved with time and Paul currently works
as a full time Subject Matter Expert specializing in Human Factors and Process Risk Assessment.
Paul is involved in several projects for the European Process Safety Centre (EPSC) and is a member of the EPSC Management Board.
Michael Drscher
is the current president of the German Chemical Society (GDCH). His academic career started at
Mainz University where he studied chemistry and got 1975 the doctor degree in physical chemistry. He habilitated 1981 at the University of Freiburg in macromolecular chemistry and became
supernumerary professor at the University of Mnster in 1988. In 1982 Michael Drscher entered
Hls AG, Marl, which later merged in Degussa-Hls AG and finally became Evonik. His final position at Evonik was Vice President Innovation Management Chemicals.
Ursula Fischbach
is member of the Industry/Seveso working group of the European Environmental Bureau (EEB)
and the environmental organization BUND (Friends of the Earth Germany). She graduated 1973
in physical chemistry at the Goethe University in Frankfurt on the Main, received her doctor degree in 1977 at the Technical University of Darmstadt, and continued scientific research in climate
and CO2 modeling. Presently her main activities are related to labor and environmental protection. Ursula Fischbach represents BUND in the Commission on Process Safety at the German
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety.
Andreas Frster
works for DECHEMA since 1997. He is currently the head of two departments Research Management and Conferences and chemical engineering. Andreas Frster has a diploma in chemistry and holds a PhD in the field of Physical Chemistry, both at the University of Wrzburg. From
2006 to 2010 he was managing director of the German Bunsen Society for Physical Chemistry.
Since 2010 he is managing director of fms (Forschungsgesellschaft fr Messtechnik, Sensorik
und Medizintechnik e.V., Dresden) as well as of ProcessNet.
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Manuel R. Gomez
joined the staff of the CSB in 2004 and currently serves as the Director of Recommendations.
He has more than twenty-five years of experience in occupational and environmental health and
safety. He holds a Doctorate in Public Health from Johns Hopkins University, a Masters in Environmental Health from Hunter College of the City University of New York, and an Undergraduate
Degree in Biochemistry from Harvard College. He is a Certified Industrial Hygienist, a member
of numerous professional societies, and the author of a book and numerous scientific papers
and presentations. Manuel R.Gomez previously served as the Director of Scientific Affairs for the
American Industrial Hygiene Association. He was responsible for the societys expert technical
committees, laboratory accreditation activities, and voluntary consensus standards program.
Mark Hailwood
graduated with a degree in Applied Chemistry from the University of Salford in 1989 and was
awarded the degree of MPhil in 2000, having completed his dissertation researching the implementation of the Seveso Directive within the EU-15 states. Since 1991 he has worked for the
German State of Baden-Wrttemberg in the field of Major Accident Prevention. His role is to
advise the state Environment Ministry and State Inspectors on the application of Major Hazards
Legislation and on process safety generally. Particular fields of interest are safety management
systems, hazard identification and risk assessment, human factors and risk communication.
Mark has been involved in a wide range of international activities with the European Union (EU),
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). He
is currently the chair of the OECD Working Group on Chemical Accidents.
Niels Jensen
is currently retired, which gives him time to blog about safety on Safepark Consultancys website.
His professional career that shaped his views on process safety involved almost a decade as a
computer control engineer with Imperial Oil Limited in Canada, and two decades as an associate
professor in chemical engineering at the Department of Chemical and Biochemical Engineering
at the Technical University of Denmark. Niels Jensen has a Master of Science degree in Chemical
Engineering from DTU, where the thesis was written under the supervision of professor Sten Bay
Jrgensen, and a Ph.D. Degree also in Chemical Engineering from University of Alberta, where
the thesis was written under the supervision of professors D. Grant Fisher and Sirish L. Shah.
Christian Jochum
is Director of Centre for the European Process Safety Centre (EPSC) in Rugby/GB. He also
chairs the Commission on Process Safety, which advises the German Federal Government in
process safety issues. In 1969 Christian joined Hoechst AG, then a major international chemical and pharmaceutical corporation. After 10 years in pharmaceutical research and pilot plant
operations he joined the safety department. 1988 1997 he was Corporate Safety Director for
the international Hoechst group, including the responsibility for safety, process safety and industrial hygiene. Since 1997 Christian is working as a free-lance consultant, advising companies of
different sizes and sectors as well as governmental agencies in safety, process safety, risk and
crisis management issues. Christian holds a doctorate in chemistry and was honorary professor
at Goethe University, Frankfurt(Main). He has been awarded with the German Order of Merit for
his contributions to process safety.
Konstantinos Mitropetros has a diploma in chemical engineering from the Technical University of Athens, Greece and holds
a doctorate degree from the Technical University of Berlin, Germany. His doctorate deals with
explosion phenomena in bubbly liquids. After graduation he worked for six years at the Federal
Institute for Materials Research and Testing in Berlin as a member of a team performing experimental and theoretical research on heterogeneous explosions. In 2006 he joined DECHEMA.
Some of his current tasks are to support the ProcessNet section safety engineering and its
committees; to represent DECHEMA at organizations in the field of industrial safety, such as the
European Process Safety Centre; and to be responsible for the scientific program on industrial
safety and security of the worldwide largest exhibition for the process industry ACHEMA.
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Louisa A. Nara
is the Technical Director of the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) for the American
Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE). Louisa Nara came to AIChE/CCPS after 15 years with
Bayer where she held positions of increasing responsibility including: Manager Process Safety
and Crisis Management; Director of HSE, Security and Emergency Response at Bayers largest
US Manufacturing site; and, Director, Risk Management and Compliance, NAFTA. Prior to joining Bayer, she also gained significant experience in process safety, engineering, and HSE with
Diamond Shamrock, PQ Corporation, and in private consulting. Her roles and responsibilities
within CCPS include: overseeing the execution of projects in the CCPS technical portfolio; developing and enhancing CCPSs educational offerings; developing and deploying new tools; and,
enhancing value for corporate sponsors. Louisa Nara holds a Bachelor of Science in Chemical
Engineering from West Virginia University, a Master of Science in Environmental Engineering from
Villanova University and is a Certified Compliance and Ethics Professional (CCEP).
Hans J. Pasman
is member of the Dutch Council of Hazardous Substances, Research Professor at Mary Kay
OConnor Process Safety Center of the Department of Chemical Engineering of Texas A&M University and Emeritus Professor Chemical Risk Management of the Delft University of Technology
in the Netherlands. Graduated in chemical technology at Delft University of Technology in 1961,
with Ph.D. in 1964 while employed by Shell, joined the Dutch organisation for Applied Research,
TNO, for research in reactive materials, explosions, investigation of industrial accidents and risk
analysis. He was chairman of the International Group on Unstable Substances for 10 years, the
European Study Group on Risk Analysis (1980-1985), a NATO Group on Explosives, and the
Working Party on Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries (1986-2004)
and in this latter capacity in 1992 co-founder of the European Process Safety Centre.
Norbert Pfeil
is chairman of ProcessNets Safety Engineering Section. He graduated in chemistry in 1972 at

the Technical University Berlin, got his doctoral degree in 1978 and worked since then with BAM
Federal Institute for Materials Research and Testing. After more than 10 years in the field of pyrotechnics his responsibilities enlarged on the one hand to reactive materials in general and on the
other hand to all regulatory areas relevant to dangerous substances and goods. Since 2003 he
is member of BAMs directorial board with new responsibilities shifted to general management
tasks.
Martin J. Pitt
has degrees from the Universities of Aston and Loughborough and has a long-standing interest in chemical and chemical engineering safety. He currently teaches design and safety at the
University of Sheffield, UK. He also gives lectures on industrial short courses and MSc modules.
His experience includes being Safety Training Organizer for J. T. Baker Chemicals Ltd, project
chemical engineering and being manager of a chemical plant as well as his academic career.
He was for many years the only academic on the Committee of the Safety and Loss Prevention
Subject Group of the Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE), running the website and organizing meetings, including those for other academics on teaching safety. He is on the organizing
committee of the successful Hazards series of conferences. He is a long-standing member of
the Committee of the Safety and Loss Prevention Subject Group of the Institution of Chemical
Engineers, and is currently Chairman of the EFCE Working Party on Education. Since 1990 he is
assistant editor of Brethericks Handbook of Reactive Chemical Hazards.
Eddy De Rademaeker
is Managing Director of Prevention Management International and Chairman of the Working Party
on Loss Prevention in the Process Industries of EFCE. He holds a Diploma of Civil Chemical
Engineering, from the State University Ghent and a Diploma in Safety Engineering/Management
from the University of Antwerp. He has over thirty years of practical experience in safety management and is a certified Lead Auditor OHSAS 18001, and regularly acts as an expert witness for
different courts in Belgium. He formerly held engineering and safety positions in the chemical and
engineering industry and was Director Safety Services for the group of companies of Janssen
Pharmaceutica N.V. (Johnson & Johnson).

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Herman Van Roost
studied at the University of Leuven (KUL) and holds a Civil Engineering degree in Electro Mechanics and Energy Conversion. From 1980 to 1996 he worked in the Antwerp petrochemical
industry for Exxon Chemical and Fina, in several engineering and maintenance functions, and as
Maintenance Manager and Plant Manager. Between 1996 and 2006 he occupied several business management positions within Petrofina and its successor company Total Petrochemicals.
In 2007 Herman Van Roost returned to the industrial branch of Total Petrochemicals as General
Manager of the corporate project Industrial Organisation and Competencies, and from 2010
he headed a strategic project on reshuffling the governance of the groups Antwerp site. Since
2012, he is in charge of new business development in the Middle East and North African region
for Total Refining and Chemicals.
Peter G. Schmelzer
holds a doctorate on chemical engineering from the University of Dortmund (1987). Today he is
working for the Bayer Group. He has extensive professional experience as Plant and Process
Engineer at many Bayer locations. During the last twelve years he has being intensively focusing
on process and plant safety. His current field of responsibilities includes Health, Safety and Environmental Protection for the Bayer whole Subgroup HealthCare. He also leads the Bayer Group
Community on Global Process and Plant Safety. He is an active member, mostly as chairman,
of many high level committees both within the Bayer Group (e.g. he is chair of the Process and
Plant Safety Committee and community) as well as within several industrial associations and
other NGOs like the VCI (Chair of the Process and Plant Safety committee), CEFIC (Chair of the
Issue Team Process and Plant Safety committee), EPSC (member of the Steering Committee),
EFCE (member of the working party Loss Prevention) and ProcessNet (Chair of the working
group Lessons Learned). Peter is also deputy chair of the well known Major Hazard Commission of the German federal environment ministry (BMU).
Jrgen Schmidt
worked with BASF since 1993, after six years at Hoechst AG. His experiences are in developing
safety concepts, consultancy of plant managers and performing research especially in the fields
of model-based safety related process control systems, condensation of heavy volatile components in natural gases and the design and sizing of safety devices. Jrgen Schmidt studied
process engineering at the Ruhr-University Bochum with a focus on thermal and fluid engineering, wrote his master thesis at the Texas A&M University and made his doctorate dealing with
two-phase flows in pipes during his work at Hoechst AG. Since 2002 he lecture process and
plant safety and is honorary professor at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. Within ProcessNets Safety Engineering Section he is member of the steering committee, chairs the working
party Safe Desing of Chemical Plants and is currently involved in elaborating process and plant
safety curricula for relevant bachelor and master degrees. His international activities are in the
standardization of sizing safety valves and in the European DIERS User Group.
Hans V. Schwarz
is since 2010 as VP Process Safety the head of process safety globally for the BASF group
(BASF SE, Ludwigshafen). His previous positions within BASF, which he joined in 1986, have
been 2003 2010 BASF Polyurethanes (Brussels), first as Director Polyol Technology, later as
Project Director supply chain optimization (project Polyplex); 1999 2003 BASF Corporation
(Baton Rouge, USA) head of investment project for new TDI plant; 1994 1999 BASF Polyurethanes (Brussels) global technology management for TDI, MDI; 1991 1994 BASF Corporation
(Baton Rouge, USA) Manager Technology & Production Isocyanates; 1986 1991 BASF AG
(Ludwigshafen) manager process R&D and later plant manager high pressure pilot plant of the
Ammonia Laboratory. Hans holds a diploma in chemistry and a PhD in physical chemistry from
the University of Heidelberg, Germany.
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Jan Slijpen
started his career in the industry sector as a Safety and Environmental Engineer for DSM. He initially graduated as a Chemical Engineer and studied Risk Management and Occupational Safety
and Health. Today he is a highly experienced expert in the public sector for the areas Process
Safety, Risk Management and Occupational Safety and Health. In the past 30 years he has been
working for the Dutch Labour Inspectorate at several positions. His professional experience in
the afore-mentioned areas includes working for the European Commission in several Central and
Eastern Europe countries and for a number of UN organizations, like for the ILO in India. Since
2003 he is Head of a Major Hazards Control Inspection Team for the Dutch Inspectorate of Social Affairs and Employment at the Central Government. He continues to deliver training on Risk
Management and Process Safety in a number of countries.
Jrg Steinbach
is the current president of the Technical University (TU) Berlin, the university where his academic
career started in 1975 with studies in chemistry, completed in 1985 with a doctorate on the
safety of indirectly cooled semi-batch reactors. He then joined Schering AG advancing 1992 to
the head of the plant safety section. In 1994 he habilitated in chemical engineering. 1996 he went
back to TU Berlin as professor for plant and safety technology. To name a few of Jrg Steinbachs
avocational activities: he is member of AIChE, the American Institute of Chemical Engineers,
during many years he was member of the Technical Committee on Plant Safety at the German
Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety, from 2007 to 2009 he was
president of the European Society for Engineering Education (SEFI), and currently he is chairman
of AVI, an association for the accreditation of engineering curricula.
Gerd Uhlmann
is head of the Training Center Maikammer of BG RCI, the statutory industrial injuries insurance
for raw materials and chemical industries, where both managers and staff are educated in occupational health and safety including process and plant safety issues. Gerd Uhlmann started
his tertiary education in chemistry at Clausthal University of Technology, finalizing with a doctor
degree at Heidelberg University. Before he joined the Training Center Maikammer he worked for
ten year with the former Hoechst AG.
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Process Safety Europeasn Conference

Uploaded by

Process Safety Europeasn Conference

Uploaded by

Process Safety

Responsible for the contents of each contribution in this book is

ISBN Nummer: 978-3-89746-130-7

Booklet on the ECCE 8s special session on process and plant safety

01. Nov. 2011

Chairman: Eddy De Rademaeker

Avoiding accidents Process Safety Competence could make the difference

Competence conceptual introduction from a pedagogic and scientific point of view

Universities teaching process and plant safety the european map

Chairman: Norbert Pfeil

Plant safety: ProcessNets curriculum recommended to universities

Safety competence key insights from a study on the Dutch situation

How to achieve high quality teaching in higher education?

Leading from the top in making process safety competence a reality

Process Safety Competence Management

The DECHEMA approach to Process and Plant Safety knowledge transfer

Promoting incident prevention decades of experience to share

Chairman: Konstantinos Mitropetros

Teaching Safety in Chemical Engineering What, How and Who?

Process and Plant Safety competence the authorities view

High Process Safety competence an asset of a chemical company

Process Safety through Operational Management

Training In Industrial Safety: The OECD-Experience

EPSC Award 2011

Panel Discussion & Wrap-Up

Avoiding accidents Process safety competence could make the difference

Avoiding accidents Process safety competence could make the difference

PROCESS SAFETY COMPETENCY COULD

Avoiding accidents Process safety competence could make the difference

CSB Cases and Safety Competence

Modeled after National Transportation Safety Board

Process Safety Management Standard (PSM, 1992) by the

Avoiding accidents Process safety competence could make the difference

To promote prevention of industrial

Incident Investigations & Safety Studies

Relies heavily on Recognized and Generally

Avoiding accidents Process safety competence could make the difference

INVESTIGATIONS & STUDIES

Avoiding accidents Process safety competence could make the difference

Avoiding accidents Process safety competence could make the difference

Safety (In)Competence Where?

Company (e.g., cost cutting, mergers/acquisitions)

Front line (e.g., equipment failures, faulty procedures,

(*Modified from Hopkins, AcciMap of Esso Gas Plant Explosion)

Avoiding accidents Process safety competence could make the difference

Avoiding accidents Process safety competence could make the difference

BP Texas Refinery Disaster

Front Line or Direct Causes (Incompetence?)

Fatigued (some with 29 consecutive 12-hour shifts); and,

BP Texas Refinery Disaster

Routine tolerance of violation of procedures.

Avoiding accidents Process safety competence could make the difference

BP Texas Refinery Disaster

Improper measurement of high risk

BP Texas Refinery Disaster

Avoiding accidents Process safety competence could make the difference

Bayer Cropscience, West Virginia

Sister plant to Bhopal

Bayer Cropscience, West Virginia

Avoiding accidents Process safety competence could make the difference

Bayer Cropscience, West Virginia

Rush to start unit

Proximity of MIC tank not fully evaluated

Regulatory and Societal causes:

Insufficient inspection resources

Avoiding accidents Process safety competence could make the difference

Reactive Chemical Explosion

Lack of knowledge of reaction & hazards

No safety oversight by French parent company

Regulatory and Societal causes:

Facility not covered by regulations (PSM & RMP)

CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS & STUDIES

Gas safety (purging and blows)

Always a Central Issue: OSHA PSM Standard

Avoiding accidents Process safety competence could make the difference

Conagra Slim Jim (food product) plant